

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION COP KEATING, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2009/10/10	3. TIME 1125L	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O2	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS B TROOP/3-61 CAV/4TH BCT 4TH ID			

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

a. What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the complex attack on COP Keating?

At 0558L the initial round impacted on Keating on 03 October 2009. I immediately made my way into the TOC to begin working on getting assets pushed out to us. Private (b)(3), (b)(6) was on the mIRC system sending up a SALTUR report but was having trouble getting through on the system. SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) called the initial contact report stating that we were taking RPG fire and he had one KIA, PFC Thomson. About 60 seconds into the contact I called B Troop ALOC at FOB Bostick and reported that we were taking heavy and accurate enemy fire and were suffering casualties and needed assets as soon as possible. Shortly after an RPG hit our generator and the TOC lost all power. LT (b)(3), (b)(6) began maneuvering guys on the ground to support the pinned down locations. PV (b)(3), (b)(6) ran to the ASP and began to gather ammo for re-supply to the different fighting positions as well as direct other soldiers coming in on what ammo needed to go to each position. Due to the heavy volley of fire we were not able to fire any of our indirect assets. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) assessed the situation and devised a plan to coordinate with the artillery pieces stationed at Bostick to begin firing in support of OP Fritsche, who was also taking heavy accurate enemy fire at the time. This allowed the 120mm mortars at OP Fritsche to begin to support us. About this time CCA checked on station. After I gave them a short synopsis of the situation they immediately located 30 AAF dismounts running towards the COP. This was about the same time we received word that our wire had been breached and there were AAF inside the COP. I gave the CCA the clearance to engage and they immediately eliminated the group of 30 dismounts. As the fight continued we began to slowly regain control of the situation and the COP. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) escorted a team to begin clearing buildings to re-secure the perimeter. Under suppressive fire from the friendly elements on the ground and the air support overhead SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) team began moving from the North side of the COP to the south side clearing buildings. Throughout the day SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) would come into the TOC and give us updates on what he was seeing on the ground and pertinent things that needed to be relayed to the aircrafts overhead. During the morning hours we had lost contact with LRAS 2 which consisted of SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6). We were under the assumption they were KIA. After about 2 hours of radio silence from that location we finally received comms from them after SP4 (b)(3), (b)(6) crawled to a different area of the COP to grab a radio and alert us of their pinned down position. At that time we were able to lay down enough suppressive fire to get them back into our condensed safety perimeter. Throughout the day we dropped over 35 ordinances from fixed wing aircraft and had CCA engage multiple targets of opportunity with 30mm, 2.75" rockets, and hell fires. The QRF arrived to the Cop at just about dusk. Since the LZ at Keating was hot most of the day they landed at OP Fritsche and walked down from OP Fritsche. SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) led pre-assaulting fires and offensive triggers to prep the infil route the QRF was taking on their way to Keating. The QRF walked up on a near ambush by two AAF who looked like they had shrapnel wounds from the mortars moments before. They quickly engaged and neutralized the targets and continued their route into the COP. They swept the Cop clearing all buildings and assumed force pro responsibilities after that.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

b. How many US service members and Afghan National Security Forces were occupying COP Keating? What units were present at the time of the attack?

There were roughly 2 Platoons plus attachments (50 US soldiers) at COP Keating and an Afghan National Army platoon (roughly 26 soldiers) stationed there as well. 1st Platoon, B/3-61 CAV and 3rd Platoon, B/3-61 CAV were on the ground as well as HQ Platoon, B/3-61 CAV. I am unclear of the ANA unit that was on the ground there as well.

c. Who attacked the COP? How many Anti-Afghan Forces (AAF) were involved in the attack? How many AAF were killed or injured during the attack?

The reports we received after the attack say that the fighters were from all of the surrounding villages including Kamdesh, Agassi, Mandaghal, and Agro. As well as fighters from the south near Gewi and Jalalah. I believe there were roughly 300 AAF fighters that attacked the COP. From speaking with the different assets of that day I would estimate we killed 150 AAF fighters with another 50-75 injured.

d. When did the attack begin? Develop a timeline of the key events leading up to, during, and after the attack.

The initial round impacted on the COP at 0558 local time. At that time we called up the initial contact report. After the first round impacted we began to take a heavy volley of fire with an RPG impacting every 15 seconds or so. We lost power at roughly 0605 after an RPG struck our generator. The first air support we received checked on station at roughly 0625 local time. At this time we still had complete control of the COP. At roughly 0640 local time was when we received the first report that AAF had breached our wire. CCA checked on station just before 0700 local where they were informed that we had lost control of the COP and had enemy inside the wire. The first lull in the attack came about 1100 local time. At this point we were able to begin to send a team back to recapture buildings we had previously lost. I believe the initial QRF platoon landed at OP Fritsche at 1300 local time. They began their movement to the COP sometime near 1400 local time heading north from OP Fritsche. By 1530 local most of the buildings on the COP were on fire and we were all stationed and centralized in 1st Platoon's Barracks. We made visual with the QRF just before sundown at roughly 1800 local. At this point they swept the west side of the COP to ensure all buildings were clear of enemy. The QRF company from 1-32 IN assumed force pro duties at roughly 1900 local time. All forces were pulled out of the COP 3 days later on 06 October at roughly 2000 local time.

e. Where did the attack occur? Provide relevant graphics and photographs depicting the location of the attack.

The attack basically happened all around us. When the initial attack began we were taking fire from every cardinal direction. I would say their strong points were to our South and Southwest on the Switchbacks and to our West from the village of Urmal and from the Northwest draws across the river. From these locations they were able to clearly engage the mortar pit as well as our different force pro fighting positions.

f. What were the specific injuries to each member of the coalition forces killed or injured in the attack?

PFC Thomson received a gunshot wound to the head at the beginning of the attack when trying to man the 240B in the mortar pit to provide cover fire for the mortar team to begin hanging rounds. SGT Kirk I believe was shot in the neck at the ECP trying to support the 240B position at the ECP. SGT Hardt was shot when trying to suppress AAF fighters for other members of (b)(2)High (b)(2)High to fall back to a safer location. I do not have the specifics for how each member of (b)(2)High was killed. I know we lost 8 US soldiers with another 10 or so who received various injuries. I believe most of the wounds came from RPG's and small arms.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

g. What was the AT/FP plan for the COP? Was it current? Was it available at the FOB or was it at a higher HQ? Was the plan appropriate based on the terrain and AAF activity in the area? What force protection technology was in place and how was it employed? Did the COP commander conduct base defense rehearsals prior to the start of the attack? Was the plan followed? How many US Service Members were engaged in force protection duties at the time of the attack?

Our FP plan at the COP was current. We had an LRAS truck that covered the Southwest to the Northwest, our ECP covered from the Northwest to the North face, and another LRAS truck covered from the Southeast pushing towards the North face. The ANA covered the North side of the camp and had a tower that looked to the Northeast. We also had a 240B in the mortar pit that looked South to Southwest. During stand to we would add a couple additional trucks to support the primary trucks for additional firepower. Our stand to times lasted for 2 and a half hours in the morning and 2 and a half hours in the evening. I think based on the amount of ground we were forced to cover on the COP this was the best force pro plan available. The plan was initiated at the COP level. It was not pushed down from higher. We had claymores located to the West of the ECP as well as claymores located to the south of the mortar pit. We were conducting base defense drills about once a week until about 2 months before the attack initiated. At this point we kind of backed off on base defense drills due to the amount of TIC's we had been in everyone knew the plan and their roles during TIC's. We also had a real life base defense drill about once a week during TIC's is another reason why I think we quit having them as often. Everyone knew there roles for base defense and knew how we liked to fight and we followed that plan on the morning of the attack. I'm not sure the exact number of US Service Members doing force pro duties during the time of the attack, I know it was during our stand to time but I would say it was less than 50% of people on the COP.

h. Were there any contract security guards in place at COP Keating? If so, how were they employed prior to the attack, how did they respond to the attack, and how had command and control of the contract security force?

We have ASG who search vehicles passing outside of the COP and also handle ECP duties. When the attack started I am almost positive all of the ASG ran away and were nowhere to be found during the attack. But we always knew they would do that, out of all of the TIC's we were apart of at COP Keating I can't recall one time the ASG fired their weapons in support of Coalition Forces. Most of them are locals from the surrounding villages so I think they face a lot of consequences when they go home at night if they do too much for us. The ASG commander, (b)(6) lived on the COP full time but I cant tell you his actions during the attack.

i. Were the ISAF and/or US ROE followed during the engagement? If so were the ROE too restrictive? Did the on-scene commander understand his authority to employ force and did he apply the appropriate amount of force?

It is my opinion that ISAF and US ROE were followed exactly how it was designed during the attack. We found out pretty relatively early they were using the village of Urmal and particularly the mosque inside the village as well as the clinic to the east of the COP as strong points because they knew we would not fire in there. Once the on-scene commander realized that we were in danger of being overrun and could not sustain with the amount of casualties we were taking he gave the commands to fire on the mosque and the clinic, but only after we tried every other option to avoid damaging civilian structures.

j. When was COP Keating first occupied? Was COP Keating under construction at the time of the attack? Was the occupation and construction of COP Keating a planned operation? If so, who did the planning and what planning was done? Was there a current vulnerability assessment? If so, what was the result of the vulnerability assessment? How were identified vulnerabilities mitigated?

I'm not exactly sure when COP Keating was first occupied. I believe it was about 3 years ago by the PRT in 2006. I know a vulnerability assessment had been done in the past but I am unsure how long ago. Since I arrived in May I know we had not had a vulnerability assessment, but our Commander at the time had mentioned getting one out there to give us an assessment. If personnel on the ground identified vulnerabilities we would point them out to the commander and ask to make changes. I know some were approved and some were denied. When it was asked to look at revising the ECP due to its vulnerability to the West it was said that it's not a big issue. However, we did add more sandbagged fighting positions throughout the COP to provide guys a little more cover in the event of an attack

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

STATEMENT OF ILT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Bostick DATED 2009/10/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

k. Had COP Keating been attacked in the 30 days prior to this attack? If so, what was the extent of the attacks?

Since I arrived in May the COP has averaged an attack about every 5 or 6 days. During the 30 days prior to 03 October none of the attacks were out of the ordinary. They usually consisted of an initial RPG or B-10 round followed by a couple sprays from small arms. Never were the fights sustained and I never thought the attacks to be more than 5 or 6 fighters. I believe all the attacks before the 03 of October were just probing attacks to learn our TTP's and learn how we react during contact.

l. Was there a current threat assessment? Had any intelligence reports been received indicating a possible attack in the 30 days prior to this attack? If so, what was that intelligence? What office was responsible for those reports? What actions were taken as a result of that intelligence? Were those actions appropriate? Were higher HQ made aware of any current intelligence?

Since arriving in May we usually hear once every couple of days that 50 fighters or 100 fighters were massing to attack the COP, and then an attack would happen and it would be 4 or 5 individuals. We just learned to take the local national's account of number of fighters attacking with a grain of salt. So hearing that AAF fighters were massing for an attack was nothing out of the ordinary. We took everything seriously, we did not take any reports lightly, but because the local national's reports were so watered down all the time it did not raise any red flags for us before the attack that anything was out of the usual. Pretty much all of our intelligence came from KLE's with the local populace and relying on locals to report information to us. Anytime we received word of a possible attack we would send it up in a nightly report. No matter what the report was, everything was pushed to higher.

m. What Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance platforms were covering COP Keating at the time of the attack? Was the ISR support appropriate? What organic ISR support was available at the COP? Was that organic support adequate? Were any deficiencies made aware to higher HQ? Was anything done to correct deficiencies?

Before the attack began, to my knowledge there was no (b)(2)High covering COP Keating. After the attack initiated we had multiple (b)(2)High covering COP Keating and one even engaged a target with a hellfire. Organically the only (b)(2)High we had was (b)(2)High located at OP Fritsche. We rarely flew th(b)(2)High Due to the terrain and the valley with the winds coming down the valley it was nearly impossible to get any kind of feed from th(b)(2)High It was more of a liability when flying it in case it crashed than any sort of knowledge we could gain from it. We had requested from higher HQ for (b)(2)High in the past but were occasionally told that since we were not the main effort in the brigade we did not have priority for (b)(2)High and none were available at the time, which was completely understandable.

n. What was the relationship with the local community prior to the attack? Was there any indication from the local community that there would be an upcoming attack?

The local populous did not tip their hat in any way to inform us there was going to be an attack outside of an individual here and there bringing in a 3rd or 4th order report he had heard. In fact the day before the attack we met with the Mandagal village Shura and discussed what projects we could look at developing together in the future because security in the region was improving and the intensity of the attacks were beginning to die down.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1125L DATED 2009/10/10

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

u. Recommendations concerning improvements, if any, to coalition force techniques, tactics, and procedures to prevent future incidents from occurring?

I think with the amount of troops we had on the ground the COP was entirely too big and we were forced to cover too much ground. The area of the COP could have been downsized to make it a little more defensible. Also just the position of the COP as I am sure has been noted by now was surrounded by high ground and was a tough piece of land to defend, especially with the amount of soldiers we had on the ground to defend that type of terrain. Having CCA an hour a way is too long as well. Due to the rugged terrain and cover provided by the vegetation fixed wing assets can only see so much. The CCA is vital to repelling an attack like that in that terrain and an hour is a long time to wait against those kinds of enemy numbers. End of statement. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR INTENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18th day of October, 2009 at FOB Bostick, Afghanistan

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

B TROOP/3-61 CAV

4TH BCT 4TH ID

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

1SG (b)(3), (b)(6)

B TROOP/3-61 CAV

4TH BCT 4TH ID

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT

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