

Page 1 redacted for the following reason:

(b)(5)

REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by COMMANDER, COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE- AFGHANISTAN
(Appointing authority)

on 18 JUN 06 (Date) (Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The (investigation) (board) commenced at BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN at 1300Z
(Place) (Time)

on 18 JUN 06 (Date) (If a formal board met for more than one session, check here . Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.) The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were present: (After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)

The following persons (members, respondents, counsel) were absent: (Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)

The (investigating officer) (board) finished gathering/hearing evidence at 1400Z on 26 JUN 06
(Time) (Date)
and completed findings and recommendations at 1800Z on 28 JUN 06
(Time) (Date)

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES		YES	NO	NA ²
1	Inclosures (para 3-15, AR 15-6)			
	Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals. (Attached in order listed)			
	a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	X		
	b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? (See item 9, below)			
	c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?			X
	d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?			X
	e. Privacy Act Statements (Certificate, if statement provided orally)?			X
	f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered (e.g., absence of material witnesses)?			X
	g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?			X
	h. Any other significant papers (other than evidence) relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?			X

FOOTNOTES: ¹ Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.
² Use of the NA column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.

		YES	NO ¹	NA ²
2	Exhibits (para 3-16, AR 15-6)			
	a. Are all items offered (whether or not received) or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	X		
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	X		
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	X		
	d. Are copies, descriptions, or depictions (if substituted for real or documentary evidence) properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?			X
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board (para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?			X
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	X		
	g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit (para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?			X
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations (paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?			X
B. COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS (Chapter 5, AR 15-6)				
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment (para 5-3h, AR 15-6)?			
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board (para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?			
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused (para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?			
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required (para 3-1, AR 15-6)?			
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence (para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?			
C. COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED (Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)				
9	Notice to respondents (para 5-5, AR 15-6):			
	a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?			
	b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?			
	c. Does each letter of notification indicate:			
	(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?			
	(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?			
	(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?			
	(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?			
	(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?			
	d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?			
	e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?			
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began (or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):			
	a. Was he properly notified (para 5-5, AR 15-6)?			
	b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel (para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?			
11	Counsel (para 5-6, AR 15-6):			
	a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?			
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	(If counsel is a lawyer, check here <input type="checkbox"/>)			
	b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?			
	c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy (or, if oral, a summary) of the request and the action taken on it included in the report (para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?			
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality (para 5-7, AR 15-6):			
	a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?			
	b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?			
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to (para 5-8a, AR 15-6):			
	a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?			
	b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?			
	c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?			
	d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?			
	e. Testify as a witness?			
	f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument (para 5-9, AR 15-6)?			
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses (para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?			
15	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it (para 5-11, AR 15-6)?			
FOOTNOTES.				
1. Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.				
2. Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.				

SECTION IV - FINDINGS (para 3-10, AR 15-6)

The (investigating officer) (board), having carefully considered the evidence, finds:
SEE ATTACHED MEMO

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS (para 3-11, AR 15-6)

In view of the above findings, the (investigating officer) (board) recommends:
SEE ATTACHED MEMO

SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION (para 3-17, AR 15-6)

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. (If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)

(Recorder)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Member)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT (para 3-13, AR 15-6)

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board. (In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)

(Member)

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY (para 2-3, AR 15-6)

The findings and recommendations of the investigating officer board are approved (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions: _____) (substitutions: _____). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

CJSOTF-A-CDR

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE - AFGHANISTAN
APO, AE 09354

18 June 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force --
Afghanistan, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Appointment as AR 15-6 Investigating Officer

1. You are hereby appointed as an Investigating Officer pursuant to AR 15-6. You are directed to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding an enemy engagement by Task Force 73 personnel on 17 June 2006 in Oruzgan Province. This mortar engagement resulted in the death of one local national civilian and injury of four other local national civilians.
2. This will be an informal investigation conducted IAW the provisions of AR 15-6. You will review all available documentary evidence and conduct witness interviews. All witness statements will be sworn. If written statements cannot be obtained, you will summarize the content of any conversations and attach them to your report.
3. You will make findings of fact, and recommendations based upon those facts, at the conclusion of the inquiry. You will provide recommendations on how to resolve all issues. Report your findings using DA Form 1574. You are to include any recommendations for UCMJ or administrative action. Your findings and recommendations, including a legal review, will be submitted to the Commander, CJSOTF-A, within 10 days of receipt of this appointment. Contact me if you require an extension.
4. If, in the course of your investigation, you suspect that a person may have committed a criminal offense in violation of the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), you will advise that person of his or her rights under Article 31, UCMJ prior to obtaining a statement from that witness. You will use the DA Form 3881 to conduct right warning advisement. If you determine that someone senior in rank may be responsible for any offense, you will inform me immediately.
5. This investigation takes priority over all other duties. Contact your assigned legal advisor, MAJ (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CJSOTF-A Command Judge Advocate (DSN (b)(2)High for a legal briefing before you begin your investigation.

///—original signed—///

(b)(3), (b)(6)

COL. SF
Commanding

CENTCOM 009896



DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
 COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE - AFGHANISTAN
 APO, AE 09354



(b)(2)High J5

28 June 2006

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force - Afghanistan, Bagram, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Findings and Recommendations

1. **SUMMARY:** The investigating officer, having carefully considered the evidence, finds that the proximate cause of the injury to the noncombatants was a mechanical failure of the 120mm mortar bipod and meteorological conditions (high winds) at the time of the incident. There was no gross negligence or dereliction of duty that contributed to the death and injury of noncombatants in the vicinity of Firebase Tycz on 171420ZJUN06. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(2)High Commander, did follow the CENTCOM ROE prior to engaging suspected ACM in the vicinity of Firebase Tycz. And, (b)(2)High conducted complete and thorough consequence management in the wake of the accident.

2. **FINDINGS:**

a. On 171130ZJUN06, (b)(2)High received a report from an Afghan who works at Firebase Tycz that approximately 15 ACM had been observed on and around a hilltop located at (b)(2)High. The Afghan reported that the ACM had been seen on the hilltop for the past two days. Historically, the ACM have used this hilltop to shoot rockets at Firebase Tycz. The (b)(2)High had recovered two IEDs and saw Taliban fighters transiting the area ten days prior to this report.

b. The typical ACM indirect attack cycle is normally a 3 day cycle. The first day of the cycle, the ACM reconnoiter the proposed firing position. The second day, the ACM prepares the firing position, and on the third day, the ACM emplace the rockets and arm them with a firing system. According to the report received by (b)(2)High 17 JUN 06 was the third day of the cycle.

c. (b)(2)High attempted to launch its organic (b)(2)High but it could only hover while turned into the headwind. At 171420ZJUN06, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) the Detachment Commander, moved to an observation tower approximately 500 meters from Firebase Tycz and observed two individuals on the hilltop. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) determined that the two fighting age males were ACM and were likely to pose a threat to the firebase in the form of a rocket attack based on the following facts: (b)(2)High

(b)(2)High

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 INVESTIGATING OFFICER FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

d. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed all previously computed data and conducted an adjust fire mission with the firebase's 120mm mortars. SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) senior weapons sergeant, and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) junior weapons sergeant, crewed the 120mm mortar. SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) graduated from the Infantry Mortar Leaders Course in July 2005 and was performing the duties of gunner. He also input the data into the Mortar Ballistic Computer (MBC). The MBC was using registration data computed from a mortar registration that was conducted on 15 JUN 06 along with the default meteorological corrections because a current met message was not available. SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) performed the duties of assistant gunner. The range to target from the mortar to the target was approximately 4 kilometers and the wind was blowing from North to Southwest at approximately 15-20 mph. The wind had the effect of pushing the round to the west of the intended impact point.

e. Upon receipt of the fire mission, SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) set the elevation and deflection on the sight and leveled the bubbles, as computed by the MBC, and SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) set the charge on the mortar round. When SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) released the round, the mortar tube shifted to the right. The mortar round landed to the west of the target in the vicinity of a nearby village. The reaction of the two suspected ACM was inconsistent with what would be an expected noncombatant response. One individual remained near the fighting positions while the other individual ran down the hill to the south. Due to a communications failure, it was several minutes before the correction of "right 200" was transmitted to the mortars. During this time, four males climbed the hill from the south and moved to the fighting positions. The second adjusting round landed on the northern portion of the hill and CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) used two more adjusting rounds prior to calling for a fire for effect on the center of mass of the fighting positions where the suspected ACM had moved. After the three round fire for effect and seeing the suspected ACM move off the hilltop, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) called "end of mission", observed no measurable BDA, and began moving back to the firebase.

f. Upon receiving "end of mission", SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) inspected the mortar in an attempt to discover what caused the mortar tube to move when the first round was fired. Upon closer inspection, they discovered the bipod crossbeam that has the deflection adjustment wheels was loose. The retaining screw at the end of the crossbeam had worked itself loose and there was approximately a 0.5 inch gap between the retaining screw and the crossbeam. This gap did not effect the operation of the deflection wheel, but the play in the crossbeam was transferred directly to the bipod cradle, which caused the mortar tube to move when unequal pressure was applied to it by SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) during firing.

g. While moving back to the firebase, CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) interpreter received a phone call from one of the firebase workers who lives close to where the first round impacted. He stated that some children had been wounded by the mortar round. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed the Afghans to bring any wounded to the firebase for treatment. The wounded Afghans arrived at the firebase at approximately 171600ZJUN06 and the

(b)(2)High -J5

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 INVESTIGATING OFFICER FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

(b)(2)High treated six Afghans for wounds, requesting a MEDEVAC for five of six Afghans. The first medevac request was denied, even though CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the casualties were caused by U.S. fire. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) again requested a MEDEVAC received approval. Moonrise on 17 JUN was 1922Z and the MEDEVAC did not arrive until 2000Z.

h. Following the MEDEVAC of the five Afghans, the (b)(2)High paid for the transportation of the families of the wounded personnel to the Tarin Khowt Forward Surgical Team (FST). All, but one, of the wounded Afghans who were medevaced to the FST were stabilized and are currently recovering. A (b)(6) year old female died from exsanguination at the FST. The death of the (b)(6) year old girl was a direct result of the medevac taking four hours to arrive at the firebase.

i. After the casualties had been moved to the FST, the (b)(2)High immediately drafted a message to be played on the local radio station that explained the accident to the local populace and met with the village elder the next day. Humanitarian assistance was offered by the (b)(2)High and accepted by the villagers. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) met with the wounded Afghans' family members, explained what had happened, and apologized. The families understood that accidents happen and stated that they support the government. The (b)(2)High also informed local government officials and the Tarin Khowt Police Chief, who stated that he would inform Governor Monib.

3. RECOMMENDATIONS: In view of the above findings, the investigating officer recommends: (1) that no punitive action be taken against the members of (b)(2)High (2) that CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) be formally counseled for failing to request additional (b)(2)High (b)(2)High assets that could have engaged, or facilitated the engagement of, the ACM with fires more precise than mortars; (3) that SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) be formally counseled on the importance of proper PMCS of the 120mm mortar system; (4) that serious consideration be given to providing meteorological equipment (radiosomes, receivers, etc.) for firebases with 120mm mortars; and (5) that an inquiry be conducted to determine the facts surrounding the four hour MEDEVAC response time.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INDEX OF EXHIBITS

- I. Initial executive summary of 17 JUN 06 incident
- II. (b)(2)High executive summary follow-up
- III. Statement of CPT
- IV. Statement of SFC (b)(3), (b)(6)
- V. Statement of SSG

EXSUM Follows:

Background: (b)(2)High received a (b)(2)High report from a firebase worker on 171130ZJUN06 stating that 15 Taliban were seen on a hilltop four kilometers to the north. Detachment subsequently confirmed this report by one of their sources. This specific uninhabited hilltop is the same one that the Taliban has historically launched 107mm rockets at the firebase. The hilltop is also in the vicinity where the detachment recovered two IED's ten days ago and observed Taliban fighters transiting the area.

Mortar grid data was computed at 1300Z. At 1420Z the detachment commander dispatched two Forward Observers to the firebase's outer perimeter tower to observe the target area. They subsequently observed four fighting age males. Prior to authorizing a 120mm mortar fire mission, the detachment confirmed the grid coordinate of hilltop (TRP from previous rocket attacks), double checked it on (b)(2)High and reconfirmed the gun data.

Fire Mission: At 1440Z the detachment commander authorized a 120mm mortar fire mission. As the first round was hung, the bipod shifted slightly causing the round to land approximately 200 meters west of the hilltop. The detachment's mortar crew adjusted the gun and fired six additional rounds that impacted the target.

Consequence Management: The detachment has LN workers that live in area where the stray mortar round impacted. The detachment commander requested that his interpreter contact them via phone to see if there was any collateral damage. The interpreter reported that several villagers had been injured. The detachment commander informed the interpreter to have the injured brought to the firebase's medical clinic for immediate care.

Injured local nationals:

1. (b)(6)yr old female (large wound to right foot, possible right leg fracture – tourniquet placed on right leg)
2. 7yr old female (injury to right hip, possible pelvic fracture – patient stable and alert)
3. 7yr old male (large hole in pelvis with arterial bleed)
4. (b)(6)yr old male (open fracture to left foot)
5. 7yr old male (shrapnel to right forearm, possible fracture)

Patients were air MEDEVAC'd to the Tarin Kowt FST for surgery/follow-on treatment. (b)(6)year old female has expired. Additional four patients are expected to recover.

Detachment commander informed the village elder that this was an unfortunate accident and that his village was not targeted. Requested that village elders attend a Shura tomorrow to discuss the event and compensate the families of the 1 x KIA and 4 x WIA. Detachment will also employ its CAT-A to the village in the morning to distribute HA. Have also prepared a radio broadcast message which has been translated and sent to the firebase's radio station for broadcast.

TF-73 will continue prudent consequence management measures to maintain the rapport we have established in Deh Rawood over the last 4.5 months. Will also ensure that Governor (b)(6) is kept abreast of the situation.

CENTCOM 009901

Sir,

EXSUM Update Follows:

Update to Consequence Management:

1. Detachment Commander met at 180710ZJUN06 with the families of the individuals that were wounded. Detachment Commander explained to the families what happened, the families were understanding, they said they support the government and understand that accidents happen.
2. Detachment Commander sent our CA/TPT to the the area with ANA at 172330ZJUN06. The villagers were offered HA assistance, but the families where enroute to FB Tycz to get taxi-evac'd to Tarin Kowt, because the pilots would not take the family members with the wounded. The CAT-A team, and the Detachment Commander informed the families that we had assistance available for them, the families said they would return to the firebase after they went to Tarin Kowt for the assistance. The Detachment paid for their Taxi-evac and the family members were sent at 180730ZJUN06 to Tarin Kowt to be with their wounded family members.
3. TPT drafted broadcast at 172020ZJUN06 for the radio station and it was first aired at 180330ZJUN06, during the morning news broadcast. It will continue to air throughout today at each news spot.
4. Detachment called the Governor several times but could not get through to him. The Deh Rawod District Chief, Assistant District Chief, Chief of Police, and Mayor are all currently in Tarin Kowt. They were in Tarin Kowt before the incident happened. Detachment Commander got in contact with the Tarin Kowt Chief of Police, the general, and explained the situation to him and he said he understood the situation and that it was an accident and would pass the information on to the Governor.
5. Detachment Commander also met with a representative from the area where the mortar round landed and the local elder informed the Detachment Commander that he had told the people in the area that it was unintentional and he said that if the people of the area thought we had done it intentionally they would not have brought the wounded to our firebase for treatment.
6. Last night after the round landed west of the desired target the Detachment Commander talked to one of our workers who lives in the area and explained that the round was not intended for the spot where it landed. The worker told the local people that it was an accident and we relayed through him to bring any wounded to us so we could treat the wounded.
7. At 180810ZJUN06 the Detachment Commander called the local government officials here in Deh Rawod, they had not been told about the incident from any of the locals. We explained what happened.

Mortar Tube Findings:

CENTCOM 009902

1. The mortar tube has a loose washer/bolt on the traverse bar. The bolts cause the tube to be able to shift even after the traverse bar has been moved and the bubbles are level. The tube was bumped as the round was being hung and it moved, because of the loose bolt/washer.

2. Both Bravos on the detachment have tried to tighten the bolts but were unsuccessful. The bolts will not tighten, due to them being worn out from overuse/old equipment.

3. The Bipod has been replaced and will not be used. The Detachment is requesting a replacement for the bipod and will list it on our logstat.

Very Respectfully,

CPT (b)(3), (b)(6)

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 dated November 22, 1943 (SSI).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately identified.
ROUTINE USES: Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.
DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION FB TYCZ, DEH RAWOD, AFGHANISTAN		2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2006/06/21	3. TIME 1800Z	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)		6. SSN (b)(6)		7. GRADE/STATUS O-3/CPT

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(2)High

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON 17 JUNE 2006, WHILE SERVING AS THE FIREBASE COMMANDER FOR FIRE BASE TYCZ, I RECEIVED AN (b)(2)High REPORT AT APPROXIMATELY 171130ZJUN06 OF 15 ACM MASSING ON A HILLTOP (b)(2)High (b)(2)High THE (b)(2)High WAS FROM A RELIABLE SOURCE THAT LIVES IN THAT AREA AND WORKS AT OUR FIREBASE. THE REPORT STATED THAT 15 ACM HAD BEEN SEEN ON THE HILLTOP THE PAST TWO DAYS. THIS HILLTOP IS ONE OF THE TRPs THAT WE HAVE AT FIREBASE TYCZ BECAUSE OF HISTORICAL ROCKET ATTACKS FROM THAT LOCATION. THE TYPICAL ROCKET ATTACK IS CONDUCTED OVER A SERIES OF DAYS, WITH ACM OBSERVING FROM A HILLTOP, THEN COMING IN AND SETTING UP AIMING POINTS, AND THEN FIRING THE ROCKETS AT FIREBASE TYCZ. WE RECEIVED MULTIPLE 107MM ROCKETS FROM THIS SAME AREA ON 26 JAN 06 BASED ON THE (b)(2)High REPORT AND HISTORICAL ATTACKS, WE VIEWED THE HILLTOP ON (b)(2)High TO ENSURE THAT WE HAD AN ACCURATE 10 DIGIT GRID FOR CALCULATING THE ROUNDS AT APPROXIMATELY 171300ZJUN06. I CONFIRMED THE TARGET LOCATION, MY FORWARD OBSERVER LOCATION, AND THE EXACT MILS FROM MY FORWARD OBSERVER POSITION TO THE TARGET ON FALCON VIEW WITH SSG (b)(3), (b)(6) THE WEAPONS SERGEANT AND THE NCOIC OF THE MORTAR FIRE DIRECTION CENTER AT FIREBASE TYCZ. WE CALCULATED DISTANCE, DIRECTION, OBSERVERS LOCATION AND THE GUN TUBE DIRECTION FROM ON (b)(2)High TO ENSURE THE MOST ACCURATE CALCULATIONS. AT APPROXIMATELY 171420ZJUN06 I MOVED OUT TO THE ANA GUARD TOWER TO CONFIRM THE REPORT OF ACM ON THE HILLTOP. WHEN I OBSERVED THE HILLTOP WITH THE REPORTED ACM I OBSERVED TWO INDIVIDUALS THAT WERE IN THE VICINITY OF THE RUSSIAN FIGHTING POSITIONS THAT ARE ON TOP OF THE HILL. THERE ARE NO COMPOUNDS OR FIELDS ON THE HILLTOP, JUST THE RUSSIAN DUG-IN FIGHTING POSITIONS. I DETERMINED THAT THERE WAS PROBABLE CERTAINTY THAT THESE WERE ACM AND THAT THE MALES ON THE HILLTOP WERE LIKELY TO POSE A THREAT TO THE FIREBASE IN THE FORM OF A ROCKET ATTACK. I RECONFIRMED ALL DATA, GRIDS, FRIENDLY LOCATIONS, DISTANCE AND DIRECTION TO THE FIRE DIRECTION CENTER AND THEN OBSERVED THE FIRST ROUND. THE FIRST ROUND LANDED APPROXIMATELY 200M WEST OF (b)(2)High THE NEARBY VILLAGE. AT THIS POINT, ONE OF THE INDIVIDUALS ON THE HILL RAN DOWN THE HILL AND ONE REMAINED AT THE RUSSIAN FIGHTING POSITIONS. DUE TO A COMMUNICATIONS PROBLEM BETWEEN MYSELF AND THE FIRE DIRECTION CENTER, THERE WAS A SEVERAL MINUTE BREAK BETWEEN ROUNDS, IT WAS DURING THIS TIME THAT FOUR MALES MOVED INTO THE VICINITY OF THE FIGHTING POSITIONS. AT THIS TIME, I CALLED THE FIRST ADJUSTMENT OF RIGHT 200METERS. THE NEXT ROUND LANDED ON THE NORTHERN PORTION OF THE HILLTOP, THE INDIVIDUALS WERE FURTHER SOUTH ALONG THE EASTERN PORTION OF THE HILL. I COULD STILL SEE A TOTAL OF FIVE INDIVIDUALS IN VICINITY OF THE SOUTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE HILL SO I ADJUSTED THE NEXT ROUND DROP 100METERS. THIS ROUND IMPACTED ALONG THE SOUTHEASTERN PORTION OF THE HILL. THE INDIVIDUALS BEGAN MOVING BACK TOWARD THE CENTER OF THE HILL AND THEN TOWARD THE EAST IVO OF A VILLAGE. I ADJUSTED THE NEXT ROUND TOWARD THE RUSSIAN FIGHTING POSITION WHERE THE INDIVIDUALS MOVED BEFORE FLEEING THE HILLTOP, AT THIS POINT I COULD ONLY SEE TWO MALES MANEUVERING. MY LAST ADJUST WAS ADD 100METERS LEFT 50METERS. THE ROUND IMPACTED CENTERMASS OF THE RUSSIAN FIGHTING POSITION THAT THEY RAN BACK TO, SO I CALLED FOR A 3 ROUND HE FIRE FOR EFFECT ON THE TOP OF THE HILL. I BELIEVED THAT THEY ACM WERE LIKELY MOVING BACK TO A CACHE OR SOMETHING THAT THEY HAD IN THE FIGHTING POSITIONS. AFTER THE 3 ROUNDS WERE OBSERVED IMPACTING ON THE FIGHTING POSITIONS I CALLED END OF FIRE MISSION AND NO ADDITIONAL ROUNDS WERE SHOT. AS I WAS RETURNING TO THE CAMP FROM THE OP, MY INTERPRETER, (b)(6) (b)(6) RECEIVED A CALL FROM ONE OF OUR WORKERS THAT LIVED IN THE VICINITY OF WHERE THE

10. EXHIBIT	11. IN (b)(3), (b)(6)	MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"
 THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

CENTCOM 009904

STATEMENT OF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TAKEN AT

1800Z

DATED

2006/06/21

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

THE FIRST ROUND IMPACTED. HE SAID THAT SOME CHILDREN HAD BEEN WOUNDED BY THE MORTAR ROUND. I TOLD HIM THROUGH THE INTERPRETER TO BRING ANYONE WHO WAS WOUNDED TO THE FIRE BASE. ONE OF THE ELDERS FROM THE AREA CALLED (b)(3), (b)(6) AND SAID THAT THERE HAD BEEN CHILDREN PLAYING OUTSIDE WHERE THE MORTAR ROUND IMPACTED. WE ASSURED HIM THAT WE WERE NOT TARGETING THE PEOPLE OF THE VILLAGE, BUT RATHER RESPONDING TO A REPORT OF TALIBAN IVO THE HILLTOP, HE SAID HE UNDERSTOOD AND WE AGAIN URGED HIM TO HAVE THE FAMILIES OF THE WOUNDED TO COME TO THE FIREBASE. AT APPROXIMATELY 171600ZJUN06, WE RECEIVED A CAR WITH THE WOUNDED AT OUR FIREBASE. IMMEDIATELY 15 PERSONNEL FROM THE FIREBASE BEGAN TO TREAT THE WOUNDS OF THE WOUNDED. THERE WERE THREE FIGHTING AGE MALES THAT HAD SHRAPNEL WOUNDS AND THREE CHILDREN. WE CONTINUED TO TREAT AND STABILIZE ALL THE PATIENTS UNTIL APPROXIMATELY 172000ZJUN06 WHEN A MEDEVAC HELICOPTER ARRIVED TO TAKE THE WOUNDED TO THE TARIN KOWT AND KHANDHAR AIRFIELD MEDICAL CENTERS. ALL PATIENTS WERE STABILIZED PRIOR TO DEPARTURE FROM FIREBASE TYCZ. I THEN SPOKE WITH THE FAMILY MEMBERS OF THE WOUNDED AND ASSURED THEM THAT WE DID NOT INTENTIONALLY TARGET THEM OR THEIR FAMILY MEMEBERS THAT WE WERE RESPONDING TO AN ACM THREAT. WE PAID FOR A TAXI TO TRANSPORT THE FAMILY MEMBERS TO TARIN KOWT TO BE WITH THEIR WOUNDED FAMILY MEMBERS. THAT EVENING THE TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAM DRAFTED UP A STATEMENT ABOUT THE INCIDENT TO BE BROADCAST TO THE PEOPLE OF THE DEH RAWOD DISTRICT INFORMING THEM THAT IT WAS AN ACCIDENT THAT INNOCENT CHILDREN HAD BEEN WOUNDED. THE STORY WAS PLAYED THROUGHOUT THE FOLLOWING DAY. THE FOLLOWING MORNING I ATTEMPTED TO CONTACT THE GOVERNOR TO INFORM HIM OF THE SITUATION. MY INTERPRETER WAS UNABLE TO GET THROUGH, SO WE CONTACTED THE CHIEF OF POLICE IN TARIN KOWT AND RELAYED THE INCIDENT TO HIM TO PASS ON TO THE GOVERNOR. ADDITIONALLY, WE CALLED THE DEH RAWOD MAYOR, CHIEF OF POLICE, AND ASSISTANT DISTRICT CHIEF TO INFORM THEM OF THE INCIDENT. ALL OF THEM WERE IN TARIN KOWT ON DISTRICT BUSINESS AND WE WERE FINALLY ABLE TO GET THROUGH TO THEM. THE MORNING OF THE 18TH OF JUNE WE SENT THE CIVILIAN AFFAIRS TEAM AND TACTICAL PSYCHOLOGICAL OPERATIONS TEAM TO THE AREA WHERE THE INJURIES HAPPENED TO CONDUCT A HUMANITARIAN DISTRIBUTION FOR THE FAMILIES. I ALSO SPOKE WITH THE FAMILY MEMBERS PRIOR TO THEIR DEPARTURE FOR TARIN KOWT AND INFORMED THEM THAT I HAD FINANCIAL ASSISTANCE AND HUMANITARIAN SUPPLIES FOR THEIR FAMILIES TO BE PICKED UP UPON THEIR RETURN FROM TARIN KOWT. THE FAMILIES AGREED TO COME BACK BY THE FIREBASE FOR THE ASSISTANCE. UPON INSPECTING THE MORTAR TUBE IT WAS DETERMINED THAT THE BI-POD FOR THE TUBE HAS A LOOSE OR STRIPPED WASHER/BOLT IN THE TRAVERSE BAR THAT CAUSED THE TUBE TO SHIFT ON THE FIRST ROUND AS THE ROUND WAS HUNG IN THE TUBE CAUSING THE FIRST ROUND TO LAND WEST OF THE HILLTOP. WE HAVE REPLACED THE BI-POD AND DEADLINED IT UNTIL IT CAN BE FIXED OR REPLACED. THE MORTAR SECTION FROM B/2/4 INF IN TARIN KOWT HAS BEEN CONTACTED TO SEND ITS MORTAR SECTION TO OUR LOCATION TO CONDUCT PMCS AND BORESIGHTING.

-----NOTHING FOLLOWS-----

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT OR INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21st day of June 2006 at (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Upon receipt of the (b)(2)High report, did you request (b)(2)High assets (b)(2)High observe the hill top? (b)(2)High

A: Tried to fly tower but could not get any forward motion (wind blowing behind) what further info. to determine the two fighter age codes were ACW?

(b)(2)High

Q: Why did it take 4 hours to describe the wounded LNs?


A: First request was denied. It was stated on the first request that the casualties were caused by U.S. fire. Subsequent request was approved. Nostrise was @ 1922Z.

Q: What was the weather like during the fire mission? What was the approximate wind speed & direction?

A: Fast enough to stall the radar & blow away from N to SW

Q: Was there any visible BDA from any of the mortar rounds?

A: NO



AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23 day of Feb 1972.

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is DDCSOPS

LOCATION AFghanistan	DATE 21 Jun 06	TIME	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (b)(6)	GRADE/STATUS E-3	

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON 17 JUNE 2006 I WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WAS SUSPECTED ACM ACTIVITY AT GRID (b)(2)High. I WAS BY MY TM LEADER CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) AND HE REQUESTED A FIRE MISSION ON THAT GRID. HE ALSO INFORMED ME THAT HE WOULD BE THE FORWARD OBSERVER. IN THE MORTAR PIT I WAS MYSELF ALONG WITH MY JUNIOR BROW SSgt (b)(3), (b)(6) AND TWO OTHERS AS GUNNERS BROW SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) AND SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) TWO DAYS PRIOR 15 JUNE 2006 WE REGISTERED THE MORTAR B- BECAUSE OF THE LARGE AREA WE DID NOT NOTICE A MALFUNCTION IN THE BIPEDS WHEN WE FIRED THE FIRST ROUND DURING THE FIRE MISSION. MY JUNIOR NOTICED THAT THE GUN NOT THE BIPEDS MOVED WHEN I WAS HANGING THE ROUND HE BEGAN TO CORRECT THE PROBLEM THEN GAVE THE COMMAND FIRE. THE ROUND LANDED 200M LEFT OF THE TARGET AS WE WAS TOLD AND GIVEN A SHIFT OF RIGHT 200M BY THE FORWARD OBSERVER. MY JUNIOR SFC HADENBACH AN MLDC GRID WAS USING THE MORTAR BALLISTIC COMPUTER FOR ALL THE DATA GIVEN. WE FIRED A TOTAL OF 7 ROUNDS. TO MY UNDERSTANDING ONLY THE FIRST ROUND WAS OFF BUT WE DID RECEIVE OTHER SHIFTS. 4 ROUNDS WAS SHIFTS AND 3 ROUNDS FOR A (FE, FIRE FOR EFFECT) AFTER THE FIRST ROUND I WAS AWARE THAT THE GUN HAD MOVEMENT AND ADJUSTED WHEN HANGING THE ROUNDS MAKING SURE THE BUBBLES STAYED LEVEL. AFTER THE MISSION WE WERE ABLE TO ANALYZE THE PROBLEM WE FOUND THAT THE DEFLECTION WHEEL HAS MORE MOVEMENT THAN IT IS SUPPOSE TO HAVE UNABLE TO FIX IT WE CHANGED BIPED WITH THE SECOND MORTAR SYSTEM. THE MOVEMENT OF THE GUN DURING THE FIRST ROUND WAS TO THE RIGHT AND THE ROUND LANDED 200M LEFT OF THE TARGET.

Nothing follows

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 1 PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED."
THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE _____ OF _____ PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LIVED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is ODCSOPS

LOCATION FIRE BASE, TYCZ, AFG	DATE 210906Z JUN 06	TIME 0906Z	FILE NUMBER
LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)	SOCIAL SECURITY NUMBER (b)(6)		GRADE/STATUS E-6
OF			

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON 17 JUNE 06 I WAS INFORMED THAT THERE WERE 15 SUSPECTED TALIBAN ON A HILL THAT WE HAD BEEN ROCKETED FROM ON SEVERAL OCCASSIONS. GRID (b)(2)High CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TOLD ME HE WAS GOING TO BE THE FORWARD OBSERVER, HE MOVED OUT TO HIS POSITION AND SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) AND MYSELF MOVED TO THE MORTAR FIRE POSITION. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) GAVE ME HIS INFORMATION AND I PUT THE DATA IN THE MORTAR BALLISTIC COMPUTER. SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) AND MYSELF PUT THE INFORMATION RECEIVED FROM THE COMPUTER INTO THE SITE. WE LEVELLED THE BUBBLES ON THE SITE AND GOT THE CROSSHAIRS ALIGNED ON THE POLE. WE WAITED FOR CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TO CALL WHEN HE WAS READY FOR THE FIRE MISSION. HE CALLED FOR FIRE AND I TOLD SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) TO HANG THE ROUND. HE WAS STANDING ON THE LEFT SIDE OF THE MORTAR TUBE I THEN TOLD HIM TO FIRE, WHEN HE RELEASED THE ROUND THE TUBE SHIFTED TO THE RIGHT A GOOD AMOUNT. CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) CALLED THE FIRST CORRECTION OF 2500. I PUT THE DATA IN THE COMPUTER AND GOT THE REFLECTION AND ELEVATION WE PUT THE INFORMATION IN THE SITE LEVELLED THE BUBBLES AND FIRED. WE GOT ANOTHER CORRECTION OF ^{DROP} 100. AGAIN GOT THE INFORMATION AND SHOT THE ROUND. WE GOT ANOTHER CORRECTION OF ANOTHER 100, LEFT 50. GOT THE INFORMATION, PUT IT IN THE SITE AND SHOT THE ROUND. WE THEN WERE TOLD 6 PERSON IN THE OPEN AND FIRE FOR EFFECT. WE SHOT THE MISSION AND WERE TOLD END OF MISSION, NO BDA. WE HAD JUST REGISTERED THE MORTARS TWO DAYS PRIOR AND HAD CONTINUED →

EXHIBIT	INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6)	ING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____ CONTINUED." THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND BE INITIALED AS "PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES." WHEN ADDITIONAL PAGES ARE UTILIZED, THE BACK OF PAGE 1 WILL BE LINED OUT, AND THE STATEMENT WILL BE CONCLUDED ON THE REVERSE SIDE OF ANOTHER COPY OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT (Continued)

A FEW PROBLEMS, BUT WE GOT THEM REGISTERED. SO WE TRIED TO FIGURE OUT WHAT THE PROBLEM WAS AND DISCOVERED WHEN WE SHOT THE FIRST ROUND THE BIPOD SHIFTED BECAUSE THE ^{(3), (b)(} ~~CLUSTER~~ WHEEL WAS ^{DEFLECTING} VERY LOOSE AND THE TUBE CAN ROTATE BACK AND FORTH

Q: Have you been to ^{(3), (b)(} DMCC?

A: Yes, graduated on Jul-05.

Q: Fire Effect consisted of how many rounds?

A: 3 rounds

Q: What problems did you have during registration on 15 Jun?

A: The rounds were being inconsistent in their dispersion pattern and it took awhile to register

Q: How many rounds did it take to register?

A: About 7 rounds

Q: Did you have default MET input into the MRC?

A: Yes

Q: Why did you try to figure out what the problem was?

A: After rounds were on 17 Jun fire mission

Q: What was the result of the charge you fired on 17 Jun? A: 1638 ft

AFFIDAVIT

I, ^{(b)(3), (b)(6)} _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 21st day of June 1977

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

[Signature]
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON STATEMENT
^{(b)(3), (b)(6)}

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

USAPPC V2 00

Pages 20 through 25 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Incident/Date (Unit)	SIGACT (DTG Posted, Location, Summary)	Appointing Unit; IO	Investigation Status	Comments
Convoy M1114 and LN Motorcycle Accident (and Subsequent CF Negligence) /03JUN06 (TF Warrior)	030538ZJUN06: (Zabul Province, Qalat District) LN killed when he swerved into oncoming convoy's path IOT pass a LN truck; M1114 and motorcycle collided head-on; LN subsequently died.	TF Warrior; IO - [Bn XO]	Initiated: 8JUN06 Referred to CID for negligent homicide investigation	During 15-6 interview, evidence found that HMMWV tire crushed LN's head as it complied w/LT CC's order to move off road
LN on Motorcycle Shooting Death by Convoy /09JUN06 (TF Chamberlain)	091617ZJUN06: (Kandahar Province, Arghandab District) Stopped convoy signaled approaching motorcycle to stop; despite signals and warning shot from convoy, motorcycle continued and LN was shot.	TFEagle; IO - MAJ 3), (b)	Initiated: 13JUN06 Completed: 20JUN06	Pending legal review w/CJA
Wrecker/motorcycle Accident Kabul /13JUN06 (TF Chamberlain)	130228ZJUN06: (Kabul) Double vehicle rollover - wrecker and towed Palletized Loading System (PLS). 1 LN on motorcycle killed, 1 LN injured. 1 LN in structure hit by vehicles injured. No escalation or violence at scene.	CJTF76; IO - LTC 3), (b)	Initiated: 13JUN06 Completed: 28JUN06	Pending legal review
Friendly Fire Incident by AH-64 on CJSOTF /15JUN06 (TF Nighthawk and CJSOTF-A)	152007ZJUN06: (Uruzgan Province, Tirin Kot District) AH-64s taking heavy SA and RPG fire during insertion of ground elements into HLZ; air assets engaged enemy troops by returning fire over-top CJSOTF personnel; 4x EKIA and SFC wounded (not life threatening).	CJTF76; IO - LTC 3), (b)	Initiated: 25JUN06 Due: 07JUL06	Investigation ongoing
5 TFNs Accidentally Hit by Mortar Attack /17JUN06 (CJSOTF-A)	171817ZJUN06: (Uruzgan Province, Deh Rawood District) 5LNs accidentally hit by mortar; 5/6 yr old died; 5/6 old children and 2 adults injured. [initial rpt of firing error; single mortar landed 200m+ off target]	CJSOTF-A; IO - MAJ 3), (b)	Initiated: 18JUN06 Completed: 28JUN06	Pending legal review

Pages 27 through 28 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a and c, (b)(2)High, (b)(3), (b)(5) and (b)(6)