



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-82
FOB FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

AFZC-BCT-BJA

28 October 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation Statement of CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 25 October 2009, I, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) at FOB Fenty, Afghanistan. The primary purpose was to ascertain CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) involvement during the attack on COP Keating on 3 October 2009. The following are questions I asked and the answers provided by CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6)

- a. What is your duty position? pilot
- b. How long have you been in the Army? 15 years
- c. How many combat deployment have you had? Provide location and time frame?
2, OIF 3 Jan 05-Dec 05 and OEF Dec 08- current
- d. How long have you been in Afghanistan for your current deployment? When did you arrive? 10 months. I arrived in Dec 2008.
- e. What training have you received to fly an AH-64 helicopter? Include total number of hours, total number of combat flight hours, and specific training completed.
Flight School, total hours 1950, total combat 1525
- f. What was your duty position with the attack weapons team? What was your callsign?
CPG trail aircraft, (b)(2)High
- g. When did your team initially arrive on station at COP Keating? Approx 0240Z
- h. Describe your team's actions on the day of the attack at COP Keating? Be as complete as possible.

On 3 October at 0150z my QRF team, was notified to launch to support COP Keating which was in heavy contact. We took off from JAF at 0200z and while in the vicinity of FOB Wright we received a call over SATCOM from Palehorse TOC that the AAF were inside the wire at Keating. We then asked Palehorse TOC to spin up the Division QRF so that we could constant coverage over Keating. We also made the decision at that time to

take a more direct route of flight by cutting over the mountains IVO OP Bari Alai because it would shave a few minutes off the flight and would mask our approach to the enemy. At 0236z IVO Op Bari Alia I contacted Destroyer fires and asked for a situation update. (b)(2)High got on the radio and stated that there was AAF inside the wire and that anyone outside the wire was declared hostile and we were clear to engage. When we arrived on station at approx 0240z we found the eastern half of Keating on fire and the valley full of smoke. Within 30 seconds of arriving on station CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) identified 25-30 personnel approximately 100m to the east of Keating moving along the main road at the base of the valley. CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) then once again confirmed with (b)(2)High that all friendlies were currently consolidated in 3 buildings on Keating and that everyone outside the wire was considered hostile, as they were still under constant and accurate fire. Both aircraft picked up on left orbits and we engaged the AAF until there was no one moving. As a flight we expended approximately 380 rounds of 30mm. As we continued left orbits and continued to scan we saw muzzle flashes and tracer fire coming from the spur that runs from Keating up to Fritsche, in about 40-50 locations, oriented at both the (b)(2)High elements and the aircraft. We suppressed as many locations as possible, with rockets and 30mm approximately 150 rounds of 30mm and 20 rockets, until the fire had all but quit. We continued our scans of the spur, the main road, the town of Urmil, the road to Mandigal, and the towns of upper and lower Kamdesh. The (b)(2)High elements and the aircraft remained in constant contact over the next hour and a half until the both aircraft were bingo fuel and our weapons load was Winchester (no rounds remaining) on 30mm and Remington (down to our last 10%) on rockets. When we arrived at the FARP we relayed the current situation, as we knew it, to Destroyer fires. We completed rearming and refueling and went straight back to Keating. We arrived back on station at Keating at approx 0500z and resumed engaging the enemy who had once picked up firing from multiple locations. After doing this for around 1 hour (b)(2)High asked us to destroy the Mosque in the town of Urmil at (b)(2)High (b)(2)High just across the river on the west side of Keating, which the enemy was using to deliver constant and accurate fire on the COP including heavy machine gun and RPG fire. The location of the target required us to attack from east to west over the COP and put us in range of the enemy that were holding the high ground overlooking Keating. Lead began his attack run with our aircraft following approx 500-750 meters behind. Lead called off his shot stating he had a missile failed. Once clear I engaged with a K2A missile from 1800m hitting the Mosque on the eastern wall. Immediately following our missile launch we felt a round strike our aircraft and started getting system failures. The aircraft had been struck by a DShK round directly under the pilot's seat which then entered the left EFAB where it cut a wire bundle and destroyed the AFT ECS condenser.

My AFT ECS failed, we lost FMC YAW, the battery charger, and auto stabilator immediately. Later on short final to Bostic we also got an EFABS hot warning. We informed lead that we had been hit and that we needed to return to Bostic to assess the damage. Lead was already getting in position to fire on the Mosque again so we told them that we could wait while he took his shot. After lead finished his engagement and we turned and started to return to Bostic his aircraft started losing utility hydraulics and they noticed a vibration in the pedals. As we headed to Bostic CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) in (b)(2)High were attempting to escort the medivac aircraft in to Keating. Once (b)(2)High learned that both aircraft had received battle damage they tasked the Medivac to escort our aircraft back and they fail in trail behind leads aircraft. By the time we landed at Bostic lead had no utility hydraulics. As we were landing the (b)(2)High Apaches from BAF arrived and I conducted a battle handover with them as they refueled and once complete they flew on to Keating. We then contacted Palehorse TOC and informed them that both aircraft had battle damage and that we needed maintenance personnel and a DART team. After shut down the battle damage was found on both aircraft and we determined that they were both non-mission capable. About 20 minutes after we had shutdown we learned the (b)(2)High elements had received battle damage and back inbound to Bostic. We then attempted to coordinate going with 1 of our aircraft and one of the (b)(2)High elements, but were informed that CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) were in route with the DART team and another aircraft. While we were waiting on the DART team and our replacement aircraft we conducted hasty air assault planning to make two turns into Fritsche with (b)(2)High elements to reinforce the (b)(2)High elements with, CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) the AMC for (b)(2)High. Once the planning was completed CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) moved to (b)(2)High we prepared to go to (b)(2)High when it arrived and (b)(2)High loaded the ground QRF. CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) and CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived just as the QRF had finished loading and we quickly briefed CW3 (b)(3), (b)(6) of the maintenance issues and climbed in to (b)(2)High. We had all observed weather coming from all directions and we concerned with getting the multiple lifts in, we told Destroyer Fires that we felt we could definitely get one of the turns completed before the weather arrived and we would reevaluate the weather for the second turn. They told us to continue as planned and reevaluate. The weather dropped in on us but we were able to maintain VMC so we continued to make turns. A total of 6 turns inserting 126 personnel into Fritsche. Throughout the infil of troops all the (b)(2)High took countless small arms and RPG fire and the (b)(2)High aircraft continued to suppress. The bad weather turned out to be beneficial in one respect and that was that the muzzle flashes from the enemy weapons were now much more visible. This allowed lead to locate the 2 DShK positions on the spur overlooking Keating, (b)(2)High that

we believe hit our aircraft earlier. Both aircraft engaged the positions with 30mm and rockets expending another 480 rounds and 36 rockets. The crews manning the guns were killed but the guns appeared to still be intact. While we were on our way out we passed the grid for the DShk position to fixed wing aircraft, (b)(2)High which had arrived on station and while we were gone they reengaged the target. No further fire was received from that location for the rest of the day. We also got a call from (b)(2)High asking us to engage the ASG checkpoint, (b)(2)High on the west side of the COP because it had been occupied by the enemy and they believed that the AAF were using it as a staging point. Lead had called bingo while we were getting the info from (b)(2)High for the engagement and we decided that we didn't want to leave without hitting the target so lead started back at 70 knots while we shot the building with a hellfire and 6 rockets. We caught up with lead over the BK pass after completing the engagement and we returned to Bostic as a flight of two. While we completed the first 2 turns CW2 (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Dart team managed to get (b)(2)High operational again and when we launched on the next lift they joined the flight as trail so that we could have another aircraft to cover close in to the LZ and act as an escort for the 60s when they left the valley enroute to Bostic. Once we completed the air assault of the reinforcements we remained on station to cover the (b)(2)High elements, (b)(2)High elements (on Fritsche), and the (b)(2)High element that had now started their movement from Fritsche down to Keating. We called and received approval for an extension and remained on station until the end of our extension. No additional significant events occurred.

We flew for 10 hours today and fired over 1600 rounds of 30mm, approx 90 rockets, and 5 hellfires in support of the ground forces. We destroyed 3 buildings, killed at least two DShK crews and one RPG crew. Estimates at the end of the day by us and the ground forces put the enemy dead due to our fires at 50-80.

- i. How did your team PID targets?

With the TADS and visually we PIDed targets by muzzle flashes, and smoke fired by (b)(2)High personnel.

- j. How did your team identify enemy locations? In addition to what is listed above we received verbal talk ons from (b)(2)High
- k. How long did it take your team to engage enemy targets? 1-2 minutes
- l. Did your team identify enemy elements in the village of Urmul? No.

- m. Was your team in contact with ground elements? Who did your team communicate with during the battle? Yes. (b)(2)High at Keating and (b)(2)High on Fritsche.
- n. Was CAS on station prior to your team arriving? If so, how did your team deconflict airspace? No.
- o. Was your aircraft damaged from enemy contact? Yes.

- p. Did your team fire on any structures? If so, what specific structures? Why did your team engage those structures? What weapon systems did your team use to engage those structures? Did your team receive any special permission to engage those targets?

Yes, we fired on 3 structures a Mosque, an L shaped building we later learned was a clinic, and an ANP station. We fired on the ANP Station and the Mosque based on the (b)(2)High stating that is where the were taking effective small arms fire and RPG fire. We fired on the L shape Building because that is where AAF pax ran to. We engaged all the structures with K2A Hellfires. No additional permission was required in accordance with my understanding of the ROE.

- q. Did your team assess collateral damage prior to engaging targets within the village of Urmul? Yes which is why we engaged with Laser guided munitions.
- r. Did your team identify any non-enemy or non-AAF elements in the village of Urmul or any area within the target location? No
- s. Did your team delay or not engage enemy targets after being requested to by ground elements? If so, why? no
- t. Did your team delay or not engage enemy targets in the village of Urmul at any point during the battle? Is so, why? No
- u. Did COMISAF tactical directive inhibit your team from engaging enemy targets at any point during the battle? If so, describe in detail how. No
- v. Did your team engage targets on COP Keating? Did anyone request that your team engage targets on COP Keating? No and no.
- w. Did your aircraft sustain any damage? If so, what cause the damage and when did it occur? Yes, DShK fire hit the bottom of our aircraft. This was approx 0600z.

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- x. Provide the amount of ammunition and other weapons expended during the attack on COP Keating? We fired about 1600 rounds of 30mm, 86 rockets, and 5 hellfires.
- y. Did any weapons malfunction during the attack on COP Keating? Not on my aircraft, but lead had a hellfire fail to launch.
- z. Provide any other matters you deem relevant based on the incident that day. Nothing additional

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CPT, JA
Assistant Investigating Officer