



4 IBCT / 4 Infantry Division


"LED BY LOVE OF COUNTRY"



TF MOUNTAIN WARRIOR

GRAPHIC INTELLIGENCE SUMMARY (GRINTSUM)

300500DSEPTEMBER2009 – 010500DOCTOBER2009



POINTS OF CONTACT:

MW2		
CFT Director		
AS2		
BISE Chief		
S2X		
NCOIC		
CM&D		



Weather Effects Matrix



As of: 10/1/2009

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

AO South

JALALABAD 4-DAY FORECAST

VALID 1800 HRS ZULU 30 SEP 09

FORECAST	Thu 01 Oct 09		Fri 02 Oct 09		Sat 03 Oct 09		Sun 04 Oct 09									
	HAZE		HAZE		HAZE		HAZE									
	LO: 70F/21C	HI: 99F/37C	LO: 72F/22C	HI: 97F/36C	LO: 75F/24C	HI: 99F/37C	LO: 77F/25C	HI: 93F/34C								
	WIND CHILL	HEAT INDEX	WIND CHILL	HEAT INDEX	WIND CHILL	HEAT INDEX	WIND CHILL	HEAT INDEX								
	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A	N/A								
	WINDS	8 KTS	10 KTS	10 KTS												
	SKY/VIS/WX	00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG	12-00Z: 5 MI / NO CIG	00-12Z: 5 MI / NO CIG	12-00Z: 5 MI / NO CIG	00-12Z: 7 MI / NO CIG	12-00Z: 7 MI / NO CIG	00-12Z: 7 MI / NO CIG	12-00Z: 7 MI / NO CIG							
	CONDITIONS	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	HAZE	MOSTLY CLEAR	MOSTLY CLEAR	SCATTERED TSTMS								
	ILLUM DATA	[Bar chart]		[Bar chart]		[Bar chart]		[Bar chart]								
FIXED WING CAS	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]									
HELO OPS	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]									
PREDATOR	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]									
PERSONNEL	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]									
SHADOW	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]									
TIME	00	06	12	18	00	06	12	18	00	06	12	18	00	06	12	18

TS - Thunderstorms T - Temperature CC - Cloud Cover P - Precipitation

Weather Effects

	0000-0400	0400-0800	0800-1200	1200-1600	1600-2000	2000-2400
Troops	[Green]	[Green]	[Yellow]	[Red]	[Yellow]	[Green]
Mobility	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]
Shadow	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]
Hunter	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]
Predator	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]
RW (CAS)	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]
FW (CAS)	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]
COMMS	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]	[Green]

AO North

BLESSING-BOSTICK 4-DAY FORECAST

AS OF 2000 HRS LOCAL 30 SEP 09

FORECAST	Thu 01 Oct 09		Fri 02 Oct 09		Sat 03 Oct 09		Sun 04 Oct 09									
	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]									
	LO: 59F/15C	HI: 90F/32C	LO: 57F/14C	HI: 88F/31C	LO: 57F/14C	HI: 86F/30C	LO: 57F/14C	HI: 84F/29C								
	WINDS	12 KTS	10 KTS	11 KTS	9 KTS	8 KTS	8 KTS	9 KTS								
	SKY/VIS/WX	7 MI / NO CIG														
	CONDITIONS	CLEAR	MOSTLY CLEAR	CLEAR	CLEAR	CLEAR	CLEAR	MOSTLY CLEAR	SCATTERED TSTMS							
	CAS	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]								
	HELO OPS	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]								
	PERSONNEL	[Green]		[Green]		[Green]		[Green]								
TIME	00	06	12	18	00	06	12	18	00	06	12	18	00	06	12	18

TS - Thunderstorms T - Temperature P - Precipitation

Lunar Effects

Date	BMT	SR	SS	EET	MR	143	150	153	160	163	170	173	180	183	190	193	200	203	210	213	220	223	230	233	000	003	010	013	MS	Lunar % Illum	
	(UTC)	(0000, 2359)																													
01 Oct 09	0023	0117	1307	1402	1127	12	17	23	28	33	38	42	45	48	49	49	48	46	43	40	35	30	25	20	14	9	3	-3	2318	96	
02 Oct 09	0024	0118	1306	1400	1153	7	13	19	24	30	35	41	45	49	52	54	55	55	53	50	46	42	37	31	26	20	14	8	0016	99	
03 Oct 09	0024	0119	1304	1359	1219	2	7	13	19	25	31	37	43	48	52	56	59	61	61	59	56	52	48	43	37	32	26	20	0016	100	
04 Oct 09	0025	0120	1303	1357	1247	-4	2	8	14	20	26	32	38	43	49	54	59	63	66	66	66	63	59	54	49	44	38	32	0116	99	
05 Oct 09	0026	0121	1302	1356	1319	-10	-4	2	7	13	19	25	31	37	43	49	55	60	65	69	71	71	69	66	61	56	50	44	0219	96	



Mountain Warrior PIR



As of: 10/1/2009

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//REL TO USA, CCTF, ISAF, NATO

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As of 30 AUG 09

TF Mountain Warrior PIR

Laghman/Western Nuristan Derivative PIR

1. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process?
 - 1a. Who and where is spreading propaganda to delegitimize the Afghan elections?
 - 1b. How will AAF groups target the new Provincial Council members are the election results are released?
2. Where does the local populace rely on AAF for support rather than GIROA, ANSF, or CF?
3. How can CF sway local leaders to a more favorable opinion of the GIROA?
4. What effects are friendly and threat IO messages having on the local populace?
5. What individuals or facilities have connections to which insurgent group?
6. When and how is corruption and/or drug trafficking supporting AAF operations?
7. What rifts exist between AAF groups that can be exploited by CF and GIROA?
8. How will the upcoming winter affect AAF activity in N2KL?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Laghman?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Laghman?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Laghman?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Laghman?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being produced in Laghman?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Laghman?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Laghman?

Nangarhar Derivative PIR

Konar/Eastern Nuristan Derivative PIR

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Nangarhar?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Nangarhar?
- 5a. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Nangarhar?
- 5b. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 5c. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Nangarhar?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Haqqani Network in Nangarhar?
- 6b. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 6c. What individuals or facilities have connections to Bilal Ahmandi's network in the Khogyani tribal area?
- 7a. When and where is narcotics being sold or processed in Nangarhar?

- 1b. What plans do AAF have to disrupt the post-election process in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2a. Where does the GIROA, ANSF, or CF not exert any influence in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 2b. Where does the AAF provide basic governmental services to the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 4a. Who are the local leaders that CF may be able to sway towards supporting the CF in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5a. Where is OBJ Hot Date and Tamadullah?
- 5b. Who, where, and how is AAF propaganda being disseminated in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are AAF propaganda having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 5d. What effects are CF/GIROA IO messages having on the local populace in Konar/Eastern Nuristan?
- 6a. What individuals or facilities have connections to the Trucker Mafia?
- 8a. How can the divisions between the HiG, TB, and Salafists be exploited by CF?

AO MOUNTAIN WARRIOR SIGACTS



As of: 10/01/09 00:01 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

4

Last 24 Hours

300000D+SEP09 -302359D+SEP09

AO Destroyer


- 300847D+SEP09 - DF
OP MACE received SAF from 3-5 x AAF
- 301415D+SEP09 - SAF
OP BARI ALAI received SAF from 1-3 x AAF
- 301723D+SEP09 - IDF
OP FRITSCHER received IDF from 3-5 x AAF

AO Lethal

- 300717SEP09 - DF
COP MICHIGAN received SAF from 2-5 x AAF
- 300750D+SEP09 - DF
RCP 6/D/2-12IN received SAF/RPG from 2-3 x AAF
- 300804D+SEP09 - SAF
COP HONAKER MIRACLE received SAF from 2-3 x AAF
- 301710D+SEP09 - SAF
HAVOC 7 received SAF from 2-3 x AAF
- 301934D+SEP09 - DF
ANP CP & 27/D/2-12IN received SAF/RPG from 2-3 x AAF
- 302320D+SEP09 - CPLX
PSD 3/D/2-12 received SAF/RPG from 5-7 x AAF

AO Gryphon

- 300254D+SEP09 - DF
NDS BUILDING hit with SAF/RPG from UNK AAF
- 301935D+SEP09 - IED-F
HHC 4BSTB reported IED FOUND in JBAD CITY
- 302202D+SEP09 - IDF
FOB LONESTAR receives IDF from UNK AAF



ASSESSMENT

Activity in N2KL increased during the reporting period. Activity will likely remain at elevated levels over the next month until the onset of winter, followed by a subsequent lull in volume and effectiveness of attacks. In Nuristan, activity will remain decreased overall; attacks conducted will focus IVO COP Keating and Lowell to facilitate the movement of MWE. In Konar, AAF will continue to conduct sporadic harassment style attacks focusing on CF bases and patrols in Dara Noor IOT fix CF in static locations. IED-initiated ambushes and direct fire attacks along MSRs will increase IOT restrict CF FoM and logistics. In Laghman, AAF have recently received funding and possible training from Pakistan which could result in increase in attacks. Attacks targeting GIROA officials will become more prevalent as the elections results loom. In Nangarhar, AAF will continue to emplace IEDs and conduct direct fire attacks against ANSF/CF throughout southern districts, focused along Route Newark. These attacks will be used to slow CF patrols, facilitate illicit activity and protect freedom of movement. Attacks focusing on construction efforts will also increase in the near term as AAF continue their attempts to disrupt progression of infrastructure throughout the area and demonstrate an inability of GIROA to influence the area. Intimidation attacks targeting GIROA officials will increase in the near term as insurgents wish to further dissuade LNs from further cooperating with both GIROA and CF. Continued delays in the release of Presidential election may bring unrest or support AAF's propaganda capabilities.

24-48 THREAT REPORTING



As of: 10/1/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET //REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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Laghman:

• **No Direct Threat Reporting.** AAF may attack ANSF/CF bases or supply trucks traveling on HWY7

Konar:

- Reporting indicates **AAF are possibly preparing for another attack on OP Mace in the next 24-48 hours.**
- Reporting indicates **AAF planned to carry out a large scale attack on COP Michigan and FOB Blessing on 30SEP09. It is plausible AAF will carry out two separate attacks on these bases in the next 24-48 hours;** however, it is highly unlikely that AAF will conduct a large, coordinated attack on both locations.
- Reporting indicates **AAF plan to ambush a CF patrol operating in Recha Lam Village, Pech District on 30SEP09.** Prior reporting indicated Gul Zaman and fighters plan to conduct an IED initiated ambush on CF patrolling IVO Senji Village, Pech District in the next 24-48 hours.
- Reporting indicates **AAF plan to attack COP Monti in the next 24-48 hours.** The continued presence of AAF in the Dangam District and movement of AAF into various locations within Konar increases the likelihood that the base will be attacked in an attempt to divert CF attention from AAF movement into the area.
- Reporting indicates **AAF may attack COP Penich in the next 24-48 hours;** attacks will likely initiate with IDF as seen in AAF's recent TTPs targeting the COP.
- AAF will continue to conduct attacks targeting CF patrolling elements operating in eastern Pech and western Dara Noor. Reporting indicates AAF have possibly emplaced an RCIED IVO COP Michigan and plan to carry out an IED initiated ambush in the near term.
- Reporting indicates AAF are possibly planning to attack CF operating in the Korengal Valley.

Nangarhar:


No Direct Threat Reporting. Increased targeting of GIROA and tribal leaders could occur as AAF attempt to regain control and challenge the governments ability to secure the population.

Nuristan:

• Reporting indicates **AAF will attack COP Keating in the next 24-48 hours.**

★ -Threat in Next 24-48 Hours

☆ - Continuing Threat




THREAT ASSESSMENT

- AAF will increase harassing direct and IED initiated attacks throughout Konar province to slow CF targeting and patrols in the area. Attacks will target CF bases throughout Pech and Dara Noor districts with IDF and SAF from stand-off distances. IED and ambushes along MSR Rhode Island will be emplaced to interfere with CF/ANSF operations in the area. Attacks will be most prevalent along western portions of Rhode Island due to AAFs freedom of movement and unpaved surfaces.
- AAF in Konar will conduct IED-initiated attacks along MSRs in the near future will target CF/ANSF convoys and patrols in western Dara Noor and the eastern Pech districts. IDF attacks targeting CF bases in Dara Noor are highly probable in the next 24-48 hours.
- IED activity in southern Nangarhar will continue to screen and facilitate AAF and criminal activity in the area. Increased intimidation will also occur in these southern districts targeting both locals and ANSF to slow patrols and retain freedom of movement with GIROA interference.

Pages 6 through 7 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

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Presidential Election Update



AS OF: 1 OCT 09

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET// TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

8

Post-election meetings continue to be held in Kabul to synchronize notes, receive an update to ballot auditing/recount, and de-conflict planning/operations for a potential run-off election.

Key points:

-ISAF officials met with two internationally known election experts regarding the audit/recount process. As confirmed in other all source reporting, three criteria were used to identify an estimated 1,380,000 suspicious votes:

- **Greater than 600 ballots per ballot box**
- **Ballot boxes with 100 or more ballots and where 95% or more were selected for one candidate**
- **Combination of the above two scenarios**

- With the current sampling method being executed, final election results remain undetermined and a run-off is still a possibility

- The presidential palace is reportedly preparing for a presidential inauguration for the 3rd week of October (assuming Karzai wins first round). This is different than the previous timeline of 1 October.

- A FRAGO regarding contingency planning for a run-off election has been modified based on the adjusted post-election timeline

So What...

- Continued delays in the announcement of the Presidential election results will lead to distrust and questioning of the democratic process.
- AAF will attempt to flame this mistrust, attempting to incite demonstrations and violence toward GIRoA.
- Once the final announcement is made AAF may target GIRoA officials or facilities to challenge the governments ability to secure the population

Final Uncertified Results (Presidential Candidates)




Hamid Karzai




Dr. Abdullah Abdullah




Ramazan Bashardost

Current Post-Election Timeline (Subject to Change)

- 27-29 SEP: Retrieval of sample ballot boxes from provinces to Kabul IEC warehouse
- 30 SEP: Personnel training on how to sample suspect ballots and what to look for in terms of fraud
- 1-2 OCT: Execute ballot auditing
- 3-6 OCT: Recount and processing of auditing results
- 4 OCT: Next post-election coordination meeting
- 7 OCT:** (Tentative) Final IEC certified results announced
- 6 OCT: In the event of a run-off, all ballot materials will be broken down from shipping boxes/containers
- 9 OCT: Tentative move of ballot material to provinces/districts will occur in the event of a run-off

Konar Daily Rollup



As of: 09/08/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

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SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

9

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks

10

0



AUG 24
AUG 30

Konar Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

- △
- △
- △
- △
- △
- △
- △

- 8 x SIGACTs**
- OP MACE RECEIVED DF
 - OP BARI ALAI RECEIVED SAF
 - COP MICHIGAN RECEIVED DF
 - RCP 6/D/2-12 RECEIVED DF
 - COP H-M RECEIVED SAF
 - HAVOC7 RECEIVED SAF
 - ANP CP & 27/D/2-12 RECEIVED DF
 - PSD 3/D/2-12 RECEIVED CPLX ATTK

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties
NSTR


KONAR ACTIVITY

- Active OBJ
- OBJ KILTY
- OBJ COPYCAT
- OBJ HOTDATE

□ - TB Radio Active

So What...

CF WILL SEE CONTINUED AMBUSHES AND DIRECT FIRE ALONG MAJOR MSRS; AAF MAY ATTEMPT TO TARGET CF/ANSF WITH IED INITIATED AMBUSHES ALONG SOUTHERN RTE BEAVERTON AND IVO EA HUSKIES IN THE PECH DISTRICT



LEGEND

- SAF
- PSFAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE
- X LN CASUALTIES

ASSESSMENT

- SIGACTs during the past week have decreased slightly in comparison to last week's trends; AAF CMDRS are also finalizing plans for large scale attacks that will be carried out in OCT and attempting to repair disagreements between various AAF groups
- ICPs set up along the Dangam/Asmar border are possibly being used to prevent CF/ANSF movement into the area; the push of AAF into Konar from PAKMIL operations will likely result in a slight increase of attacks in the near term, CF can also expect to see an increase of ICPs as AAF are prepared to ambush CF/ANSF patrolling elements attempting to operate in insurgent safehaven regions
- With the influx of foreign fighters into the Dara Noor District and the movement of Abu Ikhlas into PAK within the next 7 days, CF can expect to see an increase in activity IVO the Watapur Valley in the near term; AAF will possibly continue to conduct harassment attacks on COP H-M and COP Able Main in an attempt to fix CF in static positions
- Sensitive reporting indicates AAF operating in northern Konar are aware of CF hasty OPs while the SPARTAN CLP moved towards FOB Bostick, it is plausible that AAF will begin to shift focus from convoys to CF OPs as the OPs have successfully hindered AAF's ability to carry out attacks on convoys

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

Nuristan Daily Rollup



As of: 10/01/2009 5:00 D+


MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

10

Trends By Week Last 5 Weeks



Nuristan Daily Activity: SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

NSTR


NURISTAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

OBJ NURISTAN 3
OBJ BUNSON

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDP
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE
- ✕ LN CASUALTIES



So What...
ATTACKS TARGETING CF BASES WILL CONTINUE IN THE NEXT 24-48 HOURS; CF CAN EXPECT TO SEE B-10 RECOILLESS RIFLE ALONG WITH INDIRECT FIRE ATTACKS POSSIBLY TARGETING COP KEATING AND OP FRITSCH AS A NEW WEAPONS ARE BROUGHT INTO THE AREA.

ASSESSMENT

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

1 x SIGACT

● OP FRITSCH RECEIVED IDP

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

- Over the past week, kinetic activity within Nuristan has significantly decreased in comparison to prior weeks' trends; CMDRs attendance at various meetings, the lack of fighters and weapons acquisitions prevented AAF from conducting large scale attacks; AAF CMDRs continue to recruit AAF in the Kamdesh District IOT carry out pre-planned large scale attacks on CF bases
- The past two days DF attacks targeting CF bases in eastern Nuristan indicate AAF have finished conducting resupply operations and will continue to engage CF bases in the next 24-48 hours; AAF's primary targets will continue to be COP Lowell and COP Keating and AAF will likely continue to conduct sporadic DF attacks targeting the bases; the movement of AAF IVO COP Lowell indicates AAF may be planning to conduct a retaliatory attack, for fighters killed on 28SEP09, in as early as the next 24-48 hours
- The movement of a B-10 recoilless rifle weapon's system back into the Kamdesh District indicates B-10 attacks targeting COP Keating will return in the near term; AAF have not conducted B-10 attacks on COP Keating or OP Fritsche since 29AUG09 when a CF bomb drop was assessed to have destroyed the weapon's system

Laghman Daily Rollup



As of: 10/01/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR


"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

11

Trends By Week

20
10
0



AUG 24
AUG 30

Laghman Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING



SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

0 x SIGACTS

NSTR

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties

NSTR

LAGHMAN ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND


- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE
- X LN CASUALTIES

So What...

SUICIDE BOMBERS MAY TARGET GIROA OFFICIALS AND SUPPORTERS IN THE ALISHANG AND MEHTAR LAM AREAS. AAF ARE UNDER NEW LEADERSHIP AND INCREASED FUNDING AND SUPPORT FROM PAKISTAN WILL RESULT IN INCREASED ATTACKS THROUGHOUT LAGHMAN IN THE NEAR TERM.

ASSESSMENT

- Trends for Laghman this week indicate a continued low level of AAF kinetic activity which is slightly higher than 2008 activity levels; current trends will increase due to new fighters from Pakistan conducting operations in Laghman
- New AAF commanders in Laghman are conducting attacks IOT create more funding for future attacks; AAF are continuing to increase effective attacks throughout Laghman
- Suicide bombers have been smuggled into the Mehtar Lam District in order to aid in successfully targeting of GIROA officials; expect an increase of intimidation attacks in the Alishang District as AAF attempt to disrupt GIROA through intimidation
- The Afghan NDS investigation recently assessed that the Taliban Peshawar shura and the Taliban shadow governor of Laghman Province were responsible for the NDS Deputy Director Dr. Abdullah Laghmani assassination attack



2 LAGHMAN PROVINCE

Nangarhar Daily Rollup



As of: 10/01/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET / REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

Trends By Week



10

0

AUG 24
AUG 30

Nangarhar Daily Activity:

SIGNIFICANT REPORTING

- △
- △
- △
- △
- △
- △

SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY

3 x SIGACTS

- NDS FACILITY RECEIVED DF
- FOB LONESTAR RECEIVED IDF
- IED FOUND IN ZONE 1 OF JALALABAD CITY

AAF Attacks Resulting in LN Casualties


NSTR

NANGARHAR ACTIVITY

Active OBJ

LEGEND

- SAF
- PSAF
- SAFIRE
- RPG
- DF
- COMPLEX ATTACK
- IED DET.
- IED FOUND
- IDF
- OTHER
- △ HUMINT
- SIGINT/OTHER
- ◆ ACTIVE OBJ
- ▲ NIGHT LETTER
- ★ CF BASE
- X LN CASUALTIES



So What...

AAF WILL CONDUCT SAF ATTACKS AGAINST THE DEH BALA DISTRICT CENTER ABP IN ORDER TO HARASS AND STOP CONSTRUCTION PROJECTS IN THE AREA. IED ATTACKS WILL REMAIN ON RTE NEWARK IN ORDER TO PREVENT ANSF/CF FOM TO THE KHOGYANI/SHERZAD AREA.

3 NANGARHAR

ASSESSMENT

- 2009 trend analysis indicates a small increase in kinetic activity that resemble 2008's level of attacks; due to a large influx of AAF from Pakistan, current trends will increase in Nangarhar as AAF conduct operations before the winter snow blocks mountain passes
- and three other AAF are seeking retribution for fighters who were captured by and are preparing for an attack against him; fighters under their command will conduct attacks on GIROA facilities in southern Nangarhar to intimidate and procure the release of those detained AAF
- AAF will focus on intimidation of political candidates in the near term IOT gain influence in Nangarhar as recent attempts to successfully disrupt the GIROA have not met the standards of Taliban shuras in Pakistan, especially after the successful Afghan Presidential Elections took place; Nangarhar may see an increase of intimidation style attacks throughout the province prior to the winter season
- A Taliban facilitator living in the Khogyani area is also involved in the production of heroin; possibly financing Taliban operations in the Memla village area

Pages 13 through 15 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(6)

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

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OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 37580 07939
DATE: 30SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO/IR IOT assess flood damage to HWY1a and assist in mission planning for alternate routes along the route. CF, ICW ANSF, prepare to coordinate reconstruction efforts, traffic control measures, and possible vehicle staging areas along the route as logistical moves are halted due to limited traffic ability. Failure to launch FMV will force CF and ANSF to coordinate without proper SA of the extent of the damage along the route.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc. At 0000z Shadow was redirected to provide overwatch for CF clearing a house IVO 42S XD 31865 08395.

Mission type: security

EEL's:

1. Identify vehicle traffic ability along route.
2. Identify number of personnel on foot along route.
3. Identify vehicles whose speed is excessively fast.
4. Identify location of each congested location along the route.
5. Identify and locate any checkpoints along the route.
6. Identify driver actions at checkpoints to include efforts to avoid them.
7. Confirm or deny the presence of personnel in possible overwatch position observing hwy1a.
8. Confirm or deny any evidence of digging along HWY 1A
9. Confirm or deny the presence of large items for storage of bulk homemade explosives emplacements
10. Confirm or deny any evidence of clearing of trees, shrubs or terrain to obtain los from possible hide site to IED
11. Identify any personnel digging on or along, side roads or personnel congregating on the road, or in concealed locations (from the road).
12. Identify cold or hot thermal signatures located on the road or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters on either side of the road).
13. Identify any personnel in positions within 10-15 meters of the road in positions that provide clear line of sight to the road.
14. Identify any vehicles that appear to be abandoned. Identify any vehicle tracks leading to a thermal signature or indication of disturbed earth/suspicious object.
15. Identify any indications of new piles of dirt or rubbish to include bags, boxes and any other items larger than 0.5m by 0.5m; concrete blocks or barriers as along side the road that appear out of place (serve no identifiable purpose) or new.
16. Identify any disturbed earth, broken pavement, speed bumps, shallow pits, or trenches on or immediately alongside (within 5-10 meters) of the road.
17. Identify any earth movement, ground scarring, or vegetation clearing along side roads (within 5-10 meters).
18. Identify and annotate size and location of any visual indications of wire, tubing, or cord laid across the road surface or along the road (within 5-10 meters).

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 06 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 03 IDPs
 2. 00 highlight video
 3. 00 storyboard products
3. Supplementary imagery
 1. 00 national imagery
 2. 00 TIGR derived

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~



HWY 1A NAI 1-4, IDPs



As of: 10/1/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~



OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
TGT NAME: BRIDGE WASHOUT
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
MGRS: 428 XD 41613 05943
TOT: 300230ZSEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
DRV FM: DIA
CL BY: 1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



NORTH BYPASS

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

IA: JPR QC: SBM



OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
TGT NAME: BRIDGE WASHOUT
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
MGRS: 428 XD 41637 05948
TOT: 300232ZSEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
DRV FM: DIA
CL BY: 1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



NORTH BYPASS TRAFFIC

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

IA: JPR QC: SBM



OPERATION: HWY 1A NAI 1-4
TGT NAME: BRIDGE WASHOUT
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
MGRS: 428 XD 41493 05779
TOT: 300237ZSEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES



~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
DRV FM: DIA
CL BY: 1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



SOUTH BYPASS

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~


IA: JPR QC: SBM



OPERATION: SHERZAD FUTURE PLANNING
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: NANGARHAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S WC 92675 86979
DATE: 30SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEL's:

1. Identify Local Nationals digging in or next to roads.
2. Local Nationals loitering in groups of 3 or more personnel on or next to roads.
3. Identify movement of munitions, weapons, equipment and supplies.
4. Identify suspicious objects placed on or next to roads.
5. Identify MAMs with weapons within 500 Meters of roads.
6. Identify possible illegal traffic control points along roads.
7. Traffic jams or congestion of 5 or more vehicles.
8. Disturbed earth in or along roads.
9. Movement of 3 or more vehicles traveling together.

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 15 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF Gryphon requests FMV/EO IOT support future planning in the Sherzad District. The lack of FMV will hinder CF/ANSF general movement in the area, and pose unnecessary risk to both mounted and dismounted troops.



TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

~~SECRET//REL TO
USA, ISAF, NATO~~



OPERATION: DROP KICK
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: KONAR, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 70779 48251
DATE: 30SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



MISSION TYPE: COIN

- EEI's:**
1. Confirm or deny the presence and occupation of any or all Cave systems
 2. Confirm or deny the presence, occupation, or construction of fighting positions
 3. Report presence of PAX on ridgelines or that have overwatch on NAI, or are acting as spotters.
 4. Report men loading possible equipment on pack mules/donkeys
 5. Report groups of 5 or more PAX, anywhere, doing anything, or massing.
 6. Report the presence of crew served weapons.
 7. Confirm or deny the presence of any radio transmitting equipment.
 8. Report any persons talking on ICOM radios.
 9. Confirm or deny the existence of any number of AAF maneuvering towards CF or ANSF.
 10. Confirm or deny the existence of any number of personnel fleeing away from CF and moving towards hiding areas.
 11. Identify any groups of 3 or more personnel in area carrying equipment (backpacks, etc.)
 12. Identify personnel and activity on the objective prior to execution.
 13. Identify Military Aged Males who flee the OBJ areas during the approach of ground forces.



- Production:**
1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 05 target(s).
 2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
 3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: TF CHOSIN In partnership with ANSF will conduct Reconnaissance and surveillance of Ganjgal and Damdarah prior to Phase I of Operation Dropkick in order to confirm or deny existing patterns of life. BPT register known TGTs in and near the valley. The purpose of this operation is to provide ANSF with enablers which will assist their initiative in disrupting AAF activity, increase security relations with the populace, and disrupt an atmospheric for providing AAF sanctuary.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

OPERATION: RTE RECON MSR NEBRASKA
MAP SCALE: 1:250K
RC/E PROVINCE: LAGHMAN, AF
CENTER GRID: 42S XD 40579 29059
DATE: 30SEP09
COORDINATES NOT TO BE USED FOR TARGETING OR NAVIGATIONAL PURPOSES

DRV FM: DIA
CL BY-1.4 C
DECL: 20340930



MISSION TYPE: SECURITY

EEL's:

1. Identify Local Nationals digging in or next to roads.
2. Local Nationals loitering in groups of 3 or more personnel on or next to targets.
3. Identify movement of munitions, weapons, equipment and supplies.
4. Identify suspicious objects placed on or next to roads.
5. Identify MAMs with weapons within 500 Meters of target.
6. Identify possible illegal traffic control points along roads.
7. Traffic jams or congestion of 5 or more vehicles.
8. Disturbed earth in or along roads.
9. Movement of 3 or more vehicles traveling together.
10. Identify possible vehicles staged IVO target

Production:

1. TF ODIN-A provided coverage of 01 target(s).
2. TF ODIN-A produced a total of:
 1. 00 IDPs
 2. 00 Highlight Video
 3. 00 Storyboard Products
3. Supplementary Imagery
 1. 00 National Imagery
 2. 00 TIGR Derived

Justification for Imagery: FMV is requested IOT identify possible IED emplacement along MSR Nebraska prior to the movement of RCP 15 from Alishang to cop Najil, approx time SP from Alishang 1000L. Situation: in the past 30 days there has been a significant increase in IEDS along MSR Nebraska, increasing the level of risk for CF forces traveling along the route. The last IED on 26 SEPT 09 resulted in 5 x CF WIA. Failure to launch an FMV recon mission will result in the convoy traveling along the route without proper SA of the IED threat.

TF-ODIN Jalalabad Comment: All significant activity was reported to the unit via Mirc.

Pages 21 through 22 redacted for the following reasons:


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ANA RANK STRUCTURE



ANP RANK STRUCTURE



ANA: The service branch of the military of Afghanistan that is currently being trained by CF IOT ultimately take control of land-based military operations in AFG.

ANP: Serve as a temporary organization of hastily trained policemen, working for local police chiefs of the ANP to perform static security functions.



BREAKDOWN OF THE ANA

- The ANA is a Task Organization formed into 6x corps with 5x corps serving as ANA regional commands and the 6th Corp being the "Air Corps"
- The basic ANA unit is the Kandak BN, comprised of 600 troops; the vast majority of the unit is infantry, but there is at least 1x mechanized and 1x tank BN that have been formed with more planned.
- Ultimately all ANA corps will be assigned a commando BN and will have advanced infantry training and US equipment
- **ANA Roles:**
 - Secure the borders and minimize external threats
 - Defeat terrorist forces
 - Manage internal security and emergencies through cooperation with ANP
- **Key Principles of Building the ANA Ranks:**
 - Soldiers loyal to GIROA
 - Discipline and professionalism
 - Ensuring an affordable and sustainable force for Afghanistan

BREAKDOWN OF THE ANP

- The ANP are a part of the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) that are responsible for maintaining law and order throughout Afghanistan.
- The ANP consists of the following organizations:
 - Afghan Uniform Police (AUP)
 - Afghan National Auxiliary Police
 - Afghan Border Police (ABP)
 - Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP)
 - Counter Narcotics Police of Afghanistan (CNPA)
- **More than 62,000 members of the AUP, Afghan Auxiliary Police, and ABP have completed Police Training.**
- **Over 12,000 members of the above mentioned groups have also completed more advanced training courses in specialized areas such as:**
 - Firearms,
 - Crowd Control
 - Investigative Techniques
 - Domestic Violence

SIGNIFICANT DATES & SPECIAL PRODUCT



As of: 10/1/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

"Led by Love of Country" "All The Way"

SECRET//REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

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OCTOBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
				1	2	3
4	5	6	7	8	9	10
11	12	13	14	15	16	17
18	19	20	21	22	23	24
25	26	27	28	29	30	31

NOVEMBER

SUNDAY	MONDAY	TUESDAY	WEDNESDAY	THURSDAY	FRIDAY	SATURDAY
1	2	3	4	5	6	7
8	9	10	11	12	13	14
15	16	17	18	19	20	21
22	23	24	25	26	27	28
29	30					

- 07 October** – Tentative Presidential Results Released
- 17 October** - Inauguration (if no Run-off)
- October – November** - Poppy planting
- 25 –27 November** - Hajj –Pilgrimage to Mecca, 1 of the 5 Pillars of Islam. Attendee gains the title "Hajji"
- 27 –29 November** - **Eid al-Adha** – Historically this time of year has a low amount of kinetic activity due to prohibitive weather and mountain pass conditions.

As in previous years, the Taliban will likely use the coming of winter weather to regroup and build on perceived successes from the past year; refining current strategies and adjusting its command and control architecture in preparation for the upcoming fighting season.

In N2KL the only area that observes a noticeable decrease in AAF activity is Konar. Extreme weather conditions historically make passes untrafficable between November and April. Similar conditions exist along the southern Tora Bora Mountain range however, freedom of movement to HWY7 and lower kinetic activity in the province results in only a minor decrease in attacks. Historically attacks have become less effective which is attributed to leadership leaving the area or inability to stage/facilitate attacks.

Continuous CF patrols/presence will undermine AAFs ability to replenish pre-winter caches and will force increased efforts to move supplies within the next month. Attacks will continue throughout the winter, but be limited due to logistics and movement restrictions resulting in decreased lethality and frequency in attacks. AAF will focus efforts on the increasingly canalized movement of supplies ISO CF/ANSF with attacks along MSRs and the Valley floor.

Mountain Warrior Fall/Winter Weather and AAF Activity/Strategy

Historical Winter AAF Activities

October – November

December

January/February

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, ISAF, NATO) Analysis: Ice/Snow undermines use of ridgelines IVO Kamdesh, Aranas, and Barg-e Matat; washouts along Naray to Kamdesh route, impedes veh. movement; Aranas access limited to valley routes; Nuristan border crossings closed, Konar remains open.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, ISAF, NATO) Assessment: TBHIG/IAQ freedom of movement from PAK unaffected in Konar; TBHIG/IAQ in Nuristan forced to use valley infiltration routes/caches, attacks concentrated on mines/IEDs; Narang/Chowkay Valley use continues, movement slows across high ridges, attacks remain consistent; movement IVO Aranas slows, attacks limited to low ridges and valley floors.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, ISAF, NATO) Analysis: Ice/Snow closes NE Konar border passes; use of valleys decrease due to ice, snow in higher elevations (>7,000); access to Aranas, Kamdesh, and Barg-e Matat increasingly difficult; road status black north of Naray.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, ISAF, NATO) Assessment: Majority of leaders exfiltrate to PAK sanctuaries for the winter; sporadic attacks along major routes throughout Konar and SE Nuristan; insurgent re-supply and movement extremely restricted around Kamdesh and Aranas; access to the Korangal limited, insurgents forced to use valley caches for subsequent attacks.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, ISAF, NATO) Analysis: Ice/Snow closes NE Konar border passes; use of valleys decrease due to ice, snow in higher elevations (>7,000); access to Aranas, Kamdesh, and Barg-e Matat increasingly difficult; road status black north of Naray.

(S//REL TO USA, AUS, ISAF, NATO) Assessment: Leaders in PAK sanctuaries; leadership concentration on arranging funding and planning for spring operations; sporadic ISAF and IDF along open routes throughout Konar; ISAF and IDF along open routes throughout Konar; re-supply and movement to mission essential only; access to tributary valleys severely restricted.


AAF WINTER STRATEGY

AAF will use the coming winter to focus on three primary objectives:

- Continuing to counter ISAF troop increases.** Building on perceived success during 2009, senior Taliban leaders will likely continue directing their subordinates to conduct aggressive asymmetric operations with a focus on expanding the capability to conduct highly lethal IED attacks, high-profile attacks involving multiple suicide bombers, and denying ISAF freedom of movement on key lines of communication. Additionally, we assess continued strong emphasis on increasing violence in the West and North to demonstrate Taliban reach across Afghanistan.
- Expanding community outreach efforts.** Taliban commanders will likely continue to engage local leaders in contested areas of the South and East to counter Coalition Forces initiatives and increase the Taliban's base of popular support, freedom of movement and intelligence collection capabilities while limiting Coalition Forces access.
- Improve Taliban command and control.** To improve accountability and effectiveness, the Taliban leadership will replace ineffective or recalcitrant shadow governors and some mid-level military commanders, along with restructuring the command and control structure. As in previous years, it is likely some of these changes will be politically motivated; not all will yield the desired effects.

Assessment: Taliban's strategic intent for the Winter is to fuel the popular belief that Taliban victory is imminent, while preparing for increased and more effective operations in 2010. The decrease in activity during the winter provides an opportunity for CF/ANSF to counter the Taliban's message through sustained and effective COIN operations better connecting the populace with GfRoA. Enduring CF/ANSF operations designed to disrupt insurgent leadership and logistics networks during this period would complicate insurgent efforts to prepare for the coming year.

Winter Attack Trends Comparison



Page 25 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(6)

TF MTN WARRIOR BDE S2 ACRONYMS LIST



As of: 10/01/2009 5:00 D+

MTN WARRIOR

“Led by Love of Country” “All The Way”

SECRET // REL TO USA, GCTF, ISAF, NATO

26

- AAF = Anti-Afghan Forces
- ABP = Afghan Border Patrol
- AC = Afghan civilian
- ACM= Anti-Coalition Militia or AAF
- ANA = Afghan National Army
- ANAAC = Afghan National Army Air Corps
- ANP = Afghan National Police
- ANSF = Afghan National Security Forces (Army, Police and NDS)
- AQSL = Al-Qaida Senior Leader(ship)
- ASG = Afghan Security Guards
- AWT = Attack Weapons Team
- BDA = Battle Damage Assessment
- CAS = Close Air Support
- CF = Coalition Forces
- CFACC = Combined Forces Air Component Command
- CFSOCC = Combined Forces Special Ops Component Command
- CIV = Civilians
- CIVCAS = Civilian Casualties
- CMA = Central Movement Agency
- COIN = Counter-Insurgency
- COP= Combat Outpost
- CSTC-A = Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan
- DC = District Center
- DCOM = Deputy Commander
- DCOS JOPS = Deputy Chief of Staff Joint Ops
- ESF = Election Security Force
- ETT = Embedded Training Team
- EW = Electronic Warfare
- FAM = Fighting-Aged Male
- FFIR = Friendly Forces Information Requirements
- FMV = Full Motion Video
- FNU = Father’s Name Unknown
- FOB = Forward Operating Base
- FOM = Freedom of Movement
- FP = Fighting Position
- GIRoA = Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
- GSW = Gunshot Wound
- HBIED = Home-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- HE = High Explosive
- HiG= Hezb-E Islami/Gulbuddin
- HME = Home-Made Explosives
- HQN = Haqqani Network
- HVI = High Value Individual
- HVT= High Value Target
- HWY = Highway
- ICP = Illegal Checkpoint
- IDF = Indirect Fire
- IDP = Internally Displaced Person
- IEC = Independent Election Commission
- INS = Insurgents or AAF
- IO = Information Operations
- ISTAR = Intelligence, Surveillance, Target Acquisition and Reconnaissance
- ISO = In Support Of
- IVO = In Vicinity Of
- KAF = Kandahar Airfield
- KIA = Killed In Action
- LN = Local National
- LNU= Last Name Unknown
- MANPADS = Man-portable Air Defense System
- MBT = Main Battle Tank
- MEDEVAC = Medical Evacuation
- MoD = Ministry of Defense
- Mol = Ministry of Interior
- MRAP = Mine Resistant Ambush Protection
- MWE= Men, Weapons and Equipment
- NBD = Non-battle Death
- NBI = Non-battle Injury
- NDS = National Directorate of Security
- NFO = Normal Framework Operations
- NMCC = National Military Command Center
- NPCC = National Police Coordination Center
- OBJ = Objective
- OCC-P/R = Operations Coordination Center-Provincial / Regional
- OMLT = Operational Mentor Liaison Team
- OP = Outpost
- PAX = Passengers
- PC = Police Chief
- PID = Positively Identified
- POO = Point of Origin
- PPIED = Pressure Plate IED
- PRT = Provincial Reconstruction Team
- QRF = Quick Reaction Force
- RPG = Rocket-Propelled Grenade
- SAF = Small Arms Fire
- SIED = Suicide IED
- SVIED= Suicide Vest IED
- SOF = Show of Force
- SOP = Show of Presence
- STRATCOM = Strategic Communications
- TFK = Task Force Kandahar
- TFL = Task Force Leatherneck
- TIC = Troops in Contact
- TMCC = Theater Movement Coordination Center
- TTP = Tactics, Techniques & Procedures
- UAV = Unmanned Aerial Vehicle
- UNAMA = United Nations Assistance Mission in Afghanistan
- VBIED = Vehicle-Borne Improvised Explosive Device
- WIA = Wounded in Action