

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2009/10/24	3. TIME 1140	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O-5/RA	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS HQ, 3RD SQN, 61ST CAV REGT, 4IBCT-4ID, APO AE 09354			

9. I, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I assumed command of the squadron in March 2008 and conducted a pre-deployment site survey (PDSS) in December 2008. During the PDSS I flew into Keating with the BDE CDR for a memorial service. The 6-4 CAV troop commander at Keating was killed by an IED set near a foot bridge by the creek. I was on the ground for about an hour and saw the geography and the positioning of the COP. My first impression was that the COP was extremely remote, and dominated by high ground on all sides. Its position in the valley floor made it too remote for foot patrols into the surrounding villages, with the exception of Urmol, a small neighboring village. The only road was not HMMWV trafficable, leaving no means of ground resupply or evacuation in bad weather, or to patrol mounted to outlying population centers. After reviewing all of the COPs and OPs manned by the outgoing unit, I was concerned that we had too many fixed sites to defend, leaving almost no manpower to conduct patrols and interact with the population. To relieve 6-4 Cav's positions, we had to divide our normally 2 platoon C troop into three platoons, as well as create an additional platoon by taking Soldiers from the three line troops. We effectively had to create 10 platoons out of an MTOE designed at 8. We were manned at a higher rate than our fellow battalions, and the CSM and I ensured we replaced 6-4 on a one-for-one basis at the outlying COPs and FOBs, though we accepted a 50 Soldier shortfall at FOB Bostick. To mitigate at the higher risk locations, we placed all of the 19Ds and 11Bs in the platoons, even the command drivers from HHT.

When it was established in 2006, the primary mission at COP Keating was to establish a base of operations to patrol the Kamdesh district area, interact with local district leaders, and hold a line through the river valley to protect the local population. The purpose of OP Fritche was to provide fire support to COP Keating, maintain observance and overwatch of the North face, and serve as a retrans location in support of COP Keating. OP Fritche did not have sufficient manpower to both conduct combat operations and maintain force protection levels at the OP. The tactical description of Keating and Lowell from the previous command was that they served as a "cork in the bottle" and they had the view that if we were fighting the AAF up there we would not have to fight them elsewhere. It was a view both CO (b)(3), (b)(6) and I did not agree with. Given its remoteness in the vast mountainous district, Keating did very little to interdict enemy freedom of movement, and the vast majority of attacks against it came from residents of the surrounding area. The enemy regularly bypassed COP Keating, and could move freely anywhere outside its direct observation.

After visiting the COP during the PDSS, I assessed that the basic problems were structural, and directly related to its site location. It was exposed to high ground on all sides, with very little standoff from the cliff sides to the north, east, and south. It could be easily observed from high ground in all directions, including beyond the range of direct fire systems. Apart from Urmol, it was too far from population centers for scout platoon sized foot patrols. Our predecessors were only able to patrol 1-2 km in the immediate vicinity of the COP, and even those patrols took 4-6 hours, and exhausted their water supply due to the extreme elevation changes and rugged terrain.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF <u>7</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

My guidance to commanders on initially assuming our COPs and Ops from 6-4 Cav was to fall in on the same force protection measures and patrol sets being executed by the previous unit, to ensure we retained their previous combat experience, but to fix things that were obvious concerns. During my initial assessment of Keating we identified the need to increase the height of the perimeter wall, upgrade the electrical grid support to the generators, sandbag and add overhead cover to provide protection to areas, remove excess explosive ammunition from the barracks to reduce fire hazards, and reinforcing the two fixed vehicle positions with HESCOs and sandbags. All of these projects were addressed to some degree by my next visit in August. The troop also built an additional section of HESCO wall, and hung camouflage netting between the buildings to mask personnel movement around the living areas. On different visits, the CSM and S3 also reviewed security, and pointed out areas for reinforcement. Despite the supply difficulties, force protection supplies were high priority, and we were able to maintain a significant supply of HESCOs, sandbags, concertina, and plywood on hand. Getting RDISS cameras replaced was difficult due to short production from the manufacturer, and their frequent damage by enemy fire.

The COP was subject to long range fires from 360 degrees, and at extremely high angles of fire. The COP employed two US fighting positions, and 2 ANA towers with crew served weapons, in addition to the primary positions of 1151 uparmored HMMWVs, mounting a mixture of .50 Cals, MK-19s, and LRASS thermal sites. I discussed the use of the vehicles with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and he explained that the vehicles allowed them to respond and reposition the weapons against the wide horizontal and vertical sectors required, while provided the necessary 360 degree protection from enemy fire. This was a TTP employed by the COP from its establishment, and subsequent RIPs between 3-71 Cav, 1-91 Cav, 6-4 Cav, and us. On force protection the troop had one platoon available to go out and conduct patrols and one platoon to provide security for the COP and they would rotate responsibilities. In August, the squadron published an order requiring all COPs and OPS to review and update their defense plans, and submit them to the squadron. This was done for all locations, including Keating. Although I discussed force protection with CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) never asked how he was going to defend this position if he was attacked by 400 guys. On my visits, I assessed that COP Keating took security seriously. The best way to convey that point is that every Soldier wore full battle rattle every time they were outside of a building. It did not matter if they were going to the latrine or the shower in the middle of the night. COP Keating was not a new position, and had been in place for 3 years and by 3 units prior to 3-61 Cav. Much of the force protection was focused on the consistent, historic attack patterns and fighting positions established over the previous 3 years, which had changed very little from historical data, or during our first five months of deployment.

The majority of patrols conducted by B Troop were for force protection. They regularly patrolled the high ground in all four directions surrounding the COP. They briefed 3-4 patrols per week, rotating the objectives and times of day to reduce predictability. Each patrol required one complete platoon, working with ANA and the OMLTs, and could only cover one objective per day due to the distance and terrain. On resupply nights, the patrol unit would secure the LZ and surrounding terrain, as well as download and transport the supplies. Apart from patrols to Urmol, most interaction with the public was through elders and shuras visiting the COP.

I assessed that we had sufficient forces at Keating to defend it, but not enough to execute the troop sized patrols that would be required to expand the reach of the COP, and conduct COIN. I expressed this to the BCT commander well before and during the deployment, and we frequently discussed what to do about Keating, as well as COP Lowell, OP Hatchet, OP Mace, OP Bari Alai, and COP Pirtle-King – which all faced the same basic manning challenge. I could not internally reinforce Keating or any post without closing another, which posed a "catch .22." In the pre-deployment briefings, all of the commanders expressed similar concerns, and the brigade commander was particularly concerned about 2-12 Infantry's COPs in the Korengal valley, and that the most populous province of Nangahar had the fewest US forces. After closure, COI (b)(3), (b)(6) had planned to send B troop to reinforce the STB there. I knew we were spread thin everywhere and if I was the BDE CO and I had an extra PLT, I would not have put them at Keating. I did not specifically ask for external forces from COI (b)(3), (b)(6) after we deployed, because we both agreed that closing poorly positioned and ineffective COPs was preferable to reinforcing them. This was also consistent with COMISAF's guidance to focus on protecting the population.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The position of COP Keating made air supply very high risk. The location, size and obstacles on the COP did not allow sufficient room within the perimeter to build an HLZ. Instead, the HLZ at Keating was a rock sandbar in the river. Prior to our arrival, the aviation brigade considered the approach into Keating as so difficult, they would only fly into the COP during green (high) illumination periods. Due to the high number of attacks in June and July, coupled with the increasing familiarity of the pilots, the AVN BDE changed the parameters in their risk assessment when flying into Keating. They would then only fly into Keating during green illum to support MEDEVAC or other emergency situations, and all routine resupply had to be conducted in amber or red conditions. In addition, the "Kamgow" resupply flights required AH-64 escort, Redridge SIGINT support, and Full Motion Video (b)(2)HighThe squadron XO closely tracked the success rate for getting flights in to Keating during the first three months, and it average around 60%. Both the XO and I were constantly fighting to get more resupply flights into Keating. The BDE CDR called the AVN BDE CDR on a few occasions when the situation got critical to get supplies into my forces.

I was able to make it to Keating on three different occasions. In my opinion they were correct. The morale of the troop from July to August was not high, which was partially an extension of the attitude of the unit they replaced. The troopers in B Troop understood the mission at Keating was to conduct COIN operations and protect the local populace, but I believe they shared our general impression that the COP was austere, isolated, and that their focus was on protecting the COP and that their mission was not useful. It was difficult to get mail, supplies, and equipment into B Troop. Many flights were canceled due to supporting Barg-e Matal, maintenance issues, and the change in the aviation brigade's SOP on when they were willing to fly into Keating. We prioritized critical military supplies such as mortar and small arms ammunition, fuel, and force protection items such as HESCOs, RDISS cameras, and generators. Mail and "quality of life" items were often bumped by higher priorities, impacting unit morale. The mail situation got so bad that we finally had to arrange an exception to policy to have the mail dropped in by sling load. We kept the Soldiers informed on the on/off nature of plans to close the COP so they knew what was going on.

Prior to deployment, COI(b)(3), (b)(6) and I identified Keating as a COP we wanted to close as soon as possible, and created a timeline to realign and restructure the positioning of our forces within our battle space. 5 of our 10 platoons were committed to Keating, Fritsche and Lowell, but were only able to routinely interact with approximately 1000 of the 50,000 people in our AO. The BDE and squadron were intent on closing COP even prior to deployment, and the brigade began engaging both 82nd and 101st Divisions to gain approval beginning in January 09, more than five months before we deployed. This realignment formed the basis of the Squadron and brigade initial campaign plans.

On 8 July, shortly after the BCTs TOA from 3-1 IN, I briefed BG Fuller from 82nd on our desire to quickly close COPs Keating and Lowell. The feedback we had previously received on the plan was positive, and BG Fuller was very supportive. We had already begun backhauling excess supplies and unneeded equipment from Lowell to help speed the process once we received official approval. We used the normal resupply aircraft that dropped off fuel and ammunition to backhaul things like gym weights, unserviceable equipment, and unused vehicles. During a meeting at FOB Bostick with MG Scaparrotti and GEN McChrystal on 17 July, COI(b)(3), (b)(6) and I briefed the closure plan to gain approval to close Lowell in August, and Keating in September. COMISAF told me he agreed with me on a tactical level but that there were other concerns that went into making that decision, including Afghan leadership, and that we would have to wait for authorization.

In planning the closure of Keating and Lowell we had to balance the information operations perception that we were "abandoning Nuristan", while maintaining OPSEC and monitoring the perception of the local population. In order to effect this mission we began engaging local leaders, the ANA, ABP, and ANP to develop a plan to realign their forces, protect the populace, and deal with local violence after US forces departed the AO. We kept the potential timelines very vague. Several options were explored to handover the closing COPs to local security forces, either locally recruited security or Border Police. Several meetings and shuras were held with the ABP Zone Commander, BG Zaman, as well as the district shura, and ANSF leaders whose support would be required to get GIROA approval of such efforts. The slow progress caused us to decide to proceed with closure even if local security could not be recruited, trained, and equipped prior.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

In support of the realignment and COP closure plan, we were making a concerted effort across the district to engage local leaders, with the specific purpose of separating Hezb-I Islami Gulbiddin members from the more militant Taliban. The majority of village shuras in Kamdesh District were dominated by HIG leaders, and we received numerous reports of conflict between the factions. The intelligence reporting leading up to the attack indicated that the Taliban wished to continue attacks against coalition and GIROA positions, but that HIG leaders opposed attacks, and were interested in re-energizing development in the district. In every month between June and September, the number and scale of attacks against OP Fritsche and COP Keating declined, while they were increasing overall in the squadron area. While attack trends against Keating were in steady decline, attacks in Ghaziabad against C Troop had increased precipitously – doubling between August and September. Though Keating was attacked frequently, all were small in scale, ranging from 3-5 fighters from a single position, to 10-15 fighters from multiple positions. These attacks resulted in only one US injury requiring evacuation, and that occurred in early June, prior to our TOA with 6-4 Cav. In the same period, C and HHT had suffered 2 x KIA and 10 x serious WIA requiring evacuation from theater. We received a few reports in the days preceding the attack that the AAF was going to attack the COP, but these were consistent with previous reporting, and accompanied by reports of active preaching by HIG leaders against such attacks. Given this picture, the threat reports against Keating did not stand out when compared to reporting across the battle space and were not different from the many previous reports we received on a continuing basis that never materialized.

Initially the plan was to close COP Lowell first. COP Lowell was in a worse location than Keating, influenced even fewer people, and had more severe aviation constraints. In July, the attacks directed at Lowell were of much greater number than Keating, including several attempts to assault its supporting OP positions. Prior to 3 October, I was more concerned about closing Lowell than Keating. Due to illumination levels it was finally decided to close Keating first then Lowell, as there was a period of (b)(2) High illum occurring prior to the red illum required to close Lowell. Prior to beginning any backhaul, the order directed reinforcement of COP Keating with an additional scout platoon, as well as pathfinders from the aviation squadron. This reinforcement would occur during the first day of amber illumination on 4 October, with the backhaul beginning 9 October.

We routinely requested Predator UAVs for ISR support, but after the Soldier went missing in Yukon's AO we saw a dramatic drop off in the amount of ISR assets allocated to the BDE. The brigade's Shadow UAV lacked the range to cover any part of our AO. We frequently used "non standard ISR" provided by fixed wing aviation when we had troops in contact, or when we had an imminent threat of attack. All of the troops have ROVER systems that could receive the feed from aircraft, but they were of limited use due to the terrain restricting line of sight required to pick up a feed. Additionally, when 1-32 Infantry moved forces into Barg-e Matal in mid July, their higher priority reduced the availability of Predator and ISR and air assets even more. The collection range of Redridge SIGINT aircraft allowed us to collect ICOM traffic around Keating when those aircraft were supporting Barg-e Matal or Kamgow resupplies. Barg-e Matal was in our AO boundaries, but we never had a presence there. When 1-32 IN moved forces into the town, they took the lead in that operation and effectively owned that district.

I was concerned about the amount of time it would take to obtain MEDAVAC, CAS, the difficulty in sustaining these outposts, and the wasted amount of combat power at Keating and Lowell, and these concerns were clearly shared by the brigade commander from the beginning, starting with our PDSS in December. I never felt I had to convince my higher HQ of my position concerning these locations, as they were regularly highlighted in both squadron and brigade briefs to RC-E and higher. It was always the BDE's plan to close both of these locations to decrease our manning requirements and increase the amount of combat power available to conduct both offensive and shaping operations. We were always concerned with the amount of time it would take to get a MEDEVAC and AWTs to Keating. During Barg Matal we had MEDEVAC and AWT assets at Bostick but they left after 1-32 pulled out of Barg Matal in late September. On several occasions we requested and received repositioning of MEDEVAC at Bostick when B Troop conducted longer range patrols beyond their normal local security patrols. These required CONOP briefings to the brigade. We did not have the maintenance support, fuel support, or supplies to sustain a permanent AWT and MEDEVAC presence at Bostick. The brigade plan for closure directed return of these assets prior to initiation, beginning with the insertion of the pathfinders and additional platoon on 4 October.

On 29 September, CP(B)(3), (b)(6) reported to me that the ANP police chief told him he knew that we were going to start pulling out of Keating on the 9th of October. We never gave the ANSF or the locals a specific timeline, though we had talked in terms of the month. The closure of Nuristan COPs was briefed to GIROA officials prior, and it was likely passed through ANSF channels. The next period of amber illumination began on 4 October, and we had already planned to reinforce Keating and insert several assets in

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

On 3 October I was in my room when the 155s started firing in support of OP Fritsche. The XO came and told me we were in a serious TIC and I walked to the TOC. An air TIC was already up on the board when I walked in. I began assessing what assets B troop would need during the fight and ensured fixed wing and rotary aircraft had been called in to support the fight.

Initially, I let the battle captain and XO run the fight and monitored the situation. We started receiving casualty and KIA reports very quickly within the first 30 minutes of the battle. Immediately after the first KIA report, I called the brigade commander and explained the seriousness of the situation. The brigade had already alerted MEDEVAC, directed their air QRF to reinforce, and he told me they were requesting the CJTF redirect UAV, and an additional Attack Weapons Team, located at Bagram.

The fixed wing came on station first, and our JTACs related a 9 line request to drop on an established TRP in the high ground west of the COP. I had given authorization for the aircraft to drop, but it took quite a while for the first weapon release. In the interim, both the primary and alternate CPs had lost power, and 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) and 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) began using MBITRs for FM, and a TACSAT to communicate with the squadron. The AWT was flying up from Jalalabad, and had not arrived. I heard 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) getting more nervous, so I took over the TACSAT and starting reassuring him that support was enroute, and had him brief me on his situation, and where he needed CAS after the initial drop. He explained the huge scale of the attack, that the ANA had abandoned their positions and allowed the enemy into the wire. He said he was pulling back the perimeter to the inner HESCO barrier, and needed fires badly. He gave the TRPs where they were receiving fire, and that his priority for CAS was the "putting green" – the historic TRP on the west ridgeline. I ensured the JTACs were passing these locations to the aircraft. There was no question about the requested targets or their grids in the TOC – we had used these numbers in numerous incidents of contact. Despite this, it took a long time for the first bomb to drop.

The first AWT came on station and contacted 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) for targets. They executed a couple of gun runs against massed enemy fighters along the road east of the COP. During these attacks, they received significant ground fire, and both aircraft suffered serious damage. The Apache pilots came into the TOC and briefed me on what they were seeing on the ground, and the enemy locations where they took fire. I directed CAS on a series of buildings where there were significant enemy and heavy weapons, getting the 10 digit grids from the TIGRNET system in the TOC. During the fight I spoke to 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) on TAC SAT and confirmed that the only people in Urmol were the AAF. He reported that the local civilians had received word early that morning prior to the attack to get out of the city.

Once bombs starting the falling, B Troop was able to regain the initiative and begin to counterattack, and retake the COP. Several times I talked with 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) to check on his situation, and confirm the support he needed. I also advised him of the plan to reinforce from OP Fritsche with 2 x platoons from 1-32 Infantry. The COP continued to take sporadic and periodic heavy fire throughout the day, despite the AWT support and huge volume of CAS. MEDEVAC arrived at COP Keating within 90 minutes of the initial attack, but the volume of fire prevented evacuation of casualties until after dark. OP Fritsche defeated the force attacking their position by about 0730, and was able to provide 120mm mortar support through 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6)

We had the "Hatchet" platoon of 16 guys from HHT designated as the QRF, and a secondary QRF from our distro platoon. Ultimately we did not use either platoon as BDE offered up two reinforced infantry platoons from 1-32 Infantry to serve as QRF. This QRF was airlifted into Fritsche early in the afternoon, and moved down the mountain to relieve the COP, making contact along the way. When they reached the COP shortly after dark, we flew in MEDEVAC. I flew into the Keating HLZ with the MEDEVAC escort UH-60, and supervised the consolidation and reestablishment of security on the COP. Over the next three days, we gathered supplies and prepared slingloads, clearing all personnel and critical equipment on 6 October, closing the COP.

Throughout our deployment, we have had difficulty in getting timely delivery of ordnance from CAS. Even with trained JFOs, our time to complete a drop after a 9-line has been initially sent has frequently been 30-40 minutes. Even though the ROE gives clearance to the ground commander in troops-in-contact situations, aircrews are frequently reluctant to drop until they have independently confirmed grids, target locations, and have often delayed to gain independent observation and "positive identification" of enemy prior to dropping. I believe this was a problem with Air Force interpretation of the Tactical Directive - their concerns over collateral damage caused delays in getting ordnance dropped on the enemy. Once the on-scene commander confirmed PID, and I authorized the drop, we should have had the bombs falling on our targets. But it rarely worked that way. I do not know exactly why the initial drop on 3 October took over 40 minutes, but this time was not unusual compared to our previous experience.

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

On 3 October I did not feel constrained by the ROE or the tactical directive. I considered collateral damage and the potential danger to civilians when making my decisions that day. At some point the friction in the process was resolved – particularly after the TACSAT reports that the enemy had breached the wire, and the situation was dire. Once they started dropping bombs they kept it up and suppressed the enemy attacking us out of Urmol. The continuous CAS presence throughout the day was critical to the successful defense of the COP, and all ordnance dropped was accurate, even when dropped extremely close to the wire.

I never personally observed or heard of issues between the 1SG and CDR of B troop. I considered changing CP(B)(3), (b)(6) prior to deployment, but in coordination with the BCT commander, chose to change A troop's commander instead, who had not performed as well during our MRE. After two years in command, including a part of a deployment in Iraq, I sensed that CP(B)(3), (b)(6) was fatigued – but I did not perceive an immediate mission critical need to change out CP(B)(3), (b)(6) as a commander-- I always felt he could get the job done. COI(b)(3), (b)(6) and I planned to change CP(B)(3), (b)(6) in September, after Keating had been closed. This would simplify the process, and the change of area would mitigate the loss of institutional knowledge. His replacement was also not available until then due to the fact he had been initially assigned to help out on the STB staff.

When COMISAF did not approve the immediate closure of Keating along the planned timeline in July, I talked to CP(B)(3), (b)(6) about the need to perform his mission like COP Keating was not going to close – because after the Barg-e Matal reinforcement began consuming a huge percentage of the brigades aviation and ISR resources, I was not certain we could get it closed before winter. Interaction with the locals was minimal with our previous unit, and almost every CMO project – most having been initiated 2 years prior -- was stalled due to enemy threat or simple corruption. I believed he was operating under the assumption the COP was closing, and the Troop was not making a sufficient effort. On several occasions we discussed the need to make a better effort to build relationships and patrol more, and reconnect with the Kamdesh 100 man Shura. I scheduled two shura meetings – one at Bostick that the elders failed to show up for, and one at Keating where we discussed security, the creation of local security forces, and restarting CMO projects. CP(B)(3), (b)(6) reported he restarted regular meetings with the Mandogal and Urmol shuras.

Even with closure uncertain, I elected to change the command anyway. I perceived that CP(B)(3), (b)(6) was tired, and not up to a third year in command, and that a change would be positive for the troop. In my final judgment of CP(B)(3), (b)(6) I'm colored a bit by what I've heard after the Keating battle. I didn't get the subsequent negative reports from his Soldiers until after the attack. I did speak to all the LTs and many of the Soldiers and NCOs in the Troop during my battelefield circulation, but I believe they knew a new commander was inbound and they did not feel a need to rock the boat.

The problems with the ANA were systemic throughout the entire battle space. The 6th KANDAK had the worst reputation and performance of all the units in the Corps. Only created in the summer of 2008, they were considered a new, inexperienced Kandak, but were assigned to one of the most kinetic areas in January 2009, five months prior to our deployment. The troop at Keating and the OMLT Soldiers worked with the ANA as best they could. The problems they reported were similar to those reported by all of the troops. The isolation of the ANA at the various COPs and OPs hindered their already limited command and control, magnified by the fact that the Kandak routinely had 20-28 officers present for duty out of a 42 authorized – with the nadir during and after Ramadan in August and September. The 6th Kandak was due to rotate out of our AO in July 09, to be replaced by a more seasoned, capable Kandak. They were extended for 6 months due to the election in August. The squadron and the OMLT regularly reported the poor state of the Kandak to both US and ANA channels, and requested they be rotated early. Distant from their command, they sometimes refused to train or patrol, and claimed their commander said they didn't have to – particularly during Ramadan in August & September. The troop's primary reported concern was not about the ANA failing during base defense operations, but running away from an enemy engagement while out on patrol. This happened several times while B Troop was patrolling outside the wire. I know that 10-15 ANA left their battle positions and ran away during the attack, with most of the remainder fleeing to the Aid station, CP, and surrounding buildings. Of the 36 ANA on the COP at the beginning of the contact, less than 10 actively engaged the enemy for any length of time.

***** NOTHING FOLLOWS *****

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9. STATEMENT (Continued)

***** NOTHING FOLLOWS *****

AFFIDAVIT

I, LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD. WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28th day of October, 2009 at FOB BOSTICK, AFGHANISTAN, APO AE 09354

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) US ARMY, PARALEGAL NCO
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136, UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)