

**From:** SOTFBAF S35 IO PLANNER SFC (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[mailto: (b)(2)High  
**Sent:** Tuesday, October 06, 2009 9:52 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6) MAJ TF MTN Warrior S7; (b)(3), (b)(6) MSG TF MTN Warrior Psyop Planner  
**Subject:** SITREP for COP Fritche

Gents,

Have you guys put out a press release on COP Fritche. I just received a SITREP from the field. I would like to see if you guys would broadcast it for us. Attached is a radio script. I would appreciate it if we can get out as soon as possible unless you have any objection, thanks

Any questions, you have my contact info

06 OCT 09 COP KEATING QRF / KAMDESH SITREP

SIZE - 206 PAX

ACTIVITY - REINFORCEMENT OF COP FRITSCHÉ

LOCATION - (b)(2)High

TIME 061300Z0CT09

(b)(2)High , AND ANP CONTINUE TO SECURE  
OP FRITSCHÉ FROM AAF ATTACK.

(b)(2)High AND (b)(2)High CONDUCTED THREE PRESENCE/CLEARING PATROLS, WITH (b)(2)High  
OVERWATCHING BOTH PATROLS WITH LONG RANGE PRECISION SNIPER FIRE.

(b)(2)High AND (b)(2)High CLEARED TERRAIN TO THE EAST AND SOUTH OF OP FRITSCHÉ,  
DISCOVERING 8 FIGHTING POSITIONS/FIRING POINTS. THESE LOCATIONS HAVE BEEN PASSED  
TO THE JTACS FOR ACTIONING BY ARTILLERY OR CAS THIS EVENING.

(b)(2)High CONDUCTED TWO MUTUALLY SUPPORTED PATROLS TO THE NORTH AND WEST OF OP  
FRITSCHÉ. THESE PATROLS DISCOVERED 2 EKIA, (b)(2)High , BELIEVED KILLED BY  
30MM CANNON. THEIR WEAPONS SLINGS WERE CUT OFF THE BODIES, WEAPONS WERE TAKEN.  
THEY WERE CARRYING BREAD AND CARROTS, AND OTHER HN FOOD. THEY WERE CARRYING  
PAPERWORK WRITTEN IN ARABIC AND DARI, POSSIBLY MEANING FOREIGN FIGHTERS WERE  
INCLUDED IN THIS GROUP. THE LIST OF NAMES WAS BROKEN DOWN INTO AN ATTACK AND A  
DEFENSE GROUP.

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

OTHER BODIES WERE ABLE TO BE IDENTIFIED BY SMELL, BUT WERE UNABLE TO BE VISUALLY OBSERVED DUE TO THE STEEP TERRAIN. (b)(2)High ALSO FOUND 6 FRESH GRAVES AT (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High 'S OTHER PATROL DISCOVERED AN IMPROVED OBERVATION POST OVERLOOKING COP KPEATING AT (b)(2)High , ELEVATION 6,214 FT, AND (b)(2)High (b)(2)High, ELEVATION 6,149 FT. THIS WAS A TWO STAGE OP, THE LOWER POSTION HAS AN UNOBSTRUCTED VIEW OF COP KEATING, AND THE UPPER POSITION HAS A IMPROVED TRAIL LEADING FROM IT DIRECTLY BACK TO THE DISTRICT CENTER AT KAMDESH, FURTHER IMPLICATING KAMDESH'S COMPLICITY IN THE ATTACK ON COP KEATING. APPROXIMATLEY 200MS FROM THE POSITION, (b)(2)High , ELEVATION 6,345 FT, A CACHE WAS FOUND WHICH WAS STOCKED WITH US CONTRACTED WATER BOTTLES, GATORADE, AND US MRE COMPONENTS. THIS FURTHER DEONSTRATES MOME COMPLISCITY BY HN FORCES WORKING AT COP KEATING OR OP FRITSCHER BEFORE THE ATTACK ON COP KEATING.

WHILE ALL PATROLS WE RE OUT, AOB PERSONNEL OBSERVED APPROXIMATELY 8-9 PERSONNEL MOVING TO THE NORTHWEST (RANGE 2,365 METERS) OF (b)(2)High , CARRYING WAEAPONS. AOB ENGAGED WITH BARRETT .50 CAL SNIPER RIFLES, CF WITH 50 CAL M2 FIRE, AND CAS. AOB PERSONNEL KILLED OR WOUNDED SOME PERSONNEL, BASED ON (b)(2)High MONITORED BY AOB. AOB ALSO CODUCTED TACTICAL PSYOPS AGAINST AAF UTILIZING AOB TPT PERSONNEL. TALIBAN PERSONNEL AEE FRUSTRTED, SCARED, AND ARE REFUSING THEIR CHAIN OF COMMAND TO PATROL OR CONDUCT ATTACKS AGAIST THE "BEARDED ONES". TALIBAN DIRECTLY REQUESTED TO TALK TERMS WITH THE USSF TO RESOLVE THE COMBAT. AOB IS ADVISING TALIBAN ELEMENTS TO DEPOSIT ALL WEAPONS IN AN OPEN FIELD APPROXIMATELY 1300 METERS TO OUR SOUTH, WHERE THE AOB CAN OBSERVE AND DIRECT A CAS STRIKE ON THEM TO DESTROY ALL WEAPONS. EARLIER MESSAGES SENT WERE FOR ALL NON-COMBATANTS TO EVACUATE ALL VILLAGES, AOB HAS OBSERVED WOMEN AND CHILDREN EXITING THE AREA. OVERALL IMPRESSION IS THAT THE TALIBAN ARE COMPLETELY OVERWHELMED BY USSF/CDO PRESENCE, AND FLATLY REFUSE TO CONDUCT OPERATIONS THAT MAY CAUSE THEM TO COME IN CONTACT WITH USSF/CDOS.

CF PLAN FOR OP FRITSCHER IS TO EXFIL USSF/CDOS TOMORROW NIGHT, AND REINFORCE COP FRITSCHER WITH 20 ADDITIONAL CF TROOPS. CF IS NOT PLANNING TO BEGIN EXFIL OF OP FRITSCHER UNTIL 09 OCT-12 OCT. USSF STRONGLY ADVISED AGAINST THIS PLAN, AS THE TALIBAN ARE IN FEAR OF USSF/CDOS, BUT NOT OF CF, AND THE RISK IS HIGH THAT AFTER THE SIGNATURE OF USSF/CDOS IS GONE, THE TALIBAN MEY BE EMBOLDENED TO ATTACK OP FRITSCHER. CF REFUSES TO TAKE THE ADVISE OF USSF AT OP FRITSCHER, THIS NEEDS TO BE PUSHED HIGHER. USSF/CDOS ARE PREPARED TO STAY ANOTHER 48-72 HOURS TO ASSIST THE

WITHDRAWAL OF CF, BUT IF THIS TIMELINE IS NOT ADHERED TO, USSF/CDOS WILL EXFIL TOMORROW NIGHT.

(b)(3), (b)(6) SENDS

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Caveats: No Caveat

At 061300OCT09 1LT (b)(3), (b)(6) and SFC Matthew Norbeck conducted a debrief with Latvian OMLT Soldiers, 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) of events that transpired on the 03OCT09 attack on COP Keating. Below is a narrative of how they described the events:

At 0600, both Soldiers were awoken by numerous rockets impacting on the COP. They threw on their equipment and started out the barracks door. As door opened, a RPG impacted the protective barrier outside, and immediately put the Soldiers at a run to the nearest battle position on the northeast side of the compound (4). The suppression of enemy fire caused them to push back to the aid station, where several US Soldiers had gathered and where putting out guidance. At this time, the OMLT report several of the ANA soldiers huddled together, near the wall of the TOC hugging their knees and shaking uncontrollable. 1SG (b)(6) found the ANA commander from among the ANA and asked if there were any ANA manning their battle positions on the east side of the compound. The ANA commander responded that the enemy had taken that side of the compound, and all ANA had pulled back. 1SG (b)(6) issued instructions to the ANA Commander that he needed to take his men and go retake and defend the east side of the COP. The ANA Commander responded with "You are not my commander", and stormed off to the TOC, where he remained for the entirety of the engagement. It was at this time that both Soldiers indicated that the enemy forces were inside the wire.

Following the dispute with the ANA, a US Soldier (name unknown) approached them and asked if they had grenade launchers. They responded affirmative, but that they were back in their barracks room. The US Soldier explained that they were cut off from their ASP, and they had to suppress the enemy enough to allow them to get resupply of ammunition to the battle positions. The OMLT recovered their grenade launchers, and were directed to set up in the west battle position and orient their weapons south towards the mortar pits and switchbacks. Once they were in position, they observed a RPG and PKM position established between the HMMWVs, opposite the ANA mortar pit. All observed enemy fighters were dressed in DCU style uniforms, ammo pouches on their chest, and some type of head dress. They began suppressing the enemy positions, which in turn cause the enemy to fall back behind the large rock and BLDG 18. 1SG (b)(6) launched several grenades which effectively eliminated both threat areas. As they continued laying down suppressive fire, CPL (b)(6) reported seeing, who he believed to be a commander, on the switchbacks, near RPG Rock, talking on a radio and using hand and arm signals to get fighters to move onto the COP. Another US NCO (name unknown) organized an offensive to regain some of the terrain, and both were directed to specific locations. As they began their offensive they began to see the enemy start to dissipate, and the rate of their retreat was quickened from the sound of a car horn honking. Seconds later, following the horn, CCA was on station assisting in the fight. With the presence of CCA and CAS, effective fires ceased, and a majority of the attacks turned into harassing pop-shots.

Once the fight was reduced to harassing fires, the OMLT were instructed to do a sweep through the COP to gather any remaining ANA, ASG, Terps, or civilians. 1SG (b)(6) began his search, opened the door to the Terp shack, and found all the Terps, a majority of the ASG, and a couple ANA all sitting on the beds anxiously waiting. None of the ASG or ANA had a weapon at the ready or even budge to make an aggressive move when the door was initially swung opened. Later, as the OMLT continued their search, they inspected the battle positions on the northeast side (4) and on the east side and found the

positions completely intact and functional. They moved through several of the other buildings and found ANA soldiers in ones and twos, hiding under blankets in the fetal position. Upon first contact, the both 1SG (b)(6) and CPL (b)(6) believe the ANA abandoned their positions and sought hiding locations.

Following the Arrival of the QRF, and CFs had reestablished security, tensions were still extremely high, and disputed between CFs and ANA, CF decided that it would be best to push the ANA out of the area first. The OLMT relayed the orders, that the ANA would be leaving first, and instructed them to gather their personal belongings and meet in the Shura building (1). Prior to lift off, the OMLT went in to check on the ANA and inform them that there were going to be weight constraints, and they would each be limited to small hand bag. As 1SG (b)(6) reached down to check the weight on one ANA soldier's bags, he said that it was extremely heavy and was met with harsh resistance from the rest of the ANA. 1SG (b)(6) informed the ANA commander of the weight restrictions, and also told him of the resistance he was receiving from the ANA when he was merely checking the weight of their bags. The ANA commander entered the building and began dumping out the contents of the ANA soldier's bags. The OMLT reported that a majority of the duffels contained materials that had been pillaged from the US Soldiers' barracks rooms. The material ranged from protein drink mixes to digital cameras.

When asked about the indicators prior to the assault, both OMLT stated that 2 days prior, the threat to the COP became a lot more imminent. They stated that the Chief of Police had recently met with Taliban leader, Mullah (b)(6) after which time, the Chief of Police relay the topic of discussion to the ANA commander. The ANA commander reported to the OMLT that 100 fighters were going to attack the COP with suicide bombers and a VBIED. The following day, the ANA commander came back to report 40 more fighters were in the area to participate in the attack. Following both reports, the OMLT escorted the ANA commander to the S2 rep and (b)(2)High to allow the commander an opportunity pass the information to US Soldiers. At both engagements, the ANA commander refused to relay the information to the US Soldiers. The OMLT approached the ANA commander about the issue, and he replied that the he never gets paid for information like other American sources.