




4 IBCT / 4 Infantry Division

"LED BY LOVE OF COUNTRY"



TF MOUNTAIN WARRIOR GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (GRINTSUM) 250500DSEPTEMBER2009 – 260500DSEPTEMBER2009



POINTS OF CONTACT:	
MW2	<input type="text"/>
CFT Director	<input type="text"/>
AS2	<input type="text"/>
BISE Chief	<input type="text"/>
S2X	<input type="text"/>
NCOIC	<input type="text"/>
CM&D	<input type="text"/>



Weather Effects Matrix



As of: 9/26/2009

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

2

AO South

JALALABAD 4-DAY FORECAST

VALID 1700 HRS ZULU 25 SEP 09

FORECAST	Sat 26 Sep 09		Sun 27 Sep 09		Mon 28 Sep 09		Tue 29 Sep 09	
	HAZE		HAZE		HAZE		HAZE	
	LO: 77F/25C HI: 104F/40C		LO: 73F/23C HI: 99F/37C		LO: 74F/23C HI: 95F/35C		LO: 68F/20C HI: 93F/34C	
	WIND CHILL N/A HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL N/A HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL N/A HEAT INDEX N/A		WIND CHILL N/A HEAT INDEX N/A	
	WINDS 12 KTS		WINDS 8 KTS		WINDS 8 KTS		WINDS 10 KTS	
	SKY/VIS/WX CONDITIONS 00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG HAZE		00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG HAZE		00-12Z: 7 MI / NO CIG PARTLY CLOUDY		00-12Z: 6 MI / NO CIG HAZE	
	ILLUM DATA		ILLUM DATA		ILLUM DATA		ILLUM DATA	
	FIXED WING CAS		FIXED WING CAS		FIXED WING CAS		FIXED WING CAS	
	HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS	
PREDATOR		PREDATOR		PREDATOR		PREDATOR		
PERSONNEL		PERSONNEL		PERSONNEL		PERSONNEL		
SHADOW		SHADOW		SHADOW		SHADOW		
TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME		

T - Temperature C.C - Cloud Cover

Weather Effects

	0000-0400	0400-0800	0800-1200	1200-1600	1600-2000	2000-2400
Troops	Green	Yellow	Red (T)	Red (T)	Yellow	Green
Mobility	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Shadow	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Hunter	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
Predator	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
RW (CAS)	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
FW (CAS)	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green
COMMS	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green	Green

AO North

BLESSING-BOSTICK 4-DAY FORECAST

AS OF 2000 HRS LOCAL 25 SEP 09

FORECAST	Sat 26 Sep 09		Sun 27 Sep 09		Mon 28 Sep 09		Tue 29 Sep 09	
	HAZE		HAZE		HAZE		HAZE	
	LO: 63F/17C HI: 91F/33C		LO: 63F/17C HI: 90F/32C		LO: 63F/17C HI: 90F/32C		LO: 63F/17C HI: 91F/33C	
	WINDS 9 KTS		WINDS 9 KTS		WINDS 10 KTS		WINDS 11 KTS	
	SKY/VIS/WX CONDITIONS 7 MI / NO CIG		6 MI / NO CIG HAZE		6 MI / NO CIG HAZE		7 MI / NO CIG CLEAR	
	CAS		CAS		CAS		CAS	
	HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS		HELO OPS	
	FMV COLLECTION		FMV COLLECTION		FMV COLLECTION		FMV COLLECTION	
	PERSONNEL		PERSONNEL		PERSONNEL		PERSONNEL	
TIME		TIME		TIME		TIME		

T - Temperature

Lunar Effects

Date	BMT	SR	SS	EET	MR	143	150	153	160	163	170	173	180	183	190	193	200	203	210	213	220	223	230	233	000	003	010	013	MS	Lunar % Illum
	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(UTC)	(0000, 2359)																						(UTC)	(0000, 2359)	
26 Sep 09	0019	0114	1314	1409	0842	29	29	29	28	26	24	21	17	13	9	4	-1	-6	-12	-17	-23	-28	-34	-40	-46	-52	-58	-63	1829	59
27 Sep 09	0020	0114	1313	1407	0924	28	30	31	32	31	30	28	25	21	18	13	9	4	-1	-7	-12	-18	-24	-30	-35	-41	-47	-53	1926	68
28 Sep 09	0021	0115	1311	1406	1000	27	30	32	34	35	35	34	32	30	26	23	18	14	9	4	-2	-7	-13	-19	-25	-31	-36	-42	2024	77
29 Sep 09	0021	0116	1310	1404	1031	25	29	32	35	37	39	39	37	35	32	28	24	19	14	9	4	-2	-8	-14	-20	-26	-31	2122	84	
30 Sep 09	0022	0117	1309	1403	1100	21	26	31	35	39	41	43	44	44	43	40	37	34	29	25	20	14	9	3	-3	-9	-15	2220	91	



Mountain Warrior PIR



As of: 9/26/2009

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

3

As of 30 AUG 09

TF Mountain Warrior PIR

Laghman/Western Nuristan Derivative PIR

1. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process?
 - 1a. Who and where is spreading propaganda to delegitimize the Afghan elections?
 - 1b. How will AAF groups target the new Provincial Council members are the election results are released?
2. Where does the local populace rely on AAF for support rather than GIROA, ANSF, or CF?
3. How can CF sway local leaders to a more favorable opinion of the GIROA?
4. What effects are friendly and threat IO messages having on the local populace?
5. What individuals or facilities have connections to which insurgent group?
6. When and how is corruption and/or drug trafficking supporting AAF operations?
7. What rifts exist between AAF groups that can be exploited by CF and GIROA?
8. How will the upcoming winter affect AAF activity in N2KL?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Laghman?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Laghman?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Laghman?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Laghman?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being produced in Laghman?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Laghman?

Nangarhar Derivative PIR

Konar/Eastern Nuristan Derivative PIR

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Nangarhar?
 - 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Nangarhar?
 - 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Nangarhar?
 - 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Nangarhar?
 - 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
 - 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
 - 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Haqqani Network in Nangarhar?
 - 6b. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
 - 6c. What individuals or facilities have connections to Bilal Ahmandi's network in the Khogyani tribal area?
 - 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Nangarhar?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
 - 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
 - 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
 - 5a. Where is OBJ Hot Date and Tamadullah?
 - 5b. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
 - 5d. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
 - 5d. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
 - 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
 - 8a. How can the divisions between the HiG, TB, and Salafists be exploited by CF?

AO MOUNTAIN WARRIOR SIGACTS



As of: 9/26/09 02:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

4

Last 12 Hours

250000D+SEP09 -252359D+SEP09

AO Destroyer


- 1. 251038D+SEP09 - SAF
HATCHET received SAF from 1-2 x AAF

AO Lethal

- 1. 250632D+SEP09 - SAF
3/A/2-12IN received SAF from UNK AAF
- 2. 250732D+SEP09 - IDF
COP ABLE MAIN received IDF from 3-5 x AAF
- 3. 250923D+SEP09 - CPLX
COP ABLE MAIN received SAF/RPG/IDF from 3-5 x AAF
- 4. 251237D+SEP09 - DF
COP VEGAS received SAF from 2-5 x AAF
- 5. 251428D+SEP09 - IDF
FOB BLESSING received IDF from 2-3 x AAF

AO Chosin

- 1. 251910D+SEP09 - DF
ASG OP 1 received SAF/RPG from 3-5 x AAF
- 2. 252112D+SEP09 - DF
FOB FORTRESS received RPG/SAF from UNK AAF



ASSESSMENT

Activity in N2KL has only slightly decreased over the reporting period. Activity will remain consistent with historical trends prior to the onset of winter. In Nuristan, activity will remain decreased; attacks conducted will focus IVO COP Keating and Lowell in the near term. In Konar, AAF continue to target CF in the Pech and Dara Noor districts, centering their attacks on CF fixed locations. AAF have recently received resupply of MWE in the area, this along with increased leadership activity and possible planning will result in increased attacks possibly larger in scale as AAF conduct final push before the weather changes. IED-initiated ambushes along MSRs will be prevalent IOT restrict CF FoM. In Laghman, AAF will increase emplacement of IEDs along MSRs to disrupt CF patrols and intimidate LNs in the area. In Nangarhar, AAF will continue to emplace IEDs and conduct direct fire attacks against ANSF/CF throughout the province, especially along Route Newark. These attacks will be used to slow CF patrols, facilitate illicit activity and protect freedom of movement. The reported desire for Taliban surrendering to may be bring small scale attacks in the near future as AAF attempt to retain their legitimacy in the Achin District. Over the past 9 vity overall has remained increased especially in Konar. During the election timeframe, we saw a large spike in kinetic activity followed by a dramatic decrease in significant activity, as AAF expended much of their ammunition. Recently, the AAF have begun to increase their activities, though their tactics remain primarily stand-off in nature. Activity throughout N2KL will most likely increase in the near term as Eid has concluded and the AAF prepare for the end of their historical fighting season.

24-48 THREAT REPORTING



As of: 09/26/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET //REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

5

Laghman:

No Direct Threat Reporting. IEDs will be emplaced along MSR Nebraska and Iowa targeting ANSF/LNs

Konar:

- Reporting indicates **AAF will likely continue conducting attacks targeting FOB Bostick and elements patrolling IVO FOB Bostick possibly in the next 24-48 hours.** AAF will continue to conduct IDF attacks on FOB Bostick and will likely increase IDF attacks targeting CF bases in northern Konar in the near term.
- **AAF will continue targeting CF operating in the Korengal Valley in the next 24-48 hours;** with the alleged movement of a weapon's system AAF will potentially sustain attacks targeting COP Vegas during this time.
- Reporting indicates **AAF plan to attack FOB Blessing in the next 24-48 hours.**
- The reported purchases of multiple mortar rounds indicates **AAF will sustain IDF attacks targeting COP H-M and COP Able Main in the next 24-48 hours.**
- **AAF intend to attack CF convoys traveling along MSR California between Noor Gul and Patan Kalay, Noor Gul District.**

Nangarhar:


No Direct Threat Reporting. Increased targeting of GIROA and tribal leaders could occur as AAF attempt to regain control and challenge the governments ability to secure the population.

Nuristan:

• AAF will continue to conduct attacks targeting COP Keating and COP Lowell in the near term.

★ -Threat in Next 24-48 Hours

★ - Continuing Threat



THREAT ASSESSMENT

- AAF will increase harassing direct and IED initiated attacks throughout Konar province to slow CF targeting and patrols in the area. Attacks will target CF bases throughout Pech and Dara Noor districts with IDF and SAF from stand-off distances. IED and ambushes along MSR Rhode Island will be emplaced to interfere with CF/ANSF operations in the area. Attacks will be most prevalent along western portions of Rhode Island due to AAFs freedom of movement and unpaved surfaces.
- AAF in Konar continue to conduct meetings for future attack plans consisting of more large scale, coordinated attacks targeting CF bases. AAF in the Khas Konar District have reportedly received multiple IEDs and plan to emplace them in the near future. IED-initiated attacks along MSRs in the near future will target CF/ANSF convoys and patrols especially IVO the Shaunkrai Valley. Attacks targeting CF bases in the Pech, Ghaziabad and Nari Districts will be most prevalent over the next 24-72 hours.
- IED activity in southern Nangarhar will continue to screen and facilitate AAF and criminal activity in the area. Increased intimidation will also occur in these southern districts targeting both locals and ANSF to slow patrols and retain freedom of movement with GIROA interference.

Pages 6 through 7 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

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Konar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

8

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



AUG 17
AUG 23

KONAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

- OBJ BURNSIDE
- OBJ COPYCAT
- OBJ WRIGLEY
- OBJ MOWGLI
- OBJ HOTDATE

☐ - TB Radio Active

So What...

CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE A SLIGHT INCREASE IN ATTACKS TARGETING CF/ANSF BASES AND PATROLLING ELEMENTS IN THE NEXT 24-72 HOURS WITH THE RECENT INFLUX OF MWE INTO THE AO. AAF WILL ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT LARGE SCALE ATTACKS PRIOR TO THE ONSET OF WINTER, LEADING TO AN INCREASE OF PROBING ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE

Konar Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

- △
- △
- △
- △
- △
- △

Epicenter for instability in NKL

Disruption and Intimidation

Sanctuary and Facilitation

90 Day Assessment

- AAF in northern Konar continue to attack CF patrols and fixed locations to screen the movement of MWE and illicit goods; extreme terrain, porous borders and an inability to connect with the population allows AAF freedom of movement
- The border region of Konar provides sanctuary and support to sustain the AAF; fighters commonly leverage long standing feuds, intimidation and corruption to move freely; IDF attacks are primarily used to fix CF in static locations and assist with movement
- IEDs and attacks along the Konar river valley continue to support AAF movement and challenges GIROA and CF attempts to connect the population and provide security to the populace
- Seasonal direct fire attacks and ambushes along MSR California are conducted by AAF to sustain operations and disrupt CF supply lines
- The Pech river valley remains the most kinetic area of N2KL; AAF utilize SAF, RPG and IDF along with IEDs to target CF throughout the area; interconnected supply routes through severely restricted terrain, internal and external support and historical ties create the ideal area to conduct an insurgency; attacks used to remove CF and demonstrate inability to secure or provide for population

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- ☐ SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

8 x SIGACTS

- HATCHET PATROL RECEIVED SAF
- FOB FORTRESS RECEIVED DF
- ASG OP1 RECEIVED DF
- 3/A/2-12 RECEIVED SAF
- COP ABLE MAIN RECEIVED IDF
- COP ABLE MAIN RECEIVED CPLX ATTK
- COP VEGAS RECEIVED DF
- FOB BLESSING RECEIVED IDF

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

1x LN INTERPRETER KIA

Nuristan Daily Rollup



As of: 09/26/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

9

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



**AUG 17 -
AUG 23**

**AUG 24 -
AUG 30**

**AUG 31 -
SEP 06**

**Isolation and local
insurgency**

**SEP 07 -
SEP 13**


Nuristan Daily Activity:

NURISTAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE



90 Day Assessment

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

0 x SIGACTs

NSTR

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

- AAF use the lack of CF/ANSF presence and isolationist culture for passive support and safehavens
- AAF use screening attacks to fix CF assisting in the exfil and infil of MWE and illicit goods into and out of the area
- Historic ratlines through the area allow AAF to move undetected from valley to valley to support operations
- Force locals to support insurgency due to a lack of GIRoA and ANSF

Laghman Daily Rollup



As of: 09/26/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

~~SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO~~

10

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



AUG 17 - AUG 23

LAGHMAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

So What...

IN THE NEXT 24 HOURS AAF WILL CONDUCT IDF OR SAF TARGETING CF IN THE VICINITY OF METHAR LAM IOT GENERATE FUNDING FOR FUTURE OPERATIONS AND DISRUPT CF.

Corruption and intimidation of LN and ANSF

AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 06 - SEP 12

Transit and staging area

Criminal and fraud to generate funds

90 Day Assessment

- AAF lead by Char Noor Chapow conduct IED attacks along MSR Nebraska; attacks are often hastily emplaced possibly to intimidate LN and ANSF from cooperating with CF and slow patrols or convoys moving through the area; devices continue to increase in lethality possibly shifting to the targeting of CF once devices evolve to adequate levels
- Direct fire and IDF attacks targeting CF FOBs demonstrate AAFs attempt to fix CF, possibly to facilitate illicit activity and movement throughout the AO
- Provincial boundaries along western and southern borders allow for AAF undetected freedom of movement from safehavens
- AAF and criminal elements use the lack of ANSF and CF to conduct attacks and illegal CPs along HWY7 to slow movement of logistics and shake down or tax commercial vehicles traversing the area
- Corruption and intimidation are prevalent throughout the province

~~S//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO~~

Laghman Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

△

△

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY
0 x SIGACTS

NSTR

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties
NSTR



Nangarhar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/26/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR


"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

11

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks

20
10
0



AUG 17 - AUG 23

NANGARHAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

So What...

AAF WILL TARGET ANSF TRAVELING ON ROUTE NEWARK AND SOUTHERN RTEs IN KHOGYANI WITH RCIEDs IOT LIMIT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT AND FACILITATE ILLICIT ACTIVITY.

JG 24 - AUG 30

AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 07 - SEP 13

Corruption and extortion

Defensive belt to support operations

Unknown movement of support

Exploit tribal feuds

Narcotics and illicit activity

90 DAY ASSESSMENT

- AAF use defensive IEDs, direct style attacks and illegal CPs to ensure safehavens in southern district to facilitate the production and movement of narcotics and other illicit activity
- Corruption at every level is reported, leads to distrust and strain on CF and GIRoA's ability to connect the people to the government.
- AAF IED and suicide networks indirectly and directly support criminal activity
- Tribal feuds and dislike is exploited by AAF to support operations
- A lack of ANSF and GIRoA emphases on Torkham gate allows high-speed movement of weapons, fighters and leadership in to the area relatively undetected and unknown to CF and ANSF; extortion and corruption prevalent due to in adequate oversight of operations
- Challenge development to infrastructure to retain control of population and limit influence of GIRoA

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

0 x SIGACTS

NSTR

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

Pages 12 through 14 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)


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OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 49004 52108
DATE: 25SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340925



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEL's:

1. Identify vehicle traffic ability along route.
2. Identify number of personnel on foot along route.
3. Identify vehicles whose speed is excessively fast.
4. Identify location of each congested location along the route.
5. Identify and locate any checkpoints along the route.
6. Identify driver actions at checkpoints to include efforts to avoid them.
7. Confirm or deny the presence of personnel in possible overwatch position observing hwy1a.
8. Confirm or deny any evidence of digging along hwy1a
9. Confirm or deny the presence of large items for storage of bulk homemade explosives emplacements.
10. Confirm or deny any evidence of clearing of trees, shrubs or terrain to obtain LOS from possible hide site to IED.
11. Identify any personnel digging on or alongside roads or personnel congregating on the road, or in concealed locations (from the road).
12. Identify cold or hot thermal signatures located on the road or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters on either side of the road).
13. Identify any personnel in positions within 10-15 meters of the road in positions that provide clear line of sight to the road.
14. Identify any vehicles that appear to be abandoned. Identify any vehicle tracks leading to a thermal signature or indication of disturbed earth/suspicious object.
15. Identify any indications of new piles of dirt or rubbish to include bags, boxes and any other items larger than 0.5m by 0.5m; concrete blocks or barriers as along side the road that appear out of place (serve no identifiable purpose) or new.
16. Identify any disturbed earth, broken pavement, speed bumps, shallow pits, or trenches on or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters) of the road.
17. Identify any earth movement, ground scarring, or vegetation clearing along side roads (within 5-10 meters).
18. Identify and annotate size and location of any visual indications of wire, tubing, or cord laid across the road surface or along the road (within 5-10 meters).

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 03 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 02 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT assess flood damage to HWY1a and assist in mission planning for alternate routes along the route. CF, ICW ANSF, prepare to coordinate reconstruction efforts, traffic control measures, and possible vehicle staging areas along the route as logistical moves are halted due to limited traffic ability. Failure to launch FMV will force CF and ANSF to coordinate with out proper SA of the extent of the damage along the route.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

Page 16 redacted for the following reason:



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High



OPERATION: KHOGYANI COUNTER IED
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XC 10603 79604
DATE: 25SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340925



MISSION TYPE: C-IED

EEL's:

1. Identify Local Nationals digging in or next to roads.
2. Local Nationals loitering in groups of 3 or more personnel on or next to roads.
3. Identify movement of munitions, weapons, equipment and supplies.
4. Identify suspicious objects placed on or next to roads.
5. Identify MAMs with weapons within 500 Meters of roads.
6. Identify possible illegal traffic control points along roads.
7. Traffic jams or congestion of 5 or more vehicles.
8. Disturbed earth in or along roads.
9. Movement of 3 or more vehicles traveling together.

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 23 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT identify areas of IED emplacement along MSRs in Khogyani as well as the movement of AAF operatives within the valleys of southern Khogyani.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc. At 1849Z, TF ODIN observed a large mound of dirt on the east side of the road IVO 42S XC 14476 81264.

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Pages 18 through 19 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

Page to be removed

SIGNIFICANT DATES, ELECTION & RAMADAN



SEPTEMBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
		-----		◆	-----	
6	7	8	9	10	11	12

13	14	15	16	17	18	19
-----		◆	●	-----		
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
☆	-----		◆	-----		
27	28	29	30			

OCTOBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
				🇺🇸		
4	5	6	7	8	9	10

11	12	13	14	15	16	17
						🇺🇸
18	19	20	21	22	23	24

25	26	27	28	29	30	31

- ★ 22 August – 20 September – Ramadan
- ◆ 3 September – Preliminary results
- ◆ 16 September – Lailatul-Qadr (Night of Power)
- 17 September – IEC certifies presidential election
- ☆ 20 September – Eid-al-Fitr (Generally lasts 3-5 days)
- 🇺🇸 01 October – Presidential run-off, if needed
- 🇺🇸 17 October – Inauguration (if no Run-off)


Significant Date Threats and Assessments

Ramadan

- During this period, there has been no decrease in activity that has been attributable to Ramadan. The increase observed during the latter part of the Pre-Ramadan period is a direct result of election related attacks. Supply issues will be the biggest factor contributing to the decrease observed during this Ramadan period. Reporting continues to indicate attacks will commence once supply levels return to acceptable amounts.
- The timing of Ramadan this year will likely see insurgent and criminal activity remain increased across N2KL due to favorable weather conditions, the peak of the fighting season, as well as election related events and a possible election run-off.
- Attacks will likely recommence once supplies return to an acceptable level. These attacks will focus on CF bases to avoid local casualties. Election results being released just after the Laiatul-Qadr (Night of Power) observance could provoke demonstrations and increased propaganda. Large crowds will present viable targets for possible suicide bombs however to avoid negative IO, AAF will refrain from such attacks instead targeting ANSF, CF and GIROA facilities.



2008 – 2009
Ramadan Comparison



Page 21 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF MTN WARRIOR BDE S2 ACRONYMS LIST



As of: 9/26/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

“Led by Love of Country” “All The Way”

SECRET // REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO

22

- AAF = Anti-Afghan Forces
- ABP = Afghan Border Patrol
- AC = Afghan civilian
- ACM= Anti-Coalition Militia or AAF
- ANA = Afghan National Army
- ANAAC = Afghan National Army Air Corps
- ANP = Afghan National Police
- ANSF = Afghan National Security Forces (Army, Police and NDS)
- AQSL = Al-Qaida Senior Leader(ship)
- ASG = Afghan Security Guards
- AWT = Attack Weapons Team
- BDA = Battle Damage Assessment
- CAS = Close Air Support
- CF = Coalition Forces
- CFACC = Combined Forces Air Component Command
- CFSOCC = Combined Forces Special Ops Component Command
- CIV = Civilians
- CIVCAS = Civilian Casualties
- CMA = Central Movement Agency
- COIN = Counter-Insurgency
- COP= Combat Outpost
- CSTC-A = Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
- DC = District Center
- DCOM = Deputy Commander
- DCOS JOPS = Deputy Chief of Staff Joint Ops
- ESF = Election Security Force
- ETT = Embedded Training Team
- EW = Electronic Warfare
- FAM = Fighting-Aged Male
- FFIR = Friendly Forces Information Requirements
- FMV = Full Motion Video
- FNU = Father’s Name Unknown
- FOB = Forward Operating Base
- FOM = Freedom of Movement
- FP = Fighting Position
- GIRoA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- GSW = Gunshot Wound
- HBIED = Home-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- HE = High Explosive
- HiG= Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin
- HME = Home-Made Explosives
- HQN = Haqqani Network
- HVI = High Value Individual
- HVT= High Value Target
- HWY = Highway
- ICP = Illegal Checkpoint
- IDF = Indirect Fire
- IDP = Internally Displaced Person
- IEC = Independent Election Commission
- INS = Insurgents or AAF
- IO = Information Operations
- ISTAR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
- ISO = In Support Of
- IVO = In Vicinity Of
- KAF = Kandahar Airfield
- KIA = Killed In Action
- LN = Local National
- LNU= Last Name Unknown
- MANPADS = Man-portable Air Defense System
- MBT = Main Battle Tank
- MEDEVAC = Medical Evacuation
- MoD = Ministry of Defense
- Mol = Ministry of Interior
- MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protection
- MWE= Men, Weapons and Equipment
- NBD = Non-battle Death
- NBI = Non-battle Injury
- NDS = National Directorate of Security
- NFO = Normal Framework Operations
- NMCC = National Military Command Center
- NPCC = National Police Coordination Center
- OBJ = Objective
- OCC-P/R = Operations Coordination Center-Provincial / Regional
- OMLT = Operational Mentor Liaison Team
- OP = Outpost
- PAX = Passengers
- PC = Police Chief
- PID = Positively Identified
- POO = Point of Origin
- PPIED = Pressure Plate IED
- PRT = Provincial Reconstruction Team
- QRF = Quick Reaction Force
- RPG = Rocket-Propelled Grenade
- SAF = Small Arms Fire
- SIED = Suicide IED
- SVIED= Suicide Vest IED
- SOF = Show of Force
- SOP = Show of Presence
- STRATCOM = Strategic Communications
- TFK = Task Force Kandahar
- TFL = Task Force Leatherneck
- TIC = Troops in Contact
- TMCC = Theater Movement Coordination Center
- TTP = Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- UNAMA = United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- WIA = Wounded in Action