

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2009/10/21	3. TIME 1257	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E4/ AD	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS TRP B, 3RD SQN-61ST CAV REGT, 4IBCT-4ID, APO AE 09354			

9. I, SPC (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. WHAT IS YOUR DUTY POSITION? Troop Armorer, TOC RTO

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE ARMY? HOW LONG IN COUNTRY FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT? I have served 4 years and 2 months. I have been in country for 5 months.

3. DO YOU HAVE PRIOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS? IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE? From October 2006 To December 2007 I deployed to Baghdad, Iraq with 3-61 CAV.

4. WHERE WAS YOUR BATTLE POSITION ON 3 October 2009 AT COP KEATING? My official position at the time was to man the back up TOC. However, when the severity of the situation became more clear I joined the Aid and Litter team. Shortly after that I manned the Shura Building's ECP tower.

5. WHAT WERE YOUR ACTIONS DURING THE FIGHT?
At approximately 0600 I was awoken by numerous explosions and a large amount of small arms fire. I immediately strapped on my vest and kevlar, grabbed my weapon and ran out of the headquarters barracks to the back up TOC to insure the radios were up and functional. After a short time it became clear that casualties were mounting so I ran to the TOC itself and found the Aid and Litter team in order to attempt to help with collecting the casualties. We then made our way out of the TOC moving between the TOC and 1st Platoon Barracks up to the COP Mosque for maximum cover. Myself, SPC(b)(3), (b)(6) and SPQ(b)(3), (b)(6) made our way up from the mosque moving toward the LRASSS 2 fighting position and were effectively pinned down by small arms fire and precision small arms fire beside of one of the Force Pro trucks that had attempted to move up in support of (b)(2)High We assessed the situation, and decided that the heavy SAF coming down from numerous positions around us was unsuppressable. It was then that I received shrapnel from an RPG explosion approximately 10 meters from our position. After the explosion we then moved back down to the mosque, I split away from the litter team and made my way to the Aid Station to ensure my injuries were non-life threatening. After CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SG (b)(3), (b)(6) treated me and made sure I was ok, I then made my way back to the TOC to try to find the litter team again and gather my bearings. Shortly after arriving in the TOC I was told to move out to the Shura Building in order to man the ECP Tower. I grabbed a few belts of 7.62mm and made my way up past the Aid Station, around the bend in front of the ASP and straight into the Shura Building. I then moved up into the tower and manned the M240B, laying down suppressive fire onto the western face (Putting Green), the ANP station, and the northern face (North Face) where we were continuing to receive sporadic SAF and precision small arms fire. Several hours later we were reinforced by the Chosin Element that had moved down from Fritsche. Exact times are unknown to me, but to the best of my ability this is the sequence of events.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB BOSTICK DATED 2009/10/21

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

6. WHAT VULNERABILITIES DID YOU SEE OR FEEL AT COP KEATING?

First and foremost the surrounding North, West, and South faces had nearly perfect infill, exfill, and concealment from the COP for the attacking forces. Not to mention the PERFECT high ground positions available to the assaulting forces that we were almost completely incapable of maneuvering on. They allowed for precision small arms to be very effectively used on us, from all of our force pro positions. The significant lack of cover between the ASP and the fighting positions caused many of our casualties. The positions called for men to move distances of nearly 100 yards with no cover available from the considerable high ground COMPLETELY surrounding the COP. Also the lack of effective barriers around the COP. Our ECP "gate" was little more than a large steel rod that could be raised and lowered. The ECP was mainly manned by the ASG who were lacking at best in their thoroughness in vehicle searches. The only Hesco wall that was apart of our perimeter was along the road. The South face perimeter was a three strand concertina wire obstacle. I can't stress enough the ineffectiveness of the ASG. The positions they were supposed to man normally only had one guard at a time in them. I can not recall seeing any of the ASG manning any positions at all that day, specifically the one I passed on my way to the Shura Building that was supposed to be over looking the road outside of the COP. The ANA positions to the East were also abandoned as well. I can't say if the guards in those towers were KIA or if they simply ran. The only time I saw any ANA that day was inside of the doorway to the TOC clogging the entry way for cover, and inside of the Aid Station attempting to receive treatment for wounds I could not visually see. Most assuredly if American Soldiers had not taken the initiative in pulling guard on that COP and mounting clearing mission through the camp, we could not have repelled the attack.

7. WHAT WAS FIRST ENEMY ACTION YOU SAW? WHERE WERE YOU, AND WHERE DID YOU MOVE?

The first enemy contact I actually saw was when I first moved out of my barracks. SAF coming from numerous positions surrounding the COP. Mussel flashes, and the explosions from RPG's as they impacted on the COP.

8. WAS ANYONE NEAR YOU WOUNDED OR KILLED? WHO, AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF INJURIES? WHAT WERE THEY WEARING AT THE TIME? WERE THEY WEARING THEIR FULL BATTLE GEAR?

I did not witness any actual injuries other than my own. I did however see SPC(b)(3), (b)(6) after he was wounded. He appeared to have severe lacerations to his face, and a SAF wound to his left arm. He was wearing his Vest, Kevlar, and his eye pro. SGT Martin's body was dragged into the Shura building while I was in the Tower. He was also wearing his full kit. His only injuries I could identify in a brief time were some first aid treated wounds to his leg. I do not recall if it was his left or right. SSC(b)(3), (b)(6) had a treated shrapnel wound in his right wrist, and one in his right shoulder. He was in full kit as well. I didn't personally witness any of the other casualties.

9. DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANA? HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSIGNED ANA/ANP ELEMENTS?

I had a few experiences with the ANA and the ANP. They were limited to minor social gatherings and a few conversations. As far as the working relationship I would say that the ANA were very largely/ completely dependant on us for all supplies. They had no other logistical support. They were prone to neglect patrolling when assigned to. On one occasion two ANA soldiers flat out left a patrol to "take a nap" as it was described to me later. I really do not know much about the ANP. I do know that the night before the attack they were informed about our planned departure from Keating. From what was described to me about the meeting they then stormed out, very upset.

10. DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY? HOW WERE YOU RECEIVED BY THE LOCALS?

I never interacted with the local community.

11. ARE YOU AWARE OF ANY WEAPON MALFUNCTION DURING THE ATTACK? IF SO, WHAT HAPPENED?

As I stated above, I am the Troops Armorer. The weapons maintenance on Keating was overseen by me. When we first fell in on our TPE equipment I can say that I found numerous faults that should have been caught by annual services and gauging. There were several times I found various problems with M-2's and MK19's to be caused by parts that were long over due to be changed out. As far as the attack is concerned many of our weapons had been through annual gauging and services by D trp, 3-61. As of this statement I am unaware of ANY problems with them save severe damage from shrapnel and direct hits from SAF and RPG's. The only malfunctioning equipment at the time were our LRASSS's, which we were attempting to have serviced one at a time. They simply failed BIT tests, and on occasions, wouldn't turn on at all. Due to the logistics involved and the difficulties, we could only afford to send one at a time or else lose significant force pro capabilities for far to long a time.

END OF STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF SPC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB BOSTICK

DATED 2009/10/21

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS

AFFIDAVIT

I, SPC (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

T.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(*making Statement*)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21 day of october, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09354

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) SFC, USA

(*Typed Name of Person Administering Oath*)

ARTICLE 136, UCMJ

(*Authority To Administer Oaths*)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

csc

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



Complex Attack on COP Keating Storyboard – 03 OCT 09



As of: 10/19/2009 6:06 PM

TF Mountain Warrior "Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

2



- 1. Shura Bldg/ASP
- 2. Red PLT Barracks
- 3. TOC
- 4. Aid Station
- 5. Blue PLT Barracks
- 6. North Fighting Pos
- 7. HQ Barracks
- 8. Overflow Barracks

COP Keating GRG

- 9. US Mortar Pit
- 10. ANA Mortar Pit
- 11. DFAC
- 12. Gym
- 13. Mosque
- 14. Laundry Trailer
- 15. Latrines
- 16. Showers

- 17. IMO Barracks
- 18. Maintenance Shed
- 19. ANA Barracks
- 20. Radio Station
- 21. Billet near Purifier
- 22. Mahqood Barracks
- 23. Rock Shed
- 24. Hescos (577 total)

(b)(3), (b)(6)