



4 IBCT / 4 Infantry Division

"LED BY LOVE OF COUNTRY"



TF MOUNTAIN WARRIOR GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (GRINTSUM) 230500DSEPTEMBER2009 – 240500DSEPTEMBER2009

POINTS OF CONTACT:

MW2			SVOIP:	
CFT Director				
AS2				
BISE Chief				
S2X				
NCOIC				
CM&D				



Mountain Warrior PIR



As of 30 AUG 09

TF Mountain Warrior PIR

Laghman/Western Nuristan Derivative PIR

1. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process?
 - 1a. Who and where is spreading propaganda to delegitimize the Afghan elections?
 - 1b. How will AAF groups target the new Provincial Council members are the election results are released?
2. Where does the local populace rely on AAF for support rather than GIROA, ANSF, or CF?
3. How can CF sway local leaders to a more favorable opinion of the GIROA?
4. What effects are friendly and threat IO messages having on the local populace?
5. What individuals or facilities have connections to which insurgent group?
6. When and how is corruption and/or drug trafficking supporting AAF operations?
7. What rifts exist between AAF groups that can be exploited by CF and GIROA?
8. How will the upcoming winter affect AAF activity in N2KL?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Laghman?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Laghman?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Laghman?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Laghman?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being produced in Laghman?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Laghman?

Nangarhar Derivative PIR

Konar/Eastern Nuristan Derivative PIR

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Nangarhar?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Nangarhar?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Nangarhar?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Haqqani Network in Nangarhar?
- 6b. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 6c. What individuals or facilities have connections to Bilal Ahmandi's network in the Khogyani tribal area?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Nangarhar?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5a. Where is OBJ Hot Date and Tamadullah?
- 5b. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 8a. How can the divisions between the HiG, TB, and Salafists be exploited by CF?

AO MOUNTAIN WARRIOR SIGACTS



As of: 9/24/09 01:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET // REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Last 24 Hours

230000D+SEP09 -232359D+SEP09

AO Destroyer

- 1. 231136D+SEP09 - CPLX
ANP CP 2 received SAF from 5-8x AAF resulting in 1x LN casualty

AO Lethal

- 1. 231556D+SEP09 - IDF
FOB BLESSING received IDF from 2-3x AAF
- 2. 231717D+ SEP09 - SAF
B/2-12 received SAF from 2-3x AAF
- 3. 231745D+SEP09 - CPLX
COP VEGAS received SAF/PKM from 6-8x AAF

AO Chosin


- 1. 230830D+SEP09 - SAF
EAGLE 26 received SAF from UNK AAF

AO Wildhorse

- 1. 232100D+SEP09 - CPLX
FOB METHAR LAM received SAF/IDF/RPG from UNK AAF

AO Gryphon

- 1. 230930D+SEP09 - IED-D
IED DET on ANP convoy along RTE NEWARK
- 2. 231630D+SEP09 - IED-F
LN reported IED FOUND and turned into 4/BSTB



ASSESSMENT

Activity in N2KL has slightly increased over the reporting period. Though not a significant spike in activity, the complexity of attacks possibly signifies the official end of Eid celebrations and the commencement of normal AAF activity. This activity will likely remain consistent with historical trends prior to the onset of winter. In Nuristan, AAF will increase attacks IVO COP Keating and Lowell in the near term. Attacks will be disruptive in nature to screen to movement of MWE and stage for further attacks. More coordinated attacks may increase as AAF become aware of possible CF movement from the area and winter months approach. In Konar, AAF continue to target CF in the Pech district, centering their attacks on fixed locations. Kashmir Khan, a HiG CDR is reportedly in the province with fighters from Pakistan to conduct attacks on CF in Nari and Ghaziabad Districts; OP Bari Alai and COP Pirtle-King will be the most likely targets. In Laghman, AAF will increase emplacement of IEDs along MSRs to disrupt CF patrols and intimidate LNs in the area. As seen today, IDF may continue to be included in attacks targeting CF bases in the near term. In Nangarhar, AAF will emplace IEDs and conduct small arms fire attacks against ANSF/CF in southeastern provinces. These attacks will be used to slow CF patrols, facilitate illicit activity and protect freedom of movement. AAF have reportedly met and have decided to target road construction projects and attempt to kidnap NGOs working on these projects, likely to hinder infrastructure improvements, garner funding and challenge the GIRoAs ability to provide for, or protect the people.

24-48 THREAT REPORTING



As of: 09/24/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET //REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO

5

Laghman:

- Reporting indicated COP Najil and the Dowlat Shah District Center would be attacked after Ramadan. Attacks conducted will potentially be seen at the end of Eid, which may occur as soon as the next 24-48 hours.

Konar:

- Reporting indicates **AAF may attack OP Mace in the next 24-48 hours.**
- With the movement of Kashmir Khan into northern Konar, **CF/ANSF can expect to see attacks targeting COP Pirtle King and OP Bari Alai in the next 24-48 hours.**
- Reporting indicates **AAF plan to attack COP Monti during the next 24-48 hours.** AAF will likely engage the COP with IDF, as historically seen in attacks targeting the CF base.
- AAF will continue targeting CF operating in the Korengal Valley in the next 24-48 hours;** AAF will likely sustain attacks targeting COP Vegas during this time.
- Reporting indicates **AAF plan to attack FOB Blessing in the next 24-48 hours.**
- AAF are planning to emplace IEDs in western Pech between the villages of Wodigaram and Kandarow Villages; **AAF are planning to conduct an IED initiated ambush targeting CF/ANSF patrolling elements possibly as soon as the next 24-48 hours.**
- Reporting indicates AAF are planning to emplace multiple IEDs IVO Shaunkrai Valley IOT restrict CF/ANSF FOM in the area.
- AAF will likely continue to conduct attacks targeting CF patrolling elements operating in eastern Pech and western Dara Noor.

Nangarhar:


- Earlier reporting suggested AAF planned to attack the Pachir Wa Agam District center on 19 or 20 SEP 09. This attack has yet to occur; it is possible this will occur following Eid, which could be as soon as the next 24-48 hours.

Nuristan:

- AAF will continue to conduct attacks targeting COP Keating and COP Lowell in the near term.

★ -Threat in Next 24-48 Hours

★ - Continuing Threat



THREAT ASSESSMENT

- AAF will increase harassing direct and IED initiated attacks throughout Konar province to slow CF targeting and patrols in the area. Attacks will target CF bases throughout Pech and Dara Noor districts with IDF and SAF from stand-off distances. IED and ambushes along MSR Rhode Island will be emplaced to interfere with CF/ANSF operations in the area. Attacks will be most prevalent along western portions of Rhode Island due to AAFs freedom of movement and unpaired surfaces.
- AAF in Konar have possibly completed resupply and in planning phases. The end of Eid will signify an increase in attacks. AAF in the Khas Konar District have reportedly received multiple IEDs and plan to emplace them in the near future. IED-initiated attacks along MSRs in the near future will target CF/ANSF convoys and patrols especially IVO the Shaunkrai Valley. Attacks targeting CF bases in the Pech, Ghaziabad and Nari Districts will be most prevalent over the next 24-72 hours.
- IED activity in southern Nangarhar will continue to screen and facilitate AAF and criminal activity in the area. Increased intimidation will also occur in these southern districts targeting both locals and ANSF to slow patrols and retain freedom of movement with GIROA interference.

Pages 6 through 8 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)
(b)(2)High, (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

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SECURITY

- **The Pech is the most kinetic AOR in Afghanistan.**

- 15% of all kinetic events in RC(E) during the last 120 days occurred here. There are over 20 senior TB commander's in the Pech, some of which have operated here since the 90s.

- The Pech is a training ground. Insurgents from across Afghanistan come here to be trained by senior, Pech commanders.
- Many leaders see themselves as leaders of the resistance, the continuous fighting here creates fear in the eyes of local citizens and GIRoA.

GOVERNANCE

- **Pech fighting propagates a message across Afghanistan that the GIRoA is unable to provide security, governance.**


- The Pech is a Mujahidin symbol because it is where they "Defeated" the Soviet Army.
- Timber trade breeds corruption in the official and unofficial government systems in N2KL.
- More than one hundred thousand people live in the Pech river valley, it is a significant population center for N2KL.
- Fighting and Corruption in the Pech will prevent CF from establishing legitimate GIRoA connections in Konar.

DEVELOPMENT



- **Pech holds the key to development in N2KL and the second largest industry in Afghanistan: TIMBER**

- Much of the fighting in the Konar is due to the lack of a legitimate Timber infrastructure in Afghanistan.
- AAF will target development projects through subversion IOT siphon off funding for their operations.
- Timber trade is a national issue. Not only is it sold in other areas of RC(E), benefits from its illegal sales spreads into other regions breeding corruption at the highest levels of the GIRoA.



Konar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/28/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



KONAR ACTIVITY

- Active OBJ
- OBJ KILTY
- OBJ COPYCAT
- OBJ MOWGLI
- OBJ HOTDATE


- TB Radio Active

So What...

CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE A SLIGHT INCREASE IN ATTACKS TARGETING CF/ANSF BASES AND PATROLLING ELEMENTS IN THE NEXT 24-72 HOURS WITH THE CONCLUSION OF EID. AAF WILL ATTEMPT TO CONDUCT LARGE SCALE ATTACKS PRIOR TO THE ONSET OF WINTER; LEADING TO AN INCREASE OF PROBING ATTACKS IN THE NEAR FUTURE.

Konar Daily Activity:

- △
- △
- △
- △
- △
- △



LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

ASSESSMENT

- SIGACTS during the past week have decreased in comparison to both previous weeks and 2008 trends; this decrease in activity can be partially attributed to AAF's continued attempts to stockpile weapons with winter approaching, infighting between AAF groups, and an emphasis on meetings to plan future attacks; AAF will carry out IDF attacks targeting FOB Blessing and COP Monti in the next 24-48 hours, AAF will also continue conducting attacks targeting COP Vegas in the near term
- The movement of Kashmir Khan into northern Konar will shortly be followed by attacks in the Ghaziabad District; Khan has historically conducted attacks on OP Bari Alai and COP Pirtle-King, CF can expect to see attacks on these areas in as soon as the next 24-72 hours
- Abu Hamza and AAF are planning to emplace IEDs in southern Konar IVO Shaunkrai Valley in the near term; AAF will emplace the IEDs in the Shaunkrai Valley as it is assessed to be a smuggling route, and AAF are attempting to prevent frequent CF/ANSF patrols in the area
- AAF will increase attacks targeting CF/ANSF patrolling elements in the near term; AAF will emplace IEDs in western Pech in an attempt to conduct IED initiated ambushes and continue to conduct sporadic ambushes targeting CF patrolling elements in eastern Pech; AAF in central Konar are planning for large scale attacks targeting CF bases prior to the onset of winter months

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

5 x SIGACTS

- ANP CP 2 RECEIVED CPLX ATTK
- EAGLE 26 RECEIVED SAF
- FOB BLESSING RECEIVED IDF
- 2/B/2-12 RECEIVED SAF
- COP VEGAS RECEIVED DF

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

1 x LN WOUNDED

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

Nuristan Daily Rollup



As of: 09/24/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



Nuristan Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING


NSTR

NURISTAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE



So What...
 CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE MINIMAL KINETIC ACTIVITY IN NURISTAN IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS; HARASSING ATTACKS MAY OCCUR, ATTEMPTING TO SCREEN MOVEMENT OF MWE IN PREPARATION FOR FUTURE, POSSIBLY MORE COMPLEX ATTACKS.

ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

0 x SIGACTs

NSTR

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

- Over the past week, AAF within Nuristan have slightly decreased attack levels in comparison to prior weeks' trends; expect to see a continued decrease in kinetic activity during the near term as the majority of prior attacks were focused on Barge Matal Village prior to CF withdrawing forces from the area
- Attacks targeting CF across Nuristan will remain minimal in the upcoming days, attacks will remain sporadic, targeting CF bases with harassment style attacks on an irregular basis IOT emphasize that AAF are still occupying the area
- CF can expect to see sporadic attacks targeting COP Lowell, COP Keating and OP Fritsche in the near term, as AAF are assessed to be in the middle of their attack cycle; AAF have historically conducted attacks in this area periodically over a course of 3-4 days, which is then followed by a rest/refit period lasting for only a short period of time; attacks targeting the CF bases in the area will consist primarily of DF attacks (SAF/RPGs)

Laghman Daily Rollup



As of: 09/24/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

12

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



AUG 17 - AUG 23

JG 24 - AUG 30

AUG 31 - 2 SEP 06

SEP 07 - 13 SEP

So What...

AAF WILL EMPLACE IEDs ON ROUTE NEBRASKA IN ALISHANG DISTRICT TARGETING ANSF/CF TRAVELING OR PATROLLING IVO COP NAJIL.

LAGHMAN ACTIVITY


Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

Laghman Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING



ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

1 x SIGACTS

● FOB MEHTAR LAM RECEIVED CPLX ATTK

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties
NSTR

- Trends for Laghman this week indicate a decrease in activity from last week; we can expect to see activity for this week to closely follow Laghman's 2008 trends
- LNs have been requested by Taliban fighters to turn over any weapons and equipment found from CF attacks in Alishang District; LNs understand they can receive money through the Small Rewards Program (SRP) which is possibly the reason for the LN not handing the weapon over to the Taliban and would have likely turned in the weapon to a CF FOB
- Mullah Layl may have recently received a shipment of mines that he intends to use on ANSF/CF on COP Najil; the acquisition of these mines indicate increased IED activity throughout the Alishang District in the near term
- AAF are removing the command wire from landmines after emplacing them in order to use the IED later; this TTP may explain the incomplete IEDs found in the NKL area

Nangarhar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/24/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR


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SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

13

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks

20
10
0



AUG 17 - AUG 23

NANGARHAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ


LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE

JG 24 - AUG 30

AUG 31 - SEP 06

SEP 07 - SEP 13



Nangarhar Daily Activity:

- SIGNIFICANT REPORTING
- △
 - △
 - △
 - △

So What...

AAF WILL CONDUCT CROSS-BORDER ATTACKS AGAINST ABP IN DUR BABA DISTRICT; KIDNAPPINGS AND AMBUSH STYLE ATTACKS MAY OCCUR IOT DISRUPT ROAD CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN PACHIR WA AGAM; RCIEDs WILL TARGET CF/ANSF TRAVELING ON ROUTE NEWARK AND SOUTHERN RTEs IN KHOGYANI TO LIMIT FREEDOM OF MOVEMENT.

ASSESSMENT

- For the second consecutive week trend analysis indicates a continued decrease in kinetic activity; this year's level of attacks remains below the 2008 historical trends which may indicate disruption caused by CF/ANSF operations; expect an increase in attacks after the Eid Al-Fitr holiday has passed and AAF attempt to expend munitions prior to the winter months
- The Taliban will attempt to make friends with in an attempt to regain access to key areas in Achin known to have need to patch relationships with members of Niaz's tribe IOT continue using the Mohmand Valley as an operational hub
- AAF are using a compound that belongs to Mangal Bagh to conduct attacks for ANSF/CF in Khogyani in the near term; reporting indicates that fighters from Pakistan may be assisting with the attacks
- AAF are transporting hashish from Afghanistan to Pakistan by mules in order to fund Taliban operations in Pachir Wa Agam and Khogyani Districts

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

2 x SIGACTS

- IED DET ON ABP CONVOY
- LN REPORTED IED FOUND

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties
NSTR

Pages 14 through 16 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

REDACT WHOLE
PG

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OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4

MAP SCALE: 1:500K

RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF

CENTER GRID: 42S XD 50063 50439



DATE: 23SEP09

COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340923



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEL's:

1. Identify vehicle traffic ability along route.
2. Identify number of personnel on foot along route.
3. Identify vehicles whose speed is excessively fast.
4. Identify location of each congested location along the route.
5. Identify and locate any checkpoints along the route.
6. Identify driver actions at checkpoints to include efforts to avoid them.
7. Confirm or deny the presence of personnel in possible overwatch position observing hwy1a.
8. Confirm or deny any evidence of digging along hwy1a
9. Confirm or deny the presence of large items for storage of bulk homemade explosives emplacements.
10. Confirm or deny any evidence of clearing of trees, shrubs or terrain to obtain LOS from possible hide site to IED.
11. Identify any personnel digging on or alongside roads or personnel congregating on the road, or in concealed locations (from the road).
12. Identify cold or hot thermal signatures located on the road or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters on either side of the road).
13. Identify any personnel in positions within 10-15 meters of the road in positions that provide clear line of sight to the road.
14. Identify any vehicles that appear to be abandoned. Identify any vehicle tracks leading to a thermal signature or indication of disturbed earth/suspicious object.
15. Identify any indications of new piles of dirt or rubbish to include bags, boxes and any other items larger than 0.5m by 0.5m; concrete blocks or barriers as along side the road that appear out of place (serve no identifiable purpose) or new.
16. Identify any disturbed earth, broken pavement, speed bumps, shallow pits, or trenches on or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters) of the road.
17. Identify any earth movement, ground scarring, or vegetation clearing along side roads (within 5-10 meters).
18. Identify and annotate size and location of any visual indications of wire, tubing, or cord laid across the road surface or along the road (within 5-10 meters).

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 02 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 02 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT assess flood damage to HWY1a and assist in mission planning for alternate routes along the route. CF, ICW ANSF, prepare to coordinate reconstruction efforts, traffic control measures, and possible vehicle staging areas along the route as logistical moves are halted due to limited traffic ability. Failure to launch FMV will force CF and ANSF to coordinate without proper SA of the extent of the damage along the route.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit VIA mlRC. At 0210Z, TF Gryphon requested an imagery derived product (IDP) of the bridge washout.



HWY 1A NAI 1-4, IDPs



As of: 9/22/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO

18



TFO-A ARST JALALABAD
 OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
 TGT NAME: BRIDGE WASHOUT
 RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
 MGRS: 42S XD 41622 05988 TOT: 230212ZSEP09
 COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
 DRV FM: DIA
 CL BY: 14 C
 DECL: 20340923



TFO-A ARST JALALABAD
 OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
 TGT NAME: BRIDGE WASHOUT
 RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
 MGRS: 42S XD 41415 05732 TOT: 230214ZSEP09
 COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
 DRV FM: DIA
 CL BY: 14 C
 DECL: 20340923

NORTH BYPASS



SOUTH BYPASS



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~





OPERATION: SHERZAD FUTURE PLANNING
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 23753 09059
DATE: 23SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340923



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEI's:

1. Identify Local Nationals digging in or next to roads.
2. Local Nationals loitering in groups of 3 or more personnel on or next to roads.
3. Identify movement of munitions, weapons, equipment and supplies.
4. Identify suspicious objects placed on or next to roads.
5. Identify MAMs with weapons within 500 Meters of roads.
6. Identify possible illegal traffic control points along roads.
7. Traffic jams or congestion of 5 or more vehicles.
8. Disturbed earth in or along roads.
9. Movement of 3 or more vehicles traveling together.

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 10 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO IOT support future planning in the Sherzad District. The lack of FMV will hinder CF/ANSF general movement in the area, and pose unnecessary risk to both mounted and dismounted troops.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

Pages 20 through 21 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High

Page to be removed

SIGNIFICANT DATES, ELECTION & RAMADAN



SEPTEMBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
		1	2	3	4	5
		-----		◆	-----	
6	7	8	9	10	11	12

13	14	15	16	17	18	19
-----		◆	●	-----		
20	21	22	23	24	25	26
☆	-----		-----		-----	
27	28	29	30			

OCTOBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
				🇵🇰		
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
						🇵🇰
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

- ★ 22 August – 20 September – Ramadan
- ◆ 3 September – Preliminary results
- ◆ 16 September – Lailatul-Qadr (Night of Power)
- 17 September – IEC certifies presidential election
- ☆ 20 September – Eid-al-Fitr (Generally lasts 3-5 days)
- 🇵🇰 01 October – Presidential run-off, if needed
- 🇵🇰 17 October – Inauguration (if no Run-off)


Significant Date Threats and Assessments

Ramadan

- During this period, there has been no decrease in activity that has been attributable to Ramadan. The increase observed during the latter part of the Pre-Ramadan period is a direct result of election related attacks. Supply issues will be the biggest factor contributing to the decrease observed during this Ramadan period. Reporting continues to indicate attacks will commence once supply levels return to acceptable amounts.
- The timing of Ramadan this year will likely see insurgent and criminal activity remain increased across N2KL due to favorable weather conditions, the peak of the fighting season, as well as election related events and a possible election run-off.
- Attacks will likely recommence once supplies return to an acceptable level. These attacks will focus on CF bases to avoid local casualties. Election results being released just after the Laiatul-Qadr (Night of Power) observance could provoke demonstrations and increased propaganda. Large crowds will present viable targets for possible suicide bombs however to avoid negative IO, AAF will refrain from such attacks instead targeting ANSF, CF and GIROA facilities.

2008 – 2009

Ramadan Comparison



Page 23 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TF MTN WARRIOR BDE S2 ACRONYMS LIST



As of: 9/24/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

“Led by Love of Country” “All The Way”

SECRET // REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

24

- AAF = Anti-Afghan Forces
- ABP = Afghan Border Patrol
- AC = Afghan civilian
- ACM= Anti-Coalition Militia or AAF
- ANA = Afghan National Army
- ANAAC = Afghan National Army Air Corps
- ANP = Afghan National Police
- ANSF = Afghan National Security Forces (Army, Police and NDS)
- AQSL = Al-Qaida Senior Leader(ship)
- ASG = Afghan Security Guards
- AWT = Attack Weapons Team
- BDA = Battle Damage Assessment
- CAS = Close Air Support
- CF = Coalition Forces
- CFACC = Combined Forces Air Component Command
- CFSOCC = Combined Forces Special Ops Component Command
- CIV = Civilians
- CIVCAS = Civilian Casualties
- CMA = Central Movement Agency
- COIN = Counter-Insurgency
- COP= Combat Outpost
- CSTC-A = Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
- DC = District Center
- DCOM = Deputy Commander
- DCOS JOPS = Deputy Chief of Staff Joint Ops
- ESF = Election Security Force
- ETT = Embedded Training Team
- EW = Electronic Warfare
- FAM = Fighting-Aged Male
- FFIR = Friendly Forces Information Requirements
- FMV = Full Motion Video
- FNU = Father’s Name Unknown
- FOB = Forward Operating Base
- FOM = Freedom of Movement
- FP = Fighting Position
- GIRoA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- GSW = Gunshot Wound
- HBIED = Home-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- HE = High Explosive
- HiG= Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin
- HME = Home-Made Explosives
- HQN = Haqqani Network
- HVI = High Value Individual
- HVT= High Value Target
- HWY = Highway
- ICP = Illegal Checkpoint
- IDF = Indirect Fire
- IDP = Internally Displaced Person
- IEC = Independent Election Commission
- INS = Insurgents or AAF
- IO = Information Operations
- ISTAR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
- ISO = In Support Of
- IVO = In Vicinity Of
- KAF = Kandahar Airfield
- KIA = Killed In Action
- LN = Local National
- LNU= Last Name Unknown
- MANPADS = Man-portable Air Defense System
- MBT = Main Battle Tank
- MEDEVAC = Medical Evacuation
- MoD = Ministry of Defense
- Mol = Ministry of Interior
- MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protection
- MWE= Men, Weapons and Equipment
- NBD = Non-battle Death
- NBI = Non-battle Injury
- NDS = National Directorate of Security
- NFO = Normal Framework Operations
- NMCC = National Military Command Center
- NPCC = National Police Coordination Center
- OBJ = Objective
- OCC-P/R = Operations Coordination Center-Provincial / Regional
- OMLT = Operational Mentor Liaison Team
- OP = Outpost
- PAX = Passengers
- PC = Police Chief
- PID = Positively Identified
- POO = Point of Origin
- PPIED = Pressure Plate IED
- PRT = Provincial Reconstruction Team
- QRF = Quick Reaction Force
- RPG = Rocket-Propelled Grenade
- SAF = Small Arms Fire
- SIED = Suicide IED
- SVIED= Suicide Vest IED
- SOF = Show of Force
- SOP = Show of Presence
- STRATCOM = Strategic Communications
- TFK = Task Force Kandahar
- TFL = Task Force Leatherneck
- TIC = Troops in Contact
- TMCC = Theater Movement Coordination Center
- TTP = Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- UNAMA = United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- WIA = Wounded in Action