

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 304; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20091022	3. TIME 1058	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O2/AD	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS TRP B, 3RD SQN-61ST CAV REGT, 4IBCT-4ID, APO AE 09354			

9. I, 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. WHAT IS YOUR DUTY POSITION?
I am the mortar/ HQ PL.

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE ARMY? HOW LONG IN COUNTRY FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT?
I started Active Duty on 29 May, 2007. We flew from Colorado Springs Airport on 22 May 2009.

3. DO YOU HAVE PRIOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS? IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE?
No, this is my first deployment.

4. WHERE WAS YOUR BATTLE POSITION ON 3 OCTOBER 2009 AT COP KEATING?
I started out at the TOC (BLDG 3), then moved to Blue PLT Barracks (BLDG 5), then to the mosque (BLDG 13), then to the TOC, then to the ASP (BLDG 1), then to the truck southwest of the mosque, then to the TOC, then to Blue PLT Barracks, then to the Overflow Barracks (BLDG 8), then to the Blue PLT Barracks, then to the Aid Station (BLDG 4), then to the Shura Building (BLDG 1), then to the far side of the helicopter landing zone and back to the Shura Building several times.

5. WHAT WERE YOUR ACTIONS DURING THE FIGHT?
I initially helped man the radios in the TOC until the power was knocked out early in the fight. Then, when we learned that one of the stationary trucks needed a new M2 .50cal machinegun, I asked for a volunteer to help me carry the weapon to the truck. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) our cook, volunteered, and we moved to Blue PLT Barracks to get the weapon. We moved to the southern side of the mosque, where I provided cover fire to SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) as they carried the weapon to the truck. Upon returning to the truck, we found that the truck also needed additional ammunition, so SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved to the ASP to get some. We found that other Soldiers were there, already working on the same task, but we grabbed a few cans of .50cal ammunition and ran it to the truck. After returning to the TOC, I found that the Apache gunships were still not on-station, but were either at JAF or FOB Bostick. With the radios already manned, and the rest of my mortar platoon cut off in their pit, I asked ISG (b)(3), (b)(6) where additional men were needed. He told me to coordinate with SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) outside the aid station. This was about the same time that SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) led his element to retake the western portion of the COP. I linked up with SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) who told me that he was sending some Soldiers to clear the Blue PLT and Overflow Barracks. I volunteered to go with them. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), SGT (b)(3), (b)(6), SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) and I

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS C (b)(3), (b)(6)	KING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT FOB Bostek DATED 20091022

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

moved to the Blue PLT Barracks and cleared them. We were unable to leave via the eastern exit because it had been destroyed by an RPG, so we left via the northern exit and buttonhooked east and south to reach the rear of the Overflow Barracks (BLDG 12). During our maneuver, we saw that the ANA side of the COP, to the east, was in flames, and that the fire had reached their ASP. Ammunition was cooking off, including mortar and B10 recoilless rifle rounds. Upon opening the rear door of the Overflow Barracks, a large plume of smoke billowed out. At that point, we knew that the building was already on fire. At this time, we heard the first radio notification of KIAs. The suggestion was made to throw frag grenades into the building instead of clearing it, but I was worried that there may have been friendlies in the building - possibly unconscious due to smoke inhalation or other injuries - so I made the call to clear it. The four of us poured water from SG (b)(3), (b)(6) amelBack onto bandanas and t-shirts, and proceeded into the Overflow Barracks, which was dark and filled with smoke. Once the building was cleared (we found neither enemy nor friendly personnel), we moved back into the Blue PLT Barracks because we could not hold the Overflow Barracks. We resecured the Blue PLT Barracks and secured all three entrances from enemy infiltration. During our time in the Blue PLT Barracks, we saw SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) carrying fire extinguishers to try to put out the fire in the Overflow barracks, and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) came through to grab his M14. We observed muzzle flashes from a bush on the northern ridgeline, and fired on it with M4 and M203, killing the enemy sniper. Sometime during our stay in the Blue PLT Barracks, the AH-64 gunships came on-station and began firing. I estimate that the occupation of the Blue PLT Barracks lasted for about two hours before it, too, caught on fire and we were forced to abandon it due to smoke. Once the Blue PLT Barracks were abandoned, SG (b)(3), (b)(6) G (b)(3), (b)(6) SP (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved back to the aid station to help secure it, as it was now the northeastern corner of the COP's viable perimeter. There, we linked up with SP (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and the two Latvian OMLT Soldiers. We held this position for a few hours. While there, I checked in with the medics several times to see if they needed help with anything. Each time I checked in, they were working with SPC Stephan L. Mace, who had sustained several gunshot wounds early in the battle. The fire from Blue PLT Barracks was spreading across camo nets, commo wires, and a tree, and threatened to catch the TOC. Several Soldiers helped to cut the camo nets, the commo wires, and even cut down the tree in an attempt to delay the spread of the fire. Darkness began to fall, and the first QRF element arrived. I asked ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) the on-scene commander, what he needed me to do. He asked me to move to the Shura Building (BLDG 1) to help ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) with securing the landing zone for the MEDEVAC helicopters. I moved to the Shura Building and linked up with ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) who put me in charge of the far-side security team, consisting of SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6). We waited until the first helicopter was five minutes out, and then we moved out. We exited the entry control point, crossed the concrete bridge, and moved to the ANP hut. After securing the ANP hut, we took up covered and concealed positions and began to scan the ridgelines and avenues of approach. The first MEDEVAC helicopter landed, dropped off ammunition and medical supplies, and evacuated the most serious of the wounded. After it lifted off again, we collapsed back into the Shura Building. We repeated this process four more times, with the UH-60s evacuating the wounded and dead. Once all the helicopters had left, we moved back to the Shura Building and reinforced the ECP with concertina wire and overturned benches. Then, ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I reported to the TOC for further guidance. I then proceeded to the US mortar pit (marked "9"), where I linked up with my men and the reinforcements from the 10th Mountain Division. I spent the remaining time at COP Keating mainly in the US mortar pit, where we executed fire missions with the 120mm and 60mm mortars.

6. WHAT VULNERABILITIES DID YOU SEE OR FEEL AT COP KEATING?

High ground on all sides; air resupply only; small landing zone outside of wire; ASG, ANP, and ANA proved unreliable during fights; inability to utilize LCMR or Boomerang equipment due to high ground on all sides; located far from air support; undermanned; ECP tower had very poor field of fire.

7. WHAT WAS FIRST ENEMY ACTION YOU SAW? WHERE WERE YOU, AND WHERE DID YOU MOVE?

Once I got outside, the first enemy action I saw was muzzle flashes on the southeastern ridgeline (aka "Diving Board"), followed by RPGs exploding in the middle of the COP by the latrines (marked "15").

8. WAS ANYONE NEAR YOU WOUNDED OR KILLED? WHO, AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF INJURIES? WHAT UNIFORM WAS THE SOLDIER(S) WEARING? WAS THE SOLDIER WEARING THEIR BATTLE GEAR?

No.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF ILT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

FOB Bostick

DATED

2009/022

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

9. DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANA? HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSIGNED ANA/ANP ELEMENTS?

Yes. I saw them cluster around the aid station and the TOC during the fight, ignoring the commands of their commander and the OMLT team assigned to them. They were not eager to fight and refused to help US and Latvian forces.

10. DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY? HOW WERE YOU RECEIVED BY THE LOCALS?

No, I did not interact with the local community.

11. DID YOU EXPERIENCE ANY WEAPONS SYSTEM FAILURE DURING THE INCIDENT?

No, I did not experience any weapon system failure.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, ILT (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 22nd day of Oct, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09354

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CPT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

JA

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136 USMS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES



Complex Attack on COP Keating Storyboard – 03 OCT 09

As of: 10/19/2009 6:06 PM

TF Mountain Warrior

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO



- 1. Shura Bldg/ASP
- 2. Red PLT Barracks
- 3. TOC
- 4. Aid Station
- 5. Blue PLT Barracks
- 6. North Fighting Pos
- 7. HQ Barracks
- 8. Overflow Barracks

- 9. US Mortar Pit
- 10. ANA Mortar Pit
- 11. DFAC
- 12. Gym
- 13. Mosque
- 14. Laundry Trailer
- 15. Latrines
- 16. Showers

COP Keating GRG

- 17. IMO Barracks
- 18. Maintenance Shed
- 19. ANA Barracks
- 20. Radio Station
- 21. Billet near Purifier
- 22. Mahqmood Barracks
- 23. Rock Shed
- 24. Hescos (577 total)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

20 OCT 2009