



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, 18TH MILITARY POLICE BRIGADE
CAMP VICTORY, IRAQ
APO AE 09342

AETV-MP

22 January 2008

MEMORANDUM THRU Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, Multi-National Corps, Camp Victory, Iraq APO AE 09342

FOR Commander, Multi-National Corps, Camp Victory, Iraq APO AE 09342

SUBJECT: Findings and Recommendation AR 15-6 Investigation-EOF

1. I have reviewed the Army Regulation 15-6 investigation and supporting documentation pertaining to an Escalation of Force incident by a member of the 401st Military Police Company, 92nd Military Police Battalion, 18th Military Police Brigade on 01 January 2008.

2. The investigation established that the soldier in question had a reasonable belief that the Local National (LN) vehicle involved demonstrated hostile intent. Nonetheless, the post-event facts of this investigation clearly show that the driver's actions should not have been enough to trigger a lethal response based on the actual threat. However, the gunner perceived the threat as real based on his understanding of the potential threats. Analysis shows that this unfortunate event was not the result of undisciplined application of deadly force procedures, but rather a failure to fully understand and grasp the nature of the threat in the current operating environment within 92nd MP Bn's area of operation (AOR), now the 716th MP Bn's AOR.

3. It is clear that conditions within the 92nd's AOR have changed. I have analyzed historical trends in enemy attack patterns and the reduced probability of Vehicle Borne Improvised Explosive Devices (VBIEDs) on Coalition Forces in this AOR. Accordingly, my analysis of the change of conditions along with a strong desire to mitigate all the negative consequences caused by EOF incidents has caused me to reassess the triggering events that lead to the initiation of lethal engagements. [REDACTED] (b)(2)High

[REDACTED] (b)(2)High

4. Accordingly, I have taken the following actions to fix this issue:

a. On 1 January 2008, I personally conducted Leader Training to all Co/Bn level Commanders to include their CSMS/ISGs assigned to MND-B, using the 4ID Escalation of Force Training Packet.

006129

b. On 1 January 2008, I directed an immediate stand-down of all PTT and MP operations and ordered these operations to remain suspended until remedial training was conducted and Co/Bn level Commanders certify their troops understand the training and the intent of this command as directed by the Commanding General of the 4th Infantry Division.

c. On 1 January 2008 I directed that remedial training highlight and clarify (with zero ambiguity)

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

d. I revised Annex E (ROE), to the 18th MP Bde OPROD, to address the fact that I no

(b)(2)High

5. Recommend you approve the Investigating Officer's findings and recommendations.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1 Encl

~~COL, MP~~
Commanding

Pages 3 through 5 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(5), (b)(2), (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(5), Previously Released, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
92D MILITARY POLICE BATTALION (FORWARD)
APO AE 09344

IMSE-BEN-F92-ZX

01 Jan 08

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Facts and Findings

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to inform the Battalion Commander, 92D Military Police (MP) Battalion (BN) and the Brigade Commander, 18th Military Police Brigade of the facts regarding the AR 15-6 investigation of the escalation of force (EOF) incident that resulted in the death of IX local national female that occurred on 31 1308LDEC07 at the intersection of (b)(2)H (b)(2)High Road and Route (b)(2)High

2. Facts.

a. All leaders within the 401st Military Police Company receives quarterly EOF training and is reinforced daily as part of the pre-mission brief before every mission (TAB D, E, G, J & N).

b. All members of 2nd Squad, 3rd Platoon (to include Delta Team) received a pre-mission brief by SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) (2nd squad leader) which included the current EOF procedures (TAB D, E, F & G).

c. The trial vehicle of 2nd Squad, 3rd Platoon (Delta Team) did not have a warning sign (sign that states in both English and Arabic, "Danger, stay back 100 meters") attached to the rear of the vehicle (TAB D & E).

d. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) (Delta Team Gunner) is qualified on his assigned weapon (TAB D & I).

e. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) perceived the red sedan operated by a local national approaching the rear of his squad at a high rate of speed as threat and rendered all required escalation of force steps that were at his disposal before firing directly at the vehicle (TAB D & E).

f. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) fired at the hood of the vehicle attempting to disable it before firing at the windshield (TAB C & D).

g. Both 2-101 and 4-1 S2's note that pertaining to SVBIED threat in the (b)(2)High District against mobile coalition force convoys is present but unlikely

3. Findings.

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a. After careful review of the facts surrounding this incident, I could not find sufficient evidence to substantiate that SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) did not follow the current MND-B EOF procedures. This was determined after interviewing SPC (b)(3), (b)(6)'s Team Leader, Squad Leader, Soldiers who were present at the scene, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) and a review of current EOF procedures (TAB D, E, F, G, & L).

b. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) determined that the vehicle operated by a local national was a direct threat to his squad due to the vehicle's aggressive approach at a high rate of speed and the non responsiveness to less than lethal EOF measures. Based on current BCT intelligence the threat of VBIED activity against coalition forces still exists in 401st MP CO's area of operation but is unlikely (TAB D & M).

c. SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) (squad medic) rendered appropriate and immediate medical treatment to the local national female that was unconscious that was a passenger in the local national vehicle. Iraqi National Police showed up at the scene and placed the local national female in a vehicle and transported her to the Yarmouk Hospital where she later died of her wounds (TAB C & H).

4. Recommendations.

a. Immediately conduct a 24 hour operational stand down in order to retrain leaders and Soldiers of the 92D MP BN using the 4ID EOF Training Packet.

b. Ensure all personnel assigned to the 92D MP BN understands that (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High

5. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at VIOI (b)(2) DSN (b)(2) (b)(2) or NIPR email at (b)(3), (b)(6) @mnd-b.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MAJ MP
Investigating Officer

92D MILITARY POLICE BATTALION
CIR# 0317

- 1. UNIT REPORTING: 92ND MILITARY POLICE BATTALION, BTL CPT (b)(2)
- 2. INCIDENT: EOF 1 X LN WIA (DOW)
- 3. DTG INCIDENT OCCURRED: 311315CDEC07
- 4. LOCATION OF INCIDENT: ZONE 54, (b)(2)High INTERSECTION OF (b)(2)High RD AND (b)(2)High (b)(2)High

- 5. PERSONNEL INVOLVED (NAME, RANK, UNIT, SSN, SEX, AGE, AND RACE):
 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SGT, 401ST MP CO, (b)(6) M, 30, (b)(6), (TEAM LEADER)
 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SPC, 401ST MP CO, (b)(6), M, 21, (b)(6) (DRIVER)
 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SPC, 401ST MP CO, (b)(6), M, 20 (b)(6) (GUNNER)
 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SPC, 401ST MP CO, (b)(6), M, 30, (b)(6) (MEDIC)

6. MISSION: PTT

7. SUMMARY OF INCIDENT: AT APPROX 1315 HRS, GUNFIGHTER 3-2 ELEMENTS WERE TRAVELING SOUTH ON (b)(2)High RD, TURNING WEST ONTO RTE (b)(2)High GUNFIGHTER 3-2 REPORTED A VEHICLE RED IN COLOR WITH 3 X LN (2 X MALE & 1 X FM) APPROACHED THEIR CONVOY FROM THE REAR, WHILE TRAVELING SOUTH ON (b)(2)High RD. THE VEHICLE WAS (b)(2)High BEHIND THE CONVOY WHEN GUNNER (b)(2)High BEGAN EOF PROCEDURES. THE VEHICLE IGNORED THE GUNNERS ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN ITS DISTANCE (HAND AND ARM SIGNALS), AS THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO APPROACH, THE GUNNER PRESENTED DEADLY FORCE (b)(2)High WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, AT THAT TIME ONCE THE VEHICLE WAS (b)(2)High BEHIND THE CONVOY, THE GUNNER FIRED 1 X (b)(2)High (RD) INTO THE MEDIAN TO THE RIGHT OF THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TOWARDS THE CONVOY, AT THAT TIME THE GUNNER FIRED 1 X (b)(2)High INTO THE HOOD OF THE VEHICLE AND 2 X (b)(2)High (RD) INTO THE WINDSHIELD, CAUSING INJURY TO THE FEMALE LN. THE ROUND ENTERED THE FRONT RIGHT OF HER FOREHEAD AND EXITED IN THE REAR OF HER HEAD. GUNFIGHTER 3-8 (B3159) RENDERED MEDICAL TREATMENT TO THE INJURED LN FEMALE, WHO WAS UNCONSCIOUS. NATIONAL POLICE (NP) FROM JSS KHADRA ARRIVED ON SCENE AND TRANSPORTED THE LN TO YARMOUK HOSPITAL FOR FURTHER TREATMENT. GUNFIGHTER 3-2 SECURED THE SCENE, CONDUCTED A SEARCH OF THE VEHICLE WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS. GUNFIGHTER 3-2 ELEMENTS REPORTED THE INCIDENT TO LANDOWNER (ROGUE X-RAY, SFC (b)(3), (b)(6)), AT 2240, 2-101 NOTIFIED 92 MP BN THAT THE VICTIM HAD DIED. THREE VEHICLE HAD (b)(2)High AND 1 VEHICLE HAD A (b)(2)High THAT WERE [OPERATIONAL] AND ON. ALL VEHICLES WERE EQUIPPED WITH A RHINO, LEVEL 1 AND (b)(2)High ALL SOLDIERS WERE WEARING (b)(2)High (b)(2)High AND WERE USING SEATBELTS. THIS IS AN FINAL REPORT.

8. DAMAGE TO GOVERNMENT AND/OR CIVILIAN PROPERTY: NONE

9. COMMANDER REPORTING: LTC (b)(3), (b)(6)

31 DEC 07 EVENT EOF (1 X LN WIA),

(2)High

401ST MP CO, 92nd MP BN

INCIDENT: EOF
RESULTS: 1 LN WIA

SIGACT/EVENT ID: 401ST MP CO SIGACT #44

DTG: 311315DDEC07

Unit/Call Sign 401ST MP CO/92D MP BN, GUNFIGHTER 3-

2

LOCATION: [redacted]

MISSION OF UNITS:

T: PT
P: MAINTAIN IPS TRAINING

TIMELINE OF EVENTS:

1303: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 SP [redacted] PS (BC0037) EN-
ROUTE ECP 3, VBC

1308: GUNFIGHTER 3-2A HAD EOF [redacted] IN WHICH A RED IN COLOR VEHICLE WITH 3X LN (2 X MALE AND 1 X FEMALE). THE VEHICLE WAS [redacted] BEHIND THE CONVOY WHEN GUNNER (H9596) BEGAN EOF PROCEDURES. THE VEHICLE IGNORED THE GUNNERS ATTEMPT TO MAINTAIN ITS DISTANCE (HAND AND ARM SIGNALS), AS THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TO APPROACH, THE GUNNER PRESENTED DEADLY FORCE [redacted] WITH NEGATIVE RESULTS, AT THAT TIME ONCE THE VEHICLE WAS [redacted] BEHIND THE CONVOY, THE GUNNER FIRED 1 X [redacted] (RD) INTO THE MEDIAN TO THE RIGHT OF THE VEHICLE. THE VEHICLE CONTINUED TOWARDS THE CONVOY, AT THAT TIME THE GUNNER FIRED 2-3 X [redacted] (RD) INTO THE WINDSHIELD.

1309: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 ELEMENTS SECURED THE SCENE

1310: GUNFIGHTER 3-8 (MEDIC) CONDUCTED FIRST AID ON THE FEMALE, WHO HAD BEEN WOUNDED WITH A ROUND THAT ENTERED THE FRONT TOP RIGHT OF HER FOREHEAD AND EXITED IN THE REAR OF RIGHT HER HEAD.

1311: GUNFIGHTER 3-2C REPORTED THE EOF TO GUNFIGHTER BASE.

1312: GUNFIGHTER 3-2A REPORTED THE EOF TO ROUGE X-RAY

1314: GUNFIGHTER 3-8 DETERMINED THAT THE LN NEEDED TO BE EVACUATED TO A HOSPITAL FOR FURTHER TREATMENT THAT GUNFIGHTER 3-8 COULD NOT PROVIDE.

1316: LN WAS EVACUATED BY THE DRIVER OF THE VEHICLE ALONG WITH NP FROM JSS KHADRA TO YARMOUK HOSPITAL.

(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

31 DEC 07 EVENT EOF (1 VLN WIA)

(b)(2)High

401ST MP CO, 92ND MP BN

INCIDENT: EOF

RESULTS: 1 LN WIA

SIGACT/EVENT ID: 401ST MP CO SIGACT #44

DTG: 311315DDEC07

Unit/Call Sign 401ST MP CO/92D MP BN, GUNFIGHTER 3-2

LOCATION: [REDACTED]

MISSION OF UNITS:

T: PTT
P: MAINTAIN IPS TRAINING

TIMELINE OF EVENTS

1317: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 ELEMENTS STAYED ON SCENE AND TRIED TO OBTAIN INFORMATION FROM NP, TO SEE IF THEY HAD GOTTEN ANY NAMES FROM THE LN INVOLVED IN THE EOF.

1330: WILD BUNCH ELEMENTS SENT 1LT [REDACTED] TO INFORM GUNFIGHTER 3-2 TO MAKE A MEET WITH WILD BUNCH 6 AT JSS KHADRA.

1333: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 SP ENROUTE JSS KHADRA

1338: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 RP JSS KHADRA

1339: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 MET WITH WILD BUNCH 6, AND DISCUSSED THE EOF AND PROVIDED WRITTEN STATEMENTS FROM GUNFIGHTER 3-2, GUNFIGHTER 3-2A9, AND GUNFIGHTER 3-8.

1559: 1-64 AR BN CALLED GUNFIGHTER TOC TO GIVE UPDATE ON LN WIA IN EOF, LN WAS STILL ALIVE AT THIS TIME.

1604: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 SP ENROUTE ECP 3 VBC.

1615: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 RP ECP 3 VBC.

1625: GUNFIGHTER 3-2 AND GUNFIGHTER 3-2A9 ARRIVED AT 401ST MP CO TOC. TO DEBRIEF SITUATION TO GUNFIGHTER 6.

1819: JSS KHADRA CALLED GUNFIGHTER TOC TO GIVE UPDATE ON LN WIA IN EOF, LN WAS STILL ALIVE AT THIS TIME.

2003: 1-64 AR BN CALLED GUNFIGHTER TOC TO GIVE UPDATE ON LN WIA IN EOF, LN WAS STILL ALIVE AT THIS TIME.

2240: 92ND MP BN S-3 CALLED GUNFIGHTER TOC, TO INFORM THAT 2-101 ABN, HAD CALLED 18TH MP BDE, AND INFORMED THEM THAT THE LN WAS KIA.

FILENAME: [REDACTED] ESCALATION OF FORCE, 401ST MP CO, 18 MP BDE (FINAL)

(b)(2)High, (b)(1)1.4a

UNCLASSIFIED



31 DEC 07 EVENT EOF (1 X LN WIA)

(b)(2) Hig

401st MP CO, 92nd MP BN

FINAL

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRO, AND MFR//
20171231 For display only to IRO



POINTS OF IMPACT

SECRET//REL TO USA, IRO, AND MFR//
20171231 For display only to IRO

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

31 DEC 07 EVENT EOF (1 X LN WIA)

(2) Hi

401ST MP CO, 92nd MP BN

FINAL

ORIGINALLY CLASSIFIED BY: [REDACTED]
20171231 For display only to IRG

1. PASSANGER
KIA
HEAD INJURY
FRONT/RIGHT HEAD



SECRET//NOFORN//USA//KJ//AM//MCP//
20171231 For display only to IRG

UNCLASSIFIED

006141

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: 92D MP BN HQ, Camp Liberty, Iraq
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2008/01/01
3. TIME: 1109hrs
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3), (b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: SPC/ Active
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 401st Military Police Company, 92nd Military Police Battalion, Camp Liberty Iraq

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:
(3), (b) At approximately 1300hrs on 31 December 2007, our convoy, Gunfighter 3-2, lead by squad leader SSG (3), (b) I was the gunner of the trail vehicle whose truck commander is SGT (3), (b) Our convoy was heading south in the southbound lane of (b)(2)High road from (b)(2)High local police station en route to Camp Liberty's (b)(2)High when a small red sedan that had previously been parallel to another medium sized silver sedan, both behind our convoy, sped up passing the silver sedan, coming toward our convoy at a rate of speed I estimated to be about 40 miles per hour. When the red sedan passed the silver sedan I approximate the distance from our convoy to be about (b)(2)High. I allowed the red sedan to get approximately (b)(2)High from our convoy, at which time I began to give the red sedan hand and arm signals to slow down or to deviate its course of action. The red sedan did not deviate, it maintained its speed and course, still about 40 miles per hour headed toward my truck in the rear of our convoy. I continued to give my hand and arm signals until the red sedan reached approximately (b)(2)High away from our truck. At (b)(2)High I shouted "Ogoff" as loud as I could while holding up my (2)H Carbine in plain and obvious view of the driver, I held it vertically muzzle pointed straight up. The vehicle still showed no signs of slowing down, knowing that my convoy would be slowing down a great deal very shortly due to us about to turn west on route (b)(2)High I brought my (2)H to a ready position, to show the driver that he needed to stop, by this time the red sedan was within (b)(2)High Our truck slowed down about to take the turn onto route (b)(2)High so I took my warning shot at just shy of (b)(2)High because even as we were slowing to take the turn the red sedan still maintained his speed. My warning shot hit the southbound lane's median's curb, about 10 feet in front of the red sedan. The red sedan still did not slow down and with our truck moving slowly I had to immediately fire on the red sedan with my (2)H firing approximately five rounds into the vehicle at approximately (b)(2)High Upon firing my fifth round into the vehicle he finally stopped. I saw at least one of my rounds impact the windshield of the sedan, injuring the passenger. At this time our convoy stopped and pulled a cordon around the area, grid coordinate (b)(2)High to assess and assist with injuries, we were on scene approximately 30 minutes. The injured passenger and driver were escorted to the hospital by Iraqi National Police, at that time our convoy headed to JSS Khadra.

(3), (b)
Q: Do you fully understand the Escalation of Force (EOF) procedures?
A: Yes, while mounted the EOF is (b)(2)High
(b)(2)High
Q: What about the step between (b)(2)High
A: Correct, in any other situation that is acceptable but I felt uncomfortable using my (2)H to disable the vehicle due the high amount of local national pedestrians in the area.
Q: Why didn't you attempt to disable the vehicle with your (2)H by shooting into the engine block?
A: I tried but the vehicle did not become disabled so I had to escalate to firing into the passenger compartment.
Q: Did you fire at the driver or the passenger?

10. EXHIBIT
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3), (b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF SPC (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Liberty, Iraq DATED 2008/01/01

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

A: Neither because of the difficulty of the shot due to our truck moving to avoid road hazards such as potholes, I just fired into the windshield as best as I could.

Q: When did you qualify on your (2)H?

A: November 2007.

Q: Did you any EOF equipment issued to you such as laser dazzlers, flags, sirens or lights.

A: Yes, our truck is equipped with a siren, and it was on due the fact that we coming up on a turn, we like to let the locals know we are about to come around the bend for their safety, also my (b)(2)High but it is a low power night time use laser.

Q: Did your truck have the "Danger, stay back 100 meters) warning sign placed on the rear of the vehicle at the time of this incident?

A: No, our sign is actually on of the new tire covers, but it broke the first day we got it and we have not been given more.

Q: Did you communicate to your team leader the situation before going thru the EOF sequence?

A: I let him know just before the warning shot, because hand and arm signals are so common.

Q: Did your team leader give you the order to take the warning shots and the lethal shots?

A: Negative, he told me to stay on top of it though, I acted under my own will.

Q: Is EOF procedures part of squads mission brief before going out in sector? If so, was it covered that morning before going on mission?

A: Yes, we conduct full convoy rehearsals every day before the mission, in which we discuss our "EOF Bubble".

Q: What is your "EOF Bubble" and who briefed the EOF procedures before going out on mission yesterday?

A: Our EOF Bubble is a term we use to describe at what distances we as gunner escalate force (b)(2)High begin hand and arm

(2)Hig (b)(2)Hig (b)(2)High (2)H This

is briefed by SSG (3), (b)(6) everyday.

Q: What was the threat?

A: The threat was a red sedan was encroaching a high rate of speed toward the rear of my convoy, showing defiance by not yielding to my EOF, as perceived by me.

Q: If you could go back in time and be presented with this same situation, would you have done anything different?

A: Although unfortunate due to the loss of life, I would have to do the same thing because I did it to the best of my abilities and according to regulation as well, no.

Q: How is an approaching vehicle a threat?

A: Because of the nature of the enemy, we know that they will go to any length to attack, disrupt, and kill US soldiers, there is always a high threat of VBIEDs, and no matter how mundane or normal the vehicle looks, we cant get complacent, because that's what the enemy wants us to think, and we must treat everything as a threat until proven otherwise.

Q: Would you like to add anything else to your statement (b)(3), (b)(6)

A: no.

Nothing Follows

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE NOT USED

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to 2008

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ART 136 (B), (4)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES