

Additional Comments to Sworn Statement
For MAJOR (b)(3), (b)(6)
TF

1. (b) How many US servicemembers and Afghan National Security Forces were occupying COP Keating? What units were present at the time of the attack?

There were 54 US servicemembers, 2 Latvians (OMLT), and 26 Afghan National Army (ANA) soldiers at COP Keating at the time of the attack. This equates to one US CAV Troop Headquarters, two US CAV platoons, and one ANA platoon.

2. (j) When was COP Keating first occupied? Was COP Keating under construction at the time of the attack? Was the occupation and construction of COP Keating a planned operation? How were identified vulnerabilities mitigated?

COP Keating was originally an Afghan National Police (ANP) outpost. It later was occupied by Coalition Forces and became known as the Kamdesh PRT in early in 2006 due to its relative proximity to Kamdesh population centers.

There was no construction ongoing at the COP at the time of the attack. In fact, the unit was preparing to close the COP starting 09OCT09. Non mission critical supplies were packed and prepared to initiate the backhaul.

As to whether the occupation and construction of COP Keating was a planned operation, it is difficult to accurately assess since this position was not established under TF Destroyer's (3-61 CAV) supervision. It was established by 3-71 CAV in coordination with a Provincial Reconstruction Team.

To mitigate identified vulnerabilities, force protection was increased through adjusting stand to times, manning additional positions and crew served weapon systems.

3. (k) Had COP Keating been attacked in the 30 days prior to this attack? If so, what was the extent of the attacks?

Yes, COP Keating had been attacked in the last 30 days. The attacks were small scale but did demonstrate some level of coordination and experience. Below are the dates with the type of small arms contact.

- 9/7/2009 Small Arms Fire
- 9/9/2009 Complex attack RPG/SAF
- 9/9/2009 Small Arms Fire
- 9/9/2009 Small Arms Fire
- 9/11/2009 Small Arms Fire
- 9/12/2009 Complex attack RPG/ Small Arms Fire by less than
- 9/16/2009 Complex attack RPG/ Small Arms Fire
- 9/20/2009 Complex attack RPG/ Small Arms Fire
- 9/22/2009 Small Arms Fire
- 9/27/2009 Small Arms Fire

The reports indicated that the attacking force was at least a team element but no more than a squad size element involved in these attacks.

4. (I) Was there a current threat assessment? Had any intelligence reports been received indicating a possible attack in the 30 days prior to this attack? If so, what was that intelligence? What office was responsible for those reports? What actions were taken as a result of that intelligence? Were those actions appropriate? Were higher HQ made aware of any current intelligence?

Yes there was a current threat assessment.

The Squadron S2 and his subordinates assessed that the threat level was high. It was reported that a possible attack with varying numbers of fighters would occur between 28-30SEP09. The Squadron and Troop intelligence teams viewed the reports the same way. Unfortunately, routinely these types of reports often painted an overestimation of the possible attack, frequently those reports were inaccurate or exaggerated, and often were false.

The Squadron and the troop took appropriate measures in response to these threats. Those measures included increasing the force protection, declaring imminent threat, and requesting CAS.

The Brigade staff was informed. /////END OF STATEMENT////////////////////////////////////

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Operations Officer
3-61 CAV

////////////////////////////////////NOTHING FOLLOWS////////////////////////////////////

