



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-82
FOB FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

AFZC-BCT-BJA

28 October 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation Statement of CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2009, I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) at FOB Fenty, Afghanistan. The primary purpose was to ascertain CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) involvement during the attack on COP Keating on 3 October 2009. The following are questions I asked and the answers provided by CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

- a. What is your duty position? AH-64D Platoon Leader
- b. How long have you been in the Army? 4 Years, 5 months
- c. How many combat deployment have you had? Provide location and time frame? 1st Deployment
- d. How long have you been in Afghanistan for your current deployment? When did you arrive? 10 months, 17 December 2008
- e. What training have you received to fly an AH-64 helicopter? Include total number of hours, total number of combat flight hours, and specific training completed.

I was trained at Fort Rucker in flight school XXI. I did IERW, Instruments, BNAV, and the AH-64D Longbow XXI course. I have 687 combat hours and 1238 total hours.

- f. What was your duty position with the attack weapons team? What was your callsign?

I was the third AH-64D launched up to COP Keating to escort a MEDEVAC, I eventually joined the air assault mission in to OP Fritsche and was the overall AMC of that portion of the flight. I also served as an LNO during my shift, and later went back up to FOB Bostick to serve as the LNO for another 12 hours during the night QRF shift. I was originally in (b)(2)High and then gave up my aircraft to the day QRF team and once (b)(2)High was repaired I flew that one on the air assault.

- g. Describe your actions on the day of the attack at COP Keating? Be as complete as possible.

On the third of October 2009, I was woken up on my day off and informed that COP Keating had been overrun. I changed in to my flight gear and ran out to the flight line. I flew aircraft (b)(2)High (b)(2)High with CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) to FOB Bostick in order to escort a medevac in support of the fight that was currently under way in the Kamdesh Valley. We arrived at FOB Bostick around (b)(2)High local and refueled. As we were in the (b)(2)High (CW (b)(3), (b)(6) W2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(2)High (CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) left the FARP and headed back north to support COP Keating and (b)(2)High was in a high orbit over FOB Bostick acting as a retrans between Bostick and the aircraft in the Kamdesh. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were waiting at Bostick until the AWT at Keating determined the Kamdesh Valley and COP Keating were secure enough to bring in the medevac at which time we would escort (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High in order to bring out as many wounded as possible. Around (b)(2)High (b)(2)High tried multiple times to contact the Weapons team that was in the Kamdesh with no success so CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I launched to ensure that the AWT had not been brought down. As we flew towards the Bari Kowt (BK) pass we tried to contact (b)(2)High with no success until with had passed the BK pass. Finally we were able to contact (b)(2)High who informed us that they had been hit and had lost their #2 ECS and had no SCAS in the yaw axis. I coordinated with (b)(2)High (b)(2)High escort (b)(2)High back to Bostick while CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I in (b)(2)High teamed up with (b)(2)High to continue supporting COP Keating. As we were inbound to COP Keating, (b)(2)High informed us that they had also been hit and were returning to Bostick. Since they had a utility hydraulic system caution we came down and flew in close to check for any damage but there was no damage that we could see while in the air other than a significant amount of oil down the right side of the tail boom. We finally were able to get on the ground back at Bostick and assess the extent of the battle damage on (b)(2)High. I got out of the aircraft and checked with both crews and ran in to the TOC to call Palehorse TOC and provide a SITREP to the battle captain and start getting the DART and an additional AH64D flown up to Bostick. The damage on (b)(2)High consisted of a single DHsK round that entered the aircraft in the center of the aircraft in the middle of the aft fuel cell at a low trajectory exiting through the right side of the fuselage into the right EFAB where it destroyed a wire bundle and then came to stop in the #2 ECS compressor. (b)(2)High had a DHsK round through one of the tail rotor blades and a round had penetrated the tail rotor driveshaft cover, severed the utility hydraulic pressure line for the tail wheel unlock actuator and the utility side of the directional actuator. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) came in to Destroyer TOC and I had him give the damage assessment to the TOC and coordinate to get a tail rotor blade and Modernized System Processor Unit (MSPU) kit to track the tail rotor, and also the parts and equipment needed to repair the severed utility hydraulic line. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I went back out to the LZ and as we were assessing the damage on the Weapon aircraft the warning system at Bostick began blaring "INCOMING! INCOMING!" and three mortar rounds impacted on or near the FOB. Palehorse TOC had said that the DART team was going to be

arriving in approximately an hour and a half which would be around 1100. Sometime around this time an Overdrive element arrived and the Weapon crew gave them a battle handover and then they went to support COP Keating. Approximately twenty minutes later they returned and (b)(2)High had received battle damage. This aircraft had a DShK round through the top of the right hand "doghouse" just aft of the laser detector, it then proceeded to destroy a main wire bundle in the transmission bay, a wire bundle at the rear end of the work platform, the IPAS (bleed air) manifold coming off of the bleed air pre-cooler, and then bounced off the forward fire bottle went through the left-side engine firewall dented a cooling shroud on the engine turbine section. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) began an assessment of the aircraft and I called Palehorse TOC give them another SITREP and had CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinate to let them know the parts that were required to repair the IPAS manifold and ensure they had the electricians and electrical components required to begin the repairs to the wire bundles that were damaged. We again went back out to the LZ and as we were assessing the damage of (b)(2)High mortar round impacted on the MWR side of the FOB. After the DART team arrived I had CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) CW (b)(3), (b)(6) and the DART began repairs of (b)(2)High and assessments on the other two aircraft. While they were doing maintenance, I coordinated with (b)(2)High and the commander from the QRF out of the 10th Mountain Division to begin planning a hasty air assault into OP Fritsche. I was able to provide the scheme of maneuver for the 3 AH-64Ds (with the assumption (b)(2)High would be repaired in time for the mission) and 3 UH-60Ms. I continued to coordinate between the ground assets and aviation assets while acting as the aviation LNO for Task Force Palehorse. There was enough of a break in weather that we were able to launch the first two turns of the air assault, but (b)(2)High was not repaired yet. After the second turn for the air assault, CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) signaled to me out on the HLZ and gave me a sitrep that they had PID of two DHsK positions, they believed they had destroyed the crews, but the DHsKs were still operative. I had just left the TOC where I was working with the (b)(2)High and knew there was a B1B coming on station for one hour. I copied the grid locations for the DHsK and ran back to the TOC and used an example nine-line CAS drop to work up a drop for 6 bombs. I worked with (b)(2)High to draw up the drop and he relayed to the B1B the nine line destroyed the two DShK positions. Once the weather cleared up (b)(2)High was ready to go and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I ran the aircraft up. While we were running up the Utility Hydraulic Level caution appeared but as we were able to monitor our Utility Hydraulic PSI and the (b)(2)High element needed the support of three Apaches; CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I felt comfortable with taking the aircraft. I began doing a weapons operational check and noticed that the rockets would not move and appeared to be inoperative, my MTADS was completely inoperative, and I could not move the gun. We took off as the trail bird to provide close security for the UH-60s as they infilled the ground force into OP Fritsche. We entered the valley over the BK pass and successfully infilled the ground QRF into OP Fritsche. The first two UH-60s made their drop and departed back to Bostick while we escorted

the third UH-60 into the LZ. As we were crossing the ridge high ridge south of OP Fritsche the UH-60 we were escorting took fire from the three o'clock position higher on the ridgeline. I couldn't use my sight or gun and was able to talk CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) on to the target and he suppressed the area with approximately sixty rounds of 30mm. After successfully getting back to Bostick we were told that we would be making an additional turn in to OP Fritsche. We refueled while the three (b)(2)High aircraft loaded up the next load of QRF. We took off from Bostick enroute to Fritsche, (b)(2)High the third UH-60 again took fire when departing the HLZ from almost the same position. We were able to identify about 4-6 enemy personnel under a bush and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) suppressed with approximately fifty rounds of 30mm. When we arrived back in Bostick for what we thought was the last time we were informed we were going to be escorting (b)(2)High for one more turn into OP Fritsche. The other two AH-64Ds had landed for fuel so after getting everything loaded up the three (b)(2)High and the three Weapon aircraft took off for the last infil into Fritsche. This time we went south from Bostick and entered the Darin valley just north of OP Bari Alai and entered the Kamdesh valley south of OP Fritsche. As we came over the ridge, because of the terrain and bad weather, we were forced into the number two position after we crossed the ridge. We turned west right into the sun and we had trouble maintaining contact with the lead (b)(2)High aircraft. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) began doing s-turns to slow down and keep (b)(2)High one in sight and as we made a right hand break turn we saw a RPG team fire two RPG at our aircraft. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I decided to drop below the Blackhawks to divert fire away from the lift aircraft with their personnel inside. By the time we were able to identify (b)(2)High position to ensure they were clear CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) was unable to get the gun far enough to the right to engage so we told (b)(2)High of the RPG team and marked the position with flares. As (b)(2)High crossed the ridge he asked where the RPG team was located and we talked him on to the flares. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately identified the enemy position and destroyed the RPG team. We continued escorting the (b)(2)High element into OP Fritsche and did not observe any more fire until (b)(2)High was lifting off the HLZ. As we departed to the south the blackhawks began taking small arms fire and we began suppressing with 30mm. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) maneuvered the aircraft between the fire and the blackhawks and the enemy personnel shifted their fire and began engaging our aircraft. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) suppressed the area with approximately one hundred rounds of 30mm. After getting the (b)(2)High element safely out of the Kamdesh we pushed over to FOB Bostick picked up (b)(2)High and escorted them back to JAF. We continued to get a Utility Hydraulic Level caution for the rest of the flight and safely made it back to JAF. Once we returned to FOB Fenty, I went to Palehorse TOC and gave a debrief and requested to go back up to Destroyer TOC to continue acting as the aviation LNO for the night shift. I departed in a UH-60 with the night AWT and began coordinating with (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High and the Palehorse TOC for another hasty air assault that night. After I had the details of the air assault, i went out to the HLZ and briefed the night QRF team using a wing cord

and running to each aircraft to give them an aircrew brief. I returned to the TOC and continued coordination throughout the night providing aviation input to the ground forces. Once the air assault was complete I returned to FOB Fenty on a CH-47 having flown just over 7 hours, and completed a 25 hour duty day.

h. Did COMISAF tactical directive inhibit your team from engaging enemy targets at any point during the battle? If so, describe in detail how. No not at all.

i. Provide an assessment of damage to aircraft. Be as specific as possible.

The damage on (b)(2)High consisted of a single DHsK round that entered the aircraft in the center of the aircraft in the middle of the aft fuel cell at a low trajectory exiting through the right side of the fuselage into the right EFAB where it destroyed a wire bundle and then came to stop in the #2 ECS compressor. (b)(2)High had a DHsK round through one of the tail rotor blades and a round had penetrated the tail rotor driveshaft cover, severed the utility hydraulic pressure line for the tail wheel unlock actuator and the utility side of the directional actuator.

j. What actions did you take regarding damaged aircraft? Be as comprehensive as you can.

I had CW2(b)(3), (b)(6) give the damage assessment to (b)(2)High TOC and coordinate to get a tail rotor blade and Modernized System Processor Unit (MSPU) kit to track the tail rotor, and also the parts and equipment needed to repair the severed utility hydraulic line. I also provided maintenance updates throughout the day to (b)(2)High TOC.

k. Provide the amount of ammunition and other weapons expended during the attack on COP Keating? My aircraft shot 150 rounds of 30mm

l. Did any weapons malfunction during the attack on COP Keating? Not in my aircraft prior to it being damaged. Once it received battle damage my rockets, missiles, and MTADS were inoperative.

m. Provide any other matters you deem relevant based on the incident that day.

Having an LNO during the day and night portions of the operation proved to be imperative to the success of both air assaults (day and night). It was also a necessity because it kept the aviation TOC informed and provided a subject matter expert in the ground forces TOC to answer aviation questions and aid in the air assault planning. I suggest it be added to the TACSOP for the Brigade/Division on handling a large scale attack that could be drawn out and require extensive aviation support.

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