

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2009/10/20	3. TIME 1245	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E-8/RA	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS TRP B, 3RD SQN-61ST CAV REGT, 4IBCT-4ID, APO AE 09354			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. WHAT IS YOUR DUTY POSITION?

Troop 1SG.

2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE ARMY? HOW LONG IN COUNTRY FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT?

I have been in the Army for 19 years, 4 months. And I have been in the country for 5 months, two days.

3. DO YOU HAVE PRIOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS? IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE?

Yes. Iraq Desert Storm 1990-1991, OIF I 2003 to February 04, and OIF III March 2005 to February 2006. I was with the 3rd ACR for both tours. I got to COP Keating on 29 May 2009.

4. WHERE WAS YOUR BATTLE POSITION ON 3 October 2009 AT COP KEATING?

I was posted between CCP and inside the TOC.

5. WHAT WERE YOUR ACTIONS DURING THE FIGHT?

When the TIC started I went through my battle drills and put on my full kit and began to post myself in my battle position outside by the aid station to help coordinate the fight, supervise the aid and litter team as well as help with resupply of ammunition to the Soldiers who needed it. On my way out of the TOC I noticed that our MIRC system had just went down. I stayed to ensure that the contact reports were sent up via FM. As soon as this was accomplished we lost all power to the TOC. This now became my priority as I identified two things that we had to sustain as soon as I arrived on COP Keating in May. Those were maintain communications and support our mortar pit. When the power went down I immediately placed our emergency procedures into action. I made sure LT (b)(3), (b)(6) had a MBITR radio to fight the fight with as I was getting comms fixed with higher. FM was a no go so I then got our TAC SAT up and running on battery power. At that point I started receiving reports that we had casualties. First was SGT Kirk and SPC Scusa. Now that comms were restored I went out to the aid station to check on my guys. Both were KIA so I returned to the TOC to assist 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) I basically manned the TAC SAT and for a majority of the fight, talked with my higher coordinating air support and CASEVAC operations. Within the first hour before air support arrived we sustained I believe 6 casualties. While assisting to fight the fight, I went outside a dozen times to check on the men and also do an assessment on the fire that was raging in the camp. The ANA portion of the camp (in the vicinity of point 19) and the fire was spreading towards barracks where some of our guys lived (point 8). All means of fighting the fire were exhausted and we did what we could to limit the spread of it to the rest of the camp. I then started a fall back plan as we were going to have to evacuate the TOC. We gathered up all priority equipment and we stayed there until the smoke became overwhelming and we pulled back into the one of the only remaining buildings (point 2).

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF ISG (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT FOB Bostic DATED 2009/10/20

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

We ran all operations from our fallback position the rest of the evening. My actions in between TOC operations consisted mainly of supporting my men and the aid station. About 45 min into the fight we had AAF in the wire. Myself and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) basically placed our "last stand" plan into action. He took charge of the fight outside as I was helping with the fight inside. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) had made several attempts within the first 30 min to get an additional support element up to the HMMWV fighting positions, LRAS 2 and Stand To truck 2. Both times he was beaten back by heavy enemy fire. He continued to defend the western portion, ASP area of the camp while SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge of the inner perimeter and supporting SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) element in further attempts to get to our Vehicle fighting positions. We had lost all comms with those trucks within minutes of the fight and feared all had been killed. We just could not get to them due to the overwhelming fire coming in. I then suggested to LT (b)(3), (b)(6) that we had better reorganize and ensure that our defense was set before making further attempts to get to our boys. We made this happen and placed guards with our wounded by the doors to the TOC. We then finally got a call from SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) on the EF (b)(3), (b)(6) radio and learned that he and SP (b)(3), (b)(6) were still alive in (b)(2) High truck. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) then made more attempts with the support by fire position of SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and SS (b)(3), (b)(6) and was able to take back the Shura building and help get (b)(3), (b)(6) and Mace down from the truck. They were pulled back and I learned that they had retrieved SPC Mace who was severely wounded up by the truck (in the vicinity of point 15). SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SP (b)(3), (b)(6) were able to pull him into the truck and give first aid until help arrived. They did this while still fighting from inside the truck. SPC Mace was taken to the aid station and SP (b)(3), (b)(6) and SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) joined in the fight on the inner perimeter. I could not get the LZ secured so no MEDEVAC could come in at that time. During the fight I was tracking one Soldier as unaccounted for, SGT Hardt. He was found after the QRF arrived that evening behind the maintenance shed (in the vicinity of point 18). SGT Hardt was KIA at the time he was found. He was wearing ACUs and his full kit. After the first 2-3 hours the shooting died down a bit but we were still taking sporadic fire for several more hours. A quick reaction PLT walked down from OP Fritche and were deployed to assist in securing the perimeter. Our forces reconsolidated and redeployed to secure the LZ and get my boys evacuated. SGT Gallegos body was found near a ditch behind the latrines (vicinity of point 15). He was wearing ACUs and his full kit. SGT Kirk was wounded near the Shira building (vicinity of point 1) and later DOW while at the aid station. SPC Mace was wounded while supporting a battle position near truck LRAS 2 (vicinity of point 15) and later DOW at FOB Bostic. He was wearing ACUs and his full kit. SGT Martin was killed near stand to truck 2 (vicinity of point 14). He was KIA when found and had apparently treated himself by applying a field dressing to a leg wound. SPC Scusa was shot in the neck outside blue platoon barracks (vicinity of point 5) near the aid station. He was taken to the aid station and DOW there. PFC Thompson was shot in the head while going to man the weapons system at the mortar pit (point 9).

6. WHAT VULNERABILITIES DID YOU SEE OR FEEL AT COP KEATING? Only one major and that was the terrain. Worst location I have ever seen in my 19 years for a fighting position. This spot should not have been chosen even during the best of conditions. The high ground on all four sides was just something that we could not guard against no matter what type of preparations we had taken. And with the numbers of AAF fighters that hit us that day I am surprised any of us made it out. Thank god for planning!!

7. WHAT WAS FIRST ENEMY ACTION YOU SAW? WHERE WERE YOU, AND WHERE DID YOU MOVE? First saw the enemy on the switchbacks as I was making my way to the aid station. Engaged with one mag from my M4 and then moved out as I had casualties to attend to.

8. WAS ANYONE NEAR YOU WOUNDED OR KILLED? WHO, AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF INJURIES? WHAT UNIFORM WAS THE SOLDIER WEARING AND WHY? WAS THE SOLDIER WEARING ALL HIS BATTLE GEARS?
 All my wounded and dead were near me. I was helping take care of them as well as getting them inside the TOC to a safer position. The last unit never wore their protective gear outside. The first day on ground for me at COP Keating during the RIP we were attacked by my 3-4 man element with two RPGs, I was hit by one small piece of shrapnel in the head so from that day on I made the decision to wear full kit at all times while outside the buildings. All our boys were in full kit the entire time during the fight.

9. DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANA? HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSIGNED ANA/ANP ELEMENTS? The group of ANA we had with us was horrible. We had training in place but they just were not interested and complained about everything. They knew that COP Keating was attacked on a regular basis so none of them wanted to be there. As soon as the fight started most of them ran off and the 6-7 that I counted that remained abandoned their position and cowered in the corner of my TOC and aid station. The 1st group of ANA were decent but the group that replaced them was worthless.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

10. DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY? HOW WERE YOU RECEIVED BY THE LOCALS? I interacted with the COP workers mainly. Made some good relationships with some and yes I think we were well recieved by them. They just reminded us that this area just wanted to be left alone and that the Taliban were in control of the area.

11. DID YOU EXPERIENCE ANY WEAPON FAILURE DURING THE INCIDENT? Not at all. We are very good about weapons maintainance and I spot check my Soldiers daily. I had no reports of failures until well into the fight when the crew served weapons began to go down due to the amount of ammunition being fired. This was restricted to the 50 Cal and MK 19.

Initial call for rotary wing assests took approximatly 1 hour to arrive on station. Requests for CAS and fires from fixed wing assests took longer (30-40 min) than the rotary wing AWT requests (responded almost immediately and engaged targets as they identified them) for fire. No friendly fires hit our forces and only hit our TRPs after we had pulled back.

My first impression of the FOB was, "Are you kidding me"? Why are we in this location? Our RIP/TOA lasted about 2 weeks. I would describe the unit we replaced as lacks in their attitude towards the AO. The unit we replaced would walk around in soft caps and without their kits on. They were involved in about 41-45 TICs the entire time they were at Keating. Our unit was involved in 47 TICs by 3 OCT 09. The 1st day I was at Keating an RPG hit and I took a piece of shrapnel in the head. Right then I decided that all my Soldiers were going to wear their full kit everytime they went outside. It is a rule I strictly enforced and ensured the troops adhered to. Most TICs would last about 5 to 7 minutes then the enemy would break off and retreat before we could really start to engage them. The Troops mission was the COIN fight to win the hearts and minds of the locals. Local patrols went out from the FOB at different times each day. I had about 48-52 assigned to the troop while at Keating. We improved the base defense as best we could by sandbagging and adding cover to several locations and establishing secondary and final fighting positions around the TOC. I identified two main priorities, to establish and maintain communications and to protect the mortar pit. It was a real problem getting flights to come to Keating for resupply runs and bring us the supplies we needed to sustain operations. The command constantly tried to get us the supplies we needed but could not control the helo flights. All of our KIAs came within the first 20-30 minutes of the fight. We were unable to get a helo into the LZ to get out the KIAs and WIAs due to the heavy amount of fire we were taking from the AAF. There were no instances of friendly fire during the fight. Almost 100% of my guys were CLS trained. The only new guy we had was SG (b)(3), (b)(6) and he fit in very well. I estimate there were about 250 AAF that attacked Keating during the fight. There were no civilian casualties that I know of. Afterwards we received word that Urmal have been cleared out before the attack. Our post BDA did not identify any dead civilains in Urmal. END OF STATEMENT.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Signature of Person making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of OCT, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09354

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) SFC, USA (Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ARTICLE 136, UCMJ (Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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