



4 IBCT / 4 Infantry Division


"LED BY LOVE OF COUNTRY"



TF MOUNTAIN WARRIOR

GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (GRINTSUM)

280500DSEPTEMBER2009 – 290500DSEPTEMBER2009



POINTS OF CONTACT:	
MW2	SVOIP:
CFT Director	
AS2	
BISE Chief	
S2X	
NCOIC	
CM&D	



Weather Effects Matrix



As of: 9/29/2009

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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AO South

JALALABAD 4-DAY FORECAST

VALID 1800 HRS ZULU 28 SEP 09

FORECAST	Tue 29 Sep 09		Wed 30 Sep 09		Thu 01 Oct 09		Fri 02 Oct 09	
	HAZE		HAZE		HAZE		HAZE	
	LO: 70F/21C	HI: 97F/36C	LO: 72F/22C	HI: 97F/36C	LO: 75F/24C	HI: 99F/37C	LO: 77F/25C	HI: 100F/38C
	WIND CHILL N/A	HEAT INDEX N/A						
	← 8 KTS		← 8 KTS		← 8 KTS		← 10 KTS	
	00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG		12-00Z: 5 MI / NO CIG		00-12Z: 7 MI / NO CIG		12-00Z: 6 MI / NO CIG	
	HAZE		HAZE		PARTLY CLOUDY		HAZE	
	ILLUM DATA		ILLUM DATA		ILLUM DATA		ILLUM DATA	
	FIXED WING CAS		FIXED WING CAS		FIXED WING CAS		FIXED WING CAS	
HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS		
PREDATOR		CC		CC		CC		
PERSONNEL		T		T		T		
SHADOW		CC		CC		CC		
TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME		

T - Temperature CC - Cloud Cover

Weather Effects

	0000-0400	0400-0800	0800-1200	1200-1600	1600-2000	2000-2400
Troops			T	T	T	
Mobility						
Shadow			CC	CC		
Hunter			CC	CC		
Predator			CC	CC		
RW (CAS)						
FW (CAS)						
COMMS						

AO North

BLESSING-BOSTICK 4-DAY FORECAST

AS OF 2000 HRS LOCAL 28 SEP 09

FORECAST	Tue 29 Sep 09		Wed 30 Sep 09		Thu 01 Oct 09		Fri 02 Oct 09	
	LO: 57F/14C		HI: 90F/32C		LO: 57F/14C		HI: 91F/33C	
	LO: 57F/14C		HI: 90F/32C		LO: 59F/15C		HI: 90F/32C	
	LO: 59F/15C		HI: 90F/32C		LO: 59F/15C		HI: 90F/32C	
	10 KTS		10 KTS		12 KTS		10 KTS	
	7 MI / NO CIG							
	CLEAR		CLEAR		CLEAR		CLEAR	
	CAS		CAS		CAS		CAS	
	HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS	
FMV COLLECTION		FMV COLLECTION		FMV COLLECTION		FMV COLLECTION		
PERSONNEL		T		T		T		
TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME		

T - Temperature

Lunar Effects

Date	BMT	SR	SS	EET	MR	143	150	153	160	163	170	173	180	183	190	193	200	203	210	213	220	223	230	233	000	003	010	013	MS	Lunar % Illum (0000, 2359)
	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)																									(UTC)
29 Sep 09	0021	0116	1310	1404	1031	25	29	32	35	37	39	39	39	37	35	32	28	24	19	14	9	4	-2	-8	-14	-20	-26	-31	2122	84
30 Sep 09	0022	0117	1309	1403	1100	21	26	31	35	39	41	43	44	44	43	40	37	34	29	25	20	14	9	3	-3	-9	-15	-22	2220	91
01 Oct 09	0023	0117	1307	1402	1127	12	17	23	28	33	38	42	45	48	49	48	46	43	40	35	30	25	20	14	9	3	-3	-9	2318	96
02 Oct 09	0024	0118	1306	1400	1153	7	13	19	24	30	35	41	45	49	52	54	55	55	53	50	46	42	37	31	26	20	14	8	0016	99
03 Oct 09	0024	0119	1304	1359	1219	2	7	13	19	25	31	37	43	48	52	56	59	61	61	59	56	52	48	43	37	32	26	20	0016	100



Mountain Warrior PIR



As of: 9/29/2009

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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As of 30 AUG 09

TF Mountain Warrior PIR

Laghman/Western Nuristan Derivative PIR

1. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process?
 - 1a. Who and where is spreading propaganda to delegitimize the Afghan elections?
 - 1b. How will AAF groups target the new Provincial Council members are the election results are released?
2. Where does the local populace rely on AAF for support rather than GIROA, ANSF, or CF?
3. How can CF sway local leaders to a more favorable opinion of the GIROA?
4. What effects are friendly and threat IO messages having on the local populace?
5. What individuals or facilities have connections to which insurgent group?
6. When and how is corruption and/or drug trafficking supporting AAF operations?
7. What rifts exist between AAF groups that can be exploited by CF and GIROA?
8. How will the upcoming winter affect AAF activity in N2KL?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Laghman?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Laghman?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Laghman?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Laghman?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being produced in Laghman?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Laghman?

Nangarhar Derivative PIR

Konar/Eastern Nuristan Derivative PIR

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Nangarhar?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Nangarhar?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Nangarhar?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Haqqani Network in Nangarhar?
- 6b. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 6c. What individuals or facilities have connections to Bilal Ahmandi's network in the Khogyani tribal area?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Nangarhar?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5a. Where is OBJ Hot Date and Tamadullah?
- 5b. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 8a. How can the divisions between the HiG, TB, and Salafists be exploited by CF?

AO MOUNTAIN WARRIOR SIGACTS



As of: 9/29/09 02:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Last 24 Hours

280000D+SEP09 -282359D+SEP09

AO Destroyer

- 281619D+SEP09 - DF
COP LOWELL received SAF/RPG from 1-3 x AAF
- 281330D+SEP09 - SAF
LN received SAF from UNK AAF resulting in 1 x LN CHILD WIA **LN CAS**
- 282005D+SEP09 - SAF
NISHIGAM ANP received SAF from 1-3 x AAF

AO Lethal


- 280934D+SEP09 - SAF
IM21 received SAF from 2-3 x AAF
- 281008D+SEP09 - IDF
COP HONAKER MIRACLE received IDF from 3-5 x AAF

AO Chosin

- 281753D+SEP09 - DF
DOG 1 received RPG/SAF from UNK AAF
- 282122D+SEP09 - IDF
COP MONTI received IDF from UNK AAF

AO Wildhorse

- 281250D+SEP09 - SAF
LN received SAF from UNK AAF; 2x LN WIA 2x LN KIA
- 282250D+SEP09 - CPLX **LN CAS**
ANP CHECKPOINT received RPG/SAF from 12-15 x AAF



LEGEND	
Blue circle	SAF
Pink circle	PSAF
Yellow circle	SAFIRE
Light blue circle	RPG
Grey circle	DF
Purple circle	COMPLEX ATTACK
Red circle	IED DET.
Yellow-green circle	IED FOUND
Green circle	IDF
White circle	OTHER
X	LN CAUSALITIES

ASSESSMENT

Activity in N2KL remained consistent over the reporting period, with attacks mostly keeping in the northeastern Konar area. Activity will likely remain at elevated levels over the next month until the onset of winter, followed by a subsequent lull in attacks. In Nuristan, activity will remain decreased; attacks conducted will focus IVO COP Keating and Lowell, and possibly OP Mace, in the near term. In Konar, AAF continue to target CF in the Pech and Dara Noor districts, centering their attacks on CF fixed locations. IED-initiated ambushes and direct fire attacks along MSRs will become more prevalent IOT restrict CF FoM. AAF will use intimidation tactics, such as kidnappings for ransom and targeting of LNs to deter them from working with CF. In Laghman, AAF will increase emplacement of IEDs along MSRs to disrupt CF patrols and intimidate LNs in the area. In Nangarhar, AAF will continue to emplace IEDs and conduct direct fire attacks against ANSF/CF throughout the province, especially along Route Newark. These attacks will be used to slow CF patrols, facilitate illicit activity and protect freedom of movement. Reportedly, criminals being paid by AAF in Nangarhar has been targeting Pro-GIRoA LNs. Attempts by AAF to dissuade LNs from supporting or working for CF/GIRoA will remain prevalent but will unlikely have a large impact on the populace's support in the near term. Attacks in Konar and Nangarhar may increase in the near future as a result of PAKMIL operations being conducted along the border regions. Insurgents will seek sanctuary in bordering provinces under the guise of refugees in order to evade capture while facilitating the movement of MWE into the AO.

24-48 THREAT REPORTING



As of: 09/29/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET //REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Laghman:

- AAF plan to attack COP Zio Haq or supply trucks traveling on HWY1A between 25SEP-29SEP.

Konar:

- AAF will conduct sporadic attacks targeting CF bases in the Korengal Valley in the next 24-48 hours.
- Reporting indicates and fighters plan to conduct an IED initiated ambush on CF patrolling IVO Senji Village, Pech District in the next 24-48 hours.
- Reporting indicates AAF plan to attack FOB Fortress in the next 24-48 hours.
- AAF will continue to conduct IDF attacks targeting COP Monti in the next 24-72 hours.
- Reporting indicates AAF are possibly planning to ambush CF/ANSF patrolling along southern MSR California in the next 24-48 hours.

Nangarhar:


No Direct Threat Reporting. Increased targeting of GIROA and tribal leaders could occur as AAF attempt to regain control and challenge the governments ability to secure the population.

Nuristan:

- Reporting indicates AAF will attack COP Keating in the next 24-48 hours.

★ -Threat in Next 24-48 Hours

★ - Continuing Threat



THREAT ASSESSMENT

- AAF will increase harassing direct and IED initiated attacks throughout Konar province to slow CF targeting and patrols in the area. Attacks will target CF bases throughout Pech and Dara Noor districts with IDF and SAF from stand-off distances. IED and ambushes along MSR Rhode Island will be emplaced to interfere with CF/ANSF operations in the area. Attacks will be most prevalent along western portions of Rhode Island due to AAFs freedom of movement and unpaved surfaces.
- AAF in Konar continue to conduct meetings for future attack plans consisting of more large scale, coordinated attacks targeting CF bases. AAF in the Khas Konar District have reportedly received multiple IEDs and plan to emplace them in the near future. IED-initiated attacks along MSRs in the near future will target CF/ANSF convoys and patrols especially IVO the Shaunkrai Valley. Attacks targeting CF bases in the Pech, Ghaziabad and Nari Districts will be most prevalent over the next 24-72 hours.
- IED activity in southern Nangarhar will continue to screen and facilitate AAF and criminal activity in the area. Increased intimidation will also occur in these southern districts targeting both locals and ANSF to slow patrols and retain freedom of movement with GIROA interference.

Pages 6 through 7 redacted for the following reasons:

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Konar Daily Rollup




As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO~~

Trends By Week



AUG 24 - AUG 30

AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 07 - SEP 13

SEP 14 - SEP 20

Konar Daily Activity:




SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

KONAR ACTIVITY
<u>Active OBJ</u>
OBJ KILTY
OBJ COPYCAT
OBJ WRIGLEY
OBJ MOWGLI
OBJ HOTDATE

☐ - TB Radio Active

So What...

CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE SPORADIC ATTACKS TARGETING CF PATROLS IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS; AAF WILL ENGAGE COP BADEL AND OTHER BASES ALONG THE KONAR RIVER THAT HINDER AAF FOM ALONG FACILITATION ROUTES IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS AS AAF CONTINUE TO TRANSPORT MWE INTO THE AO IOT CARRY OUT FUTURE COORDINATED ATTACKS



LEGEND	
●	SAF
●	PSAF
●	SAFIRE
●	RPG
●	DF
●	COMPLEX ATTACK
●	IED DET.
●	IED FOUND
●	IDF
○	OTHER
△	HUMINT
☐	SIGINT/OTHER
◆	ACTIVE OBJ
▲	NIGHT LETTER
★	CF BASE
X	LN CAUSALITIES

ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

6 x SIGACTs

- NISHIGAM ANP RECEIVED SAF
- LNs RECEIVED SAF FROM UNK AAF
- IM21 RECEIVED SAF
- COP H-M RECEIVED IDF
- DOG 1 RECEIVED DF
- COP MONTI RECEIVED IDF

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

1x LN CHILD WIA

- SIGACTs during the past week have decreased slightly in comparison to last week's trends; this decrease in activity can be attributed to AAF's lack of fighters and resources to carry out effective attacks; AAF CMDRS are also finalizing plans for large scale attacks that will be carried out in OCT and attempting to repair disgruntlements between various AAF groups; however, the push of AAF into Konar from PAKMIL operations will likely result in a slight increase of attacks during the near term
- AAF will continue to engage CF bases that hinder AAF FOM; COP Monti will continue to receive sporadic attacks as AAF attempt to divert CF attention from AAF facilitation efforts; CF can expect to see attacks targeting the two CF bases continue in the next 24-48 hours as AAF move more MWE into Konar in preparation for upcoming attacks
- AAF will continue to utilize cornfields for cover/concealment in the sporadic attacks targeting CF/ANSF patrolling elements until cornfields are harvested during the month of October; once AAF are unable to utilize the cornfields, CF/ANSF will likely see a slight increase of stand-off style attacks targeting CF/ANSF static locations as AAF will attempt to minimize AAF casualties while continuing attacks targeting friendly forces

Nuristan Daily Rollup



As of: 09/29/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//R


GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Trends By Week

10

0



NURISTAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

AUG 24 - AUG 30

AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 07 - SEP 13

SEP 14 - SEP 20

Nuristan Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING



LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

1 x SIGACT


● COP LOWELL RECEIVED DF

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

- Over the past week, kinetic activity within Nuristan has significantly decreased in comparison to prior weeks' trends; CMDRs attendance at various meetings, the lack of fighters and weapons acquisitions prevented AAF from conducting large scale attacks
- Attacks targeting CF across Nuristan will remain minimal in the upcoming days, attacks will remain sporadic, targeting CF bases with harassment style attacks on an irregular basis IOT emphasize that AAF are still occupying the area
- The past two days DF attacks targeting CF bases in eastern Nuristan indicate AAF have finished conducting resupply operations and will continue to engage CF bases in the next 24-48 hours; AAF's primary targets will continue to be COP Lowell and COP Keating and AAF will likely continue to conduct sporadic DF attacks targeting the bases
- AAF operating IVO Mandagal Sofla Village, Kamdesh District are attempting to recruit more fighters and dissuade the local populace from working with CF; pending AAF's further recruitment of fighters, AAF will begin to conduct more complex attacks targeting friendly force static locations within eastern Nuristan

So What...
CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE SPORADIC DF ATTACKS TARGETING COP KEATING AND COP LOWELL IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS; CF OPERATING IN WESTERN NURISTAN CAN EXPECT TO SEE A CONTINUED LULL IN KINETIC ACTIVITY FOR THE NEAR TERM




SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

△

△

△

- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE
- ✕ LN CAUSALITIES



ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY
2 x SIGACTS

- ANP CP RECEIVED CPLX ATTK
- ✕ LN RECEIVED SAF FROM UNK AAF

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties
2x LN WIA; 2x LN KIA

- Trends for Laghman this week indicate a decrease last week; we can expect to see this week's trend follow Laghman 2008 trends
- A senior Taliban shura in Peshawar, Pakistan was conducted in order to resolve the recent demands of Taliban members in Laghman Province; due to Shah Agha Kheyli's ineffective logistical support he may be replaced with a more effective logistical leader ; that would indicate that fighters in Laghman Province may be able to increase attacks as AAF could then receive weapons to carry out planned attacks
- CWIED engineers in Masamute village will increase the IED production in Alishang indicating an increase in activity
- Zar Jan has sought to conduct SAF on ANSF/CF elements along HWY1A in Qarghayee; the ANP CP may have presented the highest chance for success and Jan attempted to avoid fighter casualties

Nangarhar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/22/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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
SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Trends By Week

10

0



AUG 24 - AUG 30

NANGARHAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ACTIVE OBJ
- NIGHT LETTER
- CF BASE


AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 07 - SEP 13

SEP 14 - SEP 20

Nangarhar Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING



So What...

IED ATTACKS ON ROUTE NEWARK WILL TARGET CF PATROLS IN THE VICINITY OF MEMLA VILLAGE, KHOGYANI AS AAF SEEK TO KEEP CF FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AT MINIMUM LEVELS. AAF ARE ATTEMPTING TO PREVENT ANSF/CF OPERATIONS IN THE KHOGYANI/SHERZAD AREA AS AAF LEADERS USE THESE DISTRICTS AS BED-DOWN LOCATIONS.

ASSESSMENT

- For the second consecutive week trend analysis indicates a continued decrease in kinetic activity; this year's level of attacks remains below the 2008 historical trends which may indicate disruption caused by CF/ANSF operations
- Taliban members are possibly paying small criminal organizations operating in Nangarhar to conduct intimidation operations targeting Pro-GIRoA LNs in order to discredit GIRoA security; this group is tasked to keep the local populace point of view of GIRoA security obscured and misinformed and ultimately dissuade LNs support for CF/GIRoA
- AAF are using the Kuz Kunar ANP to facilitate movement through northern Nangarhar which allows AAF to freely enter Konar Province in order to conduct attacks on ANSF/CF; the ANP are allowing this so that they are not attacked which inhibits the fidelity of the ANP and will thus reflect on GIRoAs security capabilities in the public's eye
- Weapons and financial support from Pakistan will result in an increase of kinetic activity; AAF will use Khogyani as an area to stage and launch attacks on ANSF/CF patrols in the vicinity of Memla village; Pakistan funding has also facilitated the release of AAF in Nangarhar through bribery

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

0 x SIGACTS

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

0xLN WOUNDED

1 NANGARHAR

Shinwari/Afridi Tribal Relations



As of: 9/29/2009 5:45 AM

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//NOFORN


12

Background:

- ❖ The Afridi Tribe is the most powerful and dominant tribe in Kyber Agency, based in the Tirah area. Afridis, the guardians of the Kyber Pass, are widely known throughout the region for their courageousness. While short tempered, Afridis are known as good fighters who are pragmatic in picking their battles and making alliances.
- ❖ There are 7 Afridi subtribes. The Afridi are divided between 2 major Sunni sects – the Deobandi and the Barlevi. The Deo militant form of Islam, not dissimilar from Wahabism. organization gains strength from the Deobandi network, but until 2008, was running into resistance from moderate Barlevi factions.
- ❖ The Afridi control most of the transportation routes through the Khyber Pass into Afghanistan. Shinwari and Afridi tribes have historically dominated the transport industry, creating close ties between the two. Cross-border trade is either the cause or result of strong ties to Afridi tribes across the border in Khyber Agency.
- ❖ Afridis do not have a blood tie on the Afghanistan side.
- ❖ The A'ash Khail subtribe of the Shinwar Tribe, Koki Khail subtribe of the Afridi Tribe and Mohmand Tribes appear to be cooperating as members of the Mangal Bagh's Lashkar-e Islami insurgent group. The Lashkar-e Islami, followers of Mangal Bagh, were from the Afridi Tribe near Bara CAN Khyber Agency, FATA, PK.
- ❖ Reporting in 2006 claims each of the Afridi subtribes contained elders who received Pakistani Government Support. Pakistan's ISI maintained an interest in securing the support of the various tribes. In return, these tribal elders lobbied for acceptance of Pakistani government involvement in tribal areas.

Assessment:

- ❖ *Despite an attempt by [redacted] from the Shinwari Tribe to work together with the Afridi Tribe in preventing insurgent infiltration and activity cross-border, the Afridi are viewed as troublesome, unreliable and inferior by not holding up their end of the deal. [redacted] is most likely frustrated with the Afridi who has fighters involved in TB activities against [redacted]. While some Afridi tribal elders may be genuinely cooperative, some tribal elders may have an interest in supporting TB activity due to ISI ties. In addition, certain subtribes of the Afridi tribe are mo [redacted] old Deobandi sympathies and therefore supportive of [redacted] organization.*



Recent Developments:

- ❖ Leaders from Nangarhar Province's 3 main Pashtun tribes met in Jalalabad 12 May 09 with Tribal Elders from Pakistan's Khyber & Mohmand Agencies to build cross-border tribal unity and discuss ways to prevent insurgent infiltration and activity. During the Shura, Afridi Tribal Elder [redacted] from Pakistan told participants that local Afridi Tribal members would not cooperate with insurgents in his area. Shinwari Tribal Elder [redacted] from Nangarhar's Dur Baba District, [redacted] added that he would work with fellow tribal leaders on both sides of the b [redacted] ent tribal agreements designed to stop the flow of insurgents. Mohmand Tribal elder [redacted] from Nangarhar's Goshta District, added that remote villages along th [redacted] stan would benefit from further development projects from the US provincial reconstruction team in Nangarhar. The Shura was organized by the Nangarhar Director for the Ministry of Border, Tribal and Ethnic Affairs, [redacted] and included 45 tribal leaders from four tribes. These included Nangarhar's Khogyani & Shinwari Tribes, the Mohmand Tribe which is located in both Nangarhar & Pakistan's Mohmand Agency and Paksitan's Afridi Tribe. (Source: 08 Jun 09 State Department Cable)
- ❖ [redacted] warned the TB not to harm kidnap victims (kidnapped Shinwari tribal members) or he will kill 3 TB prisoners he has been holding since the failed 17 July 2009 attack. The 3 TB prisoners are Afridi Tribesman from Pakistan, one of whom is from Maydan (CNA), PK. [redacted] allowed the prisoners to be interviewed by local television and radio media, which broadcasted the interview. The prisoners claimed they only came to Afghanistan to tour the area. One, who identified himself as [redacted] said he didn't shoot anyone because he didn't want to harm any good Muslims. (S [redacted] IIR 6 059 7471 09, 11 Aug 09)





Factors Leading to Assessment

- **Increased SIGACTs** – Across the entire N2KL area, the number of SIGACTs is significantly higher in 2009 than in 2008. This trend is the same for Nangarhar province. This may possibly be related to an increased threat or simply increased patrolling by CF and ANSF. Additionally, the 2009 presidential election played a role in the increased threat activity. As a result, the increased number of SIGACTs leads to an assessment of decreased security.

- **Increased Threat Reporting** – An increased presence of CF in Nangarhar has a direct correlation with an increased amount of threat reporting, whether through formal intelligence reports, debriefs, or KLEs. Additionally, the addition of reporting from the OCC-R and OCC-P has provided added information on the threat in the province. With no previous reporting in some areas, it is impossible to tell if the reporting signifies an actual decrease in security or just a greater awareness of the threat.

- **PAKMIL Operations** – The Pakistani military is currently engaged in operations directly across the border from the Mountain Warrior AO in the Khyber, Kurram, and Mohmand agencies of the FATA. Recent unverified reporting indicates large groups of insurgents are entering Nangarhar to evade these operations. This influx is focused around the Dur Baba, Nazyan, and Lal Pur districts. These groups likely intend to establish these areas as support zones while setting up disruption zones to attack CF/ANSF in outlying areas to deny access to their new safehavens. Thus, it is likely the security situation in these districts is worsening.

- **Intelligence Gaps** – Large areas of Nangarhar rarely see CF or ANSF presence. Therefore, significant intelligence gaps exist across the province. These intelligence gaps prevent gaining an accurate assessment of the threat in these areas. However, most analysts would agree that areas with little CF/ANSF presence are likely to be insurgent safehavens and would highlight the security in these areas to be "bad" or "worsening."



Overview


Recent assessments of Nangarhar Province show the security of the province decreasing over the last year and continues to decrease. However, questions have been raised as to whether this perceived decrease is due to analysis or reporting that has stated the security situation is worse. To answer, the perceived decrease in the security of Nangarhar Province is due to analytical assessment rather than reporting stating this is the case. Factors leading to this assessment include increased SIGACTs, increased threat reporting, and the influence of military operations across the border in Pakistan. While some areas are definitely experiencing a decrease in overall security, the perception of decreased security across the province may be due to greater situational awareness of the threat. However, only more intelligence collection in the province will provide a true picture of the security situation.



Kabul Election Rallies



Tribal leaders throughout Afghanistan are expected to attend rallies in Kabul this week to support Dr. Abdullah and Hamid Karzai. The Karzai rally may promote a message against the influence of international organizations, including ISAF, in the election process.



- Tribal leaders from across the country are expected in Kabul this week for rallies in support of the leading presidential candidates – Hamid Karzai and Dr. Abdullah Abdullah.
- A rally is expected to support Dr. Abdullah on or around Sunday, 27 September. The rally for Hamid Karzai is expected to occur on Thursday, 1 October.
- The two rallies are likely to promote differing messages in reference to the international community's role in the Afghan presidential election. The rally for Dr. Abdullah will likely promote the decision by international monitoring organizations for vote recounts or the conduct of a runoff election. The rally for Karzai is likely to stress the election as an internal affair and international monitors should stay out of the election.
- The initial result of the presidential election was in favor of Karzai with just over 54% of the electorate. However, numerous allegations of election fraud has resulted in several investigations by the Afghan IEC and international bodies.
- No definitive information is available at this time on the participation of N2KL personalities at these rallies. However, some assessments believe elders will stay in Kabul to attend both rallies to enjoy a few days in Kabul and the free hospitality likely to be arranged in conjunction with these rallies.
- AAF may attempt to attack tribal elders with a pro-GIROA/CF stance as they travel to/from Kabul. These attacks will occur on the major MSRs if they happen.
- The rallies may possibly be held at the Loya Jirga tent in Kabul.



Pages 15 through 17 redacted for the following reasons:

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

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

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OPERATION: HWY1A NAI 1-4
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 59699 06120
DATE: 28SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340928



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEI's:

1. Identify vehicle traffic ability along route.
2. Identify number of personnel on foot along route.
3. Identify vehicles whose speed is excessively fast.
4. Identify location of each congested location along the route.
5. Identify and locate any checkpoints along the route.
6. Identify driver actions at checkpoints to include efforts to avoid them.
7. Confirm or deny the presence of personnel in possible overwatch position observing hwy1a.
8. Confirm or deny any evidence of digging along hwy1a
9. Confirm or deny the presence of large items for storage of bulk homemade explosives emplacements
10. Confirm or deny any evidence of clearing of trees, shrubs or terrain to obtain los from possible hide site to IED.
11. Identify any personnel digging on or alongside roads or personnel congregating on the road, or in concealed locations (from the road).
12. Identify cold or hot thermal signatures located on the road or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters on either side of the road).
13. Identify any personnel in positions within 10-15 meters of the road in positions that provide clear line of sight to the road.
14. Identify any vehicles that appear to be abandoned. Identify any vehicle tracks leading to a thermal signature or indication of disturbed earth/suspicious object.
15. Identify any indications of new piles of dirt or rubbish to include bags, boxes and any other items larger than 0.5m by 0.5m; concrete blocks or barrier as along side the road that appear out of place (serve no identifiable purpose) or new.
16. Identify any disturbed earth, broken pavement, speed bumps, shallow pits, or trenches on or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters) of the road.
17. Identify any earth movement, ground scarring, or vegetation clearing along side roads (within 5-10 meters).
18. Identify and annotate size and location of any visual indications of wire, tubing, or cord laid across the road surface or along the road (within 5-10 meters).

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 01 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 02 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT assess flood damage to HWY1a and assist in mission planning for alternate routes along the route. CF, ICW ANSF, prepare to coordinate reconstruction efforts, traffic control measures, and possible vehicle staging areas along the route as logistical moves are halted due to limited traffic ability. Failure to launch FMV will force CF and ANSF to coordinate without proper SA of the extent of the damage along the route.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Page 19 redacted for the following reason:



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

OPERATION: DROPKICK
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: KONAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 71874 34961

DATE: 28SEP09

COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340928



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EI's:

1. Confirm or deny the presence and occupation of any or all Cave systems
2. Confirm or deny the presence, occupation, or construction of fighting positions
3. Report presence of PAX on ridgelines or that have overwatch on NAI, or are acting as spotters.
4. Report men loading possible equipment on pack mules/donkeys
5. Report groups of 5 or more PAX, anywhere, doing anything, or massing.
6. Report the presence of crew served weapons.
7. Confirm or deny the presence of any radio transmitting equipment.
8. Report any persons talking on ICOM radios.
9. Confirm or deny the existence of any number of AAF maneuvering towards CF or ANSF.
10. Confirm or deny the existence of any number of personnel fleeing away from CF and moving towards hiding areas.
11. Identify any groups of 3 or more personnel in area carrying equipment (backpacks, etc.)
12. Identify personnel and activity on the objective prior to execution.
13. Identify Military Aged Males who flee the OBJ areas during the approach of ground forces.

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 12 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF CHOSIN In partnership with ANSF will conduct Reconnaissance and surveillance of Ganjgal and Damdarah prior to Phase I of Operation Dropkick in order to confirm or deny existing patterns of life. BPT register known TGTs in and near the valley. The purpose of this operation is to provide ANSF with enablers which will assist their initiative in disrupting AAF activity, increase security relations with the populace, and disrupt an atmospheric for providing AAF sanctuary. TF Chosin's emphasis for ISR assets will be the areas designated as potential over watch and staging areas in an effort to give CF and ANSF on the ground increased situational awareness and possible early warning of imminent threat from AAF. This area has historically been a safe haven for AAF facilitation and staging for kinetic activity against CF and ANSF. It is likely that during this OP, CF and ANSF will receive sporadic harassment from AAF in an attempt to draw CF and ANSF attention away from IDF firing positions and weapons cache's in the area. FMV coverage will allow early warning for CF and ANSF, cover dead space unobservable by ground forces, assist in detection of firing positions and munitions cache's, allow near real time information of LN and potential AAF activity around CF and ANSF locations as well as provide valuable intelligence for future interdiction operations conducted in the area. Denial of the asset will result in increased unobserved movement of AAF and little to no warning for AAF spectacular and harassment activities.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

Pages 21 through 22 redacted for the following reasons:

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SIGNIFICANT DATES & RAMADAN



SEPTEMBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
		-----		◆	-----	
6	7	8	9	10	11	12

13	14	15	16	17	18	19
-----		◆	●	-----		
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
☆	-----		-----			
27	28	29	30			

OCTOBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
				🇺🇸		
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
						🇺🇸
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

- ★ 22 August – 20 September – Ramadan
- ◆ 3 September – Preliminary results
- ◆ 16 September – Lailatul-Qadr (Night of Power)
- 17 September – IEC certifies presidential election
- ☆ 20 September – Eid-al-Fitr (Generally lasts 3-5 days)
- 🇺🇸 01 October – Presidential run-off, if needed
- 🇺🇸 17 October – Inauguration (if no Run-off)


Significant Date Threats and Assessments

Ramadan

- During this period, there has been no decrease in activity that has been attributable to Ramadan. The increase observed during the latter part of the Pre-Ramadan period is a direct result of election related attacks. Supply issues will be the biggest factor contributing to the decrease observed during this Ramadan period. Reporting continues to indicate attacks will commence once supply levels return to acceptable amounts.
- The timing of Ramadan this year will likely see insurgent and criminal activity remain increased across N2KL due to favorable weather conditions, the peak of the fighting season, as well as election related events and a possible election run-off.
- Attacks will likely recommence once supplies return to an acceptable level. These attacks will focus on CF bases to avoid local casualties. Election results being released just after the Laiatul-Qadr (Night of Power) observance could provoke demonstrations and increased propaganda. Large crowds will present viable targets for possible suicide bombs however to avoid negative IO, AAF will refrain from such attacks instead targeting ANSF, CF and GIROA facilities.

2008 – 2009

Ramadan Comparison



Page 24 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(2)High

TF MTN WARRIOR BDE S2 ACRONYMS LIST



As of: 9/29/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

“Led by Love of Country” “All The Way”

SECRET // REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

25

- AAF = Anti-Afghan Forces
- ABP = Afghan Border Patrol
- AC = Afghan civilian
- ACM= Anti-Coalition Militia or AAF
- ANA = Afghan National Army
- ANAAC = Afghan National Army Air Corps
- ANP = Afghan National Police
- ANSF = Afghan National Security Forces (Army, Police and NDS)
- AQSL = Al-Qaida Senior Leader(ship)
- ASG = Afghan Security Guards
- AWT = Attack Weapons Team
- BDA = Battle Damage Assessment
- CAS = Close Air Support
- CF = Coalition Forces
- CFACC = Combined Forces Air Component Command
- CFSOCC = Combined Forces Special Ops Component Command
- CIV = Civilians
- CIVCAS = Civilian Casualties
- CMA = Central Movement Agency
- COIN = Counter-Insurgency
- COP= Combat Outpost
- CSTC-A = Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
- DC = District Center
- DCOM = Deputy Commander
- DCOS JOPS = Deputy Chief of Staff Joint Ops
- ESF = Election Security Force
- ETT = Embedded Training Team
- EW = Electronic Warfare
- FAM = Fighting-Aged Male
- FFIR = Friendly Forces Information Requirements
- FMV = Full Motion Video
- FNU = Father’s Name Unknown
- FOB = Forward Operating Base
- FOM = Freedom of Movement
- FP = Fighting Position
- GIRoA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- GSW = Gunshot Wound
- HBIED = Home-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- HE = High Explosive
- HiG= Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin
- HME = Home-Made Explosives
- HQN = Haqqani Network
- HVI = High Value Individual
- HVT= High Value Target
- HWY = Highway
- ICP = Illegal Checkpoint
- IDF = Indirect Fire
- IDP = Internally Displaced Person
- IEC = Independent Election Commission
- INS = Insurgents or AAF
- IO = Information Operations
- ISTAR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
- ISO = In Support Of
- IVO = In Vicinity Of
- KAF = Kandahar Airfield
- KIA = Killed In Action
- LN = Local National
- LNU= Last Name Unknown
- MANPADS = Man-portable Air Defense System
- MBT = Main Battle Tank
- MEDEVAC = Medical Evacuation
- MoD = Ministry of Defense
- Mol = Ministry of Interior
- MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protection
- MWE= Men, Weapons and Equipment
- NBD = Non-battle Death
- NBI = Non-battle Injury
- NDS = National Directorate of Security
- NFO = Normal Framework Operations
- NMCC = National Military Command Center
- NPCC = National Police Coordination Center
- OBJ = Objective
- OCC-P/R = Operations Coordination Center-Provincial / Regional
- OMLT = Operational Mentor Liaison Team
- OP = Outpost
- PAX = Passengers
- PC = Police Chief
- PID = Positively Identified
- POO = Point of Origin
- PPIED = Pressure Plate IED
- PRT = Provincial Reconstruction Team
- QRF = Quick Reaction Force
- RPG = Rocket-Propelled Grenade
- SAF = Small Arms Fire
- SIED = Suicide IED
- SVIED= Suicide Vest IED
- SOF = Show of Force
- SOP = Show of Presence
- STRATCOM = Strategic Communications
- TFK = Task Force Kandahar
- TFL = Task Force Leatherneck
- TIC = Troops in Contact
- TMCC = Theater Movement Coordination Center
- TTP = Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- UNAMA = United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- WIA = Wounded in Action