

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2009/10/22
3. TIME:
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: O2/AD
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: TRP B, 3RD SQN-61ST CAV REGT, 4IBCT-4ID, APO AE 09354

9. I, 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
1. WHAT IS YOUR DUTY POSITION? I am the 1st Platoon Leader for Bravo Troop, 3-61 CAV. I was the ground commander at COP Keating from 1 October 2009 until QRF arrived on 3 October 2009 with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was ground commander from on or about 20 September 2009 until the morning of 1 October 2009. MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) was the ground/troop commander prior to 20 September 2009.
2. HOW LONG HAVE YOU BEEN IN THE ARMY? HOW LONG IN COUNTRY FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT? 29 Months in Army-5 months
3. DO YOU HAVE PRIOR COMBAT DEPLOYMENTS? IF SO, WHEN AND WHERE? No
4. WHERE WAS YOUR BATTLE POSITION ON 3 OCTOBER 2009 AT COP KEATING? I was the on-scene ground commander. I initially coordinated efforts from the TOC (labeled number "3" on the map). I also moved on two occasions to the west side of the aid station (labeled number "4"). I also moved in the vicinity of Mahqmoood Barracks (labeled number "22"). We also moved to the Red Platoon Barracks (labeled number "2") to set it up as the TOC.
5. WHAT WERE YOUR ACTIONS DURING THE FIGHT? At initial contact I moved to the TOC ("3") to run the battle from that location. For the most part, I spent the initial hour or two in that building. On two occasions, I moved to the west side of the aid station ("4") to talk to SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding upcoming movements and what I wanted them to execute. On the first occasion that I spoke with SSG(b)(3), (b)(6) and SFC(b)(3), (b)(6) instructed S(b)(3), (b)(6) to secure the East side of the COP using machine gun positions and any obstacles that he could put in the way of the maneuvering enemy. He used C-wire, benches, wood, and anything else that they could find to block enemy forces. SSG(b)(3), (b)(6) instructions were to assault and retake the Ammo Supply Point ("1") to create a strongpoint and allow us to reorganize and refit our weapon systems in preparation for the assault on the remainder of the COP. The second time I spoke to S(b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG(b)(3), (b)(6) was to have SSG(b)(3), (b)(6) lay suppressive fire on the Switchbacks to the Southwest in order to allow SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) element to retake the Shura building/ASP ("1") and the ECP. The third time, I moved to the vicinity of Mahqmoood's barracks ("22") to assess the location of future ordnance drops. I wanted a number of targets to be ready as we were preparing to take back our western battle positions. I moved back to the TOC ("3") and S(b)(3), (b)(6) attempted to maneuver his element to the maintenance shed ("18") to clear some space for SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) team to assault toward LRAS 2. (CONTINUED)

10. EXHIBIT:
11. INITIALS OF PEF: (b)(3), (b)(6)
STATEMENT:
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/22

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(CONTINUATION) S (b)(3), (b)(6)s unable to make it to the shed. SSQ (b)(3), (b)(6) maneuvered anyway. They assaulted to LRAS 2 where they found and recovered SGT Gallegos and SGT Martin. They attempted to locate SGT Hardt, but were unable to find him at this time. He was later recovered on the east side of the maintenance shed ("18"). When the TOC ("3") became too smokey and started to burn, we jumped buildings to Red Platoon's barracks ("2") which was the only hard stand remaining. This was around 1200-1300 hours. We used this building as the TOC the remainder of the day. From this location, we talked to fixed wing and rotary aircraft as well as coordinated with the QRF element moving down the mountain from OP Fritsche. At around 1900, local QRF arrived and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) assumed the responsibility of on-scene commander.

6. WHAT WAS FIRST ENEMY ACTION YOU SAW? WHERE WERE YOU, AND WHERE DID YOU MOVE?
Initial contact I was in my barracks, moved to the TOC and began to assess the situation

7. WAS ANYONE NEAR YOU WOUNDED OR KILLED? WHO, AND WHAT WAS THE NATURE OF INJURIES?
Immediately no, during the course of the day I was moving with a number of Soldiers who were wounded by a variety of things, mostly shrapnel from RPG's.

8. DID YOU HAVE EXPERIENCE WITH THE ANA? HOW EFFECTIVE WAS THE WORKING RELATIONSHIP WITH ASSIGNED ANA/ANP ELEMENTS?

Yes, The ANA broke contact almost immediately the ANA PLT LDR in charge came into the TOC and asked me when the helicopters were coming to get him, as he wanted to leave. I told him to get back out there and defend his side of the COP, I was able to get them to man one location poorly, my forces had to overwatch him at all times, his Soldiers showed no willingness to fight or even defend themselves.

9. DID YOU INTERACT WITH THE LOCAL COMMUNITY? HOW WERE YOU RECEIVED BY THE LOCALS?

I have interacted with locals on a few occasions, they were generally accepting as the majority of the village next to the COP was employed by us.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/22

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

ANY ADDITIONAL MATTERS YOU DEEM RELEVANT?

FORCE PROTECTION

We had 5 main battle positions. 3 battle positions are always manned by force pro. The 2 other positions are manned by the maneuver platoon or force pro. Normally during stand to we have one Soldier manning the position as we do not have enough Soldiers to sustain the positions with additional Soldiers at one given time. The hours were around 0430 to 0730. Overall, we had a SOG and 5 Soldiers manning 5 individual battle positions. We also cut down on patrols while the CDR CP(b)(3), (b)(6) was away. We were also prepping for the draw down. We also had 2 guys manning the TOC at the time. Our force protection did not change much from the last unit positions. We maintained the same 5 battle positions that were handed over from the last unit. We couldn't really improve the sections of fire as the current set up had the maximum amount of overlap as it is currently positioned. In addition, the mortar location also remained the same. We had one 120mm and one 60mm mortar tube. I believe the patterns could easily be picked up. In fact, the AAF did go after the battle positions and mortar location from the initial assault. On the ANA side of the compound, they had 1 squad up at all times in a tower that watches across the river. They also had an additional tower. This was not an official ECP, but would be used as one. The ANA would step down on the wire and cross over. I believe the AAF breeched the compound at that point, but also in other places as well. However, this place is where the wire was already beat down pretty bad. Overall, I know they breeched 3 locations around the COP: the location mentioned above, behind the mortar pit where there was serpentine c-wire, and also thru the main ECP. I believe 20 to 30 AAF actually got thru. I believe we engaged 10 to 15 of those enemy fighters that breeched the COP. Of note, from my observations, the enemy fighters seem to be very relaxed once they got on the COP. They were not acting as I would have expected them too. I also know that they were dragging their dead off the COP. After we had secured the inner area, I initially counted 5 dead AAF. However, when I saw the area again, there were only 3, which means they dragged off 2 of them.

ATTACK ON 3 OCTOBER 2009

I was initially in my barracks' room laying down just getting ready to get up when we were attacked. At that time, we had 5 Soldiers in battle positions and 1 SOG. I woke up at 0559. SSG ran thru the barracks waking people up. I was wearing my PT uniform when I ran to the TOC. I did not have my weapon or gear as I thought it was going to be a general harassing fire. I first called OP Fritsche and informed them we were in contact. OP Fritsche informed me that they were also in contact. L(b)(3), (b)(6) and 1S(b)(3), (b)(6) entered the TOC. SG(b)(3), (b)(6) was on the MIRC. I told him the time was 0602 and asked him to find out what air assets were available. I wanted whatever was available. Our initial report to higher was thru mIRC stating we were taking SAF and RPG fire. In addition, L(b)(3), (b)(6) called up to BN HQ at FOB Bostick as well. Shortly after that, the power went out. The only way we could communicate was over FM and TACSAT.

SSG Gallegos (RED6) was near the latrine area ("15") when he pushed out to LRAS 2 (one of the battle positions) with all of his equipment on. He was just coming off SOG duty. He called me within 2 minutes and provided me with SITREPS. Of note, we have a force pro battle drill in case of a TIC. It changes on a weekly basis and was on the board to tell Soldiers what they needed to do and where they needed to be. Based on this, I had a general idea of who was on and where they were at.

The location of LRAS 2 was the point we knew we would win or lose a major fight. This truck was not well protected. It was a .50 cal and 240 fighting position but was very vulnerable. It was located in a position to help ensure the mortar pit could fire. If the mortar pit can't fire, the LRAS 2 needs to suppress. If the truck and mortar pit is suppressed, they can't cover so SSG Gallegos went up there. He knew it was a decisive point and SSG Gallegos was calling for fires. However, I could not get mortars to respond to targets as they were suppressed by enemy fire.

At this point, we already had a KIA, PFC Kevin Thomson, who was part of the mortar team and had been killed near the mortar pit. SSG Gallegos was observing enemy fire from the switchbacks and the village of Irmul. The mortars always have someone awake with the 120 and 60 already set and pointed to a target. We can normally drop a round immediately. I am not sure who was awake and pulling a shift at the time we were attacked. (CONTINUED)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/22

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(CONTINUATION) Of note, COP Keating and OP Fritsche were attacked at the same time. It seemed to be a coordinated attack. Because COP Fritsche was being attacked, they could not support us at COP Keating with any IDF. We were isolated out there and the 155mm at FOB Bostick could not reach us at COP Keating, but they could reach close to OP Fritsche. So I thought we needed to find a way to get 155mm to support OP Fritsche so we could then get us some support at COP Keating.

Most of the weapons went down or went black on ammo at some point during the fight. However, none of the weapons malfunctioned. I never received a report of any weapon going down for a malfunction. They only went down from being hit. We had weapons that were inoperable prior to the attack, but they were waiting to be shipped and repaired.

Soldiers I got spot reports were from SSG Justin Gallegos, SGT Joshua Hardt and SGT Joshua Kirk. The ANA platoon leader came into the TOC and asked where the helicopters were. He said they needed to leave. The other 12 ANA Soldiers were huddled outside the TOC door. OMLT was doing everything they could to get the ANA to re-engage the enemy. They managed to get the ANA platoon leader to move back to the tower location. We did find 1 or 2 ANA hiding in gutters occasionally throughout the day. At this time, the ANA side was wide open. It was only a couple of minutes later that we got a call saying that AAF breached the wire.

At this time, we needed to get ammo from the ammo supply point connected to the Shura building. It was Blue platoon's responsibility to get the ammo out to the battle positions. They initially were able to run ammo to the battle positions, but that was it. I also determined it was time to abandon the Western part of the COP. We could not support the mortar guys taking fire up there. By this time, AAF breached thru the south side of the COP and the ECP. From the initial attack to this point, it had been approximately 30 to 45 minutes.

Air assets then started coming on station. First to arrive was fixed-wing support. We initially couldn't get CAS dropped. However, once we said that enemy fighters were in the wire, CAS support became more liberal. I told them everything outside the wire was hostile. I had to relay thru higher to tell them what targets to drop on. Overall, I don't think the directives had any effect on getting air support to drop bombs. Normally, CAS came on station within 45 minutes and CCA was available within 10 to 15 minutes after CAS. By the time we had air support, we only could secure the center of the COP. However, at no point did I think the fight was over until it was over. The addition of air support did not necessarily make me feel we had a handle on the situation. CAS dropped bombs first, then an attack weapons team (Weapons 20) arrived on station 10 to 15 minutes later. They were only on station for 6 to 10 minutes before being hit and after to exit the area.

At this point, we had to take accountability and determined we were missing 8 Soldiers based on the fact we did not have communications. With enemy fire coming from all directions, we had no choice but to collapse to the center of the COP and try to establish security. At this time, SF (b)(3), (b)(6)am tried to secure the east side of the COP by blocking paths with anything they could find and setting up machine gun nests. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) team tried to secure the ASP. We began clearance operations by force and had basically established a patrol-based sized perimeter. However, SG (b)(3), (b)(6)P (b)(3), (b)(6)PC Mace, SSG Gallegos, and SSG Martin were isolated in the vicinity of LRAS 2. SG (b)(3), (b)(6)as near the shower trailers and SGT Hardt's last known location was near the maintenance shed and Truck 1, which was on the west side of the maintenance bay. There was another Soldier we could not account for, but I am not sure who it was, this Soldier was located shortly after this accountability check. At this point, we did not have any communications with the unaccounted for Soldiers. We were still taking heavy fire in the form of RPGs and some IDF.

At this time, CAS was doing quick drops. (b)(2)Highwas doing gun runs on the north face. I don't believe there was any issue with CAS or CCA engaging based on directives. CCA did ask to engage the ANA side of the compound. However, I would not clear it and told them not to. I told them we could take care of the compound and have CCA take care of everything outside the compound.

Next, we secured the ECP and then the AAF re-engaged with renewed intensity, similar to the initial attack. We were taking a lot of contact from the ANP checkpoint. We had engaged that location with CCA, but they came back. We were engaged by the enemy from the ANP police station and the ANP checkpoint. In addition, we took heavy fire from Irmul village, including B10s and RPGs. We also took heavy fire from the Mosque. I gave them a center grid for the village to target. I asked for 120s and started getting white phosphorous rounds dropped on the village from OP Fritsche. CCA engaged the mosque with hellfire and CAS dropped bombs on the village. The enemy fire dissipated from the village. (CONTINUED)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) _____ TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/22

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(CONTINUATION) At this time, the ANA compound was on fire and the majority of other buildings were ablaze as well. We began discussing moving the TOC to another location as the fires and smoke were spreading. I also talked with SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) and S (b)(3), (b)(6) put a plan to push back out and try to get our guys that were isolated on the western end of the COP. I then got in contact with SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) who was up at LRAS2 with PFC Mace. SGT Larson told me he was wounded pretty bad and they need covering fire to move him out. We were then also able to account for SSG Gallegos and SSG Martin. We still couldn't find SGT Hardt, so SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted to do a lap around the COP to find him, he executed this lap. However, he still couldn't find him. At this point, we were missing one Soldier (SGT Hardt) around noon time frame. QRF was still prepping and CAS was still dropping bombs. Major fighting had tailed off. CCA and CAS were coming on more often. QRF took about 4 or 5 hours to make their way down from COP Fritsche. As they came into COP Keating, they found SGT Hardt. At this point, we had accounted for all B Troop Soldiers.

We were never able to fire the 120mm mortars during the attack. It wasn't until after the QRF were we able to use the mortar put. Historically, COP Keating had never taken enemy fire from the village of Irmul or the ANP checkpoint or police station. However, the other enemy fighting positions were historical fighting positions with overwatch on COP Keating. Throughout the day, I was talking with LT (b)(3), (b)(6) at COP Fritsche on and off. There was a lot of cross talking when the 155s came in. However, part of the day, we were both isolated and couldn't support each other. Once OP Fritsche were able to support us, we had to relay thru higher targets we need them to fire on. There is also no visual observation from COP Keating to OP Fritsche or vice versa. We also never rehearsed an Alamo plan, but we had also never seen fire like this before.

All our KIAs passed away at the COP during the attack, except for SPC Stephan Mace. SPC Mace was taken to the aid station sometime around noon where he received medical treatment. I saw him there. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that he needed to be medically evacuated within the next couple of hours. While he was not totally coherent, I could still talk to him and he could respond. However, medical evacuation was not feasible at the time when CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) initially asked for SPC Mace to be evacuated. The landing zone was off the COP near the ANP checkpoint we were taking heavy fire from. We could not secure the COP and the landing zone at the same time until the QRF arrived.

When I first arrived at COP Keating, the losing unit seemed very relaxed. From what I remember, they did not have much happed while they were there. Overall, I felt the location was horrible with the fact that mountains surrounded the COP and we had to cross a bridge outside the COP to get to the helicopter landing zone. In addition, the COP is too big being approximately 350 meters from corner to corner. Also, the center of the COP from the TOC to the LRAS 2 fighting position was too open with no cover. We only had 50 to 55 US personnel, 26 ANA personnel, and 2 OMLT to secure the COP.

With regard to cover positions, we did not really have any except the concrete buildings. We had some trench systems. We also discussed putting up hesco barriers to cover movement, but it was never done. We did have camo nets to hide moves. When MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) as Commander, we discussed a lot about improving the COP. CP (b)(3), (b)(6) and I didn't as he had just become the Commander and was dealing with all the property issues. We did try to get a new gate for the ECP, but that did not work out. I requested a welder for the gate, but never got one. In addition, I asked for the claymores to be reset. I wanted to blow up the ones currently in place as they were placed prior to our unit taking over and was worried they would not work. However, MA (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed us not to blow the claymores and to leave them in place. Our mortar guys tried to blow the claymores during the attach, but they would not blow up. They might have been able to suppress some enemy fighters had they worked. Overall, we only conducted combat patrols to clear areas in the vicinity of the COP. We did very little offensive operations. We did set up practice ambushes a couple of times.

Overall, I would say that there were approximately 300 enemy fighters as part of this coordinated attack against COP Keating.

END OF STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, ILT (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of October, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09354

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) Ssg, USA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136, UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)