

## EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

WHO: B/1-8 CAV, 2/1 CD

WHAT: Noncombatants killed in combat ops

WHEN: 13 1053 July 2007

WHERE: (b)(2)High Muhalla, (b)(2)

### 1. Summary of Events.

the morning of 13 Jul 07, E and F/1-8 CAV were preparing to conduct (b)(2)High from FOB Rustimayah to FOB Hope. Shortly before the SP time, two (b)(2)High 8 CAV, bumper numbers B21 and B22, were assigned to serve as rear security for the (b)(2)High. As the (b)(2)High left FOB Rustimayah, the lead Bradley, B22, began experiencing problems with pump. (b)(2)High fell behind and lost sight of the main (b)(2)High element. 1LT (b)(3),(b)(6), (b)(2)High Commander for B21, unsuccessfully attempted to contact other vehicles in the (b)(2)High

1LT (b)(3),(b)(6) then mistakenly began to follow another U.S. convoy onto (b)(2)High unaware that the main element of the (b)(2)High had turned into FOB Loyalty. At 1053, B22 was struck by an IED on the east side of (b)(2)High. The B22 Commander identified a triggerman approximately (b)(2)High away and engaged with the (b)(2)High. The weapon jammed, however, and the B22 crew switched to the (b)(2)High gun. At the same time, a group of approximately 10 to 12 AIF began to engage the convoy from the east. B21 and B22 returned fire with both (b)(2)High and (b)(2)High guns.

After the convoy resumed moving north, B22 was struck at 1057 by a second IED, which (b)(2)High the vehicle. The IED blast was followed by a series of coordinated small arms attacks by several two- and three-man AIF teams to the east. B22's (b)(2)High, again forcing the crew to switch to the (b)(2)High gun. From 1104 until 1155, the patrol received consistent small arms fire from several locations and returned fire. By 1211 (b)(2)High had arrived, secured B22, and continued movement north to catch up with the (b)(2)High

On 16 July 2007, Iraqi Police provided CF with a list of the Iraqi casualties from the series of engagements on 13 July. Among the dead and wounded were some family members and friends of (b)(6) (b)(6)

2. Findings (summarized). The IO found that the addition of 2/B/1-8 CAV as a rear security element was not properly coordinated or executed and resulted in confusion and communications problems throughout the mission. The security element directed all its fire at enemy locations to the east of (b)(2)High. During the engagement, using the (b)(2)High gun likely caused more collateral damage than the (b)(2)High would have.

(b)(5), (b)(2)High

b. BCT Cdr concurred with the IO's findings and recommendations and directed that \$30,000 in condolence payments be made to the family of (b)(6).