

1. On 30 Oct 09, MG Swan, Investigating Officer, interview MG Scaparrotti, Commander, CJTF-82, pursuant to an AR 15-6 investigation into the COP Keating battle of 3 Oct 09. MG Scaparrotti provided the following information:

- A major concern at COP Keating was for MEDEVAC; by noon there was a stable perimeter but some continuing fire from the surrounding hills; talked with the brigade commander and asked if the unit controlled the LZ; he concurred in not trying to push in MEDEVAC aircraft at that time since it was not secure between the COP and the LZ; it was too risky for a helicopter to get in; an Apache pilot said he had flown the MEDEVAC route into the LZ and had been heavily shot up
- It appeared from enemy support by fire positions that the enemy knew the range of B Trp weapons systems
- It was not his decision to close the COP; there was Afghan pressure to go to Barg-e Matal; he understood with the brigade commander the desire to come out of Keating; a third of his aviation resupply went to Barg-e Matal
- We can do some things to make our decisions less clear to the enemy when closing COPs; mindful of OPSEC
- Limited (b)(2)High RC-East; if put on remote COP then limit operations elsewhere; challenge is where to put limited (b)(2)High ; never sense till after the fight that we did not get more definite intelligence; there was sensing of impending attack on Keating, but not that it was more than normal
- Very large enemy force surprises; experience with Ranch House and Wanat; what are we missing?
- Understand CAS and CCA key players in this fight; AC-130 to help helos come in for MEDEVAC and QRF
- Overflew Keating but not able to land; never boots on ground there
- Approx 180 positions (FOBs, COPs, OPs) in RC-East; staff does force protection overview; identify top 20 concerns; must be in position that unit can hold for an hour; takes that long to reinforce; note reluctance by US forces to use USAF in strafing runs; advantage in bringing fire danger close to deter enemy