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LEADERSHIP + COMMAND CLIMATE
OF B/1-502^d IN, MND-B -
ACCUSED SOLDIERS IN MANMU-
DIYAN/YUSIFIYAN RAPE/MURDER,
(12 MAR 06)

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)



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STANDARD FORM 704 (8-85)
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004561



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, MULTINATIONAL DIVISION BAGHDAD
CAMP LIBERTY, IRAQ
APO AE 09352

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFYB-JA-OL

13 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR APPOINTING AUTHORITY

SUBJECT: Legal Review of AR 15-6 Investigation concerning leadership actions in effect of B/1-502 IN on or about 12 MARCH 2006.

1. In accordance with AR 15-6, paragraph 2-3, I have reviewed the AR 15-6 concerning the 12 March 2006 alleged criminal acts of Soldiers in B/1-502 IN/2/101st ABN, against a family of local nationals. I make the following determinations:

- a. The proceedings comply with the legal requirements under AR 15-6.
- b. Errors in the proceedings, if any, do not have a material adverse effect on any individual's substantial rights as related to an informal AR 15-6 investigation.
- c. Sufficient evidence supports the findings for an informal AR 15-6 investigation.
- d. The recommendations are consistent with the findings.

2. One fact not mentioned in the Investigating Officer's findings, but of likely significance to the Appointing Authority is that LT (b)(3)(b)(6) asked CO (b)(3)(b)(6) to replace CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) in March 2006 and May 2006 due to substandard performance; however both requests were denied by CO (b)(3)(b)(6) See exhibit A.

3. The POC is the undersigned at VOIP (b)(2)High or (b)(3)(b)(6) @mnd-b.army.smil.mil.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

CPT, JA
Operational Law Attorney

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-8. The proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by MG JAMES D. THURMAN
(Appointing authority)

on 5 JUL 06 (Date) (Attach inclosure 1 Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (investigation) (board) commenced at FOB Mahmudiyah, Iraq (Place) at 1700 (Time)

on 6 JUL 06 (Date) (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present. (After each name indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 3-2 and 3-5a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 0800 (Time) on 10 JUL 06 (Date)
and completed findings and recommendations at 2000 (Time) on 11 JUL 06 (Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO	NA
1. Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)				
Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals. (Attached in order listed)				
a.	The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	X		
b.	Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 9, below)			X
c.	Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?			X
d.	All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?			X
e.	Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?	X		
f.	Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?			X
g.	Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?			X
h.	Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?			X

FOOTNOTES: 1) Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.
2) Use of the "X" column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

		YES	NO	NA ²
2	Exhibits (<i>para 3-16, AR 15-6</i>)			
a	Are all items offered (<i>whether or not received</i>) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	X		
b	Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	X		
c	Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	X		
d	Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (<i>if substituted for real or documentary evidence</i>) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?			X
e	Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (<i>para 3-8b, AR 15-6</i>)?	X		
f	Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?			X
g	If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (<i>para 3-16d, AR 15-6</i>)?			X
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (<i>paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6</i>)?			X
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (<i>Chapter 5, AR 15-6</i>)				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (<i>para 3-3b, AR 15-6</i>)?			
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board (<i>para 5-2b, AR 15-6</i>)?			
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused (<i>para 5-2a, AR 15-6</i>)?			
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (<i>para 3-1, AR 15-6</i>)?			
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (<i>para 5-2d, AR 15-6</i>)?			
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (<i>Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6</i>)				
9	Notice to respondents (<i>para 5-3, AR 15-6</i>)			
a	Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?			
b	Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?			
c	Does each letter of notification indicate -			
(1)	the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?			
(2)	the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?			
(3)	the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?			
(4)	the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?			
(5)	the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?			
d	Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?			
e	If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?			
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (<i>or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings</i>)			
a	Was he properly notified (<i>para 5-3, AR 15-6</i>)?			
b	Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (<i>para 5-4, AR 15-6</i>)?			
11	Counsel (<i>para 5-6, AR 15-6</i>)			
a	Was each respondent represented by counsel?			
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	<i>(if counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/>)</i>			
b	Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?			
c	If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (<i>for, if oral, a summary</i>) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (<i>para 5-6b, AR 15-6</i>)?			
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (<i>para 5-7, AR 15-6</i>):			
a	Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?			
b	Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?			
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to (<i>para 5-8a, AR 15-6</i>):			
a	Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?			
b	Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?			
c	Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?			
d	Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?			
e	Testify as a witness?			
f	Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (<i>para 5-9, AR 15-6</i>)?			
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (<i>para 5-8b, AR 15-6</i>)?			
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (<i>para 5-11, AR 15-6</i>)?			
FOOTNOTES: ¹ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet. ² One of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.				

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (board), having carefully considered the evidence, finds:
SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S FINDINGS.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) (board) recommends:
SEE ATTACHED MEMORANDUM FOR INVESTIGATING OFFICER'S RECOMMENDATIONS

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

_____	(Recorder)	_____	(b)(3)(b)(6)	_____
_____	(Member)	_____	(Member)	_____
_____	(Member)	_____	(Member)	_____

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

_____	(Member)	_____	(Member)
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SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the (investigating officer) (board) are (approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence for a summary, if oral; as a numbered inclosure.)

Department of the Army
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
FOB Kalsu, Iraq

AFYB-AR

10 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commanding General, MND-B
THRU: Chief of Staff, MND-B

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation concerning leadership actions in effect of B/1-502 IN on or about 12 MAR 2006. Appointment Orders dated 5 July 2006

1. Background. The purpose of this investigation is to conduct an inquiry concerning the 12 March 2006 alleged criminal acts of Soldiers in B/1-502 IN/2/101st ABN, against a family of local nationals. The inquiry was to focus on the Troop Leading Procedures (TLPs) in place at the time of these alleged crimes. Specifically, the inquiry was to examine:

a. How four Soldiers abandoned their post at Traffic Control Point (TCP) 2, allegedly committed criminal acts, and returned to the TCP without being detected.

b. The inquiry is also to determine the frequency and measures that the chain of command (officers and non-commissioned officers) actually checked on and supervised B/1-502 IN's tactical sites. The Investigating Officer will focus specifically on TCP 2 and TCP 1.

c. The available leaders (Platoon leader, squad leaders, and team leaders) from the Company B headquarters, 1st Platoon and the battalion command group were interviewed by the Investigating Officer and were given a questionnaire by the Investigating Officer. The Investigating Officer also interviewed 9 Soldiers from 1st Platoon. The reason the other Soldiers were not interviewed was due to mission availability. The main questions asked by the Investigating Officer were how the TCPs were manned and how much sleep they received on an average basis while on TCP. The Investigating Officer then gave the Soldiers a chance to talk about what ever else they felt was pertinent to the investigation.

d. In order to check the input from 1st platoon against a common background, the Investigating Officer interviewed the platoon leaders and platoon sergeant of 2nd and interviewed a sampling of 5 other Soldiers from 2nd Platoon manning TCPs 1, 2, and 6. The Investigating Officer also interviewed the platoon leader, platoon sergeant and three other Soldiers from 3rd platoon.

e. Upon entering into the 1-502 IN Area of Operation (AO), the Battalion Commander determined that the Battalion needed to take back from the enemy and secure (b)(2)High in order to maintain control of the Jerf Al Sakur Bridge (JSB). (b)(2)High lies in the heart of the most enemy controlled area of the Battalion's AO.

However, soon after the Company B began operations in its AO, the company began to experience problems in discipline related losses. Company B has suffered a significant

amount of turmoil due to loss of leaders between December 2005 and February 2006. This was the result of both enemy action and moves made by the battalion in an attempt to overcome what they perceived as leadership inadequacies internal to the company. 1st Platoon has had two Platoon Leaders, three Platoon Sergeants (although four changes of leadership in the PSG position), and has lost two NCOs to combat action. Up to March 2006, the platoon has suffered 10 casualties, of which five were returned to duty. It appears that almost from the start, Company B has been unable to establish themselves as a disciplined unit capable of handling the missions required of them.

2. Facts.

a. Soldiers not available for interview:

- (1) CSM (b)(3)(b)(6) Battalion CSM: EML Leave.
- (2) SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) 1st Platoon Sergeant: EML Leave.
- (3) SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) acting Squad Leader for TCP 2 on 12 March 2006.

Soldier is under investigation for crimes associated that day, and is at FOB Stryker.

- * (4) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) assigned to TCP 2 on 12 March 2006. Soldier was discharged, and is currently under arrest in CONUS.
- * (5) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6), assigned to TCP 2 on 12 March 2006. Soldier is under investigation for crimes on 12 March 2006 and is at FOB Stryker.
- * (6) PV2 (b)(3)(b)(6), assigned to TCP 2 on 12 March 2006. Soldier is under investigation for crimes on 12 March 2006 and is at FOB Stryker.
- * (7) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) Radio Operator. Soldier is under investigation for crimes on 12 March 2006 and is at FOB Stryker.

b. Manning for Company B and Soldiers assigned to PB Yusufiyah on 5 March 2006 was 122 Soldiers "boots on the ground" in the company AO. 12 Soldiers on EML. 9 Soldiers at FOB Mahmudiyah. 1 Soldier on Emergency Leave. 91% of the company's Soldiers assigned Soldiers were present for duty. The Battalion S1 did not have a Daily status Report for 12 March. However, 5 March can give an reasonably accurate representation of the manning status of the company. (Exhibit AC) Also, 6 of the 36 Soldiers assigned to 1st Platoon were not with the platoon at the TCP's vicinity Mulla Fayyad (listed as Yusufiyah on the DSR). (Exhibit AD) Of the 6 soldiers, 4 were on EML and 2 were at FOB Mahmudiyah.

c. 1st Platoon had lost or changed out the following leaders prior to 12 March 2006:

- (1) 1st Platoon Leaders lost due to enemy action: (Exhibit AF)
 - (a) SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) 1st Squad Leader; KIA 10 DEC 05
 - (b) SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) A Team Leader, 1st Squad; KIA 10 DEC 05
 - (c) 1LT (b)(3)(b)(6) Platoon Leader; KIA 22 DEC 05
- (2) 1st Platoon Leaders moved out of position:
 - (a) SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) Acting Platoon Sergeant: removed January 06
 - (b) SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) Platoon Sergeant: removed February 06

3. Findings.

a. First and foremost, there are many outstanding leaders and Soldiers in Company B, and the Investigating Officer does not believe that the alleged heinous acts committed

on or about 12 March are indicative of 1st Platoon, Company B, nor the 1st Battalion. Every leader and Soldier from 1st Platoon that the Investigating Officer spoke to was not only revolted by the acts that allegedly occurred by one of "their own," but were also revolted by the stain that this allegation brought on their unit. The Soldiers and leaders of Company B believe that they have fought hard and honorably, and want to prove it. Almost every Soldier that the Investigating Officer spoke to from 1st Platoon wants to be allowed to return to their company and finish the fight. There are issues within the 1st platoon, Company B, and the battalion, and the investigating officer will address those issues at the end of this section.

b. What Troop Leading Procedures were in place by Company B, surrounding the incident on 12 March?

There are numerous troop TLP failures during this time. Most notably, is the failure to supervise the operations and enforce standards at the TCPs by the company commander and platoon leader and platoon sergeant. Although the Commander visited the TCPs 1 to 2 times per week, the actual operations of the platoon missions were haphazard and marked by inconsistent performance and allocation of combat power. The company commander never had his platoon leaders conduct a back brief on their planned execution of the mission. (IO Notes) This resulted in inconsistent understanding and application of manning guidance. It appears that because the platoon had conducted the TCP mission before, the mental attitude for approaching the mission was "do it like we have always done it." Regardless of the current enemy situation, changes made to the TCPs, terrain changes based on the weather, and personnel changes. A telling example was when one Soldier commented to the Investigating Officer that he did not need a range card because the range card was in his head. (IO Notes) As stated by the battalion commander and company commander, basic fundamental tasks such as keeping range cards and using sector sketches were routinely ignored. Several squad leaders from 1st Platoon stated that they were always emplacing concertina to improve their defenses. The force protection improvements continued to occur incrementally over time. The terrain around the Soldiers changed, but the leaders were not conducting basic fundamental tasks and put their Soldiers at risk by becoming complacent.

c. How were four Soldiers able to abandon their post at TCP 2, allegedly commit criminal acts, and return to TCP without being detected?

On 12 March, there were six Soldiers at TCP 2, although not all of the Soldiers were from 3rd Squad. SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) the A Team Leader, a newly promoted Sergeant, was acting as the squad leader while SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) was on leave and in charge of TCP 2. Placing SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) in charge of the squad, according to SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) was approved by the Platoon Sergeant and acting Platoon Leader, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit M) SGT (b)(3)(b)(6), the other team leader was at another location, leaving only one leader with the unit at TCP 2. This was normal for the squad responsible for TCP 2 to have personnel serving as a 3-4 man OP at TCP 6. (Exhibits D, IO Notes) The Soldier manning the machinegun on the roof of TCP 1, a two story building, is tasked to keep observation on TCP 2. (Exhibits D, F, G, H, I, K, N) Given the terrain, the machine gun position at TCP 1 can only observe the road and the vehicles on the road at TCP 2.

(Exhibits H, K, AE) The building used by the Soldiers at TCP 2 is obscured by vegetation. It is possible to exit out of the building on the east side (astride) (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and move around the south side of the building, then move along the road west towards the incident site without being observed by TCP 1. The route to the incident site is obscured by palm trees. (Exhibits H, K, AE)

It is theoretically possible for the Soldiers manning TCP 2 to leave the TCP 2 and move to the house unobserved. The machine gun position would not have observed the Soldiers leaving TCP 2 and the platoon headquarters would not notice the Soldiers missing from the TCP unless one of two events occurred. First, if a leader came by the TCP to check on the Soldiers, he would have identified that the majority of the Soldiers were missing, and at least been able to ask follow on questions to determine why the Soldiers were not at their place of duty. The only other manner in which the chain of command could possibly have identified that Soldiers were missing was if the TCP failed to make a radio check. Radio checks are conducted every hour on the hour via ASIPS radio. If the radio check is not made, then the platoon headquarters attempts to call the TCP via ICOM. If neither of those methods elicits a response, then a patrol is sent to check on the TCP. (IO Notes) Short of either of these two events occurring, the Soldiers could have remained away from the site for as long as a considerable sufficient time to perform the alleged acts.

DIDN'T THEY LEAVE A SOLDIER ON RADIO AT TCP?

d. What was the frequency and measures that the chain of command (officer and non-commissioned officer) actually checked on and supervised operations at B/1-502 IN's TCP?

The battalion commander stated that he and his CSM generally spend 6 out of 7 days a week conducting battlefield circulation. Factors that effected their movement around the battlefield were on-going operations, IED's causing route closure, and engagements with Iraqi officials, civilian and Iraqi Security Force. The battalion commander stated that he visited the TCPs at least twice a week, although the battalion commander's visits dropped during 28 Feb to 09 Mar 2006 due to (b)(2)High in the western sector of the battalion AO. Additionally, on returning from (b)(2)High the battalion commander was wounded in the leg, and was on bed rest from 12 to 19 Mar 2006 due to an infection of the wound. (Exhibits A, F, S) The battalion S3 attempted to visit the Company B TCPs at least twice a month. (Exhibit C) The battalion level leadership was and remains engaged trying to help coach Company B, and 1st Platoon through the deficiencies that the battalion commander identified. The battalion commander's frustration has been that he has continued to make the same corrections repeatedly to Company B, specifically with 1st Platoon. The battalion commander has counseled the company commander as early as 11 December 2005 for failing to listen and uphold standards. (Exhibit AB)

The company commander, CP1 (b)(3)(b)(6) generally only visited his TCPs 1 to 2 times a week according to his Soldiers. Although the company commander made corrections to the platoon for standards, the platoon repeatedly failed to make the changes. This is also insufficient for a leader to check on his Soldiers. Operations did occur, and there were plenty of events, leader engagements and missions, occurring, but not all the time. The commander should have visited his unit more frequently. SFC

(b)(3)(b)(6) the acting ISG generally visited the TCPs twice a week. (Exhibits F, S) SFC also made corrections to the platoon, but appeared to be significantly more engaged in ensuring that the force protection of the TCPs was improved.

11. T (b)(3)(b)(6) states that he visited his TCPs while he was on patrol, and his soldiers (Exhibit H) The Platoon Sergeant, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was generally commented by Soldiers in the platoon as coming by the

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There appears to be a breakdown in communication between battalion to company, company to platoon, and platoon to squad. Part of the communication difficulty stems from the OPTEMPO across the battalion at the time of the incident on 12 March 2006, and the fight the battalion has had gaining control of the terrain between Yusifiyah to the Jerf Al Sukar Bridge. Additionally, other operations such as (b)(2)High also pulled the focus of the battalion leadership away from Company B. At battalion to company, the Investigating Officer feels that the breakdown between the two headquarters was a result of frustration at the battalion level by having to repeatedly make the same corrections. At company to platoon, and platoon to squad, the breakdown appears to be a result of either changes to guidance, or lack of guidance.

e. Secondary Areas of inquiry:

(1) What are the SOPs and/or command guidance at Battalion, Company, and Platoon level regarding minimal manning, and equipment requirements at TCPs, OPs, and other tactical sites in March 2006?

(a) Until recently, there was no specific written guidance published concerning manning of TCPs. The only written guidance used by the battalion was the MND-B TCP guidance, first that from 3 ID and then from the 4th ID. On 28 October, 2005 the battalion published the MND-B SOP for TCPs for the first time to the subordinate companies. This SOP covered specifics such as alert, warning, and stop lines; signage requirements, and barrier requirements, but did not specify the manning requirements. (Exhibit AJ) The battalion published 4 additional FRAGOs giving guidance to specific aspects of TCP Operations. (Exhibits AK, AL, AM, AN) On or about 27 October 2005, the Battalion published a battalion Standards SOP, directing guidance for tactical operations. (Exhibit AH) Specifically, the battalion's Standards SOP established guidance on uniform standards and maintaining 360 degree security. The battalion did not publish manning guidance to Company B because of the battalion's belief that this would be a squad mission, and that the Company, planning 2 levels down should be able to determine and enforce the requirements based on the tactical situation.

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was the first written guidance published by the battalion. Before that, the guidance consisted of verbal guidance and Commander's notes. The current written guidance was published

in FRAGO 262, dated 28 June 2006, which encapsulates the definitive guidance from the staff study into a written directive. (Exhibit A1)



(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(2) What was the on the ground reality of manning and equipment at tactical sites for B/1-502 IN at this time ?

(a) According to SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) he states that there were 5 Soldiers at TCP 2, SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) and PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) (although he states he's not completely sure (b)(3)(b)(6) was there). SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) states that he, SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) and PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) were at TCP 1. (Exhibit I) The platoon sergeant was unavailable to answer this question due to being on EML, and the platoon leader did could not verify since he was on EML on 12 March 2006. See the table above for a comparison between guidance issued by each level of command and execution on 12 March 2006.

(b) The company commander believed that his actual platoon manning average was 29 PAX on the ground. A sampling of the Battalion Daily Status Report as of 5 March 2006 shows his on the ground strength of 30 PAX, with four Soldiers on EML and two Soldiers at FOB Mahmudiyah. The company commander had a reasonably accurate picture of his manning. However, when interviewed by the Investigating Officer, the company commander could not describe the Soldier manning requirements

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for each TCP. He could not describe the requirements either by numbers of Soldiers, or by unit (squad, fire team, and platoon headquarters) allocation. Furthermore, he could not definitively describe where the key leaders, platoon leader, platoon sergeant, and squad leaders were supposed to be located. The company commander appears to have failed to have developed an appreciation for the proper manning of the TCPs. As a result, it appears that he failed to also coach or give guidance to the platoon leader for manning the TCPs. This is based on the difference of the platoon leader's understanding of the TCP requirements and the company commander's understanding of the TCP requirements. The Investigating Officer believes that the platoon leader was put into a situation with little to no guidance and then fell in on "that's the way we've always done it."

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(d) Although there are variations of interpretation concerning the manning guidance at each TCP, the interpretations were not significantly different from each other. However, there appeared to be an attitude of going to the minimal manning, for a variety of reason, such as to conduct presence patrols, SWEAT-MS assessments, conduct crater analyses, and respond to any other mission passed to them from company. The Investigating Officer believes the actual execution of the TCP manning can best be summed up by SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) comment "LAW the de facto standard stated above was often discarded in favor of constant patrolling of Mulafrayad" (Mullah Fayyid). (Exhibit L.) A consistent theme from members of the platoon was that the higher did not understand the on the ground manning reality, and the squads made do as best they could. It appears that the minimal manning requirement at a TCP consisted of a Soldier on the each vehicle manning the crew served weapon, a Soldier manning an OP position, and a Leader. There are reported instances where they went below that level in order to meet an immediate mission requirement.

(3) What were the actual physical conditions of the tactical sites for this unit in terms of force protection? Also, in general, was the unit's vehicles mission ready at this time?

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(a) Each TCP remains in a constant state of improvement; however there is significant frustration that key force protection items, such as HESCO barriers and Jersey Barriers were slow in arriving, or lacking the bucket loader support specifically to fill the HESCO barriers. Concertina and pickets have steadily been provided to Company B to improve the TCPs. There have been minor issues with getting pickets, properly constructing the wire obstacles, etc., but generally the Soldiers felt that there were no significant force protection issues. Some leaders of the other platoons, and the 1SG however were concerned with the lack of suitable protection from a VBIED and direct fire.

(b) The most notable issue effecting force protection was getting engineer support to fill the HESCO barriers. Upon establishment of the TCPs, the battalion immediately ordered HESCO barriers, T-Walls and Jersey barriers for the TCPs. T-Walls and Jersey barriers have been in short supply, and the only available option to fill the demand was HESCO barriers. (Exhibit B) The battalion received HESCOs, however initially they were unable to get a contractor to come into the AO to fill the HESCOs. To overcome this, the battalion was able to get limited support of engineer assets from the brigade to help fill the HESCOs, make improvements on fields of fire by bulldozing weeds, etc. (Exhibits A, B, E, F, G) However, improvements continued to be made and more HESCO barriers have been delivered to the TCPs. Soldiers have resorted to filling the new HESCO barriers by hand because of the lack of available engineer assets. (Exhibit G)

(c) None of the Soldiers or leaders that the Investigating Officer interviewed believed vehicle readiness was an issue that effected operations. They acknowledged that vehicle maintenance was difficult, particularly since the vehicles were old and were constantly being used, but it was a point of pride concerning the work that the mechanics attached to Company B had achieved. When a vehicle was identified as NMC, it rarely took more than 2-3 days to fix the vehicle, unless the vehicle had struck an IED. (Exhibits B, H, J, K) The main maintenance issue noted by the Soldiers was air conditioners, and the air conditioners' lack of durability. The other issue was that since the mechanics could only safely work on the vehicles back at the patrol base, the company was often challenged to get the vehicle back to the patrol base.

(4) Did B/1-502 IN request additional support in manning or tactical site improvement (force protection improvement) to the Battalion?

(a) The Company Commander made three requests for additional support in manning. (Exhibits D, E, F, G) These requests were denied due to lack of additional platoons, a constant OPTEMPO across the battalion, and the belief that the company was not utilizing its resources properly. The battalion commander felt that the company had sufficient resources to accomplish the mission. (Exhibits AG) This was based on the battalion commander's perception that the other two platoons, 2nd platoon and 3rd platoon, were able to accomplish the mission with no problems. Also, when the battalion commander asked the company commander to lay out where his people were, the company commander was unable to do so. The Investigating Officer also observed this lack of situational awareness to the allocation of troops to task when he tried to walk the manning through with the company commander. The company commander was

unable to describe to the Investigating Officer how his TCPs should have been manned. (IO Notes)

(b) **Did the platoons make such a request to the company?** The 1st platoon leader did not make an actual request to the company commander; however the platoon leader stated that he was concerned about the OPTEMPO that his Soldiers were undergoing. The platoon leader felt that they would have to go to minimal manning in order to accomplish additional tasking that would come up while on the TCPs. (Exhibit H) This belief was not reflected in the other platoons. (Exhibits R, S)

(5) **Did the Soldiers of B/1-502 IN, at TCP 1 and TCP 2 understand their mission, task and purpose in March 2006?** Uniformly and consistently, all of the Soldiers cited the same mission statement for their operations at the TCPs on (b)(2)High (b)(2)High which was to maintain control of (b)(2)High in order to allow Coalition Forces to transit the route and to prevent the AIF from using (b)(2)High. The standard mission statement for TCP 1 was: Secure (b)(2)High with a combined element of IA Soldiers IOT prevent AIF freedom of maneuver SW to NE along (b)(2)High (b)(2)High and SE along (b)(2)High. The Mission statement for TCP 2: Secure (b)(2)High IOT prevent AIF freedom of maneuver SW to NE along (b)(2)High (Exhibits C, D, F, H, I, K, L, N) Every Soldier and leader that the Investigating Officer interviewed believed that they were accomplishing that task, and thought that task was important.

(6) **What is the general command climate of the Soldiers in this unit? What is their attitude towards the mission in March 2006?**

(a) Inside Company B, many of the leaders and Soldiers feel beaten down. 1st Platoon feels that they have suffered the brunt of the fight. Key leader moves at the platoon level have resulted in many changes in dynamics for the platoon. (Exhibit AO) I (b)(3)(b)(6) the previous Platoon Leader, was well liked within the platoon. His death hit the platoon hard just as they were starting to recover from the loss of SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) and SGT (b)(3)(b)(6). On top of that, SS (b)(3)(b)(6) the platoon sergeant from the start of the deployment through January, was largely ineffective and had to be removed from the position. SFC (b)(3)(b)(6), the 1st Platoon Sergeant up to the deployment, was brought back and also failed to establish the NCO leadership needed for the platoon. SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was brought in specifically to instill basic discipline in the platoon. When SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) started doing this, he met with resistance from the junior leaders who were used to getting their own way. This initially caused much resentment against SFC (b)(3)(b)(6).

Many of the Soldiers interviewed do not feel that the battalion understands their problems nor is the battalion sympathetic to the company. With the current guidance directing exactly how the company is to execute the TCP mission, many Soldiers expressed that they felt the battalion is doing the platoons job. (Exhibit E, G, H, N, O, P, V, X, Y, Z) The same comments are reflected by the battalion leadership. The battalion leadership feels they have to do the company's job because the company has failed on numerous opportunities to properly perform the tasks expected as part of the mission analysis at company level. Specifically, determining manning requirements, and enforcing standards. (Exhibit A, C, R, U) Additionally, the battalion leadership has lost confidence in the ability of the Company B commander to command his company.

(Exhibit A, B, C) The battalion commander has counseled the company commander on the company commander's performance, and has had to resort to sending emails to both the Company XO and 1SG because he felt that was required to ensure that the mission got accomplished. (Exhibit AB)


(b) Most of the Soldiers interviewed felt that their mission of guarding the TCPs along (b)(2)High was an important mission because they realized that they had taken a contested area away from their enemy. They also realized that the enemy had been trying to force them from (b)(2)High, and the Platoon had beaten back every attempt by the enemy to force them out of the area. Combined with improvements that they saw occurring in Mullah Fayyid, they generally felt proud of that accomplishment. Of the Soldiers who did not feel the mission was important, their reasoning was generally that they should be going out after the enemy and not sitting in TCPs.

4. Recommendations

(b)(5), (b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

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(b)(5), (b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

~~SECRET/REL and MCFI~~

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(b)(5)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Investigating Officer

Encls: 42

- A. DA 2823-LTC July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement.
- B. DA 2823-MAJ dated 7 July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement.
- C. DA 2823-MAJ 8 July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement.
- D. DA 2823-CPT 8 July 2006
- E. DA 2823-CPT 8 July 2006
- F. DA 2823-SFC ed 7 July 2006
- G. DA 2823-1SG July 2006
- H. DA 2823-2LT d 7 July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement
- I. DA 2823-SSG July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement
- J. DA 2823-SSG ly 2006
- K. DA 2823-SSG ed 7 July 2006
- L. DA 2823-SGT y 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement
- M. DA 2823-SSG July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statcment
- N. DA 2823-SGT dated 7 July 2006 w/ Privacy Act Statement

(b)(3)(b)(6)

- O. DA 2823-SSG ed 7 July 2006
- P. DA 2823-CH dated 7 July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement
- Q. DA 2823-2LT her R. dated 8 July 2006
- R. DA 2823-SFC ted 8 July 2006
- S. DA 2823-SSG ated 8 July 2006
- T. DA 2823-SPC l 8 July 2006
- U. DA 2823-SFC ated 8 July 2006
- V. DA 2823-SPC July 2006
- W. DA 2823-2LT ly 2006
- X. DA 2823-SSG ated 8 July 2006
- Y. DA 2823-SGT l 8 July 2006
- Z. DA 2823-SPC July 2006
- AA. DA 2823-SGT 8 July 2006

(b)(3)(b)(6)

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~~SECRET/REL and MCFI~~

- AB. Performance Counseling from LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) to CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) dated 11 Dec 05
- AC. Alpha Roster- B Co, 1-502 IN Reg, 101st ABN DIV (ASSLT)
- AD. Platoon Breakdown-B Co, 1-502 IN Reg, 101st ABN DIV (ASSLT)
- AE. 1st Platoon, B Co, 1-502 IN Reg TCP assignments and views from TCP 1 and 2.
- AF. 1st Platoon, B Co, 1-502 IN Reg casualty roster
- AG. B Co, 1-502 IN Reg Foxhole Strength Staff Study dated 23 June 2006
- AH. DA 2823-CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) dated 7 July 2006 w/First Strike Standards Document
- AI. FRAGO 262 to OPORD 05-56 dated 28 June 2006
- AJ. FRAGO 19 to OPORD 05-56 dated 18 October 2005
- AK. FRAGO 72 to OPORD 05-56 dated 25 December 2005
- AL. FRAGO 252 to OPORD 05-56 dated 21 June 2006
- AM. FRAGO 239 to OPORD 05-56 dated 8 June 2006
- AN. FRAGO 233 to OPORD 05-56 dated 2 June 2006
- AO. E-mail from CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) to MAJ (b)(3)(b)(6) CC to LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) dated 26 June 2006
- AP. Memorandum for Record-Notes of LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) dated 10 July 2006.

~~SECRET/REL and MCFI~~

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
2d Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division (Mechanized)
FOB Duke, Iraq APO AE 09329

AFYB-AR-DCO

11 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation Index

1. The exhibits listed on this index are included in the final report of the AR 15-6 Investigation conducted from 6 July 2006 until 10 July 2006.

- | | | |
|---|----------------------------------|---|
| A. DA 2823-LTC | (b)(3)(b)(6) | July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement. |
| B. DA 2823-MAJ | | dated 7 July 2006 w/Privacy Act |
| Statement. | | |
| C. DA 2823-MAJ | | 8 July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement. |
| D. DA 2823-CPT | | 8 July 2006 |
| E. DA 2823-CPT | | 8 July 2006 |
| F. DA 2823-SFC | | dated 7 July 2006 |
| G. DA 2823-1SG | | July 2006 |
| H. DA 2823-2LT | | dated 7 July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement |
| I. DA 2823-SSG | | July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement |
| J. DA 2823-SSG | | July 2006 |
| K. DA 2823-SSG | | dated 7 July 2006 |
| L. DA 2823-SGT | | July 2006 w/Privacy Act Statement |
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| N. DA 2823-SGT | dated 7 July 2006 w/ Privacy Act | |
| Statement | | |
| O. DA 2823-SSG | (b)(3)(b)(6) | dated 7 July 2006 |
| P. DA 2823-CH | | dated 7 July 2006 w/Privacy Act |
| Statement | | |
| Q. DA 2823-2LT | (b)(3)(b)(6) | dated 8 July 2006 |
| R. DA 2823-SFC | | July 2006 |
| S. DA 2823-SSG | | July 2006 |
| T. DA 2823-SPC | | July 2006 |
| U. DA 2823-SFC | | 8 July 2006 |
| V. DA 2823-SPC | | 2006 |
| W. DA 2823-2LT | | 06 |
| X. DA 2823-SSG | | 8 July 2006 |
| Y. DA 2823-SGT | | July 2006 |
| Z. DA 2823-SPC | | 2006 |
| AA. DA 2823-SGT | | 2006 |
| AB. Performance Counseling from LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) to CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) | | dated 11 Dec 05 |
| AC. Alpha Roster- B Co, 1-502 IN Reg, 101 st ABN DIV (ASSLT) | | |

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AFYB-AR-DCO

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigation Index

- AD. Platoon Breakdown-B Co, 1-502 IN Reg. 101st ABN DIV (ASLT)
- AE. 1st Platoon, B Co, 1-502 IN Reg TCP assignments and views from TCP 1 and 2.
- AF. 1st Platoon, B Co, 1-502 IN Reg casualty roster
- AG. B Co, 1-502 IN Res Foxhole Strength Staff Study dated 23 June 2006
- AH. DA 2823-CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) dated 7 July 2006 w/First Strike

Standards Document

- AI. FRAGO 262 to OPORD 05-56 dated 28 June 2006
- AJ. FRAGO 19 to OPORD 05-56 dated 18 October 2005
- AK. FRAGO 72 to OPORD 05-56 dated 25 December 2005
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- AP. Memorandum for Record-Notes of LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) dated 10 July 2006.

(b)(3)(b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, MULTINATIONAL DIVISION BAGHDAD
CAMP LIBERTY, IRAQ
APO AE 09352

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFYB-CS

5 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) Deputy Commander, 2BCT, 4ID, MND-B

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer under AR 15-6

1. You are hereby appointed as an Investigating Officer (IO) pursuant to Army Regulation 15-6, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, to conduct an investigation into the 12MAR06 alleged criminal acts of Soldiers in Bravo/ 1-502 INF, 2-101 ABN, against a family of local nationals. Your investigation will not address the criminal acts of US Soldiers, which is being investigated by CID, rather your inquiry will focus on Troop Leading Procedures in place at the time of these alleged crimes. Specifically, you will examine how four Soldiers abandoned TCP 2, allegedly committed criminal acts, and returned to the TCP without being detected. You will address the frequency and measure that the Chain of Command (officers and non-commissioned officers) actually checked on and supervised operations at this unit's tactical sites.
2. You will issue Findings and Recommendations that specifically cover the following areas of inquiry:
 - a. What were the Standard Operating Procedures and/ or command guidance at the Battalion, Company and Platoon levels regarding minimal manning and equipment required at TCPs, OPs and other tactical sites in March 2006?
 - b. What was the on the ground reality of manning and equipment at tactical sites for Bravo Company at this time?
 - c. What were the actual physical conditions of the tactical sites for this unit in terms of force protection? Also, in general, were the unit's vehicles mission ready at this time?
 - d. Did Bravo Company request additional support in manning or tactical site improvement (force protection improvement) to the Battalion? Did the Platoons make such requests to the Company?
 - e. Did the Soldiers of Bravo Company, at TCP 1 and TCP 2, understand their mission, task and purpose in March 2006?
 - f. What is the general command climate of the Soldiers in this unit? What was their attitude toward the mission in March 2006?

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AFZP-CS

SUBJECT: Appointment as Investigating Officer under Army Regulation 15-6

3. Your legal advisor is CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) Chief of Administrative Law, MND-B, VOIP (b)(2)High. Contact CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) for an IO brief before beginning your investigation.

4. You may speak with any and all individuals that you believe have information pertinent to your investigation. You will obtain guidance from your legal advisor if in the course of your investigation you determine that completion thereof requires examining the conduct or performance of, or may result in Findings and Recommendations adverse to, a person senior to yourself.

5. If during the course of your investigation you come to suspect that an individual you are questioning may be criminally responsible, you will advise that individual of his or her rights under Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment as appropriate. You will administer and record such rights advisements on DA Form 3881.

6. All witness statements will be sworn and, if possible, submitted on DA Form 2872. If circumstances preclude you from obtaining a sworn statement, or if you obtain a statement telephonically, you will summarize such a statement in a Memorandum for Record and swear to the accuracy of your summary.

7. Your report will be submitted to this office on DA Form 1574 together with all evidence marked as Exhibits, and an Index to said Exhibits. Your Findings must be based on the evidence you include as Exhibits. And your Recommendations must be based on your Findings.

8. Your complete report will be submitted to this office no later than 10 July 2006. Submit any requests for delay in writing to the Staff Judge Advocate. You must obtain a written legal review from the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, MND-B, before final submission to this office.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b)(3)(b)(6)

COL, GS
Chief of Staff

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is comparable with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

8 July 2006
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Signature

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Social Security Number

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2006-07-08

(b)(3)(b)(6) STATEMENT (Continued)

4. Q: What was B Co's troop to task requirements on 12 March 2006? 1 Platoon was on TCP's, 1 PLT was at the JS Bridge TCP 1 and 1 Platoon was available for maneuver, offensive operations or non-lethal operations. How many TCP's, FOB Security Requirements, QRF, OP's, or any other requirement did B Co have?

A: Again, 1 Platoon on TCP task (TCP 1, TCP 2, TCP 5, TCP 6), 1 Platoon at JS Bridge and TCP 4. This task at JS Bridge allows for an internal QRF as well as the ability to conduct area engagements in Zone 309. 1 Platoon as a maneuver platoon, Force Protection is primarily done by IA manning the towers on the FOB and B Co HQ's personnel manning front gate which is 2 pax in

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Platoon was on they always found it very hard and difficult to manage. On 1 March 2006, 1st Platoon had 36 pax assigned, 2nd Platoon had 36 pax, and 3rd Platoon had 35 pax.

5. Q: What are the manning and equipment requirements for OP's during March 2006?

A: I have been very clear in my guidance with regards to how we fight which correlates to how OP's are manned and equipped. This is under fight and because of that you must have a base of fire and be able to maneuver as So with that said, if we sent scouts out which we often do, it would be a sniper team along with at least 4 to 6 other pax to ensure they could maintain at all times 360 degree security. OP's were manned with a

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The standard for this OP was 4 pax and 1 pax must be an NCO. Every soldier has a his soldiers, no exceptions.

6. Q: On an average basis, how often are you able to get out and check your units? During the first half of March, what was the tactical situation vicinity of TCP's 1 and 2? How did this effect your battlefield circulation on checking B Co?

A: On average I was out conducting battlefield circulation 6 days a week. Sundays were a maintenance day for the vehicles and the PSD personnel. At a minimum Unreadable Text Unreadable Text schedule is as follows, Monday morning CUB followed Unreadable Text Wednesday is usually a meeting with Qada Mayor and if it did not last all day I would do battlefield circulation. Thursday all day battlefield circulation. Friday would be a CUB in the morning followed by battlefield circulation. Saturday would be a mixture of battlefield circulation and visiting the 4th Bde IA Commander. Sundays were a maintenance day and church services. The tactical situation at TCP 1 and TCP 2 and in and around Mulla Fvad and report attached. Unreadable Text

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Unreadable Text

On 12 March 2006 I was directly in my vehicle destroying the vehicle and me (I think) being wounded, taking shrapnel to my left eye. I would not go to the hospital instead requesting to go to our Battalion Aid Station by ground evac and was treated by our surgeon who got as much shrapnel out of me as possible. The following day on 10 March 2006 we had 2 soldiers wounded by and IED Strike so instead of staying off my leg as instructed I got up and had the PSD take me and the Command Sergeant Major to the 10th CSU to see our wounded soldiers. On the 11th of March 2006 my leg swelled and an infection set in so on 12 March 2006 I was taken to the 10th CSU and told I would have to be either admitted or come to go back to FOB MMD and have my leg amputated.

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7. Q: Between 5 March 2006 and 12 March 2006, how many times did you go to TCP 1 and TCP 2? Did you note any deficiencies or concerns? If so, what guidance did you to correct them? Do you know if the deficiencies were corrected?

A: As stated above, I was out with the FAC on Operation Glory Light from 28 February 2006 till 9 March 2006 and at the FAC redeployed back to FOB MMD we passed through each TCP on (b)(2)High and Unreadable Text while out on Glory Light it was relayed to me from my TOC Unreadable Text

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Unreadable Text March 2006 and was kept down for about 14 days. I do know that in my absence my S-3 went down and checked and inspected TCP's because as my PSD was taking him down they got hit by another IED but were able to continue the mission in order to check on operations and do battlefield circulation as did the command sergeant major in my absence. (b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF I.T.C. (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2006-07-08

STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6) What was your assessment of the Chain of Command within the platoon? What mitigation measures/guidance did you give to try and help reduce the possible leadership capability shortcomings? Were these measures implemented?

A: [Redacted]
The Platoon Leader was the most senior I-1 in the battalion and the platoon he had been the Platoon Leader of was one of our stronger platoons in the battalion, that is the reason I moved him to 1st Platoon, B Co because they had lost a squad leader, fire team leader, platoon leader and rifleman all KIA's in the last month. Prior to 11/06/06 (b)(3)(b)(6) assuming his position as Pl for 1st Platoon.

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Unreadable Text of how they were conducting missions, what was working for them and what standards, discipline and just concentrated on basic squad tactics. The Platoon Sergeant was SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) who had served as a company First Sergeant in Easy Company and Operations Sergeant for the 2/101 B I B, but had been working at brigade headquarters. Command Sergeant Major (b)(3)(b)(6) and Command Sergeant Major (b)(3)(b)(6) both realized that 1st Platoon needed a leader who was grounded in the fundamentals, who knew the importance of standards and discipline and holding soldiers and leaders accountable. At the time of this incident [Redacted]

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the reason why the squads or soldiers were not doing the harder right.

9.Q: What was the FMC status of B Co's vehicles (OH/FMC) on 12 March 2006? Was there a significant change in operational readiness status during the previous week? Are there any consistent maintenance issues in B Co and in the Battalion that have not been resolved?

A: First and very important, I always directed that the outlying patrol bases be resourced first and foremost. My staff has done this as has our forward support company ensured that the outlying patrol bases always get priority on vehicles and all maintenance and logistical issues. At this time I know B Co had 20 ea M1114's on hand and at least 18 FMC if not all of them. We had resourced B Co with 4 mechanics at the expense of the rest of the battalion. Of note, when this battalion took this AO over the OR Rate was about 65% and we quickly and aggressively turned this around and have maintained an OR Rate at above 90% at all times. Maintenance was not the issues in B Co, accountability of property and command supply discipline were and still is the biggest issues or short comings in B Co. Leaders not supervising and accept excuses for any shortcoming.

10.Q: Were there any identified weaknesses at FCP's 1 and 2 in terms of force protection? If so, what was done to mitigate those weaknesses?

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES

STATEMENT OF LT (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 2006-07-08

(b)(3)(b)(6) COMMENT (Continued)

Who were the leaders in B Co that you did not have confidence in? What if any measures were taken to mitigate the weaknesses that you felt existed in the company and platoon? What weaknesses were not able to be resolved and why?

A: As early as 17 December 2005 I had lost a great deal of confidence in the B Co commander [Unreadable Text] counseled the company commander in writing (see attached) and made the Brigade Commander aware of my concerns. Myself and the command sergeant major both personally counseled the 1st Platoon PSG on his shortcomings and what he needed to do in order to fix his and his platoons issues and shortcomings. In January 2006, myself and the command sergeant major replaced the 1st Platoon PSG with SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) and made LT (b)(3)(b)(6) the new Platoon Leader because LT Brito had been killed by an IED Strike on 23 December 06. We moved SS (b)(3)(b)(6) 1st Squad as the Squad Leader. At the end of January 2006 myself, the command sergeant major as well as the Company Commander acting ISG all determined that SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was not working out as the PSG so we replaced him with SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) and SS (b)(3)(b)(6) the 1st Squad Leader with SS (b)(3)(b)(6) in addition the command sergeant major moved 1 SGT from 2nd Platoon and 1 SGT from 3rd Platoon to 1st Platoon along with moving or backfilling 1st Platoon with other soldiers from 2nd and 3rd Platoons. In January 2006 I directed the Company Commander to go on Freedom Rest hoping this would help him to get some rest and reevaluate himself and his company. The Company Commander did seem to do a little better in the month February but in March his company RTO was wounded in the [Unreadable Text] again. I did make the Brigade Commander a infantry Captain was available to replace CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) At the end of March the Brigade Commander counseled CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) and I asked the Brigade Commander to replace CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) with CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) who had just arrived in country. The Brigade Commander felt CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) would be alright and wanted me to continue to work with him. Again in May I requested of the Brigade Commander to replace CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) with CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) but again he felt [Unreadable Text] and told me to continue to work him. [Unreadable Text] Because of this, myself, [Unreadable Text] [Unreadable Text]

[Unreadable Text] from the TOC and through continuous battlefield circulation.

16.Q: What was or do you think was the B Co soldier's attitude towards their mission in the first half of March 2006?

A: I can without reservation state that 2nd and 3rd Platoons of B Co knew without a doubt they were making a difference and felt pride in their mission and abilities to get the job done. They were engaged with the local populace of Yusufiyah, Mualla Fyad and Jasim Village. These two platoons embraced not only the lethal part of the mission but saw how much of an impact the non-lethal part of the mission was having on the Iraqi people. 2nd and 3rd Platoons felt pride in how they were getting the mission accomplished. 1st Platoon felt sorry for themselves and were just hanging on. 1st Platoon was also having a hard time dealing with SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) because he was not allowing them to make excuses and feel sorry for themselves. He was building them from the bottom up focusing on the fundamentals of soldiering. In regards to the B Co HQ's I feel the only thing [Unreadable Text] CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) was just trying to hanging on and was extremely dependent [Unreadable Text] mode. CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) was trying to get the job done but I do not think he believed the sacrifices that had been made were worth getting the mission done.

17.Q: I feel it is important to bring out or to your attention the following facts.

A: When we initially took control of Route Sporster we established TCP's 1, 2, 3, and 4. Immediately TCP 1 was established as a combined TCP (CF/IA) and TCP's 2 and 3 were coalition only. In the late November we made TCP 3 a combined TCP (IA/CF) and by the middle of December it became Iraqi Army only. On 2 Dec 05, B Co temporarily established TCP 5 for Operation Deliverance. Upon completion of Operation Deliverance B Co requested to make TCP 5 permanent and to make it a combined TCP (CF/IA) because the people of Mualla Fyad felt safer and more secure with the establishment of TCP 5. On 1 Jan 06, B Co moved from TCP 2 and established TCP 6. Reason for this was the AIF was able to emplace IED's in between TCP 2 and TCP 3. Based on [Unreadable Text]

[Unreadable Text]

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

STATEMENT OF LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, LTC (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

2-11-06
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Social Security Number

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB Mahmudiyah North, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2006/07/07	3. TIME 1400	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS MAJ/AD	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC/1-502 IN, FOB Mahmudiyah Iraq, APO AE 09398

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: LTC McCarthy
A: MAJ Wintrich

1. What were the manning and equipment requirements at TCP 1 and TCP 2 on 12 March?

(b)(2)High

2. Were the manning and equipment requirements at TCPs 1 and 2 IAW the BN SOP, FRAGO, or command guidance? If not, why and what actions were taken to mitigate the difference in manning and equipment? Exactly who was at the TCP 2?

(b)(2)High

3. Was anyone at TCP 1 responsible for observing TCP 2? What is expected of the Soldier observing TCP 2? What can the Soldier actually see of TCP 2 from TCP 1?
I do not know if observing TCP 2 is a specified task for TCP 1. From the rooftop position of TCP 1, you can see the northern end of TCP 2 without binoculars, during daylight. With binoculars, you can see the length of TCP 2, but you cannot observe the house on the north side of (b)(2)High due to vegetation along the route. I have not observed the position during limited visibility.

4. What were B Company's troop to task requirements on 12 March? How many TCPs, FOB security requirements, QRF. Operations, or other requirements did B Company have?
I was on R&R from 8-29 March, I cannot specifically state what B Company's tasks were on this particular date. In general, the company troop to task requirements for steady state operations were as follows: one platoon was posted to the Joint Patrol Base at the Jafr Sukr Bridge on the Euphrates River, one platoon was tasked to conduct route control at TCPs 1, 2, 5 and 6 and the third platoon was available for operations in the company AO. The JSB platoon has, as subtasks, the responsibility for securing the AVLB checkpoint and TCP four, the southernmost TCP along (b)(2)High. The security for the patrol base is a combination of CF and IA soldiers, posted at the front gate and along the perimeter wall; I am fairly certain that the only CF guard position is the front gate position, and that position is manned by both CF and IA in a guard tower and two M113s for armored protection.

5. What are the manning and equipment requirements for OPs during March 06?
I cannot recall specific equipment or manning requirements for Observation Posts during this time frame. Without any specific document or FRAGO to reference, the decision to man and equip Observation Posts rested on the company commander and his METT-TC assessment of the operation.

10. EXHIBIT 3	11. INITIALS (b)(3)(b)(6)	PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF MAJ (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Mahmudiyah DATED 2006/07/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

6. On an average basis, how often are you able to get out and check your units? During the first half of March, what was the tactical situation vicinity TCPs 1 and 2? How did this effect your battlefield circulation on checking B Company?

On average, I move through the battalion Area of Operations once every three or four weeks. My movement patterns are usually linked to a LOGPAC from the battalion FOB to the company patrol bases. In early March, the battalion was focused primarily in AO 309G and the Russian Power Plant, and had accepted tactical risk in the Mahmudiyah city area. B Company maintained their TCP footprint and JSB footprint, but operated with reduced combat power available inside Yusufiyah itself. The battalion commander and S3 were posted forward with the battalion TAC at the JSB, and I remained at FOB Mahmudiyah for the duration of that operation (26 FEB - 8 MAR)

7. Between 5 and 12 March, how many times did you visit TCP 1 and TCP 2?

None - I departed Iraq on the 10th or 11th of March on R&R leave. In the weeks leading up to the 12th of March, the battalion was primarily focused on the execution of Operation Glory Light, a brigade level offensive operation in our western sector from 26 FEB to 8 MAR. In all of the times I moved through TCP 2 en route to or from the JSB or other checkpoints, it does not stand out in any way; I have reviewed my personal notes and cannot find a single note taken that indicates I ever went down to TCP 2 on a reconnaissance. I have specific recollections of TCP 1 and TCP 5 from a previous commanders inquiry, and of all the TCPs along

(b)(2)High from a TCP survey in January.

8. What was your assessment of the chain of command within the platoon? What mitigation measures/guidance did you give to try to reduce the possible leadership capability shortcomings? Were these measures implemented?

The chain of command in 1st Platoon B Company has been badly fractured by combat losses since arriving in the AO in late October. The platoon lost their platoon leader, a squad leader, and two team leaders to enemy action. The platoon was led by the second platoon leader and third platoon sergeant since arriving in theater. After the loss of their platoon leader, squad leader and two team leaders, we moved an experienced platoon leader over from the battalion MITT Team, as well as the platoon sergeant who had originally held the position before being assigned to the MITT Team. The battalion replaced the brigade LNO (an infantry SSG) and moved him down to 1st Platoon in early February. All of the leadership changes took place from early January to mid-February. The intent was to provide experienced leaders to replace the combat losses, allowing 1st Platoon to remain operational in support of B Company and the battalion.

9. What was the OR rate of B Company's vehicles (OH/FMC) on 12 March 06? Was there a significant change in operational readiness rate during the previous week? Are there consistent maintenance problems or concerns in B Company and the battalion?

The company had 16 FMC of 17 OH. According to the maintenance slide from 9 March, there were two additional M1114s not available due to retrograde from combat losses. Since taking a battalion fleet that had a 64% OR rate, the battalion has maintained an OR rate of over 90% since 1 February. There were no significant maintenance problems with B Company or the battalion. The battalion had provided the company with a float M1114 as of 9 March, to mitigate the effect of the two battle loss trucks.

10. Where there any identified weaknesses at TCPs 1 and 2 in terms of Force Protection? If so, what was done to mitigate those weaknesses? For the weaknesses that could be mitigated, who made the decision to accept the risk?

(b)(2)High

11. Were any requests made to improve the force protection of TCPs 1 and 2? Was this a problem at other sites?

I am not aware of any specific requests for force protection assets or resources nor any requests that were unfilled by the battalion. The battalion has maintained a stock of six foot HESCO bastions in the CL IV yard, along with concertina wire, barbed wire and pickets. HESCO barriers have been used across the battalion area of operations, but require external assets to emplace properly. We have requested and been allocated armored front end loaders and flat bed trucks from external sources to fill HESCO barriers on PB Yusufiya, as well as other checkpoints in AO Talon. Concrete barrier demands and allocation for TCPs compete across the brigade to include a substantial effort at the intersection of (b)(2)High and efforts to reinforce two other patrol bases (Lions Den and PB 2) in the BCT AO. The battalion reinforced the Sportster TCPs using assets available, which included concertina barriers and HESCO barriers.

Using HESCO barriers as a method of providing force protection is difficult to accomplish in AO Talon, linked almost exclusively to the lack of organic engineer assets necessary to fill the barriers. In order to fill seven foot HESCO bastions, we used an up-armored bucket loader and three flat bed trucks provided by the brigade engineer company. The flatbeds, front end loader (on lowboy) and security patrol of four M1114s moved out into sector, located fill dirt from road side piles and brought it back to the patrol base. Three flatbeds filled two HESCOs, requiring a week's worth of combat patrols just to find and deliver enough fill for the barriers. The flatbeds and front end loader all suffered mechanical failure at some point during the week, requiring additional time and resources to locate, deliver and install parts. The point of the narrative is to illustrate that HESCO barriers are a solution with a significant resource requirement bill, paid by a limited brigade level asset - the Engineer E&M platoon from the Engineer company.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

12. Did you feel that you were able to refuse a mission due to unacceptable risk?
I am confident that the battalion commander has the ability to speak directly to the brigade commander when he believes risk to mission or risk to force is excessive. The company commanders have the same freedom and requirement with the battalion commander.

13. What was the mission statement for B Company, 1st Platoon and TCPs 1 and 2? Did you feel that the Soldiers understood their mission?
Control (b)(2)High NOT maintain coalition force freedom of maneuver and disrupt insurgent freedom of maneuver in AO Bulldog. I believe the company understands the task purpose and overarching necessity for controlling (b)(2)High

14. What do you feel the command climate of B Company and 1st Platoon during the first half of March? What do you feel the command climate of B Company and 1st Platoon is now?
I do not know about March. I do not know what specific climate problems or sentiments exist in the company and platoon; any answer to this question would be a guess.

15. Who are the leaders on B Company that you do not have confidence in? What if any measures were taken to mitigate the weaknesses that you felt existed in the platoon?
I have lost confidence in the company commander's ability to command B Company. The measures we have taken primarily amount to very specific, directive orders to the commander, in order to reduce the number of variables he is required to manage or control. I believe First Sergeant (b)(3)(b)(6) capable, but has lost self confidence, and therefore has lost a fair degree of effectiveness as the senior noncommissioned officer in the company. The First Sergeant was once the platoon sergeant for 1/B/1-502, and may underestimate the impact of transitioning from Platoon Sergeant peer to First Sergeant leader and supervisor. The extended period (November to April) that he was recovering at home station from wounds suffered in an IED attack also weigh in on the situation. I (b)(3)(b)(6) was not yet in theater, but I do not know if his personal presence in the company would have made a difference.

16. What did you think the B Company Soldiers attitude towards their mission in the first half of March?
I do not know for certain, but my belief is that after nearly five months of rotations through the TCPs had the effect of instilling a sense of monotony and perhaps complacency.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

08 July 2006
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Social Security Number

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB Mahmadiyah, IZ, MND-B
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006/07/08
3. TIME: 1130
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: O4

3. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HHC/1-502d IN, 2 BCT, 101st ABN DIV (AA)

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH

(b)(3)(b)(6) What were the manning and equipment requirements at TCP 1(T128C) and TCP 2(T138C) on 12 Mar 06?

(b)(2)High

EXHIBITS

(b)(3)(b)(6) Were the manning and equipment requirements at TCP's 1(T128C) and 2(T138C) LAW the BN SOP, FRAGO, or command guidance? If not, why and what actions were taken to mitigate the difference in manning and equipment? Exactly who was at TCP 2(T138C)?

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6) Was anyone at TCP 1(T128C) responsible for Observing TCP 2(T138C)? What is expected of the Soldier observing TCP 2(T138C)? What can the Soldier actually see of TCP 2(T138C) from TCP 1(T128C)?

Yes, there is a bunker on the rooftop of TCP 1(T128C) that faces southwest down (b)(2)High. This position is expected to observe between TCP 1 and TCP 2 to ensure no one emplaces IED's between the two locations on (b)(2)High. The Soldier at TCP 1 can see the road between the two TCPs and he can see a lot of the ground between the two TCPs. Due to the distance, seeing anyone moving anywhere off the road would be difficult using NVGs. The (b)(2)High shows thermal signatures as long there is nothing in between the observer and the target. At TCP 2, the road is in a slight depression. This depression is 3-6 feet lower than the road, and movement to the north side of (b)(2)High is concealed by vegetation around the TCP. If the soldiers departed the TCP following the canal to the northwest they might not have been seen movement very well due to vegetation. Vegetation makes the (b)(2)High ineffective. If the vegetation was reeds, and I am not sure about that, then it would have been very difficult to see their movement. Reeds are a real problem along (b)(2)High. Efforts have been made since our arrival in October 2005 to control the reeds. Methods used have been burning, cutting with a weed eater, cutting by hand, and using a D7. Burning did not work well at this location because the reeds are rooted in water and are not flammable. Cutting works well for short periods of time. The Soldiers efforts for reed cutting are focused along (b)(2)High specifically to mitigate the IED threat. The D7 has proven effective in reed control along (b)(2)High and keeps them cleared for at least a month. The D7 has cleared reeds on (b)(2)High three times since JAN 06. They would not have cut/cleared reeds along the canal to the northwest because it is not necessary to mitigate the IED threat. Contractors hired to cut reeds has been attempted since our arrival in October 2005. However, initially upon our arrival no contractors were willing to work in the Yusufiyah area because they claimed the AIF threatened to kill them or their families. Contractors from outside the Yusufiyah Nahia were unwilling to work alone (b)(2)High because they were uncomfortable with the security situation. In June 06, a local contractor was hired to cut reeds along (b)(2)High. The contractor did not work for the first three weeks after he was hired because of the security situation. However, after some negotiation, he cut the reeds in short stretches of (b)(2)High without incident vic. (b)(2)High.

10 EXHIBIT: C
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 03 22 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6) What was B Company's troop to task requirements on 12 March 06? How many TCP's, FOB security requirements, QRF, OP's, or any other requirements did B Co have?

B Company was task organized with their headquarters element and three maneuver platoons. Platoons would rotate through the three platoon missions of TCP Operations, Jaffar Sakar Bridge Operations, and Maneuver Operations on a schedule as dictated by the company commander. They also secured their patrol base with IA assistance. There was no requirement to provide a QRF, if one was maintained, it was at the Company Commander's discretion. Generally, the amount of forces they had available was always a platoon operating at approximately 85% strength of MTOE, or 32 personnel. This included a platoon headquarters with platoon leader, platoon sergeant, RTO, forward observer, medic and four squads. The battalion published a frago prior to departure from home station in August 2005 that a squad is considered no less than 7 personnel. That frago was published on an unclassified computer and is no longer available.

(b)(3)(b)(6) 1) STANDARD SPECIFIED TASKS: YUSIFYAH PATROL BASE (b)(3)(b)(6)

- T1: PROVIDE COMMAND AND CONTROL
- P1: ALLOW UNHINDERED COMBAT OPERATIONS AND PROVIDE FOR NEEDS OF SOLDIERS IN SUPPORT OF THEIR COMBAT OPERATIONS
- T2: PROVIDE LIFE SUPPORT TO PB YUSIFYAH WITH RESPECT TO CL I, CL III, MEDICAL, AND MAINTENANCE
- P2: ALLOW UNIMPEDED COMBAT OPERATIONS
- T3: PROVIDE 120MM MORTAR SUPPORT
- P3: PROVIDE INDIRECT FIRE COVERAGE FOR THE AREA IN THE MOST WESTERN PORTION OF AO TALON
- T4: SECURE MAIN ENTRANCE TO PB YUSIFYAH WITH ONE 2 MAN CREW IN AN M113 APC. PROVIDE SOG ICW MITT 4
- P4: PREVENT UNAUTHORIZED ENTRANCE INTO PB YUSIFYAH

(b)(3)(b)(6) 2) STANDARD SPECIFIED TASKS FOR TCP PLATOON:

- TCP (b)(2)High
- T1: SECURE (b)(2)High WITH A COMBINED ELEMENT OF IA SOLDIERS
- P1: PREVENT AIF FREEDOM OF MANUEVER SW TO NE ALONG (b)(2)High AND SE ALONG (b)(2)High
- TCP (b)(2)High
- T1: SECURE (b)(2)High
- P1: PREVENT AIF FREEDOM OF MANUEVER SW TO NE ALONG (b)(2)High
- TCP T13C (b)(2)High
- T1: SECURE (b)(2)High WITH A COMBINED ELEMENT OF IA SOLDIERS
- P1: PREVENT AIF FREEDOM OF MANUEVER SW TO NE ALONG (b)(2)High
- TCP T130C(B5) (b)(2)High
- T1: SECURE THE MULLA FAYAD HIGHWAY WITH A COMBINED ELEMENT OF NOT LESS THAN 8 SOLDIERS
- P1: PREVENT AIF FREEDOM OF MANUEVER NW TO SE INTO MULLA FAYAD

CONTINUED PAGE 3 24

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 28 JUL 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6) Question #4, continued.

STANDARD TASKS: JSB PATROL BASE MB22995299

T1: SECURE JSB PB

P1: PROVIDE A BASE OF OPERATIONS FOR TCP 4. AVLB GUARDS AND 120 MM MORTAR SUPPORT

T2: PROVIDE 120MM MORTAR SUPPORT

P2: PROVIDE INDIRECT FIRE COVERAGE FOR THE AREA IN THE MOST WESTERN PORTION OF AO TALON

TCP T142C(AVLB) (b)(2)High

T1: SECURE THE AVLB BRIDGE

P1: PREVENT ITS DESTRUCTION BY AIF

TCP T132U(B) (b)(2)High

T1: SECURE (b)(2)High

P1: PREVENT AIF FREEDOM OF MANUEVER SW TO NE ALONG (b)(2)High DNTD (b)(2)High FROM (b)(2)High ROAD AND ALONG THE ROAD LEADING TO THE AVLB

d) MANUEVER PLATOON. B Company has one platoon remaining of available manuever combat power after all of the above tasks are conducted. This platoon would conduct search and attacks, ambushes, area reconnaissance, area engagements, SWEAT-MS assessments, cordon and knocks on specified targets, and other manuever tasks required in an area of approximately 70 square kilometers

(b)(3)(b)(6) Question 4, Continued: Where did B Co have to accept risk? Who made the risk decision?

It is my assessment as the battalion S3 that the tasks required of B Company could be completed with the combat power available. There was not any risk that B Company had that exceeded that of the rest of the elements of 1-502d

(b)(3)(b)(6) What are the manning and equipment requirements for observation posts during March 06?

(b)(2)High

(b)(3)(b)(6) On an average basis, how often are you able to get out and check your units? During the first half of March, what was the tactical situation vicinity of TCPs 1 and 2? How did this effect your battlefield circulation on checking B Co?

I was able to get off the FOB about once per week, which I rotate between the four companies. Due to the TCP requirements that B Company has and the requirement to constantly improve their defenses, I attempted to visit them two times each month. During the first half of March the battalion was conducting normal offensive operations in zone. Specifically, OPN Glory Light, a battalion operation in Zone 309 from 1-8 MAR 06. The threat at TCP 1 and TCP 2 was not elevated any higher than normal, and was somewhat reduced due to the increased amount of combat power operating to their northwest. At 09 1930 MAR06 B/1-502 reported that TCP 2 received one round of RPG fire. They were able to detain 3 AIF with IED material associated with this incident. This is annotated in the 1-502 DA Form 1594 for 9 MAR 06. By 31 January 06, the 2 BCT Brigade Commander restricted movement on (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High at night due to the IED threat. These are the two primary LOCs to Yusifiyah. This did prevent freedom of manuever at night along the two trafficable routes to Yusifiyah. Other routes are too high risk to get to Yusifiyah at night due to the IED threat. Battlefield circulation was somewhat limited unless I was able to remain in the Yusifiyah Nahia over night to trips conducted during daylight hours. Since the routes have been closed I have spent time there overnight at PB Yusifiyah and PB JSB on five separate occasions when the BN TAC was deployed as part of other offensive operations. During these times I was able to spend time with the platoons located at each of those sights. Other trips have been limited to day trips with the focus on TCP force protection improvement.

(b)(3)(b)(6) Between 5 March and 12 March, how many times did you go to TCP 1 and TCP 2? Did you note any deficiencies or concerns? If so, what guidance did you give to correct them? Do you know if the deficiencies were corrected?

I did not go to TCP 1 or 2 between 5 and 12 March 06. We had a Battalion level offensive operation, OPN Glory Light, from 1-8 March 06. The BN TAC operated from PB JSB during the duration of the operation. Upon completion of the operation, the 1st returned via (b)(2)High but did not stop at TCP 1 or TCP 2.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 23 May 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6) What was your assessment of the Chain of Command within the platoon? What mitigation measures/guidance did you give to try and help reduce the possible leadership capability shortcomings? Were these measures implemented?

The chain of command of the platoon has been ineffective in leading their Soldiers. The platoon leader they had when we deployed, 1LT (b)(3)(b)(6) was killed in action in December, once that occurred the platoon sergeant, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) stopped leading his platoon and enforcing standards we expect of our Soldiers. A new platoon leader, 1LT (b)(3)(b)(6) that the BN CDR assessed as one of more experienced officers, was reassigned from a MiTT team to be the platoon leader in December. The BN CSM replaced the platoon sergeant, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) believe it was in the January timeframe, in an attempt to get the platoon kick started again. This was not effective because the new platoon sergeant, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was not enforcing standards well enough, and after approximately a month the platoon sergeant was replaced. A third platoon sergeant, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was assigned and began making improvements with the platoon and they have improved, but they were not as effective, or capable, as the other two platoons in B/1-502d. While the platoon leadership did enforce some standards, others they did not, and those caused problems with security and force protection. Specific errors that were repeatedly addressed included sector sketches, range cards, proper uniform standards, personal hygiene, and situational awareness. Specified tasks to conduct SWEAT-MS assessments were not understood, with some Soldiers not knowing what SWEAT-MS meant or why it was important. I find this difficult to understand because it is discussed with the company commander at every CUB, targeting meeting, and several times throughout the week. Additionally, the platoon chain of command expressed that they understood SWEAT-MS during previous discussions and SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) had been assigned to 1st Platoon from the BCT S9 Section. These deficiencies showed a lack of discipline and a lack of initiative on the part of the platoon leadership to teach their Soldiers the things that were expected of them. On each occasion that I inspected the platoon I corrected deficiencies, explaining not only what needed to be corrected, but why it was important to correct them in the grand scheme of the Battalion's efforts. I also provided feedback to the company commander on the problems found during these visits. I additionally spent a lot of time listening to their needs and concerns with respect to morale. On one occasion where I stayed overnight, I talked for over four hours with SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) about the platoon's morale and what I thought the leaders needed to do to try and solve their problems. He also requested a Combat Stress Team (CST) visit them on site, which requires special permission through medical channels. We were able to get the necessary authorization, and the CST worked with them for 72 hours on site. I personally went down and picked up the team when they were complete, delivering specially requested items at the same time such as electrical cable for air conditioning and coffee creamer to the Soldiers who needed it. I discussed with the platoon chain of command how they felt after the CST's visit, and they felt as though the platoon was doing a lot better after allowing the Soldiers to talk with CST.

(b)(3)(b)(6) 9. What was the FMC status of B Co's vehicles (OH/FMC) on 12 Mar 06? Was there a significant change in operational readiness status during the previous week? Are there any consistent maintenance issues in B Co and in the BN that have not been resolved?

On 09 March 06, 1/B/1-502 had six vehicles OH/FMC according to the BMO's report at the BN CUB. There were no significant changes in operational readiness, no consistent maintenance issues in B Co or the BN that have not been resolved.

CONTINUED PAGE 5707

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 22 July 06

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

10. Were there any identified weaknesses at TCPs 1 and 2 in terms of Force Protection? If so, what was done to mitigate those weaknesses? For the weaknesses that could not be mitigated, who made the decision to accept the risk?

(b)(2)High

11. (b)(3)(b)(6) Were any requests made to improve the force protection of TCPs 1 and 2? Was this a problem at other sites?

Requests made to improve force protection were made as indicated in question 10.

12. (b)(3)(b)(6) Did you feel that you could refuse the mission due to unacceptable risk?

I have refused missions from the BCT due to unacceptable risk and I believe I created an environment where the company commanders could come to me stating that they felt the risk was too high or unacceptable. I feel this is true because several of the company commanders came to me on multiple occasions to discuss high or unacceptable risk. When they did, we would discuss where they saw the risk, actions to mitigate that risk and we would make changes to the course of action to keep Soldiers safe and minimize risk.

13. (b)(3)(b)(6) What was the Mission Statement for B Co, 1st PLT, TCP 1, and TCP 2? Did you feel that the Soldiers understood their mission?

The missions given to B/1-502d during this period are those shown in question 4. I feel that the Company Commander understood his mission and when I spoke to his subordinates I felt they understood their missions as well.

CONTINUED PAGE 6

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 7 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

DATED

08 June 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

b)(3)(b)(6) do you feel was the command climate of B Co and 1st PLT during the first half of March? What do you feel is the command climate for B Co and 1st PLT now?

At the beginning of March I feel that they felt discouraged due to the losses and wounded Soldiers in their platoon. They were still performing well, completing all of their missions, but I still feel they compromised on standards at that time. From 1-8 March 06 the Battalion TAC operated from the PB JSB during OPN Glory Light. During that period the platoon we were staying with, 3d platoon, conducted their missions well, but we had to make multiple corrections during the first few days until they consistently upheld standards. Additionally, during OPN Glory Light, the B/1-502 Company Commander's RTO was shot in the head when he took his helmet off on the top of a building in an area where the company had been taking small arms fire for several days. This indicated to me that standards were not being taken seriously. I did not have any interaction with 1st platoon during this period. B Company is very dejected right now due to their recent losses and the circumstances around the death of this local national family. Their morale is very low. Initially after the DUSTWUN incident on 16 June 06 1st platoon acted as though they were in denial and that the incident occurred, but it was not their fault, almost as though they were not involved. Since the discovery of the murders of the local national family, the platoon has been removed from duty in the Yusufiyah Naltia. The Battalion Commander and CSM directed they be relieved from duties under B/1-502 command due to their lack of discipline, lack of NCO leadership, and their overall morale. It was the BN Commander's assessment that they could not be trusted to do the right thing because they consistently showed a poor reaction to potentially traumatic events like the loss of Soldiers. I have not had the opportunity to assess the command climate in B Company except for a brief visit immediately following the DUSTWUN incident, that was on the 20th of June. I have not interacted with the company since that date. The company chain of command seems depressed and is having a difficult time handling the tasks required of them, they seem overwhelmed.

b)(3)(b)(6) Who were the leaders in B Co that you did not have confidence in? What if any measures were taken to mitigate the weaknesses that you felt existed in the company and platoon? What weaknesses were not able resolvable and why?

I do not have confidence in CP (b)(3)(b)(6). The BN CDR and I have tried multiple techniques giving very simple tasks, backbriefs on every mission, visiting and ensuring he was properly resourced. We have both spent time with the platoon at the JS Bridec patrol base, and visited them on TCPs. The company commander does not enforce standards, visit his troops, task organize properly to execute his mission, and he is inefficient with his combat power. He is reactive, not proactive, and lacks initiative. He does not listen to his subordinates, and drives them to stop trying because he does not listen. He can not keep accountability of his equipment, and has been surveyed on thousands of dollars worth of government equipment. He is a follower not a leader, and executes tasks well that are specifically spelled out for him. He can not operate based on Commander's intent and a simple task and purpose, he must have an entire course of action dictated. I do not trust him, and I have no confidence in him.

Continued Page 7

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED 29 June 2004

9. STATEMENT (Continued)
Question 15. continued.

With respect to 1/B/1-502, the Battalion Commander directed they be attached to HHC/1-502. This attachment reduces the risks that they are exposed to while they train on discipline and enforcing standards. They are currently part of the guard force on FOB MMD(N). They are able to receive sufficient rest each day, at least 8 hours is available each day without an assigned duty. Additionally they have access to the CST as they need it. The HHC Commander is developing a training plan to increase discipline, structure, troop management and morale. This plan will help the platoon increase their discipline and structure their schedule more until their leaders show the platoon has improved sufficiently to return to duty in Yusifiyah. This will be supervised by the HHC Company Commander and First Sergeant, me, the BN CSM, and the BN CDR.

16. (b)(3)(b)(6) What did you think was the B Co Soldiers' attitude towards their mission in the first half of March?

I did not have any interaction with 1st platoon during this period. I think they perceived themselves as working harder than the rest of the Battalion. Since they were the only company on their patrol base, they had very little interaction with the rest of the battalion from which to form this opinion.

Nothing further
End of statement
(b)(3)(b)(6)
(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION PB Yusifiyah, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2006/07/08	3. TIME 1500	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	5. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS CPT/O3E	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Co, 1-502 INF REGT, 101st ABN DIV (ASLT), Yusifiyah, Iraq

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

At this time I have been in command of B Co for 14 months, 10 months deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. Since we have arrived in Yusifiyah, B Co has operated a platoon patrol base at the JSB, one platoon has operated TCPs along (b)(2)High and one platoon has conducted operations from PB Yusifiyah.

The requirement of the platoon at the JSB has been to place one platoon there in order to conduct security, both at the JSB, the AVLB and TCP 4. They also conduct patrols in Caraguli Village area and the village to the south. They also have conducted CMO assessments in the area.

Since we have been in Yusifiyah we have increased TCPs from 4 to 6, 4 of which have been manned by one platoon at varying degrees of manpower. While these TCPs are defensive in nature, we have been able to conduct dismounted patrols from the TCPs. Dismounted patrols were conducted in Mulla Fayad, Jassim Village and the al Thobat neighborhood. These patrols were tasked by both Battalion and myself. By conducting these operations we have been able to disrupt AIF forces in zone and have increased the security as well. This has allowed for CMO projects to begin and start conducting Council meetings in both Mulla Fayad and Yusifiyah.

The platoon that is not forward is responsible for conducting Convoy Security operations, company QRF, detainee operations, FOB Security, dismounted and mounted patrols in Yusifiyah, al Taraq, Rushdi Mulla, Jassim Village, Caraguli Village, as well as mosque assessments, CMO assessments, City census, refit operations, Aircraft recovery and other operations that are on order. The platoon at PB Yusifiyah is busier than the other two platoons and usually on continual stand by.

When I first established the TCPs we only had TCP1. This was manned by a squad plus. Within weeks we conducted a deliberate Route Clearance of (b)(2)High and emplaced TCPs 2, 3 and 4. The task and purpose of these TCPs was to secure a LOC along (b)(2)High to allow movement to the JSB and disrupt AIF movement along the route. We began building the TCPs with wire and barriers as well as HESCOs and other force protection measures. For the duration of these TCPs I have continued to ensure that the platoons improve these sites as they can. I have had an almost endless request for Class 4 material in and as it comes in we emplace it and usually need more. This is understandable based on the Battalion and Brigade AOs. We have conducted operations to clear the vegetation along the route to improve observation and fields of fire, but this is a continuous process. Based on the OPTEMPO we are always one step behind.

Guidance that I have given was that depending on the TCP there should be no less than 3 Soldiers on security and when possible 1 HMMWV. I allowed the platoons to devise how they managed the TCP within that guidance. In doing so I have assumed risk, but the intent was to continually change how we were set to confuse the enemy. Due to manpower constraints (WIA, KIA, EML, Emergency leave, etc.) my platoons have averaged 24 pax, but have adapted and accomplished many missions. The main mission being to disrupt AIF in zone, and we have done that.

Overall set on the TCPs was generally 1 squad and platoon headquarters and 2 trucks at TCP1, TCP2 was manned with 1 squad and 2 trucks, TCP3, now owned by IAs, was manned by 1 squad and 2 trucks with the PSG there. As we began to expand and create more TCPs, 5 and 6, we have adjusted that set. TCP 5 was then manned by 1 squad, 2 trucks and the PSG moved to that site. TCP6 was established from TCP2, 2 trucks and 1 squad. When we reestablished TCP2, the intent was to leave TCP6 as an OP only to observe IED emplacements between TCP 2 and 3. However, once the HESCOs were emplaced it became a static TCP(6). combined 2 and 6 were manned by 1 squad and 2 trucks.

Once all TCPs (1,2,5 and 6) were established and TCP3 was turned over to IA control, one platoon could man all 4 TCPs and still conduct local patrols. The set was generally the same, TCP1 and 5 were 1 squad plus with 2 trucks and 1 squad would man TCPs 2 and 6. There were no less than 4 pax at TCP2 or 6 with at least 1 truck on both. The platoons only had 6 trucks at this point and could only man 1 truck on 2 and 6 and 2 trucks on 1 and 5. Depending on the platoon the number of personnel on TCP 2 and 6 would vary. 1st platoon put more pax on TCP2 than 6 and 3d platoon put more on 6 than 2, but they met my guidance of no less than 3. Both 2d and 3rd platoons conducted numerous operations from the TCPs into areas west of Mulla Fayad, Mulla Fayad and Jassim Village. 2d platoon focused more on Mulla Fayad and the al Thobat neighborhood, while 1st focused on Mulla Fayad with some patrols to the west of Mulla Fayad.

10. EXHIBIT D	11. INITIALS (b)(3)(b)(6)	MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT PB Yusifiyah DATED 2006/07/08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

I personally would go visit the TCPs about once a week to talk to my Soldiers, see what they were doing and what they knew as well. I would also see what improvements needed to be made and let the appropriate leaders know that they need to improve something. The biggest issues were the continuous force protection improvements, Range cards and Sector sketches. I also need to notify the leadership of uniform corrections, guys not wearing all of the gear, kevlar off, etc. I failed to always right down the correction, and would miss some items, such as signs and employment of certain optical systems from time to time. But I have informed the leadership of what needed to be fixed.

Since February, 1st platoon in general has made improvements on standards and discipline that were missing prior. While L (b)(3)(b)(6) was on EML, the platoon spent 22 days on the TCPs and had great success in Mulla Fayad conducting 3 council meetings which had never been done since 2005.

During the time they were on the TCPs, there was resistance to the PSG, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) because he was pushing the standards and discipline and this was something the platoon was not used to. With these changes came the resistance and a lower morale and esprit de corps within the platoon, but they were able to overcome the changes and by mid March there was a obvious improvement from where they were when SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) came on board. During this period of late February to mid March, the platoon was down several key leaders, the PL, a SL. Also because the platoon and I had an agreement that they could stay on the TCPs for an extended duration, I allowed SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) to bring personnel back to shower and refit and grab resupplies for the TCPs almost daily. What I failed to realize was the lack of personnel that he would bring back to the PB and leave at the TCPs. During the resupply trips to the PB, the TCPs would be minimally manned or in one case undermanned, sometimes leaving a new squad leader in charge of a couple of Team leaders.

In late March, we began to conduct 72-96 hours missions in Rushdi Mulla. The rotations for the platoons then became 4 days in Rushdi Mulla, refit and then RIP the TCPs. The platoon on the TCPs would then come back to the PB, refit, conduct TLPs and then move to Rushdi Mulla for 4 days. This went on for some time. Then in May, the Battalion built a PB in Rushdi Mulla, with A Co and C Co relieving my platoon and then my platoon would relieve them. It generally ran a platoon of B Co then C Co, then B Co, then A Co, then B Co. This went on for over a month and took a toll on my platoons.

Prior to this occurring I had begun to focus operations away from Yusifiyah and focus more on Rushdi Mulla. At which point I asked MA (b)(3)(b)(6) if I could have another platoon to operate in Yusifiyah based on AIF activity in the city, that I could not affect. I was declined and told that the Battalion was not able. Once we established the patrol base in Rushdi Mulla I again asked MA (b)(3)(b)(6) if a platoon to work in the Yusifiyah area and assist with my platoon rotations. My company was getting no break from operations. I was told once again that there was no platoon available and asked if I was trying to take control of another company. To which I replied that the company commander could come down as well, but I needed the additional combat power.

Prior to the incident at the AVLB, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) had requested more Soldiers to assist with his missions. I told him that I did not have them and that I had requested them from Battalion and been denied. I told him that for whatever reason, he had the same responsibilities as the other platoons and they were capable of managing the tasks. I had no combat power available to give him. Were there thing that could have been managed differently at the company and platoon level. Yes. That also goes for Battalion and higher. It is my belief that there is a disconnect between my company and the Battalion. I know for a fact that I have sent information to Battalion that never gets to the people it needs to. This goes for radio traffic, general information, personnel actions and intelligence. Now I will admit that my company, to include me, is not perfect, and I will never say that higher has not supported me, but when I work in a zero defect environment and the environment itself has defects there is a double standard that is visible. I have been scolded because information that I provided was either not given to the people who needed it, misunderstood or just wrong when given to the people who need it. Case in point. 1. SQB (b)(3)(b)(6) informed LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) that there was 1 medical clinic and a dental clinic in Mulla Fayad, with several places to buy drugs. This was then thrown in my face when asked how many clinics there were and I replied with 1. Then I was told that I have no idea what is going on in my AO. 2. I have personally sent radio traffic to Battalion that has been lost or not logged. I have also gone through the Indirect fire process that we were engaging LNs without cause, when my PL caught the AIF firing mortars from within the flock of sheep. This was never passed to Brigade, although I had notified personnel in the BN TOC and other staff. 3. I have had my HQs submit numerous articles of paperwork to be process in S1, only to have them shred it or lose it, and blame us that there was no DA 200. when there was and the individual acknowledges his signature. 4. I requested additional combat power and have been denied 3 times. The first time I requested a platoon I was laughed at and told no. The second time, I more thoroughly explained the situation and was told no, that the BN could not support it. The third time I was asked what I felt that I needed to assist. I requested 2 squad and was told I could have 1. I understand and see where the combat power is within the Battalion and know that the Battalion is undermanned, but the perception is that I am all screwed up and the Battalion is perfect.

Currently Battalion is dictating my mission schedule, number of personnel used for what tasks and when and how we move. The current TCP situation has taken away 50% of my maneuver element and forced me to do even more with the platoon that is at the PB. In addition to all the missions and tasks that I stated above they are now responsible for the patrols in the remainder of my AO to include Mulla Fayad, Jassim Village and the al Thobat neighborhood. These patrols were conducted by the platoon on TCP, but they can no longer do that because they must be manned by no less than 8 personnel. I was able to disrupt the enemy very successfully this way, but that is no longer feasible. While my AO has shrunk, my responsibilities have not been reduced, just changed.

There have been lapses in standards and discipline within B Co. I acknowledge them and have spent 9 months correcting them and improving the TCPs and trying to follow ALL of higher's guidance, which at times is vague or contradictory, but I move forward and do not complain. I know what has to get done and will SUPPORT the Division, Brigade and Battalion 100% of the time. But higher needs to listen to the guys on the ground as well.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 7 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT PB Yusifiyah

DATED 2006/07/08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The Current Operating Environment has now allowed for me to operate in a smaller AO and focus my efforts. Up until this point that has not been possible. My compan has not had the luxury of being in one place to consolidate and train. We started a "marathon" i October and have been running 4 minute miles for 20 of the 26 miles. We have made mistakes and tried to adjust accordingly, but most importantly have accomplished every mission we have been given and continue to make progress and disrupt the enemy. In closing, there should have been more precise guidance given to the platoons as to manning of the TCPs. I should have been more situationally aware of manpower at the TCPs that I was. I addressed uniform issues as they arose, and notified the platoon leadership when they were wrong. However, as far as manning, I do not understand why 1 platoon out of 3 could not manage the reltive same number of personnel with no more burdens paced on them. 1st platoon was also given specific guidance to manage all TCPs, OPs and static positions with no less than 4 pax per vehicle or position. This was put out in a weekly Company CUB and acknowledged by all personnel in attendance.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF REWARD OR PUNISHMENT, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAW

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATE

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1993 (SSA)
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Yusifiah, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2006/07/08	3. TIME 1540	4. FILE NUMBER
(b)(3)(b)(6)	E NAME	5. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS O-3

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B CO 1-502D IN REGT. 101ST ABN DIV (AA) APO AE 09398

9. (b)(3)(b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

1. Force Protection. The process to improve the force protection assets in place at PB Yusifiah, the JSB, and the TCPs on (b)(2)High has been a continual fight throughout the deployment. It is a mission that is on-going concurrent with an extremely heavy op tempo and requires many additional assets beyond both the company and battalion's capabilities. As we initially developed both PB Yusifiah and the JSB during the early months of the deployment, the engineer assets were not available. The Soldiers of B Co put in many long, hard hours of filling sandbags, pounding pickets, stringing wire, moving barriers, and filling hescos as well as taking steps to meet many other basic force protection measures. As the fight ramped up and B Co began to take control of areas previously uncontrolled by coalition forces, we began to incur further force protection requirements in the form of permanent TCPs in place on (b)(2)High so as to maintain control of this vital route. Engineer assets were cut to B Co to assist with these tasks such as Hesco filling, barrier emplacement, and reed reduction for clearer observation and fields of fire but oftentimes could not remain long enough to complete all the tasks due to other missions from Brigade, leaving the Soldiers of Bravo Company to finish the job. After the fire in February, force protection focus shifted back to PB Yusifiah and the construction of fortified living conditions for Bravo Company on PB Yusifiah. Engineer assets were given to us for a month to rebuild the LSA on PB Yusifiah, as well as to move tall walls and fill hescos to mitigate potential mortar damage to the new LSA, motor pool, and Company Headquarters. The constantly evolving force protection fight is just one of the many missions Bravo Company has conducted concurrently with all other combat operations in an extremely dangerous area of Iraq. It is by nature slow going, with so much to do and the constant rise of new areas to fortify (JSB, TCPs, PB Yusifiah post fire), and cannot be completed in one shotgun blast effort because of the op tempo for the platoons in Bravo Company.

2. Operational Tempo, Tasks, and Combat Power. Yusifiah is a dangerous sector and B Co has been necessarily stretched all the way across it in an effort to maintain better control of the area as well as to disrupt AIF movement in sector. In the beginning of the deployment, one platoon manned the JSB for 3 weeks and two platoons remained on PB Yusifiah to conduct missions. Following the destruction of a vehicle by IED on (b)(2)High, the commander decided to establish a permanent TCP on (b)(2)High to control the intersection and mitigate the IED risk on a critical route of resupply to the JSB. Over the course of the next couple months, more TCPs were added as they became needed to control the route. This changed the tasking to 1 platoon manning the JSB, one platoon manning the TCPs, and one platoon at the PB to conduct missions in sector from here. Following an operation in early March into Rushdi Mulla, an insurgent safe-haven 7 km from the FOB, the decision was made to increase the presence in Rushdi Mulla, and B Co was tasked routinely with sending a platoon out to the town for several days to search for insurgents. This evolved into manning a permanent patrol base in Rushdi Mulla on a rotational basis with other platoons in the battalion, and meant that in essence a platoon from B Co would go from spending four days at the TCPs into the PB to refit for 24 hours before going to Rushdi Mulla where they would stay for 3 days, then return to refit for 24 hours before returning to the TCPs. This heavy schedule left little time for platoons to conduct proper PMCS, administrative issues, and proper refit while still giving their Soldiers some semblance of down time which in this kind of environment is absolutely essential to morale and welfare. Even during the platoons 34 hour refit period, the company normally received last minute "hey you" missions to take photographs of CMO projects, conduct crater analysis or IED cordon patrols, and convoy security missions to MMD N in order to transport either the ISG or CDR to the weekly CUBs. Ultimately, the schedule was wearing on the Soldiers and the platoon leadership as they went from one task to the next at such a rapid pace. While all three of the platoons were out in sector, there were still tasks to be completed back in Yusifiah itself. Without maneuverable combat power of its own, B Co had to rely heavily on the MiTT element collocated at PB Yusifiah, detracting from the important mission of training and equipping a substandard Iraqi Battalion.

3. Relationship with Battalion. I would characterize the relationship with Battalion as strained at best. I see the looks on my commander and ISGs faces when they come back from weekly CUBs. As the Company XO, I am the confidant of both individuals and they vent their frustrations to me when it is more than either can bear. Both are strong, capable leaders who have a wealth of experience, knowledge, and dedication to the mission. Yet they are routinely berated and belittled and made to feel as if they are

10. EXHIBIT E	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

more or less worthless in the eyes of their leaders. They work hard from sun up to long past sundown, planning, resourcing, leading, and do a lot of things that the leaders up at Battalion Headquarters never even see. No matter what they do, it is not good enough. They express their concerns over manpower and numerous tasks on a given day and they are shot down as bad managers of resources and ineffective leaders. A Soldier is caught out of uniform and the 1SG is automatically the worst 1SG in the history of the Army and has no conception of what standards are. In reality, coming from a guy who has watched the actions of both men day in and day out through the most trying circumstances--they are effective leaders who have been dealt a difficult situation in Yusifiah, have a FOB to run, as well as the dispersion of forces across numerous static positions in sector, and do it to the best of their, and anyone else's, ability. What they need in such a difficult situation, what Bravo Company needs, is a Battalion Headquarters that listens, that attempts to understand the nature of the fight down here through the eyes of the Bulldogs, and doesn't automatically and systematically dismiss the Commander's concerns and First Sergeant's tremendous efforts as trivial and unimportant.

The Company as a whole feels the strain of the relationship as well. These Soldiers give 110 percent and they feel the guidance roll downhill as new things continually pop up--like the front gate all of the sudden being sub-standard in month 7, or being told they can't roll their sleeves or untuck their pantslegs even though they spend 12 hours a day in 110 degree weather pulling security at a TCP, only to be able to "rest" inside an even hotter building when not on guard. It causes strain and the ever-changing guidance and last minute missions combined with seeing the effect numerous very negative, very directive counselings take on their leaders has caused many of them, particularly in the ranks of the Senior NCOs, to lose faith in this battalion. I cannot recall the last time a command climate survey was conducted in this battalion, and I believe one needs to be conducted in order to flesh out these issues across the board and allow for subordinate leaders not just in Bravo Company but throughout the battalion to communicate their concerns in an open forum.

Nothing Follows

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF _____ MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF _____

TAKEN AT _____

DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing Follows

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing Follows

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6) _____
(Signature)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me; a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of the form, see AR 150-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPB

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 2011; Title 5 USC Section 2061; E.O. 9397 dated November 72, 1943 *ISSN*.
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disc. copies of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FOB MAHMADIYAH, IRAQ, APO AE 09398	2. DATE 2006/07/07	3. TIME 1600 hrs.	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E-7, SFC	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC, 1-502D, 2BCT, 101ST IAAJ, APO AE 09398

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text TCP 1 the average person with out aids from optics can see the shape of soldiers, and vehicles; with the aid of optics such as binos he can see faces of soldiers and distinct shape such as type of gun mounted on vehicles at TCP 2. Troop to Task requirements as I recall for 12 March 06 for the entire B Company were as follows: 1 Platoon the ISB compound and TCP 4. Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text Platoon rest, refit, recovery, PB Yusufiyah guard, and any patrols out in sector for that day. This is the set for the line all CS elements conduct maintenance, cook chow, provide medical support, provide purified water to the PB. The MCTT element daily taskings were to check up on their 13 IA checkpoints with the majority being on (b)(3) and 2 on (b)(2) High IA 45 B3. As I recall there were no risk acceptance taken that day because all vehicles were present, and all missions started

Unreadable Text

Tactical Situation around TCP 1 and 2 was AIF IED emplacements, some small arms engagements on normally TCP 1, and the smuggling of weapons or IED making material in and around the TCP's. Both TCP's were doing a great job in finding the IED's before they would hit CF. TCP 1 sustained no friendly casualties from small arms fire, and AIF chose different routes

Unreadable Text

protection, and the need to keep improving position. All findings were explained by me to the Soldier, the First Line Supervisor, and a consolidated list to the Platoon Sergeant or PL. Improvements to the TCP's such as barriers, support from the CEE, and

Unreadable Text

10. EXHIBIT **F**

11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADINGS "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED, IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Mahmadiyah DATED 20/06/07/07

Unreadable Text

to that in November SSG(b)(3)(b)(6) 2nd Sqd Ldr, and SG(b)(3)(b)(6) Team Leader were killed at TCP 2 by a Local National with a hand gun - both shot in the head, both out of uniform, and the Local National shot and killed by PVT(b)(3)(b)(6) the M240B Gunner that day on that TCP. SSG(b)(3)(b)(6) and was B Company because he

Unreadable Text Unreadable Text Unreadable Text

concerned to maintenance of vehicles in B Company I can say that we did not get an adequate opportunity to ever conduct a full days maintenance on every vehicle every week. We were a busy Company always using our trucks daily, the operators for the most part did conduct daily PMCS, but it was rare for a vehicle just to sit idle back on the PB. We did not get that chance until shortly before I left sometime in April 06 when the S-3 slowed down the taskings, and the BN XO and Maintenance forced the

Unreadable Text

adding fighting positions using e-tools and sandbags their hands and it was very taxing adding to the already cases a lack of understanding basic Infantry Skills. In my head, I always knew I could go to the CSMP and DC and tell them something. Sometimes I was told to drive on the best I could, but was always given advice on how to accomplish the task. The

Unreadable Text

as they did their best to do everything they could for us- sometimes even came in the form a need boot in the ass when our performance was sub-standard. I have the utmost respect for CSM(b)(3)(b)(6) and LTC(b)(3)(b)(6) am sure they asked higher for a lot.

Unreadable Text

BY CONDUCT OPERATIONS TAKES RECON POSITION IN AQ BULLDOG IN ORDER TO DISRUPT AIF ACTIVITY

Unreadable Text

enemy wanted to kill us. We would do almost anything for a fellow Bulldog, and we did about us because if they wanted to bitch about something about us (B Company) than they could take their asses down here and do it with us, other than that quit your bitching. From my perspective this is quite true throughout this theater

Unreadable Text

then your opinion does not mean much- If your here to help then your one of us, if not get lost because I don't have the patience for the time to deal with your crap. It is hard to hide how others leave what you don't have from your men- they can read the news paper, they have friends on other camps, and they see it on T.V. The only thing you can tell them is do your job to standard, be proud of what you do, and most importantly be right there with them when it sucks- That is why the men, I believe, did everything I told them. That sums up the culture of Bravo Company to the best of my ability to put the feeling in writing. I have already explained who and what I did about the leaders I did not think should have been leading earlier in this statement, nothing else follows about that. I think, I know, the men of Bravo Company exist then in March and now for one thing, and one thing only- each other. They can and will do any mission you put in front of them. They have taken ridiculously dangerous missions and executed them often times with out injury. I never returned back from the hospital due to

Unreadable Text

as the way they started, proud to be a BULLDOG, and capable of completing the mission they best way they can, no matter what.

END OF STATEMENT. (b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

FOB Mahmadiyab

DATED

2006/07/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3)(b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____

at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 304; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSM).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <i>Yusubiyah, Iraq</i>	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) <i>20060708</i>	3. TIME <i>1415 hrs</i>	4. FILE NUMBER
6. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS <i>BCC, 1-502D IN REGT</i>			7. GRADE/STATUS <i>E8/1SG</i>

8. I, *(b)(3)(b)(6)*, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Concerning the leadership of BCC, 1-502D IN my assessment is as follows: From the beginning we were told that we were running a marathon. However we have been spending the whole time. I know that Cpt *(b)(3)(b)(6)* Unreadable Text numerous occasions but was denied. Company commanders within the Battalion have directed me and confirmed this. The repercussion that came out of this was that we did not know how to manage our people. This may have been true in some circumstances, however I feel that the Battalion's tries to manage in a desk rather than out there when the *(b)(3)(b)(6)* Battalion looks at us they always see how we can be minimally manned using "economy of force". By minimally manning each and every position during sustained operations it only degrades the Soldier over time and sets a unit up for failure in the long run. For example, TCP 2 started out as a squad position and over time it went from nine to four personnel. There was never a minimum requirement and it was usually manned between two to four Soldiers depending upon what platoon was manning it and the perceived threat. Recently prior to the MHO P requirements Battalion did direct that TCP 2 be a four man position. I feel that the enemy has watched us over the course of time and only exploited our minimum manning to their advantage.

Now with the TCPs being such a huge focal point we have had to back peddle to get them up to standard. I do not understand why the TCPs were not given the attention and engineer support back in mid to late November. They have been driven by and visited by numerous levels of the chain of command and have changed very little since their inception. Now only have they become our focus. Unreadable Text that we should have taken 3 weeks to set up our defenses prior to conducting a full offensive operations we would not be in this. Unreadable Text Now I do not have Soldiers filling four and seven foot Hesco's Unreadable Text them positions up to standard because TCPs are the focus this week. Unreadable Text effort put forth by 3 living Soldiers because of "knee jerk" Unreadable Text go to show that they pay for others mistakes. I do believe that we could have improvised or crew served positions and wire throughout this time frame, but what the

10. EXHIBIT <i>G</i>	11. UNIT <i>(b)(3)(b)(6)</i>	12. TAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <i>3</i> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)


positions really need are the large reserves to protect from IEDs. These will allow the Soldiers to operate out of sound defensible positions.

Unreadable Text leader problems. For a reason that I have not been able to figure out, the platoon has not united as one. Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

believe that he can recover. The amount of adversity that the platoon has been through has caused some (b)(3)(b)(6) SER (b)(3)(b)(6) SER (b)(3)(b)(6) to rise to (b)(3)(b)(6) and others to become apathetic. I feel that many 1st platoon did not back into the fight, but the platoon needs a truly Unreadable Text takeover. This especially goes with the decentralized operations that we execute. The Soldiers of the platoon deserve energetic well disciplined leaders at all levels. I would only hope that if the platoon is sent back with new leadership it could get at least a week to train before being committed to the fight. I hope that my input would be taken into account as I do know the Soldiers.

END OF STATEMENT



INITIALS OF STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

07 JUL 06
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Signature

(b)(3)(b)(6) 1 Lt
Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Social Security Number

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proposing agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2051; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB Mahmudiya
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006/07/07
3. TIME: 1330
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: O-2/PL

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B co 1-502 2 BCT 101st AA

9. (b)(3)(b)(6) WANTS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was assigned to B-co on Jan 1 2006. Prior to that I was assigned to 2nd platoon Charlie Company 1-502, from March 18 to September 24. I went to both JRTC and NTC rotations. In September I was assigned to a MITT team in Lutfiya for 1 BN IA's. In January I was called into BN to take over 1st platoon Bravo after their PL and RTO were killed. Their 1stSG and a TL were killed about 2 weeks prior to that. BN felt that there was a lack of leadership, discipline, and Unreadable Text. 1stSG SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was sent a few days prior. I was briefed by the BN XO Maj (b)(3)(b)(6) and the BC LTC (b)(3)(b)(6). They all raised their issues about the platoon and gave me guidance on how to fix the discipline problem and get them back on their feet. Unreadable Text of command and Unreadable Text accomplish the mission and did not want to stop. Not one soldier felt sorry for themselves but had issues on what we were doing here in Iraq and is it all worth it. In regards to SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) he was not a competent leader and bought into too much of the complaining of the platoon and failed to perform his PS (b)(3)(b)(6) and worried too much what people thought of the platoon. He couldn't handle the personalities and focused too much on tactical issues that were of my concern. He was moved out of the platoon and SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) replaced him on or about 5 Feb 2006. Immediately myself and (b)(3)(b)(6) Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text The platoon had loose standards on certain things and immediately that was changed. Unreadable Text allowed to sleep in. Instead vehicles were pines'd, counseling was done, soldiers confirmed their zeroes on their weapons, open discussions about ROE and our task and purpose in Iraq were discussed heavily no matter what time of the day. Often I would stay up with a soldier who didn't understand something that was going on in Iraq and I would help clarify what it meant to him until he understood it. ROE was always discussed and respecting the Iraqi culture and how if you disrespect it you may have just created an insurgent. In regards to maintenance, after the fire of 5 Feb, we worked hard on filling out 2404 and 5988's in order to insure parts were ordered for trucks and mechanics knew what was wrong. SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) even checked to make sure our parts were on order. Making sure we had accountability of everything was a big issue after the fire. The events of the fire did not effect the platoon as most would think. The soldiers were upset about personal affects burning up but the soldiers never quit and knew the army would take care of them. In fact we did not even pause with our missions even when the FOB was burning down. Morale was increasing in the platoon and soldiers were very aware of the uniform standards while out on mission. SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) and his TL were killed because they did not have the helmets on while conducting personal hygiene in the open. The soldiers always remembered that incident and never violated that policy. When soldiers tried to loosen the standard like undo a chin strap their sergeants were very quick to correct them. In regards to the questions on the sheet here are the following answers. For all the following questions it should be noted that I was on leave at the time from 22Feb06 till on or about 19Mar06 (b)(3)(b)(6)

1. What were the manning and equipment requirements at TCP 1 and TCP 2 on Mar 12? (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

2. Were the manning and equipment requirements at TCP 1 and 2 IAW with the BN and co SOP FRAGO or command guidance? If not, why and what actions were taken to mitigate the difference in manning and equipment. Exactly who was at TCP (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT: H
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ DATED _____
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

Ft. Belvoir, Ariz.

DATE

27 Dec 06

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

I was the only PL in the company the others had been killed or wounded. To answer who exactly was at TCP 2 on that day I do not know I was on leave. As part of another investigation I know SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) and SP6 (b)(3)(b)(6) were there. SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) may have been a SPC promotable at the time. He was promoted in March but I do not remember the date. As for the standard for manning the TCP's I went in accordance with the CO guidance and from what the other platoons had been doing because I was new to sector. The overall assessment was 6 plus 1 truck; 2 trucks if available. It did change some times especially if IED's were being put in certain areas. Like TCP 5 may get more men than usual because more IED's were being put in and more OP's were necessary. I never saw a written standard for the BN on TCP's I went in accordance with the Captain Goodwin's guidance. Every time I went out I double checked his guidance and checked with the platoon on duty on how they were manning the TCP's and to make sure BN had not made any changes. If IA support was available often you could plus up other TCP's in order to patrol (b)(3)(b)(6)

3. Was anyone at the TCP responsible for observing top 2? What is expected of the soldier observing TCP 2? What can the Soldier actually see of TCP2 from TCP 1? The rooftop guard of TCP 1 has optics, thermal sight, and binos to observe down to TCP 2 and can make out the position, the HESCO's, and the truck position. Unreadable Text

The rooftop guard at TCP 1 can also see down to the intersection of Mulla Fayad highway and Sportster. There is always a rooftop guard on duty to watch (b)(2)High and have eyes on TCP 2. The soldier is not expected to fully observe TCP 2 especially at night because thermals have limited range but they are fully expected to watch RTE Sportster and keep watch for IED emplacements. (b)(3)(b)(6)

4. What was B Co's troop to task requirements on 12 MAR? How many TCP's, FOB security requirements, QRF, OP's or any other requirements did B Co have? Where did B Co have to accept risk? Who made the risk decision? Again I was on leave. Usually there are 5 TCP's, the AVLB OP, FOB security, the JSB and other missions. Usually the only QRF you have available is from yourself or maybe 1-2 squads from another platoon provided they are on the FOB or available to push out from the JSB. All in All all the platoons are tasked out and have to support each other there is no extra reserve. All other available people have other jobs like mechanics, cooks, RTO's. This was a big concern for the company and I raised it on several occasions on where a QRF would come from. Often times the CO made the risk decision but he even reported to BN that he needed more assets than he had as a platoon and it went on unanswered. On several occasions BN would call down for a mission and no assets were available but we went told to "go get after it" and we would have to strip down positions to minimal manning at an unacceptable risk in order to accomplish a mission for BN. B Co as far as I am concerned accepts risk at every position and every piece of ground it owns. It has always been undermanned since I've been there. The issue has always been brought up especially since FtB when we started patrolling Rushdi Mulla because it left little assets back on the FOB. The issue was brought up to the CO from all the platoons and he in turn brought it up to BN. The sector has had well over the most amount of Sig Acts in the BN sector, to include mortar attacks, rockets, RPG's, SAF, IED's, not to mention VCIED's and VBIED's. (b)(3)(b)(6)

5. On an Average basis, how often are you able to check your units? During the the first half of March, what was the tactical situation vicinity of TCP's 1 and 2 How did this effect you battiefied circulation on checking B Co? I was on leave and cannot answer this question. From what I can gather and recollect as to what I was told was that it had been fairly quiet at the TCP's. There was one instance when insurgents tried to sneak up on TCP 2 and SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) managed to engage and kill probably 2 of them due to the amount of water left after the engagement. SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) broke contact with his men because they were a perimeter OP and

Unreadable Text

concerns were AAR's are big with me too after each rotation that way we can work on and improve our situation whether it was a formal AAR or informal. The schedule for me to check TCP's was in conjunction with pre planned missions. Due to the high risk of IED's it was not practical to send a convoy specifically to check TCP's. The issue of getting the manpower and enough trucks to make a sufficient convoy was an issue in itself. So the plan to check the TCP's would be with pre planned missions of route back to the FOB and were done in conjunction with that. Also when the soldiers came to TCP 1 to change out batteries after IED sweeps I would talk to the soldiers about their TCP and their concerns. So checking the TCP's were all METT-TC dependent (b)(3)(b)(6)

6. Between 5 Mar to 12 Mar, how many times did you go to top 1 and top 2? Did you note any deficiencies or concerns? Did you raise any of your concerns to higher? What action was taken to correct those deficiencies that you could not fix at your level? I was on leave at the time. During other TCP rotations we would raise our concerns often it was requesting engineers for HESCO filling. The only other deficiencies were uniform corrections which were uncommon but did happen on occasion like a chin strap undone. All concerns were brought to the CO but there were usually not many often it was just manpower in order to conduct patrolling (b)(3)(b)(6)

7. What was your assessment of the Chain of Command within the platoon/ squad? What mitigation measures, guidance did you give to try and help reduce the possible leadership capability shortcomings? Were these measures implemented? The Chain of Command within in the platoon was as follows: The SL's are very good and very competent. The PL's are very young and

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB Al-Badr DATED 12/20/06

Unreadable Text

...DC and most had just been promoted and a sergeant for
We often PL PSGI talked to the TL and taught them the

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Even the SPC's were capable of fulfilling a SGT's role and often times they and one or two
casualties. As I stated prior the platoon had a problem with individual personalities always thinking they were right or quick to
throw their opinion into the matter. These individuals were moved through out the platoon. TL's were all reassigned and one was
fired. This helped mitigate the individual personalities and brought everyone back in line with the chain of command. TL's all showed
signs of improvement and have continued to develop

8. What was the FMC status of B co's vehicles on 12 MAR? Was there a significant change in operational readiness status during
the previous week. Are there any consistent maintenance issues in B co and in the BN that have not been resolved? I was not letter
and do not recall. As for maintenance issues there are a few. First while at the TCP's you cannot do maintenance Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

you can do some maintenance. You are limited to the supplies you have on hand. So if a
you need to bring back the FOB. Once there SSG (3), (b)(6) and his crew did everything they could
to fix the trucks. Taking mechanics to the TCP's was not possible. It is too dangerous to work on a truck at TCP with civilians
walking by and cars passing through. The TCP's constantly get attacked and it is not a safe environment work. Also the
mechanics worked non stop on the vehicles on the FOB of the platoon that was on mission and FOB duty. Often if we came to BN
we could have the mechanics work on them at BN. The issue is that we are constantly on mission on often there is not time to
work on the trucks and they are all on mission. If time allowed obviously they were looked at and worked on. It is hard though
when in some months you would spend less than one week on the FOB. Overall due to mission necessity and the operational tempo
it was very difficult to put off a mission in order to get all the trucks repaired and fixed. Also the number of IED's that damaged
vehicles was an issue for the trucks whether it was damaged by the shrapnel or the overall concussion. Electrical, AC, fluid leaks,
and transmission problems were very common (3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High

10. Were any requests made to improve force protection of tops 1 and 2? Was this a problem at other sites? Yes, prior to my
arrival to B co there were no TCP's they built them themselves. Due to the fact I came Unreadable Text
was unaware of initial steps for force protection but engineers have come out to fill in
wired the sites themselves. This was an issue at all the sites upon Bravo company taking over the sectors so I am told.
Improvement Unreadable Text
and mission (3)(b)(6)

11. Did you feel that you could refuse the mission due to unacceptable risk? NO. There have been instances of manpower
shortages but it was not allowed to not do the mission somebody had to do it. Sometimes yes it would be given to a different unit
or platoon within a company mission. Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

you just have to do that's understood. Even the company would often come down with mission
my concerns and stated the facts about the issue and if I was told to do it anyway I would do it. BN
sample was back in May. There was a target site of TCP 5 that was heard to be in a house in June.
The information was to kill or capture the individual and that he was very dangerous and a high priority target. All I could muster
were 10 bodies to move 1 km outside of the TCP 5 into fields known to IED's, indirect fire, and snipers Unreadable Text
importance I couldn't effectively cordon the site nor have a reserve. The TCP's would have to be manning
houses at an unnecessary risk and BN still wanted us to do it with no ORF available. Another example of a not being able to refuse
mission was back Unreadable Text Charlie company had to due a crater analysis of a mortar round. Charlie said
it wasn't worth it because the round was launched at approximately 6000m to the best of my knowledge so it was guaranteed to be
120 mortar or higher. All their line platoons were out on mission and there were few soldiers left. The other point was that it
impacted nearly 2 km outside the FOB on one of the most heavily IED emplaced roads in Lutiffiya. (b)(2)High This was back in
NOV/DEC. (b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

F2B Alibon 1/2/06

DATED

6/7/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

12. What was the mission statement for B co 1 plt tcp 1 and tcp 2? Did you feel that the soldiers understood the mission? The mission statement would best be described as: First platoon Bravo company, occupies TCP's cloud (b)(3)(b)(6) in order to deter AIE forces from emplacing IED's and to provide force protection for the civilian populace.

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

it was hard for them to grasp the necessity of discovering non lethal targets in order to create lethal targets (b)(3)(b)(6)

13. What do you feel was the command climate of B CO, 1st Platoon, early on during the first half of March? What do you feel is the command climate for B Co, 1st Platoon, and in the squads now? You could always raise a concern and the CO would listen. Sometimes you load is coming in but that is because they didn't know but they always work command climate for the most part. SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was not well received

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Officers did not agree with them but they were for the he is a very good PSG and cares for the soldiers a lot. As for myself I always listen to soldiers and will take the advice of any leader regardless of rank. I may not act on it but I will always listen. I always encourage soldiers to ask questions so they are better informed and I enjoy talking to soldiers to know what their concerns are so as to better their situation and the platoon as a whole. The squads are all very close. They are close within themselves but the squads sometimes argue with one another but just in a competitive way. All the soldiers due take pride in the platoon and respect their squad leaders and team leaders. As for the command climate in March I was on leave but again SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was in charge and was not well liked. The squads all had the same good command climate. As for now, SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) is now well respected and the platoon itself has come together closer due to recent events and is now more professional than ever.

Unreadable Text

platoon wants to show effort and they are discipline and there is no issue with them. They want to go their brothers in Bravo Company in Yusufiya. They do understand that they are here at Muhmoudiya for a reason. Some think they are being punished. Others think it is because BN or BDI thinks we cannot handle another casualty. Others see it as a genuine concern for soldiers and an opportunity to train. The concern for soldiers and training are the reasons that were given to the platoon briefed by the CO ISG and the PSG. I believe the platoon should stay at Muhmoudiya to prepare for home and breaking up the platoon would be the worst thing you could do. It would destroy morale and weapons that they are here for punishment (b)(3)(b)(6)

Unreadable Text

14. Who were the leaders in B Co that you did not have confidence in? What if any measures were taken to mitigate the weaknesses that you felt existed in the company and platoon? What weaknesses were not resolvable and why? I have confidence in all the leaders of B co. Measures were taken to mitigate weak leaders though. They were never incapable of leading but just through constant coaching and mentoring we helped them along. SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) is one example. He had a great amount of potential and was made a sergeant but lacked initiative once he had the rank and we had to help him grow into the rank. SS (b)(3)(b)(6) did a very good job at this (b)(3)(b)(6)

15. What did you think was the B co soldiers' attitude towards their mission in the first half of March? attitude towards the mission in March and roughly that time frame was that they actually wanted to get out while many individuals were quick to think the platoon wasn't ready with all the change out of leadership (Over 50% leader change out in 4 months). The platoon was ready for higher risk missions and wanted an opportunity to prove themselves. As to right now the platoon again wants to prove that they are more than ready for missions. They do not want to stop. They don't like the fact that other companies are operating in B co's area. They see it as other people have to do the work for us. They understand that FOB security is necessary but it is disheartening to them when they always strive to do the right thing on guard and they see other people not doing the right thing which has been reported (b)(3)(b)(6)

Unreadable Text

For the rest of the statement I will cover other questions and issues that were discussed with LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) One thing that should be noted is that I was put in this position in Bravo in January not at the beginning of deployment. So I am unaware of any incidents or guidance prior to January except for a few incidents. I was not here to reinforce discipline and

Unreadable Text

es I can still improve on things but I and SFC (b)(3)(b)(6) am the senior PL in BN and had a very good reputation

Unreadable Text

LTC (b)(3)(b)(6) and the CSM spoke very highly of me when I was in Charlie company and on MITT The BC around the April-May timeframe sat me down for lunch and we discussed the platoon and the steps I was taking to improve it. He agreed with me on enforcing the standards and all the little things that soldiers take for granted like shaving and timelines for soldiers. The CSM back around April-May timeframe stated to me that he didn't even uneraud entirely differently and had improved dramatically. He said it wasn't the best of

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

fter my initial counseling and that one instant with the CSM of the platoon (b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE

4

OF

5

PAGES

STATEMENT OF	(b)(3)(b)(6)	TAKEN AT <u>Ft. Belvoir, Va</u>	DATED <u>2/27/06</u>
<p>9. STATEMENT: <i>(Continued)</i></p> <p>As for questions regarding the TCP's I always operated within the specified guidance from the CO and BN. It seems that after all the incidents it has been stated by the BC that he had put out other guidance. I never received that information and I would never, never, disobey an order from a superior officer. I never lied about information or the way I operated. The BC several times came by the TCP's but never stated there had to be more trucks or more bodies. He saw how we operated and we never ordered anything up. LT(6)(3)(b)(6) seems to think we had more trucks in places than we actually did, like at the AVLB but other companies and his PSD have said they have seen one truck their for a while. During his visits he often talked complacency, and working on the basics and occasionally on site improvement. Again the way I got my guidance from CP(6)(3)(b)(6) I never acted within the Company chain of command knowing what I was up to. The only with dissemination of information. I think with the way Bravo company operates, in a decentralized Unreadable Text to share information. You have a platoon on the FOB or out on mission, a platoon on the TCP's and a platoon at the JSB so it is hard to cross talk. It also makes it difficult to put out information. If it is something important it would get broadcasted on FM. Again I want to clearly state that I always operated within the commanders guidance, CP(6)(3)(b)(6) and that it was the way we've been operating since being in theater. If it was an issue, several people to include the BC, DCO, and BDE commander have toured Bravo sector why was it never brought up(6)(3)(b)(6)</p> <p>My last concern would be that a command climate survey needs to be done on 1-502. Due to the Unreadable Text and command climate of the company is it important to look at the command climate of BN as well Unreadable Text</p> <p>Unreadable Text Talking to my peers from that there is a bad command style and most agree. LT(6)(3)(b)(6) goes well before the issue is fully addressed and he denies the leader can finish speaking. He never lets you fully explain your point he has berated company commanders and other leaders in front of their LT(6)(3)(b)(6) yelled at him for his leadership and criticized his company over the radio with well over 10 other radios on that net manned by both leaders and lower enlisted of the company. He has physically threatened myself, threatening to "beat my fucking ass" if I did not have a hard stripe NCO in each vehicle, which took place on or about 10 JAN 2006. SFC(6)(3)(b)(6) personally witnessed this event. There are other incidents known where he has threatened other leaders. Charlie Company, witnessed by SF(6)(3)(b)(6) asked for a BN command climate survey to be conducted around Jan 2006. LT(6)(3)(b)(6) declined. Soldiers and leaders choose not to go to LT(6)(3)(b)(6) with questions for fear of what may be out of their control. NCO's have also stated a lack of willingness to talk with USM(6)(3)(b)(6) Unreadable Text lack of concern for soldiers, and the needs of the NCO's of BN. My concern and perception is that there and distrust in the leadership of the BN and I believe a BN command climate survey is necessary in order to bring these issues out for the good of 1-502(6)(3)(b)(6)</p> <p>***Addition to question 1*** It should be noted that the platoon was on a 21 day rotation on the TCP's in order to build relationships with the people of Mulla Fayyad. It should be noted that success was made and an informal town council was established something that was never done before. Again I was on leave for all of this(6)(3)(b)(6)</p>			
AFFIDAVIT			
<p>I, <u>(b)(3)(b)(6)</u> HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE <u>2</u> AND ENDS ON PAGE <u>3</u>. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT</p>			
<p>WITNESSES:</p> <p>_____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p>ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS _____</p>		<p style="text-align: center;">(b)(3)(b)(6)</p> <p>Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____</p> <p>_____</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Signature of Person Administering Oath)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)</p> <p style="text-align: center;">(Authority To Administer Oaths)</p>	
INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT		PAGE OF PAGES	

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

07 July 2004
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Signature

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Social Security Number

004623

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2051; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/biometric means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB MMD (N) 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006 07 07 3. TIME: 4. FILE NUMBER:
5. NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6) 6. GRADE/STATUS: E-6

7. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Bn 1-502d INF 25ST

8. I, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

- 1) TCP1 - 6 pos w/ 2 vehicles TCP2 - 5 pos w/ 1 vehicle.
2) I'm not exactly sure if I can remember exactly if our platoon was within the BN minimum standard for pos at TCPs. AT TCP2 - SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6), PFC (b)(3)(b)(6), PFC (b)(3)(b)(6), PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) I'm not sure if PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) was actually there or if he was at TCP1. AT TCP1 - SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) PFC (b)(3)(b)(6), SPC (b)(3)(b)(6), PFC (b)(3)(b)(6).
3) The Guard on the Rooftop of TCP1 can observe the vehicle off the Road at TCP2, and cannot see anything else of TCP2, due to deadspace.
4) The manning and Equipment requirements were the same the 1st half of March. The platoon was tasked to occupy 4 TCPs, and on occasion kick out an 4 man OP, to observe the intersection of Mulla Fuyada Hwy + Spantitee.

5) (b)(2)High

- 6) (b)(3)(b)(6) were employed and L-wire was employed in front of the Entrance to the Building that we occupied.
8) Radio checks are done regularly at the top of the hour. Whoever is on guard at the time. Each TCP has a minimum of 1x FM radio, 2x Icoms. Sitreps are sent to TCP1, ie; water, chow, Batteries, issues.

10. EXHIBIT: I 11. PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

9) Each Platoon was probably out 1x vehicle due to IEDs or mechanical difficulties, Air Conditioners going out.

10)

(b)(2)High

11) Better Force protection was always requested. all the Teps needed more Force pro.

12) Yes, when I felt a mission was going to render my squad at high risk.

13) The Mission statement was for us to deny AIF movement in and around in Buidog AO, To control the flow + stoppage of Traffic and overall to keep (b)(3)(b)(6) secured and free of IEDs. Yes, the soldiers understood. We have to remind them daily.

14) The Climate was probably a little crazy due to us being on Teps for 20 days. Honestly, everyone hates Teps, its good were there but our forces could be used other places.

15) I've always had Confidence in the leadership within Bee, but when Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6) had gotten promoted to E-5, he turned into a piece of Crap Team (b)(3)(b)(6) always expecting rewards.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INI PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 8957 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB MAHMUDIYAH
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006 07 07
3. TIME: 2000
4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. GRADE/STATUS: E-5
7. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: 3. 1-502 INF

9. I, Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text RUN WITH COORDINATION BETWEEN THE ON SCENE COMMANDER AT EACH TOP AND THE PLATOON SERGEANT AND PLATOON LEADER. AS FAR AS I KNOW, NO TOP WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR MONITORING ANY OTHER TOP. EACH TOP WAS ALSO UNDER THE CONSTANT SUPERVISION OF THE ON SCENE COMMANDER, TYPICALLY AN E-6 SQUAD LEADER. PLATOON LEADER INSPECTIONS WOULD HAPPEN AT BATTALION LEVEL INSPECTION WOULD HAPPEN LATER, AND BATTALION LEVEL. THE ON SCENE COMMANDER WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR SITE IMPROVEMENTS, HOWEVER IF IMPROVEMENTS WERE REQUIRED THAT THOSE AT THE TOP COULD NOT COMPLETE, THE COMPANY WOULD BE NOTIFIED. SOMETIMES THE REQUIREMENTS WERE EASILY MET, OTHER TIMES DUE TO REASONS SUCH AS AVAILABILITY (b)(3)(b)(6) ENGINEERS OR EQUIPMENT, THERE WERE DELAYS. RADIO CHECKS AT THE TOPS WERE CONDUCTED HOURLY BY THE TRUCK GUARD OR RADIO GUARD. TRUCKS DEFICIENCIES AT TOPS WERE NOTED AND CORRECTED UPON RETURN TO PATROL BASE YUSUFYAH. SERIOUS ISSUES WITH TRUCKS WERE TAKEN CARE OF IMMEDIATELY BY GROUND COMPANY, WHO WOULD IN TURN SEND OUT A MAINTENANCE TEAM. MY ASSIGNMENT BRANG COMPANY IS THAT NOT ONLY

Unreadable Text

ALWAYS SEEN. THERE HAVE BEEN SEVERAL LEADERS NOT IN MY CHAIN OF COMMAND WHO'S STYLE OF LEADERSHIP I DO NOT LIKE, BUT I TRUST THEIR LEADERS TO SHAPE THEM INTO BETTER NCO'S.

NOTHING FOLLOWS.

10. EXHIBIT: J
11. INITIALS OF (b)(3)(b)(6) ON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT FOG MAHMUDIYAH DATED 07 JUL 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is OBCEOPG

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 391; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA);
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB Mahamidyah; 2. DATE: 2006/07/07; 3. TIME: 1330; 4. FILE NUMBER; 5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, INITIAL NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6); 6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6); 7. GRADE/STATUS: E-6; 8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Bco 1-502 FOB Mahamidyah, Iraq APO AE 09398

9. I, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Today I was asked a series of 15 questions and given a paper copy of these questions. In this sworn statement I would like to answer those questions to the best of my ability and in full truth. I will attach a copy of the questions to this sworn statement (b)(3)(b)(6)

1. On 12 March 2006 all manning requirements, as I understood them, were mission dictated. Our company as best as I can remember took us to maintain at least 4 people at each TCP. Our platoon usually had anywhere from 10 to 13 soldiers at TCP 1 and 4 soldiers at TCP (b)(3)(b)(6)

2. I do not recall there ever being a Bn frago issued on manning requirements during the time in question and we were in accordance with that guidance during the date in question. Unreadable Text had with attachments was at TCP 2, CCP Unreadable Text

3. The building at TCP 2 is not visible from any position at TCP 1. From both the rooftop and Unreadable Text however that is not in the primary sector of fire for either the truck Unreadable Text

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

6. This question is not applicable because I am a squad leader and live with my squad at all times (b)(3)(b)(6)

7. As far as I remember from 5 Mar until 12 Mar I did not do a rotation at TCP2. I was at TCP 1 during that time although I don't remember which days. I can't exactly remember what the projects or problems that were being improved upon were at that time. Any time there was a problem with Force Protection or anything else at the TCP's it was brought up through the chain of command (b)(3)(b)(6)

8. Radio checks are conducted every hour on the hour, or as close as they can be made to that time, during regular guard or on an OIC. Other radio traffic to include updates or reports are sent up as needed (b)(3)(b)(6)

9. My assessment of the Platoon Leadership at the time was that I was really surprised how well the squad leaders, including SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) who was new, were working together with the change of our Platoon Sergeant and Platoon Leader. I honestly didn't think it would go as well as it did. I was doing everything I could do to mitigate friction since I had worked with SF (b)(3)(b)(6) before. As it turned out that was the only thing that caused any friction at (b)(3)(b)(6)

10. I don't know the FMC status of all the vehicles in Bco. I do know that out Unreadable Text were several problems with them at all times. The main one that I remember, not being able to get fixed, was the doors Unreadable Text

10. EXHIBIT: K; 11. INITIALS: (b)(3)(b)(6); PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF" DATED; THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT 1330 DATED 2006/07/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

for whatever reason we could not always get parts for our doors no matter how much we ordered. There was not a serious change to our operational readiness for the better or worse at any time during the deployment. If a vehicle went down we would borrow the CO's vehicle or another platoon's if necessary (b)(3)(b)(6)

11/12. There will always be identified weaknesses on any static position. You will always continue to improve on your position as the enemy threat level or experience changes. All steps that we could take to mitigate this risk were taken by our platoon. Requests were made both formally of the company and informally to the Bn chain of command as they came to the Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text I personally requested on numerous occasions to get these filled and to this day they are still empty. I filled as many as I could over the few rotations I did to TCP (b)(3)(b)(6)

13. When given a company mission that had risk that needed to be mitigated, I personally felt that I could work to mitigate that risk with the company commander. When given a Battalion dictated mission through the company commander of the risk involved in the mission I had to go through with it. An example of this was route (b)(2)High in the west side of our sector. Every time we had to do this route clearance it was brought up to the company command that there was no way to effectively clear this route and still mitigate the risk involved. It was put out to me that it was a Battalion dictated mission and regardless of the risk it had to be completed. It wasn't until after the MP unit working in our area lost 4 guys I believe and 1st platoon lost 2 more that route caveman was put off limits unless cleared by Strike Ironclaw first (b)(3)(b)(6)

14. The mission statement for the TCP's as best I can remember it was to monitor and control all vehicular and foot traffic moving on route Sporster and to work in and around (b)(2)High in order to deter, capture, or kill all AIF forces trying to operate in Bulldogs A (b)(3)(b)(6)

15. I feel that during that time the command climate in 1st squad was one of mixed emotion. Unreadable Text was one of the NCO's who tended to go a little on the rash side in second squad, my squad, there wasn't much change in the Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text some better than others, but other than a couple of guys talking to CST there were no major issues in their attitude. In 2nd squad there was a lot of change but for the better. SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) was learning from SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) and other platoon sergeants and learning how to better train his team leaders. Overall I would say between the Unreadable Text different platoons. If I had taken an emotional discipline before and after Jenny Craig picture. I would gladly Unreadable Text continued success. I was with everything going on in Unreadable Text discipline problems (b)(3)(b)(6) Unreadable Text

16. I have Unreadable Text to have the utmost confidence in my platoon and company. I would gladly come back here with them 100 times. Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text Unreadable Text of command over any I have ever served with. I have nothing but respect and confidence in them and that will always remain (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6)

4 STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, **SSG** (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL IMPROBATION.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Questions for SLs and TLs:

1. What were the manning and equipment requirements at TCP 1 and TCP 2 on 12 Mar 06?
2. Were the manning and equipment requirements at TCPs 1 and 2 IAW the Bn and Co SOP, FRAGO, or command guidance? If not, why and what actions were taken to mitigate the difference in manning and equipment? On 12 Mar 06, exactly who was at TCP 2? Who was at TCP 1 on 12 Mar 06?
3. Was anyone at TCP responsible for Observing TCP 2? What is expected of the Soldier observing TCP 2? What can the Soldier actually see of TCP from TCP 1?
4. What was manning and equipment requirements for TCPs in the first half of March 06? How many TCPs, OPs, or any other requirements did the PLT have? Where did the PLT have to accept risk? Who made the risk decision?
5. What are the manning and equipment requirements for OPs during March 06?
6. On an average basis, how often are you able to get out and check your units? During the first half of March, what was the tactical situation vicinity of TCPs 1 and 2? How did this effect your battlefield circulation on checking B Co?
7. Between 5 Mar to 12 Mar, how many times did you go to TCP 1 and TCP 2? Did you note any deficiencies or concerns? If so, what guidance did you give to correct them? Do you know if the deficiencies were corrected? Did you raise any of your concerns to higher (Bn CDR, BN XO, BN CSM, Co CDR, Co XO, 1SG, PL, PSG)? What action was taken to correct those deficiencies that you could not fix at your level?
8. How often is a report or radio check required to be sent while on TCP or OP duty? Who normally sends the radio check or report? What information is sent?
9. What was your assessment of the Chain of Command within the platoon/squad? What mitigation measures/guidance did you give to try and help reduce the possible leadership capability shortcomings? Were these measures implemented?
10. What was the FMC status of B Co's vehicles (OH/FMC) on 12 Mar 06? Was there a significant change in operational readiness status during the previous week? Are there any consistent maintenance issues in B Co and in the Bn that have not been resolved?
11. Where there any identified weaknesses at TCPs 1 and 2 in terms of Force Protection? If so, what was done to mitigate those weaknesses? For the weaknesses that could not be mitigated, who made the decision to accept the risk?
12. Were any requests made to improve the force protection of TCPs 1 and 2? Was this a problem at other sites?
13. Did you feel that you could refuse the mission due to unacceptable risk?
14. What was the Mission Statement for B Co, 1st PLT, TCP 1, and TCP 2? Did you feel that the Soldiers understood their mission?
15. What do you feel was the command climate of B Co, 1st PLT, each squad during the first half of March? What do you feel is the command climate for B Co, 1st PLT, in the squads now?
16. Who were the leaders in B Co that you did not have confidence in? What if any measures were taken to mitigate the weaknesses that you felt existed in the company and platoon? What weaknesses were not able resolvable and why?

M

004631

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

7 Jul 06
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Sgt
Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Social Security Number

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPF

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 6 USC Section 2551; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA);
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Mahumudiya; 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006/09/07; 3. TIME: 2155; 4. FILE NUMBER; DOLE NAME; 5. SSR; 6. GRADE/STATUS: E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B. Co 1/502

9. Sgt. (b)(3)(b)(6) WANTS TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. I was not aware of any manning requirements mandated by company, however the normal de facto requirements...
2. I am not aware of manning requirements mandated by higher than platoon headquarters.
3. No individuals from TCP one was tasked to watch TCP2, however TCP2 falls within the sector of the roof guard on TCP one.
4. The locations are about one kilometer away from one another and so observation of TCP2 from another TCP is not feasible.
5. The requirement of the TCPs, IAW the de facto standard stated above was often discarded in favor of constant patrolling of...
6. My soldiers were generally co-located with me. We were on constant patrols of Mulafiyad at the time, and the TTP of the enemy had recently changed from command wire buried IEDs, to surface laid LRTC IEDs.
7. I was stationed at TCP1 for that whole period, though I had to relieve Sgt. Cortez shortly after the family was found for about...

Unreadable Text... though usually soldiers on guard... had the support of Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6) and some squad leaders that he w... Unreadable Text

10. First platoon had reliable vehicles as far as I remember, I am unaware of the condition of the other platoons vehicles.
11. I am not aware of any force protection deficiencies in TCP1, and TCP2 at the time. Any deficiency that would have been present would have been impressed in time when realized, and class four been available.

12. Unreadable Text... though from that perspective I cannot say that there were no real force protection problems at any other sight.
13. Refusing a mission because it is too dangerous... Unreadable Text... if your chain of command is aware of the risk, it is your duty as a soldier to assume that risk.
14. The mission of TCP1 and TCP2 was to screen traffic, and disrupt movement of AIF forces through AO Bulldog down route sportier... Unreadable Text... the mission, even if they didn't always like it.

15. The squads had very set personalities. Third squad believed that they were the hard core combat killer squad, though they was a pack of misfits who had lost three personnel... Second squad tended to be quiet, and perhaps a little more even scheme of mission delegation. I did not trust. The OPTENTPO required new leaders to fit into a team quickly, and... Unreadable Text

ASSUME RESPONSIBILITY for a number of complex missions very quickly. All available consideration was given to new leaders in order to make them aware of how the company did business, however danger involved with the sector, and the changing nature of how this company, still very much learning it's sector did business set many good leaders up for failure.

10. EXHIBIT: L; 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6); PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF... TAKEN AT... DATED..."

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT 2155 DATED 2006/09/07

STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing Follows
2006/09/07
0955

(b)(3)(b)(6)

STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT (b)(3)(b)(6) 155 DATED 2006/09/07

9 STATEMENT *Continued*

(b)(3)(b)(6)

09/07

AFFIDAVIT

I, Sgt (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. (THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

NAME OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

7 Feb 06
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Signature

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Printed Name and Rank

556

(b)(3)(b)(6)
Social Security Number

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proposing agency is DDCSGPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 3801; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: MAHOMADEVAH
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006 07 14
3. TIME: 1400
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: C-6
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS:
9. (b)(3)(b)(6)

WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(2)High

- 3) The duties at TCP 2 are to patrol the grid tracks not to conduct any patrols of GPS due to the high threat.
4) The only issue with traveling from TCP to TCP and to the FOB is with what occurred in JAN 06. While I was at TCP 5, BLINDDOG MIKE ordered me to send one vehicle and three personal to the FOB.
5) The percentage of personal allowed to go on leave from the company was 30 percent I believe.
6) The assigned strength of my squad is 8 men.
7) SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) was the acting squad leader at the time I went on leave. He was promoted on 1 March.
8) There were no issues that there was no NCOs on TCP 2 or TCP 6 due to the fact that (b)(3)(b)(6) was a team leader and about to become a sergeant. This was SEC (b)(3)(b)(6) idea.

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

re that family lived at was by conducting patrol back in that area. saw SP (b)(3)(b)(6) two times a week. The commander a couple of The battalion commander has never stopped at the TCP I have

- 13) About fifty percent of the woman would wear these veils
14) The visitors such as the company first sergeant and company commander came to the TCP's they asked how everyone was doing what do you need and I back briefed them on what was going on in my AO
15) Unreadable Text if there was no response with the Radio a patrol would be sent down to that TCP
16) Soldiers were made aware of SOP's mandated from higher by ISG CO PL PSG and memos posted on side the TOC These were SOP's for the TCP's for example Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

- 17) I felt that the SOP for IED sweeps was bullshit due to the terrain; you could not walk 100 meters off of (b)(3)(b)(6) The ISG and the battalion commander were dead fast about dismount IED sweep.
18) Yes, there was a call on the radio every time Talon 6 was in the AO.
19) There no maintenance issues with vehicles except the air conditioning constantly needed repairs.

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text

Due to the amount of IED's on that route.

As the leadership climate in 1st platoon, the first and second squad was more laid back than I was. I micro managed my guys its just I like to have a tight grip on my men. I also have a family environment I'm papa bear an if you needed something don't be afraid to come up to me, we would watch out for each other you could call it tough love.
23) I would not say there were leaders that I did not have confidence in, now there have been some bad decisions made but that is due to not being aware of your surroundings or listening to your leader's on the ground, I.E. the commander said get across that canal, I don't care if you have to swim this was what the commander said on the radio when (b)(3)(b)(6) and SP (b)(3)(b)(6) were killed.

10. EXHIBIT: M
11. INITIALS: (b)(3)(b)(6)
STATEMENT: PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

MAHIAH A. OUYA DATED

7 JULY 06

IF STATEMENT *Continued*

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT FORCE, COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, 2006.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON	STATEMENT	PAGE	OF	PAGES
(b)(3)(b)(6)				

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

1004 0747
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Printed Name and Rank

E 5/507

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Social Security Number

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

Fort Meade

DATED

21/07/06

3. STATEMENT (Continued)

They were also responsible for watching the section of Spawar that
is toward T-2 and the bounding

Unreadable Text

(b)(2)High

My assignment of the platoon was
was based on the situation. The chain of command was down
as far as the higher chain of command. They tried to lower
the time at the top and work load by preventing things on the
the platoon. The next situation was taken care of as the
problems came we would pass on a level as need from all platoons
with our own work on. The maintenance was done to standard
and had no problems

Unreadable Text

The weaknesses the the T-2s had were that they were
in the open we used what we could to make them safer with
with better bases. The improvements were mentioned and most of them
can be solved and some of the same problems were at the other end.

RU

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

PA

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT FOB Mukdiz

DATED 07-07-06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The missions that received were in steam and had to be done and there would be actions taken if you refuse such as second phase the protocol in one instance. In another we the equipment used as the personal workbooks were broken and we still had to do distances IED Sweeps even with the chain of command with full knowledge of this and know one new anything on how to fix this problem so we continued to do the sweeps.

The mission that we received was to maintain and take down the specialist room to prevent IAF movement and we carried out this mission but it was with great ease and the platoon understood the mission and did it to the best of their abilities.

The platoon was recovering well from the events that happened before and they still need our three instructors now they are building up and working even better together but yet still recovering from the loss but we are focused on our tasks.

(b)(2)High

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

_____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIAL

(b)(3)(b)(6)

ON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 501; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 8387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSM).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: Mahmudiyah, Iraq
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006/07/07
3. TIME: 1602
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: 409-27-3824
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-6 SSG

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B Co 1-502 Inf Regt

9. I, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I have been in 1st plt B Co since 12 April 2006. There are some problems in platoon but they are still soldiers and can still effectively do their job. I think that being here on FOB Mahmudiyah is a good idea because it gives these kids the break that they need before we go home and they should stay together no matter what. At least now they have a place where they can shower, eat and start at the platoon level. All the blame should start there. This platoon has alot of great leaders, yes some of the team leaders are young, but they do their job. I don't think the leadership problem is at the company, yes there may be some problems but not what everyone is perceiving. I don't know why, ma that for the AVL Bridge, the Battalion Commander and the Battalion CSM have past the AVL Bridge hundreds of times before and has never said anything until 3 soldiers were killed and now it seems that they want to put the blame on the platoon leader. (b)(3)(b)(6) has done wonders with platoon. The Battalion CSM It almost seems that they are always the first to blame and point the finger. B Co has been in a bad area for the last nine months. Everybody knows what these kids do day in and day out. I know our Company Commander has asked for help for months but nothing has ever been done about it. It is one thing to try to Let the leaders do what they are charged with. I would like to see a Command Climate Survey done for the command of this battalion. (b)(3)(b)(6)

Nothing follows

(b)(3)(b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT: 0
11. INITIALS: (b)(3)(b)(6)
KING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing follows

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT
(5 U.S.C. 522a)

AUTHORITY: 5 U.S.C. 301 and 10 U.S.C. 3012

PURPOSE: The purpose of this solicitation is to gather facts and make recommendations to assist the appropriate authorities in determining what action to take with regard to allegations of

ROUTINE USES: Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in performance of their official duties, and where use of such information is compatible with the purpose for which the information is collected. In addition, the information may be disclosed to Government agencies and persons outside the Department of Defense for law enforcement purposes, or if determined to be disclosable pursuant to a request submitted under the Freedom of Information Act, or if needed for Congressional or other Government Investigations.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY FOR INDIVIDUAL WHO MAY BE ORDERED TO TESTIFY: providing the information is mandatory. Failure to provide information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under the UCMJ or applicable Army or other federal regulations.

DISCLOSURE VOLUNTARY FOR INDIVIDUAL WARNED OF HIS RIGHTS UNDER ARTICLE 31, UCMJ, OR THE FIFTH AMENDMENT OF THE U.S. CONSTITUTION: providing the information is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing the information other than essential information which might not otherwise be available to the commander for his decision in this matter.

ACKNOWLEDGMENT

I have read and been provided a copy of the Privacy Act Statement above and understand its contents.

July 7, 2006
Date

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Signature

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Printed Name and Rank

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Social Security Number

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Mahamudiyah, Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2006/07/07	3. TIME 1000	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS C-3	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
IHHC, 1 502nd Infantry Regiment, 101st ABN (ASLT)

9. I, (1) (CPT) (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The following statement contains no information revealed in any type of formal or informal counseling session. At no time prior to, or during the preparation of, this statement, was I asked to reveal any information that would be considered a breach of trust or confidence between myself and any soldier in 1 502nd Infantry Regiment. In accordance with AR 165-1 all information given to the chaplain as an act of religion is classified as either privileged or confidential. Therefore, my statement will remain limited to my observations as the Battalion Chaplain during routine battlefield circulation. For the past 10 months I have rotated between FOB Mahamudiyah, and PB Yusufiyah, and PB Laffiyah. My battle rhythm has been as follows: I spend four days out of each week at FOB Mahamudiyah, the remaining three days I live at one of the outlying Patrol Bases. Each week I alternate which of the PB's I will visit, allowing me to spend quality time in religious support operations to the entire battalion during the deployment, as well as during pre deployment operations at Fort Campbell. I have had the opportunity to be personally present with, and observe Bravo Company, 1 502nd Infantry Regiment. I have lived and/or visited PB Yusufiyah as well as the 1st platoon of Bravo Company, 1 502nd Infantry Regiment.

Unreadable Text
pany's Area of Operations. In my
The current command climate
has developed over the course of
incidents involve, but are not limited to the following: enemy engagements; daily receiving indirect fire against the
PB, JSB, and TGP's; soldiers killed in action; soldiers wounded in action; majority of PB burnt to the ground during
a fire, and soldiers performing their daily duties which often times required them engaging and killing the enemy.

Unreadable Text

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF CI (CPT) (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT Mahamudiyah DATED 2006/07/07

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Unreadable Text

(b)(3)(b)(6)

MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

Memphis, Tennessee

DATED

12/23/98

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

WHILE I WAS AT THE END OF PAGE _____, I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Oath)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

IN MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION YUSUFYAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20080708	3. TIME 1630	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS 2LT	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
3/B Co. 1-502nd

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Unreadable Text

Unreadable Text arrived in 3 Co. in early May. TLP2 was an observation post. The platoon sergeant or platoon commander conducted a check on all TLPs every day by route and designated patrols. TLP2 was manned by a team

Unreadable Text

on our own we no longer check TLPs on our own, we resupplies check each TLP regularly

* end of statement * CRT

10. EXHIBIT Q	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT FBI YORKVILLE DATED 3-2-01

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

FOR Yusefyan

DATED

8 20 02

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE

OF

PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 19 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Sulaymaniyah	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060708	3. TIME 1400	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E-7 / ASG	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS 3014 Bco 1-5020			

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I used the TCPs on (b)(2)High to prevent the ATF from capturing IEDs and to keep a safe route down to the JSB where we had a PLT position. I also used the TCPs to conduct offensive operations in Jassin Village, AL Thabit, Rusul, Mulla + Mulla-Find. While on the TCPs my PLT would conduct up to 10 patrols a day. These patrols would be joint with IA soldiers. We had a lot of success on these patrols. ISG (b)(3)(b)(6) would come out once or twice a week sometimes more. He would support us w/ anything we needed, and ensure we were maintaining our tactical discipline at the TCPs. I, the PL/SG1 would usually go to all TCPs everyday. I have the most competent Squad Leaders in this BN so I never had any problems. We now stay on the defensive at the TCPs. For 10 months we bustled our asses out there in sector and now all of a sudden we have been doing something wrong? We have NO discipline? I would like any one who thinks that to come on a patrol with any one of my squads and you will see the most tactically disciplined soldiers in this BN!

This whole thing has been a slap in the face to us! we do not deserve this. I have found that if you receive a mission with a Task + Purpose and you do what you are asked to do, you won't have problems with the BN CO. I have never had a problem with

10. EXHIBIT R	11. INITIAL (b)(3)(b)(6)	MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

004652

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT 1430

DATED 08 JUL 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

the SSM or BN CO. If they expected me to do something, I did it. This is how the Army has run for hundreds of years. Its too easy. It seems like any time someone screws up they are quick to point their fingers and blame others. ^{↳ those responsible}

As for as 1st PLT, ^{oct 04} they have been a problem since the first day I came to this company. The soldiers in that platoon are being treated like leprosy right now and its bullshit! They just need good leadership. They need team leaders who are gonna get in their ass when they screw up and slap them on the back when they do good.

LT (b)(3)(b)(6) was an outstanding platoon leader. He can't do everything though and he didn't get much help from the NCO's.

We have problems just like every other BN in the Army. The only difference is 4 ~~losers~~ ^{losers} may have ~~done~~ ^{done} the most horrible thing in the history of the Army. They are responsible for what they have done. Where was the NCO in charge? I am proud of this BN and BDE. I am proud of all we have done in SW Baghdad. We deserve better than this!

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

1930

DATED

08 JUL 06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE OF THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2954; E.O. 8387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION Hustler	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 200703	3. TIME 1701	4. FILE NUMBER
(b)(3)(b)(6)	E NAME	(b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E6

3. Unit In 30 PW

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The Top's were used to keep enemy from employing any IEDs on route. (b)(2)High is our main supply route to the 103. It is so cluttered as to move trucks through our sector. I usually received Top's as I would normally man the Top with my squad of 9 people. I believe we had enough materials for some maintenance. The

Unreadable Text

He was usually doing the missions that was in our sector. So it wouldn't have as much time to come to the on the overall relationship of the Company and our speed in my eyes. The same goes for my level and could be open with the chain of command and they listen to any suggestions that I would have. I have ran to the best of our abilities given the situation we were in.

Unreadable Text

10. EXHIBIT 5	11. INST (b)(3)(b)(6)	MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" IN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

1700

DATED

9/1/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

PAGE 2, DA FORM

C 1996

USAPA V1.00

004657

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

1701

DATED

8/1/06

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF REWARD OR WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON

(b)(3)(b)(6)

STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9597 dated November 22, 1943 (SSM).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2006 07 08
3. TIME
4. FILE NUMBER

5. (b)(3)(b)(6) FILE NAME
6. (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS SRC E-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
3/Bco 1/502nd FOB VUSUFIVAH

9. I, SRC (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON JULY 8 2006 I WAS ASKED A FEW QUESTIONS, MAINLY ABOUT THE TCP'S THAT WE (Bco.) MAN ON (b)(2)High. Recently there have been some changes on the way we secure these TCP's as well as the way we make TCP's much safer for us. In addition Bco. was totally unaware that 8 men element was supposed to provide security at each TCP at all times (b)(2)High in Bco's main supply route TO TSB, also it leads to key places such as Rushid Mulla and power plant. As far as our force protection at the TCP's. As stated in the beginning, lately we have been provided with a lot of class 4 items to make each TCP a safer place for us. Lastly, because of our JCS and the level of insurgent activity we give our only asset which is our vehicles a great level of maintenance. So being that we encountered a lot of IED's our vehicle suffers damage very often, but our support element is quick to get our vehicles fixed, so we could be back on the road. Unless the vehicle requires parts that need to be ordered which may take sometime. END OF STATEMENT

10. EXHIBIT 1
11. (b)(3)(b)(6) PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 150-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOP3

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 361; Title 5 USC Section 2851; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1945 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: TRP 1 MA 2830 5870 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20060708 3. TIME: 0729 hrs 4. FILE NUMBER:

5. [Redacted] 6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6) 7. GRADE/STATUS: E-7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B Co 1-502 D IN 2 PIT

9. I, [Redacted], WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1) [Redacted]
2) [Redacted]

- 3) I believe our TRPs are now less effective in stopping/detering AIF in our area due to our inability to move outside of the confines of the TRP to engage the local populace.
- 4) The mission of the TRPs is to observe and maintain disrupt AIF activity in AC Talon. [Redacted] ICT
- 5) With our current guard rotations and the need for continuous site improvements the men at any given TRP range between 4-8 hrs of sleep/rest throughout the course of a given day.

10. EXHIBIT: U 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the precendent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2854; E.O. 9387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: TCP 1 MB 2830 5820
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20060708
3. TIME: 0729 hrs
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-7

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B Co 1-502 D IN 2 PIT

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1) (b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

- 3) I believe our TCPs are now less effective in stopping/detering AIF in our area due to our inability to move outside of the confines of the TCP to engage the local populace.
4) The mission of the TCPs is to observe and maintain Route Spitzer IOT disrupt AIF activity in AD Tabor.
5) With our current guard rotations and the need for continuous site improvements, the men at any given TCP range between 4-8 hrs of sleep/rest throughout the course of a given day.

10. EXHIBIT: U
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

SWORN STATEMENT

For this form, see AR 150-45; the proponent agency is JOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2551; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 3. TIME 4. FILE NUMBER
2006 07 08

5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME 6. SSN 7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3)(b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) JRC E-4

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
3/Bco 1502ND FOR VUSUFIVANT

9. I, SRC (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON JULY 8 2006 I WAS ASKED FEW QUESTIONS, MAINLY ABOUT THE TCP'S THAT WE (Bco.) man on (b)(2)High Recently There have been some changes on The way we secure These Tcp's as well as the way we make Tcp's much safer For us. In addition Bco. was totally unaware that 8 man element was supposed to provide security at each Tcp at all time. (b)(2)High in Bco's main supply route to TSB, Also it leads to key places such as Roshid Mulla and Power plant. As Far as our force protection AT the Tcps, As stated in the beginning lately we have been provided with a lot of Class 4 items to make each Tcp a safer place for us. Lastly, because of our JOP and the level of insurgent activity we give our only asset which is our vehicles a great level of maintance. So being that we encountered a lot of IED's our vehicle suffers damage very often, but our support element is quick to get our vehicles Fixed, so we could be back on the road. Unless the vehicle requires parts that need to be ordered which may take sometime. END OF STATEMENT

10. EXHIBIT 11. (b)(3)(b)(6) PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

004662

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

1200 hrs

DATED

2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT 1700 hrs

DATED 2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

Use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency: JCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9387 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION TCP 1 MB 2830 5820	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060708	3. TIME 0729 hrs	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LA (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E-7	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS B Co 1-507 D IN 2 PIT			
9. I, _____ (b)(3)(b)(6)	WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:		

1) _____

2) _____
(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

- 3.) I believe our TCP's are now less effective in stopping/detering AIF in our area due to our inability to move outside of the confines of the TCP to engage the local populace.
- 4.) The mission of the TCP's is to observe and maintain Route Spacster JCT disrupt AIF activity in AO Tylon.
- 5.) With our current guard rotations and the need for continuous site improvements to men at any given TCP range between 4:8 hrs of sleep/rest throughout the course of a given day.

10. EXHIBIT U	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3)(b)(6)	NG STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT"		DATED _____	

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT TCP I (MB2830522) DATED 2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

- 6.) The current command climate in the company is a little tense currently, given the catastrophic events that have befallen us lately. We are segregated down to the platoon level; so we have little contact with the other elements of the company. The climate within the BN as seen by myself and the majority of the men under me; is that of distrust. We generally feel that the actions of a specific platoon in the company has made the rest of company look incompetent in the eyes of the BN leadership.
- 7.) Supervision of the TCP's has always been adequate. Prior to the new manning requirements; company level leadership visited the TCP's on average once a week. I feel this was adequate due the fact that a member of the platoon leadership was at PB Kusadiah area every 48 hrs and was able to debrief the Commander on TCP operations in detail. We are now visited by Company leadership daily and someone from B4 visits the TCP's at least twice weekly. I feel this to be excessive. TCP operations is a platoon operation; and the fact our leadership feels the need to micro-manage us is disheartening to men of my platoon. It all goes back to the trust issue.
- 8.) I have not had any maintenance issues at the company or BN level at any time during the deployment. All platoon maintenance issues have been resolved at the company or BN levels quickly and efficiently.
- 9.) Force Protection at the TCP's are obviously always a concern. I feel we have had a thorough Force Protection plan in place, since the TCP's were established. I feel this evident in the number of AIF attacks that have been reported from all TCP's since we have manned them.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT TP 1 (MS) 2832

DATED 2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Follows

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Nothing

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

Re: of this form, see AR 190-45; the preparing agency JCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 304; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: TCP 1 MBZ8305820
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20060708
3. TIME: 0830
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: E-4
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: Bco 1-502ia 7 Det

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(2)High

3. What is the mission of the TCP's?

It is to prevent AIF movement along (b)(2)High in order to deny them freedom of movement. Basically by having the TCP's we are trying to keep AIF from moving North to South and South to North.

4. How is effectiveness affected by the new manning requirements for patrolling and the TCP's?

Due to the fact that we cannot replace OP's between the TCP's during hours of limited visibility, the TCP's are not as effective as they were before. Also, I believe that it

10. EXHIBIT: V
11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT' TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT ICD1 MBZ222 DATED 2001a0708

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

not as effective having patrols come from the FOB. The people who live in the cities seemed to respond better when the same faces who were patrolling were also on the TCP's.

5. How much sleep do you get (then and now)?

Then - On a good night, six or eight hours, and on a bad night, four to six.

Now - On a good night, four to six hours, and on a bad night, two to four.

6. What is the command climate like compared to before?

Before, command was like "Here's what needs to get done, here's why. Get it done." We were allowed to plan and execute on our own, and do whatever we needed to do, within reason.

Now it seems like command is trying to be the platoon leader, the squad leader, and the team leader. It seems like command believes we are incompetent and untrustworthy, hence the daily visits by company command and biweekly visits by battalion command.

They have become overbearing. Information flow does seem to be better now, but we cannot do anything with it now.

7. Are there any maintenance issues?

There aren't any that I know about.

8. Force protection concerns?

There are none that I know about.

Continues on next page

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT TCD 1 MBZ 78

4 DATED 700120708

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Nothing follows

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR _____. ENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is CSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: TCP 1 (NB 28305820) 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20060708 3. TIME: 0715 4. FILE NUMBER:

5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6) 6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6) 7. GRADE/STATUS: O2 / AD

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B CO. 1-502 IN, 2BCT, 101ST ABN, 2ND PLATOON

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(2)High

2. THE CO. COMMANDER HAS DONE A GOOD JOB OF USING THE FORCES AVAILABLE TO COMPLETE THE MISSION. BATTALION HAS DONE THE SAME. I FEEL THERE SHOULD'VE BEEN MORE OF FORCES IN THIS AREA OF OPERATIONS LONGER AGO.

3. THERE HAVE BEEN NO MAINTANANCE ISSUES CREATED BY OUR TIME SPENT ON THE TCP'S.

4. MISSION: SECURE (b)(2)High, PURPOSE: NOT TO DENY AIF FREEDOM OF MANUEVER AND FACILITATE A SAFE ROUTE FOR CF. (b)(3)(b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT: W 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT TCP (b)(2)High DATED 08 JUL 2006

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

5. OUR ABILITIES NOW, COMPARED TO PRIOR TO THE TCP FRAGO, TO SECURE ROUTE SPORTSTER ARE MORE LIMITED DUE TO THE AMOUNT OF SOLDIERS NEEDED FOR AN OP, AND THE INABILITY TO CONDUCT THEM OUT OF THE TCP'S.

6. I BELIEVE WE CAN COMPLETE OUR MISSION ON (b)(2)High WITHIN THE CURRENT STANDARDS AND GUIDELINES.

7. WE DO NOT PATROL OUT OF THE TCP'S ANYMORE DUE TO THE CURRENT MANNING REQUIREMENTS. ALL PATROLS ARE CONDUCTED OUT OF PATROL BASE YUSUFYAH, PRIOR TO THE TCP FRAGO WE CONDUCTED DAILY PATROLS IN ALL AREAS AROUND THE TCP'S FROM THE TCP'S.

8. CURRENTLY THERE IS A SQUAD LEADER OR HIGHER AT EACH TCP, HE SUPERVISES. THE PLATOON SGT AND I CONDUCT DAILY INSPECTIONS OF THE TCP'S WHICH HAS BEEN THE SAME SINCE THE BEGINNING. THE CO OR 1SG NOW INSPECT THE POSITIONS DAILY SINCE THE TCP FRAGO AS OPPOSED TO ONCE EVERY WEEK.

INITIALS OF (b)(3)(b)(6) MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

PRIOR TO THE TCP FRAGO.

9. THERE ARE NO FORCE PROTECTION ISSUES AT THE TCP'S.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF REWARD OR PUNISHMENT, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

MAKING STATEMENT

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 195-42; the proponent agency is CDCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 501; Title 5 USC Section 2501; E.O. 6557 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an official, reliable means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: TEP6 Keesing Trng
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 30060708
3. TIME: 0700
4. FILE NUMBER:
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. GRADE/STATUS: E6

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B Co 1st SF BATT (A) Keesing Trng

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(2)High

and 2 vehicles. I believe that the TEPs are just as effective now as they were at the beginning of the deployment. The command climate for our company as been on a down fall for quite some time. In February and March the command climate was fair due to new higher leadership in the company now it is on a continous downward spiral due to Battalion and Brigade involvement in every aspect of our daily duties. Maintenance has never been an issue for our company. It was broke or repairable, it was done so as soon as parts were available. It was repairable at the time, a replacement was found. Force protection is done at the lowest level. Everyone has found what works for them now and in the past. With higher level of involvement from Battalion and Brigade, we haven't really seen a lot of change in our platoon except more people on guard and more tired people. In regards to the command climate being in a downward spiral, when USG status left due to an injury, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) became our USG. He micromanaged every thing the company and platoons did and his interaction with the platoons on a personal level was abusive but desired. The soldiers did not like being called names all the time even though USG (b)(3)(b)(6) was only being himself. Now with current events and higher leadership is placing so much stress on our company leadership that they are afraid to make decisions that higher may not approve of. The soldiers were extremely happy when USG status returned but due to higher stress levels, it really doesn't make a difference who is in charge, everyone is still micromanaged from company and higher. While on the TEPs, sleep is hard to come by. Everyone puts 12 hours of guard per day and 12 hours of rest. During rest, you make improvements to the TEPs and end up with approximately 4-6 hours of sleep throughout the 24 hour period, but never more than 4 hours at a time. nothing else.

Signature: (b)(3)(b)(6)
Title: (b)(3)(b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT: X
OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6)
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING 'STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED'
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

004674

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form see AR 191-45; the retirement process is DPCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSM)
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary

1. LOCATION Yusafie 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060708 3. TIME 1011 4. FILE NUMBER
(b)(3)(b)(6) 5. (b)(3)(b)(6) 7. GRADE/STATUS E-5

8. (b)(3)(b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Manning requirement in March was enough to get the job done. Now it is eight minimum.
How often did leadership PLT / CO / Batt come to check on the tcps. PLT once a day. CO none that I can remember. Batt. Never. Now, PLT once a day, CO once a day, Batt, Every other day.
What is the mission here. To Prevent AIF Freedom on movement From Southwest to Northeast along route sportster.
How much sleep do we get at TCPs. In March it was 7 hours now its about 4 to 5 hours
How do we feel about (b)(2)High are garbage. They are cheaply made and break very easily.
Command Climate. The PLT. Leadership are some of the best I have ever worked with. They are very compadant and take care of us the best they can. Co is very much the same as PLT. I just dont think that they are giving the means. They have a mission to get done whether we have the proper manpower or not. Battalion, they don't care at all about us. They stick us in a sector that we cannot properly man, patrol, or do missions with. proper manpower.
The only reason they come down here is when something

Y (b)(3)(b)(6)

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT" TAKEN AT DATED
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 198-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 3357 dated November 22, 1946 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION TCP 6 Kasabiyah Iraq	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20060708	3. TIME 0700	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3)(b)(6)	6. SSN (b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS E6	

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
B Co 1-502 INF 24LT DIVA Kasabiyah Iraq

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The meaning of TCP2 during the time frame of February and March was placed dependant on situation we did only mean TCP 2 with a four man element on 1 vehicle as an OP only. On occasion we would use an entire squad to man TCP2 which would have 7-8 people and 1 or 2 trucks. Now TCP2 is manned with an 8 man squad and 2 vehicles. I believe that the TCPs are just as effective now as they were at the beginning of the deployment. The command climate for our company has been on a down fall for quite some time. In February and March the command climate was fair due to new higher leadership in the company now it is on a continuous downward spiral due to Battalion and Brigade involvement in all aspects of our daily duties. Maintenance has never been an issue for our company, all it was a broke or repairable, it was done so as soon as parts are available. It is inevitable at the time, a replacement was found. Force protection is done at the lowest level everyone has found what works for them now and in the past. With higher level of involvement from Battalion and Brigade, we haven't really seen a lot of change in our platoon except more people on guard and more tired people. In regard to the command climate being in a downward spiral, when the studies left due to an injury, SSG Zsaski became our leader. He micromanaged everything the company and platoons did and his interaction with the platoons on a personal level was anything but desired. The soldiers did not like being called names all the time even though 1st Lt Kasabiyah was only being himself. New with current events all higher leadership is placing so much stress on our company leadership that they are afraid to make decisions that higher may not approve of. The soldiers were extremely happy when the studies returned but due to higher stress levels, it really doesn't make a difference. Who is in charge, everyone is still micromanaged from company and higher. While on the table sleep is hard to come by. Everyone gets 12 hours of guard per day and 12 hours of rest. Every rest, you make improvements to the TCPs and end up with approximately 4-6 hours of sleep throughout the 24 hour period, but never more than 4 hours at a time. Nothing like

end of statement

(b)(3)(b)(6)	(b)(3)(b)(6)
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10. EXHIBIT OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

0900 TIA

DATED

1006 07 83

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH OCCURS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

(b)(3)(b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF _____ ING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

Page 118 redacted for the following reason:

Duplicate of page 115

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) T 1011 DATED 2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

*happens. Battalion left us out here like this. We the
best we could with what we had and they wonder
why shit went wrong. End of Statement*

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AT

1011

DATED

2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE OF PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9897 dated November 22, 1993 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION <i>Vulturne</i>	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) <i>2306/07/08</i>	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
5. (b)(3)(b)(6)	(b)(3)(b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS <i>E-1</i>	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS <i>Bco 1-50202</i>			
9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:			

Unreadable Text

plus the losses we see are the personnel ones they are worse. Now the losses are a lot on the tanks are effective they are much better than the (b)(2)High. The (b)(2)High are worthless, but they can prevent you from getting blown up by at least one IED. How I feel, you my sergeant comment stating with a

of 10, 150 Battalion. Unreadable Text
and having everything we can do make it easier for us to make it better for us. Sgt said my Lt has done an outstanding job throughout the whole deployment to make it better for us.

Unreadable Text

and does it in a serious matter. The Lt's motto is to do just look were the

Unreadable Text

sector of Iraq. They thought we would not lose anything - all they thought wrong. Especially this area is a stronghold for the Iraqis. Nothing else follows.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT <i>3</i>	11. # (b)(3)(b)(6)	ON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"			
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.			

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

TOPZ

DATED

02 27 04

3. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE

OF

PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

TAKEN AT

TCD 7

DATED

08 JUL 96

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3)(b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)(b)(6)
subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSN).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: TCP 2; 2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 20060708; 3. TIME: 1035; 4. FILE NUMBER; 5. NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6); 6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6); 7. GRADE/STATUS: E-5

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: B Co 1/502nd

9. I, (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The TCP numbers & locations have been redesignated & moved. My immediate chain of command is satisfactory. Immediate chain of command visited TCPs at least once weekly before incident. Battalion level chain of command visited once every few weeks for special events. The TCPs are undergoing constant improvement. Company & Battalion elements are visiting the TCPs once a company morning is now at minimum & soldiers at every TCP. Prior meeting requirements were satisfactory for job done. We cannot run patrols from TCPs any more due to mounting requirements. TCPs themselves are still effective.

Nothing Follows (written diagonally across a large redacted area containing (b)(3)(b)(6))

10. EXHIBIT: AA; PERSON MAKING STATEMENT: (b)(3)(b)(6); PAGE 1 OF ___ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING: TAKEN AT ___ DATED ___; THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

[Large empty space for the statement content]

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3)(b)(6) T 1011 DATED 2006 07 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

happens. Battalion left us out here like this. We the best we could with what we had and they wonder why shit went wrong. End of Statement

(b)(3)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3)(b)(6) PAGE OF PAGES

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3)(b)(6)

NAT

1011

DATED

2006 07 08

2. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

_____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL OR

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____ at _____

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3)(b)(6)

PAGE

OF

PAGES

Pages 131 through 159 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(5)

Duplicate pages

SWORN STATEMENT

For of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is USOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSA).
PRINCIPAL: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION: FOB MAHUMUDIYAH NORTH, IRAQ APO AE 09398
2. DATE (YYYYMMDD): 2006/07/07
3. TIME: 1013 HOURS
4. FILE NUMBER:

5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME: (b)(3)(b)(6)
6. SSN: (b)(3)(b)(6)
7. GRADE/STATUS: O3, RA

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS: HHC, 1-502D IN, 2 BCT, 101ST ABN DIV (AA), FOB MAHUMUDIYAH NORTH, IRAQ, APO AE 09398

9. I, CPT (b)(3)(b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I was tasked by the 1 502D IN Battalion Commander to format the First Strike Standards that he wrote o/a 27 October of 2005, shortly after arrival into Iraq. After he approved the format, my follow-on instructions were to post the standards at various locations, specifically the DFAC, all MWR Facilities and BN TOC area. Additionally, I was instructed to provide a copy to each company and organization task organized under our Battalion so that they could post them in their areas as well. I do not recall the exact date/time I provided the document to the companies, but I recall emailing it out the Company Commanders as per the guidance I was given. The attached First Strike Standards is the document that I was instructed to distribute and have kept that document on my computer since it was developed.

Handwritten signature area with 'Nort' and 'A. Lewis' and a redacted box containing '(b)(3)(b)(6)'. A large 'X' is drawn over the entire page.

10. EXHIBIT: AH
11. INITIALS: (b)(3)(b)(6)
ING STATEMENT:
PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT TAKEN AT DATED

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Pages 161 through 184 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

Non Responsive

Department of the Army
2nd Brigade Combat Team, 4th Infantry Division
FOB Kalsu, Iraq

AFYB-AR

10 July 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes from the Investigating Officer, from 6 to 10 July 2006, at FOB Mahmudiyah, Patrol Base Yusifiyah, and TCPs 1, 2, and 6.

1. Between 6 through 10 July 2006, the Investigating Officer interviewed or had conversations with the Soldiers who rendered pertinent information not found in their statements. Also, the Soldiers who did not occupy leadership positions were generally asked a series of questions but were not required to fill out a sworn statement unless they had something of significant value towards the investigation.

2. During the interview on 8 July 2006 at Patrol Base Yusifiyah, between the Investigating Officer and the company commander, CPT (b)(3)(b)(6), the Investigating Officer asked CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) if he ever had the platoon leaders back brief the company commander on how the platoon was going to execute the TCP mission. CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) replied that he never had the platoon leaders back brief him.

3. During interviews with both leaders and Soldiers from 1st Platoon at FOB Mahmudiyah on 8 July 2006, the Investigating Officer asked the Soldiers how often were radio checks made, and what was done if the radio checks were not answered by a TCP. The vast majority of the respondents stated that radio checks were made every hour on the hour. They stated that the ASIP radio was the primary means of communication and the ICOM was the back up means. The respondents also stated that if neither means of communication were answered, then the platoon command post would have the next closest TCP send a patrol out to check on the TCP.

4. During an interview on 6 July 2006 between the Investigating Office and PFC Cross, rifleman A/3/1/B, PFC Cross made the quote that he did not need a range card because he had it all in his head.

5. During the interview on 6 July 2006 at FOB Mahmudiyah, between the Investigating Officer and SGT (b)(3)(b)(6), Team Leader B/3/1/B, SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) stated that TCP 6 had 3 Soldiers from his squad with 4 IA Soldiers at TCP 6. From discussing manning with most of the interviewed Soldiers, it appeared to be common during that time to split one squad between TCP 2 and TCP 6. The method in which this was done varied. Sometimes Squads would occupy TCP 6 and send a 3-4 man fire team to TCP 2. Other times, the Squad would occupy TCP 2 and send a 3-4 man fire team to TCP 6.

6. During the interview on 8 July 2006 at Patrol Base Yusifiyah, between the Investigating Officer and CPT (b)(3)(b)(6), the Investigating Officer attempted to get CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) to explain how CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) saw the manning requirements per TCP. The Investigating Officer started with the manning of TCPs in mid to late February and

attempted to progress to 12 March. CPT (b)(3)(b)(6) could not explain how TCPs were supposed to be manned in March.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Investigating Officer

~~SECRET~~
UNCLASSIFIED

THIS IS A COVER SHEET

FOR CLASSIFIED INFORMATION

ALL INDIVIDUALS HANDLING THIS INFORMATION ARE REQUIRED TO PROTECT IT FROM UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE IN THE INTEREST OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES.

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION OF THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT MUST BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH APPLICABLE EXECUTIVE ORDER(S), STATUTE(S) AND AGENCY IMPLEMENTING REGULATIONS.

LEADERSHIP + COMMAND CLIMATE
OF B/1-502^d IN, MND-B -
ACCUSED SOLDIERS IN MANMU-
DIYAN/YUSIFIYAN RAPE/MURDER,
(12 MAR 06)

(This cover sheet is unclassified.)

UNCLASSIFIED

~~SECRET~~





Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family

1st Plt, B/1-502, 2-101, MND-B

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

1



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family

Timeline

- ❖ O/A 12 Mar 06, Iraqi family murdered, and 15 y-o daughter raped and body is burned.
- ❖ 25 June 06 – Cdr, 2-101 informs MND-B Cdr of reports of the murder and rape by four Soldiers in 1/B/1-502 IN occurring in March.
 - Commander's Inquiry confirms report.
 - MND-B Cdr directs CID investigation and informs MNC-I Commander
- ❖ 26 June 06 - CID criminal investigation begins.
- ❖ 4 Jul – 101 Div Cdr asks for and receives GCMCA jurisdiction over the case from the 4ID Cdr.
- ❖ 5 Jul - IO commences AR -15-6 investigation. Purpose is to examine leadership actions in effect of B/1-502 IN o/a 12 Mar.
- ❖ 8 Jul – Charges preferred against SGT (b)(3)(b)(6), SGT (b)(3)(b)(6), SPO (b)(3)(b)(6), PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) and PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) (1/B/1-502).
- ❖ 11 Jul - IO completes investigation.
- ❖ 6-9 Aug Article 32 hearing for the five charged soldiers; report pending
- ❖ 18 Aug - \$30K condolence paid to family.
- ❖ CID criminal investigation on-going (see slide 8).

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

2

004748



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family
MND-B AR 15-6 Investigation (Findings 1 of 3)

- ❖ Many outstanding officers and soldiers in B company all of whom were repulsed by the criminal acts of 12 Mar.
- ❖ Numerous Troop Leading Procedure failures in B Company – notably failure to enforce standards.
- ❖ Soldiers were able to depart TCP2 because leaders were not conducting regular checks, and the radio checks from the TCP were being conducted:
 - Bn Cdr visits TCPs approx 2x week; Bn S3 tried to visit B Co TCPs 2x month.
 - Co Cdr visited TCPs 1-2x week, but did not enforce the corrections to deficiencies that he noted. Acting 1SG visited TCPs 2x week.
 - PL visited the TCPs 2-3x week and the PSG 1-2x week (PL on EML when incident occurred).
- ❖ Appears to be a breakdown of communication from Bn to company, company to platoon level.

3

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family
MND-B AR 15-6 Investigation (Findings 2 of 3)

- ❖ No SOP re TCP manning until Bn published same on 28 Jun. Prior to that guidance, Bn, Co, Plt all were following different guidance all of which was different than reality on the ground.
- ❖ TCP2 was manned by six soldiers on 12 Mar 06. Soldiers and small unit leaders understood the manning requirements, but would drop to minimum levels so as to permit patrolling.
- ❖ Co Cdr could not define where his key leaders were or were supposed to be.
- ❖ Force protection was under constant improvement although issues did exist getting proper support / materials.
- ❖ Vehicle readiness was an issue but the B Co mechanics were a point of pride to the company given the mechanics ability to keep older over-used vehicles running.

4

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

004749



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family MND-B AR 15-6 Investigation (Findings 3 of 3)

- ❖ B Co did make requests for additional soldiers to Bn which were not granted due to the Bn Cdr's belief that the Co Cdr was not properly utilizing his soldiers.
- ❖ Platoons did not request additional personnel from the company to support platoon missions.
- ❖ **The Soldiers** of B/1-502 uniformly understood their mission along (b)(2)High and thought that the mission was important. Also, **Soldiers felt that they should be taking the fight to the enemy rather than sitting at TCPs.**
- ❖ B Co Command climate:
 - First Plt feels that it has borne the brunt of the fight. Co B does not feel that the Bn is sympathetic to them or understands their issues. Bn believes that B Co is failing to enforce stds or properly execute missions. Bn has lost confidence in B Co Cdr to command.

5

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family MND-B AR 15-6 Investigation (Recommendations 1 of 2)

- ❖ Co Cdr should be removed from command and reassigned outside the Bn.
- ❖ First Platoon leadership should be reformed with leaders from throughout the Bde (in addition to the PL and PSG, the IO details leader changes to the TL level that he thinks should be made).
 - Bn Cdr recommends not reforming First Plt until return to Fort Campbell. Plt is currently performing force protection mission under close supervision at FOB Yusufiyah. This has freed other units from the FP mission.
- ❖ Procedures for controlling AO along (b)(2)High should be re-examined IOT facilitate patrolling.
- ❖ Conduct a command climate on the entire 1-502 IN BN.

6

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

004750



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family Actions to date based on 15-6

- ❖ Actions taken by the Bn Cdr to date:
 - Tremendous upgrades to force protection across the Bn AO.
 - The (b)(2)High security mission has been reevaluated and adjusted to permit greater patrolling.
 - B Co's AO has been reduced.

- ❖ Actions taken by MND-B Cdr
 - Company Cdr suspended from command pending relief and issued a GOMOR.
 - Plt Ldr suspended from position pending relief and issued a GOMOR.
 - Ordered a command climate survey of 1-502.

7

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family Criminal Case Road Ahead - CID

- ❖ Evidence sent to USACIL for processing.
- ❖ A FBI dive team is on site to attempt to recover the AK-47. (Update, 29 Aug – FBI dive team failed to recover AK-47)
- ❖ MNF-I continues to pursue with GOI exhuming the bodies.

8

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

004751



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family Criminal Case Road Ahead – UCMJ / PAO

- ❖ 101st CG will decide whether and what level courts-martial to refer against the accused Soldiers. (Art 32 inv report still pending and will be for at least another two weeks.)
- ❖ Copy of the 15-6 will have to be provided to the defense counsels after the cases are referred pursuant to discovery requests – anticipate defense counsel to release the investigation to the press.
- ❖ Current PAO posture is passive.

9

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family Back up slide Alleged facts of crime (12 Mar)

- ❖ TCP2 was manned by six soldiers from B/1-502: SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) SPC (b)(3)(b)(6), PFC (b)(3)(b)(6), PVT (b)(3)(b)(6) and PV2 (b)(3)(b)(6) Their SL was on EML.
- ❖ At approx 1500 (b)(3)(b)(6) were drinking whiskey and the plot was devised to go to the Iraqis' house.
- ❖ (b)(3)(b)(6) was left on radio watch with instructions to call if anyone came to the TCP. The other four soldiers went to the Iraqis' house.
- ❖ Father and five year old daughter were in front lawn (b)(3)(b)(6) took them inside, got mother and took all three into separate room and killed them with AK-47 found at the house.
- ❖ (b)(3)(b)(6) took 15 year old into the living room and raped her.
- ❖ (b)(3)(b)(6) came out and raped the 15 year old and then shot her with AK-47.
- ❖ (b)(3)(b)(6) put kerosene on 15 year old's body and one of the other soldiers lit it. (b)(3)(b)(6) had also opened the propane tank in the kitchen.

10

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

004752



Crimes Against a Local Iraqi Family

Backup slide

Alleged facts of crime (12 Mar)

- ❖ The soldiers then returned to TCP2 and burned their clothes.
- ❖ (b)(3)(b)(6) told (b)(3)(b)(6) to throw the AK-47 in a nearby canal, and he did.
- ❖ A few hours later, the IA reports dead Iraqis at the house to TCP1.
- ❖ After the incident is reported, SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) (TCP1) is sent to the house with PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) (TCP1), SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) (TCP2), and PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) (TCP2).
- ❖ SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) takes pictures of the crime scene and allegedly disposes of a shotgun shell that he finds there.
- ❖ PFC (b)(3)(b)(6) returned to Fort Campbell and separated from the Army for a personality disorder o/a May 06. He is currently in federal custody pending federal prosecution in KY.
- ❖ That US soldiers allegedly committed the crimes comes to light o/a 25 Jun 06.

11

STEADFAST AND LOYAL!

(b)(2)High

004753

Yusufiyah -- Basic Facts

- On 24 June 2006, MND-B was informed of an allegation of a rape and murder in the vicinity of Yusufiyah, Iraq. A soldier reported to a combat stress team that two members of his unit told him about a rape and murder they committed while on a checkpoint operation.
- The soldier stated that in March of this year, three soldiers in B/1-502d (a 101st Airborne Division unit under the operational control of 4ID in the vicinity of Baghdad) murdered an Iraqi family consisting of: a 50 year-old man, a 50 year-old woman, a 25 year-old woman, and a 4 year-old child.
- MND-B reported the information to the 10th MP Battalion (CID) for investigation. An initial inquiry was conducted into the facts and circumstances surrounding the incident to determine if there was credible information surrounding the information.
- Based on their initial investigation, CID believes there is credible information that the murder was committed by the B/1-502 Soldiers. It also appears at least one of the Soldiers raped the woman prior to the murders.
- The incident is currently under investigation by CID.
- The soldiers are in the same Company as the three soldiers who were recently killed in the vicinity of Yusufiyah while on duty at a checkpoint.
- The alleged ringleader of the incident was discharged from the military on 15 May 2006 for a mental disorder under the provisions of AR 635-200, Chapter 5.

Yusufiyah -- Additional Facts

004755

- Because (b)(3)(b)(6) has been discharged, the Army no longer has any jurisdiction over him. He will have to be prosecuted in Federal district court.
- The CG, 101st Airborne Division wants to assume jurisdiction and try the cases. Given the pending TOA dates for the units involved, the cases will likely be tried at Fort Campbell.
- On 28 June 06 Judge Advocates from MNC-I, MNF-I, and the 101st met via conference call to discuss the case.
- OTJAG Criminal Law Division has been informed IAW AR 27-10.
- The OSJA for MNC-I is assisting the 4th ID OSJA in every way possible.

Yusufiyah -- Personnel Involved

004756

- PFC [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Did not participate. Was told about the crime by his fellow-Soldiers. He informed combat stress of the crime.
- PFC [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Identified by all thus far as the ring leader. Soldiers involved all say he committed the rape and all of the murders. He was chaptered out of the Army in May 06 on a Chapter 5 (mental disorder). FBI and CID plan on apprehending him ASAP.
- SPC [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Admits being in the house, but claims not to have participated in the rape or murder. Gav statements to CID initially, but later invoked his rights.
- SPC [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Admits being in the house, but claims not to have participated in the rape or murder. Has not invoked his rights. Still talking to CID.
- PFC [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Admits acting as the lookout outside the door of the house. Says he heard shots, but did not witness any crimes.
- SPC [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) : Remained at the TCP during the crime and manned the radio. Knw about the crime, but did not participate.
- SGT [redacted] (b)(3)(b)(6) Located at a second TCP a few Km away. When he received the initial report of the murdered family, he dispatched the team from TCP 1 to investigate. There are indications that he learned about the crime at a later date, but did not tell anyone.

Pages 197 through 371 redacted for the following reasons:

Duplicate Pages
Duplicate pages