

**DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE**  
HEADQUARTERS, 4TH BRIGADE, 4TH INFANTRY DIVISION  
COMBINED/JOINT TASK FORCE 82  
FORWARD OPERATING BASE BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN

AFZC-BCT-BJA

22 October 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 15-6 Investigation Statements of 1SG (b)(6) & CPL (b)(6) Latvian Army

1. On 21 October 2009, at FOB Bostick, Afghanistan, MG Guy Swan interviewed 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) of the Latvian Army, under Operation Mentor and Liaison Team (OMLT), NATO, regarding their actions during the attack at COP Keating on 3 October 2009. 1SG (b)(6) has been in the Latvian Army for over 13 years and he is an infantryman. CPL (b)(6) has been in the Latvian Army for over 9 years and he is an infantryman. Both 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) have deployed in combat operations before 3 October 2009. 1SG (b)(6) had been at COP Keating for about 7 weeks, while CPL (b)(6) had been at COP Keating for three days.
2. In their opinion, the Afghan National Army (ANA) lacked discipline, motivation and initiative. When 1SG (b)(6) arrived at COP Keating, his first impression of the ANA was based on his assessment of the ANA platoon commander. 1SG (b)(6) believed that the ANA platoon commander lacked leadership skills that his soldiers needed to see in a commander. Additionally, 1SG (b)(6) noted that there were 36 ANA soldiers at COP Keating on 3 October 2009. The ANA platoon commander was 1LT (b)(6).
3. On the early morning of 3 October 2009, 1SG (b)(6) was getting ready for a patrol with the ANA that SP'd at 0630 hours. 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) were living in the same building with the US Soldiers. When 1SG (b)(6) heard the first rocket propelled grenade (RPG) impact, he told CPL (b)(6) to get in battle uniform and they both ran out to the ANA compound. Once they were in the ANA compound, 1SG (b)(6) told the ANA soldiers to get their weapons and man their battle positions.
4. While running to the Tactical Operations Center (TOC), they ran into a US Soldier who asked 1SG (b)(6) if they had a sniper rifle. 1SG (b)(6) told the US Soldier that they did have a sniper rifle and they ran back to their living quarters to retrieve it. The electrical generator that provided electrical supply to the TOC was destroyed by an RPG. As they entered their living quarters, they found SPC Kevin C. THOMAS, injured with bandage wrapped around his leg, in a ready kneeling firing position. They offered to help SPC THOMAS who declined and remained in his ready kneeling fighting position. 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) went to their living space and armed themselves with a sniper rifle and grenade launcher.
5. After they armed themselves, they ran to the Aid Station. While running towards the Aid Station, they saw two US Soldiers carrying a US Soldier casualty to the Aid Station, but they could not recall who the Soldier was. When 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) got to the Aid Station, they saw ANA soldiers with weapons waiting to be treated by the medics. One ANA Soldier was on a litter while three others were waiting to be treated for minor injuries, such as scratches and cuts. 1SG (b)(6) told the ANA soldiers, who were able to fight, to return to their battle positions. As 1SG (b)(6) turned around, he saw the ANA platoon sergeant in the corner

of the waiting area in a fetal position. 1SG (b)(6) tried to get the ANA platoon sergeant to collect his soldiers, regroup, and return back to their battle positions. CPL (b)(6) was providing security at the north of the Aid Station while 1SG (b)(6) was trying to get the ANA soldiers to return to their battle positions.

6. After trying to get the ANA platoon sergeant to collect his soldiers and regroup, without success, 1SG (b)(6) saw the ANA soldiers move between the TOC and first platoon building. 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) knew several ANA and Afghan Security Guards (ASG) abandoned their fighting positions. However, they are not certain how many ANA and ASG did.

7. After trying to convince the ANA platoon sergeant to collect and regroup his soldiers to return to their battle positions, 1SG (b)(6) heard SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) trying to establish a group to push the insurgents away from the ammunition supply point (ASP). 1SG (b)(6) understood that it was important to secure the ASP, which was taking heavy fire from all directions. After realizing that his mentoring duties had no effect, and the importance of fighting for survival, 1SG (b)(6) joined SFC (b)(6), (b)(3) group to retake the ASP. At this point, CPL (b)(6) helped secure the north fighting position of the Aid Station, while 1SG (b)(6) joined the group to retake the (b)(2) High CPL (b)(6) was using his sniper rifle to locate targets and engage enemy fighters. CPL (b)(6) also gave the locations of enemy fighters to US Soldiers from his fighting position. CPL (b)(6) continued to find targets with his sniper rifle, engaged enemy fighters, and notified US Soldiers of enemy locations until quick reactionary forces (QRF) arrived from OP Fritsche.

8. While 1SG (b)(6) and SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) group secured the ASP, 1SG (b)(6) heard on the radio that enemy forces were coming from the "diving-board" area. 1SG (b)(6) ran to the dining facility (DFAC) area near the mosque. 1SG (b)(6) joined US Soldiers, who already established a secured fighting position, and engaged enemy fighters coming from the "diving-board." The enemy fighters were numerous and outnumbered 1SG (b)(6) and the US Soldiers. 1SG (b)(6) heard a radio transmission from SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) that close air support (CAS) was in the area and would engage the enemy fighters from the "diving-board." However, the CAS needed the target area to be marked to prevent friendly fire. 1SG (b)(6) told the US Soldiers to notify SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) that he would fire his grenade launcher to mark the target area. 1SG (b)(6) fired a red smoke grenade to mark the target for the CAS. The CAS fired upon the marked target. Once SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) determined that the "diving-board" area was suppressed, he radioed that he did not need any more support. 1SG (b)(6) left the fighting position to run to the TOC for further guidance from 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6). 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) told 1SG (b)(6) to return to his mentoring duties and went to the ANA compound to collect as many ANA soldiers as he could and checked the other buildings.

9. There were 3 ANA soldiers killed (1 found inside the base and 2 found outside the base). There were 8 wounded ANA Soldiers. There were 21 ANA soldiers total, the following day at COP Keating. 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) do not know what happened to the 15 missing ANA soldiers.

10. While collecting the ANA soldiers in the ANA compound area, 1SG (b)(6) found an ANA soldier with a radio taken from an enemy fighter. 1SG (b)(6) told the ANA soldier to give the radio to the TOC S2, SGT (b)(3), (b)(6). 1SG (b)(6) said that the ANA Soldier refused to give up the enemy radio because he was using it to listen to enemy radio transmission. 1SG (b)(6) insisted that the enemy radio be given to SGT (b)(3), (b)(6). After arguing with the ANA

soldier, 1SG (b)(6) grabbed the radio from the ANA soldier and secured it. 1SG (b)(6) collected all ANA soldiers he could find and checked the buildings. After clearing all the buildings, 1SG (b)(6) went to the TOC and gave the enemy radio to SGT (b)(3), (b)(6). 1SG (b)(6) updated 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) with his situation report (SITREP). After giving his SITREP to 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) 1SG (b)(6) was rejoined by CPL (b)(6) and created a new defensive position northwest of the TOC.

11. 1SG (b)(6) explained to CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) that the ANA soldiers needed to be moved out of COP Keating. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) agreed with 1SG (b)(6) and the ANA soldiers were transported out of COP Keating to FOB Bostick. During the preparation for the transport of the ANA soldiers to FOB Bostick, 1SG (b)(6) informed the ANA soldiers that there was a weight limit on the CH-47 Chinook helicopter and that they needed to leave anything that is non-essential behind. 1SG (b)(6) recalls that the ANA soldiers were upset with him and that they wanted to complain to CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) about the weight restriction of their personal effects. 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) were transported out of COP Keating to FOB Bostick with the US Soldiers.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CPT, JA  
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