

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION COP Keating, Kamdesh, Afghanistan	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2009/10/03	3. TIME 0600	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O-2, Active Duty	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS B Troop, 3-61 Cavalry, 4BCT, 4ID			

9. I, 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

At COP Keating, on the morning of 3 October 2009, I was woken by the sound of incoming RPGs. I got out of bed in the rear of the TOC and put on my pants, boots, armor, and helmet. I headed into the TOC to see if I could help the acting OIC of the COP, 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6). I fully expected that day's contact to consist of nothing more than a few rocket rounds, as that was the norm I had experienced in my numerous - through brief - stays at the COP. Instead, the RPG fire only seemed to increase exponentially in the next few minutes. That is when it first dawned on me that this could be something bigger. 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) and the other Soldiers in the TOC were already manning the radios to the force protection element on the COP, as well as to Squadron Headquarters, so I mostly just observed. During this time, Soldiers from the Troop's Headquarters section filtered into the TOC, prepared to fulfill their roles as aid-and-litter teams or help in any other way that was asked of them. Soon, all of the generators on the COP had been hit by rockets, which knocked out all power across the COP. As soon as the radios were back online, calls began coming in from the static trucks of the force protection element that they were being suppressed with heavy volumes of RPG and machinegun fire. One of the positions called to say that they needed another M2 .50cal machinegun. I asked for a volunteer from the HQ section to help me take an M2 to the truck. SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) the COP's cook, volunteered and we moved under fire to 3rd Platoon's barracks to get the weapon. We carried to the southern side of the mosque, where we took cover in a small trench with a pair of M249 SAW gunners from 1st Platoon. One of these Soldiers, PVT (b)(3), (b)(6) helped (b)(3), (b)(6) carry the weapon to the truck, moving across 25 meters of open ground under heavy enemy fire with only myself and his fellow SAW gunner providing covering fire. Once there, the crew of the truck informed SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) that we had been misinformed: they did not need another weapon, but more ammunition. Upon learning this, the two of us moved to the Ammunition Supply Point, where we met up with several other Soldiers from the HQ section. We grabbed some .50cal ammunition and SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) ran, alone and with complete disregard for his own safety, back to the truck - this time across 50 meters of open ground. We were separated when I was driven back to cover by a pair of RPG rounds which struck between us. I witnessed SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) and the ammunition over to the crew of the truck, then head for cover as another barrage of enemy fire began impacting around him. I used my M4 to provide what limited cover fire I could to the southwest while he moved. I moved back to the TOC via a different route from SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6). When I got back, the ANA commander was in the TOC. His actions were somewhat detrimental to the command and control of the Troop, as he proceeded to holler about getting air support to evacuate his wounded and suppress the enemy. The 1SG and I had managed to calm him down a bit, when a call came over the radio from one of the force protection positions that enemy fighters had breached the perimeter. At this point, we had not heard any communications from the mortar pit located on the southwest side of the camp, so I volunteered to help 3rd Platoon in their efforts to clear the COP's structures of enemy fighters. I linked up with SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) 3rd Platoon PSG, on the deck outside of the aid station. I told him I was there for him, and to tell me where he thought I could be of most use. He asked me to accompany SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) on their mission to clear the HQ/overflow barracks and 3rd Platoon's barracks, with an emphasis on securing the eastern portion of the COP where the ANA compound was. At this point, the ANA compound had been dealt heavy blows by B10 recoilless rifles and RPGs, and most of its buildings were on fire. The ANA soldiers had abandoned their posts and were gathered around the aid station and the TOC. My

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>3</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/13

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

element moved out to the 3rd PLT barracks, which we quickly cleared with our M4s and flashlights. After we cleared the 3rd PLT barracks, we moved on to the HQ/overflow barracks, making use of a small alley between those buildings and the ANA compound. On our way, we noticed that the fire had spread to the ANA ammo supply point, and was threatening to cook off B10 and mortar rounds that were stored there. This increased the urgency of our clearing mission, but when we opened the door to the HQ/overflow barracks, a thick cloud of smoke billowed out, indicating that the structure was already on fire. The suggestion was made to frag the building rather than risk entering, but the possibility of an unconscious friendly Soldier inside made me reject that course of action. Instead, I pulled a bandana from my pocket and used SG(b)(3), (b)(6) hydration pack to soak it in water. I tied it around my nose and mouth and instructed the others to follow my lead. They quickly soaked their t-shirts or bandanas and pulled them over their faces. While they were doing this, I went back into the 3rd PLT barracks and secured a SureFire flashlight to mount to my weapon. This proved to be the only light we possessed which had any ability to cut through the thick smoke once we entered the HQ barracks. We held our breathes as long as we could and quickly but thoroughly cleared the structure. It was instantly clear that the building was on fire and thus of little tactical value to either friendly or enemy fighters, so once we confirmed that the it was unoccupied, we pulled back to the 3rd PLT barracks. SC(b)(3), (b)(6) called the TOC on his MBITR and informed them of our findings. We were told to keep the 3rd PLT barracks secure from intrusion by AAF coming from the east. We held the barracks, gathering what medical supplies we could find. Once we would amass a decent amount of supplies, SG(b)(3), (b)(6) and I would make periodic runs to take them to the aid station, where we figured they were most necessary due to the heavy number of friendly casualties. It was at this time that we learned over the radio of our first friendly KIAs, including one of my Soldiers, and that air support was on-station. While standing in the doorway, observing for enemy movement to the north, SG(b)(3), (b)(6) noticed a muzzle flash coming from a bush on the ridge across the river. SG(b)(3), (b)(6) and I fired our M4s into the bush, and SG(b)(3), (b)(6) red his M203 around it. We continued firing until we saw the sniper's body fall. Right after this, SP(b)(3), (b)(6) came in, grabbed his M14 Enhanced Battle Rifle, and returned to the aid station to provide precision small arms fire to the southwest. I spotted S(b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) heading to the HQ/overflow barracks with fire extinguishers in a brave attempt to push back the fire. Their attempts were unsuccessful, and soon after, we noticed smoke starting to build up and realized that the 3rd PLT barracks was in imminent danger from the quickly-spreading fire. We gathered all the fire extinguishers we could, even calling on the radio for additional ones from the TOC and surrounding buildings. We used all the fire extinguishers, but we couldn't stop the fire. Eventually the smoke got so bad that we were forced to evacuate and head back to the deck of the aid station, keeping a security element posted to watch the east side of the COP. I periodically went into the aid station to check on the medics and see if they needed anything. At the time, they were working to help PFC Mace, who had sustained multiple gunshot wounds to the abdomen and legs. He kept trying to push the medics' hands away when they were attempting to start additional IV lines, so I held his hands to keep him from interfering with their treatment. I had to leave again, though, after they attempted to get a line into his neck. SP(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SP(b)(3), (b)(6) two members of the Latvian OMLT team, and I secured the aid station in preparation for another influx of friendly casualties. We helped to cover ridgelines to the north and southwest, and the eastern side of the COP. For a while it started to rain, which worried me because I thought that the weather might take a turn for the worse, forcing our vital air support to leave us. I was comforted both by OP Fritsche's flawless 120mm mortar support, and the dissipation of the rain clouds, both of which were key in preventing the enemy from completely overrunning the COP. The fire soon engulfed the 3rd PLT barracks and jumped to a tree directly behind the TOC. Several Soldiers took up an effort to cut down the tree to stop the spread of the fire, despite the fact that the enemy was still shooting at them while they worked with a chainsaw. They also cut burning wires and camouflage net in a desperate attempt to keep the fire from the TOC. Their efforts certainly delayed the spread of the fire, which allowed the personnel in the TOC to jump to the 1st PLT barracks and establish a backup TOC. The fire did spread to the primary TOC, though, as well as the DFAC and Supply Room. By this time, the air and 120mm mortar support, combined with our maneuver elements, had beaten back much of the enemy assault. Friendly KIAs were brought to the aid station by aid-and-litter teams from HQ section. Just as the sun was beginning to set, our first wave of reinforcements arrived, including the 3rd PLT platoon leader and senior scout. Soon after, we got received word that MEDEVAC helicopters were on the way, and I moved to the Shura Building to see what I could do to help. 1LT(b)(3), (b)(6) the 3rd PLT PL told me that he was putting together a near-side LZ security team, and asked if I would take some Soldiers to secure the far side of the LZ. I agreed and took SSQ(b)(3), (b)(6) and SG(b)(3), (b)(6) from 1st PLT, as well as SPC(b)(3), (b)(6) from HQ. We moved out of the entry control point and sprinted across the concrete bridge to the ANP hut. Having verified that there were no ANP at that location (in fact, we had been receiving fire from the hut for most of the day), SG(b)(3), (b)(6) threw a frag grenade into the door and moved quickly up to the roof to secure the small tower on top of it. Once we were satisfied that it was secure, we took cover and began scanning the ridgelines around us for enemy movement while the UH-60 helicopter landed, dropped off ammunition and medical supplies, and took the wounded to evacuate them.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

J. STATEMENT (Continued)

We repeated this four more times, though we did not repeat our steps to clear the ANP hut. After the last MEDEVAC helicopter left, we moved back inside the wire for good, and 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved back to the new TOC. When I was sure it was reasonably safe, I moved to the mortar pit to link up with my men, whom I had been unable to reach, either physically or by radio, all day. SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed me on the events of the day as they had occurred from the perspective of those in the mortar pit, and their current status. Shortly thereafter, an element from 1-32 INF, 10th Mountain Division, came to the mortar pit to help secure it in case we needed to perform a fire mission. Over the next two days, the COP went mostly unmolested and I spent most of my time in the mortar pit with SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) SG7 (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) shooting fire missions with the 60mm and 120mm mortars. We used our indirect fire capabilities to hinder enemy freedom of movement through the surrounding terrain. On 5 October, we packed up as much equipment as we could carry and loaded the rest of the 120mm and 60mm ammunition (minus the amount we would need to help pull security on the LZ) into the Mortar section living quarters in preparation for friendly bomb drops upon our evacuation. Later that night, all remaining US personnel were evacuated from COP Keating via CH-47 helicopters.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

NOTHING FOLLOWS

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13th day of October, 2009 at FOB Bostick, Afghanistan

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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