

**SWORN STATEMENT**

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

**PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT**

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FORT CARSON, COLORADO	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20091026	3. TIME 1600	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS E4/AD	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3-61 CAV, 4TH BRIGADE, 4 ID			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6) \_\_\_\_\_, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:  
  
SEE ATTACHED 7 PAGE, TYPED STATEMENT.]

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6)	MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
-------------	--------------------------------	------------------	-------------------

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1600 DATED 26 OCT 2009

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Large diagonal line indicating a redacted or empty statement area]

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT AWARE, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

ATTACHED

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Statement)

WITNESSES:

\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS  
\_\_\_\_\_  
\_\_\_\_\_  
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26<sup>TH</sup> day of OCTOBER, 2009 at FORT CARSON, COLORADO

(b)(3), (b)(6) (ing Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)  
COMMISSIONED OFFICER  
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6) 16 Oct. 09

SWORN STATEMENT BY SPC (b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN 22 OCTOBER 2009 AT 1600 MOUNTAIN TIME, 23 OCTOBER AT 1300, AND 26 OCTOBER AT 1600

Q: WHAT IS YOUR DUTY POSITION?

A: I was a machinegunner as well as an assistant gunner.

Q: HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE ARMY? HOW LONG IN COUNTRY FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT?

A: 5 years and 4 months. I had been in country for 5 months.

Q: DO YOU HAVE PRIOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS? IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE?

A: Yes, a 15 month deployment from Oct 06 to Dec 07.

Q: WHERE WAS YOUR BATTLE POSITION ON 3 OCTOBER 2009 AT COP KEATING?

A: When it first started I had gotten off guard duty. I spoke to my wife and laid down at 0530. about 30 minutes later I was woken by an explosion. At first I thought it was an isolated incident. Then more rounds and RPGs started hitting. As part of our battle drill we had to get spun up. I woke up, grabbed my Mark 48 and had PR(b)(3), (b)(6) grab several belts of 240 ammo. We moved to the LRS guard position and began to scan our area until our acting PSG told us to get between the barracks and the humvee. At that time all the fire was coming from the North-Northeast area. We hunkered down in a little ditch and stayed there for a little while. About 10-15 minutes after we got to our position an RPG hit 10-15 feet from our position. A fragment from the RPG or its explosion hit (b)(3), (b)(6) the knee. He yelled out, "my knee, my knee." I checked him out and there were no signs of external injury.

Sometime later we saw (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC(b)(3), (b)(6) who were trying to find the Stand To Truck 1 position. They were carrying a .50 Cal, but did not know where Stand To truck 1 was located. They asked, "Where is the truck?" I told him, "I know where the truck is at (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(6) said, "Ok, help us out."

(b)(3), (b)(6) stayed with the 240 and I grabbed (b)(3), (b)(6) M4 to go with the LT and (b)(3), (b)(6) to find the position. I led them between the TOC and the 3d Platoon barracks, between the TOC and the HQ barracks, up the stairs, and then stopped between the chow hall and the tool shed. We figured out the distance between our position and the stand-two truck and tried to get the attention of the guys in the truck, but they couldn't hear us. I went to the mosque to try to get the truck's attention, and ran into SPC(b)(3), (b)(6) and PR(b)(3), (b)(6) told them I was going to try to get in contact with truck 1, but I couldn't get a hold of them (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed at the position, and I moved back to (b)(3), (b)(6) location with (b)(3), (b)(6)

who by that time had moved up to where I was at the mosque.

I told (b)(3), (b)(6) had an idea that required us to move the .50 cal to the location at the corner of the mosque. I went back to where (b)(3), (b)(6) was with the .50 cal, grabbed the .50, and moved it to the back corner of the mosque, where PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) were still at. I told them my plan: PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) with the Mark 48, lightweight 240, and SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) with the SAW that they would suppress fire while (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved the .50 cal to the truck 1 position.

Once the suppressive fire started (b)(3), (b)(6) and I ran to the truck with the .50 cal. We opened up the back passenger side door. We said, "Hey we got that .50 for you." PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) who was manning the stand to truck, said, "I don't need a fucking .50, I need ammo!" We left the .50 by the truck and returned to our previous position off the back of the mosque. LT (b)(3), (b)(6) were still there.

I left the position off the corner of the mosque to return to my barracks by crouching between the hesco barrier and mosque. I informed SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were posted on the corner of the mosque facing stand to truck 1. I stayed there for a little bit, got a drink, then returned to the position off the corner of the mosque. When I returned, (b)(3), (b)(6) had returned to his barracks to grab 249 ammo, and (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to the TOC.

We stayed at that position for some time, until we began to receive well placed small rounds fire. Rounds were also falling on the generator. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) said we gotta get outta here, and we fell back to my platoon barracks. After we returned to the barracks we began hearing that insurgents had overrun the COP and were moving freely inside. We created defensive positions at the southern entrance to the barracks, as well as inside the barracks. (b)(3), (b)(6) were at the north ends of the barracks covering that entrance, while me, PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) covered the southwest side of the building. Shortly SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) came in and asked how many people we had. He told us they had formulated a plan to start taking the COP back.

SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) moved PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) cover to the west of the barracks with a 240 (b)(3), (b)(6) the AG, was also covering to the east. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed me, PFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) to act as a team to take back the COP. We moved to the boardwalk next to the aid station to let (b)(3), (b)(6) were going to start securing the area. At the time we knew we had friendlies on the southwest side of the COP, but nothing more than that. We could also see the entire ANA camp was on fire. We were concerned that some of the Latvian .50 would fall into the insurgents hands, but due to the huge fire on the ANA camp, we said, "fuck it."

We threw a smoke grenade off the corner of the 1st Platoon barracks to assist our movement to the hescos on the outside of the Afghani Building. Our team moved to the corner of the building off the hescos and stacked as a team on the northeast corner. (b)(3), (b)(6) threw two frag grenades, and we cleared the area between the fighting position and the Afghan building. I yelled door left, door left. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) our door man, breached and we cleared the building. (b)(3), (b)(6) came in with a light and shined it into the dark areas. Once the building was secure we exited the building.

We were short on grenades, so we broke all three doors into the ASP, which was next to the building, and grabbed grenades. We stayed on the northside of the ASP, under the cammo netting, for some time. We saw someone running outside the wall and threw several frags over the wall. We assumed, based on the clothing flying in the air, that we killed him. We continued to hold the position. Eventually SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) called (b)(3), (b)(6) and send another team to support the position. Our guys were covering all points of approach, but we couldn't advance any farther without support. (b)(3), (b)(6) me back to the boardwalk position to ask (b)(3), (b)(6) a team to hold our position so we could advance.

(b)(3), (b)(6) us SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SP (b)(3), (b)(6) We moved up to our position off the ASP. We stayed at the position for some time. From our position on the FP, we saw one person running on a road outside the COP. I took precision shots, while (b)(3), (b)(6) fired with the 240. Every once and a while we would take harrassment fire from the Southwest, as well as the Southeast. All told we held the position for two to three hours, returning fire when we could. Occassionally (b)(3), (b)(6) would say, "Bombs away in 2 or 3 minutes." We would hear the impacts, but generally speaking we couldn't see anything because the buildings obstructed our view.

While in our positions I would occassionally get up and check on positions. At some time I returned to my position and I saw an individual carrying an AK-47 on the road, just outside the firing position. He was about 4 or 5 feet away. I yelled, "Hey, fucking stop." He was facing away from me, so when he turned around I saw the AK47. I went to shoot, but I had placed my weapon on safe. I ducked, and took my weapon off safe. When I stood back up to shoot, he shot me twice in the arm. I fell to the ground. (b)(3), (b)(6) put the 240 on him and put a burst into him. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) threw several grenades over the wall, I think 5 total.

(b)(3), (b)(6) he needed to get me in the Afghani building. I stood up and muscled my way into the Afghani building. (b)(3), (b)(6) looking in my first aid kit for my isreali bandage, but couldn't find it. I said, "Fuck it, I'll fucking walk over to the first aid station (b)(3), (b)(6) I took off for the aid station. Because I was walking so slow (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed my vest and pulled me along to the Aid station.

I was in the Aid Station for about an hour. We could observe the whole ANA camp was on fire. They then moved (b)(3), (b)(6) and me to the back of the TOC. We then sat there for the majority of the day, probably upwards of 3 hours. We could see the fire from the ANA fire moving towards the overflow barracks and the third platoon barracks. Eventually the third platoon barracks caught on fire, and so did the cammo netting between the TOC and third platoon barracks. The TOC started filling with smoke, so 1SG told us to leave.

We (the walking wounded) moved to 1st Platoon barracks, which became the TOC. We stayed there for 2 or 3 hours, until 1830, which is when medavacs started to land to pickup the seriously wounded. They moved out our most seriously wounded, and we moved to the building next to the ASP, the Shura building, for the next Medavac. (b)(3), (b)(6) one ANA Soldier, one interpreter, and I got on the second medavac. The last bird came in for the heros after we left. We flew to Bostick, then to Jalalabad, then to Bagram.

Q: WHAT WERE YOUR ACTIONS DURING THE FIGHT?

A: See my narrative above.

Q: WHAT VULNERABILITIES DID YOU SEE OR FEEL AT COP KEATING?

A: Yes. First, the location was fucking terrible. It was surrounded by mountains and we sat in the bottom of a bowl – to the south was a mountain, to the southwest was a mountain, and from the north to the east was a mountain. The rivers were also a problem, because our patrols on the north side could have been compromised if the bridge was taken out. The bridge itself was only suitable for single or, at most, double file travel. And the bridge itself was unstable. Also, there were trees all over the sides of the mountains, so often times we'd take fire but not be able to identify where it was coming from.

Second, we didn't have any of the high ground.

Third, we didn't have immediate air support. Since we didn't have ground support, it was our only source of help. The day of the attack it took four hours for us to get air support.

Q: WHAT WAS THE FIRST ENEMY ACTION YOU SAW? WHERE WERE YOU, AND WHERE DID YOU MOVE?

A: Immediately when I woke up to the explosion and got outside. See my narrative above.

Q: WAS ANYONE NEAR YOU WOUNDED OR KILLED? IF SO, WHO WAS AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF THE INJURIES? WHAT UNIFORM WAS THE SOLDIER(S) WEARING AT THE TIME? WAS THE SOLDIER(S) WEARING THEIR PERSONAL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT?

A: No

Q: WERE YOU WOUNDED? HOW WERE YOU WOUNDED? WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF YOUR INJURIES? WHAT UNIFORM WERE YOU WEARING AT THE TIME YOU WERE WOUNDED? WERE YOU WEARING YOUR PERSONEL PROTECTIVE EQUIPMENT (PPE)?

A: Yes, I was shot twice. I have on large grazing wound to my upper left arm and left shoulder. I was also shot in the back of my left shoulder. I was wearing boots, ACU pants, tan t-shirt, kevlar vest with front and back plates, eye pro, ear pro, and ACH when I was hit.

Q: DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANA? HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSIGNED ANA/ANP ELEMENTS?

A: Yes, but not the ANA. We worked with the ASG, while the Latvians worked with the ANA. The ASG would go on patrols with us and they seemed to know what they were doing. On the day of the attack, however, neither the ASG nor the ANA were, for the most part, anywhere to be found. The only ANA I saw the day of the attack were manning a firing position in the northeast corner of the COP. At the beginning of the attack I'd seen a RPG hit that fighting position.

Q: DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY? HOW WERE YOU RECEIVED BY THE LOCALS?

A: No, I had very little contact with the locals. During our patrols we would occasionally see locals, but we'd never stop to talk to any of them.

Q: DID YOU EXPERIENCE ANY WEAPON MALFUNCTIONS?

A: No.

Q: PERSONALLY, WHAT AS THE BIGGEST PROBLEM WITH COP KEATING FORCES PROTECTION?

A: Complacency had set in. (b)(3), (b)(6) was in Stand-to Truck 1 and received reports of imminent attack frequently. We were also always low on personnel, so it was difficult to do presence patrols. Like (b)(3), (b)(6) said, we had become predictable.

Q: HOW LONG DID IT TAKE BEFORE YOU GOT CAS?

A: It was 3-4 hours before CAS was on station. Our mortars were pinned down, so they couldn't be utilized.

Q: WERE YOU FAMILIAR WITH THE CLAYMOR SYSTEM? IF SO, WERE YOU AWARE OF ANY PROBLEMS?

A: Yes, I was familiar with the system. I don't know of any problems.

Q: ON THE DAY OF THE ATTACK, WERE THERE ANY ISSUES WITH THE ANA, ANP, OR ASG?

A: None of the ASG were around that afternoon. Like I said earlier, the ANA were at the LRAS position that took that RPG. I don't know anything besides that.

Q: PLEASE COMMENT ABOUT ANY OTHER PROBLEMS YOU HAD WITH COP KEATING.

A: The location was more important than the number of friendly forces. The major problem was we were surrounded by mountains. Also, the patrols we conducted were of limited use because we didn't interact with the locals.

Q: APPROXIMATELY HOW MANY US PERSONNEL OCCUPIED COP KEATING?

A: 50 to 60.

Q: BASED ON YOUR EXPERIENCE THAT DAY, HOW MANY ANTI-AFGHAN FORCES (AAF) WERE INVOLVED? FROM WHERE DID THEY ATTACK? HOW MANY AAF WERE KILLED OR INJURED FROM WHAT YOU KNOW?

A: From what I personally saw, three. Based on the amount of ordinance that was hitting the COP, at least 50, probably no more than 100. Most of the attack came from the North and the West. I know of at least 2 that were killed, but I know the papers reported 20 to 30 were killed on the COP. Between the guys I was with that day, I believe we killed 2 and injured 1.

Q: DO YOU REMEMBER IF YOU CONDUCTED ANY DEFENSE REHEARSALS PRIOR TO THE ATTACK? IF SO, WAS THE PLAN FOLLOWED DURING THE ATTACK?

A: Yes. We rotated weekly for force protection, so my platoon once or twice a month would conduct a force protection drill. The platoon sergeant would come in, get us spun up, and we'd all go to our spots. Yes, the plan was followed during the attack. The rehearsals helped, and everyone went to their assigned spots. Our guard roster would also have positions in case you weren't on guard duty. So far as I could tell, everyone went to the positions they were assigned to.

Q: HOW MANY AFGHAN SECURITY GUARDS WERE USED DURING THE ATTACK? HOW DID THEY RESPOND?

A: As far as I know, the ASG were nowhere to be found. We didn't see any of them. The only Afghan local nationals we saw were ANA that were helping us out.

Q: HOW WERE THE AFGHAN NATIONAL ARMY SOLDIERS USED DURING THE ATTACK? HOW DID THEY RESPOND?

A: They were around. Some of them were missing during the attack, and some of them were fighting with us. As I said above, the ANA were manning the fighting position. After the fighting position was hit by the RPG, I didn't see any of them fighting.

Q: HAD COP KEATING BEEN ATTACKED IN THE 30 DAYS PRIOR TO THIS ATTACK? IF SO, WHAT WAS THE EXTENT OF THE ATTACKS?

A: Yes. The attacks were mostly harrassment fire. I felt like they were probing us and seeing our routine. They wanted to see our response.

Q: WHAT IS YOUR CURRENT MEDICAL PROGNOSIS? WHAT MEDICAL ISSUES DO YOU FORESEE IN THE FUTURE?

A: My current prognosis is unknown. It will take a couple months for my collarbone and acromian to heal. If it doesn't heal correctly, then the docs are going to have to put a screw in to fix it. I'm not sure what the full prognosis will be if they have to put the screw in.

Q: PLEASE DISCUSS ANY OTHER MATTERS YOU DEEM RELEVANT.

A: I can say that PFC [redacted] was a very brave soul that day. He made me very proud. He was new to the Army and hadn't been around that long. He hadn't had much training with us and was new to the platoon. With the very little training he had, he did a great job and made me proud.

SSG(b)(3), (b)(6) did a great job that day

SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) did a good job.

Everyone in general and the ones that had minor wounds kept fighting, and they made me proud. They'd get bandaged up and get back out there. They made me proud. Everyone that was out there did a great job overall.



Shura  
Buildings

ASP  
Arms Supply Point

Afghani  
Buildings

Door

IPD  
IPD

IPD  
IPD  
B5

