



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-82
FOB FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

AFZC-BCT-BJA

28 October 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation Statement of CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 26 October 2009, I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) at FOB Fenty, Afghanistan. The primary purpose was to ascertain CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) involvement during the attack on COP Keating on 3 October 2009. CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) served as the Air Mission Commander for the Attack Weapons Team on the day of the attack. The following are questions I asked and the answers provided by CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6)

a. What is your duty position? 152HB AH64D Pilot/Aviation Safety Officer

b. How long have you been in the Army? 20 years 5 months 20 days

c. How many combat deployment have you had? Provide location and time frame?

6 total: 1. Desert Shield/Storm 1990, 2. Bosnia 1997, 3. Kosovo 1998-99, 4. Afghanistan OEF 2002, 5. Iraq OIF 2003, 6. Afghanistan Dec 2008 until the present.

d. How long have you been in Afghanistan for your current deployment? When did you arrive? 10 months. I arrived on 11 December 2008.

e. What training have you received to fly an AH-64 helicopter? Include total number of hours, total number of combat flight hours, and specific training completed.

AH64A AQC, AH64D AQC, AH64D UTP Ft. Hood, TX. HAATS. AH64A and AH64D time approx. 2400 hours. Combat time approx 1200-1300 hours.

f. What was your duty position with the attack weapons team? What was your callsign? I

(b)(2)High

g. When did your team initially arrive on station at COP Keating? Approx 0240Z

h. Describe your team's actions on the day of the attack at COP Keating? Be as complete as possible.

On 3 October at 0150z my QRF team, was notified to launch to support COP Keating which was in heavy contact. We took off from JAF at 0200z and while in the vicinity of FOB Wright

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we heard over the radio that the enemy was inside the wire at Keating and that the COP was in danger of being over run. I asked my front-seater, CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) to contact the TOC and ask for more apaches to be sent from BAF so that we could have constant coverage as teams had to go to Bostic to rearm and refuel. We also made the decision at that time to take a more direct route of flight by cutting over the mountains past Nishgam because it would shave a few minutes off the flight and would bring us in closer to the enemy and reduce the time they had to react to our arrival. When we arrived on station at approx 0240z we found the eastern half of Keating on fire and the valley full of smoke. We had been notified by (b)(2)High while we were in the vicinity of Bostic that "all personnel outside the wire are hostile", and after making contact with (b)(2)High at Keating that was confirmed. Within 2 minutes of arriving on station the lead Apache, flown by CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) found 25 to 30 personnel just outside the wire on the eastern side of Keating preparing to join the assault on the COP. My front-seater soon acquired the targets and both aircraft began engaging them. We continued to attack them, expending around 380 rounds of 30mm between the two aircraft, until we determined that all those personnel were either dead or wounded. It is my belief that if we had arrived 10 minutes later the 25-30 enemy would have been inside the wire, and together with the enemy already inside the wire, they would have been able to overwhelm the Americans in Keating. Following that engagement we remained on station until approx 0400z when we had to return to Bostic for refuel-rearm. During that time we were under constant heavy fire from the enemy which had the COP completely surrounded. We expended approx 30 rockets and another 150 rounds of 30mm engaging seven different locations in close proximity to the COP. We arrived back on station at Keating at approx 0500z and resumed engaging the enemy who were firing on Keating from all sides. After doing this for around 1 hour (b)(2)High asked us to destroy the Mosque at (b)(2)High just across the river on the west side of Keating, which the enemy was using to deliver constant and accurate fire on the COP including heavy machine gun and RPG fire. The location of the target required us to attack from east to west over the COP and put us in range of the enemy that were holding the high ground overlooking Keating. (b)(2)High began his attack run with my aircraft following approx (b)(2)High behind. I was waiting to see the smoke from his hellfire shot when he radioed that his missile failed. He turned away from the valley and when he was clear we fired our missile hitting the Mosque. Immediately following our missile launch we felt a round strike our aircraft and started getting system failures. The aircraft had been struck by a DShK round directly under the pilot's seat which then entered the left EFAB where it cut a wire bundle and destroyed the AFT ECS condenser. My AFT ECS failed, we lost FMC YAW, the battery charger, and auto stabilator immediately. Later on short final to Bostic we also got an EFABS hot warning. We informed (b)(2)High that we had been hit and that we needed to return to Bostic. (b)(2)High was already getting in position to fire on the Mosque again so I told them that we could wait while he took his shot. After he finished shooting and we

turned and started to return to Bostic his aircraft started losing utility hydraulics and they noticed a vibration in the pedals. By the time we landed at Bostic (b)(2)High had no utility hydraulics. As we were landing the Overdrive Apaches from BAF arrived and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted a battle handover with them as they flew on to Keating. We then contacted Palehorse TOC and informed them that both aircraft had battle damage and that we needed maintenance personnel and a DART team. After shut down the battle damage was found on both aircraft and we determined that they were both non-mission capable. Around 40 minutes later CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived in aircraft (b)(2)High with a DART team in a CH47 and began working on the aircraft. Five minutes after that the (b)(2)High returned to Bostic with one aircraft battle damaged. At that point we asked (b)(2)High if they would launch with one of their aircraft and one of ours but they refused without clearance from their TOC. We then received notification through Destroyer TOC that CW5 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) were enroute to us with another aircraft, tail (b)(2)High and three UH60s, so CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) moved to (b)(2)High and we prepared to go to (b)(2)High when it arrived. Destroyer had decided by that point to send in more ground forces on the 60s to support Keating so we touched base with the infantry unit that was going in, and the planners from Destroyer, to help them determine which LZ to use and give them some situational awareness. We informed them that the initial LZs they were looking at were within range of large numbers of enemy fighters and based on our intel the decision was made to drop the relieving units at Fritche and have them walk down to Keating. When (b)(2)High arrived CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I got into the aircraft while the blades were still turning and we took off as a flight of 5 with the original crews and 3 UH60s. The weather had begun to deteriorate rapidly and there was some doubt about our ability to get back into the valley so I took off first to check the weather on the other side of the BK Pass followed by the 3 60s with gun 2 in trail. There was cloud cover over the whole valley with lightning and rain but CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and I determined that it was still possible to complete the mission. We cleared the LZ and employed suppressive fires in the vicinity of Fritche while the lift birds were coming in to drop off. (b)(2)High took position over Keating and began engaging targets. The 60s came under small arms fire as they entered the valley so I began engaging the locations where the fire was coming from until all three 60s had dropped off and left the valley.

We stayed on scene to support Keating until we were bingo fuel again and had to return to Bostic. The bad weather turned out to be beneficial in one respect and that was that the muzzle flashes from the enemy weapons were now much more visible. This allowed (b)(2)High to locate the 2 DShK positions on the spur overlooking Keating, (b)(2)High that we believe hit our aircraft earlier. Both aircraft engaged the positions with 30mm and rockets expending another 480 rounds and 36 rockets. The crews manning the guns were killed but the guns appeared to still be intact. While we were on our way out we passed the grid for the DShk position to fixed

wing aircraft, (b)(2)High which had arrived on station and while we were gone they reengaged the target. No further fire was received from that location for the rest of the day. We also got a call from (b)(2)High asking us to engage the ANP checkpoint, (b)(2)High, on the west side of the COP because it had been occupied by the enemy and they were using it to fire on the COP. (b)(2)High had called bingo while we were getting the info from (b)(2)High for the engagement and we decided that we didn't want to leave without hitting the target so (b)(2)High started back at (b)(2)High while we shot the building with a hellfire and 6 rockets. We caught up with (b)(2)High over the BK pass after completing the engagement and we returned to Bostic as a flight of two. While we were gone on that first lift CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Dart team managed to get aircraft (b)(2)High operational again and when we launched on the next lift they joined the flight as trail so that we could have another aircraft to cover close in to the LZ and act as an escort for the 60s when they left the valley enroute to Bostic. We conducted a total of three turns into the valley with the UH60s. During every turn the UH60s received small arms fire from numerous positions on the southern ridgeline overlooking Fritche. All three Apaches employed suppressive fires on numerous positions in response to the fires. On the last turn CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) spotted several personnel on the ridgeline who fired an RPG at the UH60s but his aircraft too close to get a shot off before he passed them. He passed on the location to CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) aircraft which had also seen the first shot and then saw a second RPG fired before they were able to engage the area killing two. No further fire was received from that location. Following the final turn we returned to JAF and were relieved by the night QRF crew.

We flew for (b)(2)High today and fired over 1600 rounds of 30mm, approx 90 rockets, and 5 hellfires in support of the ground forces. We destroyed 3 buildings, killed at least two DShK crews and one RPG crew. Estimates at the end of the day by us and the ground forces put the enemy dead due to our fires at 50-80.

i. How did your team PID targets? With the TADS and visually we PID'd targets by muzzle flashes, through CCA walk-ons through (b)(2)High smoke fired by Keating personnel, and obvious weapons and hostile acts.

j. How did your team identify enemy locations? Same as above

k. How long did it take your team to engage enemy targets? From the time we crossed the ridge into the valley with Keating approx 4 to 5 min.

l. Did your team identify enemy elements in the village of Urmul? Yes

m. Was your team in contact with ground elements? Who did your team communicate with during the battle? Yes. (b)(2)High

n. Was CAS on station prior to your team arriving? If so, how did your team deconflict airspace? No

o. Was your aircraft damaged from enemy contact? Yes

p. Did your team fire on any structures? If so, what specific structures? Why did your team engage those structures? What weapon systems did your team use to engage those structures? Did your team receive any special permission to engage those targets?

We fired on three structures during the day with Hellfires: the Mosque in Urmul, the ANP checkpoint on the west side of Keating, and the clinic on the east side of Keating. The first target hit was the Mosque. We were informed by (b)(2)High that Keating was receiving large amounts of small arms and RPG fire from the structure and he asked us to destroy the building.

(b)(2)High also requested we attack the other two buildings, but our aircraft had been damaged and we had to return to Bostic, we hit the other two structures later in the day. We went into the Destroyer TOC at Bostic and the buildings were pointed out to us by (b)(2)High and by using the map and the Keating GRG. The ANP checkpoint had been over-run and was being used by AAF to engage Keating. The clinic was being used both as a place to attack Keating from, and as a staging area for the AAF trying to enter Keating from the east. During our initial attacks on AAF east of Keating, we ID'd AAF coming to and going from the clinic.

q. Did your team assess collateral damage prior to engaging targets within the village of Urmul? Yes. We circled the target for several minutes determining which was the correct building to fire on and then determined that the only way to engage the target without the risk of hitting other structures was to approach from the east. This also put our aircraft in the most dangerous position from which to attack and it was during this engagement that both of our aircraft were damaged by heavy machine gun fire.

r. Did your team identify any non-enemy or non-AAF elements in the village of Urmul or any area within the target location? No

s. Did your team delay or not engage enemy targets after being requested to by ground elements? If so, why?

Yes. We delayed prior to nearly every engagement to be sure we were looking at the correct target and to determine to best way to attack so as to reduce the risk of collateral damage and reduce the risk to our aircraft. The only time I can recall when I didn't delay is when Keating had put out red smoke and we turned to the target and immediately saw tracer fire and muzzle flashes on the hill overlooking Keating to the south being directed towards Keating and our aircraft. The longest delay was the shot on the Mosque. We delayed approx 8 to 10 minutes on

that engagement before we were satisfied that we had the right target and could not engage it in a better way. After the first Hellfire hit we delayed again until (b)(2)High confirmed that the first shot was a good hit.

t. Did your team delay or not engage enemy targets in the village of Urmul at any point during the battle? Is so, why? The only target engaged in Urmul was the Mosque, see above.

u. Did COMISAF tactical directive inhibit your team from engaging enemy targets at any point during the battle? If so, describe in detail how. No

v. Did your team engage targets on COP Keating? Did anyone request that your team engage targets on COP Keating? No

w. Did your aircraft sustain any damage? If so, what caused the damage and when did it occur?

Yes, DShK fire hit the bottom of my aircraft. We were hit by a weapon which was emplaced southeast of Keating while making the run in from the east to hit the Mosque west of Keating. We were at approx. 6800ft MSL traveling at around 100kts. This was approx 0600z.

x. Provide the amount of ammunition and other weapons expended during the attack on COP Keating?

We fired over 1600 rounds of 30mm, approx 90 rockets, and 5 hellfires in support of the ground forces.

y. Did any weapons malfunction during the attack on COP Keating? (b)(2)High
had a hellfire fail to launch.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CPT, JA
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