

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FORT CARSON, COLORADO	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20091026	3. TIME 1600	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. GRADE/STATUS E1/AD		
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3-61 CAV, 4TH BRIGADE, 4 ID			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

SEE ATTACHED 6 PAGE, TYPED STATEMENT. EMF

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF PY1 (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT 1600 DATED 2009 10 26

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Large diagonal line indicating a redacted or empty statement area]

AFFIDAVIT

ATTACHED

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26th day of OCTOBER, 2009 at FORT CARSON, COLORADO

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)
COMMISSIONED OFFICER
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT BY PV1 (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN 22 OCTOBER 2009 AT 1830 MOUNTAIN TIME, 23 OCTOBER AT 1300, AND 26 OCTOBER AT 1600

Q: WHAT IS YOUR DUTY POSITION?

A: On patrol I was a grenadier and AG. I rotated on the stand-to trucks from 0430 to 0730.

Q: HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE ARMY? HOW LONG IN COUNTRY FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT?

A: Four years and change. I had been in country about 5 months on the day of the attack.

Q: DO YOU HAVE PRIOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS? IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE?

A: Yes, I was in Iraq from Oct 06 to Dec 07. I wasn't there the entire time though, because I got shot in January by an insurgent and I was home for five months.

Q: WHERE WAS YOUR BATTLE POSITION ON 3 OCTOBER 2009 AT COP KEATING?

A: I was on stand-to truck 1 pulling duty from 0430 to 0730.

Q: WHAT WERE YOUR ACTIONS DURING THE FIGHT?

A: I was sitting on guard 90 minutes in. I had just done a radio check at 0600. There was chatter on the radio that we were going to get hit by the Taliban, and that they were forming up in the village outside the main gate. Everyone acknowledged, and about 20 minutes later a single RPG round came in and hit the middle of the COP. The guy nearest the explosion called on the radio to report. About 20 seconds later all hell broke loose. Machine gun fire scattered all over the post, and multiple RPG rounds were hitting.

I saw muzzle flashes on the north face, so I engaged with the .50 cal. Right across the river, on the east side, I saw a smoke signature in the treeline. I engaged the treeline, and traversed between the treeline, the north face, and another location. I quickly went black on ammo. Or at least it seemed pretty quickly. Because I was so heavily engaged, I didn't have a chance to radio for ammo. I radioed for ammo as soon as I went black, but it was difficult to get across because of all the radio traffic. It seemed like I called it up 5 or 6 times before I got an acknowledge from the TOC.

While I had been shooting, (b)(3), (b)(6) ran up to the truck and was feeding me ammo. He was throwing me cans of .50 (b)(3), (b)(6) off before the TOC acknowledged, saying he was going to get me ammo. Just after he left, my buddy Griffin ran out with his saw. He was firing off the corners of the truck. He also eventually went black. I started feeding him M4 mags. When he started getting thin on ammo, he jumped in the truck with me.

All the while I was monitoring the radio. Clockwise from my position was LRAS2. He called over the radio that he was taking precision fire. He came on the air moments later saying his weapon his out. (b)(2)High called over the radio and told us to move to LRAS2 to support him. Before I did anything I called for ammo. At that moment, Hart and (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up with as much .50 cal ammo as 2 men could carry. They threw it in the truck. Griffin was on the .50 and I drove the truck up to LRAS 2.

I drove the truck up to LRAS 2. We took a lot of small arms fire. Rounds were bouncing off the windshield and turrent and Griffin occassionally had to drop down. He fired a couple bursts, but was then hit by what I think was shrapnel in the face. Hart showed up and jumped in. We decided to try to back the truck, but when I started to back up I got stuck on a berm behind our position. I couldn't drive forward or back.

We decided that we had to get out. Hart was about to get on the .50 cal, and Griffin jumped out the rear passenger door. Before Hart could shut the door, rounds started flying in the door. We saw 3 guys standing in the middle of the COP, wearing ASG uniforms. For some reason, they didn't look right. I told Hart that, and as soon as Hart took my position to look out the door. Hart threw himself back in and yelled, "They're shooting an RPG at us." At that time it was too late. The RPG hit on outside windshield on the drivers side. I was yelling from pain from the shapnel, but Hart kept telling me, "you're good, you're good."

At this time I had no idea where my M4 was. We had to decide how we were going to get out of the truck. We didn't decide where we were going, we just knew we had to act fast and get out of the humvee – it was still taking small arms fire and RPGs were hitting all around. Our plan was for me to exit the driver side, crouch down, and open the rear driver's side door so Hart could get out. I opened the door, and without a weapon ran straight to the DFAC, cut a left, and saw our guys stacked up with the ANA.

I ran straight to the aid station and put the word out that they needed to get help to LRAS 1 and LRAS 2 to make sure Hart got out, and to make sure LRAS 2 was okay. I stayed in the aid station for 90 minutes or so wher (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up. When it got to crowded they decided to move the walking wounded to the TOC.

Q: WHAT VULNERABILITIES DID YOU SEE OR FEEL AT COP KEATING?

A: Yes. It was a perfect setup for an enemy attack. The enemy had all the high ground. At times I thought to myself, "If they ever want to mess us up, they can do it." We also knew it was hard to get birds in there.

Q: WHAT WAS THE FIRST ENEMY ACTION YOU SAW? WHERE WERE YOU, AND WHERE DID YOU MOVE?

A: I saw the RPG hit. The rest of my story is above.

Q: WAS ANYONE NEAR YOU WOUNDED OR KILLED? IF SO, WHO WAS AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE INJURIES? WHAT UNIFORM WAS THE SOLDIER(S) WEARING AT THE TIME? WAS THE SOLDIER(S) WEARING THEIR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT?

A: Yes. Hart didn't make but 20 meters from the truck. Because I was running without a weapon, I didn't turn around to see if Hart would make it. Hart had on full ACUs, kevlar and plate carriers, and ACH. He was MIA until almost night fall, when things settled down enough they could go look for him. They found him 20 meters from the truck, behind a rock, dead.

Q: WERE YOU WOUNDED? HOW WERE YOU WOUNDED? WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR INJURIES? WHAT UNIFORM WERE YOU WEARING AT THE TIME YOU WERE WOUNDED? WERE YOU WEARING YOUR PERSONEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)?

A: Yes, I was wounded by the RPG that hit my truck. I took shrapnel up and down my left arm, left shoulder blade, and the inside of my left thigh. I also took significant shrapnel on my right hand.

Q: DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANA? HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSIGNED ANA/ANP ELEMENTS?

A: I did a little patrolling with the ANA stationed at the OP. Every once and a while we'd go up to the OP during hours when we'd usually get hit. At the OP I never had any issues with the ANA. The ANP were worthless. They wouldn't do anything. The ASG were hit and miss; some you could trust, some you couldn't.

Q: DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY? HOW WERE YOU RECEIVED BY THE LOCALS?

A: No, not at all. We didn't go into the village. I don't know how we were received by the locals.

Q: DID YOU EXPERIENCE ANY WEAPON MALFUNCTIONS?

A: Yes, with the .50 cal on several occasions. I was able to fix all of them with immediate action.

Q: PERSONALLY, WHAT WAS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WITH FORCE PROTECTION AT COP KEATING?

A: Being on low ground. I said if they ever bring up guys, we're in trouble. The day of the attack, thank God we got CAS, who knows what would've happened. Two or three days before the attack, we got intel that 2 key leaders were in the area. The commander had us go out and do presence patrols.

Complacency had set in, and we were getting into a routine. We filled the generators every day at the same time. And they would test us, so they knew our response.

Things started to change before the attack. Overall we had started doing more presence patrols. But overall, there were only 2 exits on the COP, so we were limited in what we could do.

Q: WERE THE STAND-TO TRUCKS MANNED ONLY 2 HOURS IN THE MORNING?

A: And 2 hours at night. We had 3 positions manned 24 hours. But during stand-to there was only one person in each truck.

Q: WERE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE CLAYMOR SYSTEM? IF SO, DID YOU KNOW OF ANY PROBLEMS WITH IT?

A: Yes, I was familiar with the claymor system. I don't know of any problems, and I know they were checked regularly.

Q: ON THE DAY OF THE ATTACK, WERE THERE ANY ISSUES WITH THE ANA, ANP, OR ASG?

A: I don't know. We had a close relationship with the ANA when we were on the OP. They'll fight if you befriend them.

Q: PLEASE COMMENT ABOUT ANY OTHER PROBLEMS YOU HAD WITH COP KEATING.

A: It seemed like we were there to be on the defensive.

Q: APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY US PERSONNEL OCCUPIED COP KEATING?

A: 50 or so.

Q: HOW MANY ANTI-AFGHAN FORCES (AAF) WERE INVOLVED? FROM WHERE DID THEY ATTACK? HOW MANY AAF WERE KILLED OR INJURED FROM WHAT YOU KNOW?

A: I don't know the exact number. I would say 100 or more. It was almost all coming from the North and the Northwest. Going off the newspapers, I'd say 100 or more.

Q: DO YOU REMEMBER IF YOU CONDUCTED ANY DEFENSE REHEARSALS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK? IF SO, WAS THE PLAN FOLLOWED DURING THE ATTACK?

A: My platoon didn't rehearse like SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) Everyone knew where they were assigned and knew what to do if we were attacked. I'm not sure if the plan was followed during the attack, but I'm assuming it did.

Q: HOW MANY AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS WERE USED DURING THE ATTACK? HOW DID THEY RESPOND?

A: I'm not sure. All I was with my own eyes were the six ANA guys stacked up with our guys as I was running into the Aid Station. I'm not sure how the ANA responded because I was knocked out of the fight so quick.

Q: HOW WERE THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY SOLDIERS USED DURING THE ATTACK? HOW DID THEY RESPOND?

A: See above.

Q: HAD COP KEATING BEEN ATTACKED IN THE 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THIS ATTACK? IF SO, WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THE ATTACKS?

A: Yes, small attacks – sporadic AK fire.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT MEDICAL PROGNOSIS? WHAT MEDICAL ISSUES DO YOU FORESEE IN THE FUTURE?

A: I'm still recovering. I have some pain in my left forearm, but I'll know more when I get back from convalescent leave.

Q: PLEASE DISCUSS ANY OTHER MATTERS YOU DEEM RELEVANT.

A: No.