



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE MOUNTAIN WARRIOR
COMBINED JOINT TASK FORCE-82
FOB FENTY, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09310

817 EASOS/DOB

27 October 2009

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Statement from Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) and Captain (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and Captain (b)(3), (b)(6) both members of the United States Air Force ALO team in support of 4-4 IBCT, located at FOB Fenty, Afghanistan, collectively made the following statement in an interview with General Guy Swan, Colonel (b)(3), (b)(6) and LTC (b)(3), (b)(6) of the KOP Keating, AR 15-6 investigation:

We have been training with 4-4 IBCT since October of 2009. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) is the flight commander and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) is the assistant flight commander. The JTAC who was in the TF Destroyer TOC, controlling the CAS for COP Keating, SrA (b)(3), (b)(6) works for us. We think that communications would have been better with a JTAC comms at COP Keating on 3 October 2009. The contact at COP Keating appeared to be normal and routine, at first. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was awoken around 0630 on 3 October 2009 when situation became worse at COP Keating. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) pushed the NCOIC out to get a team out to the PADS which were out at FOB Bostic and work resupply. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was running the desk during the first 12 hours of the attack, while CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing the liaison work. The Squadron commander, Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) was on duty at the time of the attack on COP Keating. As the attack worsened, we began pushing more assets to support COP Keating. We were also trying to deconflict the aircraft formations, as they entered the stack. A-10s were sent into the battle space towards the afternoon of 3 October 2009. The contact on the ground began to pick up rapidly as the fight went on. It took about 7 hours until we got a JTAC on the ground at Keating.

TIC was declared at 0133; Aircraft were checked at 0145 and the first bombs were made contact at 0218. Getting to coordination and communications to figure out what was going on was the hardest part. We are not able to identify the code names for the landmarks on COP Keating (i.e putting green, waterfall, etc.) Also, there was not an emphasis for us to use these terms regarding COP Keating.

We are both pilots in the Air Force. A pilot can often tell a sense of urgency on the ground by the sound of the voices on the radio. SrA (b)(3), (b)(6) relayed that there were already two casualties during the engagement on COP Keating. The goal in the air is to get the bombs on target as soon as possible but ensure you're getting the bombs in the right place. You try to get a common reference point to talk off when trying to find a target and confirm PID. Air Force aircrew goes through multiple checks, to include weaponeering and CDE, prior to target execution. Pilots/Aircrew cannot fly and JTACs cannot control until the Tactical Directive has been signed off. There is no indication that any hesitation occurred on the pilots' part, they were probably getting clarification of where to drop the bombs.

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CAS armed escort missions have been mandated for helo flights into the Kamdesh valley for over six weeks prior to the attack on COP Keating. F-15 and F-16 fighters are familiar with this particular valley. The F-15s and F-16s are based and flown out of Bagram Airfield. The F-16 unit which supported the incident at COP Keating have since re-deployed stateside.

During the attack on COP Keating, BG Kwast was with Lt Col (b)(3), (b)(6) monitoring the situation from CJTF. Time on station was 0145z, 33 minutes from on station, the first radio communications to first bomb impacts. The first fighters returned to base after their mission at COP Keating at 0338z.

TIC response time goal for all missions is ten minutes (standard). We receive a daily report of the average daily TIC times. We try to keep fighters on station for RC East to cover the area. We are familiar with imminent threat TICs, which happen almost daily.

We rarely have untasked XCAS available in the area. RC East receives about 30 to 40 preplanned CAS hours a day. Since the attack on COP Keating we receive most all of the CAS hours we need.

We have been doing internal after action reports on how to better manage CAS flow during future scenarios since the 3 October 2009 attack on COP Keating. The elevation of the terrain is a challenge for the CAS stack, therefore the stacks have to operate at a higher altitude. We kept the fighters in and had to kick out some of the UAVs because of the small airspace available in the stack. The cold weather (ice) was also affecting certain assets for the mission regarding the attack on COP Keating.

We think it would have not mattered what airframe was there, a specific CAS airframe would have not minimized the situation.

The fighter squadrons will have the fighter footage of their weapons employment during the attack on COP Keating.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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4-4 IBCT ALO

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