ONCE WE REACHED (b)(2)High WE OBSERVED THAT THE IP WAS ENGAGED FROM MULTIPLE PERSONNEL TO THE WEST AND THE NORTH. IT WAS OBVIOUS THAT THEY WERE UNDER SERIOUS FIRE BECAUSE THEY APPEARED SEVERELY DISORGANIZED AND OVERWHELMED. WE IMMEDIATELY BEGAN TO RECEIVE FIRE FROM THE NORTH AND WEST. AFTER WE ENGAGED ENEMY PERSENNEL TO THE NORTH, WE DESTROYED 2X ENEMY DISMOUNTS. SHORTLY THEREAFTER, PERSONNEL FROM IP CAME UP TO OUR VEHICLES AND GUIDED US ON 2 MORE ENEMY PERSONNEL (1X POSSIBLE SNIPER AND 1X ENEMY DISMOUNT). AFTER WE RECEIVED THIS INFORMATION, I DISMOUNTED SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) SQUAD TO CLEAR THE AREA TO THE WEST. AS THEY CLEARED THE AREA TO THE WEST, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) FOLLOWED WITH HIS VEHICLE AND COVERED THEIR MOVEMENT. AFTER A SHORT TIME, SSG (b)(3)(b)(6) WAS ABLE TO LOCATE WHERE THE IP WERE GUIDING US ON TARGET. NOT ONLY WERE THESE ENEMY PERSONNEL ENGAGING MY PLATOON BUT THEY WERE ALSO ENGAGING THE IP. WE IMMEDIATELY ENGAGED AND DESTROYED 2X ENEMY PERSONNEL (ONE WAS IN THE FIELD AND ONE W AS IN A BUILDING). AFTER THIS, ALL SHOOTING CEASED MOMENTARILY.

ONCE THIS WAS ACCOMPLISHED, I ORDERED SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) TO GET BACK IN THE VEHICLES AND WE BEGAN TO CONSOLIDATE BACK TO OUR ORIGINAL POSITION WHICH WAS (b)(2)High WE WAITED FOR ROUGHLY 5 MINUTES TO SEE IF ANYMORE FIRE WOULD COME TOWARDS OUR DIRECTION. AFTER ABOUT FIVE MORE MINUTES, I ORDERED OUR PLATOON TO CONTINUE MISSION BACK TO (b)(2)High TO COMPLETE (b)(2)High . HOWEVER, AS WE WERE MAKING OUR EXFIL, WE BEGAN TO BE ENGAGED BY (b)(2)High ENEMY POSITIONS TO THE NORTH OF OUR POSITION. WE IMMEIDATELY REACTED TO THEIR FIRE AND DESTROYED 2 ENEMY PERSONNEL. AGAIN, I DECIDED TO WAIT LONGER TO SEE IF ANYMORE CF WOULD BE ENGAGED. AFTER ABOUT 10 MORE MINUTES, I PROCEEDED BACK TO (b)(2)High (b)(2)High DURING (b)(2)High NO VIOLATIONS OF WEAPON STANDARDS WERE FOUND. WE PROCEEDED BACK TO OLD MOD BY WAY OF (b)(2)High

8. Detainees: NONE

9. Captured Equipment: NONE

10. Enemy KIA/WIA or damage to equipment: 6X ENEMY PERSONNEL

11. Collateral Damage: BULLET HOLES IN BUILDINGS

12. Time of arrival at FOB/EOM 2215

13. MEDEVAC: NONE

(b)(2)High, Nonresponsive

(b)(2)High, Nonresponsive

15. To what extent was the mission accomplished? MISSION ACCOMPLISHED. FURTHERMORE, TODAY WAS AN EXCELLENT EXAMPLE OF CF WORKING TOGETHER TO COUNTER AIF ACTIVITY. IT WAS GOOD TO SEE IP RUN UP TO OUR VEHICLES DURING A FIREFIGHT TO GUIDE US ON AIF TARGETS.

16. Recommended changes in operational procedures. (b)(2)High

17. What additional information is needed in the mission briefing? (b)(2)High

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ UNCLASSIFIED

(b)(2)High

IO (b)(3)(b)(6)

CENTC

Ex T

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG For use of this form, see AR 220-15, the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans				PAGE NO. 1	NO. OF PAGES
ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION ICO 1/26 inf	LOCATION TAJI ~~ACO 1/26 I.~~	PERIOD COVERED			
		FROM		TO	
		HOUR	DATE	HOUR	DATE
		0700	1 Jan 07	1515	1 Jan 07

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL

(b)(2)High

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High

IO

(b)(3)(b)(6)

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~~Exhibit DD~~

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PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
1	6

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	FROM DATE	TO HOUR	TO DATE
A Co 1-26 INF	Taji	1900	1 Jan 07	2300	1 Jan 07

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High

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(b)(2)High

IO (b)(3)(b)(6)

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PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	FROM DATE	TO HOUR	TO DATE
2/26	Camp Taji	2300	01 Jan 07	2359	01 Jan 07

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INI.

)(3)(b)(

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

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USAPPC V3.00

IO (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High

Ex U

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PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
3	6

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	FROM DATE	TO HOUR	TO DATE
1 co. 1/26	Camp Taji	0006	02 Jan 07	0302	2 Jan 07

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INI.

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

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(b)(3)(b)(6)

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DA FORM 1594, NOV 62

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USAPPC V3.00

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IO (b)(3)(b)(6)

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PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	FROM DATE	TO HOUR	TO DATE
1 ½26 Inf	Camp Taji	0318	02 Jan 06	0555	02 Jan 06

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL

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(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

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PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	FROM DATE	TO HOUR	TO DATE
A '126 Int	Camp Taj:	0605	02 Jan 07	0632	02 Jan 07

ITEM NO	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL

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(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6)

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(b)(2)High 10 (b)(3)(b)(6)

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PAGE NO.	NO. OF PAGES
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ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION	LOCATION	PERIOD COVERED FROM HOUR	FROM DATE	TO HOUR	TO DATE
A 1/26 Inf	Camp Taji	0638	02Jan07	0700	02Jan07

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INL

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICIAL ON DUTY

SIGNATURE

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(b)(2)High

(b)(3)(b)(6

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(b)(2)High, (b)(3)(b)(6)

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10 (b)(3)(b)(6)

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Ex u

DECEMBER BOLO LIST

(b)(2)High

AS OF 30 DEC 06

(b)(2)High

IO BAUMEISTER

CENTCOM 012002

~~Exhibit EE~~

Ex V

2nd PLATOON, ALPHA COMPANY CONTACT 01JAN07

SITUATION: APACHE WHITE ENGAGEMENT ON NIGHT OF 01 JAN 07

DISCUSSION: WHITE PLATOON SPs OUT OF FOB OLD MOD 1330 WITH 4 VEH (b)(2)High WHILE TRAVELLING NORTH ON (b)(2)High VIC (b)(2)High INTERSECTION, PLATOON CAME UNDER FIRE FROM ALLEYS AND HOUSES TO THEIR WEST AND FROM (b)(2)High M NORTH ON (b)(2)High HE PLATOON FORMED A BOX FORMATION WITH THE (b)(2)High FACING NORTH ON (b)(2)High AND THE (b)(2)High ACING SOUTH ON ASR DOVER. AFTER RECEIVING INSTRUCTIONS FORM THE LOCAL IPs TO CLEAR THE AREA NORTH AND EAST OF THE BOX FORMATION, A25 AND A124 PROCEEDED TO THE AREA AND DISMOUNTED A TEAM OF INFANTRYMAN WHICH ENGAGED RUNNING TARGETS FLEEING THE AREA. UPON RETURNIGN TO THE EXACT LOACTION AND PLACING A25 AND A124 BACK INTO THE BOX FORMATION, APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES LATER AND AFTER THE ENGAGEMENT HAD SLOWED CONSIDERABLY, THE GUNNER ON A26 IN THE NORTHBOUND LANE OF (b)(2)High SGT (b)(3)(b) OBSERVED A WHITE SUV THAT MATCHED THE BOLO DESCRIPTION OF A VBIED TRAVELING SOUTH TOWARDS THE PATROL IN THE SOUTHBOUND LANE OF ON DOVER. AT AN ESTIMATED (b)(2)High DISTANCE, SGT (b)(3)(b) FIRED HIS 240C ON THE VEHICLE WITHOUT REQUESTING OR RECEIVING AUTHORITY FROM HIS (b)(2)High COMMANDER AND PLATOON LEADER. THE DRIVER OF THE OTHER BRADELY A25 PFC (b)(3)(b) WITNESSES THE WHITE SUV TRAVELING AT APPROXIMATELY 10 MPH AND COMING TO STOP WHEN IT WAS ENGAGED BY SGT (b)(3)(b) ALTHOUGH IT WAS NOT CONFIRMED IF THE DRIVER WAS KILLED, MUTLIPLE PEOPLE WITENESSED THE DRIVER SLUMP OUT OF THE CAR AND NOT MOVE ANY FURTHER THAN A FEW FEET FROM THE CAR. AFTER APPROXIMATELY 10 MINUTES, THE PLATOON CONTINUED MISSION WITH THEIR CORDON AND KNOCK AND RETURNED TO THE PATROL BASE OF OLD MoD.

FINDINGS: I FIND THAT SGT (b)(3)(b) HE GUNNER OF A26, IMPROPERLY ENGAGED A CIVILIAN WHITE SUV THAT POSED NO IMMEDIATE THREAT AT A DISTANCE OF APPROXIMATELY (b)(2)High I FIND THAT SGT (b)(3)(b) ENAGGED THE VEHICLE AS SOON AS IT BECAME VISIBLE WHILE TRAVELING SOUTH ON (b)(2)High WITHOUT ANY ESCALATION OF FORCE. I FIND THAT THE (b)(2)High WHITE SUV WAS MOST LIKELY SLOWING DOWN WHEN SGT (b)(3)(b) ENGAGED IT AFTER SEEING (b)(2)High IN THE DISTANCE. I FIND THAT SGT (b)(3)(b) DID NOT ANNOUNCED POSITIVE IDENTIFICATION OF THE WHITE SUV BEFORE ENGAGING IT TO HIS (b)(2)High COMMANDER 1LT (b)(3)(b) I (b)(2)High (b)(3)(b) IN THIS INCIDENT PER HIS DIRECT STATEMENTS TO ME. AS A RESULT OF HIS ACTIONS, I BELIEVE SGT (b)(3)(b) MOST LIKELY KILLED AN UNARMED CIVILIAN OPERATING THE CAR WITHOUT DUE CAUSE. I FIND THAT SGT (b)(2)High (b)(3)(b) COMMANDER 1LT (b)(3)(b) HAS COVERED UP THIS INCIDENT SINCE IT OCCURRED. I FIND THAT 1LT (b)(3)(b) DID NOT IMMEDIATELY REPORT THIS INCIDENT OVER FM COMMUNICATIONS TO HIS COMPANY TOC. I ALSO FIND THAT 1LT (b)(3)(b) DID NOT ALSO REPORT THIS INCIDENT IN HIS PATROL DEBRIEF TO HIS COMMANDER. I ALSO FIND THAT IT VERY LIKELY THAT 1LT (b)(3)(b) BROUGHT ALL PARTICIPANTS FROM THIS INCIDENT TOGETHER ONCE BACK TO OLD MoD AND DIRECTLY ORDERED EVERYONE TO NOT DISCUSS THE INCIDENT AND TOLD THEM AS HE HAD BEFORE THAT THE THINGS THAT OCCUR IN SECTOR REMAIN IN SECTOR.

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

Ex W

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 2nd Brigade Combat Team
82nd Airborne Division
Camp Taji, Iraq APO AE 09378

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AFVC-B 29 April 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Interview with SPC (b)(3)(b)(6)

1. I interviewed SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) in Building 523, Camp Taji on 9 April at approximately 2038 hrs. SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) a DA 3881 Rights Warning Procedures/Waiver Certificate properly. SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) did not want to invoke his rights for non-waiver and he did not wish to speak to a lawyer.

2. SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) corroborated many of the details that I had learned from interviewing the other participants in his platoon the previous day.

a. SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) acknowledged during his interview with me on 9 April 2007, he remembers 1LT (b)(3)(b)(6) stating that what happens in sector stays in sector but he was unsure if it included the night of 1 January 2007.

b. SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) also acknowledged during his interview with me on 9 April 2007 that he had only video taped as the platoon responded to the noise of a firefight on (b)(2)High in the following march order (b)(2)High He also stated that his videotaping ended as the (b)(2)High vehicles turned (b)(2)High from their (b)(2)High SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) stated he did not videotape any of the EOF incident and actually did not see any of the EOF incident.

c. SPC (b)(3)(b)(6) also acknowledged during his interview with me on 9 April 2007 that he had no idea who stole his memory card out of his camera while he was on environmental moral leave (EML) and that when he returned from EML his memory card had been removed from his camera.

3. Point of contact this headquarters is MAJ (b)(3)(b)(6) 2-82 COR/ S4, (NIPR) (b)(3)(b)(6), (b)(2)High (SIPR) (b)(3)(b)(6), (b)(2)High or (VOIP) 772-7041.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

MAJ, OD
BCT S4

Ex X

To whom it may concern,

It didn't have to go down this way but I guess sometimes when it gets to a point when a man has to say what he's been holding next to his heart then that's what has to happen.

(b)(2)High

Nonresponsive, (b)(3)(b)(6)

Nonresponsive, (b)(3)(b)(6) I understand that by writing this that I am messing up a lot of peoples carrier but with this unit we have some people with in the leadership that are so quick to point fingers but they don't take a step and think about what they have done in the past.

First of all ill start with the platoon 2nd platoon leader Aco 1-26 in, on the 1st of January around when we were conducting (b)(2)High mission we responder to a fire fight that had been doing on (b)(2)High for about 1 hour. The platoon leader was second in the order of march then my vehicle was the 3rd. I don't know how the order had all over changed because we always travel with (b)(2)High in the middle then (b)(2)High When the LT pulled up on (b)(2)High I my self witnessed him engage a civilian vehicle which was about (b)(2)High away without even warning them or anything and to make it even worse he kept of shouting even after the vehicle had stopped. He then instructed me to tell Spc (b)(3)(b)(6) to delete the video that he had recorded during the fire right that he didn't want any thing to come back on him. And I guess me having a call phone on sector is more messed up than that.

Nonresponsive, (b)(3)(b)(6)

~~Exhibit FF~~

Ex Y

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Nonresponsive, (b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Ex Y

Nonresponsive, (b)(3)(b)(6)

SGT (b)(3)(b)(6)

Ex Y

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
Headquarters 2nd Brigade Combat Team
82nd Airborne Division
Camp Taji, Iraq APO AE 09378

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

AFVC-B

29 April 2007

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: Interview with SGT (b)(3)(b)(6)

1. I interviewed SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) at Old Mod, Iraq on 8 April at approximately 1100 hrs. I failed to have SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) sign his DA 3881 Rights Warning Procedures/Waiver Certificate properly. SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) did not want to invoke his rights for non-waiver and he did not wish to speak to a lawyer.

2. Instead of him signing in Section B. Waiver, Block 3, I errantly directed him sign in Section C. Non-waiver, Block 2. SGT (b)(3)(b)(6) openly discussed with me the EOF incident that occurred on 1 January 2007.

3. Point of contact this headquarters is MAJ (b)(3)(b)(6), 2-82 COR/ S4, (NIPR) (b)(3)(b)(6), (b)(2)High or (VOIP) 772-7041.

(b)(3)(b)(6)

MAJ, OD
BCT S4

Ex Z