



4 IBCT / 4 Infantry Division

"LED BY LOVE OF COUNTRY"



POINTS OF CONTACT:	
MW2	 <input type="text"/>
CFT Director	<input type="text"/>
AS2	<input type="text"/>
BISE Chief	<input type="text"/>
S2X	<input type="text"/>
NCOIC	 <input type="text"/>
CM&D	<input type="text"/>

SVOIP:



Weather Effects Matrix



As of: 9/28/2009

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO

2

AO South

JALALABAD 4-DAY FORECAST

VALID 1800 HRS ZULU 27 SEP 09

FORECAST	Mon 28 Sep 09		Tue 29 Sep 09		Wed 30 Sep 09		Thu 01 Oct 09		
	HAZE		HAZE		HAZE		HAZE		
	LO: 70F/21C	HI: 95F/35C	LO: 72F/22C	HI: 97F/36C	LO: 75F/24C	HI: 99F/37C	LO: 77F/25C	HI: 100F/38C	
	WIND CHILL	N/A	WIND CHILL	N/A	WIND CHILL	N/A	WIND CHILL	N/A	
	HEAT INDEX	N/A	HEAT INDEX	N/A	HEAT INDEX	N/A	HEAT INDEX	N/A	
	WINDS	8 KTS	10 KTS	10 KTS					
	SKY/VIS/WX CONDITIONS	00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG HAZE	12-00Z: 5 MI / NO CIG HAZE	00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG HAZE	12-00Z: 5 MI / NO CIG HAZE	00-12Z: 7 MI / NO CIG PARTLY CLOUDY	12-00Z: 7 MI / NO CIG MOSTLY CLEAR	00-12Z: 6 MI / NO CIG HAZE	12-00Z: 6 MI / NO CIG HAZE
	ILLUM DATA	[Bar chart]		[Bar chart]		[Bar chart]		[Bar chart]	
	FIXED WING CAS	[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]	
HELO OPS	[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]		
PREDATOR	CC		CC		CC		CC		
PERSONNEL	T		T		T		T		
SHADOW	CC		CC		CC		CC		
TIME	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	

T - Temperature CC - Cloud Cover

Weather Effects

	0000-0400	0400-0800	0800-1200	1200-1600	1600-2000	2000-2400
Troops			T	T	T	
Mobility						
Shadow			CC	CC		
Hunter			CC	CC		
Predator			CC	CC		
RW (CAS)						
FW (CAS)						
COMMS						

AO North

BLESSING-BOSTICK 4-DAY FORECAST

AS OF 2000 HRS LOCAL 27 SEP 09

FORECAST	Mon 28 Sep 09		Tue 29 Sep 09		Wed 30 Sep 09		Thu 01 Oct 09		
	LO: 63F/17C		HI: 90F/32C		LO: 59F/15C		HI: 90F/32C		
	LO: 59F/15C		HI: 90F/32C		LO: 59F/15C		HI: 91F/33C		
	WINDS	9 KTS	10 KTS	9 KTS	10 KTS	10 KTS	11 KTS	10 KTS	
	SKY/VIS/WX CONDITIONS	7 MI / NO CIG							
	CAS	[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]	
	HELO OPS	[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]	
	FMV COLLECTION	[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]		[Green bar]	
	PERSONNEL	T		T		T		T	
TIME	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	00 06 12 18	

TS - Thunderstorms T - Temperature CC - Cloud Cover P - Precipitation

Lunar Effects

Date	BMT	SR	SS	EET	MR	143	150	153	160	163	170	173	180	183	190	193	200	203	210	213	220	223	230	233	000	003	010	013	MS	Lunar % Illum
	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)																							(UTC)	(0000, 2359)	
28 Sep 09	0021	0115	1311	1406	1000	27	30	32	34	35	35	34	32	30	26	23	18	14	9	4	-2	-7	-13	-19	-25	-31	-36	-42	2024	77
29 Sep 09	0021	0116	1310	1404	1031	25	29	32	35	37	39	39	37	35	32	28	24	19	14	9	4	-2	-8	-14	-20	-26	-31	-36	2122	84
30 Sep 09	0022	0117	1309	1403	1100	21	26	31	35	39	41	43	44	43	40	37	34	29	25	20	14	9	3	-3	-9	-15	-21	-27	2220	91
01 Oct 09	0023	0117	1307	1402	1127	12	17	23	28	33	38	42	45	48	49	48	46	43	40	35	30	25	20	14	9	3	-3	-9	2318	96
02 Oct 09	0024	0118	1306	1400	1153	7	13	19	24	30	35	41	45	49	52	54	55	53	50	46	42	37	31	26	20	14	8	0016	99	



Mountain Warrior PIR



As of: 9/28/2009

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

3

As of 30 AUG 09

TF Mountain Warrior PIR

Laghman/Western Nuristan Derivative PIR

1. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process?
 - 1a. Who and where is spreading propaganda to delegitimize the Afghan elections?
 - 1b. How will AAF groups target the new Provincial Council members are the election results are released?
2. Where does the local populace rely on AAF for support rather than GIROA, ANSF, or CF?
3. How can CF sway local leaders to a more favorable opinion of the GIROA?
4. What effects are friendly and threat IO messages having on the local populace?
5. What individuals or facilities have connections to which insurgent group?
6. When and how is corruption and/or drug trafficking supporting AAF operations?
7. What rifts exist between AAF groups that can be exploited by CF and GIROA?
8. How will the upcoming winter affect AAF activity in N2KL?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Laghman?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Laghman?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Laghman?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Laghman?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being produced in Laghman?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Laghman?

Nangarhar Derivative PIR

Konar/Eastern Nuristan Derivative PIR

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Nangarhar?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Nangarhar?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Nangarhar?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Haqqani Network in Nangarhar?
- 6b. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 6c. What individuals or facilities have connections to Bilal Ahmandi's network in the Khogyani tribal area?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Nangarhar?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5a. Where is OBJ Hot Date and Tamadullah?
- 5b. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 8a. How can the divisions between the HiG, TB, and Salafists be exploited by CF?

AO MOUNTAIN WARRIOR SIGACTS



As of: 9/28/09 01:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

4

Last 24 Hours

270000D+SEP09 -272359D+SEP09

AO Destroyer

- 1. 270615D+SEP09 - DF
COP KEATING received SAF from 3-5 x AAF

AO Lethal


- 1. 270917D+SEP09 - DF
3/D/2-12IN received SAF/RPG from 3-5 x AAF
- 2. 271212D+SEP09 - DF
COP VEGAS received SAF from 2-5 x AAF
- 3. 271453D+SEP09 - SAF
3/A/2-12IN received SAF from 2-3 x AAF
- 4. 271718D+SEP09 - SAF
IM21 received SAF from 2-3 x AAF

AO Chosin

- 1. 271207D+SEP09 - DF
COP MONTI received RECOILESS RIFLE from UNK AAF
- 2. 271527D+SEP09 - IDF
COP MONTI received IDF from UNK AAF
- 3. 272108D+SEP09 - CPLX
COP FORTRESS OP1 received SAF from 10-12 x AAF

AO Gryphon

- 1 270955D+SEP09 - IED-F
IED FOUND in culvert along RTE NARA VISTA



ASSESSMENT

Activity in N2KL has only slightly decreased over the reporting period. Activity will likely remain at elevated levels over the next month prior to the onset of winter, followed by a subsequent lull in attacks. In Nuristan, activity will remain decreased; attacks conducted will focus IVO COP Keating and Lowell, and possibly OP Mace, in the near term. In Konar, AAF continue to target CF in the Pech and Dara Noor districts, centering their attacks on CF fixed locations. IED-initiated ambushes and direct fire attacks along MSRs will be prevalent IOT restrict CF FoM. AAF in Konar will use intimidation tactics, such as kidnap for ransom, targeting LNs to deter them from working with CF. In Laghman, AAF will increase emplacement of IEDs along MSRs to disrupt CF patrols and intimidate LNs in the area. Stand-off style attacks will be most prevalent in the near term as AAF want to avoid tocasualties as possible. In Nangarhar, AAF will continue to emplace IEDs and conduct direct fire attacks against ANSF/CF throughout the province, especially along Route Newark. These attacks will be used to slow CF patrols, facilitate illicit activity and protect freedom of movement. The reported Taliban talks of surrender to may bring small scale attacks in the near future as AAF attempt to retain their legitimacy in the Achin District. Attacks in Konar and Nangarhar may increase in the near future as a result of PAKMIL operations being conducted along the border regions. Insurgents will seek sanctuary in the Konar and Nangarhar provinces under the guise of refugees in order to evade capture while facilitating the movement of MWE into the AO.

24-48 THREAT REPORTING



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET //REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

5

Laghman:

- AAF plan to attack COP Zio Haq or supply trucks traveling on HWY1A between 25SEP-29SEP.

Konar:

- Reporting indicates AAF plan to attack FOB Wright and a surrounding OP between 27SEP09 and 02OCT09.
- AAF plan to attack COP Badel in the next 24-48 hours.
- AAF operating IVO OP Bari Alai are preparing for an unspecified attack that they will carry out in the next 24-48 hours. The attack will possibly involve the emplacement of an IED, but will likely only consist of IDF/DF targeting OP Bari Alai and surrounding CF/ANSF static locations.
- AAF will continue to conduct attacks targeting CF patrolling elements operating in eastern Pech and western Dara Noor. AAF plan to set ambush CF convoys operating IVO Shagai Village, Dara Noor possibly in the next 24-48 hours.
- AAF plans to emplace IEDs in the Shaunkrai Valley to ambush ANSF patrolling elements on 29SEP09; ANSF operating in the Shaunkrai Valley should be prepared to encounter IEDs in the next 24-72 hours.


Nangarhar:

No Direct Threat Reporting. Increased targeting of GIROA and tribal leaders could occur as AAF attempt to regain control and challenge the governments ability to secure the population.

Nuristan:

- AAF will likely continue to sporadically engage CF bases in the Kamdesh District during the next 24-48 hours.

★ -Threat in Next 24-48 Hours
★ - Continuing Threat



THREAT ASSESSMENT

- AAF will increase harassing direct and IED initiated attacks throughout Konar province to slow CF targeting and patrols in the area. Attacks will target CF bases throughout Pech and Dara Noor districts with IDF and SAF from stand-off distances. IED and ambushes along MSR Rhode Island will be emplaced to interfere with CF/ANSF operations in the area. Attacks will be most prevalent along western portions of Rhode Island due to AAFs freedom of movement and unpaved surfaces.
- AAF in Konar continue to conduct meetings for future attack plans consisting of more large scale, coordinated attacks targeting CF bases. AAF in the Khas Konar District have reportedly received multiple IEDs and plan to emplace them in the near future. IED-initiated attacks along MSRs in the near future will target CF/ANSF convoys and patrols especially IVO the Shaunkrai Valley. Attacks targeting CF bases in the Pech, Ghaziabad and Nari Districts will be most prevalent over the next 24-72 hours.
- IED activity in southern Nangarhar will continue to screen and facilitate AAF and criminal activity in the area. Increased intimidation will also occur in these southern districts targeting both locals and ANSF to slow patrols and retain freedom of movement with GIROA interference.

Pages 6 through 9 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

Page to be removed

Page to be removed

Page to be removed

Konar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO~~

10

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks

20
10
0



AUG 17
AUG 23

KONAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

- OBJ BURNSIDE
- OBJ COPYCAT
- OBJ WRIGLEY
- OBJ MOWGLI
- OBJ HOTDATE

☐ - TB Radio Active

So What...

CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE SPORADIC ATTACKS TARGETING CF PATROLS IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS; AAF WILL ENGAGE COP BADEL AND OTHER BASES ALONG THE KONAR RIVER THAT HINDER AAF FOM ALONG FACILITATION ROUTES IN THE NEXT 24-72 HOURS; AS AAF CONTINUE TO FACILITATE MWE INTO THE AO IOT CARRY OUT FUTURE COORDINATED ATTACKS

Konar Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

- △
- △
- △
- △
- △

ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

7 x SIGACTs


- 3/D/2-12 RECEIVED DF
- COP VEGAS RECEIVED DF
- 3/A/2-12 RECEIVED SAF
- IM21 RECEIVED SAF
- COP MONTI RECEIVED DF
- COP MONTI RECEIVED IDF
- COP FORTRESS OP1 RECEIVED CPLX

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

- SIGACTs during the past week have decreased in comparison to both previous weeks and 2008 trends; this decrease in activity can be partially attributed to AAF's continued attempts to stockpile weapons with winter approaching, infighting between AAF groups, and an emphasis on meetings to plan future attacks; AAF will continue conducting sporadic attacks including IDF and SAF on CF elements in the near term; AAF are escalating training efforts in the area IOT increase their accuracy and frequency of attacks; larger scale attacks will occur throughout the month of October as AAF prepare for a lull in attacks during winter months
- AAF subordinate will emplace IEDs (RCIEDs, CWIEDs and PPIEDs) along RTE Beaverton near the mouth of the Shaunkrai Valley and in the valley e near term; Hamza plans to target ANSF patrolling in the Shaunkri Valley, and will possibly emplace IEDs along RTE Beaverton IOT target both CF/ANSF elements; Hamza has recently recruited fighters in the Pashad and Barabot areas which he will likely use IOT assist in efforts targeting friendly force elements, including IED initiated ambushes
- AAF will continue to engage CF bases that hinder AAF FOM; COP Monti and COP Badel continue to receive sporadic attacks as AAF attempt to divert CF attention from AAF facilitation efforts; CF can expect to see attacks targeting the two CF bases continue in the next 24-48 hours as AAF move more MWE into Konar in preparation for upcoming attacks

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO~~



LEGEND

- SAF
- PSFA
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- ☐ SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

Page 11 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

Nuristan Daily Rollup



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

12

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



NURISTAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IED
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- △ SIGINT/OTHER
- ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

**AUG 17 -
AUG 23**



**AUG 24 -
AUG 30**

**AUG 31 -
SEP 06**

**SEP 07 -
SEP 13**

Nuristan Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING



So What...

CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE MINIMAL KINETIC ACTIVITY IN KAMDESH DISTRICT OVER THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS AS AAF ATTEMPT TO RESUPPLY FIGHTERS AND PREPARE FOR FUTURE ATTACKS

ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

1 x SIGACT

COP KEATING RECEIVED DF

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

- Over the past week, AAF within Nuristan have slightly decreased attack levels in comparison to prior weeks' trends; expect to see a continued decrease in kinetic activity during the near term as the majority of prior attacks were focused on Barge Matal Village prior to CF withdrawing forces from the area
- Attacks targeting CF across Nuristan will remain minimal in the upcoming days, attacks will remain sporadic, targeting CF bases with harassment style attacks on an irregular basis IOT emphasize that AAF are still occupying the area
- During recent meetings held in eastern Nuristan, AAF have debated whether or not to target ANSF; meetings resulting in AAF disgruntlement and minimal MWE are likely contributing factors to the lull in kinetic activity within the Kamdesh District; attacks in the Kamdesh District will resume after AAF finish conducting their resupply efforts, possibly as soon as the next 24-72 hours

Laghman Daily Rollup



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO~~

13

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



AUG 17 - AUG 23

LAGHMAN ACTIVITY


Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

So What...

IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS IDF ON COP NAJIL AND IED ATTACKS ARE POSSIBLE IN ALISHANG TARGETING CONVOYS TRAVELING ROUTE NEBRASKA. DIRECT FIRE ATTACKS MAY TARGET THE ALINGAR DISTRICT CENTER IN ORDER TO DEMONSTRATE A LACK OF GIROA PRESENCE IN THE AREA.



Laghman Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING



SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

0 x SIGACTS

NSTR

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

ASSESSMENT

- Trends for Laghman this week indicate a decrease in activity from last week; we can expect to see activity for this week to closely follow Laghman's 2008 trends
- AAF in the Laghman province are attaining help from supporters who have traveled from Pakistan; AAF in Alishang district are using the help to conduct attacks indicating attacks in Laghman may become more effective than previous months
- Taliban commanders _____ are using a safehouse belonging to _____ bodyguard as a bed-down location and avoid ANSF/CF searches by using various disguises
- _____ seeks to conduct SAF on ANSF/CF elements along HWY1A in Qarghayee _____ is trying to assess which target presents the highest chance for success before conducting to attack because he is attempting to avoid a high number of AAF casualties as AAF have assessed a direct confrontation with CF will result in failure

~~SECRET //REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO~~

Pages 14 through 15 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

Page to be removed

Nangarhar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET //REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO

16

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



AUG 17 - AUG 23

NANGARHAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ


LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

JG 24 - AUG 30

AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 07 - SEP 13



So What...

DIRECT FIRE ATTACKS ON SECURITY CHECKPOINTS ALONG THE NAZYAN BORDER IN THE NEAR TERM DUE TO POSSIBLE FIGHTERS SEEKING REFUGE IN AFG TO AVOID CAPTURE BY THE PAKMIL AS THEY INCREASE OPERATIONS IN PAKISTAN.

ASSESSMENT

- For the second consecutive week, trend analysis indicates a continued decrease in kinetic activity; this year's level of attacks remains below the 2008 historical trends which may indicate disruption caused by CF/ANSF operations
- Taliban members are trying to evade detainment by the PAKMIL operations and they are using the Nangarhar Province as a safehaven until the PAKMIL operations cease; Taliban members are planning to conduct attacks while they are in Nangarhar indicating a n increase of kinetic activity through the winter months ; attacks will be staged from the La Pur and Ghosha Districts
- AAF intend to use timed fuses to conduct IDF attacks against FOB Fenty IOT leave the scene and assist in other AAF operations; AAF have also planned to use VBIEDs staged in the Chaparhar District to target CF convoys entering and leaving the front gate of FOB Fenty
- s leading a militia that has the Taliban eager to p ate in negotiations; Taliban members are trying to mend a broken relationship in order to operate freely in the Mohmand valley; s expected to consult with GIROA officials before executing any decisions that may result in the release or detainment of AAF fighters

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

1 x SIGACT

● IED FOUND ON RTE NARA VISTA

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties
NSTR

Pages 17 through 20 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

Page to be removed

Page to be removed



Page to be removed



OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 41434 00904
DATE: 27SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340927



Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT assess flood damage to HWY1A and assist in mission planning for alternate routes along the route. CF, ICW ANSF, prepare to coordinate reconstruction efforts, traffic control measures, and possible vehicle staging areas along the route as logistical moves are halted due to limited trafficability. Failure to launch FMV will force CF and ANSF to coordinate with out proper SA of the extent of the damage along the route.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEI's:

1. Identify vehicle traffic ability along route.
2. Identify number of personnel on foot along route.
3. Identify vehicles whose speed is excessively fast.
4. Identify location of each congested location along the route.
5. Identify and locate any checkpoints along the route.
6. Identify driver actions at checkpoints to include efforts to avoid them.
7. Confirm or deny the presence of personnel in possible overwatch position observing hwy1a.
8. Confirm or deny any evidence of digging along hwy1a
9. Confirm or deny the presence of large items for storage of bulk homemade explosives emplacements.
10. Confirm or deny any evidence of clearing of trees, shrubs or terrain to obtain LOS from possible hide site to IED.
11. Identify any personnel digging on or alongside roads or personnel congregating on the road, or in concealed locations (from the road).
12. Identify cold or hot thermal signatures located on the road or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters on either side of the road).
13. Identify any personnel in positions within 10-15 meters of the road in positions that provide clear line of sight to the road.
14. Identify any vehicles that appear to be abandoned. Identify any vehicle tracks leading to a thermal signature or indication of disturbed earth/suspicious object.
15. Identify any indications of new piles of dirt or rubbish to include bags, boxes and any other items larger than 0.5m by 0.5m; concrete blocks or barriers as along side the road that appear out of place (serve no identifiable purpose) or new.
16. Identify any disturbed earth, broken pavement, speed bumps, shallow pits, or trenches on or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters) of the road.
17. Identify any earth movement, ground scarring, or vegetation clearing along side roads (within 5-10 meters).
18. Identify and annotate size and location of any visual indications of wire, tubing, or cord laid across the road surface or along the road (within 5-10 meters).

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 1 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 04 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Page 22 redacted for the following reason:



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High



OPERATION: KHOGYANI COUNTER IED
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XC 05824 85244
DATE: 27SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340927



MISSION TYPE: C-IED

EEI's:

1. Identify Local Nationals digging in or next to roads.
2. Local Nationals loitering in groups of 3 or more personnel on or next to roads.
3. Identify movement of munitions, weapons, equipment and supplies.
4. Identify suspicious objects placed on or next to roads.
5. Identify MAMs with weapons within 500 Meters of roads.
6. Identify possible illegal traffic control points along roads.
7. Traffic jams or congestion of 5 or more vehicles.
8. Disturbed earth in or along roads.
9. Movement of 3 or more vehicles traveling together.

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 5 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT identify areas of IED emplacement along MSRs in Khogyani as well as the movement of AAF operatives within the valleys of southern Khogyani.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Pages 24 through 25 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

Page to be removed



BREAKDOWN OF THE AFGHAN NAMING SYSTEM



HOW DOES AN AFGHAN GET HIS NAME?

1) When a child is born, he is given a name, in this example the boy will be named *Karim*; but parents simply refer to him as *halaka* (boy), or *zoya* (son).

2) When the baby becomes a child, his parents will call him *Karim* or *Karim Jan* as a sign of affection.

3) If there is another child in the village named *Karim*, *Karim's* parents will call him *Abdul Karim*. (*Abdul* means *servant of* and can be added to any of the 99 names that also refer to qualities of God) The boy's friends will likely call him *Karimullah* or *Karimullah Jan* (-*ullah* is a common variation on Afghan names).

4) Once *Abdul Karim* is older, he will learn a trade, such as welding. Eventually his superior will start taking days off and leave *Abdul Karim* in charge. Many of the customers begin to refer to *Abdul Karim* as *Ustaz Sahib*. (*Ustaz* refers to an artisan that knows a skilled trade).

5) *Haji Ustaz* may decide that his true calling is to become a man of God and starts to study under the village *Mullah*. Once he becomes a *mullah*, people refer to him in the third person as *Mullah Abdul Karim* but will address him as *Haji Mullah Sahib*.

6) *Khalifa Abdul Karim* prospers and goes to the *Hajj*, fulfilling his once obligation as a Muslim and adopts the title *Haji*, for those to have done the *Hajj*.

7) *Haji Abdul Karim's* brother is killed by CF and he decides to join the TB. With the stature he already has in the community, he is appointed as a district SUB-CMDR by the existing TB Shadow Governor of the District. People will begin to call him *Qomandan Sahib*, in addition to his previously acquired names/titles

9) *Karim* is injured in a fight and develops a limp which forces him to use a cane. His knowledge of Islam has also grown, and people begin to call him *Gud Mullah* (Lame *Mullah*), or *Haji Mawlawi Sahib* (in recognition of his vast knowledge of Islam) while some still call him *Haji Qomandan*.

8) After his success in battle, *Qomandan Abdul Karim* adopts the nom-de-guerre *Jihadmal* (friend of the Jihad). However, only close associates will call him this, while others are required to respect his titles.

TITLE	ENGLISH MEANING
SAB/SAHEB	MISTER
WALLA/UALLA	HONORIFIC TERM FOR OLDER MALE
AGHA	LORD, RULER, ONE WHO IS RELATED TO THE PROPHET. FARSI TERM FOR 'MISTER'
ALAKADAR	OFFICIAL IN CHARGE OF A SUB-DISTRICT / TOWNSHIP CHIEF
AMER	LEADER OR ONE WHO ISSUES ORDERS
AMIR	KING OR LEADER
HAJI	MADE TRIP TO MECCA AND MEDINA DURING DESIGNATED HAJJ PERIOD
KARGAR	WORKER
KHAN	CHIEF (TRIBAL). COMMON
KOTWAL	POLICE CHIEF
MALANG	DERVISH, HERMIT
MALIK	CHIEF (TRIBAL)
MALIKA	QUEEN
MAWLAWI	SENIOR CLERIC OR HIGH CLERGY
MIRZA	CLERK
MOA'LEM	TEACHER OR KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON
MOA'LEMA	FEMALE TEACHER OR KNOWLEDGEABLE PERSON
MOHTARAM	RESPECTED
MUDIR	DIRECTOR
MUDIRA	FEMALE DIRECTOR
MULLAH	CLERIC OR CLERGY
OMRA	MADE TRIP TO MECCA AND MEDINA OUTSIDE OF DESIGNATED HAJJ PERIOD
PACHA/PASHA/PADSHA	KING
POHAND	PROFESSOR
QARI	ONE WHO HAS MEMORIZED THE QURAN AND RECITES THE QURAN WITH APPROPRIATE INTONATION
QAZI	JUDGE
QOMANDAN	COMMANDER
RAIS	PRESIDENT/CHIEF (OFFICIAL)
SADR-E A'ZAM	PRIME MINISTER
SAHEB/SAHIB	SIR/MISTER
SAHEBA	MADAM
SAYED	RELATED TO THE PROPHET
SHAGHELEY	MISTER/RESPECTED
SHARWAAL	MAYOR
USTAD	LEARNED PERSON, TEACHER OR PROFESSOR
WAALI	GOVERNOR
WAKIL	MEMBER OF PARLIAMENT
WAZIR	MINISTER
WOLESWAAL	DISTRICT COMMISSIONER OR CHIEF (OFFICIAL)
ZAMINDAR	LAND LORD
MAMA	UNCLE
BABA	FATHER
LALA	OLDER BROTHER
JAN	DEAR
KAKA	UNCLE
MALIM	TEACHER

THE ORIGINS OF AFGHAN NAMES

Afghanistan is comprised of an overwhelming majority of Muslim followers, hence commonly used names are of Arabic origin. Surnames are typically only given to educated members of society who have gone on to a higher education or have Western contacts. Usually an Afghan name is made of a one or two-part given name, where males are typically given two-part names. When a male receives a surname, it is often marked by suffixes meaning *son of* or *from* and may be derived from the names of tribes, villages, geographic regions, clans or ancestors. Inheritance of surnames in Afghanistan are not the same as other regions in the world. For example, Afghans can change their surname in an attempt to honor a respected forefather/father, which is why it is not uncommon to find members of the same family with varying surnames. However, males will normally continue to use their father's surnames, and almost all women will take their husband's surname.

SIGNIFICANT DATES & RAMADAN



SEPTEMBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
		-----		◆	-----	
6	7	8	9	10	11	12

13	14	15	16	17	18	19
-----		◆	●	-----		
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
☆	-----		-----			
27	28	29	30			

OCTOBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
				🇺🇸		
4	5	6	7	8	9	10

11	12	13	14	15	16	17
						🇺🇸
18	19	20	21	22	23	24

25	26	27	28	29	30	31

- ★ 22 August – 20 September – Ramadan
- ◆ 3 September – Preliminary results
- ◆ 16 September – Lailatul-Qadr (Night of Power)
- 17 September – IEC certifies presidential election
- ☆ 20 September – Eid-al-Fitr (Generally lasts 3-5 days)
- 🇺🇸 01 October – Presidential run-off, if needed
- 🇺🇸 17 October – Inauguration (if no Run-off)


Significant Date Threats and Assessments

Ramadan

- During this period, there has been no decrease in activity that has been attributable to Ramadan. The increase observed during the latter part of the Pre-Ramadan period is a direct result of election related attacks. Supply issues will be the biggest factor contributing to the decrease observed during this Ramadan period. Reporting continues to indicate attacks will commence once supply levels return to acceptable amounts.
- The timing of Ramadan this year will likely see insurgent and criminal activity remain increased across N2KL due to favorable weather conditions, the peak of the fighting season, as well as election related events and a possible election run-off.
- Attacks will likely recommence once supplies return to an acceptable level. These attacks will focus on CF bases to avoid local casualties. Election results being released just after the Laiatul-Qadr (Night of Power) observance could provoke demonstrations and increased propaganda. Large crowds will present viable targets for possible suicide bombs however to avoid negative IO, AAF will refrain from such attacks instead targeting ANSF, CF and GIROA facilities.



2008 – 2009
Ramadan Comparison



Page 28 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)

TF MTN WARRIOR BDE S2 ACRONYMS LIST



As of: 9/28/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

“Led by Love of Country” “All The Way”

SECRET // REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

29

- AAF = Anti-Afghan Forces
- ABP = Afghan Border Patrol
- AC = Afghan civilian
- ACM= Anti-Coalition Militia or AAF
- ANA = Afghan National Army
- ANAAC = Afghan National Army Air Corps
- ANP = Afghan National Police
- ANSF = Afghan National Security Forces (Army, Police and NDS)
- AQSL = Al-Qaida Senior Leader(ship)
- ASG = Afghan Security Guards
- AWT = Attack Weapons Team
- BDA = Battle Damage Assessment
- CAS = Close Air Support
- CF = Coalition Forces
- CFACC = Combined Forces Air Component Command
- CFSOCC = Combined Forces Special Ops Component Command
- CIV = Civilians
- CIVCAS = Civilian Casualties
- CMA = Central Movement Agency
- COIN = Counter-Insurgency
- COP= Combat Outpost
- CSTC-A = Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
- DC = District Center
- DCOM = Deputy Commander
- DCOS JOPS = Deputy Chief of Staff Joint Ops
- ESF = Election Security Force
- ETT = Embedded Training Team
- EW = Electronic Warfare
- FAM = Fighting-Aged Male
- FFIR = Friendly Forces Information Requirements
- FMV = Full Motion Video
- FNU = Father’s Name Unknown
- FOB = Forward Operating Base
- FOM = Freedom of Movement
- FP = Fighting Position
- GIRoA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- GSW = Gunshot Wound
- HBIED = Home-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- HE = High Explosive
- HiG= Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin
- HME = Home-Made Explosives
- HQN = Haqqani Network
- HVI = High Value Individual
- HVT= High Value Target
- HWY = Highway
- ICP = Illegal Checkpoint
- IDF = Indirect Fire
- IDP = Internally Displaced Person
- IEC = Independent Election Commission
- INS = Insurgents or AAF
- IO = Information Operations
- ISTAR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
- ISO = In Support Of
- IVO = In Vicinity Of
- KAF = Kandahar Airfield
- KIA = Killed In Action
- LN = Local National
- LNU= Last Name Unknown
- MANPADS = Man-portable Air Defense System
- MBT = Main Battle Tank
- MEDEVAC = Medical Evacuation
- MoD = Ministry of Defense
- Mol = Ministry of Interior
- MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protection
- MWE= Men, Weapons and Equipment
- NBD = Non-battle Death
- NBI = Non-battle Injury
- NDS = National Directorate of Security
- NFO = Normal Framework Operations
- NMCC = National Military Command Center
- NPCC = National Police Coordination Center
- OBJ = Objective
- OCC-P/R = Operations Coordination Center-Provincial / Regional
- OMLT = Operational Mentor Liaison Team
- OP = Outpost
- PAX = Passengers
- PC = Police Chief
- PID = Positively Identified
- POO = Point of Origin
- PPIED = Pressure Plate IED
- PRT = Provincial Reconstruction Team
- QRF = Quick Reaction Force
- RPG = Rocket-Propelled Grenade
- SAF = Small Arms Fire
- SIED = Suicide IED
- SVIED= Suicide Vest IED
- SOF = Show of Force
- SOP = Show of Presence
- STRATCOM = Strategic Communications
- TFK = Task Force Kandahar
- TFL = Task Force Leatherneck
- TIC = Troops in Contact
- TMCC = Theater Movement Coordination Center
- TTP = Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- UNAMA = United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- WIA = Wounded in Action