

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHO: B/2-5 CAV, 1/1 CD

WHAT: Non-combatants killed in combat operations

WHEN: o/a 25 1730 Jul 07

WHERE: Five Points Intersections, vicinity Ibrahim Bin Ali

CONDOLENCE PAYMENTS: Unit paid \$2,500 per decedent

### 1. Summary of Events.

On 25 July 2007, a patrol from 1/B/2-5 CAV was ordered to (b)(2)High  
ty of Beni Zaid and Ibrahim Bin Ali villages.. The p (b)(2)High  
(b)(2)High 2)H Soldiers, and one interpreter. The patrol's first position, with one (b)(2)High (b)(2)High  
ed Five Points Intersection and a volunteer-manned TCP near the tow Ibrahim Bin Ali.  
The rest of the platoon was at OP Hellhound, approximately (b)(2)High away.

Throughout the day, the (b)(2)High crew and nteers heard shots fired, but did not return fire.  
At approximately 1730 hours, the crew of the (b)(2)High heard two rounds fired directly over their  
position. The (b)(2)High gunner, SPC (b)(3),(b)(6) notified the TC, SGT (b)(3),(b)(6) that he was receiving fire.  
SPC (b)(3),(b)(6) also notified SGT (b)(3),(b)(6) of the s point of origin. At this point, SPC (b)(3),(b)(6)  
engaged a reedline to the nor with his (b)(2)High with approximately 130 rounds. Another round  
was then fired at SPC (b)(3),(b)(6) and he again engaged the reedline with 120 rounds. SGT (b)(3),(b)(6) then  
called CPL (b)(3),(b)(6) the (b)(2)High BC, and requested that he also engage the reedline. CPL (b)(3),(b)(6)  
complied. C (b)(3),(b)(6) r CP (b)(3),(b)(6) identified any enemy personnel; they b  
suspected enemy positions. After the (b)(2)High gaged, the volunteers also engaged.

The Soldiers and volunteers ceased fire and noticed civilians running towards the reedline. Some  
of these people put out a tracer-ignited fire in the reedline, and the others recovered  
(b)(6) a (b)(6)-year-old girl, was shot in the lower back. (b)(6)  
(b)(6) , a (b)(6) ot he head. The wounded children were rushed to OP  
nd for medical care. (b)(6) died at OP Hellhound. (b)(6) was airlifted to the 28th CSH,  
where he died of his wounds

2. Findings (summarized). Soldiers involved followed the MND-B ROE. SPC (b)(3),(b)(6) was  
reasonably certain that the enemy fire was coming from the reedline. The IO was unable to determine  
which group shot the children: the 2-5 CAV Soldiers, the AIF, or the volunteers. The IO found that  
injury to the children was unavoidable, due to the conditions on the ground. The children were in  
dead space, and the platoon could not see them. The platoon took proper to save the children.

### 3. Recommendations.

(b)(5)

c. BCT Cdr concurred with the IO's findings and recommendations and requested jurisdiction to  
issue letters of admonishment to the Soldiers involved in this incident.