HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A-SJA

JUL 2 6 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief of Staff, NATO Training Mission/Combined Security Transition Command—Afghanistan, Camp Eggers, Afghanistan APO AE 09356

SUBJECT: Appointment Order - Investigating Officer Pursuant to Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, *Procedures for Investigation Officers and Boards of Officers*, 2 October 2006

1. REFERENCES:

a. AR 15-6, (*Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*), 2 October 2006;
b. USFOR-A Guide for AR 15-6 Investigating Officers;
c. Uniform Code of Military Justice, 2008;
d. Department of the Army (DA) Form 3881, Rights Warning Advisement;
e. DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement (with Privacy Act Statement).

2. You are hereby appointed by the Commander, U.S. Forces-Afghanistan, General Petraeus, as an investigating officer pursuant to AR 15-6, Chapter 2, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, to conduct an investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the hostile fire deaths of 1LT Christopher S. Goeke, 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division; SSG Christopher T. Stout, 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division; SSG Sheldon L. Tate, 782nd Brigade Support Battalion, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division; and SPC Michael J. Tilton, HHC, 1st Battalion, 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division. These Soldiers were killed during an insurgent attack against the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Headquarters, Kandahar City, Police Substation (PSS) District 8 on 13 July 2010. This investigation is your primary mission until you tender your completed findings and recommendations to me, not later than 15 days from the date of this memorandum. Your appointment remains in effect until the investigation is completed and no further investigation is required, unless released sooner by the appointing authority.

3. The scope of your investigation is as broad as necessary. However, you will at a minimum ascertain the following:

a. The facts and circumstances surrounding the incident (including the 5 W's);

b. What was the mission at the time of the incident? What was the pre-mission briefing for enemy forces and threats?

c. Was an up-to-date threat analysis done for the mission?

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d. Were all individuals wearing appropriate personal protective equipment for the situation? If not, why not?

e. What, if any medical treatment was provided to 1LT Goeke, SSG Stout, and SSG Tate? Were the MEDEVAC procedures timely and appropriate under the circumstances?

f. What was the nature and extent of the injuries 1LT Goeke, SSG Stout, and SSG Tate?

g. What recommendations concerning improvement, if any, to coalition tactics, techniques and procedures may help avoid this type of incident in the future?

h. Any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant.

4. You will make specific factual findings and have the discretion to use any of the following methods: examination of relevant documents; visiting relevant locations; evaluating procedures; conducting inventories; taking pictures; and interviewing witnesses, documenting all in writing or otherwise. You are not limited to these means of investigation, and your legal advisor may provide you with additional guidance.

5. Based upon your factual findings, you may make recommendations which are not only supported by the facts, but also reasonably related to the facts. Recommendations are not mandatory.

6. Before you begin your investigation, you must receive a briefing from your legal advisor, (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief, Administrative Law, Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A, at DSN (b)(6) You must consult with your legal advisor regarding all aspects of this investigation, including developing an investigation plan.

7. You are to conduct this investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapter 3, AR 15-6. No individual has been named as a respondent at this time. All witnesses will be sworn-in prior to their interview. You are to thoroughly document all witness interviews in writing, preferably on a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). You will interview all witnesses in person, if practical. Reduce any oral statements to memorandums for record.

8. If, in the course of your investigation, you come to reasonably suspect that certain people may have committed criminal conduct, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ (right against self-incrimination, outlined in DA Form 3881 warnings), or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate. Witness waivers of their Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights will be documented on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate). In addition, you may need to provide a witness with a Privacy Act statement before you solicit any personal information. You are strongly encouraged to consult your legal advisor if you have any questions regarding these procedures.

9. You may examine documents of personnel senior to you, and interview personnel senior to you. However, if, in the course of your investigation, you determine that the investigation will require you to examine the conduct or performance of duty of a service member senior to you, or to which you have a moral or ethical conflict, then you shall report that fact to my

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office immediately. I will then appoint another service member, senior to the service member affected, who will either replace you as the investigating officer or conduct a separate inquiry into the matters pertaining to the service member.

10. If you determine through your investigation that possible criminal conduct has occurred, immediately notify your legal advisor before proceeding any further with your investigation. Criminal conduct includes violations of the UCMJ, punitive regulations, international, host nation, or other applicable state or federal law. In making this decision, consider whether it is more likely than not, under the circumstances you are aware of that an offense has been committed by someone. Should there be any ongoing criminal investigation into this matter, you are to ensure that you do not interfere with any investigation.

11. From the evidence, you will make findings concerning what occurred. The findings will be as thorough as necessary to fully capture the facts and circumstances surrounding the scope of this investigation. Support your findings by substantial evidence and by a greater weight of evidence than supports any different conclusion. In developing your recommendations, ensure that your recommendations are supported by your findings. Develop in your recommendations any courses of action that seem appropriate to resolve any issues or problems raised by your findings, and recommend whether judicial proceedings, non-judicial proceedings, or further investigations are warranted.

12. You will consult with your appointed legal advisor in developing your findings and recommendations. The report will include a table of contents, and all exhibits will be tabbed. Address your findings and recommendations to the appointing authority. Submit the completed report, along with the completed DA Form 1574, to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A, for a legal review immediately following completion of your investigation. Submit any request for delay or modification of the scope of your investigation to Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A, through your legal advisor.

13. This appointment authorizes priority 1 travel status throughout the AOR in order to conduct the investigation.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

United States Forces-Afghanistan

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

USFOR-A-SJA (10-107)

24 SEP 2010

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Action Memo - Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 Report of Investigation into the Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Hostile Fire Deaths of 1LT Christopher Goeke, SSG Christopher T. Stout, SSG Sheldon L. Tate and SPC Michael J. Tilton During an Insurgent Attack on the Brigade Headquarters of the Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) in Kandahar City, Afghanistan, on 13 July 2010

1. I have reviewed the AR 15-6 Investigation regarding the hostile attack on the Brigade Headquarters of the Afghanistan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) on 13 July 2010, that resulted in the hostile fire deaths of First Lieutenant Christopher S. Goeke, Staff Sergeant Christopher T. Stout, Staff Sergeant Sheldon L. Tate, and Specialist Michael J. Tilton.

2. The findings and recommendations of the Investigating Officer (IO) are approved.

a. The IO's recommendation regarding the conduct of (b)(3), (b)(6) is hereby referred to CG, CJTF-101, for whatever action he deems appropriate.

b. The IO's recommendations regarding COIN training and Force Protection products are referred to the USFOR-A J3 for appropriate action.

c. The IO's recommendation regarding commendation of soldiers who acted valorously during the attack is referred to CDR, 4/82d ABN BCT for appropriate action.

3. I make the additional finding, based on evidence contained in the investigation, that all four Soldiers perished in the line of duty, not due to misconduct, and as a result of enemy fire during combat.

4. I extend my heartfelt condolences to the family, friends, and fellow Soldiers of 1LT Goeke, SSG Stout, SSG Tate, and SPC Tilton. We all acknowledge their extraordinary sacrifice and will never forget their dedicated, selfless service to our nation. They will be sorely missed.

DAVID H. PETRAEUS
General, U.S. Army
Commander
United States Forces-Afghanistan/
International Security Assistance
Force, Afghanistan

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Page 2 redacted for the following reason:
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(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

19 Aug 10

NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, US Forces – Afghanistan,

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar City, Afghanistan

1. On 26 July 2010, the Commander, USFOR-A appointed the undersigned to investigate the circumstances of and ascertain the facts of the hostile fire deaths of First Lieutenant (1LT) Christopher S. Goeke, Staff Sergeant (SSG) Christopher T. Stout, both of 1st Battalion (BN), 508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 4th Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division; SSG Sheldon L. Tate, 782nd Brigade Support Battalion (BSB), 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division; and Specialist (SPC) Michael J. Tilton, Headquarters and Headquarters Company (HHC), 1st BN, 508th PIR, 4th BCT, 82nd Airborne Division who died as a result of an insurgent attack against the Afghan National Civil order Police (ANCOP) Headquarters, Kandahar City, Police Substation (PSS) District 8 on 13 July 2010. (Exhibit F-1).

2. Investigative Actions. As part of the investigation I assembled a team of personnel to assist. My team and I flew to Kandahar on 31 July 2010 where we initially met with BG Ben Hodges, Director of Operations, Regional Command - South. From there, and over the course of the next seven days, we visited the scene of the attack, took numerous photographs, reviewed force protection assessments, and interviewed 32 personnel. The exhibits resulting from these actions are referenced throughout this memorandum and listed in paragraph 8. A chronology of our investigative efforts is shown in Exhibit B-8. The remainder of this memorandum contains my findings, conclusions, recommendations, and addresses the specific questions the appointing authority posed.

3. Summary. On 13 July 2010 an enemy force attacked the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters compound, the headquarters of the 1-508th PIR BN. The enemy force breached the northern wall of the compound with an explosive charge and engaged the Coalition forces in the compound with small arms fire, rocket propelled grenades (RPGs), and one enemy individual who detonated a suicide vest. The actions of heroic and highly professional paratroopers who responded to the complex and confusing situation with great competence, initiative, and control repelled the attack. The attack resulted in four US Soldiers, 1LT Christopher S. Goeke, SSG Christopher T. Stout, SSG Sheldon L. Tate, and SPC Michael J. Tilton, being killed and two more Soldiers, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) being seriously injured. Four Afghan interpreters were killed in the attack.

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NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS
SUBJECT: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar City, Afghanistan

4. Facts. This paragraph outlines my findings of facts related to this incident. These are portrayed in chronological order and in increasing detail beginning with 1-508th PIR's initial operations in theater and continuing through the attack on 13 July 2010.

a. 1-508th PIR Operations in Theater Before Deployment to Kandahar. The battalion spent most of its time deployed in theater operating in Zabul and Uruzgon Provinces in largely rural areas. Their disposition required them to operate in a very decentralized fashion, establishing a TAC to control operations in one area and a main Command Post (CP), their tactical operations center (TOC), controlling operations in the remainder of their area of operations (Exhibits D-4, D-22, D-25 and E-9).

b. Deployment to, occupation of facilities in, and initial operations in Kandahar.

(1) In May 2010, the battalion was directed to move to Kandahar City to form the Security Ring Protection Force (SRPF) (Exhibit F-12). The 1-508th PIR mission was to establish and operate with their Afghan partners the SRPF that initially consisted of 13 platoon-level checkpoints controlling five main avenues of access into Kandahar City (Exhibits E-9 and F-12).

(2) In early June 2010, the battalion began its relief in place and moved to Kandahar Air Field for a three to five day RSOI and retraining period (Exhibits D-4, D-22, and F-12).

(3) For this mission in Kandahar, the Combined Team Kandahar City (CTKC) exercised Tactical Control (TACON) over 1-508th PIR immediately preceding and on the night of the attack. CTKC was a subordinate formation of Task Force – Kandahar (TF-K) (Exhibits F-2 and F-3). CTKC gained initial operational capability (IOC) on 10 June 2010 and full operational capability on 1 July 2010 (Exhibit F-3).

(4) On or about 15 June 2010, 1-508th PIR began to simultaneously occupy platoon check points, company headquarters locations, and the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters with its battalion headquarters (Exhibits F-12 and D-22).

(5) Most of the platoon checkpoints were new facilities, while the battalion headquarters was occupying an established facility (Exhibits D-4 and E-1). Priority of support for force protection was given to the company headquarters locations and the platoon check points (Exhibit D-4).

(6) Between 21-24 June 2010, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) visited Combat Operations Post (COP) 9-1, COP 8-1, PSS 8, the location of the Provincial Reserve, COP Hotel California, Checkpoint 9-1, and the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters facilities (where the 1-508th PIR was located) to conduct a Vulnerabilities and

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Force Protection Assessment (Exhibit F-11). The Trip Report praised the unit's progress improving the force protection measures at the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters (Exhibit F-11, paragraph 8), but still offered eleven recommendations for areas to improve (Exhibit F-11, paragraph 11.f).

(b)(1)1.4g as per section 1.7(e).

(7) On 8 July 2010, (b)(3), (b)(6) was assigned as the 1-508th Operations officer (S3) replacing (b)(3), (b)(6), who returned to his duties as the HHC Company Commander (Exhibit D-21). This was the battalion's sixth officer to serve in this role since their deployment began (Exhibit D-4).

(8) The daily Intelligence Summaries (INTSUMs) published by CTKC, the headquarters immediately superior to 1-508th PIR, for the five-day period prior to the attack on 13 July 2010 indicated a generic threat to facilities in Kandahar City, but generally offered no focused threat toward the 1-508th PIR Headquarters or the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters (Exhibits F-5 through F-10). (b)(3), (b)(6) the BN Commander, assessed that Saraposa Prison was a more likely target than their headquarters (Exhibit D-4). There were two more specific threats identified:

(b)(1)1.4g per section 1.7(e).

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(b) On 13 July 2010 an email that originated in 2-508th PIR offered an assessment of an elevated, though non-specific threat to US facilities in Kandahar City. The 1-508th PIR S3 and intelligence officer (S2) both read the email, but assessed that the threat was overemphasized and that the analysis was slightly flawed (Exhibit F-16).

(9) On 13 July 2010, Brigadier General (BG) Ben Hodges, Regional Command-South (RC-S) Director of Operations, personally visited the compound and talked with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) visit was the last in a series of senior officer visits to the compound prior to the attack. Brig Gen Vance, Commander of Task Force-Kandahar; BG Hodges; (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander of 4/82d Abn BCT; and (b)(3), (b)(6) Deputy Commander of 4/82d Abn BCT, had all visited the compound since 1-508th PIR's occupation (Exhibit D-1). BG Hodges and (b)(3), (b)(6) did not specifically discuss force protection during that visit.

(b)(1)1.4c per section 1.7(e).

c. Attack on the Compound.

(1) Activities and Disposition of Key Personnel Immediately Prior to the Attack (Refer to the schematic at Exhibits B-1 and B-3 to understand the specific locations in the compound referenced by building numbers used in the paragraphs below).

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR Battalion Commander, and (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR Battalion Command Sergeant Major, conducted battlefield circulation on 13 July 2010 and returned to the compound around 2000 to begin their nightly automated synchronization meeting in the TOC, Bldg 6 (Exhibits D-4 and D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR Executive Officer (XO), and (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR BN S-3, were in the TOC for the meeting (Exhibits D-21 and E-9).

(b) Medical Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) the Medical Platoon Leader, was also in the TOC (Exhibit D-20). (b)(3), (b)(6) the Battalion Surgeon, and most of the medics were in the medic tent, Bldg 12 (Exhibits D-26, D-12, D-13, D-14, D-17 and C22).

(c) C Company Leaders. (b)(3), (b)(6) C Company Commander; (b)(3), (b)(6) C Company 1SG; 1LT Goeke, C Company Platoon Leader; (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT Goeke's Platoon Sergeant; (b)(3), (b)(6) one of 1LT Goeke's Squad Leaders; (b)(3), (b)(6) one of 1LT Goeke's Team Leaders; and (b)(3), (b)(6) a member of 1LT Goeke's platoon, arrived at the TOC, and were waiting to see (b)(3), (b)(6) after the synchronization meeting (Exhibits D-5 – D-10).

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(d) Scout Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) the Scout Platoon Leader, and most of the Scout Platoon were in the Scouts' tents, Bldgs 15 and 19. Some of the Scouts were sitting around the picnic tables between the two northern most ANCOP Barracks buildings, Bldgs 21 and 22 (Exhibit D-28).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) HHC 1SG, was in his tent, Bldg 15, prior to the attack (Exhibit D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the TOC, Bldg 6 (Exhibit D-3).

(g) SSG Tate, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) These three personnel were playing video games in the west end of their tent, Bldg 10 (Exhibits D-11, D-15 and C-6).

(h) SSG Stout was also in his tent, Bldg 10, prior to the attack (Exhibit D-14).

(2) **Attack Phase 1 - Breaching Charge Goes Off**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) had just begun to read the email from 2-508th PIR that outlined their concern over the heightened threat of an enemy attack when he heard the breaching charge go off (Exhibit D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) all ran to their tent to collect their rifles. (They were carrying their handguns with them, but kept their rifles in their sleeping tent). (b)(3), (b)(6) also collected his protective gear. (b)(3), (b)(6) quickly returned to the TOC, Bldg 6 (Exhibits D-4, D-21, and D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) moved from the TOC to a position roughly between Bldgs 7 & 8 to see if he could identify what was taking place (Exhibit D-25). (b)(3), (b)(6) begin to move to the medic tent, Bldg 12 (Exhibit D-22).

(b) Medical Platoon.

i. (b)(3), (b)(6) ran out of the TOC, Bldg 6, to check on his platoon, moving toward the breach in order to get to the medical tent as quickly as possible. As he reached the area immediately south of the breach, through the cloud of dirt and dust he saw the outline of a person standing where the north wall should have been between the Afghan latrine and the northern bunker, Bldg 4 (Exhibit D-20).

ii. (b)(3), (b)(6) Battalion Surgeon, and the medics in the medic tent, Bldg 12, thought they were receiving indirect fire. (b)(3), (b)(6) one of the Medic NCOs, directed everyone in the tent to move quickly to the bunker, Bldg 4 (Exhibit D-16). (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Medical Platoon Sergeant, told all those in the tent to secure their gear and move to the bunker (Exhibits D-12 and C-2). (b)(3), (b)(6) and

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(b)(3), (b)(6) ran to the bunker, Bldg 4, and entered from the east end (Exhibits D-12, D-16, D-26 and C-19). SPC Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6) were sleeping in the medic tent and did not respond as quickly as the others. They awakened and began to get dressed and secure their gear (Exhibit D-17).

iii. The group of medics moving to the bunker joined four interpreters who had already taken cover there. They all observed a round being fired in the bunker and, not understanding that the northern wall had been breached and enemy personnel were firing at or near the bunker opening, they presumed it was a negligent discharge by someone in the bunker. The interpreters began yelling at the Soldiers and accused them of firing one of their weapons (Exhibit D-12, D-16, D-26).

iv. (b)(3), (b)(6) a medic noncommissioned officer (NCO), and (b)(3), (b)(6) the HHC XO, ran toward the northeast tower, Bldg 5, and took cover behind a wall barrier and a few of the parked tactical vehicles (Exhibit C-17).

(c) C Company Leaders. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed that his element return to their vehicles that were parked on the south end of the compound to secure their gear. (b)(3), (b)(6) remained at the BN TOC, Bldg 6, to provide security. The Soldiers donned their protective gear and instructed the remainder of C/1-508th PIR Soldiers who convoyed to the ANCOP HQ to man their vehicles and be prepared to move. The original group then moved back to the BN TOC, Bldg 6, and pulled security (Exhibits D-5 – D-10).

(d) Scout Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed his men in the tent to gather their gear and don it. He was not sure what had happened, but believed the explosion was more than what would be delivered by a medium mortar (Exhibit D-28).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) donned his equipment and directed personnel to begin to get accountability of their subordinates (Exhibit D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) moved to his tent, Bldg 13, and put on his Personal Protective Equipment (PPE). He then ran out and moved forward toward the ANCOP barracks, Bldg 21 (Exhibits B-1 and D-3).

(g) SSG Tate, (b)(3), (b)(6) When their tent, Bldg 10, collapsed from the initial blast, they all began crawling east to the door of the tent. When they reached the east end of the tent they encountered several local interpreters who were hysterical. After quickly searching for the door to the tent, SSG Tate asked for a knife to cut an opening in the tent wall to exit the tent (Exhibit C-6).

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(h) It is likely that SSG Stout was also in this tent, Bldg 10, but instead of crawling out right away with the other Soldiers, he took the time to secure his gear and put it on before exiting the tent from the west end, so he was the last person to exit the tent.[1]

(3) **Attack Phase 2 - Two RPG Rounds Strike the ANCOP Barracks** (Exhibit B-3)

(a) Command Group. [redacted] moved with some of his Personal Security Detachment PSD from the TOC to the north side of Bldg 21. When the two RPG rounds impacted at the center of the building—one just above the first floor and another just above the doorway on the second floor landing—he decided to move back to the TOC (Exhibits C-8, C-9 and D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) were also near the impact and made a similar decision (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to the TOC when he could not make out what was happening on the compound (Exhibit D-25). (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC (Exhibit D-21).

(b) Medical Platoon.

i. (b)(3), (b)(6) was quickly engaged with automatic small arms fire by the attacker standing at the breach site. This caused him to reverse course and run back into the TOC. He announced that there was a breach in the northern wall to someone in the TOC and exited again to find another route to get to the medical tent to check on his platoon. The shots that were fired at (b)(3), (b)(6) were likely the shots that the medics heard from the bunker, which caused them to quickly leave the bunker and return to the medic tent (Exhibits C-3, C-4 and C-5).

ii. As shots were fired, coming from the direction of the west end of the bunker, the US medics, but not the interpreters, exited the bunker through the eastern end and moved back to the medical tent (Exhibits C-19, D-12, D-16, and D-26). (b)(3), (b)(6) were each hit by at least one round or piece of shrapnel that produced their injuries (Exhibit D-12, D-13, D-14, and D-16). (b)(3), (b)(6) were both able to return to the medic tent on their own. The medics returned to the medical tent before SPC Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6) left the tent to move to the bunker (Exhibit D-17).

iii. (b)(3), (b)(6) remained under cover by the vehicles near the northeast guard tower, Bldg 5.

(b)(5)

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(c) C Company Leaders. Members of the C/1-508th PIR set up security around the BN TOC, Bldg 6. (b)(3), (b)(6) came up with a plan to try to repel the attackers and secure the breach. They left (b)(3), (b)(6) securing the TOC. The rest of their team moved along the east side of the BN TOC, north towards the Mobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT), Bldg 7, and the Logistics Supply Station (LSS), Bldg 9 where they began to receive enemy fire (Exhibit B-1).

(d) Scout Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) and members of his Scout Platoon headed up the northeast tower, Bldg 5. On their way up the tower they told the Afghan guards in the tower to turn off the interior tower lights (Exhibit D-28).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) made his way up the northeast tower, Bldg 5, witnessing gunfire and explosions on his way up (Exhibits C-16 and D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) had just reached the northwest corner of the ANCOP dorm, Bldg 21, when the blast from the RPGs knocked him down. He regained his footing and moved (b)(3), (b)(6) (who was injured by the blast) towards cover (Exhibits C-8, C-9 and D-3).

(g) SSG Tate, (b)(3), (b)(6) decided to crawl back to the west end of the tent, Bldg 10, to try to find a way out (Exhibits C-10, D-11 and D-15). He ran towards the west wall, passing the TOC, Bldg 6, on his left, and then towards the southwest tower. He continued in a counter-clockwise position around the inside perimeter of the compound towards the southeast tower, and then back north towards the northeast tower. When SSG Tate had cut a hole through which he could exit the tent, he and (b)(3), (b)(6) ran towards the eastern entrance of the bunker, Bldg 4, on the north wall (Exhibit D-11).

(h) I find it likely that SSG Stout was exiting the tent at this time and moving generally north near the LSS, Bldg 9 (Exhibit C-10).

(4) **Attack Phase 3 - Suicide Vest Detonates Near LSS.**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to the TOC, Bldg 6 (Exhibit D-4 and D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) directed C Company to come on line and move towards the breach site to expel the enemy (Exhibit D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) directed (b)(3), (b)(6) to secure the main gate along the southern wall of the compound (Exhibit D-3). (b)(3), (b)(6) directed (b)(3), (b)(6) to go coordinate with the ANCOP chain of command to ask them to keep all of their personnel south of Bldgs 21 and 22. (b)(3), (b)(6) left the TOC to find someone from the ANCOP chain of command (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC (Exhibit D-21 and E-9).

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(b) Medical Platoon.

i. (b)(3), (b)(6) exited the TOC, Bldg 6, and headed in the same direction as (b)(3), (b)(6) running around the inside perimeter in a counter-clockwise direction past the southwest and southeast guard towers (Exhibit D-20).

ii. (b)(3), (b)(6) heard (b)(3), (b)(6) cry for help as he made it to the entrance of the medic tent, Bldg 12, so they rushed to his aid. As the S-vest detonates and causes a loud explosion, (b)(3), (b)(6) ducks between tents, Bldgs 12 and 15, to take cover. (b)(3), (b)(6) assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) and called out for a medic (Exhibits C-11 and C-12).

(c) C Company Leaders. The C Company leaders began firing in the direction of the breach when a very large explosion 20-30 feet in front of them knocked everyone down (Exhibits C-11 and C-12). They started checking each other for injuries and discovered that 1LT Goeke was unconscious and appeared injured. They carried 1LT Goeke to the TOC, Bldg 6, for treatment and to reconsolidate. 1LT Goeke was evaluated by a medic, (b)(3), (b)(6) who determined that 1LT Goeke was dead (Exhibits D-3, D-5, D-7, D-12, D-14, D-20, and A-7).

(d) Scout Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) and his Scout platoon continued to conduct surveillance and tried to determine where the enemy was so they could take action from the tower.

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) also joined the Scout platoon in the tower during this time.

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) received his orders from the BN CDR and moved to secure the main gate (Exhibit D-3).

(g) SSG Tate, (b)(3), (b)(6). At this point (b)(3), (b)(6) was still enroute around the inside perimeter to safely get to the northeast guard tower (Exhibits C-17 and D-15). SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the bunker and entered from the east side. A few of the interpreters were in the prone position at the eastern end of the bunker, requiring SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) to climb over them before crawling under the center bench in the middle of the bunker (Exhibit C-20) They lay down under the bench and hugged each other to present the smallest possibly silhouette under the bench. (b)(3), (b)(6) lay face down and SSG Tate lay face up (Exhibit D-11).

(h) SSG Stout likely came face-to-face with Attacker #1 (see Enclosure #1 for a detailed explanation of the attack from the enemy perspective) who was armed with a suicide vest. Attacker #1 most likely detonated his vest at this time just between Bldgs 9 and 10 against the

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east edge of the LSS, Bldg 9, killing SSG Stout immediately. It is likely that 1LT Goeke was also killed from this detonation since he was very close to the scene and was injured in the same time period as SSG Stout (Exhibits C-11, C-12, C-14, C-15 and C-16).

(5) **Attack Phase 4 - RPG Hits the Northeast Guard Tower**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed his PSD team to get his vehicle from where it was parked in the southeast portion of the compound. He intended to use the vehicle as cover and take advantage of its radios to communicate (Exhibit D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) tried to find someone from the ANCOP chain of command with whom to coordinate, but was unable to do so. He returned to the TOC, Bldg 6, to inform (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC (Exhibits D-21 and E-9).

(b) Medical Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) was still enroute to the medic tent at this time, passing the southeast guard tower. (b)(3), (b)(6) made it into the rear of the medic tent, Bldg 12, and SPC Tilton immediately began treating his wounds. (b)(3), (b)(6) moved (b)(3), (b)(6) into the rear of the tent where (b)(3), (b)(6) started working on him. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) start pulling security at the entrance of the tent, but then (b)(3), (b)(6) switched places with (b)(3), (b)(6) so he could provide aid and check on the status of the casualties (Exhibits C-2, D-12, D-13, D-14, D-17, and D-26). (b)(3), (b)(6) had returned to the medic tent with the others, but took up a prone position between two bunks while the others treated casualties (Exhibits D-12, D-13, D-14, D-17 and D-26).

(c) C Company Leaders. After they reconsolidated at the BN TOC, Bldg 6, (b)(3), (b)(6) had (b)(3), (b)(6) get their trucks and move them forward to assist in closing the breach. (Exhibits D-5 – D-10).

(d) Scout Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) was on top of the guard tower, Bldg 5, along with the majority of his Scout Platoon (Exhibit D-28).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) was on top of the guard tower, Bldg 5, with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the majority of the Scout Platoon (Exhibit D-2).

(f) (b)(3), (b)(6) was still moving toward the main gate (Exhibit D-3).

(g) SSG Tate, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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i. (b)(3), (b)(6) reached the northeast guard tower, Bldg 5, and began to climb the stairs. As he reached the 2nd floor landing, the tower was hit with an RPG, shaking the entire building. (b)(3), (b)(6) was thrown back slightly, but then continued up to the top of the guard tower, joining his fellow scouts (Exhibits C-17 and D-15).

ii. SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained hidden under the center bench in the bunker, Bldg 4 (Exhibit D-11).

(6) **Attack Phase 5 - Casualties in the Bunker.**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) checked with the personnel in the TOC to ensure that reports and a Medical Evacuation (MEDEVAC) request had been forwarded to their higher headquarters and then moved back outside the TOC (Exhibit D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) left the TOC and began moving around the south side of Bldgs 21 and 22 with the C Company leaders to get to the battalion's medic tent, Bldg 12 (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC coordinating for support and a MEDEVAC for the casualties (Exhibit D-21 and E-9).

(b) Medical Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the medic tent, Bldg 12, and saw that some of his own medics were being treated as casualties. He collected the information to prepare the 9-line MEDEVAC report (Exhibit D-20). As he collected data, (b)(3), (b)(6) noticed that SPC Tilton had collapsed onto (b)(3), (b)(6) and had a serious head injury. It is likely that the injury came from small arms fire through the tent, coming from the direction of the breach site that was less than 50m away. (b)(3), (b)(6) rushed over to help SPC Tilton (Exhibits D-12, D-13, D-17, D-20, and D-26). (b)(3), (b)(6) remained on the floor between two bunks while his medics treated the casualties. (b)(3), (b)(6) crawled under a bunk to get to (b)(3), (b)(6) began treating (b)(3), (b)(6) serious wounds (Exhibits D-12, D-13, D-14, D-17, D-26).

(c) C Company Leaders. Members of C Company were still at the BN TOC, Bldg 6, and moving vehicles into position (Exhibits D-5 – D-10).

(d) Scout Platoon. During this period, (b)(3), (b)(6) and his Scout Platoon were on top of the northeast guard tower, Bldg 5, scanning for enemy activity and attempting to engage adversaries (Exhibits C-22, C-23, C-24, D-28, and D-15).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) was with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scout Platoon on top of the tower scanning for enemies and attempting to gain an understanding of the attack (Exhibits C-17 and D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) was securing the main ECP (Exhibit D-3).

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(g) SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) Attacker #2 entered the bunker, Bldg 4, from the west end, walked toward the east end, and shot and killed three of the four local nationals who were lying on the ground in the prone position. He turned to walk back to the west end and noticing SSG Tate, he leaned over the center bench, and shot SSG Tate several times. He walked up and down the bunker at least one more time before exiting the bunker at the west end. (b)(3), (b)(6) and the fourth local national were not discovered and survived (Exhibits C-5, C-20, and D-11).

(7) **Attack Phase 6 - Grenade Thrown onto Roof of Medic Tent.**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) that the Battalion Medic tent had been engaged and to move there to secure it. (b)(3), (b)(6) then linked up with his vehicle in the vicinity of the TOC, Bldg 6, got in his vehicle, and directed that it move forward, around the west side of Bldg 6 and between Bldgs 7 and 2 (Exhibit D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) moved with the C Company leaders to the medic tent (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC (Exhibits D-21 and E-9).

(b) Medical Platoon. As the medics were treating their wounded comrades, a hand grenade landed on their tent and exploded, causing minor shrapnel wounds to most of the medics in the tent (Exhibit C-22).

(c) C Company Leaders. The C Company leaders are told by (b)(3), (b)(6) that the Medic tent, Bldg 12, had been hit and to go secure it. The element moved east across the compound (Exhibits D-5 – D-10).

(d) Scout Platoon. During this period, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scout Platoon were in the northeast tower, Bldg 5, scanning for enemies. I find it likely they engaged Attacker #2, who threw the hand grenade at the medical tent. His throwing motion allowed them to differentiate him from any friendly forces on the ground, enabling them to positively identify him as enemy (Exhibits C-17 and D-2).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scout Platoon engaged Attacker #2 when they were able to positively identify him when he threw a hand grenade (Exhibit D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) had established security at the ECP and was returning toward the TOC, Bldg 6 (Exhibit D-3).

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(g) SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Tate took his last breath, and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in place for fear of being discovered by the enemy who was still nearby. (b)(3), (b)(6) had tried to keep SSG Tate awake in hopes of getting him to the medics to seek help, but the gunshot wounds were too serious to survive (Exhibits C-20 and D-11).

(8) **Attack Phase 7 - 9-line MEDEVAC Request Submitted.**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) moved forward in his vehicle toward the breach, traveling around a Scout Platoon vehicle that was in front of his vehicle, and moving west of Bldg 6 and between Bldgs 7 and 2 (Exhibits B-1 and D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) moved with the C Company leaders west to an area near the breach (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC communicating with superior and adjacent units (Exhibit D-21 and E-9).

(b) Medical Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to the TOC, Bldg 6, and submitted the 9-line MEDEVAC request (Exhibit C-4).

(c) C Company Leaders. (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to help with the BN Medic tent/MEDEVAC/CASEVAC. The remaining members of the C Company element focused their attention on securing the breach and preparing to clear the surrounding area (Exhibits C-4 and C-22).

(d) Scout Platoon. During this period, (b)(3), (b)(6) and his Scout Platoon were on top of the northeast guard tower, Bldg 5, scanning for enemy activity and attempting to engage adversaries (Exhibits C-22, C-23, C-24, D-28 and D-15).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) was with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scout Platoon on top of the tower scanning for enemies (Exhibits C-17 and D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) had returned to the TOC, Bldg 6 (Exhibit D-3).

(g) SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed in place in the bunker, still not knowing where the enemy was (Exhibit D-11).

(9) **Attack Phase 8 - Enemies Retreat.**

(a) Command Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed his tactical vehicle to be placed on the breach site to deter any further attacks. All leaders were involved in consolidating personnel accountability (Exhibit D-4).

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(b) Medical Platoon. Medics prepared their first three casualties, SPC Tilton, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) for the MEDEVAC flight (D-7, D-17, D-20, and D-26). (b)(3), (b)(6) observed (b)(3), (b)(6) on the floor, but decided that yelling at him would not help. He told him to hold onto (b)(3), (b)(6) protective vest so that (b)(3), (b)(6) could follow (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) with the casualties and provide any required medical treatment. A few minutes later, he found (b)(3), (b)(6) holding onto (b)(3), (b)(6) vest, but (b)(3), (b)(6) had his pistol drawn, safety on FIRE, round in the chamber, and the weapon pointed at (b)(3), (b)(6) back. (b)(3), (b)(6) took the pistol away from (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared it, and placed it back in (b)(3), (b)(6) holster (Exhibit D-22).

(c) C Company Leaders. (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to help in the medic tent/MEDEVAC/CASEVAC. The remainder of C Company linked up with members of the Scout Platoon, who were preparing to clear the bunker, Bldg 4. While (b)(3), (b)(6) helped the Scout Platoon, (b)(3), (b)(6) moved to the medic tent to help with the 9-line MEDEVAC and casualty evacuation (Exhibits C-4 and C-22). Once the casualties were loaded for movement to the HLZ, (b)(3), (b)(6), the remaining members of the C Company element, and the Scout PLT assaulted the breach and secured it. The Soldiers then began clearing the remainder of the compound (Exhibit C-2).

(d) Scout Platoon. The Scout Platoon was in the northeast tower, Bldg 5, scanning for enemies. (b)(3), (b)(6) saw attackers running away from the breach site into the village and engaged them as they ran into the village (Exhibits C-1 and D-28). After hostilities appeared to cease (likely due to the attackers fleeing), (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scout Platoon descended from the tower, Bldg 5, and coordinated with C Company to clear and secure the breach area. While clearing the bunker, Bldg 4, they found (b)(3), (b)(6), the wounded and dead interpreters, and SSG Tate's body. They prepared to clear the Afghan latrine, Bldg 3, when a hand grenade was thrown from the latrine. The Scouts took cover and established accountability. They continued to coordinate with C Company while they received Small Arms Fire from the latrine (Exhibits C-2, D-23 and D-28).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scout Platoon engaged the attackers as they ran into the village after possibly injuring the attacker who threw the grenade on the medic tent (Exhibits C-1 and D-2). After descending from the tower, (b)(3), (b)(6) assisted with clearing operations while simultaneously initiating and monitoring CASEVACS (Exhibit D-2).

(f) Fire Support Officer. (b)(3), (b)(6) had made contact with C Company and was assisting in the effort to secure the breach and clear the Afghan latrine, Bldg 3 (Exhibits C-2 and D-3).

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(g) SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) heard a familiar voice coming from the Scout Platoon as they prepared to clear the bunker, so he cried out for help (Exhibits C-20 and D-11). (b)(3), (b)(6) exited the bunker and directed them to SSG Tate's body.

(10) **Attack Phase 9 – MEDEVAC Casualties.**

(a) Command Group. All members of the command group began to focus on evacuation of the casualties and clearing the compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed the Scout Platoon to clear the 1-508th PIR area to ensure only US and ANCOP personnel were in the area (Exhibit D-4). (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to assist with the MEDEVAC of the casualties (Exhibit D-22). (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the TOC (Exhibits D-21 and E-9).

(b) Medical Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) returned to the medic tent, Bldg 12, and started directing that the casualties be taken out to the vehicles so they could be moved to the LZ. The three seriously injured casualties, SPC Tilton, (b)(3), (b)(6) were taken to the landing zone (LZ) where the UH-60 was waiting for them. (b)(3), (b)(6) appeared from behind (b)(3), (b)(6) told him he needed to get on the aircraft, and jumped on the MEDEVAC aircraft. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not see him check or treat any of the casualties on the aircraft, but only take a seat and secure himself. (b)(3), (b)(6) flew to KAF with the most seriously wounded patients (Exhibits D-7, D-17, D-20, and D-26).

(c) C Company Leaders. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed the movement of litters to the medical tent, Bldg 12, to evacuate/carry out (b)(3), (b)(6) SPC Tilton, and (b)(3), (b)(6). The casualties were loaded onto the hood of the MATVs and moved to the LZ. C/1-508th helped secure the LZ and helped with the follow-on operations (Exhibits D-4, D-5, D-7, D-17, D-20, and D-26).

(d) Scout Platoon. Concurrent with the Scout Platoon clearing the bunker, Bldg 4, and the Afghan latrine, Bldg 3, (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled up an MATV adjacent to the medical tent for CASEVAC. Seeing there were enough personnel assisting with the CASEVAC, he joined the Scouts in finishing the clearing of the Afghan Latrine. Once it had been cleared, he found an unexpended RPG round in the Afghan Latrine and marked it with a glow stick (Exhibits C-2, C-4, D-23 and D-28).

(e) HHC 1SG. (b)(3), (b)(6) assisted with clearing operations while simultaneously initiating and monitoring CASEVAC. He called for personnel to recover concertina wire to close the breach area. Finally, he re-initiated accountability and discovered that everyone was accounted for except SSG Stout (Exhibits C-3 and D-2).

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(f) Fire Support Officer. After clearing the Afghan latrine, Bldg 3, he brought ANCOP officers to the medical tent to ensure no Afghan Officers were KIA. He assisted in the accountability effort and ultimately found SSG Stout on the collapsed tent, Bldg 10, with his rifle approximately three meters away (Exhibit D-3).

(11) **Overview of Serious Casualties Suffered During the Attack.**

(a) 1LT Goeke and SSG Stout were evaluated by medical personnel within a few minutes after their injuries were discovered. Both had expired from their injuries when evaluated. Both likely died almost immediately after being injured (Exhibits D-3, D-5, D-7, D-12, D-14, D-20, A-7, and A-9).

i. 1LT Goeke's death certificate states that he sustained, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) This was likely caused by either a high velocity piece of shrapnel or a gunshot wound. 1LT Goeke's death certificate was signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) on 14 July 2010 that listed his official time of death as 140815 July 2010 (Exhibits A-7). I find that his death most likely resulted from injuries caused by shrapnel associated with the detonation of a suicide vest by Attacker #1 adjacent to the east side of Bldg 9.

ii. SSG Stout's death certificate states that he sustained, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Stout's death certificate was signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) on 14 July 2010 that listed his official time of death as 140810 July 2010 (Exhibit A-9). I find that his death most likely resulted from injuries caused by the blast associated with the detonation of a suicide vest by Attacker #1 adjacent to the east side of Bldg 9.

(b) SSG Tate likely died soon after being injured, too. It was not possible for medical personnel to reach him soon after he was injured because of the proximity of the enemy to SSG Tate at that time (Exhibit D-11). Even if they had been able to do so, it is unlikely he could have survived his wounds. As soon as his location was discovered, he was evaluated by medical personnel and found to have expired (Exhibits D-2, D-11, D-14, and A-8).

i. SSG Tate's death certificate states that he sustained, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Tate's death certificate was signed by (b)(3), (b)(6) on 14 July 2010 that listed his official time of death as 14 0800 July 2010 (Exhibit A-8).

ii. I find that his death resulted from gunshot wounds inflicted by Attacker #2 (see Enclosure 1) inside Bldg 4.

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(c) The other Soldier who died as a result of this attack, SPC Tilton, received prompt medical care as his injuries took place in the battalion's medic tent. Unfortunately, SPC Tilton's injuries were not survivable (Exhibits D-12, D-13, D-17, D-20, D-26, and A-10).[2]

(d) Other urgent casualties received sufficient and appropriate medical care at the scene and were evacuated to a higher level of care within a reasonable amount of time (Exhibits D-13 and D-20).

5. Conclusions.

a. Given the tactical situation, mission, and available resources, it was both reasonable and prudent to dispose the 1-508th PIR headquarters at the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar City, Afghanistan. This disposition allowed collocation of the battalion with its partnered ANCOP Brigade Headquarters. This location was also the best of the limited alternatives available for a battalion headquarters in the area of operations (Exhibits D-4, E-1, and Investigating Officer (IO) personal observations of alternatives). Finally, the broader operational requirements necessitated getting a force expeditiously positioned to build and partner with the ANSF at the checkpoints around the city. The operations in Kandahar could not proceed without that enabler in place and the operations in and around Kandahar were central to the broader strategy.

b. Given the tactical situation, mission, and available resources, (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander, 1-508th PIR, and the commanders superior to him in the chain of command made reasonable prioritization decisions relative to competing force protection requirements.

(1) Prioritizing support for construction of force protection measures to the platoon checkpoints and company staging bases over the 1-508th PIR Battalion Headquarters was both prudent and reasonable. These checkpoints were an essential tactical element of a critical operational mission to isolate Kandahar City (Exhibit F-12). In addition, the battalion headquarters occupied a location with already established infrastructure, guarded by ANCOP personnel, and with a set of already established security protocols—the platoon checkpoints had none of these (Exhibit D-4 and IO personal observations).

(2) Commanders ensured that a formal assessment of the force protection vulnerabilities at the ANCOP compound was completed (Exhibit F-11). However, various aspects of that USFOR-A assessment conducted 21 – 24 June 2010 were of little utility to the battalion because

[2] SPC Tilton passed away in a military hospital in Landstuhl, Germany (b)(6) (b)(6) I did not procure a death certificate for SPC Tilton, but the exhibits do include a summary of his injuries recorded in the "Role 3" hospital at Kandahar Airfield the night of the attack.

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NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS
SUBJECT: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar City, Afghanistan

(b)(1)1.4g as per section 1.7(e).

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have changed the outcome of this engagement. Since most leaders reasonably assumed the initial explosion was the result of indirect fire and this perception remained until after (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Tate entered the bunker, Bldg 4, it is likely any instructions issued with the bullhorn(s) would have directed these Soldiers to do exactly as they did—seek cover in the bunker.

(b)(1)1.4g as per section 1.7(e).

d. While all transitions in command relationships induce some complexity, the transition of 1-508th PIR from direction by Task Force Kandahar to Combined Team Kandahar City was ameliorated to a significant degree by the presence of the 4/82d Abn BCT headquarters—1-508th PIR's parent headquarters—as part of Combined Team Kandahar City (Exhibits F-3 and D-29).

e. The medical treatment provided to US casualties from the attack was both sufficient and appropriate with one marked exception. The battalion surgeon, (b)(3), (b)(6) behaved in an inappropriate and cowardly manner.

(1) He failed to perform his duty to treat casualties (Exhibits D-12, D-13, D-14, D-17, and D-26). While other medics were standing in the medic tent treating casualties, he remained prone on the floor of the tent, refusing to move. Only when a wounded Soldier crawled to him did he treat that Soldier's serious wounds (Exhibits D-7, D-17, D-20, and D-26).

(2) He also absented himself from the scene of the battle on the first MEDEVAC aircraft despite not knowing if there were any other seriously wounded casualties and knowing that he was the only medical officer at the scene of the battle (Exhibits D-20 and D-26).

(3) Fortunately, (b)(3), (b)(6) decision to fly away on the first MEDEVAC aircraft did not ultimately have an impact on the four Soldiers who died as a result of the attack. These Soldiers' injuries were too severe to have allowed them to survival even if (b)(3), (b)(6) had performed appropriately (Exhibits A-7, A-8, A-9, A-10, D-2, D-3, D-5, D-7, D-11, D-12, D-13, D-14, D-20, and D-26). Similarly, this did not have a perceptible negative impact on the other casualties based on the nature of their injuries.

(4) (b)(3), (b)(6) offered a rationale for his decision to leave the scene of the battle on the first MEDEVAC helicopter, saying that he needed to be present with those casualties

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during the flight in case a medical procedure needed to be accomplished (Exhibit D-26). This statement is self-serving and I do not find it credible.

(a) The MEDEVAC flight was only about five minutes long and there were medical personnel on board.

(b) When he entered the helicopter, (b)(3), (b)(6) observed (b)(3), (b)(6) take a seat immediately upon entering, not checking on the status of any of the casualties aboard the aircraft (Exhibit D-20).

(c) I find it likely that his reason for getting on the helicopter was based on his desire to remove himself from harm's way, not to assist in the care of any of the casualties.

(5) A more detailed discussion of (b)(3), (b)(6) is at Enclosure 2.

f. I find that the individuals and leaders in the compound appropriately emphasized and enforced proper wear of protective gear. The vast majority of individuals involved in the attack knew the location of their protective gear and donned it at the start of the attack (Exhibits D-4, D-12, D-21, and D-21). Some members of the command kept their protective equipment in their vehicles, while others kept it where they slept. I find this an appropriate practice to help maintain accountability of protective gear and maintain it in a location that does not unnecessarily clutter their work areas. This aside, some of the injuries and fatalities might have been avoided if all personnel were wearing the appropriate protective gear.

(1) Of the four individuals who were mortally wounded in the attack, 1LT Goeke and SSG Stout were wearing the appropriate protective gear (Exhibits D-5, D-7, D-14, and D-20). SPC Tilton was wearing his vest, but not his helmet (Exhibits D-12, D-16, D-17, and D-20). SSG Tate was not wearing any protective gear (Exhibits D-11).

(2) SPC Tilton was not wearing his helmet in the medic tent while treating casualties. Other medics in the medic tent were attired similarly (Exhibits D-12, D-16, D-17, and D-20). While this may have assisted in enabling slightly better communications in the tent and more freedom of movement, I find that the risks clearly outweighed the benefits of doing this.. The compound was still receiving direct fire and shrapnel from explosions while the medics were treating the wounded. Medics in the medic tent should have been wearing helmets. This might have prevented SPC Tilton's fatal injury.

(3) SSG Tate was not wearing any of his protective gear when he was fatally injured.

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(a) SSG Tate crawled out of his collapsed tent without making an effort to retrieve his protective gear or weapon (Exhibits D-11 and D-15). He recognized that he'd not secured his weapon after getting out of the collapsed tent and—like most others in the compound reasonably assumed—thought the compound was taking indirect fire. He would have reasonably decided that it was more important for (b)(3), (b)(6) and him to seek the cover of the bunker than retrieve their weapons and protective gear (Exhibit D-11).

(b) I find it possible, but unlikely, that wearing his protective gear would have prevented his death.

(c) Had both (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Tate been wearing all their protective gear, it is possible that (b)(3), (b)(6) would have been killed in addition to SSG Tate since (b)(3), (b)(6) would likely not have been able to remain concealed in the bunker under a relatively small bench if both SSG Tate and he were wearing bulky protective vests.

(4) Two individuals were classified as "Urgent" when MEDEVAC'd from the compound, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not wearing any protective gear. (b)(3), (b)(6) was wearing his vest, but not his helmet (Exhibits D-12, D-16, D-17, and D-20).

(a) (b)(3), (b)(6) did not take the time to gather all their protective gear prior to running to the bunker when they heard the explosion that created the breach (Exhibit D-12).

(b) Like most others in the compound, they likely reasonably assumed that they were receiving effective indirect fire and that expeditious movement to the bunker was the most appropriate response.[3]

g. (b)(3), (b)(6) and his staff reasonably assessed the available intelligence to conclude that

(b)(1)1.4g as per section 1.7(e).

[3] These Soldiers have been evacuated out of country for medical treatment. I did not interview them to identify their specific rationale, but find it reasonable to believe they initially believed, as did most others in the compound, that the explosion was from indirect fire.

[4] (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit D-4).

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(2) The fact that no ANCOP personnel showed up for sick call earlier in the evening on 13 July 2010 when they normally had approximately 12-15 show up consistently each day was also out of the ordinary. None of the individuals I interviewed had any knowledge of any special operations for the ANCOP Brigade that night that would have caused this marked drop in sick call attendance. If someone had combined this with the email assessing a heightened threat, a more compelling case for increasing force protection measures would have been evident.[5]

h. Several senior officers had visited 1-508th PIR headquarters after they had occupied the compound (BG Hodges, RC-S Director of Operations; Brig Gen Vance, Commander of Task Force-Kandahar; BG Hodges; (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander of 4/82d Abn BCT; and (b)(3), (b)(6), Deputy Commander of 4/82d Abn BCT). I find that these visits, in and of themselves, do not constitute an endorsement of the force protection measures in place at the compound, but do indicate that there were no glaring shortcomings observed by these officers at the compound.

i. I find that the MEDEVAC procedures were generally timely and appropriate under the circumstances. The confusion associated with an attack on the headquarters element which would normally develop, process, and forward a MEDEVAC request, lengthened the time required to provide higher headquarters with adequate information with which to launch the MEDEVAC helicopters. In addition, the atmospheric conditions the night of the attack prevented wounded Soldiers who were not classified as "Urgent" from being MEDEVAC'd by air. The most critical patients were evacuated to an appropriate facility in a timely manner.

6. Recommendations.

(b)(5)

[5] My inability to firmly establish which members of the ANCOP force, other than the senior leaders, were present in the compound on the night of the attack prevented me from gathering enough evidence to determine if some element of the ANCOP stationed there colluded with the attackers in the planning or conduct of the attack. While I find it possible that the attackers may have indirectly gathered information about 1-325th PIR's activities and disposition from members of the ANCOP, I find the behaviors of the ANCOP personnel present that evening consistent with a similar group under similar conditions who had simply heard from their acquaintances it would be wise to avoid the Americans that evening. I found that additional efforts to gain greater fidelity into the motivations and foreknowledge about the attack of the ANCOP personnel would likely not produce tangible results. See the recommendation in paragraph 7, addressing collection planning of partnered forces.

(b)(5)

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SUBJECT: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar City, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(5) (b)(6)

7. See enclosures to this memorandum that contain additional specific findings and exhibits. These enclosures include:

a. Enclosure 1. Overview of events from an enemy force perspective leading up to and during the attack.

b. Enclosure 2. Detailed discussion of (b)(3), (b)(6)

c. Enclosure 3. Medical Summaries and Notes ("A" series exhibits).

d. Enclosure 4. ANCOP HQ Schematics and Attack Logs ("B" series exhibits).

e. Enclosure 5. Evidence Photos ("C" series exhibits).

f. Enclosure 6. Sworn statements ("D" series exhibits).

g. Enclosure 7. Unsworn Statements and Additional Interviews ("E" series exhibits).

h. Enclosure 8. Orders, Plans, Intel and Assessments ("F" series exhibits).

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NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS
SUBJECT: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan National Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters in Kandahar City, Afghanistan

8. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.army.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Investigating Officer

Encls
as

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Pages 27 through 33 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1) 1.4g as per section 1.7(e).

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REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS BY INVESTIGATING OFFICER/BOARD OF OFFICERS

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is OTJAG.

IF MORE SPACE IS REQUIRED IN FILLING OUT ANY PORTION OF THIS FORM, ATTACH ADDITIONAL SHEETS

SECTION I - APPOINTMENT

Appointed by GEN David H. Petraeus, Commander, US Forces - Afghanistan
(Appointing authority)

on 26 July 2010 *(Date)* *(Attach inclosure 1: Letter of appointment or summary of oral appointment data.) (See para 3-15, AR 15-6.)*

SECTION II - SESSIONS

The *(investigation) (board)* commenced at Camp Eggers, Afghanistan *(Place)* at 2300 *(Time)*

on 26 July 2010 *(Date)* *(If a formal board met for more than one session, check here* ☐ *. Indicate in an inclosure the time each session began and ended, the place, persons present and absent, and explanation of absences, if any.)* The following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were present: *(After each name, indicate capacity, e.g., President, Recorder, Member, Legal Advisor.)*

following persons *(members, respondents, counsel)* were absent: *(Include brief explanation of each absence.) (See paras 5-2 and 5-8a, AR 15-6.)*

The *(investigating officer) (board)* finished gathering/hearing evidence at 2100 *(Time)* on 10 August 2010 *(Date)*

and completed findings and recommendations at 1500 *(Time)* on 19 August 2010 *(Date)*

SECTION III - CHECKLIST FOR PROCEEDINGS

A. COMPLETE IN ALL CASES	YES	NO 1/	NA 2/
1 Inclosures *(para 3-15, AR 15-6)* Are the following inclosed and numbered consecutively with Roman numerals: *(Attached in order listed)*			
a. The letter of appointment or a summary of oral appointment data?	☒	☐	
b. Copy of notice to respondent, if any? *(See item 9, below)*	☐	☐	☒
c. Other correspondence with respondent or counsel, if any?	☐	☐	☒
d. All other written communications to or from the appointing authority?	☐	☐	☒
e. Privacy Act Statements *(Certificate, if statement provided orally)?*	☒	☐	☐
f. Explanation by the investigating officer or board of any unusual delays, difficulties, irregularities, or other problems encountered *(e.g., absence of material witnesses)?*	☐	☐	☒
g. Information as to sessions of a formal board not included on page 1 of this report?	☐	☐	☒
h. Any other significant papers *(other than evidence)* relating to administrative aspects of the investigation or board?	☐	☐	☒

FOOTNOTES: 1/ *Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.*
2/ *Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.*

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		YES	NO 1/	NA 2/
2	Exhibits *(para 3-16, AR 15-6)*			
	a. Are all items offered *(whether or not received)* or considered as evidence individually numbered or lettered as exhibits and attached to this report?	☒	☐	☐
	b. Is an index of all exhibits offered to or considered by investigating officer or board attached before the first exhibit?	☒	☐	☐
	c. Has the testimony/statement of each witness been recorded verbatim or been reduced to written form and attached as an exhibit?	☒	☐	☐
	Are copies, descriptions, or depictions *(if substituted for real or documentary evidence)* properly authenticated and is the location of the original evidence indicated?	☐	☐	☒
	e. Are descriptions or diagrams included of locations visited by the investigating officer or board *(para 3-6b, AR 15-6)?*	☒	☐	☐
	f. Is each written stipulation attached as an exhibit and is each oral stipulation either reduced to writing and made an exhibit or recorded in a verbatim record?	☒	☐	☐
	g. If official notice of any matter was taken over the objection of a respondent or counsel, is a statement of the matter of which official notice was taken attached as an exhibit *(para 3-16d, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
3	Was a quorum present when the board voted on findings and recommendations *(paras 4-1 and 5-2b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☒
B.	COMPLETE ONLY FOR FORMAL BOARD PROCEEDINGS *(Chapter 5, AR 15-6)*			
4	At the initial session, did the recorder read, or determine that all participants had read, the letter of appointment *(para 5-3b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
5	Was a quorum present at every session of the board *(para 5-2b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
6	Was each absence of any member properly excused *(para 5-2a, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
7	Were members, witnesses, reporter, and interpreter sworn, if required *(para 3-1, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
8	If any members who voted on findings or recommendations were not present when the board received some evidence, does the inclosure describe how they familiarized themselves with that evidence *(para 5-2d, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
C.	COMPLETE ONLY IF RESPONDENT WAS DESIGNATED *(Section II, Chapter 5, AR 15-6)*			
9	Notice to respondents *(para 5-5, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Is the method and date of delivery to the respondent indicated on each letter of notification?	☐	☐	
	b. Was the date of delivery at least five working days prior to the first session of the board?	☐	☐	
	c. Does each letter of notification indicate —	☐	☐	
	(1) the date, hour, and place of the first session of the board concerning that respondent?	☐	☐	
	(2) the matter to be investigated, including specific allegations against the respondent, if any?	☐	☐	
	(3) the respondent's rights with regard to counsel?	☐	☐	
	(4) the name and address of each witness expected to be called by the recorder?	☐	☐	
	(5) the respondent's rights to be present, present evidence, and call witnesses?	☐	☐	
	d. Was the respondent provided a copy of all unclassified documents in the case file?	☐	☐	
	e. If there were relevant classified materials, were the respondent and his counsel given access and an opportunity to examine them?	☐	☐	☐
10	If any respondent was designated after the proceedings began *(or otherwise was absent during part of the proceedings):*			
	a. Was he properly notified *(para 5-5, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
	b. Was record of proceedings and evidence received in his absence made available for examination by him and his counsel *(para 5-4c, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
11	Counsel *(para 5-6, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Was each respondent represented by counsel?	☐	☐	
	Name and business address of counsel:			
	(If counsel is a lawyer, check here ☐)			
	b. Was respondent's counsel present at all open sessions of the board relating to that respondent?	☐	☐	☐
	c. If military counsel was requested but not made available, is a copy *(or, if oral, a summary)* of the request and the action taken on it included in the report *(para 5-6b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
12	If the respondent challenged the legal advisor or any voting member for lack of impartiality *(para 5-7, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Was the challenge properly denied and by the appropriate officer?	☐	☐	☐
	b. Did each member successfully challenged cease to participate in the proceedings?	☐	☐	☐
13	Was the respondent given an opportunity to *(para 5-8a, AR 15-6):*			
	a. Be present with his counsel at all open sessions of the board which deal with any matter which concerns that respondent?	☐	☐	
	b. Examine and object to the introduction of real and documentary evidence, including written statements?	☐	☐	☐
	c. Object to the testimony of witnesses and cross-examine witnesses other than his own?	☐	☐	☐
	d. Call witnesses and otherwise introduce evidence?	☐	☐	
	e. Testify as a witness?	☐	☐	
	f. Make or have his counsel make a final statement or argument *(para 5-9, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	
14	If requested, did the recorder assist the respondent in obtaining evidence in possession of the Government and in arranging for the presence of witnesses *(para 5-8b, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐
	Are all of the respondent's requests and objections which were denied indicated in the report of proceedings or in an inclosure or exhibit to it *(para 5-11, AR 15-6)?*	☐	☐	☐

FOOTNOTES: 1/ *Explain all negative answers on an attached sheet.*
2/ *Use of the N/A column constitutes a positive representation that the circumstances described in the question did not occur in this investigation or board.*

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SECTION IV - FINDINGS *(para 3-10, AR 15-6)*

The *(investigating officer) (board)* , having carefully considered the evidence, finds:

See attached memorandum, CSTC-A/NTM-A-COS, dtd 19 AUg 10, Sub: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters, Kandahar City, Afghanistan.

SECTION V - RECOMMENDATIONS *(para 3-11, AR 15-6)*

In view of the above findings, the *(investigating officer) (board)* recommends:

See attached memorandum, CSTC-A/NTM-A-COS, dtd 19 AUg 10, Sub: Report of Investigation into US Hostile Fires Deaths on 13 July 2010 at Afghan Civil Order Police (ANCOP) Brigade Headquarters, Kandahar City, Afghanistan.

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SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION *(para 3-17, AR 15-6)*

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. *(If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)*

(Recorder)	*(Investigating Officer) (President)*
(Member)	*(Member)*
(Member)	*(Member)*

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT *(para 3-13, AR 15-6)*

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.

(In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)	*(Member)*

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY *(para 2-3, AR 15-6)*

findings and recommendations of the *(investigating officer) (board)* are *(approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ itutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or ective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)*

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EXHIBITS "A" BINDER

Medical Summaries & Notes

Tab 1: A-1: 1LT Goeke Incident Summary

Tab 2: A-2: SSG Tate Incident Summary

Tab 3: A-3: SSG Stout Incident Summary

Tab 4: A-4: SPC Tilton Incident Summary

Tab 5: A-5: Casualties Roll-Up

Tab 6: A-6: Casualties Roll-Up (Detailed)

Tab 7: A-7: Death Certificate for 1LT Goeke

Tab 8: A-8: Death Certificate for SSG Tate

Tab 9: A-9: Death Certificate for SSG Stout

Tab 10: A-10: Medical Treatment Record for SPC Tilton

Tab 11: A-11: Medical Treatment Record for (b)(3), (b)(6)

Tab 12: A-12: Medical Treatment Record for (b)(3), (b)(6)

Tab 13: Casualty Feeder Cards:

A-13: SSG Stout

A-14: SSG Tate

A-15: 1LT Goeke

A-16: SPC Tilton

A-17:

A-18:

A-19: (b)(3), (b)(6)

A-20:

A-21:

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A-22:

A-23:

A-24:

A-25:

A-26:

A-27:

A-28:

A-29: (b)(3), (b)(6)

A-30:

A-31:

A-32:

A-33:

A-34:

A-35:

A-36:

Tab 14: A-37: Admission Document for Role 3

Tab 15: A-38: Role 3 On-Call Duty Roster

Tab 16: Patient Movement Logs:

A-39: (b)(3), (b)(6)

A-40: SPC Jesse Tilton

A-41: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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1LT Christopher Goeke

1LT Christopher Goeke was killed on 13 July 2010 when insurgents breached the ANCOP HQ compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan while performing his duties as platoon leader for the 1-508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division. He was fatally wounded by a suicide bomber while part of the counterattack force that prevented the enemy from reaching the Battalion Tactical Operations Center (BN TOC).

Prior to attack members of Charlie Company (C/1-508th PIR) were at the BN TOC waiting for a meeting with the Battalion Commander and the Battalion Command Sergeant Major. The members of C/1-508th PIR that were at the BN TOC included (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT Goeke, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

At approximately 2115L there was a large explosion towards the northern end of the compound and it was unknown at that time if it was from indirect or direct fire. The members of C/1-508th PIR immediately ran back to their vehicles to put on their protective gear (protective vest and helmet) as it was allowed to take these items off while inside the compound. Once they donned their gear they moved back to the BN TOC to set-up a security perimeter.

After the BN TOC was secured, (b)(3), (b)(6) the Company Commander for C/1-508th PIR) decided that they should conduct a hasty counterattack to both repel the attackers and secure the breach site. The element was comprised of the aforementioned group plus (b)(3), (b)(6) and minus (b)(3), (b)(6) (who stayed at the BN TOC to help provide security) and began to move along the eastside of the BN TOC. They moved past the Admin/Logistics Operations Center (ALOC) tent and south towards the Mobile Kitchen Trailer (MKT) where they began to receive enemy small arms fire (SAF) and immediately they returned fire. Besides SAF they also saw rocket propelled grenades (RPG's) being shot and what appear to be hand-grenades exploding.

While the element continued to engage the enemy, another loud explosion occurred 20-30 feet in front of their position and was so powerful that it knocked most of them to the ground. The Soldiers started checking to see each other's status and that is when they found 1LT Goeke who was unconscious (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) moved 1LT Goeke back to the TOC where (b)(3), (b)(6) began to evaluate and treat him. However, it was determined that 1LT Goeke had succumbed to his wounds.

It was determined that the blast that killed 1LT Goeke was from a suicide bomber that may have also killed SSG Christopher Stout. It is believed that the suicide bomber was probably on his way to the BN TOC and had he reached it, he more than likely would have caused mass casualties.

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SSG Sheldon L. Tate

SSG Tate was killed on 13 July 2010 when insurgents breached the ANCOP HQs compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was working as a cook for the 1-508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division. During the attack SSG Tate took shelter in a bunker where he was later shot and fatally wounded by one of the attackers.

At approximately 2115L there was a large explosion towards the northern end of the compound and it was unknown at that time if it was from indirect fire (IDF) or direct fire. SSG Tate had just completed his duties for the day as was in his tent with (b)(3), (b)(6) – this tent was also occupied by the local national interpreters. It was likely that the Soldiers believed that the explosion was the result of indirect fire and began the process to quickly escape the tent and move to the designated protective bunker. SSG Tate used a knife to cut his and (b)(3), (b)(6) way out of the east end of the tent and (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) left via the west end of the tent and moved to the northeast guard tower.

Once outside of the tent SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) realized that they had left both their protective gear (protective vest and helmet) and weapons in the tent, but decided since they believed they were in the middle of an IDF attack it was more important to take cover in the bunker. SSG Tate directed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to hold onto his shirt and follow him to the bunker which unbeknownst to them, due to the lack of visibility, was adjacent to the breach. Upon entering the bunker they found some interpreters already there and on the ground crying out in fear. SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) decided to try and conceal themselves by lying down side-by-side and hugging each other underneath the center bench that ran the length of the bunker.

Soon after they got into position an insurgent entered the bunker from the west side near the breach, walked east down the aisle (closest to where (b)(3), (b)(6) was lying) and shot three interpreters. He started to walk back to the west end but appeared to notice SSG Tate because he stopped, leaned over the bench and shot SSG Tate multiple times. The attacker apparently was not aware that (b)(3), (b)(6) was also in the bunker as he walked through the bunker one more time after he shot SSG Tate and left.

(b)(3), (b)(6) heard SSG Tate grunt as he was struck by the bullet(s) and did not move to prevent being discovered and killed and continued to hold on to SSG Tate until the attacker left. (b)(3), (b)(6) felt SSG Tate's body to try to determine where he had been shot and repeatedly told SSG Tate to hold on and stay with him. Approximately 10-15 seconds later (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) stayed in the bunker and held SSG Tate for several minutes until he heard members of the 1-508th clearing team. He then left the bunker and found (b)(3), (b)(6) whom he informed of SSG Tate's death and location.

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SSG Christopher Stout

SSG Stout was killed on 13 July 2010 when insurgents attacked the ANCOP HQ's compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was working as a chaplain's assistant for the 1-508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division. SSG Stout's death likely occurred when a suicide bomber detonated his charge.

At approximately 2115L there was a large explosion towards the northern end of the compound and it was unknown at that time if it was from indirect or direct fire. As practiced, members of the 1-508th PIR went to the location of their protective gear (protective vest and helmet) and donned it - it was allowed to take these items off while inside the compound.

SSG Stout went to his tent and donned his gear and was likely moving towards the designated protective bunker or to the BN TOC. During this movement SSG Stout may have either run directly into the suicide bomber causing him to prematurely detonate or in within close proximity when he exploded. It is believed that this suicide bomber was moving towards the BN TOC and had he reached that location he could have caused mass casualties.

Approved for Release

SPC Jesse Tilton

SPC Tilton was killed on 13 July 2010 when insurgents breached the ANCOP HQ compound in Kandahar, Afghanistan, where he was working as a medic for the 1-508th Parachute Infantry Regiment (PIR), 82nd Airborne Division. While rendering aid to an injured Soldier, SPC Tilton was likely stuck by enemy small arms fire (SAF) or shrapnel from a grenade that later led to his death.

At approximately 2115L there was a large explosion towards the northern end of the compound and it was unknown at that time if it was from indirect or direct fire. The majority of the medical personnel in their living/working tent ran to the bunker as it was the designated place to take cover. However, SPC Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6) remained in the tent because they were in bed at the time of the initial attack. By the time SPC Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6) dressed and donned their protective gear personnel were already running back into the medic tent – the bunker had been engaged by the enemy with SAF and grenades and caused multiple injuries and deaths.

One of the injured Soldiers from the bunker was (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC Tilton quickly started rendering him aid. SPC Tilton had his body armor on, but not his Kevlar while he was treating (b)(3), (b)(6) Another explosion occurred, which is believed to have been a hand-grenade thrown on the tent, sending shrapnel throughout the tent. A status report was called for and SPC Tilton was found collapsed on top of his patient (b)(3), (b)(6)

SPC Tilton was quickly evaluated and was found to have a serious injury to the back of his head that more than likely resulted from SAF and not the shrapnel from the explosion. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SPC Tilton was MEDEVAC'd to Role 3 in Kandahar Airfield and then evacuated to Landstuhl Regional Medical Center in Germany where his family was able to see him (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Casualties Rollup

Name	Battle Roster #	Injury	EVAC Category	Location	Remarks
Tilton, Jesse	41FHT6715	GSW to head.	Urgent	En route to Germany	(b)(3), (b)(6)
					(b)(3), (b)(6)
Stout, Christopher	41FHS1964	Shrapnel to Torso and lower body	KIA	KAF	Awaiting Ramp side timeline
Goeke, Christopher	41FCG2240	GS Wound and shrapnel	KIA	KAF	Awaiting Ramp side timeline
Tate, Sheldon	41FET0049	Multiple GS Wounds	KIA	KAF	Awaiting Ramp side timeline

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Exhibit A–5

E/782nd (1F) Tate, Sheldon; (b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1/508 Stout, Christopher; (b)(3), (b)(6)

C/ 1-508 Goeke, Christopher; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC/ 1-508 Tilton, Jesse; (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Pages 9 through 34 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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EXHIBITS "B" BINDER

ANCOP HQ Schematics and Attack Logs

B-1: ANCOP BDE HQ Compound Building Schematic

B-2: ANCOP BDE HQ Compound Engineer Diagram

B-3: Attack Overview Schematic

B-4: ANCOP BDE HQ Attack Storyboard

B-5: Attack Log - Provided by Role 3 Medevac Facility, Kandahar Airfield

B-6: Attack Log - Provided by Task Force – Kandahar (TF-K)

B-7: Attack Log - Provided by Med Ops NCOIC, 4/82 Bde

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Pages 2 through 36 redacted for the following reasons:

- -

(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Pages 1 through 20 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1) 1.4a

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Exhibit B-8
Investigative Timeline

Date	Movement / Location	Remarks
Monday, 26 July 2010	Camp Eggers	Appointed to conduct investigation
Tuesday, 27 July 2010	Camp Eggers	Consult with Legal Advisor
Saturday, 31 July 2010 (PM)	IO Team travels to Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts In-brief with BG Hodges
	Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) meet with TF Kandahar and identify key leaders in the Operations Cell
		(b)(3), (b)(6) attends in-brief with (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sunday, 1 August 2010 (AM)	Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) talk to medical personnel at Role 3; request medical documents
		(b)(3), (b)(6) meets with 4th BDE, 82nd Airborne Division BDE S-3 and BDE Med Ops OIC
Sunday, 1 August 2010 (PM)	Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) meets with the command team of 4th BDE, 82nd Airborne Division
		(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts interviews (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
		(b)(3), (b)(6) equests/receives casualty feeder cards from 4th BDE S-1
Monday, 2 August 2010 (AM)	Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts interviews (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Monday, 2 August 2010 (PM)	IO Team travels to Camp Nathan Smith	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts interviews (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and informally meets with (b)(3), (b)(6) from TF Kandahar
	Camp Nathan Smith	IO Team transcribes audio statements and prepares the hard copies for signature
		IO Team discusses plan of action for the next day's trip to ANCOP BDE HQs
Tuesday, 3 August 2010 (AM)	IO Team travels to ANCOP BDE HQ	IO Team walks the perimeter, climbs the guard towers to view the surrounding area, and inspects the breach site
	ANCOP BDE HQ	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts interviews (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
		(b)(3), (b)(6) take compound measurements, checks guard towers right/left gun limits, takes site pictures, walk the outer perimeter, inspect nearby buildings, and hike up to the Observation Point NE of the compound
		(b)(3), (b)(6) meets with the Soldiers of the medic platoon and collects initial statements
Tuesday, 3 August 2010 (PM)	ANCOP BDE HQ	(b)(3), (b)(6) travel to C Company Platoon Headquarters and conduct interviews (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
		(b)(3), (b)(6) meets with Soldiers from the Scout platoon and collects initial statements
	IO Team returns to Camp Nathan Smith	IO Team reviews documents, transcribes statements, identifies personnel who still need to be interviewed
Wednesday, 4 August 2010 (AM)	Camp Nathan Smith	IO Team reviews list of personnel needing to be interviewed and came up with an agenda for the day, and transcribe audio statements from 3 AUG in preparation for signatures

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Exhibit B-8
Investigative Timeline

Date	Movement / Location	Remarks
Wednesday, 4 August 2010 (PM)	IO Team travels to ANCOP BDE HQ	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts interviews (b)(3), (b)(6)
		(b)(3), (b)(6)
	ANCOP BDE HQ	IO Team gets final signatures on transcribed statements for personnel who were interviewed the previous day
	IO Team travels to Kandahar Air Field	IO Team reviews all evidence and identifies tasks that need to be completed prior to leaving Kandahar Air Field
Thursday, 5 August 2010 (AM)	Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts interviews (b)(3), (b)(6)
		(b)(3), (b)(6)
		(b)(3), (b)(6) collect medical records and death certificates for casualties from Role 3
		(b)(3), (b)(6) collects supporting documents on the Task Organziation, OPORDs, and daily threat briefs around the time of attack
Thursday, 5 August 2010 (PM)	Kandahar Air Field	IO Team gets final signatures on transcribed statements for personnel who were interviewed 1-2 August 2010
		IO Team analyzes data and works on final report and attack schematics
Friday, 6 August 2010	Kandahar Air Field	(b)(3), (b)(6) conducts Out-brief with BG Hodges
	IO Team travels to Kabul	
Saturday, 7 August 2010	Camp Eggers	Compile investigative records and develop initial draft report
Sunday, 8 ~~July~~ August 2010		

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EXHIBITS "C" BINDER

Evidence Photos

C-1: View of north wall breach site from NE Tower, Bldg 5

C-2: View of north side of compound from NE Tower, Bldg 5

C-3: View of breach site on north wall of compound

C-4: View of breach site on north wall of compound, Afghan Latrine, Bldg 3 & Bunker, Bldg 4

C-5: View of breach site and west entrance of Bunker, Bldg 4

C-6: View of tent closest to breach, Bldg 10

C-7: View of SSG Seelig's protective plate

C-8: View of RPG strike on ANCOP barracks, Bldg 21

C-9: View of RPG strike on ANCOP barracks, Bldg 21

C-10: View of tent, Bldg 10 and LSS, Bldg 9

C-11: Close-up view of LSS, Bldg 9, where S-vest detonated

C-12: View of northern portion of LSS, Bldg 9

C-13: View of body part belonging to suicide bomber

C-14: Front view of protective vest belonging to SSG Stout

C-15: Back view of protective vest belonging to SSG Stout

C-16: Close-up back view of protective vest belonging to SSG Stout

C-17: View of RPG strike on NE tower, Bldg 5

C-18: Close-up view of RPG strike on NE tower, Bldg 5

C-19: East side view of Bunker, Bldg 4

C-20: Floor of Bunker, Bldg4, where PFC Colson and SSG Tate were lying

C-21: View of bullet hole in window of vehicle parked on east side of Bunker, Bldg 4

C-22: Inside view of Medic Tent, Bldg 12, where hand grenade exploded

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C-23: Site in Medic Tent, Bldg 12, where SPC Tilton was injured and treated

C-24: Site in Medic Tent, Bldg 12, where (b)(3), (b)(6) was injured and treated

C-25: Bunk that was underneath grenade blast in Medic Tent, Bldg 12

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Pages 3 through 27 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) 10 USC 130b, (b)(6)

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ANCOP BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS HOSTILE DEATH INVESTIGATION

Kandahar City, Afghanistan

Exhibit D

Sworn Statements

UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOUO~~

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EXHIBITS "D" BINDER

Sworn Statements

D-1: (b)(3), (b)(6)

D-2: (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR

D-3: (b)(3), (b)(6) – HHC FSO, 1-508th PIR

D-4: (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR

D-5: (b)(3), (b)(6) – C Company, 1-508th PIR

D-6: (b)(3), (b)(6) - C Company, CDR 1-508th PIR

D-7: (b)(3), (b)(6) – C Company 1SG, 1-508th PIR

D-8: (b)(3), (b)(6) - C Company, 1-508th PIR

D-9: (b)(3), (b)(6) C Company, 1-508th PIR

D-10: (b)(3), (b)(6) - C Company, 1-508th PIR

D-11: (b)(3), (b)(6) - HHC, 1-508th PIR

D-12: (b)(3), (b)(6) - HHC, 1-508th PIR

D-13: (b)(3), (b)(6) - HHC, 1-508th PIR

D-14: (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR

D-15: (b)(3), (b)(6) – HHC, 1-508th PIR

D-16: (b)(3), (b)(6) HHC, 1-508th PIR

D-17: (b)(3), (b)(6) – HHC, 1-508th PIR

D-18: Omitted

D-19: (b)(3), (b)(6) 4/82 BDE

D-20: (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR

D-21: (b)(3), (b)(6) – BN S-3, 1-508th PIR

D-22: (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR

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D-23: (b)(3), (b)(6) - C Company, 1-508th PIR

D-24: (b)(3), (b)(6) - Med Ops, 4/82 BDE

D-25: Omitted

D-26: (b)(3), (b)(6) – BN Surgeon, 1-508th PIR

D-27: Omitted

D-28: (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR

D-29: (b)(3), (b)(6) – G-3, Task Force Kandahar (TF-K)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP NATHAN SMITH	2010/08/02	1932	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

I HUNT AVE FORT BRAGG NC

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I HAVE BEEN HERE FOR 11 MONTHS ALONG WITH THE BRIGADE. WE HAVE BATTALIONS SPREAD ACROSS RC-W AND RC-S. UNTIL RECENTLY WE HAVE BEEN IN ZABUL PROVINCE AND ALL THE WAY OUT WEST INTO HERAT PROVINCE. ABOUT A MONTH AGO OUR BRIGADE TRANSFERRED AUTHORITY OUT OF ZABUL AND BROUGHT THE BRIGADE HQ TO KANDAHAR CITY. FOR THE MAJORITY OF THE DEPLOYMENT UNTIL ABOUT 8 WEEKS AGO 1/508 WAS IN ZABUL PROVINCE OPERATING IN A VERY DIFFERENT ENVIRONMENT THAN KANDAHAR CITY. MOST OF ZABUL IS A VERY RURAL AREA MOST OF THEIR OPERATIONS HAVE BEEN IN THE COUNTRYSIDE AND SMALL POPULATION AREAS, NOT IN MAJOR CITIES LIKE THEY ARE IN NOW. Question: How long has the Battalion been deployed and how many casualties have they taken? THEY'VE BEEN DEPLOYED FOR 11 MONTHS. I'M NOT SURE HOW MANY CASUALTIES THERE HAVE BEEN AS OF NOW. Question: How did the Battalion end up at ANCOP? THE BN HQ AND HHC ENDED UP AT ANCOP HQ BECUASE THE FOOTPRINT FOR LIFE SUPPORT IN KANDAHAR CITY WAS LIMITED AT THAT TIME. THERE WASN'T AN EXISTING AMERICAN COALITION BASE WHERE THEY COULD PUT ALL OF THERE PEOPLE SO THEY NEEDED TO CREATE SOME SPACE. MOST IMPORTANTLY THEY NEEDED TO CO-LOCATE WITH THEIR PARTNER FORCE, WHICH ARE 2 OR THE KANDAKS FROM THE 2ND BRIGADE ANCOP AS WELL AS THE BRIGADE HEADQUARTERS OF THE 2ND BRIGADE ANCOP. WHICH IS LOCATED ON THE WESTERN SIDE OF KANDAHAR CITY. THE OLD CORPS AREA WAS CONSIDERED BUT IT IS AN UNHEALTHY AREA. THERE IS ALOT OF DRAINAGE AND HEALTH RISKS THERE. THE MAIN REASON FOR THE FORCE BEING PLACED AT ANCOP HQ IS THE NEED TO BE NEAR THE PARTNER FORCE. Question: Talk about Combined Team Kandahar City? COMBINED TEAM KANDAHAR CITY IS AN INTERIM HQ - RC-S DESCRIBED IT AS A BRIDGING STRATEGY TO GET THE BRIGADE FROM 4TH ID INTO THE CITY. THE RC-S COMMANER MADE A DECISION HE WANTED TO RELIEVE TF-K OF RESPONSIBILTY OF THE CITY AND ESTABLISH A BRIGADE HQ THAT WAS RESPONSIBLE FOR THE CITY. SO, IN EARLY JUNE I BROUGHT A SMALL TEAM FROM TF-FURY STAFF HERE FOR A PERIOD OF ABOUT A MONTH. I SERVED AS THE COMBINED TEAM KANDAHAR CITY COMMANDER DURING THE INITIAL BUILD IN THE CITY OF THE SECURITY RING PROTECTION FORCE AND THE RIP FOR THE 97 MP WAS GOING ON. I BELIEVE JULY 9 WAS WHEN (b)(3), (b)(6) ASSUMED COMMAND OF CTK-C. DURING THE FIRST SIX WEEKS OF CTK-C'S EXISTANCE, IT WAS UNDER THE CONTROL OF TF-K. AFTER 15 JULY, CTK-C WAS UNDER DIRECT CONTROL OF RC-S. CTK-C'S CAPACITY WAS FOR CURRENT OPS WITH A SMALL PLANNING CELL. WHEN I WAS COMMANDER WE HAD TWO BATTALIONS SUBORDINATE: 1-508 AND 97 MP (REPLACED BY 504 MP). OUR RELATIONSHIP WORKED FINE. 1-508 GOT TO FOCUS MORE ON THE GROUND AND THEY HAD SOMEONE TO FIGHT ON THEIR BEHALF AND NOT GET SUCKED INTO HIGHER ISSUES. WHEN 1-508 CAME OUT OF ZABUL THEY WENT TROUGH A FIVE DAY RSOI THAT THEY PUT TOGETHER AT KAF AND THEY STARTED MOVING PEOPLE INTO INTERMEDIATE STAGING BASES IN THE CITY. THEY HAD FOLKS AT FOB WALTON AND EVENTUALLY SOME AT A PLACE CALLED HOTEL HWY 1 OR HOTEL CALIFORNIA.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF P (b)(3), (b)(6) ING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-1		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE APD PE v1.00

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CNS DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

THEY ALSO HAD A COMPANY AT CAMP NATHAN SMITH THAT HAS NOW MOVED TO THE WESTERN EDGE OF THE CITY - A SIGNIFICANT PORTION OF THE COMBAT POWER WAS COMMUTING TO WORK FROM KAF.Questions: What were the companies doing? THEY WERE DOING TWO THINGS: THEY WERE VALIDATING CHECKPOINT LOCATIONS AND STARTING INITIAL CONSTRUCTION OF THE CHECKPOINTS AND THEY WERE CONSTRUCTING LIVING AREAS IN WHICH THEY CURRENTLY OCCUPY. RC-S AND TF-K WERE FOCUSED ON THE CHECKPOINTS BUT AFTER MANY HOURS OF WORKING WITH 1-508, WE RE-WORKED THE PRIORITIES TO FOCUS MORE ON THEIR LSA'S AND IMMEDIATE PROTECTION SO THEY COULD PROJECT FROM THE LSA INTO THE ACTUAL CHECKPOINT AND BUILDING THE ACTUAL INFRUSTRUCTURE. I DIDN'T THINK INITIAL PRIORITIES WERE RIGHT BUT WE DID ADJUST THEM TO FOCUS ON FORCE PROTECTION FOR THE TROOPS. THIS HAPPENED AROUND MID JUNE. Question: Do you have any insight into the command climate at the 1-508? How would you characterize it? I HAVEN'T SEEN (b)(3), (b)(6) WORKING WITH HIS STAFF SINCE LATE DECEMBER WHEN I LEFT ZABUL. THERE WAS ALOT OF FRICTION IN 1-508 THEN. IT WAS A FAIRLY HOSTILE ENVIRONMENT - MANY PEOPLE IN THAT UNIT REPORT THE SAME. THERE WAS ALSO FRICTION BETWEEN THE BDE CDR AND THE BN CDR. I DONT KNOW WHAT THE SOURCE IS. I HAVE HAD ALOT OF CONVERSATIONS WIH (b)(3), (b)(6) SINCE I HAVE BECAME THE DEPUTY COMMANDER IN JUNE IN WHICH HE STATED HE IS COMMITTED TO (b)(3), (b)(6) SUCESS AND GETTING HIM THROUGH COMMAND - I KNOW THEY HAVE HAD SEVERAL DISAGREEMENTS. Question: Do you recall any significant threat assessments or threat streams the day of the attack? THE DAY BEFORE THE ATTACK THE WAS A THREAT WARNING RECEIVED BY 2-508. THEY HAVE A BASE ABOUT 800 TO 1000 METERS FROM ANCOP HQ. I BELIEVE THE THREAT WAS THAT SUICIDE BOMBERS WERE MOVING INTO THE CITY. WE THOUGHT IT MIGHT BE TOWARD SARAPOSA PRISON BECAUSE THEY GET ALOT OF THREAT REPORTING - THAT'S A KILOMETER EAST OF THE ANCOP HQ. Question: Do you know if (b)(3), (b)(6) came to any of the commanders or TF-K staff about any FP concerns or needing any additional resources? WE HAD SIGNIFICANT DISCUSSIONS IN THREE MAJOR AREAS: 1) THE AVAILABILITY OF ALASKAN BARRIERS - HE WANTED SOMETHING TALL FOR PROTECTION THAT ALSO SAVES SPACE, 2)THE CRANES TO GET THEM PLACED, AND 3) THE TRUCKS TO GET THEM IN. WE REALLY HAD A PROBLEM IN GAINING SUPPORT IN ALL THREE OF THE AREAS. AFTER ALL THIS HAPPENED WE TOOK STEPS TO MOVE THINGS WITH ARMY ASSETS, BUT BEFORE THIS, WE WERE STILL MOVING THIS OUT OF ZABUL AND THAT WAS TYING UP OUR ORGANIC ASSETS. Question: Were there concerns from TF-K about being able to task Naval Engineer Command in the area to assist in these efforts? NO, THEY HAD THE TASKING AUTHORITY. BUT THE MAJORITY OF THE COORDINATION FELL ON CTK-C AND WE DIDN'T HAVE THE TASKING AUTHORITY SO WE WERE COORDINATING WITH TF-K ON AN HOURLY BASIS. I DON'T THINK THERE WAS ANY FRICTION WITH CTK-C DOING COORDINATION, THERE WAS FRICTION WITH 1-508 TO 2-2 NCR; AND THAT FRICTION WAS UNCLEAR COMMUNICATION AND LACK OF UNDERSTANDING OF EACH OTHER'S PRIORITIES. CTC-K WORKED ON HELPING WITH ESTABLISHING PRIORITIES. Question: Do you know if any of (b)(3), (b)(6) subordinates passed on concern's about the Force Protection at the ANCOP HQ? WE DID NOT TALK ABOUT IT. HOWEVER, I HAVE HEARD IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE ATTACK THAT SOME PEOPLE DID VOICE CONCERNS, BUT I HAVE NO FIRST HAND KNOWLEDGE. Question: Have you visited the facility? What was your assessment of the force protection of the site? I HAVE BEEN TO THE FACILITY MANY TIMES. MY JOB PRIOR TO THIS WAS AS ADVISOR TO 2ND BRIGADE ANCOP. I HAVE TALKED TO THE ANCOP BDE COMMANDER AT GREAT LENGTH ABOUT THE FORCE PROTECTION AT HIS SITE. HE DOES HAVE OP'S ON THE HIGH GROUND ON THE NORTH OF THE FACILITY, THAT IS AN AREA WHERE A GUY WITH AN RPG COULD SIT AND LAUNCH RPG'S INTO THE COMPOUND. ON THE SOUTHEAST SIDE THERE IS A HIGH RISE APARTMENT BUILDING WHERE YOU CAN LOOK DOWN ON TO THE COMPOUND AND A SNIPER COULD SIT. ACROSS THE STREET ON THE SOUTH END THERE IS ALOT OF HIGH GROUND WHERE A GUY CAN CLIMB ON THE MOUNTAIN AND LOOK RIGHT INSIDE. THE ONLY PLACE YOU CANT SEE IN IS THE WEST.

Question: Based on what you said, if someone was planning an attack, could someone observe and plan an attack based on their visibility from the exterior of the compound?

(b)(1)1.4g, (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

BUILDING BECAUSE SOME ANCOP HAVE THEIR FAMILIES UP THERE ACCORDING TO THE ANCOP BDE CDR. IT IS NOT A HARD PLACE TO DO A DETAILED RECON. Question: Do you know of any senior officers that visited the compound? Did they express concern about the Force Protection on the site? (b)(3), (b)(6) VISITED WITH ME ONE TIME, BEFORE THE ATTACK. I BELIEVE GENERAL VANCE VISITED ONE TIME, NOT WITH ME, AND I AM POSITIVE GENERAL HODGES

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CNS DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

HAS VISITED SEVERAL TIMES, BUT NOT WITH ME. I DONT KNOW IF ANY OF THE SENIOR OFFICERS SAID ANYTHING ABOUT THE FORCE PROTECTION. Question: Are you aware of any concerns with the medical treatment at the time of the attack? RIGHT AFTER THE ATTACK OCURRED, WHILE THEY WERE STILL REPORTING SPORADIC FIRE, I WATCHED A MEDAVAC LAND IN A FIELD ON THE WEST SIDE OF THE COMPOUND. I'M SURE IT WAS A HARD FLIGHT FOR THEM BECAUSE THERE WAS ALOT OF DUST IN THE AIR AND SHORTLY AFTER THE SERIOUS CASUALTIES WENT OUT, THE (b)(1)1.4a I READ A STATEMENT FROM TH BN CSM THAT THE SURGEON WAS ON A COT WITH HIS HEAD IN HIS HANDS AND WASN'T RESPONSIVE AND THEY WERE PUTTING GUYS ON THE MEDAVAC AND SOMEHOW THE SURGEON ENDED UP ON THE MEDEVAC AND GOT MOVED BACK TO KAF. AT THE TIME THAT HAPPENED WE THOUGHT HE HAD BEEN WOUNDED, THEN I GOT A LATER REPORT THAT HE WAS BEING SCREENED FOR MBTI. AND THATS ABOUT THE LAST OF IT. I'M NOT SURE WHERE THE PA WAS AT THIS TIME. Question: Talk me through the events of the evening: FIRST REPORT WAS THAT THERE WAS INDIRECT FIRE INTO ANCOP HQ AND MAYBE SOME RPGS BUT WE DIDN'T HAVE ANY PICTURE ABOUT THE WALL BEING BREACHED. I DON'T RECALL GETTING ANY REPORT OF SUICIDE BOMBERS; WE DID LATER ON GET REPORTS THAT THERE WERE SOME PEOPLE WHO GOT THROUGH THE PERIMETER. AT ONE POINT I TALKED TO (b)(3), (b)(6) - WHAT I HEARD HIM SAY AND WHAT I BELIEVE TO BE TRUE IS DIFFERENT. I HEARD HIM SAY THEY MADE IT THREE FEET INSIDE THE WALL AND HAD BEEN KILLED BUT I THINK I DIDN'T HEAR CORRECTLY. I THINK IT WAS MORE LIKE THIRTY FEET BECAUSE THAT IS MORE CONSISTENT TO WHAT WE THINK HAPPENED. Question: When did you talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) I TALKED TO (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) AROUND 2300 -2330. I TALKED SEVERAL TIMES WITH HIS S3 AS WE WERE TRYING TO FIGURE OUT WHAT WAS GOING ON. Question: What kind of tactical response came from here? WE PUT EVERY QRF IN THE CITY ON ALERT TO MOVE. WE HAD ACCESS TO A FEW QRFs. WE WERE VERY CONCERNED BECAUSE WE DIDN'T KNOW WHAT WAS REALLY GOING ON. WE KNEW THAT THERE WERE PEOPLE ON THE OUTSIDE OF THE PERIMETER OF THE ANCOP. WE KNEW THAT THERE WAS A LOGISTICS CONVOY THAT WAS MOVING TO THE 2-508 COP JUST TO THE NORTH OF ANCOP HQ, SO WE HAD ALOT OF MOVING PIECES OUTSIDE OF THE ANCOP. WE ALSO SENT A CF QRF FROM CAMP NATHAN SMITH. Question: Did Second Battalion make contact that night? 2-508 MADE CONTACT. AS THEY WERE COMING THEY HIT AN IED THAT WE THINK WAS LAID OUT TO HIT RESPONDING FORCES ON A SECONDARY ROAD NORTHEAST OF THE ANCOP HQ.

Question: How difficult was it to get medevac requests that were comprehensive enough to launch a medevac? THE MEDAVAC REPORT WAS ABOUT THE EASIEST PART OF THE REPORTING. AS SOON AS THEY HAD CASUALTIES THEY REPORTED THEM. THE ONLY THING IS THAT THE NUMBER KEPT GROWING. Question: Do you know if there was a combined security effort at the ANCOP HQ? I DON"T KNOW FIRSTHAND.

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

NTM-A / CSTC-A

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6) have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.
(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Signature

02 AUG 10
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP BDE HQ, KANDAHAR	2010/08/03	1400	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1ST BN 508TH PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Upon receiving the mission change to move to Kandahar City, I immediately sought out maps, aerial photos and SIGACTs for the area surrounding the ANCOP BDE HQ. I also engaged with the Engineers and Contracting Officials responsible for the ANCOP Build site. My immediate concerns were the (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) village to the north. I also had concerns about not having (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) for the ANCOP BDE HQ. Taking this in stride I requested additional photos of the compound from the ADVON detachement that was responsible for recon of all of the SRPF sites. When I recieved these I had additional concerns about the closeness of our Paratroopers to Afghan Hygeine facilities and living areas, this mostly out of fear of disease spreading. After leaving FOB Apache I departed KAF on the first patrol going to the ANCOP in order to oversee the construction of the base and make arrangements with the ANCOP for space. Upon arrival, I noticed that the living area was very crowded and pushed to the far northern wall in order to fit everything in and that the SeaBees and other Engineers had already constructed the floors for our living tents. I started Paratroopers to work moving some platforms to better fit everything in, placed some Paratroopers on security and made a tour of the compound to assess the security and look for potential hazards. The ANCOP Security Officer made the rounds with me and together we identified (b)(5), (b)(7)(F). We agreed that with the tents to the north of the ANCOP barracks, it would (b)(5), (b)(7)(F). When we inspected each tower, there were (b)(5) ANCOP on duty in each one. And although they were not clean or organized, appeared to be providing adequate overwatch. (b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(3), (b)(5),(b)(6), (b)(7)(F)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-2	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP BDE HQ DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(F) and left them free to be serviced by whomever was currently at the compound during any contingency. I also conducted daily discussions with the ANCOP Security Officer (S2/S3) to continue to develop a Combined defense plan and review changes and pass any intel that would benefit the defense of the compound. The Medical Platoon developed a MASCAL plan and designated and marked CCPs all around the compound and recon'd the HLZ for MEDEVAC purposes.

On the night of the 13th, me and my Headquarters Platoon had returned to the ANCOP after a 11 hour patrol to several CPs and KAF (transporting Communications Specialist and equipment) around 1730. We all were tired and ready for an uniterrupted rest before any other taskings came down. At approximately 2100-2110, I had laid down in my bunk and started to read the Army Times. The lights were all on and almost everyone was still awake in the BDOC tent when at approximately 2120L an enormous explosion ripped the compound. Everyone in the tent immediately got up and started donning their equipment as rehearsed and I directed them to begin acountability of the Company (I had assumed it was an indirect fire attack or VBIED at the ECP) and I ran to tower 2 (Northeast corner). As I was climbing the tower, additional smaller explosions and small arms fire tore across the compound. As I reached the second floor I was joined by (b)(3), (b)(6) The ANCOP in the tower took that time to turn on the lights inside the stairwell, exposing (b)(3), (b)(6) some of his Scouts and I to some small arms fire and eventually an RPG directed at the Americans climbing to the top. At the top (b)(3), (b)(6) and I scanned the compound trying to identify any threats. In between some small arms fire with the Scouts looking outward and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I observing the compound, he and I identified a man pop out from the western side of the bunker. We couldn't identify a weapon so held our fire until the Insurgent threw a hand grenade. We engaged him with small arms and forced him to the ground. He then crawled back between the bunker and Afghan latrine. Shortly thereafter another large explosion tore the space between the bunker and latrine (Suicide Bomber), potentially the individual that we had brought down. We continued to try to identify threats and engaged only when we could positively identify it as an Insurgent. After the RPG attack and the heavy contact started to wane, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I decided to go down to the ground and put together a team to retake the bunker and latrine and seal the breach. When we reached the ground we coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) (C co. CDR) to ensure that Blue on Blue did not occur. This was the first that we knew of anyone other than HHC being on the compound. A four man team consisting mostly of Scouts moved under cover of HHC and C co. towards the breach, but were forced back by near simultaneous blasts (one larger, suicide bomber to the west and a hand grenade directed at them). By this time the Medics had treated several casualties (within 20 meters of the breach) and were ready to MEDEVAC the most serious so a second attempt to take the bunker and latrine was temporarily postponed. MEDEVAC will not land if the HLZ is under attack or there is gunfire nearby so we wanted to ensure that the casualties made it out. Once the MEDEVAC left the Scouts threw an orange chemlight to signal a shift fire and approached the Afghan latrine. By this time most incoming small arms had ended so the approach was fairly unimpeded. The Team stacked on the latrine and flashbanged it and systematically cleared it. Simultaneously, (b)(3), (b)(6) myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared the bunker of threats and began removing and identifying the bodies of the killed. We moved the fallen to an area close to the Aid Station and placed them in body bags and removed them from immediate sight, to prevent a negative effect on the other defenders. At this time I was coordinating to evacuate the remainder of the casualties, leading a party to assist in clearing the tents of threats, casualties and UXO. I also direct (b)(3), (b)(6) to some ANCOP Class IV to get some comcertina wire and told him to get a party to seal the breach to the wall. I found (b)(3), (b)(6) assisting in retrieving some fallen personnel (SSG Stout and an Interpreter) and took over for him in cutting through the tent and removing body part of the suicide bomber form the tents and living areas. I was also recieving personnel and equipment statuses from Section Leaders and Platoon Leaders. I turned over my recovery responsibilites to (b)(3), (b)(6) and made my way to each tower and the ECP to ensure that all aspects of the security plan were being enforced. I was also checking on the welfare of each Paratrooper that I encountered. Most of the Paratroopers on the compound that night were Staff and support personnel and had never been in contact before, let alone that intense and close, so I made it a point to reassure each of them and praise their efforts. My intent was to limit any occurence of post traumatic stress by dealing with it head on and early. Trying to identify Paratroopers that needed assistance early and have them replaced on security. The ECP was locked down by the PSD led by (b)(3), (b)(6) and he talked me through his defensive details. I also assisted in loading a few of the casualties into vehicles for transport by the STAB A Canadian Platoon to Camp Nathan Smith. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me that the HHC patrol was being tasked to move the Heroes to KAF. He asked if I wanted to lead it as I did earlier in the day. However, my duty was to the defense of the compound so I informed him that he would have to lead the patrol with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the rest of the HQ Platoon. The Paratroopers of HQ Platoon readied their vehicles and loaded the Heroes and conducted an in depth patrol brief in recognition that there was a good likelihood of attack

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP BDE HQ DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

the Paratroopers, sending and receiving reports and beginning the process of reestablishing operations. A Canadian element arrived and assisted in providing security for most of the following morning, freeing up the HHC Paratroopers to conduct the clearance and defense bolstering operations. HHC reassumed security from the Canadians and Delta Company around 1500 on the 14th. Most Paratroopers had not slept in over 36 hours by this time and needed constant monitoring, this I provided by checking each position and having the other Section/ Platoon Leaders/ Sergeants rotate and monitor. I additionally supervised the clean up, the arrival of the Engineer assets and repair of the defenses. I fell asleep around 0100 on 15 Jul and woke at about 0300 to make checks on the perimeter and begin the days Engineering work around 05001. END OF STATEMENT. NOTHING FOLLOWS.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature

03 Aug 10

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP BDE HQ, Kandahar City, Afghanistan	2010/08/03	1520	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC/1-508th PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the evening of 13 July, 2010, at approximately 2120, a large explosion detonated on the North side of the ANCOP Headquarters compound where HHC/1-508th PIR lives and operates. The explosion created a large breach in the perimeter wall and enemy fighters began shooting small arms, Rocket Propelled Grenades, and throwing hand grenades. I was located in the BN ALOC (forward) Tent adjacent to the BN TOC. I immediately moved to my tent, located directly adjacent to the ALOC tent, to put on my PPE. Upon exiting the tent I immediately began pulling security from behind the connex next to my living tent in the direction of the ANCOP Barracks. I saw tracer fire and heard numerous explosions. I encountered one of our interpreters who subsequently informed me that he had seen enemy personnel shooting and throwing grenades. I put him behind cover and moved forward toward the ANCOP Barracks with three other Paratroopers. Upon reaching the corner of the building an RPG impacted above our heads knocking me to the ground. I gained my footing and assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) in moving a wounded Soldier (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) behind the cover of a nearby connex. (b)(3), (b)(6) was then moved into the BN TOC to receive medical treatment and attention. At that point I encountered (b)(3), (b)(6) who ordered me to move to the main gate to ensure it was secured with a vehicle and a team of Paratroopers. After reconsolidating forces (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself formed a small fire team and began to maneuver toward the main gate to carry out the BN CDR's orders. Throughout our movement, continuous enemy fire hit structures adjacent to our line of movement and points beyond. Several grenade and RPG detonations occurred throughout our movement. Once at the gate I encountered (b)(3), (b)(6) the BN CDR's PSD NCOIC. I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to move a truck in front of the main gate and ensure that enough Soldiers were placed under (b)(3), (b)(6) charge to repel any enemy maneuver. Upon returning to the BN TOC, I began to discuss CAS coverage with our BN ALO, (b)(3), (b)(6) when several more explosions occurred in close proximity to the TOC. I got my radio a new battery and moved back out to assist with security and clearance operations. I communicated information between the BN TOC and both our Scout and C Co element who were actively engaged in clearance and the securing of the breach site (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had taken up a position in his truck, one of many moved forward to increase security near the attack site, on the North West corner of the compound. He asked if all elements were in position and gave the order to clear forward to the breach sight and conduct follow on clearance of all structures. After the breach had been cleared, and a relative measure of security had been restored I moved to the Medical Tent and brought ANCOP officers over to ensure none of the Afghan KIA were ANCOP officers; all were linguists. I then heard over the radio that after conducting a 100% accountability drill (coordinated by (b)(3), (b)(6) one Paratrooper, SSG Stout, was still unaccounted for. I moved with (b)(3), (b)(6) the C Co CDR, to begin looking for SSG Stout. Upon moving toward the tent that housed our linguists we found one interpreter, KIA, under some debris. We then found the remains of SSG Stout on the top of the linguist tent. The linguist tent was the most Northern and Western of the living tents, and directly across from the breach site. We recovered SSG Stouts remains then continued improving security positions and conducting clearance operations. As daylight broke it became apparent that SSG Stout was killed in the blast levied by a suicide bomber standing adjacent to the exit of the linguist tent, next to a Shower/Laundry connex. I estimate that hostile fire lasted anywhere from 10 to 20 min, and that the time from the initial blast to the clearance of the breach site was approximately 45 min.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-3		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP BDE HQ DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS A CH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WIT WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Sub uthorized by law to administer oaths, this 03 day of August, 2010 at ANCOP BDE HQ

(b)(3), (b)(6)

th)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I (b)(3), (b)(6) have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

05 Aug 2010

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCCP HQ, Kandahar City	2010/08/02		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
1-508th PIR

9. I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

SUMMARY OF EVENTS:

At approximately 2000 hours I had just returned from BFC and I moved to the BN TOC to receive our nightly SRPF Synch meeting update. I had just opened an e-mail from (b)(3), (b)(6) that stated he was seeing numerous indicators of a significant attack in Kandahar City or the surrounding areas when an explosion shook the Task Force TOC at approx 2110 hours. I immediately assumed this was a VBIED since the force was similar to a VBIED I experienced outside of CNS. I immediately ran outside to assess the situation and grab my weapon in my tent approx 30 feet away. As I ran to the tent I started hearing firing and additional explosions. I returned to the TOC and ordered several personnel to guard the entrance to the TOC and directed my C Co Commander to take his forces to the NW side of the base and counterattack since I knew the SCOUTS would be on the NE side of the compound based on their tent locations. I then exited the TOC and began to maneuver with a few Paratroopers I picked up on the way to the North Center part of the compound where I felt I could best command and control the potential maneuvering forces. When I moved adjacent to the ANCOP barracks it was struck twice by RPG fire and glass and debris fell all around my location. I realized this was an engagement area for the enemy so I moved back to the west a bit and assumed a position next to my S-4 (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) who was locking down the NW side of the breach point. While I was there a couple members of my PSD ran up to check on me. I instructed them to get in our vehicles and bring one up immediately. After waiting approximately 5 minutes, two vehicles drove up adjacent to the TOC. The first was a SCOUT vehicle, the second was my vehicle and crew. I stepped in to the TOC to get a current SITREP and provide additional instructions. I checked to ensure CASEVAC was being organized and checked to find out the status of the SCOUTS maneuvering. I also instructed the TOC to ensure we kept very positive control of anyone moving outside the compound as I wanted to ensure we limited fratricide in case we needed to bring in CAS or AWT. I stepped back outside the TOC and entered my vehicle IOT move forward to a point where I felt I had good observation of the clearance operation as well as monitor FM nets. I pulled up beside the SCOUT vehicle that was overwatching clearance operations by some 20' containers on the NW side of the compound. When this was complete, I told my gunner to yell at the other vehicle to move forward so I could pass by and assume a better overwatch position on the breach site. During this time, I was also talking to the TOC, the remainder of the PSD, SCOUTS, and C CO about the continued clearance of the compound, CASEVAC, and security of the HLZ. Once we moved forward (b)(3), (b)(6) and members of C Co moved by my vehicle and reported that the bunker where the enemy had been firing was clear. I decided to move my vehicle forward and into the breach IOT shield the Paratroopers operating behind me (clearing and searching) from further direct fire as well as make a statement to discourage anyone observing from the outside of the compound that the breach was not open any further. I tied this in with a machine gunner that was on top of the bunker oriented to the NW. I also confirmed with the TOC that there was no one outside the wire IOT clear direct fire engagements outside the compound if anyone saw anything moving they could PID. During this time I recall the TOC being in close coordination with D Co who had moved to the south side of the ANCOP HQ to lock down on the southern entrance to the ANCOP HQs and later to secure the HLZ. I also recall coordination to move one of the CASEVAC aircraft from the primary HLZ to an alternate HLZ to pick up two 2-Fury casualties that were wounded in an IED strike east of the

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-4	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/02

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

attack site. While this was ongoing, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) came by my position and gave me an update on what they had done. Both informed me they had good accountability of their personnel. Each said they had cleared the bunker and the Afghan latrine and I asked if they were ready to conduct a (b)(1)1.4a of the compound as I was still concerned there could be individuals who were hiding inside the compound or in a tent that could come out later and reinitiate attacks. I believe this was at approximately 2200. They requested a delay so I agreed but told them I wanted them to take their forces and (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) of the compound. I told them this would occur (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) At this point I moved back to the TOC to gain additional situational awareness and understand the BDA to this point. In the TOC I was informed that there were three Paratroopers killed, two severely wounded, and a number of others with routine wounds. While I was in the TOC I saw a lot of blood on the ground and I asked the TOC personnel to clean it up because I wanted to limit this from affecting their morale and psyche. As I walked back outside the TOC I linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) who was wounded and (b)(3), (b)(6) that was helping him to the Aid Station. I told (b)(3), (b)(6) to grab onto my shoulder and I assisted him along with (b)(3), (b)(6) to the Aid Station. When I arrived at the Aid Station I got an assessment from the MEDO (b)(3), (b)(6) and some of his medics on the status of our casualties. I talked to several of the casualties and assisted with loading one into and ANCOP ranger for transport to the HLZ. At this point I engaged (b)(3), (b)(6)) and (b)(3), (b)(6)) about their personnel and sensitive item accountability. They told me they were up on everything except they did not have accountability of SGT STOUT. I immediately told (b)(3), (b)(6) we had to find him immediately. (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed a few personnel and we moved out with the search party to look for SGT STOUT. About seven of use started to move east to west in the compound and call his name as we looked for him. We were moving from East to West when we rounded the corner of a tent by the PEC shower container and someone shined a light against the deflated tent. There was a person in what appeared to be a sitting position on top of the tent. (b)(3), (b)(6) FSO) climbed on top of the tent and identified it was SGT STOUT. He was KIA. The search party then transitioned to a recovery party and started to move SGT STOUT from the tent and place him in a body bag. We also found the body of one of our terps who appeared to be inside the tent when an explosion went off (the same one that killed SGT STOUT).

After the recovery was complete I moved back to the TOC because I heard there was a problem with the CASEVAC of our remaining casualties. When I came back into the TOC, I was informed the CASEVAC could no longer fly and any additional evacuations would have to be done by ground or wait until approximately 0700 when the aviators though the dust storm would break. Based off of recommendations from the Medical PLT and the staff I decided to not immediately evac our casualties by ground as spinning up another patrol would severely degrade our ability to secure the ANCOP HQ. (Later STAB-A would arrive and assist in the EVAC of our remaining ROUTINE casualties.

There actions were completed at approx 2300. At approx 0200 the ISR in support of 1F identified a vehicle loading several PAX and driving to the bus station on Hwy 1. The vehicle returned to the same compound in MIRWAIS MINA just South of the ANCOP HQ. (The bus station has been the source of numerous reports and discussions about nefarious activity). I assessed this could have been personnel involved with the attack so I decided we needed to execute a Tactical Call Out/Cordon and Knock IOT to determine if this compound was involved in the planning, recon, or C2 of the attack. At 0430 I moved with the ANCOP Mobile Force (and Scout PLT) to the compound. The AMF isolated the compound, called the owner to the front and asked if we could search the compound. This search lasted until approx 0630. Nothing out of place was found. When I returned from the mission (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) informed he was going to take a force of about 70 ANCOP and my 4th PLT, D Co to search the village North of the ANCOP HQ from where the attack emanated. I moved to the TOC around 0700 and followed the progress of the village clearance. The element returned around 1100 with nothing significant found.

While this force was out the STAB-A element arrived to conduct CASEVAC of our remaining wounded personnel. They also brought an EOD team and I walked around showing them the areas where the attack occurred. Outside the compound to the immediate N/NW I identified a third likely location where an attacker was killed due to blood stains on the side of the mud structure.

ADDITIONAL NOTE: The only reports of personnel moving around outside the compound were of 2Fury elements from their 1/B/2F element out of FOB Johnson. They had reacted to sound of the explosion and the reports of their FSC being hit by an IED. Their actions to come from an unexpected location/direction in support of the defense of the ANCOP HQ could have also contributed to preventing the 3-4 additional suicide vest attackers from entering the compound.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/02

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

BACKGROUND: I believe it is important to note the ANCOP HQ was identified as one of the initial staging areas for 1F forces to occupy and stage out of while the SRPF was constructed. The ANCOP HQ was finished by the ENGs before 1 FURY was even in the battlespace. Later, guidance was issued to build the SRPF sites as fast as possible IOT ensure we were demonstrating progress for the security of Kandahar. Additionally, guidance was given by the RC-South Commander that construction and improvements at the Patrol Bases would stop IOT put all focus on the Search Lanes as a visible example of the new security in the city. In discussions about the FORCEPRO levels on the ANCOP HQ with the CSM we felt the back wall was our weakest point and we needed to do something to protect this weakness. We instructed the FOB MAYOR (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) with FOO money by the BN. The Battalion hosted a nightly SPRF synch meeting that initially focused on the construction of the sites and later on the resourcing of the mission. Despite repeated requests for 4/82 staff personnel to attend this meeting, they rarely did. This is important to note because it was this disconnect that caused 1 Fury to "go it alone" with respect to planning, resourcing, and executing the SRPF mission. The engineers under 22 NCR have done an exceptional job building all of our sites. However, adjusting the priorities has experienced numerous setbacks because of disconnects at the CTKC level as a result of their lack of SA at the ground level.

INTEL: Reports that came out after the attack all indicate there were up to 6x suicide attackers prepared to enter the compound the night of the incident. I assess that at least three could not enter because of the heroic actions of numerous Paratroopers during this attack. There are also reports that there were at least two additional attacks scheduled to commence this evening but these were not executed because of these same actions by the Paratroopers on this night. Since conditions like the commitment of the ANP Reserve to the ANCOP HQ were not met, I assess the Taliban could not initiate these additional attacks.

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

atement)

WIT (b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC/1-508th PIR

ANCOP BDE HQ, Kandahar, AF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____

at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

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NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-CoS

19 Aug 10

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Sworn Testimony of (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 031038 Aug 10 I took the sworn testimony of (b)(3), (b)(6) at the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters compound in Kandahar City, Afghanistan. I electronically recorded the interview and had it summarized in written form from the recording.

2. Based on the requirement to conduct other interviews and our investigation team's travel schedule, I was not able to get (b)(3), (b)(6) signature on a sworn statement form.

3. The summary of his testimony that follows is an accurate portrayal of his sworn verbal statements.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

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Exhibit D-4

Summary of the Sworn Testimony of (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander, 1-508th PIR, 031038 August 2010, 1-508th PIR Headquarters, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

- Our battalion was originally located in 11 districts in Zabol and Uruzgan. We had infantry platoons with a company of ana and about 20-40 ANP. We were very dispersed—it was about a 12 – 18 hour trip to cover the entire AO. It was tough sustaining the battalion in that environment—that's where a majority of our challenges came. (For example, it took us 10 months to get our paratroopers showers. Some of the guys rigged up their own, but it took that long to get standard showers to them.)
- Another challenge for us was the number of XOs and S3s we had during the deployment. We went through six S3s and two XOs. Some of this was related to how dispersed we were. I sent our S3 out with a small cell to serve as a C2 cell for part of the battalion while I C2'd the rest. I put our HHC Cdr in as our S3. We then received an officer to serve as our S3 who simply didn't meet standards—he was removed a few weeks later. We used a few other officers in this role, like our SVAP leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) When we moved here, (b)(3), (b)(6) had to remain in the position we left, so our (b)(3), (b)(6) moved back into the s3 job for about six weeks after we got into Kandahar. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported into the battalion a few days before the attack allowing (b)(3), (b)(6) to take more responsibility for security here.
- We had two XOs. The second one, (b)(3), (b)(6) performed well, but told me he was retiring and has been rightly focused on making that transition lately, along with some important personal issues. Because of all this, we haven't had a major infantry XO or S3 for a few months prior to the attack.
- Our higher headquarters changed over time. At first we were working for 5/2d ID BCT and then for 4/82d Abn BCT—actually called combined team Zabol. When we came to Kandahar, we were working for combined team Kandahar city, a combination of people from4/82d Abn BCT and Task Force – Kandahar (TF-K). Our logistical support came from KAF.
- When we transitioned to Kandahar, we conducted our RUP/TOA with the inbound Stryker battalion, moved to KAF for 4-5 days of RSOI and training, and then occupied our positions in the AO.
- I was most concerned about the construction and force protection at the platoon sites, where our paratroopers were the most exposed. These check point locations were dictated to us. We were consulted about some other locations for our headquarters, but the ANCOP headquarters was the best option. There was resistance to "old corps" from the ANA and the area there wasn't the best. There were also drawbacks to PSS 8, CP 8-1, Camp Nathan Smith, and the Provincial Reserve. Moving our headquarters to here

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(ANCOP Brigade Headquarters) made the most sense because we would be with our partnered unit.

- About one week prior to the attack there was a directive from MG Carter that came through BG Hodges to ensure we were not spending time and resources improving the patrol bases and that we were focused on improving the search lanes at the checkpoints. About three days prior to the attack we were encouraged to put more effort on the patrol bases. (I can't remember how this came to us, whether it was verbal or in an email.)
- We got along well with TF-K. BG Vance, the TF-K commander, was very supportive when information got to his level. We originally had an LNO at CTKC and at TF-K, but we were directed by (b)(3), (b)(6) to remove our LNO from TF-K.
- Our mission in Kandahar was to establish (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) We also had to establish company ISBs or patrol bases and the battalion headquarters.
- Prior to the attack, BG Vance, BG Hodges, and (b)(3), (b)(6) all visited here. None of them expressed concern over our force protection.
- We did have a vulnerability assessment done prior to the attack. USFOR-A conducted vulnerability assessments here and at our other sites. This assessment wasn't very useful as it looked at high end solutions. After the attack, a Canadian team conducted an assessment that was very useful.
- We did ask for some support to improve the protection here. We had trouble getting (b)(5), (b)(7)(F)
- We tried to put a lot of effort into analyzing the intelligence we were getting. We conducted intelligence fusion meetings three times each week.
- With respect to the command climate, I would say that relationships in the battalion are strained at times, but the relationship with the company commanders is very good. Relationships in the task force, because I have pushed everybody pretty hard, are strained.
- On the night of the attack we had just started our nightly synchronization meeting when the explosion went off. As soon as the explosion goes I'm thinking that its VBIED not sure where but kind of in the back area. I am immediately thinking about MASCAL issues—get to the casualties—but then I start hearing fire. I run to my tent because that's where my weapon is. I grab my weapon and come back to the TOC. I provide some immediate guidance to the TOC and told them to get outside of the TOC and secure the TOC. When I came back, there were some guys pulling security on the TOC from the inside.
- I linked back up with Company C Commander at the entrance to the TOC. The first thing out of his mouth is, "What do we do, where do we go?" I told him to take his element and establish a counterattack position on the northwest side, because I made the assumption that the scouts would be on the other side. He said, "Roger got it; moving." I work my way back outside the TOC and told my S3 I was going to the sound of guns to

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check on my guys. My S3 said, "Sir, put some body armor on." I said roger, put on the S3's gear, and I went out with a few guys from my PSD. I told my S3 I needed him to C2 the things outside the wire, that it will turn into chaos otherwise. I said I will handle the things inside the wire.

- I'm moving toward the center of the camp, trying to see what going on. I think at this time I heard about some casualties in the bunker. I was moving when an RPG slammed into the top side of the ANCOP barracks and then a second RPG hit the same location. Once that happened I realized that this was an engagement area and I moved back to a container. I eventually made my way near the s4 tent. I had been getting some reports that the scouts were counterattacking.
- I didn't have a radio at this time because i was wearing the s3's body armor. I know I'm near the ALOC when a suicide vest is detonated about 30 feet inside the wire and kills SGT Stout. I think SSG Stout thought he should get some cover from what he must have thought was indirect fire. When he ran around the corner he may have run right into the suicide bomber. The blast throws SSG Stout back to the tent, his body armor on the back is blown off, but his body armor is still on the front of his body and his helmet is on. There is an interpreter killed there, in the interpreter's tent. The suicide bomber detonates right next to the latrine, one of those containerized ones with the PEC system.
- I think Scout started his counteracttack and he's met with direct fire and hand grenades, probably coming from the Afghan latrine. They try to assault a second time and that's when 1LT Goeke got killed either with direct fire or shrapnel from a hand grenade. He received a head wound and must have died instantly.
- While I was with PSD I told them go get the vehicles and bring them around. Have part of the element lock down the front ECP and get a vehicle over here so I can have radio contact and move forward to see things.
- When PSD pulled up it's actually my vehicle. They pick me up. I jump in there and move into position just forward of the TOC. When I get some visibility, I actually see that the scouts are in the area near the containers clearing. After the guys from Company C were injured, they pull people into the TOC to be treated, so that becomes something of an alternate CCP.
- Part of the defense plan was oriented on the scouts, so they occupy both of these towers. (northeast and northwest towers.)
- A little bit later the word was that there were casualties and the aid stationed was attacked. The Charlie Company Commander heard that and responded by coming around to that side of the camp. Now we have the Charlie Company Commander, the Scout Platoon Leader, and the HHC 1SG all on this (East) side of the camp to protect that part of the camp.
- The last guy in the Afghan latrine is still shooting now. We still have to clear out the bunker, too.

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- I may not have what happened in perfect order, but there were three suicide bombers. I'm not sure any of us are really clear on the sequencing. The first one comes in and goes to the LSS, meets up with SSG Stout, and detonates right there. Attacker two goes into the bunker and attacker three goes in the bathroom. They all come in with hand grenades and AKs. At least one or two of them have RPGs. Number two goes into the bunker and kills three of my interpreters. There are some grenades thrown in this area.
- Sergeant Tate, who had been playing cards in a tent near the breach, grabs (b)(3), (b)(6) and says, "Follow me. I'll get you to safety." They think, like a lot of other people do, that this is indirect fire. They go into the bunker and one lays face down and the other lies face up. The attacker starts to depart and sergeant Tate gets up to start to go after him and the attacker shoots him. (b)(3), (b)(6) who does not have his weapon, stays down and the attacker leaves. Later I heard that the story about sergeant Tate going after the attacker may not have been true.
- This attacker comes around the corner of the bunker and into the field of view of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) They engage and wound him— (b)(3), (b)(6) believes he is the one who shot him. He stumbles back and detonates. That's where you have the debris that pushes out into the street.
- The third guy, he is the one who I think was firing the RPG, throwing grenades, and may have been the guy who killed 1LT Goeke. I think that he realized he was going to get in any further and we was trying to find a way out. He uses this exit route (b)(3), (b)(6) points to a route moving generally northwest through the village to the north of the compound). He is engaged from the (Northeast) tower and he is killed right here (at a point a few hundred meters into the village). He leaves a large blood stain on the wall. We didn't find the body, but we found a lot of bloodstains.
- I wanted to get something in the breach so nothing else could get in. I move one of my vehicles—my vehicle—into the breach.
- There is no more firing at this time, but I'm not confident, yet, that the place is secure. That becomes my next focus. I get out of the vehicle and tell (b)(3), (b)(6) that we're going to do about (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) of the compound tonight. I told him to do anothe (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) one part of the camp. I said go back through and (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) I said that we are going to do this (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) so just bear with me.
- At that point I go back to the TOC to get an update. We're talking about CASEVAC and the 2 Fury IED that hit them a few hundred meters away from here about 15 minutes after the attack started. They had been coming to resupply COP Johnson a 800 hundred meters from here.
- While I'm up here (in the TOC) the ANCOP Cdr comes ask me what's going on. I gave him an update and tell him that I think we've got this. I told him to consolidate his guys and keep them in one area because I was really very concerned about them being dressed

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in other uniforms and our guys mistaking them for one of the attackers. Our csm was also working this.

- We were now in the accountability, clearance, and MEDEVAC mode. I went back to the TOC to get an update. They have this pretty well in hand.
- One of the things that stuck in my head was that there was a lot of blood in the TOC. I asked the guys to clean it up so it wasn't messing with anyone's psyche.
- When i came back out to check on casualties, the aid station and CCP had been moved. I ended up linking up my (b)(3), (b)(6), who is wounded, and (b)(3), (b)(6) who is helping him to the aid station. I help (b)(3), (b)(6) carry (b)(3), (b)(6) to the aid station.
- At this time there are medics moving casualties out to the HLZ.
- The Delta Company Commander and one of his platoons, who had heard the engagement, they have come to here. We asked them to lock down the front (of the compound). We also asked him to secure the HLZ. It's red for air, but we bring in a USAF MEDEVAC aircraft with PJs onboard. They are able to get our most seriously wounded out. We also have an aircraft land to pick up the 2 Fury casualties. Right after that, the air goes black and we can't fly any more.
- Our other casualties remain on the HLZ waiting for another aircraft. They stay there for about two hours before we found out that they aren't going to fly anymore.
- We then started to figure out whether STAB-A would work a ground MEDEVAC or we'd have to get them out of here some other way. At about 0800 or 0900, STAB-A came out and picked them up.
- My perception is that Goeke, Tate, and Stout died immediately.
- I have very high praise for the medics and what they did that night—a mass cal, the treatments, two very critically wounded. The medics do an incredible job.
- Tilton was still alive thanks to the medics who executed some pretty good procedures. Tilton was taken to KAF and is stabilized enough so they can take him to Germany. At some point in that process, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and he later passes in Germany.
- I wasn't aware that our battalion surgeon had left on the MEDEVAC bird. I didn't direct or authorize it and I don't of anyone else who directed it.
- Fortunately, the casualties who weren't MEDEVAC'd by air didn't require a surgeon to treat them in order for them to survive. I don't think anyone thought about that before the surgeon got on the aircraft.
- I want to ensure everyone understands how well these paratroopers fought that night. What we believe to be the case is that this was a plan by a man named (b)(6) who planned the famous attack on the Saraposa prison. We've also heard some other reports about groups that may have participated.

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ	2010/07/21	2147	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC/1-508 PIR, ANCOP HQ, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6) arrived to TF 1 Fury about 8 months into our deployment. Upon his arrival, I informed him that he would be pushed out to FOB BULLARD with A Co (BN Main Effort). This was my second largest FOB and also contained the largest ANA population outside of Qalat and the largest civilian population in Zabul Province. He informed me that he would not be able to best serve me or the Battalion from that location and I acknowledged his comments but told him I was comfortable with him at BULLARD because of the Role II at LAGHMAN (within 15 minutes of the BN HQ in QALAT). The TF had a lot of success employing the BN PA with a Company where he could provide forward support to the Company as well as to the locals as part of our population centric COIN outreach. My impression was that (b)(3), (b)(6) did not like the idea of being away from a very large base. (b)(3), (b)(6) my BN Medo, later informed me that (b)(3), (b)(6) also tried to excuse himself from joining A Co because (b)(3), (b)(6) said he would not be able to be active as a result of a previous ankle injury.

My impression is that (b)(3), (b)(6) was actively looking for a reason to not work in an austere environment or in an environment that was dangerous.

After about a month at FOB BULLARD, (b)(3), (b)(6) got word of 1 Fury's new mission and wrote me and the BCT Surgeon an email detailing his concerns about his continued forward support (emails attached). He had been with the BN for barely a month and was complaining about his location with my Main Effort (second largest US and ANA FOB and largest population center in the 1FURY AO). One of his major concerns was the fact that he couldn't assist in tracking the patients or ensuring soldiers get to their appointments. (b)(3), (b)(6) responded to the email and hit the nail on the head when he said that (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) could do all of this at FOB BULLARD since BULLARD had good SIPR and NIPR connectivity to FOB APACHE. (b)(3), (b)(6) appeard to desire to be on a FOB with nicer facilities. The BCT Surgeon, BCT XO, and the BSB Commander were CC'd regarding the issues (b)(3), (b)(6) was having. I made a recommendation to allow (b)(3), (b)(6) to remain with the BSB if feasible while there PA remain with 1FURY.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-4	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/07/21

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Shortly after his email, I received word that his father was ill and had suffered a heart attack. (b)(3), (b)(6) requested to go home to see his father and the 1 Fury Chain of Command fully supported this. He went home for the maximum 15 days to be with his family.

I did not see (b)(3), (b)(6) during the attack on ANCOP HQ's on 13 July but I have spoken with all of my medics regarding the event and can not express enough my dissappoinment in his actions. My medo and medics detailed to me that when we started to take casualties and they were moved to the Aid Station, (b)(3), (b)(6) was located under his cot. Initially there were two urgent casualties suffering from GSW's and serious shrapnel injuries. My medics were the ones treating these Paratroopers while (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed under his cot. One of the medics treating a casualty was shot in the head. Instantly more medics moved to this Paratrooper to begin medical treatment, not (b)(3), (b)(6). At some point, one of the lesser wounded Paratroopers crawled over to (b)(3), (b)(6) under his cot where he received some type of medical treatment.

Soon after my Medo said he ran into the tent to assess the casualties IOT consolidate a 9 Line report. He moved throughout the tent while Medics were yelling out critical patient information for the 9 Line. He maintains at no point did he see or hear (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) throughout his movement through the Aid Station. After the casualties were loaded onto the vehicles and ready to be transported out to the HLZ, my Medo recalls seeing the BN Surgeon appear. The Medo and several Medics were on the vehicle providing en route care while moving the HLZ. The medics do not recall seeing (b)(3), (b)(6) provide any en route care. Once the casualties were loaded onto the MEDEVAC bird, (b)(3), (b)(6) decided to get on as well. At no point did I approve or know about the Surgeon getting onto the MEDEVAC Bird to fly to KAF. I had several casualties still at ANCOP that required the care/supervision of a surgeon and would not have authorized him to get onto the aircraft without understanding some justification. I am unaware of any justification to date that would have prevented him from remaining at his appointed place of duty.

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of JULY, 2010 at ANCOP HQ

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6), (b)(3)

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DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.
(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

3 AUG 10
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CP 8-1	2010/08/03	1609	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Charlie Company 1-508th PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 2010 at approxitmately 2130, (b)(3), (b)(6) LT Goeke, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were standing outside of the 1-508th CP when we heard an explosion. We moved across the area back to our vehicles and retrieved our body armor and put it on. We then proceded back to the BN CP, moved around the backside and established a security position. (b)(3), (b)(6) had linked up with us. At this time EAPs were beginning to infiltrate the breach they had created. Enemy personnel were beginning to move towards the CP when several people from our element began to fire upon them. There was numerous explosions and gunfire around us. We had an explosion go off no more than 20 yards from us. It was much larger than a grenade because it knocked most of us down. I was hit in the leg with shrapnel at this time. We began to seek a more covered position, I looked down and saw (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground. I stopped and helped him get to his feet. Once (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself were moving I saw someone on the ground. I stopped to see who it was and to help them. I turned on my white light so I could check them out. I turned the individual over and saw that it was LT Goeke. I tried to get a response from LT Goeke but was unable to get one. I yelled for someone to help me carry him, two other people came to help me, one being (b)(3), (b)(6) I do not remember the other. We got LT Goeke into the BN CP when (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself began to evaluate him. I pulled his helmet off and (b)(3), (b)(6) said that the PL had already succumbed to his wounds. We then moved his body into the CP and had someone cover him up. (b)(3), (b)(6) then took (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and began to ensure the vehicles were in place. Once he was done (b)(3), (b)(6) moved back to the Cp and then we placed (b)(3), (b)(6) at the entrance to the CP to pull security. (b)(3), (b)(6) had called (b)(3), (b)(6) by this time and informed him he had been injured also. As this was going on our group then moved outside and formed a perimeter around the Battalion Commander. After the BC was ready to move, our element moved to the vicinity of the breach and began to pull security. (b)(3), (b)(6) called our vehicles over to help secure the breach. We then began moving to seperate locations IOT get accountibility of all C Co pax (b)(3), (b)(6) then placed (b)(3), (b)(6) at the breach point with several more C Co pax to secure it. Once we established 100% accountibilty we began assisting with medevac. I was in constant communication with (b)(3), (b)(6) when he informed me he had linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) and was providing security for him because he did not have anyone with him. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) had provided the CSM with some security personnel he moved back to my location. I had place (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) along the wall at the base of a guard tower because there were reports of EAPs inside the compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself continued to sweep and clear the area around the breach. We moved to the BN CP numerous times to provide updates and coordinate with our (b)(3), (b)(6) maximize security and SA for the situation. (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself then moved to the aid station because it had been hit. We helped move a few casualties to vehicles IOT get them to the medevac LZ. At this time we saw (b)(3), (b)(6) and found out he had taken shrapnel to the back of the left leg. (b)(3), (b)(6) was still assisiting with the treatment and movement of the casualties (b)(3), (b)(6) then had me and (b)(3), (b)(6) move with him to the ANCOP ECP as the casevac vehicles were moving the wounded to the LZ. AT this time (b)(3), (b)(6) linked up with us, we noticed a jingle truck with two Local Nationals(LNs). We then had (b)(3), (b)(6) and another individual move with our group to pull security why we searched the LNs and the Jingle truck. We then placed the LNs along a wall and had the other two individuals pull security on them (b)(3), (b)(6) had (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-5	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1609 DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

move across the road and clear a 200m section of walls and alleys as the medevac was taking place. After it was clear we moved the LNs to another location and had the individuals continue to pull security on them. I then told (b)(3), (b)(6) he needed to get back into the compound. I did not want anything to happen to him. Once back inside we trooped the line and continued to help with casevac. After helping to move a few other individuals the (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself moved back to the BN CP IOT provide info and get an update. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6) had me and (b)(3), (b)(6) began to retrieve the PLs personnel effects. I took the PLs ring off and put it on my finger so I would not lose it. I removed his watch for (b)(3), (b)(6) to secure and then I removed his Ranger Tab and placed it underneath my left shoulder pocket flap. While we were in the BN CP a PSG from 2-508 named (b)(3), (b)(6) and his medic came into the BN CP. They were on patrol when they began hearing the explosions and rerouted his patrol to help out. (b)(3), (b)(6) also placed a team at the breach to help out with security. His medic then asked where the aid station was located so he could help out. (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself said we would take the medic to the aid station. (b)(3), (b)(6) moved with us, at this time the number of WIAs had increased so (b)(3), (b)(6) moved the aid station into the Scout Platoons tent and marked it with (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated and instructed numerous people what to do IOT prepare the casualties for movement. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I once again began to move around the perimeter to conduct checks on the security. We noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) sitting in a truck and helped him get to the new aid station to get treated. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved once again to the BN CP and noticed the PL had not been bagged yet. I then told (b)(3), (b)(6) to get a bodybag for my PL. (b)(3), (b)(6) brought a bag back and assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself putting the PL into the bag. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself then moved LT Goeke's body to the CCP. Throughout the night I noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) performing admirally across the compound conducting the casevac of the numerous WIAs and KIAs with complete disregard for his own safety. At this time security was in place and the Scout Platoon had began clearing the buildings on the compound. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I began moving back around the perimeter IOT receive more instructions from the (b)(3), (b)(6) and assist with food and water resupply. We continued these actions until Charlie Company was cleared to move back to our Company AO.

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ~~15~~ 3 day of ~~July~~ AUG. 2010

at CP 8-1

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
PSS 8, Kandahar City, Afghanistan	2010/07/18	1500L	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

C CO, TF 1 FURY, 4 BCT, 82nd Airborne DIV

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the night of 13-14 July the following events occurred to the best of my knowledge:
At approx. 2100 C co HQ with an element of 1st Platoon arrived at the ANCOP HQ for a meeting with (b)(3), (b)(6). Upon parking the vehicles, we dropped our kit minus our weapons which we carried with us. A group composed of myself, (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT Goeke, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) moved to the Battalion Tactical Operations Center, which is located in the north west corner of the compound. Once inside the BN TOC we stood in the back as there was a meeting going on. At approx. 2120L, a large explosion resounded inside of the compound (b)(3), (b)(6) and I grabbed our element minus (b)(3), (b)(6) who remained to defend the TOC) and raced to our vehicles which were located in the southern portion of the compound. During our movement I observed small arms fire. Once at the vehicles, we donned our combat gear and night vision goggles (b)(3), (b)(6) and I then got our element together and moved out to the BN TOC. We told our remaining guys to man the vehicles and be ready to move when called. By now it was 10 min in to the fight and we formed a parameter around the entrance to the TOC. After establishing good security, I we came up with a hasty plan to move to the breach and repulse the enemy. The lead element was comprised of (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT Goeke, (b)(3), (b)(6) HHC), and myself. We moved along the east side of the TOC. This area had a tricon container on the left for cover and the S4/S1 tent on the right. To the immediate front was the field cooking station. At commo container I noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) BN S4) pulling security there. My element moved past the commo container taking fire as we moved. Once at the cooking station fire was exchanged between my element and the enemy force at the breach. I witnessed heavy small arms fire, RPG fire, and smaller explosions which were most likely grenades. At this point, several troopers were injured to include: (b)(3), (b)(6) and 1LT Goeke. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I aided in moving 1LT Goeke to the BN TOC. At this time I looked at Chris and saw that he had passed. We moved him into the TOC and got aid for him. I ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) to get to our trucks and to bring them forward to assist in closing the breach. At this time the BN CMDR, (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that the aid station was hit and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I proceeded to that location taking SAs fire as we moved across the compound. On the east side of the compound, I linked up with the Scout PLT who was in the middle of clearing out the enemy strong point in the LN latrine (white building made of concrete). I moved up to assist when another grenade detonated near by forcing us to pull back. The main issue was that there were friendlies in the area denying us the use of any weapons barring rifles. Later we decided to attack again using flash bangs to assist. During the lull in the fight, I took overall charge of the situation dividing the various priorities. Scouts locked down the area over watching the breach, (b)(3), (b)(6) searched the initial tents and set in overwatch on the other side of the aid station (b)(3), (b)(6) took over all charge of the casualty evacuation. I proceeded from checking on security to preparing for the final push. Once the casualties were loaded and the 9 line sent up, I formed a squad sized element to finish the assault and retake the breach. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge of the lead team, with (b)(3), (b)(6) being overall responsible for the clearance of the INS strong point and holding the breach. I led the second team (me, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) which ensured the shift signal for (b)(3), (b)(6) support team was thrown and verified. My team also had the purpose of clearing the bunker. At this time I coordinated with (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and initiated the movement of both team simultaneously.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-6	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT PSS 8 DATED 2010/07/18

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

The medevac birds came in stalling the attack. At this time I heard a voice in the bunker, which I had locked down. I told the occupant to get out. (b)(3), (b)(6) came running out as he had been trapped in the bunker for the entire engagement. I told him to calm down when he told me SSG Tate was KIA in the bunker along with a bunch of interpreters. I then told him to move back behind cover. At this time, I lead the element into the bunker and spotted some one looking at me. I told him to raise his hands and to come out. He turned out to be an interpreter. We sent him to the aid station as he was wounded. Upon further investigation their were three more terps and 1 US KIA (SSG Tate) in the bunker. I called for medics and we began removing the bodies. One interpreter was still alive when I pulled him out, but he expired shortly after. I then moved to the breach which was secured by the scouts. I called for a 240B to be employed until we got a gun truck up to pull security. (b)(3), (b)(6) maintained the position. I then ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) with (b)(3), (b)(6) and some other pax to begin clearing the compound. At this time I went to the TOC to report in. I gave the S3 the report and proceeded back to the tent area to assist in clearing. At this time, a head count was sent up and SGT Stout was missing. I proceeded with (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Battalion CMDR to his tent where we found both SGT Stout and interpreter, both KIA. I assisted with placing SGT Stout and the interpreter in a body bag and moving them to the CCP. We continued to clear, move causalities, and give reports to the TOC for another hour or so (b)(3), (b)(6) and I then got the entire US side of the compound locked down with 100 % security until the next morning when relief arrived. Once EOD arrived on site I escorted them to the UXOs and the breach site. Upon completion of this we were relieved in place and conducted a MCP back to our BS.

As the ground commander for the fight I believe the following personnel deserve accommodation

- 1LT Goeke - Silver Star/ Purple Heart
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - Bronze Star w/ V
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - Bronze Star w/ V/ Purple Heart
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - Bronze Star w/ V/ Purple Heart
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - Bronze Star w/ V/ Purple Heart
- - ARCOM w/ V/ Purple Heart
- (b)(3), (b)(6) ARCOM w/ V
- (b)(6) ARCOM w/ V
- (b)(3), (b)(6) ARCOM w/ V/ Purplet Heart
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - ARCOM w/ V
- (b)(3), (b)(6) ARCOM
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - ARCOM
- ARCOM
- (b)(3), (b)(6) - ARCOM

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) C Co 1-508 PIR
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

C Co 1-508 PIR
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of July 2010 at PSS C Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Commissioned Officer
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.
(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Signature

3 Aug 2010
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
PSS 8, KANDAHAR, AFGHANISTAN	2010/07/18		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(3)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

C CO, 1-508 PIR, 82ND AIRBORNE DIV

9.

I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 10, (b)(3), (b)(6), 1LT Goeke,Christopher, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) convoyed to ANCOP HQs. On or about 2130hrs, we were in the TOC and I was talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) at that time there was a loud explosion that detonated at the ANCOP HQs. I followed (b)(3), (b)(6) out the door and sprinted to my vehicles where my soldiers were staged. (b)(3), (b)(6) followed me to the vehicles when we arrived there I had all C co soldiers get their gear on. While we were getting our kit on the rest of the C co PAX that were at the TOC got there and started getting their kit on. We formed up and started moving towards back towards the TOC. I was leading back when (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that he would take point. We got back to the TOC and then (b)(3), (b)(6) who was coordinating with the medics while we were there linked back up with us at the TOC. When he arrived, he informed me that he was wounded but could still continue on with the mission. At the TOC, we discussed the counter attack plan and started to move to the one side of the TOC. When moved approx (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) started to receive fire from insurgents. (b)(3), (b)(6) returned fire since he was the point man. After he returned fire we were fragged from the insurgents. The grenade wounded (b)(3), (b)(6) and blew him and (b)(3), (b)(6) back into (b)(3), (b)(6) and me. We pulled back to regroup cover and about 10ft behind us we saw a casualty(1LT Goeke) someone put a light on him to identify who it was and we started dragging him back into the TOC to start treating him. We left him with (b)(3), (b)(6) who started to treat him in the TOC. C co PAXs moved back outside and ran into (b)(3), (b)(6) who told us that the aid station was hit so we moved with him to secure the aid station. When arrived at the Aid Station, we linked up with IF Scouts there we secured that part of the compound. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) if he had some of his snipers in the tower to cover the our positions and he didn't. We pushed some of our guys to secure the lower portion of the tower and I pushed (b)(3), (b)(6) and two guys to the far side of the Aid Station. At this time, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were discussing what COA to co. (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that I need to start getting a 9-Line MEDEVAC up and start helping with the casualties. I went into the Aid Station and started to get Situation Awareness when another explosion detonated in our vicinity of the Aid Station. We started moving stretchers into the Aid Station to EVAC the three injured PAXs. I cut some of the tent for better mobility to get the casualties out of the tent. We evaced (b)(3), (b)(6) then SGT Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6) After all casualties were evaced outside, I asked the Doctor if he was ready to move and asked if he had his weapon and aid bag. He said he did and I noticed that he seem shock up so I told him to secure my gear and he ran out the tent with me. We moved to the vehicles and started to load the casualties on the hood of the MATVs. Once they were loaded and started to move towards the LZ. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I moved with the Doctor secured to my gear towards the ECP. We got out there and I saw the wounded loaded in the Cougar and told the Doctor that he need to get in there to keep treating the wounded to the LZ. We moved out the ECP to help with CASEVAC but when we walked out the ECP there was a jingle truck that was stopped on the road. We started to move there to clear the truck when I spotted two guys squatting down. We moved over there and searched the PAXs and then the jingle truck. After we did that, I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to start searching the alleyways and holes right in front of the ANCOP HQs by that time a couple other soldiers got there to assist. I started to leaded them until (b)(3), (b)(6) told me

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-7	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT DATED 2010/07/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

to get back that they can handle this and I shouldn't be out in front. So I walked acrossed the road and ran into a bunch of people who were standing around. I asked who they were and it was (b)(3), (b)(6) I told him where the security need it to be and then when the second aircraft landed they loaded more casualties on. I didn't know what was in the front of the aircraft so I walked in the front and pulled security for it. When it took off, I moved across the street to link up with my soldiers and they weren't there so I moved back into the ANCOP HQs. When I got to my vehicles, I told one of the soldiers there to send a message to the CO CP so that C co was tracking all injured C co PAXs. I then moved back to the TOC to link up with (b)(3), (b)(6) He wasn't there so I moved to the breach point and found all the C co PAXs and we started to get full accountability of C co men and equipment. We found out that there was one missing person so we started to check the tents again. We search the tent of the missing soldier and I started to cut into it when (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he found him. Then I helped out with recovering SGT Stout's body. Four of us moved the body over to the new CCP. I moved back over to the TOC and was talking to the CSM and letting him know I was up. I then grabbed my medic (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him that I was moving him to the CCP. He didn't't have a helmet so I gave him mine so that he was protected on the move there. We secured C co's equipment and move there. I received a squad from 2Fury and them and the C co PAX secured the breach and the east side of the ANCOP HQs. The rest of the night until C co left about 0600hrs, I just trooped the line about every 10-20minutes giving the guys food and water. Around 0600 hrs, C co PAXs departed to RTB. We dropped off our soldiers at CP 8-1 and then proceeded to PSS-8.

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1 AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Co Vice OIC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Co 1/508 PTR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of July, 2010 at PSS 8, Kandahar

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

COMMISSIONED OFFICER

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CP 8-1	2010/08/03	1609	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

C co 1-508 PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July, 2010 around 2130hrs myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) 1LT Geoke, (b)(3), (b)(6) were locatated outside the 1Fury Toc inside of the ANCOP Brigade HQ compound along HWY1. We heard a large explosion to the east which at the time I though was indirect fire. We moved out to a large hard structure building to the east of the 1Fury TOC where we thought the explosion went off to look for casualties. At this time we heard incoming small arms fire hitting the building. We decided to move to our MATV's and put on our equipment. Once we donned equipment we regrouped and moved back to the 1Fury TOC. We set up a defensive position along the east wall of the 1Fury TOC. This is when I noticed the breach in the northern wall of the compound. I witnessed an RPG being launched from the breach so I immediately began laying fire into the breach. I fired appx 6 rounds and a hand grenade exploded to my left rear appx 10feet away. I took shrapnel to my legs, arms, hand and face. I shouted "im hit" and stumbled to the rear of our element. I took a knee behind a triwall and someone told me to get inside the 1Fury TOC to get looked at. I went inside the TOC and moved to the rear of the building. A soldier whom I think was a medic began assisting me by taking off my equipment and assessing my shrapnel wounds. He put a dressing on my face and under my arm. About two minutes later I heard another large blast outside the compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) came in the TOC about 5 minutes later and took my weapon and handed over my equipment to someone. 30-40 minutes later I was moved outside and loaded into an MATV and transported to the HLZ. I was then air medevaced to KAF.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-8		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1609 DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, Benjamin Allan Wilkins, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of AUG, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CP 8-1	2010/08/03	1609	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

C co 1-508 PIR

9.

I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 Feruary 2010 (b)(3), (b)(6) Lt Goeke (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself went to the ANCOP headquarters to have a meeting with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6). All of us were standing outside the battalion headquarters when the first explosion went off. As soon as it went off all of us went into the building to take cover. I turned around to make sure our interpreter was not injured when the second explosion went off. I turned around and noticed that everyone from my chain of command was gone. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the building and told me to make sure we had security on the door to the building. I grabbed another personnel that was in the building and we went outside set security. We began to hear small arms fire and since neither of us had body armor we went back into the building to set security in there. We had security set for approximately five minutes when (b)(3), (b)(6) came in dragging Lt Goeke. (b)(3), (b)(6) began to assess Lt Goeke's injuries and then (b)(3), (b)(6) a medic, came over and began to also work on Lt Goeke. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the building with (b)(3), (b)(6) who had taken some shrapnel to his legs and face. I went to (b)(3), (b)(6) and he gave me (b)(3), (b)(6) body armor. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) told two other personnel from the building and we began to maneuver our way back to our MATV's. When we got to the vehicles I got into the turret and got the heavy weapon ready to fire while another person got into the drivers seat. We moved the vehicle down the road to pull security on the perimeter the rest of the night.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-9		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1609 DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of AUG, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CP 8-1	2010/08/03	1609	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Charlie Company 1-508th PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 2010 at aproxitmatly 2130 hours (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e), 1LT Goeke, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself were standing outside the 1 Fury TOC when we heard an explosion. After the explosion (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) told me to start moving back to the trucks to retrieve our body armor. (b)(3), (b)(6) maintained his position outside the interior TOC door as the primary security element. When we reached the trucks and dawned our body armour and helmets (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) then instructed (b)(3), (b)(6), 1LT Goeke, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself then to move back across the compound to where the breach in the primeter occured. When we moved back to the breach location we linked up and tied in with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) security position. When we reached (b)(3), (b)(6) postion he had already begun to engage the enemy combatants(EC) that had gained entry into the compund and we help surprees the EC aswell. As we where engaging EC's in the wire multiple explosions and alot of gunfire could be heard. While in our security position, approitmatley 10 to 15 meters infront of us, I saw an extreamly bright flash and heard an explosion. After I picked myself up I heard 1Lt Goeke say " Im hit." Once our element started moving back I came upon (b)(3), (b)(6) who had a white light shinned on 1LT Goeke who had been injurned. When we identified we had a casulity (b)(3), (b)(6) two others, and myself proceeded to move him to the 1 Fury TOC. Once there I identified that my Alpha Team Leader (b)(3), (b)(6) had also been hit. I moved to the back of the TOC hwere the medics had begun treatment on him to get an update on his condition. After checking on (b)(3), (b)(6) I then went back outside the TOC where I linked up (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) who infoprmed me he wanted me to move to the south side of the compound where our vehicles were located and secure a truck to pull security on the breach in the primeter. At this time I went ack into the TOC and said I needed 2 people with body armour to move with myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) When (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) joined (b)(3), (b)(6) and my self we then proceeded to where our trucks where located. when we got to the trucks I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to hop into the turet of the truck, (b)(3), (b)(6) to get in the back seat and that (b)(3), (b)(6) who was at the trucks, would drive that truck. When the truck started to move along the east wall of the compund, myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) moved along sid ethe truck using the MATV as cover while guiding it towards the beach. Our element then encountered an MATV that had no one in the turet. At this point I called (b)(3), (b)(6) on the radio asking him if they had a truck at the breach, which he informed me they did. I then instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to maintain there current position and pull security on the east wall. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) got into the unmaned turet of the MATV we came across and I then moved back and linked up with (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) and (b)(3), (b)(6) After I linked back up with this elemnet we beagn movement to get acountaility of all Charlie Company personel at the location. While I was on my way back to the truck location I came across (b)(3), (b)(6) who had no security element with him. I then accompanied him to speak with members of the ANCOP vicinity of the ECP. Once there I saw five paratroopers who worked in the TOC and informed them that they needed to assume security for 1F9 so I could link back up with my Charlie Company members. After linking back up with (b)(3), (b)(6) we continued moving back and forth between the TOC providing situation updates and checking on (b)(3), (b)(6) and the primeter security posititons. After leaving the TOC myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) linked back up with (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) then moved to the aid station when we heard that it was hit during the attack. When we reached the aid station we assisted in moving casualties from the aid station to the vehicles preparing to move the casualties to the HLZ. After we help move some casualties outside we came across (b)(3), (b)(6) who had been hit .

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-10	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1609 DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

with shrapnel in the back of his leg. When we came across (b)(3), (b)(6) he informed us he was ok and that he was still going to assist in the treatment and movement of casualties. At this point (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself to move with him to the ECP to assist in HLZ security. On the way (b)(3), (b)(6) joined our movement. When outside (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). identified 2 local nationals(LN) and a jingle truck that had not been searched. We then started moving across the street where I emplaced two soldiers to pull security along with the two MATVs that where outside. After that (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). (b)(3), (b)(6) one other soldier, and myself moved across the street to search the LNs and the jingle truck. After searching the LNs and the truck (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). instructed us to move the LNs of to the side and emplaced (b)(3), (b)(6) and his fellow soldier to pull security while (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself cleared the walls, alleys and ditches betweeh the two MATV security positions. After getting back into the compound (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself moved back to the 1 Fury TOC. When there I went to check on (b)(3), (b)(6) and was informed he was ok and getting ready to move to the HLZ. After checking on (b)(3), (b)(6) I moved to the front of the TOC where 1LT Goeke's body was located. At this time (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself then began removing his personel affects. After removing his personel affects we then placed 1LT Goeke's body into a body bag nad then (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself then proceeded to move 1LT Goeke to CCP so his body could be EVACD. After moving to the CCP (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself then started trooping the lines checking on each individual security position and provide food and water the the positions. We continued to troop the lines until aproxatmitly 0600 the next mourning when Charlie Company was released to move back to PSS 8 and CP 8-1.

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of AUG 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
KANDAHAR CITY, ANCOP HQ	2010/07/22	1653	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1-508 PIR 82ND ABN DIVISON

9.

, (b)(3), (b)(6) , WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

At 1955, I was at ECP pulling ECP guard. (b)(3), (b)(6) came to relief me from ECP at 1958. At this time I was currently wearing my (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) and M4. After I was relieved, I walked to the cooking area where SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) were cooking. When I got there SSG Tate and I was talking about playing Tekken 6 on PS3 at his tent. SSG Tate told me that I need to practice in his tent before I play him because I didn't play Tekken 6 in a while.I told him that I wanted to get really good with Bryan Fury. He told me I was better with Law than Bryan Fury and said for me to master Law's moves (Character on Tekken 6) against the computer until he get done washing the pots and pans. (b)(3), (b)(6) said he was going to play too. I asked SSG Tate how long it's going to take for him and (b)(3), (b)(6) to get done. He said "Give me 20 minutes".I said "Cool.Where do you stay at?" He pointed to his tent and said that when you walk in through the front way of the tent its the last bed to the right. I said "I'll be there". So I walked to the HHC B-Doc to place my (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) and M4 on my bed. Once I did that, I walked to the Scout's tent to look for (b)(3), (b)(6) When I got to his bed he was there laying down on his computer. I told him that I was going to be in SSG Tate's tent playing Tekken 6 (b)(3), (b)(6) said "I'll meet you there". I left from the Scout's tent and went to SSG Tate's tent. When I got there, there were 7 or more LocalNational Interperters there laying on their beds. I walked to the back to SSG Tate's area and start playing Tekken 6 on his PS3 and TV. At this time it was 2017 and I was practicing with Law against the computer and SSG Tate and (b)(3), (b)(6) came. SSG Tate said " Let me see the controller. I want you to play the computer on very hard diffcult and try to beat the boss." I said" Cool. That's nothing.After I beat the boss you give me my respect. I ain't no walk around." He said "Alright. You got better." and nodded his head. So I finally loss to the third person and (b)(3), (b)(6) came in and wanted to play. I told him let me try one more time to beat the computer and he can play me. I loss again. So SSG Tate said "Beat (b)(3), (b)(6) first and then you will play me" So (b)(3), (b)(6) and I playing each other and SSG Tate is giving (b)(3), (b)(6) advice to beat me. I while playing (b)(3), (b)(6) said " Watch this. This what SSg Tate taught me. Bam." So I beat him. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) said he was going to take a shower and was look for his shower shoes. He finally founded them and left. SSg Tate got on the controller to go against me. I beat him. I told "You better get your best fighter against me. What you think this is a amusement park?" So he beats me. Then he gave the controller to (b)(3), (b)(6) to play me again. Around 2120, right when me and (b)(3), (b)(6) got to the secong round a loud boom came through our tent and caved the tent and beds. Then another boom. SSG Tate immententally shouts " Get down." SSG Tate (b)(3), (b)(6) and I got down in the prone position. At this time the National Terps are screaming for help with smoke and chemical smell everywhere. So SSG Tate shouts "(b)(3), (b)(6) grab my shirt and follow me."because it was dark we couldn't see. So I grab his shirt. From there Tate, me, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (behind me) start crawling to the front of the tent. A bunch of Terps were inside the front of the tent screaming for help clogging the entry. So we get to the front of the tent SSG Tate started shouting to the Terps to move. We got to entry and it was closed so SSg Tate asked for a knife. Harris said " We can use the back entry. I'm going the back way". During this time SSG Tate said "Damn.I forgot my weapon." Rocket noises still going. So SSG Tate pulls out a knife and cuts through the tent. SSG Tate and I crawl out and immendiately start running to the bunker between the fire fight. We get to the bunker (competely pitch dark) and there's a pile of Terps in the front in prone postion. So SSG Tate and I hide under the bench in the middle of the bunker. I was laying on my stomach and he was laying on his back. Side by side not saying nothing.Continually loud booms and gun shots going off for several minutes. All of sudden it got quiet and I heard AK-47

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	
D-11	(b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP DATED 2010/07/22

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

cocked back and footsteps moving from the back of the entry of the bunker to the front. SSG Tate and I stayed still. Then we hear multiple AK-47 rounds go off in the bunker. The Terps are screaming, grasping, and crying loudly. SSG Tate and I remain still. Then one Terp screamed "Shoot him. Shoot him". Then me and SSG Tate hear footsteps moving from the front of the bunker to the back towards us. Then another sound of the AK-47 cocked back and I see and hear (head turned to the side) AK-47 round go off in the direction of SSG Tate. Soon as SSG Tate got hit he made a "Ugh" sound and then (b)(3), (b)(6) While this is happening I continually hear footsteps next to me moving back and forth in the bunker. Then I hear footsteps movement to the back of the bunker and stop and then move to the forward of the bunker. I remained still. This went on for 5 minutes and I stop hearing the footsteps. After that SSG Tate (b)(3), (b)(6) I was talking to him while checking his body for where he got hit saying (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Then I hear Army Personal. One say out loud " Terp. Terp".The Army Personal then said "Don't move. Don't you fucking move." Then I heard (b)(3), (b)(6) voice and I shout out " (b)(3), (b)(6) Its (b)(3), (b)(6) I need help" Then they left. Sit with SSG Tate for another 5 to 10 minutes then I finally get up and run out of the bunker. I seen (b)(3), (b)(6) and they yelled "Don't move" I said " It's me. (b)(3), (b)(6) Then I told (b)(3), (b)(6) " they got my boy Sergeant Tate." He said " Calm Down (b)(3), (b)(6) " I then yelled "No. They got my boy Sergent Tate." He then said" Where is he?" I then took him. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to the bunker. When we got to the bunker (b)(3), (b)(6) told me to go back to the HHC B- doc and get (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) and M-4. So me and (b)(3), (b)(6) went to the HHC B-doc looking for my equipment. None of it was there near my bed. So me and (b)(3), (b)(6) ran back to the bunker and then (b)(3), (b)(6) gave me his M9. Right when he gave me his M9 (b)(3), (b)(6) gave me a M4 to use. One for me and the another one I had to hold until he comes out of the bunker to pull SSG Tate out. After (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Scouts pulled SSG Tate out, I give (b)(3), (b)(6) his M4. Then (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) tells me to follow them to the TOC. When me, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) gets into the TOC, I was saying" They got my boy Tate" in a angry tone multiple times. Swinging my fist in the air. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) told me to calm down and then (b)(3), (b)(6) also told me get myself together. I walked towards to (b)(3), (b)(6) laid in the prone on the floor. (b)(3), (b)(6) gave me some water and then I finally calmed down. End of statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/07/22

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1-508 82nd Airborne Division

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1-508 82ND ABN DIV

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this day of

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.
(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Signature

3 Aug 2010
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, Kandahar City, Afghanistan	20100803		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC, 1-508th PIR, 4th BCT, 82nd ABN DIV

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 2010, at approximately 2030 hours, the ANCOP HQ came under attack. I was working on paperwork inside the Aid Station at the time, after the initial blast I instructed everyone to get their stuff and head to the bunker. Once in the bunker I linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6). I also believe (b)(3), (b)(6) was in there. There was a second blast and then an unknown number of insurgents opened fire on us from the far side of the bunker. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I maneuvered back to the aid station (about 20 feet straight in front of the bunker) to see if any casualties had been brought over. Upon entering the tent I saw that SPC Tilton (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were also in there. At this time I moved to the entrance of the tent in order to pull security and (b)(3), (b)(6) joined me. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) had both made their way into the aid station by this time. (b)(3), (b)(6) was yelling out in pain. The medics in the back of the tent were instructed to begin treatment on him. During this entire time there (b)(3), (b)(6) was hand grenades exploding outside the tent and causing shrapnel to fly through the aid station. There was also SAF coming through the tent. Next, (b)(3), (b)(6) jumped up, exposing himself, in order to check on (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) while back there (b)(3), (b)(6) noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) was injured and told SPC Tilton to help him. I called back after one of the explosions to see how everyone was doing and (b)(3), (b)(6) told me that SPC Tilton had also been injuried. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to come forward and pull security so I could help out with the casualties. (b)(3), (b)(6) came straight to my position and I went back in the tent to help out. When I got back to SPC Tilton's location (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) already had him layed out on the floor and were prepping to perform a (b)(3), (b)(6) him since they were (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) ran outside into the trauma tent area to grab a trauma hanging bag while I did what I could to assist (b)(3), (b)(6) while he performed the CRIC. on SPC Tilton. Upon returning with the hanging bag (b)(3), (b)(6) ran back out to get an oxygen bottle and BVM. Once we had oxygen flowing I looked back to see how (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing and noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) protecting him during another blast. And then he started working on (b)(3), (b)(6) again. About this time a grenade exploded right above us on our collapsed tent. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself all received very minor injuries from that blast. During all this the shrapnel seemed to never stop coming through the tent yet. (b)(3), (b)(6) made at least 4 runs out to the trauma tent and (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself also had to make runs for medical equipment since the trauma area was no longer usable and we were treating in the living area of the tent. I remember (b)(3), (b)(6) coming inside the tent and offered to help and then (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) came in to tell us MEDEVAC was enroute. Those two helped bring litters in and then we brought out the casualties. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the first out and then SPC Tilton followed by (b)(3), (b)(6) while we waited to load SPC Tilton on the hood of the MATV we had to do a quick O_2 bottle change out. Once they were ready for him, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself loaded him up. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) got on the hood to help hold the litters and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I jumped up to continue medical care. Once at the ALZ we downloaded the patients and carried them to the bird. I gave the flight medic a quick run down of what we had and then I headed back toward the vehicle. Once there I was given another casualty with a head injury. It was serious so (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) began bandaging it while I established a base line. Once the second bird landed we got him and others loaded.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF ____ PAGES
D-12		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 3 AUG 19

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We walked back to the Base and I went to the TOC to see what the situation was over there. There were several people with minor injuries and 1Lt Geoke was laying covered up on the floor. I bandaged up (b)(3), (b)(6) made sure everyone else was ok and then headed back to the Aid Station area. A CCP had been set up inside of the scouts tent and (b)(3), (b)(6) from 2Fury was in there helping treat some of the walking wounded. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I went back to the Aid Station and grabbed what ever medical supplies we could and brought them to the CCP. Several people were brought in and I directed my medics to take care of them. Between (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) a couple of ANCOP Trucks were lined up to bring the next load of casualties to the HLZ. We loaded them up and (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) rode out there with them. After about 45 minutes they came back with the casualties since MEDEVAC (b)(3), 10 USC 130b per section 552a(b)(7)(E) put them back in the CCP until a Canadian team showed up to take them to Camp Nathan Smith for further treatment. Next HHC 1-508th showed up and took the Fallen Heroes into KAF.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, (b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at (b)(3), (b)(6) *(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)*

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, Afghanistan	2010/08/04		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION

HHC 1-508 PIR, ANCOP HQ's, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Was SPC Tilton wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was killed?
Answer: SPC Tilton had on body Armor but no Kevlar,

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?
Answer: The only injury I remember seeing is his left arm.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?
Answer: I do not remember seeing him in either

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?
Answer: I only saw what appeared to be a gunshot in his abdominal area.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?
Answer: Body armor Yes. not sure about his Kevlar.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-12 (cont'd)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 04 day of August, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6) (Print Name), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

Sig (b)(3), (b)(6)

3 AUG 18
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
	20100803	1330	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC, 1-508th PIR

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 2010, the ANCOP HQ was attacked. At that moment, I was inside the Aid Station, on the internet, during the initial explosion. I hear people scrambling, so I grabbed my body armor ~~to~~ and headed outside the tent, in pursuit of the other medics. Once I was outside, I tried to get a visial of the medics at the bunker, but due to low lumination, I didn't see anyone or advance in that direction. Then automatic gunfire broke out in the direction of the bunker. I took cover with (b)(3), (b)(6), who was in full kit and weapon, next to the uparmor HUMMVEEs. After the gunfire stopped, (b)(3), (b)(6) advanced in the direction of the Aid Station's Trauma Tent. Once he made it inside the Trauma ~~Area~~ Tent, he saw (b)(3), (b)(6) injuried and began calling for a medic. Upon hearing the call for a medic, I left my position to go ~~ass~~ provide medical aid. As I was making my advance to the Trauma Tent gunfire broke out again. I dove to take cover between the BDOC tent and Trauma Tent. Once the gunfire ceased, I pushed asside boxes to get a visual of the casualty, but no one was in the Trauma Tent. At that moment, I stepped into the Trauma Tent and saw blood smeared in the direction of the Aid Station's entrance. When I stepped inside the Aid Station, I saw (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) pulling security on the entrance. At that moment, I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) and began providing medical aid along with (b)(3), (b)(6). While providing aid, I got up and went to grab my medical aid bag for additional supplies. Shortly after I returned, (b)(3), (b)(6) came over to assist in bandaging (b)(3), (b)(6) hand. All the while, we are receiving small arms fire and shrapnel from enemy hand grenades and RPGs. After each explosion, (b)(3), (b)(6) was calling out to all the medics individually asking if they were alright. Finally after an explosion went off directly over the sleeping area of the

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	
D-13	(b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT NCOP HQ DATED 3 Aug 2010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Aid Station tent, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not get a reply from SPC Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6). At that moment (b)(3), (b)(6) went to get a visual of why there was not a reply. (b)(3), (b)(6) saw that SPC Tilton was injured to head and called out to me for assistance. Upon on helping (b)(3), (b)(6) straightening SPC Tilton's body, I spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6) and helped him ~~over~~ move over where (b)(3), (b)(6) happen to be. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) made it over to (b)(3), (b)(6) the (b)(3), (b)(6) began providing medical aid. Before that moment, I was unaware of (b)(3), (b)(6) presents with us. While (b)(3), (b)(6) began bandaging SPC Tilton's head, I did a full body sweep for additional injuries. After getting a set of vitals, we realized the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) So, I had to (b)(3), (b)(6) SPC Tilton. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) came over and began providing (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) came in the Aid Station tent after time had passed and told us a MedEvac was enroute. ~~SFC~~ At that moment, I grabbed my helmet and weapon in order to provide medical care enroute to the HLZ and at the HLZ. (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself loaded SPC Tilton onto the hood of a MATV and went to the HLZ on the hood of the MATV to continue providing medical aid. Once we made it to the HLZ, we began loading the patients on the MedEvacs. Once we were done, we, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself went back to the NCOP to treat and evac the additional ~~casualtt~~ casualties

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

3 Aug 2010
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP BDE HQ, KANDAHAR	2010/08/03	100	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1ST BN 508TH PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On the night of the 13th of July, 2010 at around 2120L, the ANCOP BDE HQ compound was attacked by insurgents and suicide bombers. The north wall was breached with a large explosive charge, causing a breach in the defenses and initially stunning the defenders. I was located in the Base Defense Operations Center tent, finishing up a 2000 LOG SYNC Meeting, approximately 25 meters from the blast along with the HQ Platoon. They consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) We immediately donned our equipment and (b)(3), (b)(6) and I directed the HQ Paratroopers into action. I then exited the tent, searching for the source of the explosion, I also saw (b)(3), (b)(6) doing the same. It was pitch black outside, with zero illumination. In addition to this, there was a very thick dust, making it almost impossible to see, even with NODs. As we were checking the perimeter, approx 20 meters from the breach, there were several more explosions and rifle fire. As I continued to move toward the breach, I heard someone calling for help. I kept moving towards the cries for help, where I found (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground, outside of the Aid Station in a (b)(3), (b)(6). I immediately ran to him and assessed the severity of his wounds. (b)(3), (b)(6) had a PT uniform on, with an IOTV, and there was (b)(3), (b)(6) I opened his IOTV to find where he had been hit. He had a gunshot wound in his (b)(3), (b)(6) area. As I did what I could to stop the bleeding, I called several times for a medic. For the first couple of minutes, I heard no response, so I continued to render buddy aid. As the intensity of the enemy attack increased, I realized that (b)(3), (b)(6) needed to be moved out of the line of fire. As I was preparing to move him, the flap to the Medic tent opened and (b)(3), (b)(6) waived us inside. I assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) into the tent where there were several medics treating casualties. We lay (b)(3) towards the center of the medic tent, (which was already collapsed/deflated) where (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately started working on him, starting with treating his gunshot wound and then getting (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately after laying (b)(3), (b)(6) down, (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the tent and assisted in treating casualties. While I lay there with (b)(3), (b)(6) I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) what I could do to help. He told me that I could talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) I held (b)(3), (b)(6) hand, asked him questions, and did everything I could to assure him that he would be okay as (b)(3), (b)(6) calmly and skillfully administered to the wounds of (b)(3), (b)(6) While doing this, I assisted other medics in the Aid Station, by getting (b)(3), (b)(6) his aid bag, and taking the Israeli bandage out of my IFAC and giving it to him. Also in the tent were SPC Tilton and (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) working on (b)(3), (b)(6) wounds, and (b)(3), (b)(6) pulling security at the entrance of the tent. While I was in the tent, a grenade landed on the roof and exploded. This wounded, to at least some degree everyone in the tent-- I specifically remember (b)(3), (b)(6) shock and concern as he realized that SPC Tilton, who had been treating (b)(3), (b)(6) was hit in the head with either shrapnel or a bullet, and was slumped over, mortally wounded. I also distinctly remember getting hit in the leg just above the ankle by a piece of shrapnel and swiping my boot for blood and not finding any, I continued to assist the medics (the next day, I took off my boot and found where I had been hit-- the piece of shrapnel had penetrated my boot and hit my leg just below the top of my boot-- the bleeding was minimal and I was able to recover the piece of shrapnel). At that point, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I tag-teamed, and I took up his position at the entrance of the tent, pulling security. (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6) put full focus into treating Tilton's wounds as rifle fire and explosions continued to rock the camp. At no time, while I was in the medical tent, did I see, hear, or even know that (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the tent.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	
D-14	(b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP BDE HQ DATED 2010/07/19

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

After a few more minutes, I saw friendly forces moving into the vicinity of the aid station. I recognized (b)(3), (b)(6) from C Co, along with several other Paratroopers from his company. As C Co moved through and secured the NE area of the camp, I saw (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) actively assisting casualties. I ran into my tent (adjacent to the aid station) and grabbed my MBTR radio and joined him, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (from PSD), with one or two other Paratroopers and conducted a sweep of the living areas, tent by tent, looking for any wounded or trapped Paratroopers. Once we had cleared each tent, we went to the TOC to get situational awareness on the big picture. As I entered, I saw multiple people actively coordinating MEDEVACs, ISR support, and support from adjacent units. In the corner of the room, I saw what appeared to be a KIA with a towel covering his face (it later turned out to be 1LT Goeke) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) We then moved back across the camp to just outside the aid station, where I linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) from C Co. He told me that the bunker still needed to be cleared. We moved towards the bunker, where Scouts and C Co were clearing through. I posted myself at the east entrance of the bunker, with about (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) As the bunker was cleared, (b)(3), (b)(6) and one interpreter ran out. (b)(3), (b)(6) appeared to be pretty traumatized as he kept saying, "they got my boy, they got my boy" (referring to SSG Tate). We then moved inside the bunker and began recovering remains along with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and a couple of other Paratroopers. We first removed the remains of (b)(6) interpreter and propped him up against the side of an ANCOP HMMWV. We also removed the remains of SSG Tate and two other interpreters and laid them about five meters away from the bunker. As I squatted down to pick up one of the KIA, my pants ripped from my crotch area, all the way down to my knee cap. Under the white light of headlamps, we could see that they had all been apparently killed by rifle fire, as they each had multiple gunshot wounds to their bodies. We loaded them into body bags and relocated them to just outside the Aid Station so that they were out of the way.

I then moved to where they were loading casualties near the aid station and I assisted in lifting stretchers onto some of the MATV's which were being used to shuttle casualties over to the HLZ on the west side of the ANCOP BDE HQ. I then linked up with (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) gave him an update on the casualties I knew of, ensured we had a three hundred and sixty degree perimeter with our adjacent units and asked what other priorities of work needed to be completed. He informed me that evacuating the wounded was the current priority. He told me that we needed to get some ANCOP trucks to assist. I then went into the NE tower and requested help from the ANCOP. The first truck they had keys to had a dead battery and wouldn't start. I then found (b)(6) an ANCOP Officer, whom I had developed a friendship with over the past month. He speaks fluent English and was critical to translating between us and the ANCOP chain of command. We were able to use (b)(6) to coordinate the use of two ANCOP pick-up trucks for casualty evacuation and also to synchronize efforts with the ANCOP in general. We also went to the ANCOP Barracks to see their wounded.

The next priority was getting accountability of all our personnel. I was surprised when I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) that virtually everyone had already been accounted for in HHC except SGT Stout. We began questioning everyone, finding out the location where he was last seen. It was determined that the last place SGT Stout was seen was inside his tent, only meters from the breach. We immediately organized (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) search team to comb the designated area. At the entrance of SGT Stout's tent, we found a dead interpreter, face down on the ground. I then noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and then saw a body on top of the collapsed tent. I, along with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) climbed on top of the tent and with our head lamps confirmed that it was SGT Stout. He was laying face up, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) About three meters away, I spotted and recovered his M4 (b)(3), (b)(6), but relatively intact. We then prepared to recover his remains by grabbing a stretcher and body-bag. Just as I reached down with (b)(3), (b)(6) to place the remains in the bag, (b)(3), (b)(6) called to me to come down from the tent roof and to repair the giant 40ft breach in the perimeter wall. (b)(3), (b)(6) informed me of concertina wire located in the SW corner of the base, approximately 300 meters away from the breach.

I grabbed a few Paratroopers who were not yet tasked and had them follow me to the concertina wire storage. One of these Paratroopers was (b)(3), (b)(6) We reached the concertina wire and found three relatively small bundles which we threw over our shoulders and moved back to the breach. At the breech, there was a manned MATV, Paratroopers on the roof of the bunker, and three C Co Paratroopers monitoring the hole in the wall. Of the C Co Paratroopers, I recognized (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) They assisted in emplacing the concertina wire, (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) We then went back to the concertina wire bundles in the SW corner of the base. All that was left were giant, unmovable bundles of c-wire, so (b)(3), (b)(6) went to the Scout trucks and retrieved a pair of bolt-cutters while I went to the ANCOP in the SW tower and requested the use of their trucks. After about five minutes of charades, I was able to communicate our needs to the ANCOP and they got their truck started, and backed it up to the concertina

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF CPT (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP BDE HQ DATED 2010/07/18

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

bales open and placed c-wire into the truck, ripping the back seats. I then ground-guided the truck to the breach, where we then down-loaded the c-wire and were about to (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) but were ordered by (b)(3), (b)(6) to just patch up the hole in the wall, as the area outside the breach was not yet cleared of IED's/threats. We ended up emplacing three strands of c-wire across the hole and anchored it with a fence pole, sandbags, and rocks.

Once the breach was plugged, I then noticed that there was an unused and in-tact RPG round in the latrine hall-way adjacent to the breach. At that time, I also remembered that there was an unexploded grenade (pin-pulled) in the bunker and so I informed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) those securing the breach and the gun-team on top of the bunker of the potential danger. I also distinctly remember seeing (b)(3), (b)(6) on the ground near the breach. I then moved to the aid station and found (b)(3), (b)(6) in the process of accounting for sensitive items. I asked which sections had not reported 100% of their SI and was told the S-6, the Scouts, and PSD. I then set out to find the section leaders to get their report. I first found (b)(3), (b)(6) outside the TOC, who gave me a thumbs up. I proceeded up to the ECP and asked (b)(3), (b)(6) who also gave me a thumbs up. As I moved back to the NE corner of the base, I found (b)(3), (b)(6) and received a thumbs up from him. I linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) again and gave him my reports.

At this time, trucks with routine WIA and KIA returned from the HLZ, informing everyone that the MEDEVAC helicopters were no longer coming. I assisted (b)(3), (b)(6) and other Paratroopers in unloading the trucks with the KIA and wounded. I drove over to the HLZ and retrieved even more WIA/KIA. By this time, the casualty collection point had been moved to the Scout's tent as it was one of only two tents of the eleven still standing (every other tent had been completely shredded by bullets and shrapnel and consequently collapsed). We placed the KIA just outside the CCC and planned out the way ahead. It was determined that a Canadian unit would come from Camp Nathan Smith to collect our remaining WIA and that I would lead an HHC HQ convoy to evacuate our KIA back to KAF. I had (b)(3), (b)(6) write two trip tickets (one to hand to the TOC) and we put together our ad-hoc convoy, consisting of: myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I used ANCOP trucks to move the KIA from the CCC to our trucks at the ECP. We loaded the four interpreter KIA (Abdul, Atif, Qais, Hamayoun) onto the LMTV. We then loaded one U.S. KIA into each of our three Cougar MRAPs (1LT Goeke, SSG Tate, SGT Stout). We conducted a convoy brief, and drove straight to KAF at about 0500 and arrived at approx 0630. We went directly to Mortuary Affairs and had the desk NCO give a wake-up call to the morticians, who showed up about 30min later. Myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) took each US KIA into the morgue, opened up each body bag and positively identified each Paratrooper. We then brought all four interpreter KIA's into the morgue and identified them. We recognized most of them, but used ID cards found on their bodies for Qais and Hamayoun. We then went over to the hospital and visited (b)(3), (b)(6) and SPC Tilton. We then went to the KAF RSOI Tent at 1100, slept for three hours and returned to the ANCOP HQ in order to relieve the current guard roster and assist in priorities of work.-----NOTHING FOLLOWS-----

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Oath)

Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6) (Print Name), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature

8-3-10

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandhar City, Khandahar AFG ANCOP	20100803	1800	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC 1508 Scouts

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

July 13, 2010 Just after Dusk, SSG Tate, (b)(3), (b)(6), and I were all settling down from a long day playing a game in SSG Tates/Terp tent. As we all were sitting at the back of the tent to the right, side facing the wall, a blast exploded Knocking us and the tent down. We all immidietly hit the ground. SSG Tate ushered us towards the front of the tent entrance closer to the bunker so there we could take cover. the entrance was blocked by wood set up in the tent, so SSG Tate grabed a Knife and freed a hole so everyone including the terps could get out. During the rush I was the furthest to the back and decided to go out the back of the tent. I was expecting another explosion at our location, guessing we were taking IDF. So I didnt want to get caught in the middle. As I headed towards the back I yelled that it was open but they were leaving just as I was, but through the front. I exited out the back next to the shower connex and ran towards the hard buildings. While enroute multiple explosions and gun fire I could hear behind me. Just as I reached the hard buildings my Platoon, Scouts, were rushing to our vehicles. At that point we grabed kits and vps on everyone and headed to the NE tower. We ran between the hard ANCOP barracks and the ANP were in adisaray. I honestly felt scared that ANP would shot us by mistake in ther state of Panic. I at this time was with my team headed to the tower but didnt have my weapon, so they countinued up the tower and passing our tent I quickly grabbed my weapon. I then proceeded to the NE Tower located by our tent.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-15	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(5) TAKEN AT ANCOP DATED 08032010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

As I entered the tower more explosions and gunfire was taking place. another team, I didnt recognize at the moment, was posted at the base of the steps. My Team yelled for me to come to the roof. I continued up the Stairs and as I reached the top of the Second Floor a RPG hit the outside window, sending sparks and shattered glass everywhere. I was blown back but not of balance still griping the stairs and ran back to the base of the stairs expecting another hit. Reaching the bottom a soldier at the base with that team was Screaming in pain of his ear drums. My Team leader ran down and told me to come back up. We ran to the roof and immediatly lowered NODs and Scanned. ANP that had been on gaurd, two guys, shot wildly at the outside. We had elements manuevering by the blast in the wall and from the top we tried to get PID on enemy first. Over the radio, chatter of breach and enemy in the wire along the wall in the ANP Restrooms and the bunker, was heard and my team of five quickly Scanned and PID Two squirters from the compound after throwing more grenades. We took our shots but smoke and blasts of the grenades gave them cover. We continued to scan for twenty minutes of no contact out towards thier direction of retreat, which was amaze af compounds in the village. We could view in the middle of the compounds, one specificly, lights come on and shadows continuously moving then one last explosion went off. After that we guessed IDF or maybe another grenade tossed. At that time we posted security at the top of the roof as ANCOP was cleared and adjacent units cleared the villase. We stead ground thier and contact was broken for the rest of the night.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS	(b)(3), (b)(6)	MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD V1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6) have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

03082010

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, KANDAHAR CITY, AFGHANISTAN	20100803		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. O

HHC, 1-508th PIR, 4th BCT, 82nd ABN DIV

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 2010, I was inside the aidstation living area talking w/ (b)(3), (b)(6) who was attached to C. Co, 1-508th as a senior medic. At around 2030, we heard a loud explosion, which knocked everything inside the tent. I yelled everyone to the bunker and grabbed my weapon. No one at that time realized that the wall adjacent to the bunker was breached. I linked up w/ (b)(3), (b)(6) inside. Shortly after that, we were engaged by SAF and hand grenades. There was a lot of people yelling and screaming in pain. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I somehow made it back to the aidstation and took up a security position. We were then engaged by more SAF and hand-grenades. That's about when (b)(3), (b)(6) was brought in and I instructed my medics to start treatment on him. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I remained in position until I thought the situation somehow was under control. So I decided to move into the tent to see how (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing. As I was moving, more SAF and shrapnel from hand grenades came in. When I got there,

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	
D-16	(b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ, KC DATED 03 AUG 2010

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were working on (b)(3), (b)(6) I was also informed that (b)(3), (b)(6), one of my medics was also injured. I instructed SPC Tilton to start treatment on (b)(3), (b)(6) We were under continuous SAF and blast from explosions all around us. After each explosion, I called out the names of my medic inside the tent. After one particular explosion, I called out ~~SP~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) for SPC Tilton several times ~~with~~ but he would not answer. I moved to his position and found his body limp on top of (b)(3), (b)(6) and unconcious. (b)(3), (b)(6) also sustained more injuries from the same explosion. I tried to free SPC Tilton but (b)(3), (b)(6) could not do it from the prone position I was in. I got up on my feet to free him but he was hopelessly tangled w/ (b)(3), (b)(6). I called (b)(3), (b)(6) for help. He came over immediately and shouted at me to get down. We freed SPC Tilton and learned that he sustained a high velocity fragment wound to the left side of his head and (b)(3), (b)(6) I started bandaging his head and asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to get me a set of vital signs. Realizing that SPC Tilton's (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to perform (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I also informed (b)(3), (b)(6) about SPC Tilton and he came over while under fire to assist us. At that time, our supply was getting low.

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

_____
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

_____
_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____
_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

_____
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ, KC DATED 03 AUG 2010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I got up and ran to our trauma tent to get one of trauma hanging bags. When I returned, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) have already performed a procedure and informed that SPC Tilton needed (b)(3), (b)(6) I ran under fire to retrieve (b)(3), (b)(6) the BVM but it was damaged during the attack so I went out and got another. That was about when the enemy hand grenade (b)(3), (b)(6) exploded directly above us. We tried to cover SPC Tilton as much as possible and in the process, we all suffered (b)(3), (b)(6) shrapnel injuries. We all ignored our (b)(3), (b)(6) injuries and continued taking care of our casualties. (b)(3), (b)(6) also tried to cover (b)(3), (b)(6) during the explosion and suffered a shrapnel injury. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I did not have our helmet or body armor on throughout the attack. After the attack subsided, (b)(3), (b)(6) with C. Co. 1-50A PIR came in to assess situation. He gathered litter bearers to move casualties outside. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) volunteered to escort casualties to the HLZ. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I remained at the base and started taking care of KIA's and less (b)(3), (b)(6) critically injured casualties.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY (b)(3), (b)(6) OUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU (b)(3), (b)(6) t)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6) h)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, Afghanistan	2010/08/04		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1-508 PIR, ANCOP HQ's, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Was SPC Tilton wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was killed?

Answer: SPC Tilton was wearing his body armor but no helmet.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?

Answer: I do not know what specific injury he sustained but I saw his (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) He was injured inside the bunker and again inside the aidstation tent.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?

Answer: No, he was not wearing his body armor or helmet.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?

Answer: He was injured on the right chest and left arm.
He was injured during the initial attack on the bunker by the breached wall.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?

Answer: I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) w/ his plate carrier inside the bunker.
I am not sure about his helmet.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-16 (cont'd)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY (b)(3), (b)(6) WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ment)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 04 day of August, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.
(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Signature

03 AUG 2010
Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, KANDAHAR CITY, AFG	20100803	1330	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1-508 PIR, 4BCT, 82D ABN DIV

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 JULY 2010, at approximately 2030 the ANCOP HQ, Kandahar City, AFG, came under attack by an unknown number of insurgents. I was asleep when the first explosion hit and woke me up and I saw the other medics running out of the tent to the bunker. I looked across the tent and saw that SPC Tilton was also still in the tent and I told him to get his kit on while I was trying to quickly get dressed to head to the bunker. As we were both about to move out a moment later a second explosion hit and we heard small arms fire. We quickly got down and then heard people yelling and running back toward the tent. I heard someone yelling for a medic right outside the entrance to the tent and then (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the tent. (b)(3), (b)(6) was helping (b)(3), (b)(6) who had been injured in the left arm and stomach. (b)(3), (b)(6) yelled out that (b)(3), (b)(6) had also been hit and told SPC Tilton to begin treating him. I began working on (b)(3), (b)(6) along with (b)(3), (b)(6). While trying to treat patients the explosions continued all around our tent. I did my best to cover my patient when I could, but it was difficult to work on him and cover him from all the explosions and gunfire. At some point a piece of shrapnel or a bullet came through the tent and struck SPC Tilton in the head. As (b)(3), (b)(6) was calling out to check on everyone he noticed Tilton did not respond and when he looked over

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-17	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT NCOP HQ, AFG DATED 3 AUG 2010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

he saw him laying over (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately went over to treat SPC Tilton. Upon seeing (b)(3), (b)(6) struggling to free Tilton's body, (b)(3), (b)(6) also went to work on SPC Tilton. I continued treating (b)(3), (b)(6) and at this point numerous people also began coming into the tent. First, (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the tent. When he took a position between me and (b)(3), (b)(6) another explosion went off directly over our heads. I felt something hit my shoulder and told (b)(3), (b)(6) I felt something and he asked if everyone was OK. We all continued treating our patients and began receiving help from others. (b)(3), (b)(6) came back into the tent and helped me get supplies to treat (b)(3), (b)(6) Then he left and (b)(3), (b)(6) came in and helped get supplies for myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) When I looked up as (b)(3), (b)(6) was leaving I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) moving to (b)(3), (b)(6) position in order to get treatment. I did not realize that was even in the tent until this point because he had not spoken or helped treat any of the patients. Once the attack subsided we brought litters into the tent and moved the patients outside to get them to the HLZ. We moved (b)(3), (b)(6) then (b)(3), (b)(6), then (b)(3), (b)(6). As (b)(3), (b)(6) was being moved, (b)(3), (b)(6) of C-Co, told (b)(3), (b)(6) to get his aidbag and follow him to the HLZ. That's the last time I saw him that night. I carried (b)(3), (b)(6) and Tilton out, then tried to go to the HLZ, but was told I couldn't because I wasn't wearing my kit. I immediately linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) who was also without kit and we ran to our truck to retrieve our stuff. After this we returned to the aid station area and began moving the bodies of the KIA and set

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ, AFG DATED 3 AUG 2010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

up a secondary CCP because our tent was destroyed from all of the explosions. After moving the bodies of the terps and of SSG Tate, we began getting guys with minor wounds coming to the CCP for treatment. We got our things and moved to treat them. We saw (b)(3), (b)(6) for wounds on his leg and (b)(3), (b)(6) for wounds on his leg, (b)(3), (b)(6) for possible head injury, (b)(3), (b)(6) for wounds on his foot, an ANCOP soldier for a possible broken arm, and an ANCOP soldier who was unconscious by unknown cause. We called in a second medevac request and began loading the wounded and KIA to take to the HLZ. This time I went to the HLZ in order to provide further care for (b)(3), (b)(6) and the unconscious ANCOP soldier. We moved everyone to the HLZ and were informed about 45 minutes later the birds could not fly so we moved everyone back into the ANCOP HQ. After bringing everyone back into the base I linked up with the other medics and began preparing our equipment again in case of a possible secondary attack.

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, Afghanistan	2010/08/04		

	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1-508 PIR, ANCOP HQ's, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was SPC Tilton wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was killed?
Answer: He was wearing his vest but not his helmet.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?
Answer: His left arm and I think left leg, not sure what caused his injury

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?
Answer: I can't say for sure, but don't think so.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?
Answer: He had an injury on his left forearm and his abdomen. Its hard to say if it was a bullet or shrapnel.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?
Answer: I know for sure he was wearing his body armor, but it was removed before I treated him. I don't know about his helmet.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	
D-17 (cont'd)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 04 day of August, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

g Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKI (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

S

3 AUG 2010

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
4/82 HQ	2010/08/01	1941	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
4/82 BCT

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

WELL IN FRONT OF ME I HAVE THE ACTUAL COPY OF THE MERC CHAT, WHICH IS THE ELECTRONIC DOCUMENT FILE THAT IS USE AS THE PRIMARY MEANS OF COMMUNICATION THROUGHOUT THE BATTLE SPACE FOR THE UNIT TO TO THE BRIGADE HQ TO LET THEM KNOW WHATS GOING ON. AT APPROXIAMATELY 2135 ON THE EVENING OF THE 13 JULY I WAS WORKING AT THE MED OPS DESK AS I USALLY DO AND WE RECIEVED THE INITIAL NOTIFICATION OF A 9 LINE MEDEVAC COMING FROM 1 FURY. WE RECEIVED THE FIRST TWO LINES OF THE MEDAVAC. AT THE TIME ALL WE HAD WAS A LOCATION AND A FREQUENCY. I REQUESTED A CALL SIGN AND THEN THEY PROVIDED THE CALL SIGN.

Question: How long did it take to get the full 9-line?
JUST SCANNING OVER THE DOCUMENTS, I'D SAY IT TOOK ABOUT 50 MINUTES TO GET THE FULL 9 LINE MEDAVAC.

Question: If you can't do the chat, is there other ways to communicate? TO forward the medevac request?
(b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e).

Question: If you forward a medevac request without all nine lines, what happens?
(b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e).

Question: Do you know which unit responded to the medevac request?
JUDGING BY THE HOURS, THE UNIT THAT RESPONED TO THE INCIDENT WOULD HAVE BEEN (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) AN AIR FORCE UNIT. DEPENDING ON THE SITUATION IN SOME CASES (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) HAS DJ'S ON BOARD,MOSTLY IN SEARCH AND RESCUE BUT THE MEDICS ON THE HELO WERE PROBABLY JUST AIR MEDICS.

Question: About how long a flight is it?
ITS ABOUT A (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) FLIGHT TO THE ANCOP HEADQUARTERS. THE WHEELS UP TIME WAS ABOUT 22:11.

Question: During this period of time was anyone with you in the JOC? Anyone working medical stuff with you?
THE JOC WAS COMPLETELY PACKED BY THEN. (b)(3), (b)(6) AND I WERE THE TWO MEDICAL PERSONNEL IN THERE.

Question: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) leave at some point? Did he end up going to the hospital?
POSSIBLY, THERE WAS A LOT OF COMMOTION AND RUNNING AROUND. A LOT OF PEOPLE WHO DON'T TYPICALLY SIT IN THE JOC WERE IN THE JOC. I DON'T BELIEVE HE DID THAT EVENING. (b)(3), (b)(6) WENT TO THE HOSPITAL

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-19	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4/82 DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Question: Do you know whether or not the Battalion Surgeon ended up at the hospital?
WE WERE TRACKING (b)(3), (b)(6) AS A PATIENT. FROM THE MEDEVAC REQUEST AND WHEN THE S1 WAS TRACKING THE ROSTERS, WE WERE TRACKING HIM AS A CASUALTY.
Question: Do you know if he was admitted to the hospital or not?
I BELIEVE HE WAS SCREENED, HELD, AND THEN RELEASED LATER ON THAT DAY
Question: Do you know anything about the nature of the injuries to the four soldiers that expired?
NOT THE SPECIFICS OF EACH, I BELIEVE LT GOECKE HAD GUN SHOT WOUNDS AS WELL AS SERGEANT TATE HAD A ~~SEVERE~~ MULTIPLE GUN SHOT WOUNDS (b)(3), (b)(6) THE CHAPLAINS ASSISTANT, MY RECOLLECTION WAS HE WAS NEAR THE SUICIDE BOMBER (b)(3), (b)(6) AND HE DETONATED WITH A CATASTROPHIC KILL OF HIM.
Question: In your experience did the medevac take longer than normal?
YES, PRIOR TO THIS INCIDENT I WORKED WITH THE BRIGADE SINCE 2006 AND WITH THE LAST DEPLOYMENT IN AFGHANISTAN IN RC-E THE ENTIRE 15 MONTHS I WAS DOING THE SAME JOB THE WHOLE TIME MANAGING THE MEDAVAC FOR THE WHOLE RC-E. THIS MEDAVAC DID HAVE SOME DELAY IN IT, THAT COULD HAVE BEEN AVOIDED, POSIBLY, BUT DUE TO NOT KNOWING THE SECURITY OF THE PICKUP SITE, I CAN UNDERSTAND THE POSSIBLE DELAY THERE, THAT AND NOT HAVING THE COMPLETE MEDEVAC. DESPITE NOTE EVEN HAVING THE (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). THESE GUYS WENT WHELLS UP AND SUPPORTED THE 1 FURY GUYS.
Question: Do you know if they got adequate information while airborne to ID the LZ, land, etc?
THE CREW AT BEST WOULD KNOW WHAT WE KNOW. I GET THE INFORMATION OVER SIPR AND I TRANSPOSE IT OVER TO CENTRIX SO RC-S CAN SEE IT. RC-S PROVIDES THE APPROVAL AUTHORITY FOR THEM TO GO WHEELS UP. SO BASED UPON THE INFORMATION WE PROVIDE THEM, AND AGAIN NOT KNOWING THE ENTIRE SITUATION, UNTIL APPROXIMATELY AN HOUR LATER, THESE GUYS TOOK A CHANCE TO GO SUPPORT THE SOLDIERS ANYWAY.
Question: RC-S is the release authority for the aircraft?
ON THE EVENING WE REPORTED TO TF-K AND THEY REPORTED TO RC-S. WE REPORTED DIRECTLY TO TF-K. TODAY, WE REPORT DIRECTLY TO RC-S WITHOUT GOING TO TF-K.
Question: Do you track if injured or soldiers KIA were wearing their gear?
TECHNICALLY NO, I AM PRIVY TO THAT INFORMATION THROUGH THE S1 AND THE CASUALTY FEEDER CARD - ITS ANNOTATED ON THERE. WE GET A SCANNED COPY FOR EVERY CASUALTY WEATHER KIA OR WIA BUT I DO NOT PERSONALLY TRACK THAT INFORMATION.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM [illegible] 06 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4/82 DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	9 AUG 10
Printed Name/Rank	Signature	Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, Afghanistan	2010/08/03	1620	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1-508 PIR, ANCOP HQ's, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 13 July 2010, the ANCOP HQ's was attacked. I was located in the tent beside the TOC (ALOC) when the initial explosion occured and I thought it may have been Indirect Fire. I was concerned about my medics safety so I began to move towards the Aid Station. It was very difficult to see with all of the dust in the air, but I noticed that (b)(3), (b)(6) was right behind me and moving with me. I had my head lamp on to help us see and once we were a couple meters passed the Interpreter tent I heard a little bit of movement to my left and then shots started firing. I was about 5 meters away from the muzzleflashes and realize they were firing at us when I felt the bullets fly passed. I took cover behind an AC unit close by and heard (b)(3), (b)(6) say, "Run sir!" I waited for a pause in the firing and ran for the TOC to inform command that they had breached the wire and to regroup with more pax. Shortly after I arrived in the TOC, (b)(3), (b)(6) brought in 1LT Chris Goeke. He was wounded badly w/ a GSW to his head. Myself and (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Medic), who was also wounded from shrapnel, began to asses Chris and realized that he had passed away. About 6 more injured Paratroopers came into the TOC with shrapnel wounds. Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) began cutting everyones' clothes off to assess and triage the injured Paratroopers. Once the more serious were treated, I again tried to move toward the Aid Station to link up with my guys. The Small Arms Fire and amount of grenades thrown was still intense and did not allow me to make it all the way back to the Aid Station. After a lull in firing i linked up with who i believe to be (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) and moved to the Aid Station to check on my guys. Once we got to the Aid Station, I realized there were several Urgent Casualties. (b)(3), (b)(6) was treating (b)(3), (b)(6) who had a GSW to his abdomen. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) were treating someone critically injured and (b)(3), (b)(6) I now realize that the critically wounded person they were treating was SGT Tilton. The Medics were calling out valuable information about their casualties to me so I could consolidate and send up the 9 line. Once I had the key material for the 9 line, I left the Aid Station and quickly checked all of the other tents to ensure there were no more casualites to add to the 9 line. Once i confirmed there were no more urgent casualties, I moved back to the TOC and sent up the 9 line via (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). Once I confirmed the 9 line was sent up, I moved back to the Aid Station area. We needed a CASEVAC vehicle to move the wounded to the HLZ so I had two of the Scout vehicles that were currently parked outside of the Aid Station area and facing the southern wall pulling security turn their vehicles around and decided we would load the casualties on the hood of the two vehicles. The casualties were outside ready on litters ready to be loaded onto the vehicles but one of the vehicles was taking too long to turn around so I had some Paratroopers start moving (b)(3), (b)(6) toward the ECP and informed the TC of the MATV to pick him up there once they were turned around. The other MATV was ready to take casualties and (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself jumped on the hood of the MATV to pull up (b)(3), (b)(6) and SGT Tilton's litters. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) jumped on the hood as well to continue treatment on SGT Tilton. We had 2 litters and 4 Pax on the hood of one MATV. Once we got to the ECP, the other MATV stopped to load (b)(3), (b)(6) and we all headed out to the HLZ. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) from the Scouts was driving the vehicle I was on and did a good job getting us out to the HLZ that was outside of the Fob/Force protection. Once we got out to the HLZ area we downloaded the casualties from the MAATV, did one last assessment on them and moved them to the MEDEVAC Bird. After loading SGT Tilton onto the bird (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed me and told me he needed to get on the bird. This is the first time I heard or saw him throughout the whole ordeal.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-20	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I was confused as to why he wanted to get on the bird since they were going to a Role III, and figured he wanted to get on and double check a patient one last time. He did not get off the bird until it arrived to KAF Role III. Once all of the urgent casualties were on the bird we went back onto the ANCOP. I identified the Scout Tent as the Alternate Aid Station and we moved all of the wounded Paratroopers into the tent to begin triage and treatment. While the Medics continued to triage and treat the rest of the remaining Paratroopers, I swept the Fob with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to look for SSG Stout, the only Paratrooper unaccounted for. We came across a tent that was pretty much completely deflated and I believe it was (b)(3), (b)(6) who noticed the body. Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) climbed onto the tent and loaded SSG Stout's body onto a litter. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and moved him onto the litter and eventually into a body bag. Once this was complete, I got the final roll up of all the injured Paratroopers from my medics and moved back to the TOC to send up another Medevac for the remaining routine injuries. Once the 9 Line was sent up, I moved back to the Alternate HLZ and (b)(3), (b)(6) was loading up the casualties onto the truck and they moved out to the HLZ. Shortly after we were told that the bird was not coming and the casualties were brought back. A Canadian Platoon came and picked them up later that night. Shortly after the attack I was talking with my Platoon Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was there anything unusual about the evening of the attack, or the events leading up to the attack?
Answer (b)(3), (b)(6) We discussed the fact tha (b)(1)1.4c per section 1.7(e).
(b)(1)1.4c per section 1.7(e) We tried to enforce sick call hours and gave them a one hour block in the moring between 9 and 10 AM, and a one hour block in the evening between 1900 and 2000. However, (b)(1)1.4c per section 1.7(e). (b)(1)1.4c per section 1.7(e).

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Did (b)(3), (b)(6) assist with transporting/loading/unloading the casualties for MEDEVAC, and did he provide any medical treatment throughout this stage?
Answer (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) did not assist with any of the patients from what I could see. (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself pulled 2 of the patients onto the hood of the MATV and stayed with them to secure them and continue providing care enroute to the LZ. I did not see (b)(3), (b)(6) again until we were loading the aircraft, and then it seems as if he appeared out of nowhere.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): When (b)(3), (b)(6) jumped onto the aircraft, what did he do?
Answer (b)(3), (b)(6): I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) jump on the aircraft and ~~immediately sit down on one of the seats. I had visibility of him for a few seconds, and he just sat there as if he was in shock. He did not make any attempt to assist a patient on the aircraft, and it did not look like he was relaying patient medical information to the flight medics.~~ ---NOTHING FOLLOWS

from what I saw, ~~it looked as~~ he did not immediatly begin treating casualties. Shortly after, the bird lifted off and I do not know what he did after that

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, O

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 03 day of August, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ, Afghanistan	2010/08/04		

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC 1-508 PIR, ANCOP HQ's, Kandahar City, Afghanistan

9.

I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Was SPC Tilton wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was ~~killed~~ injured?

Answer: SGT Tilton was wearing his Body Armor but was not wearing his ACH

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?

Answer: (b)(3), (b)(6) suffered a GSW to his upper leg, shrapnel to his arm, and shrapnel to his side torso.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Was SPC D'Allura wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?

Answer: (b)(3), (b)(6) was not wearing his body Armor and Kevlar

Question (b)(3), (b)(6): Where was (b)(3), (b)(6) injured, and what caused his injury?

Answer: (b)(3), (b)(6) suffered a GSW to his abdomen and fractures to his upper right extremities.

Question (b)(3), (b)(6) Was (b)(3), (b)(6) wearing his body armor and kevlar when he was injured?

Answer: Yes he was wearing both

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-20 (cont'd)		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT ANCOP HQ DATED 2010/08/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 04 day of August, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sig

04 Aug 2010

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP BDE HQ's, Kandahar, Afghanistan	2010/08/04	1326	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
HHC/1-508th PIR	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC/1-508th PIR

9.

I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I ARRIVED TO THE 1/508TH BN AND THE ANCOP BDE HQ'S ON 8 JULY, 2010. THE BN WAS DISPOSED AT 12 FIXED SITES, BOTH COMPANY AND PLT PATROL BASES/CHECKPOINTS AROUND THE CITY. THE COMPANIES WERE CP/DISRUPTION OPS AS PART OF THE KANDAHAR SECURITY RING. THE BN HQ'S ALONG WITH HHC WERE LOCATED AT THE ANCOP BDE HQ'S.

FOR BN REPORTING ON 09 JUNE, 2010 WE WERE REPORTING SOLEY TO CTKC (COMBINED TEAM KANDAHAR CITY) BUT WE STARTED REPORTING TO BOTH CTKC AND 4/82ND BDE HQ'S. I WAS UNFAMILIAR WITH ANY WRITTEN ORDERS CONCERNING THE TRANSITION OF COMMAND/REPORTING AS I HAD JUST RECENTLY ARRIVED INTO THEATRE AND HAD NOT HAD THE OPPORTUNITY TO READ ALL OF THE OPORDS RELATING TO THE RECENT MOVE AND CHANGE OF AO RESPONSIBILTY.

THE IMPRESSION I HAVE OF THE CURRENT BN COMMAND CLIMATE IS THAT THERE ARE PERCEPTIONS AT BOTH BDE AND BN LEVELS. THE BDE SEEMS TO THINK THAT WE ARE NOT FOLLOWING THEIR INTENT/ANSWERING THEIR INFORMATION REQUIREMENTS. THE BN BELIEVES THE BDE IS NOT RESPONSIVE TO IT'S NEEDS/REQUESTS. ALSO THERE HAD BEEN SOME MEDIA ATTENTION ABOUT THE COMMAND CLIMATE IN 4/82ND AND THE 1/508TH TO WHICH I WAS MADE AWARE OF WHEN I ARRIVED IN THEATRE. AS FAR AS THE COMPANIES WITHIN THE BN THE MAIN PROBLEM IS THAT THEY FEEL THEY ARE BEING RAN RAGGED AND HAVE BEEN GIVEN AN ENDSTATE WITHOUT CLEAR GUIDANCE ON HOW TO EXECUTE.

SOMETIME IN JUNE THERE HAD SUPPOSEDLY BEEN A VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT THAT APPEARED TO BE MORE CONCEPTUAL IN NATURE. THE HHC (b)(3), (b)(6) WAS IN CHARGE OF BOTH THE FOB SECURITY AND DEFENSE. ALTHOUGH IT WAS APPARENT THAT THE ANCOP BDE HQ'S NEEDED FORCE PROTECTION/PERIMETER UPGRADES, THE PRIORITY OF EFFORT WAS GIVEN TO THE CHECK POINTS.

ON THE DAYS LEADING UP TO THE ATTACK THERE WERE NO SIGNIFICANT INDICATORS OR SET PATTERNS, JUST BROAD THREATS, AS THERE WAS A GENERAL LACK OF INTEL (BLACK HOLE) DUE TO THE LACK OF OPERATIONS/INTEL GATHERING BY TF-KANDAHAR PRIOR TO OUR ARRIVAL. THE THREATS WE DID RECIEVE WERE PRETTY BROAD AND NOT SPECIFIC.

ON THE NIGHT OF THE ATTACK WE WERE IN THE TOC CONDUCTING THE NIGHTLY 2000HR BN UPDATE. WE HEARD A LOUD EXPLOSION AND IMMEDIATELY THOUGHT THAT IT WAS INDIRECT FIRE, BUT AFTER THE SECOND EXPLOSION WE KNEW IT WAS SOMETHING ELSE AND PEOPLE, INCLUDING ME, STARTED GOING OUTSIDE TO THEIR TENTS TO GRAB THEIR KIT.

UPON GRABBING MY GEAR I RETURNED TO THE TOC WHERE I STARTED PULLING OUTSIDE SECURITY. I SAW THE BN XO WHO MOVED BACK INTO THE TOC AND ALSO THE BN CMDR WHO SAID HE WAS GOING TO TAKE HIS PSD TO CLEAR THE TENT/LIVING AREAS. HE TOLD ME HE NEEDED ME TO RUN THE TOC.

(CONTINUED ON NEXT PAGE)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-21		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ANCOP Hq,Kandahar DATED 2010/08/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

WHILE I WAS IN THE TOC SOLDIERS BROUGHT IN LT GOEKE WHO WAS KIA - HE WAS MOVED TO THE REAR OF THE TOC AND COVERED. OTHER CAUSALTIES WERE BROUGHT TO THE TOC AS WELL AND WHEN I ASKED WHY, I WAS TOLD THAT THE BN AID STATION HAD ALSO BEEN HIT.

THERE WAS A LOT OF ACTIVITY IN/OUT OF THE TOC WITH PERSONNEL COMING IN AND GIVING INDIVIDUAL REPORTS, BUT WE HAD NO COMMS WITH THE BN CMDR. HOWEVER, THE C/1/508TH COMPANY CMDR CAME IN (TIME UNDETERMINED) AND STATED THAT THE TENTS WERE CLEAR. I/WE CONTINUED TO WORK THE TOC COORDINATING 9-LINE MEDEVAC, WHICH TOOK ABOUT (b)(1) 1.4a per section 1.7(e) AND REINFORCEMENT UNITS/QRF. SOMETIME AFTER THE ATTACK WE ASKED ABOUT THE LOCATION OF THE BN SURGEON AND IT WAS REPORTED THAT HE HAD LEFT WITH THE FIRST MEDEVAC TO KAF AND DID NOT RETURN. WE ALSO TRIED TO GET THE ANCOP PERSONNEL TO GET ACCOUNTABILTY, BUT HAD NO LUCK AS THE RESPONSE WAS THEY DID NOT HAVE NVG CAPABILITY AND THEREFORE COULD NOT GET HIS PEOPLE TOGETHER.

I CONTINUED TO RUN THE TOC DURING THE ATTACK AND THE HOURS FOLLOWING.

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, (b)(3), (b)(6) EMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

son Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

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DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sig

3 Aug 10

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

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ANCOP BDE HQ's, Kandahar, Afghanistan	2010/08/03	1926	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC/ 508th PIR

9. (b)(3), (b)(6)

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I HAVE BEEN THE 1/508TH BN CSM FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO YEARS AND THE BN HAS BEEN DEPLOYED FOR ABOUT 11 MONTHS.

PRIOR TO REPOSITIONING OUR FORCES INTO KANDAHAR CITY WE WERE DEPLOYED THROUGHOUT THE ZABUL PROVINCE IN MULTIPLE COMPANY AND PLATOON LEVEL POSITIONS. O/A 3 June, 2010 WE STARTED TO RIP (LS/RS) WITH THE STRIKER BN THAT WAS TAKING OVER OUR NEW AO. AFTER COMPLETING THE RIP WE MOVED TO KAF FOR 4/5 DAYS TO CONDUCT RSO&I TRAINING. AFTER THIS TRAINING THE BN MOVED INTO OUR NEW AO O/A 15 June.

WE REDEPLOYED FROM KAF INTO SECTOR DIRECTLY INTO THE DESIGNATED POSITION - THE COMPANIES INTO CP'S/HQ'S AND THE BN HQ'S/HHC INTO OUR CURRENT LOCATION AT THE ANCOP BDE HQ'S AND BEGAN OPERATIONS IMMEDIATELY. THE BN CMDR HAD THE FINAL DECISION ON WHERE THE BN HQ'S/HHC WOULD BE LOCATED AND THE MAIN REASON HE CHOSE THE ANCOP BDE HQ'S WAS THAT THE ANCOP UNIT WITH WHICH WERE WOULD BE PARTNERED WAS LOCATED THERE. THE BATTALION COMMANDER THOUGHT IT BEST TO BE CO-LOCATED WITH THE ANCOP BDE CDR.

PRIOR TO OUR ARRIVAL THERE WAS MINIMAL INTELLIGENCE ON THE THREAT SITUATION AS THE WHOLE AREA WAS DEEMED A "BLACK HOLE" OF INTEL DUE TO MINIMAL COALITION FORCES OPERATING IN THE AO PREVIOUSLY.

I BELIEVE THAT THERE WAS A VULNERABILITY ASSESSMENT CONDUCTED PRIOR TO OUR ARRIVAL WITH THE ONLY SUGGESTION BEING THAT THE COMPOUND ENTRANCE/ECP NEEDED IMPROVEMENT. I BELIEVE THIS UPGRADE WAS DONE, BUT THEY DEEMED THAT THE REMAINDER OF THE COMPOUND WAS OKAY AND MOVED ON TO THE NEXT FACILITY.

I BELIEVED AT THE TIME (AND STILL DO) THAT THE OVERALL FORCE PROTECTION OF THE COMPOUND NEEDED WORK AND I SPECIFICALLY POINTED OUT THE ECP, THE NORTH WALL (IN AND AROUND THE BREACH SITE), THE LZ AND THE SOUTHEAST CORNER OF THE WALL NEAR THE (b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(F) TO SECURE THE NORTH TOWERS. (b)(3), (b)(6) TOLD ME THE ANCOP BRIGADE COMMANDER INSISTED THAT HE WOULD PROTECT US AND (b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

(b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

10. EXHIBIT	11. IN	(b)(3), (b)(6)	ON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1926 DATED 2010/08/03

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

DURING THE C2 TRANSITION PERIOD BETWEEN TF-K TO CTCK/TF 4-82 THE WAS A BIT OF CONFUSION, BUT WE WORKED AROUND IT WITH MINIMAL EFFECTS.

AS FAR AS COMMAND CLIMATE THROUGHOUT THE BDE, BN AND COMPANIES' BIGGEST PROBLEM SEEMS TO BE A LACK OF COMMUNICATION. THE CURRENT BN S-3 (b)(3), (b)(6) SEEMS TO BE DOING A BETTER JOB AT COMMUNICATING WITH THE BN CMDR THAN THE PAST BN S-3'S AND THE BN XO (b)(3), (b)(6). THE BN CMDR HAS NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BDE CMDR.

ON THE DAY LEADING UP TO THE ATTACK I/WE DID NOT NOTICE ANYTHING OUT OF THE ORDINARY EITHER ON OR AROUND THE ANCOP OR INTEL REPORTING. ON THE NIGHT OF THE ATTACK, 13 July, 12010, WE WERE IN OUR DAILY 2100HRS BN UPDATE MEETING LOCATED IN THE TOC. AROUND 2015HRS WE HEARD A LOUD EXPLOSION AND I (AND OTHERS) RAN OUTSIDE TO ASSESS THE SITUATION. I RAN TO MY TENT TO GRAB MY WEAPON/KIT AND LINKED-UP WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) AND THEN WE BOTH HEADED TO THE BN AID STATION. BUT ON THE WAY TO THE AID STATION A RPG HIT THE ANCOP BUILDING/BARRACKS SO I DIVERTED BACK TO THE TOC. AT THE TOC I SAW THE BN CMDR (b)(3), (b)(6) AND HE TOLD ME TO GO COORDINATE WITH THE ANCOP HQ'S TO TRY AND GET THEM TO MUSTER TO THE SOUTHSIDE OF THE COMPOUND SO THAT HE COULD CLEAR THE NORTHSIDE WITHOUT FEAR OF MISTAKING ONE THE ANCOP AS ONE OF THE ATTACKERS. I TRIED TO GET THE ANCOP TO DO THIS, BUT HAD NO SUCCESS AND DECIDED THAT IT WAS POINTLESS. I WENT BACK TO THE BN CMDR AND TOLD HIM THAT THERE WAS NO WAY TO GET THE ANCOP TO COOPERATE AND THAT WE WOULD HAVE TO GO AHEAD AND CLEAR OUR AREA KEEPING IN MIND THAT THERE COULD BE FRIENDLIES OUT THERE.

AT THAT POINT I LIKED UP WITH C/1/508TH CMDR, (b)(3), (b)(6) AND WE HEADED TO THE BUNKER TO CLEAR IT - WHICH WE DID. THE SCOUTS WERE SET TO CLEAR THE ANCOP LATRINE NEAR THE BREACH SITE BY THROWING A FLASH BANG (WITH FOLLOW-ON CLEARING) BUT I TOLD THEM TO HOLD BECAUSE THE MEDEVAC WAS ON THE WAY AND I DID NOT WANT THEM TO DIVERT. AFTER THE MEDEVAC TOOK OFF THE SCOUTS THREW THE FLASH BANG INTO THE BUNKER AND WE CLEARED (ALONG WITH C/1/508TH PERSONNEL) BOTH IT AND THE LATRINE.

AFTER THAT I WENT INTO THE AID STATION AND SAW A LOT OF CASUALTIES THAT NEEDED MEDEVAC/TREATMENT AND ALSO TO ASK IF THE MEDEVAC REQUEST HAD BEEN SENT - TO WHICH THEY REPLIED THAT THEY DID NOT KNOW. I WENT BACK TO THE TOC TO CHECK ON THE MEDEVAC AND THEY SAID IT HAD BEEN SENT. I WENT BACK TO THE AID STATION AND AT THAT TIME I SAW THE BN SURGEON/ (b)(3), (b)(6) SITTING ON HIS BUNK DOING NOTHING. I ASKED THE OTHER MEDICS IF HE WAS HURT TO WHICH THEY REPLIED "NO". I WAS GOING TO YELL AT (b)(3), (b)(6) BUT I WAS FOCUSED ON THE CASUALTIES AND GETTING THEM EVACUATED. I WENT BACK OUTSIDE AND SAW (b)(3), (b)(6) IN A VEHICLE AND I TOLD HIM TO GET OUT BECAUSE WE WERE GOING IT AS A CASEVAC. (b)(3), (b)(6) (C/1/508TH) WHO WAS NEAR THE AID STATION WENT INTO THE TENT AND TO GET THE BN SURGEON AND WHEN THEY CAME BACK OUT OF THE TENT THE MAJ WAS HOLDING ON TO THE BACK OF THE 1SG'S PLATE CARRIER WITH HIS 9MM OUT AND ON FIRE.POINTED AT THE BACK OF (b)(3), (b)(6) I TOOK IT FROM HIM PLACED IT ON SAFE CLEARED IT AND PUT IT BACK INTO HIS HOLSTER.

WE LOADED CASUALITIES ON THE VEHICLE AND THE BN SURGEON GOT ON IT AS WELL - I'M ASSUMING TO HELP TREAT THE CASUALTIES AND LOAD THEM ON THE BIRD. AROUND 0500HRS I ASKED WHERE THE BN SURGEON WAS AND SOMEONE TOLD ME THAT HE HAD GOT ON THE MEDEVAC BIRD AND WENT TO KAF AND DID NOT RETURN.

AS FAR AS AAR COMMENTS I HAVE THE FOLLOWING:

(b)(5), (b)(7)(F)

NOTE - THE INTERPRETERS THAT WERE KILLED WERE TAKEN BACK TO KAF TO MORTUARY AFFAIRS WHERE THEIR FAMILIES WERE NOTIFIED.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STA (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1926 DATED 2010/08/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 1-508th PIR

ANCOP HQ, Kandahar, AF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____

at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for the information in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The information you provide is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature

3 Aug 10

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
ANCOP HQ	20100804	1600	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
4TH BCT HHC 1-508 PIR

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON 13 July 2010 ANCOP HQ WAS UNDER ATTACK AT AROUND 2115, I WAS LAYING ON MY BUNK ASLEEP WHEN I WAS WOKEN UP BY A LOUD EXPLOSION. I THEN JUMPED OUT MY BUNK GRABBED MY WEAPON AND MADE SURE ALL MY GUYS WERE MOVING OUT TO THE TRUCKS TO SECURE OUR GEAR. AS I MOVED OUT THE TENT I WAS ON POINT AND CLEARED MY WAY THREW THE ~~FARDEST~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) FAR ANCOP BUILDING FROM THE TENT. WE MADE OUR WAY THREW THE HALLWAY AND AS I CAME OUT THE OTHER SIDE WE HEARD AN RPG ROUND GET FIRED OFF AND HIT THE TOP LEFT CORNER OF THE ENTRANCE WAY. I THEN MADE SURE NOBODY WAS HIT AND CONTINUED TO MOVE TO OUR TRUCKS. ONCE I GOT TO MY TRUCK WE SECURED OUR GEAR AND GOT ACCOUNTABILITY OF MY WHOLE TEAM. I THEN HEARD ONE OF THE OTHER TEAM MEMBER TOOK HIS TEAM TO THE NORTH EAST CORNER TOWER AND THEY HAD EYES ON THE ENEMY AT THE BREACH POINT, SO I CALLED UP ON THE RADIO THAT I WAS GOING TO MOVE MY TRUCK TO SUPPORT THAT SECTION FROM THE GROUND. WHEN I ARRIVED TO THE NORTH EAST CORNER I REALIZED THAT THE AID STATION WAS ~~HIT~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) HIT SO I DISMOUNTED WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) AND (b)(3), (b)(6) AND LOCK DOWN THE CORNER OF THE AID STATION TO PROVIDE SOME SECURITY AS THEY MOVED THE CASUALTIES TO THE HLZ USING MY GUN TRUCK I PULLED UP TO THE NORTH EAST

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-23		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 DA FORM 2823, DEC 1998, IS OBSOLETE APD V1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1600 DATED 04 AUG 2010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

CORNER. ONCE THE WOUNDED WERE MOVED OUT THE AID STATION I CALLED (b)(3), (b)(6) AND HE MOVED DOWN TO MY POSITION AND I TOLD HIM THAT WE NEEDED TO CLEAR THE BUNKER AND THE ANCOP LATRINE OF ALL THREAT. I THEN MOVED IN TOWARDS THE BUNKER TO CLEAR IT ONCE AT THE BUNKER WE SECURED A TERP THAT WAS STILL ALIVE AND (b)(3), (b)(6) RAN OUT PASSED US TO SECURE HIMSELF. ONCE THE BUNKER WAS CLEARED I DID A THREAT STILL IN THE LATRINE, THATS WHEN I WAS ABLE TO CONFIRM THAT THE RPG'S WERE FIRED FROM THAT POSITION PROVIDING THE TALIBAN WITH COVER AND CONCEALMENT. I THAN CALLED UP ON THE RADIO THAT I WAS GOING TO CLEAR IT WITH A (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) AS I APPROACHED THE LATRINE I WAS ABLE TO SEE A GRENADE THROWN AT US I YELLED BACK GRENADE AND TAKE COVER. ONCE IT EXPLODED WE PULLED BACK CHECKED EVERYONE FOR INJURIES BEHIND COVER THAN ONCE AGAIN WALKED TOWARDS THE LATRINES WITH MY FIRE TEAM I PUSHED THE FIRE TEAM AGAINST THE LATRINE WALL AS I PROVIDED SECURITY FOR THEM, THEN I RAN OVER TO THEIR POSITION AND THREW THE (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) INSIDE LATRINE AND FOLLOWED THE BANG WITH MY TEAM, WE THEN REALIZED THAT THE BREACH POINT EXPANDED BEHIND THE LATRINES. ONCE WE CLEARED THAT STRUCTURE I DISCOVERED AN UNUSED RPG ROUND AND (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) AND ON THE OPPISITE

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

_____
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

_____
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD V1.00

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1600 DATED 04 AUG 2010

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

OF THE IATRINE IN THE BUNKER WAS A FRAG WITHOUT THE FUSE SITTING ON THE GROUND WHICH WAS ALSO (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) THE BREACH SITE WAS SECURE THAN WHEN I PLACE A 240 GUNNER ON BOTH THE IATRINE AND THE BUNKER AND LEFT THREE DISMOUNTS SECURING THE BREACH POINT ON THE GROUND.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE_____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE MENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD V1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature

04 AUG 2010

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
4/82 HQ TOC	2010/08/01	1917	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
4/82 BCT

9.
I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

ON THE NIGHT IN QUESTION I WAS AT MY DESK ON THE TOC FLOOR. ONCE THE EVENT WENT DOWN ME AND (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) STARTED TRACKING THE EVENT ON MERC CHAT AS FAR AS THE CAUSALTIES AND THE KIA THERE, BOTH US, LN, AND ANSF. THE SITUATION WAS CLOUDY AT FIRST YOU COULD TELL THERE WAS ALOT GOING ON AND THEY WERE HAVING A HARD TIME GRASPING WHAT WAS GOING ON OUT THERE. THIS WAS AROUND 2130. THE INITIAL REPORT SAID ANCOP HQ HAD BEEN ATTACKED. AFTER THAT CHOPS WENT UP NOTIFIED (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). AND THE STAFF UPSTAIRS, WHICH IS NORMAL PROTOCAL. THAT WHAT WE DO WHEN BIG EVENTS ARE GOING ON SO THE BIG BOSSES COME DOWN ON THE FLOOR AND GET UNDERSTANDING. WE PULLED UP IMAGERY ON THE OVER HEAD SCREENS TO SEE EXACTLY WHAT WAS GOING ON. (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). NO STARTED TALKING WITH (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). GUYS ON THE GROUND. YOU COULD TELL THERE WAS TOO MUCH GOING ON DOWN ON THE GROUND. AFTER I HEARD THE FIRST REPORT THAT THERE WAS UPWARD OF 8 TO 10 WIA, I NOTIFIED (b)(3), (b)(6) TO STAY AT THE DESK AND MONITOR 9 NINE LINES COMING IN. I TOLD EVERYONE ELSE I WAS GOING TO THE HOSPITAL. PRIOR TO THAT I TALKED TO THE BRIGADE SURGEON, (b)(3), (b)(6) AND LET HIM KNOW OF THE SITUATION AS PROTOCOL ON THE MEDICAL SIDE. I MET (b)(3), (b)(6) OUTSIDE AND WE WENT TO THE HOSPITAL. THERE WAS ABOUT 4 OR 5 OF US WAITING AT THE HOSPITAL. FROM THE TIME WE DROPPED THE NINE LINES TO THE TIME THE BRIDS HIT THE GROUND, IT TOOK ABOUT (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). FOR THE FIRST AIRCRAFT TO LAND, IT WAS A VERY SHORT TIME SPAN. RC-S WAS SPUN UP AND (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). THE USAF PJ'S HAD THE MISSION THAT NIGHT BECAUSE IT WAS A HOT HLZ THERE WAS STILL ACTIVE CONTACT ON THE GROUNDS AND THEY ALWAYS LAUNCH (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). FOR SITUATIONS SUCH AS THAT BECAUSE OF THE 50 CAL SIDE GUNS AND THERE MORE TRAINED FOR THIS MISSIONS SUCH AS THAT.

Question: Was there a re delay in the aircraft accepting passengers once the nine line was forwarded?

NO, ORIGINALLY IT TOOK ALOT OF TIME TO FORWARD BECAUSE WE DIDNT HAVE SUFFICIENT DATA TO FORWARD IT. IN THE PAST, THE FIRST 5 LINES WAS ENOUGH TO LAUNCH THE MEDEVAC, BUT NOW ISAF RULES REQUIRE ALOT MORE IN DEPTH AND REQUIRE A 9 LINE AND A MIST REPORT FOR EACH PATIENT.

Question: So initially there was difficulty in receiving the data to get the aircraft in there air, but once you received that was there a delay?

IT TOOK (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). FOR AIRCRAFT TO GET UP ONCE THE WHOLE 9 LINE WAS COMPLETED, JUST TO DOUBLE CHECK THE GRID. WE NORMALLY HAVE AND HLZ BUT BECAUSE OF THE EVENT WE DIDNT KNOW IF IT WAS TAKEN OVER OR NOT.

Question: If someone is unable to talk to you on (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). how else do they get you the medevac request?

THE NEXT BEST WAY IS A SVOIP PHONE BUT WE HAVE EVEN TAKE 9 LINES OVER A ROSHAN PHONE, ITS NOT PREFERRED, BUT WE USE ANY MEANS POSSIBLE. WE ARE OUT OF FM RANGE, HOWEVER.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-24	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4/82 DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Question: Do you dispatch the 9 Line before or after you leave for the hospital? Describe the scene at the hospital?
AFTER. WE GOT THE WORD THAT THE FIRST AIRCRAFT LANDED. THEY OPENED THE DOOR AND WE SAW THE FIRST THREE CASUALTIES AND THE BATTALION SURGEON WHO WAS WALKING WOUNDED. WE DIDNT KNOW THAT (b)(3), (b)(6) WAS COMING AND I WAS SHOCKED TO SEE HIM.
Question: Why were you shocked to see him?
BECAUSE THE UNIT ON THE GROUND HAD NOT RELAYED HE WAS COMING AND WE KNEW THERE WERE MORE WOUNDED ON THE GROUND AND I THOUGHT IT WAS ODD TO SEE THE BATTALION SURGEON ON THE FRIST MEDAVAC. I HAVE SEEN INTHE PAST THE PROVIDER WILL RIDE WITH THE MOST CRITICALLY WOUNDED TO ASSIST, BUT THE RIDE FROM ANCOP HQ TO HERE IS ABOUT (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e).
Question: The time available for the battalion surgeon to assist in the care during the transport is almost negligible, is that true?
THE CARE THAT HE COULD HAVE GIVEN IS NOT MUCH. THE (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e) COMES WITH ABOUT 3 OR 4 MEDICS SO TO THROW ANOTHER HEALTHCARE PROVIDER - ITS SO CONFINED - ITS PRETTY MUCH WORTHLESS.
Question: How many more helicopters landed with patients?
THERE WAS ABOUT 3 TURNS WITH WOUNDED SOLDIERS ON THE AIRCRAFT - 20 MINUTES.
Question: Do you know what the status was for the first three on the aircraft? Was one expectant?
YES. I DON'T THINK HE WAS INITIALLY CATEGORIZED AS EXPECTANT, BUT AS SOON AS HE WAS WHEELED INTO THE FIRST ER BED AREA, IT WAS OBVIOUS HE HAD TOOK SHRAPNEL TO THE BACK OF THE SKULL AND HAD (b)(6) AND THERE ISN'T MUCH ANYONE CAN DO FOR THAT TYPE OF INJURY. THE OTHER PATIENTS HAD A LOT OF SHRAPNEL INJURIES. THE SECOND MEDEVAC BROUGHT SOME GUNSHOT WOUNDS. SUBSEQUENT AIRCRAFT HAD FAIRLY SERIOUS INJURIES - THERE WERE A COUPLE PATIENTS THAT WERE ALERT AND TALKING TO US BUT DID NOT KNOW THEY HAD A BULLET LODGED IN THEM, AND THEN HAD TO GO INTO SURGERY.
Question: When the Battalion Surgeon left the area, was there another medical officer left behind? Was there a PA?
WHEN THE BATTALION SURGEON LEFT THERE WAS NOT ANOTHER MEDICAL OFFICER THERE. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) IS THE PA FOR 508 AND HE WAS OUTSIDE THE ANCOP ON A PATROL DURING THIS EVENT AND FOR ONE REASON OR ANOTHER HE WAS NOT CALLED INTO ANCOP TO ASSIST WITH THE CASUALTIES. THE BATTALION SURGEON WAS REPLACED BY ANOTHER PA DURING THE WEEK.
Question: When (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the ER, what was his demeanor? What did he do and say?
WHEN (b)(3), (b)(6) CAME INTO THE HOSPITAL HE WAS VERY EXCITED AND SPORADIC AND IMMEDIATELY DROPPED HIS GEAR AND SHOUTED HE WAS THE BATTALTION SURGEON FOR THE CASUALTIES COMING IN. HOSPITAL STAFF TOOK HIM BY THE ARM, TOOK HIM TO A ROOM AND TREATED HIM. (b)(6) (b)(6) HE ALSO HAD SOME MINOR INJURES MOST LIKELY CAME FROM KNEELING ON THE GROUND. WHEN HE CAME INTO THE HOSPITOL HE HAD HIS ACH AND IBA ON.
Question: Did the casualties coming in have on their protective gear? Could some of the injuries have been prevented by personnel wearing their gear
FROM WHAT I COULD TELL THEY WERE NOT WEARING THEIR PROTECTIVE GEAR BUT IT IS NOT UNUSUAL FOR A MEDIC ON THE GROUND TO CUT IT OFF. THE SHRAPNEL TO THE SKULL MAY HAVE BEEN PREVENTED BY WEARING THE ACH BUT THERE ARE SOME INJURIES THAT WEARING GEAR WILL NOT PREVENT.
Question: Do you know what the nature of the injuries were to those that expired?
I DO SIR. FROM WHAT I KNEW SIR. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) THE INJURES THAT WERE SUSTAINED WERE SO BAD THAT MEDICAL ATTENTION REASONABLY AVAILABLE WOULD NOT HAVE BEEN GOOD ENOUGH.

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4/82 DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of August, 2010

at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Printed Name/Rank

1 Aug 2010

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
RSC-S HQ	2010/08/01	1045	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

30 PINE HILL CT SPRING LAKE NC 28390

9.

I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I WAS ACTUALLY A BACKFILL FOR THE ORGINIAL BN SURGEON. (b)(3), (b)(6) REDEPLOYED EARLY BECAUSE (b)(6) SO I HAD ABOUT A THREE WEEK NOTICE FOR THIS DEPLOYMENT. WITHIN THAT THREE-WEEK PERIOD, I VOLUNTEERED TO GO TO TCMC, THE TACTICAL COMBAT MEDICAL CARE COURSE IN SAN ANTONIO TX. TCMC IS FOR DOC'S, PA'S, AND SENIOR ENLISTED. I AM ASSIGNED TO WOMACK AS THE ALLERGIST. I DEPLOYED TO CRC ON 3 APRIL AND ARRIVED HERE ONE WEEK LATER. I EVENTUALLY MADE IT TO CAMP APACAHE IN THE ZABUL PROVINCE. THE COMMAND WANTED ME AT PLATOON/FOB LEVEL. I WAS STATIONED AT FOB BULLARD WHICH IS NEAR SHAJOY AND I WAS THERE FOR SEVERAL WEEKS. THEN MY (b)(6) SO I WENT HOME ON EML AND DURING THAT TIME OUR MISSION CHANGED. WHEN I RETURNED I WAS AT KAF FOR A FEW WEEKS. AT THAT TIME THE UNIT HAD PUSHED OUT TO ANCOP HQ AND THEN A WEEK OR SO LATER THEY PUSHED ME OUT TO ANCOP. THERE WAS AN AID STATION THERE BUT THE PLAN WAS TO PUSH ME OUT WITH DELTA COMPANY. MY ATTACHMENT ORDERS WERE THROUGH 1 JULY BUT DEPLOYMENT ORDERS STATED 180 DAYS OR UNTIL MISSION COMPLETE. I HAD NO RELATIONSHIP WITH THE BN CSM OR THE BN COMMANDER. I WAS NEVER BRIEFED OF MY RATING CHAIN OR HOW THEY SAW MY ROLE. THERE WAS VERY LITTLE INTERACTION. EVERYTHING CAME THROUGH THE BN MEDO. THE COMMAND CLIMATE WAS VERY TOXIC IN MY PERCEPTION. I AM SURE YOU HAVE READ THE PAPER. THE S3 AND XO HAVE CHANGED OUT ON MORE THAN ONE OCCASSION. I HAVE NEVER HAD A SITUATION WHERE I HAVE BEEN YELLED AT OR ANYTHING BUT I HAVE HEARD SEVERAL HEAR-SAY CONVERSATIONS. ONE WAS WITH THE BN XO. I CAN TELL YOU WHAT OTHERS SAY TO ME. I HEAR A LOT OF COMPLAINTS. I KNOW PERSONALLY FROM MY PREVIOUS DEPLOYMENT TO IRAQ THE COMMAND CLIMATE CAN BE MUCH MORE HOSPITABLE, I ACTUALLY SAT DOWN WITH MY COMMANDER. WE WENT OVER MY ORB, HE TOLD ME WHAT HE EXPECTED OF ME, AND HE EXPLAINED MY ROLE TO ME. I NEVER SAID ANYTHING TO ANYONE ABOUT FORCE PROTECTION AT THE ANCOP HQ, THAT'S NOT MY LANE. THAT WOULD BE LIKE A NON-PHYSICIAN TELLING ME HOW TO DO MY JOB. I DID HAVE MY OPINION ABOUT IT THOUGH. THERE WAS ONLY A SINGLE SOLDIER ON GUARD DUTY(ROAMING GUARD). I BELIEVE WE WERE EQUIPPED ENOUGH TO TO TREAT THE CASUALTIES. WE HAD MOST OF OUR TRAUMA SUPPLIES IN THE GREEN TENT WHICH INCLUDED 2 TRAUMA BAGS THAT HAD MORE THAN ENOUGH SUPPLIES TO TREAT THE 4 PREVENTABLE CAUSES OF DEATH ON THE BATTLEFIELD. (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6). I HAVE PREVIOUSLY TREATED TRAUMA PATIENTS. THERE WAS A MASS CAL ON 25 APRIL 10 AT FOB BULLARD AFTER A SUICIDE BOMBER DETONATED HIMSELF IN THE SHAJOY BAZAAR. SIX CASUALTIES WERE EVACUATED TO FOB BULLARD TO INCLUDE A HEAD INJURY WHICH I PERFORMED A CRICOTHYROIDOTOMY, SEVERAL EXTREMITIY WOUNDS REQUIRING TOURNIQUETTES FOR HEMORRHAGE CONTROL, AMONG OTHER INJURIES (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
D-26	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT RSC-S HQ, Kandahar DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

ON JULY 13 THE ATTACK HAPPENED AROUND 2200. WHEN I FIRST HEARD ABOUT IT I WAS LAYING ON MY COT WATCHING A VIDEO. I FELT THE CONCUSSION FROM THE BLAST. I THEN JUMED UP, SAID TO MYSELF "I'M OK," AND RAN TO THE BUNKER WITH THE MEDICS IN MY TENT. I KNEW WHERE THE BUNKERS WERE BUT I WAS NOT AWARE OF ANY BATTLE DRILLS FOR REACTION TO CONTACT/INDIRECT FIRE, (POSSIBLY BECAUSE I ARRIVED LATE THERE). THERE WAS NO LIGHT AFTER THE BLAST WENT OFF. I DONT REMEMBER LIGHTS ON IN THE BUNKER WHEN I WENT IN THERE. I HAD NO IDEA THE WALL WAS BLOWN UNTIL THE NEXT DAY. THERE WAS A DISCUSSION BETWEEN (b)(3), (b)(6) AND A TERP BEACAUSE OF A WEAPON. THERE WAS SMALL ARMS FIRE OR A SHOT OR SOMETHING AND THE TERP SAID IT CAME FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) WEAPON. THEN THERE WAS A LOT OF PROFANITY. THERE WAS MORE SAF AND IT SOUNDED LIKE SHOTS COMING FROM WITHIN THE BUNKER SO WE RAN BACK INTO THE AID STATION TENT. I FOLLOWED MY MEDICS. WE HEARD A SERIES OF INTERMITTENT EXPLOSIONS WHICH LASTED FOR SEVERAL MINUTES. I TOOK COVER. INITIALLY, I WAS HAVING A HARD TIME FINDING MY IBA AND HELMET. WHENEVER THERE WAS A PAUSE I TRIED TO FIND MY IBA AND HELMET. ACCORDING TO TCMC GUIDELINES, THERE ARE THREE PHASES OF CARE. THERE IS CARE UNDER FIRE, THE SECOND IS TACTICAL FIELD CARE, AND THEN TACTICAL EVACUATION CARE. ACCORDING TO TCMC GUIDELINES, THE ONLY THING THAT YOUR SUPPOSED TO TREAT DURING THE CARE UNDER FIRE STAGE IS COMPRESSIBLE HEMORRAGE. SOME MEDICS DID INITIATE TREATMENT TO (b)(3), (b)(6) DURING THIS PHASE, GRANTED IT IS VALOROUS TO TREAT OTHER TYPES OF CASUALTIES UNDER FIRE, BUT YOU ARE USUALLY NOT SUPPOSED TO BECAUSE YOU CAN BECOME A CASUALTY YOURSELF. I TREATED (b)(3), (b)(6) WHO HAD A DEGLOVING INJURY TO THE LEFT WRIST THAT WAS (b)(6) TO THE UPPER EXTREMITYAND COVERED IT WITH COMBAT GAUZE. ALL FOUR EXTREMITIES HAD INJURIES TO THEM. IT TAKES LONGER THAN YOU THINK TO DRESS THOSE WOUNDS ESPECIALLY WITH EVERYTHING STILL GOING ON. THEN I GAVE HIM (b)(6) (b)(6) WHILE TREATING (b)(3), (b)(6) I ASKED IF A BIRD HAD BEEN CALLED FOR, I RECEIVED AN AFFIRMATIVE RESPONSE. WE TRIED TO GET CASUALTIES OUT IN THE PRIORITY OF THE INJURIES. I'M NOT SURE WHERE THE MEDEVAC WAS COMING IN FROM,BUT, THERE WERE TRUCKS OUTSIDE THAT WE PUT THE CASUALTIES ON. I DID NOT KNOW WHERE MY PLATOON SGT (b)(3), (b)(6) WAS AT THIS POINT. WHEN WE STARTED TAKING THE CASUALTIES THE AIRCRAFT WAS ALREADY THERE. I BELIEVE THERE WERE TWO MEDICS ON THE HELICOPTER (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). . AT THAT TIME I MADE A CLINICIAL DECISON TO GET ON THE BIRD WITH THE CRITICALLY WOUNDED. THESE PATIENTS HAD CRITICAL INJURURIES WITH POTENTIAL TO DECOMPENSATE DURING FLIGHT. (b)(3), (b)(6) HAD POTENTIAL TO DEVELOP A (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) HAD POTENTIAL NEED FOR (b)(6) IN ADDITION, THESE WERE TWO OF MY MEDICS AND TILTON HAD A CRITICAL INJURY THAT REQUIRED AN (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) . I DID NOT KNOW HOW SERIOUS THE HEAD INJURY WAS AT THAT MOMENT, BUT I LATER LEARNED IT WAS A NON-SURVIVABLE INJURY. FURTHERMORE, SINCE ALL CARE WAS ESSENTIALLY "CARE UNDER FIRE" THERE WAS NO DOCUMENTATION OF THE INJURIES AND ACCOMPANYING THE PATIENTS TO ROLE 3 WOULD ALLOW A PROPER HAND-OFF. I NOTIFIED MY MEDO BEFORE I BOARDED THE BIRD THAT I WAS ACCOMPANYING THE PATIENTS TO ROLE 3. I CONTINUOUSLY ASSESSED RESPONSIVENESS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) WITH PULSE OXIMETRY AND ASKING THEM TO SQUEEZE MY HAND (ORIENTATION). THEY REMAINED STABLE AND ALERT. I WAS UNABLE TO REACH SPC TILTON BUT BOTH FLIGHT MEDICS WERE WITH HIM AND ASSURRED ME HIS (b)(6) (b)(6) IMMEDIATELY UPON ARRIVAL TO ROLE 3 I DOFFED MY GEAR AND WENT STRAIGHT TO THE TRAUMA BAYS TO BRIEF THE PHYSICIANS ON THE INJURIES SUSTAINED AND TREATMENT PROVIDED TO THE TRAUMA TEAMS. I IDENTIFIED MYSELF AS THE BN SURGEON AND ATTEMPTED TO HELP. HOWEVER, SOME TEAM MEMBERS IDENTIFIED THAT I WAS LIMPING AND HURT AND DID NOT ALLOW ME TO ASSIST WITH THE CASUALTIES AND IN FACT MADE ME GET CHECKED OUT A S A CASUALTY MYSELF. ALSO AROUND THAT TIME I WAS TOLD I WAS HAVING AN (b)(6) WAS EVALUATED WITH (b)(6) (b)(6) I DID NOT ASK FOR CARE OR AN EVALUATION, BUT WAS INSTRUCTED TO RECEIVE CARE BY OTHERS TO INCLUDE THE ACTING BRIGADE SURGEON (b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMI (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT RCS-S HQ, Kandahar DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

NOT USED

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITH[redacted] THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	2 AUG 2010
Printed Name/Rank	Signature	Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
RSC-S	2010/08/05	1949	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

4/82 BCT

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

JUST PRIOR TO THE ATTACK, I WAS IN MY TENT, THE EASTERNMOST TENT TOWARDS THE ANCOP BARRACKS. THE PLATOON WAS SPLIT IN TWO TENTS - MINE AND THE NEXT ONE JUST WEST. DURING THE EXPLOSION I WAS IN MY TENT, AS WITH MOST OF THE PLATOON, A FEW PERSONNEL WERE OUTSIDE IN THE PICNIC TABLES. THE VERY LARGE EXPLOSION JARRED THE TENT. WE GOT THE GUYS MOVING TOWARDS THE TRUCKS - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) AND I HEADED TO THE NORTHEAST TOWER. I THOUGHT MAYBE IT WAS A VBIED - I COULD TELL IT WAS LARGER THAN A MORTAR. I GRABBED MY GEAR, RIFLE - SO IT TOOK ABOUT A MINUTE AND A HALF BEFORE I HEADED TO THE NORTHEAST TOWER. WHILE HEADED TO THE TOWER, WE STARTED HEARING SMALL ARMS FIRE. ON THE WAY UP WE TOLD THE AFGHANS TO TURN OFF THEIR LIGHTS. THIS TOOK ABOUT 5-10 MINUTES TO GET TO THE TOP. FROM THE TOP, WE LOOKED AT THE BACK WALL ALONG THE BUNKER AND THE BATHROOM - TOWARDS THE WEST ALONG THE NORTH WALL. AT THIS POINT IT WAS RELATIVELY QUIET - AND I NOTICED THE BREACH IN THE WALL. AT THIS POINT I SAW SOME FIRE COMING FROM THE AFGHAN LATRINE - THROUGH MY NVGS. I DID NOT SEE ANY LARGE EXPLOSIONS AT THIS TIME. (b)(3), (b)(6) WAS IN THE TOWER WITH ME. WHILE UP IN THE TOWER, WE DID HEAR POSSIBLY GRENADES BEING THROWN FROM THE AFGHAN BATHROOM - WE DIDN'T KNOW THE BACK WALL HAD BEEN BLOWN OFF. RIGHT AFTER THAT THERE WERE ABOUT THREE OF THEM THAT TOOK OFF RUNNING TOWARDS THE VILLAGE IN THE NORTH AND WE ENGAGED THEM AS THEY RAN AWAY. WE WERE FIRING AND THEIR FIRING STOPPED. AFTER THAT ENGAGEMENT I DID NOT WITNESS A LARGE EXPLOSION. AFTER THE THREE GUYS RAN AWAY, I GOT TO MY TRUCKS, ONE WAS IN THE NE ONE WAS IN THE NW. MYSELF AND THE REST OF MY TEAM WERE GOING FORWARD TO THE BUNKER WHERE WE FOUND SOME WOUNDED TERPS. (b)(3), (b)(6) FOUND TATE AROUND THIS TIME. A TERP NAMED (b)(6) CAME OUT SHAKEN BUT NOT HARMED. WHILE WE WERE AT THE BUNKER, THERE WAS ANOTHER GRENADE EXPLOSION. WHEN THAT GRENADE WENT OFF, WE WERE EXPOSED SO WE PULLED BACK. WE HAD NOT CLEARED THE BATHROOM AT THE TIME. AFTER WE PULLED BACK FROM THE BUNKER (AFTER THE GRENADE) IT TOOK US A WHILE (20 MIN) TO CLEAR THE BATHROOM. AT THAT POINT WE HAD A TERP, DID THE CALL OUT, AND CLEARED THE BATHROOM.

CONCUURENT TO CLEARING OF THE BUNKER AND BATHROOM, THE CASEVAC PORTION WAS GOING ON. AS WE STARTED THE ASSUALT ON THE BATHROOM, ACCOUNTABILITY WAS STARTING AND THEY CAME UP SHORT ON SSGT STOUT. WE WENT THROUGH THE TENTS FROM WEST TO EAST AND EAST TO WEST AND THAT IS WHEN WE FOUND SSGT STOUT.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
D-28	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT RSC-S DATED 2010/08/05

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AT NIGHT IN THE COMPOUND, THE MAIN ILLUMINATION CAME FROM WITHIN THE GUARD TOWERS AND THE ANCOP BUILDINGS. THERE WERE NO US SOLDIERS THAT PULLED SECRUITY ROUTINELY WITH THE AFGHANS. WHEN WE FIRST GOT THERE, WE PURUSED THIS COURSE, AND THE ANCOP SAID THEY HAD IT COVERED.

I REALLY DIDN'T HAVE MANY FP CONCERNS, ESPECIALLY COMING FORM AN ISOLATED BASE IN ZABUL. WE WERE MOSTLY FOCUSED ON THE CHECKPOINTS. I DON'T REMEMBER ANY FOLKS COMING UP TO THE COMMAND ELEMENTS ABOUT FORCE PROTECTION. THE COMMAND CLIMATE IN HHC IS FINE. WE REALLY DIDN'T OPERATE AS AN HHC AS THE COMMAND ELEMENT WAS DIVIDED. MY SCOUT PLATOON OPERATED ON ITS OWN. THE COMMAND LEVEL AT THE BATTALION WAS FINE TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

I AM NOT SURE ABOUT ANY SENIOR OFFICERS ABOVE (b)(3), (b)(6) THAT VISITED THE FACILITY.

REGARDING THE ATTACK, ALL THE NCOS IN MY PLATOON MADE SWORN STATEMENTS, AND THOSE ARE AVAILABLE FROM THE 1SG IF YOU NEED THEM.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR U

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: Title 5 USC Section 301, Title 10 USC Section 3012.

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Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

CERTIFICATION: I, (b)(3), (b)(6), have read and understand the above Privacy Act statement.

(Print Name)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature

5AUG10

Date

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
RSC-S HQ	2010/08/02	1304	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

TF-Kandar, Kandahar, Afghanistan

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

As part of TF-Kandar I was part of the overall planning to move the the 1/508th BN (1-Fury) to Kandahar City. In February '10 RC-S started the planning process to secure Kandahar City, Kandahar. More detailed planning occurred in March '10 and that is when RC-S came up the the security ring of checkpoints (CP's) to be emplaced around Kandahar which would help give positive control on traffic in/out of the AO. The plan started with 35 CP's, but it now down to 13 CP's. The 1/508th BN from the 4/82nd BDE was chosen as the unit to executed the plan.

The priority of effort for both construction and gaining land rights was a huge untaking and focused on the CP's. The 22 NCR (Naval Construction Regiment) helped with the building of the CP's, but the continually shifting of priorities took quite a bit of continual coordination and was a huge project. Some of difficulties in the plan is that we/TF-K had no command relationship with 22 NCR.

After much coordination, back briefing and verbal orders construction on the CP's started on 01 June and (b)(3), (b)(6) per section started moving into position/sites on 03 June. There was a lot of pressure to get (b)(3), (b)(6) per section to bed down sites and the security ring working and there was a certain level of risk that we assumed to make sure that the task would get going.

In the planning there few a few options for bed down sites. (b)(3), (b)(6) per section sub-units would bed down at the CP's and two identified sites for the BN HQ's were either the old ANA CORPS HQ's or the ANCOP BDE HQs. The decision was made to chose the ANCOP BDE HQs and we believe that decision was made by either the 1/508th BN CDR or the 4/82nd BDE CDR. The reason given for this was that (b)(3), (b)(6) per section was to be the ANCOP mentors and co-locating seemed best.

Force protection issues with the ANCOP had been identified (bigger front gate, barriers, etc.) but I am unsure if they were ever correctly prior to the attack. Although TF-K was overall in-charge we left lots of room open to 4/82nd and 1-Fury to give input/operate. To be confident that the right decisions were being made we sat down with them on a regular basis to ensure we were all going in the right direction.

On the night of the attack (b)(3), (b)(6) was at TF-K and monitored the messaging coming in. There seemed to be some confusion at first because (b)(3), (b)(6) per section had an IED attack and they were working MEDEVAC requests at the same time as (b)(3), (b)(6) per section. The confusion was shortly sorted out and the proper support was provided.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) KING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF ____ PAGES
D-29		

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 15-6

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

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(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	2 AUG 10
Printed Name/Rank	Signature	Date

Approved for Release

EXHIBITS "E" BINDER

Unsworn Statements and Additional Interviews

E-1: Summary of Conversation with BG Hodges

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Exhibit E-1

Summary of Conversation with BG Ben Hodges, RC-S Director of Operations, and (b)(6) (b)(4), (b)(6) RC-S Deputy Director of Operations, 311930 July 2010, RC-S Headquarters, Kandahar Airfield

- Move of 1-508th PIR into Kandahar City was part of opening essential stage of operations in the city.
- 1-508th PIR had been all over Afghanistan during their deployment and had performed well. They were capable and experienced.
- Not much infrastructure from which to choose to use for 1-508th PIR Headquarters. Camp Nathan Smith at or near capacity, "Old Corps" facility would require a great deal of construction and most of the ground very swampy, other proximate FOBs unavailable. ANCOP Brigade Headquarters made sense based on partnering relationship and because it was already constructed and security in place executed by ANCOP personnel.
- Had been a plan to develop the area immediately west of the ANCOP Brigade Headquarters to hold troops.
- Plan called for partnered checkpoints around the city to control movement into city.
- Task Force – Kandahar was in command of 1-508th PIR when attack took place. 4/82d Abn BCT assumed command of 1-508th PIR on 15 July 2010—two days after the attack.
- 1-508th PIR had begun force protection improvements in the six to seven weeks they had been in the AO, but had rightly focused most of the improvements on the platoon checkpoints where there had been nothing established.
- There were some IED hits in the vicinity of the ANCOP headquarters on the night of the attack, but he believed they were unrelated, historic IEDs.
- There was a threat stream the week prior to the attack that focused on multiple targets.
- Saraposa Prison is a constant target.
- Breach location at ANCOP Brigade Headquarters compound was the most ideal spot to breach to conduct an attack.
- Attackers appeared to know how and where to proceed inside the compound.
- From outside the compound, the gate on the north wall of the compound appears to be the best point to attack through, but that point is actually a poor location since 1-508th PIR parks a large vehicle just inside the compound against the gate.

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Summary of (b)(3), (b)(6) interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) 4/82 BDE G-3

01 Aug, 2010

Interview Location: 4/82 BDE HQ's, KAF

- 4/82nd BDE BOG date 06 SEP 09
- 1/508th (TF (b)(1),1.4a per section 1.7(e). deployed to the Uruzgan/Zabul AO
- 2nd BN (TF deployed to the Hemond/Kandahar AO
- Dec '09 TF reconsolidated as BN to fight as a battle-space owner into Arghandab (Kandahar province)
- Dec '09 RSC-S started "Hamkari" – How do we focus on Kandahar City proper.
- Dec – May: MDMP process on COA's for "Hamkari"
- From 15 July, '10 (and four years prior) TF-K (Kandahar)/Canadians have of Kandahar City, Punjwai, Dan, Zharay, Arghandab – but the thought is that little to no progress had been made in curtailing the enemy/criminal activity
- 12 May '10 COA Brief for "Hamkari"
    1) TF-K retains control
    2) 525 BSB takes control
    3) 2-SCR takes control
    4) 1-4 BCT takes control (RIP with 4/82 BDE)

- 14 May '10 – CDR decides on COA #4 and will execute 1 June – 1 July
- TF to move into K-City to create SRPF (Security Ring Protection Force)
- TF was currently located in Zabul and must RIP with 5-2 while concurrently conducting RECON, construction of CP's/ANCOP build-up, occupying/manning positions and provide armed escort for construction assets
- During this timeframe TF was under TF-K control
- TF-K had no C2 relationship with 22-NCR (Naval Construction Regiment); provides no support to TF and states that TF has full responsibility for all of its own Force Protection, construction, etc.
- 15 June '10 – TF is fully out of Zabul and in K-City under TF-K control
- 22 June '10 – Decision made the TF-K will transition full control of K-City to 4/82nd "conditions based" sometime in the 1-15 July '10 timeframe.
- 5-15 July '10 - 4/82nd BDE HQ's starts consolidating to KAF (rebuilding Staff and situational awareness)
- Combined Team Kandahar City (CTKC) formed in the first part of June by 4/82nd help provide C2 for Kandahar City – comprised of eight 4/82nd Soldiers & 12 TF-K Soldiers. Intent is to help with transition of control to 4/82nd and focus solely on K-City.
- CTKC is located in Camp Nathan Smith (CNS) along with an MP BN HQ's and one company.(MP's had focus of working with K-City ANP)
- 15 July '10 – 4/82nd becomes "Combined Team K-City": comprised of C2 Node at CNS/TAC, TOC at KAF, MP's, STB, BSB

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- During week leading up to attack 4/82nd was in the process of transition and TF-K was still in control. However, 4/82nd was assuming CHOPS and Staff functions.
- On 13 July '10 at 1200hrs (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). sends out email stating that they have heard of increased threats of a large attack and suggests a heightened security posture throughout the AO. 4/82 G-3 mass distro's the email to subordinate units CMD/S-3/S-2's etc.. At 1319hrs (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). S-3 writes back and states that their S-2 feels that the threat is basically a common occurrence and nothing to get "spun-up" about.
- On the night of the attack (132120JUL10) 4/82 BDE CMDR (b)(3), (b)(6) located at CNS w/DCO (b)(3), (b)(6)
- During the attach 4/82nd BDE HQs TOC was getting extremely fragmented reporting stating that they were under attack and needed "all" assets to come to their aid. Traffic was being sent via (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). but not from one person/s – their seemed to be no overall C2/consistant reporting from the time of the attack to 0100hrs. During the attack the 4/82nd could not get an overall/accurate picture of the situation.

- MEDEVAC
  - Air was (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e).
  - (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). was the MEDEVAC unit
  - MEDEVAC requests from TF (b)(1)1.4a per section was "terrible" – fragmented/unclear
  - BN Surgeon (b)(3), (b)(6) ended up on the first MEDEVAC bird and appeared to be in shock and was then treated as a patient

General Thoughts

- TF-K still had operational control during the attack but did little – maybe moved an ISR asset
- (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). TF (b)(1)1.4a per section C2 appears to have disintegrated during attack and for hours after – it was reported that the BN CMDR was out clearing tents by himself.
- (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). TF (b)(1)1.4a per section BN CMDR had an incident happen at JRTC where a GO stated that he should be relieved as he was a danger to his troops
- There is a Facebook website the states "I will only stay in 1/508th if someone else takes command.
- (b)(3), (b)(6) believes that the BN CMDR had/had created a toxic CMD atmosphere where one could/would/can make a decision without him.
- It is believed that both the BN CSM (b)(3), (b)(6) and the BN S-3 (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had expressed their concerns (twice) about the overall "force protection" on the ANCOP (this is the location of TF (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). 1/508th) to the BN CMDR to which he "supposedly" replied that it was okay and the ANP had it under control.
- He believes the RC-S pushed the issue for the move into K-City without the preparation.
- (b)(3), (b)(6) is the HHC 1SG (TF (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e). and the "FOB Mayor" – he was in one of the guard towers when the attack occurred and it was also hit by an RPG.

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- Overall Contributing Factors to the Attack
  - Lack of Troops-to-tasks for K-City move/occupation
  - 1/508th TOC/FOB/ANCOP appeared to be last in the order of force protection priority due to the building of CP's
  - BN CMD (BC) climate was toxic and did not allow for any subordinate to challenge/contribute to the overall BN operation/s.

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I, (b)(3), (b)(6) hereby state that the following is true to my knowledge:

During the explosions and attack on the night of 13 July 2010, at the ANCOP HQ in Kandahar City, I was in the Aid Station tent when 2 patients came in along with the other medics after the bunker was attacked. I began working on a patient and did not see (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) I later looked up from my patient after another explosion to see if anyone else was injured and saw him by his bunk. We had another casualty after that explosion and the medic helping me went to work on him while (b)(3), (b)(6) stayed where he was on the floor. During the entire span of events we were calling out to all people in the tent to assess the situation at each patient and I never heard a response from (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

After the explosions and gunfire had ceased we began prepping patients for transport to the LZ and I saw him sitting next to a patient. After all of the medics and supporting personnel had moved the patients from the tent I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) finally stand up and move toward the exit behind another soldier at the same time (b)(3), (b)(6) was being taken out of the tent for evac. (b)(3), (b)(6) was taken to the LZ to work on patients until the medivac birds arrived and I did not see him again. I was later informed that he had boarded one of the helicopters.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15 JUL 2010

Approved for Release

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) would like to make the following statement concerning (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) actions during the attack on ANCOP HQ's in Kandahar City on 13 July.

I was in the Aid station tent with (b)(3), (b)(6) when the first explosion came on the night of 13 July 2010, at the ANCOP HQ in Kandahar City. Me and several others ran to the bunker behind our tent and we were engaged by the enemy with small arms and hand grenades shortly thereafter. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I ran back to the tent and took up a defensive position inside. That was when I heard (b)(3), (b)(6) saying (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) get that muzzle out of my face" from under his cot. I complied and moved to the front entrance of our tent to link up with (b)(3), (b)(6) Then I heard someone screaming in pain and yelling out for a medic. The casualty was brought into our tent and (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately began treating that wounded Paratrooper. I moved back to assist them and found out that (b)(3), (b)(6) was also wounded. I instructed SPC Tilton to begin treating (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was nowhere to be found while we were providing emergency medical assistance to our wounded Paratroopers. SPC Tilton then suffered a head injury from high velocity shrapnel. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I attempted to move SPC Tilton's body to a safer location but failed to do so because his body was tangled up with (b)(3), (b)(6) I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to crawl under his cot so (b)(3), (b)(6) and I could free SPC Tilton's body. Once freed, (b)(3), (b)(6) and I began rendering medical care for him. (b)(3), (b)(6) then joined us treating SPC Tilton shortly thereafter. Every medic in the tent treating casualties were shouting out valuable medical information, encouraging each other, and tying to keep our wounded Paratroopers calm while several enemy hand grenades were exploding all around us. During this entire ordeal, I had not heard or seen (b)(3), (b)(6) make any attempt to provide medical assistance to the casualties. (b)(3), (b)(6) was forced to low crawl to (b)(3), (b)(6) who then treated him from under his cot. When the casualties were loaded on to litters getting ready for evacuation, (b)(3), (b)(6) came in to our tent to get (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) then followed (b)(3), (b)(6) to the outside and that was the last time I saw him. Later I learned that he flew away on one of the medical evacuation helicopters.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1).4a per section 1.7(e) TF BAS NCOIC

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Attack on ANCOP 13 July 210

During the attack on the ANCOP HQs on 13th of July while moving with an element from C Co. that was getting ready to clear a bunker I heard the medic yelling for help in the CCP. I went in to see what I could do and immediately saw (b)(3), (b)(6) sitting off to side doing absolutely nothing to treat or assist my medics. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) asked me to round up some soldiers to help carry the wounded to the MAX PROs because the birds were inbound to the HLZ. I grab the first 3 Soldiers and moved 4 casualties by liter to the waiting vehicals, through all of this (b)(3), (b)(6) just sat there doing nothing. When I return to the CCP after loading casualty I asked my senior medic (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) what was wrong with (b)(3), (b)(6) he said nothing with a little disgust in his voice. I was going to start yelling at (b)(3), (b)(6) to see if I could snap him out of it, but decided to just let him be. I started heading back out the CCP and passed (b)(3), (b)(6) coming in, about 2 minutes later (b)(3), (b)(6) came back out and I noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) was shaking and hanging on the back of plate carrier. At a closer glance I noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) had his 9 mm pistol in his right hand, it was on fire, pointed at the back of (b)(3), (b)(6) I took the 9 mm pistol from him placed it on safe, cleared it and put it in his holster. I told him to get in one of the vehicles going out to the HLZ and continue to treat the wounded until the birds arrived. Later that morning I went back over to check on our CAT C wounded that were still waiting to be evacuated and asked the Medo where (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was and he responded he had gotten on one of the bird and been evacuated back to KAF. I asked him was the (b)(3), (b)(6) wounded, his response was not that he had knowledge of.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) hereby state the following is true to my knowledge:

During the contact and explosions on the 13 July 2010, at the ANCOP, I witnessed (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) lay by his bunk in full kit while not treating the wounded in the Medic Platoon tent. The Medic Platoon tent had three severe casualties that he did not make an attempt to treat until one crawled toward him. The patient that crawled toward him was (b)(3), (b)(6). (b)(3), (b)(6) had to low crawl toward (b)(3), (b)(6) in order to get under the bunk in order to make it to (b)(3), (b)(6) At no time did Major (b)(3), (b)(6) offer any medical assistance to any of the patients or attempt to assist any of the medics in the tent.

Upon EVACing the patients out of the ANCOP, (b)(3), (b)(6) was one of the first to fly out. I knew that (b)(3), (b)(6) left the Medic tent w/ (b)(3), (b)(6) to EVAC him to the Blackhawk. I was unaware that (b)(3), (b)(6) flew out on the Blackhawk with the patient until I was later informed of his accountability.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15 July 2010

Approved for Release

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) hereby state that the following is true to my knowledge:

During the attack on the night of 13 July 2010, at the ANCOP HQ in Kandahar City, I was in the Aid Station tent when the first explosion happened. I yelled for everyone to get to the bunker. Upon entering the bunker I noticed (b)(3), (b)(6) had already made it there. At that point the bunker was attacked and we all moved back to the aid station where I took up security with (b)(3), (b)(6) at the entrance. We heard someone yelling for a medic and then our first patient was brought into the tent. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) started working on him. At this time (b)(3), (b)(6) went back to see if he could help with the wounded Paratrooper and noticed that one of our medics (b)(3), (b)(6) had been injured. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed SPC Tilton to treat his fellow medic. Upon hearing that SPC Tilton had become a casualty I had an Infantry officer that was helping us take over security so I could help out with the wounded. I joined (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) with the care of SPC Tilton since he was the most seriously injured. During this entire time I was not even aware that (b)(3), (b)(6) was inside the aid station. I called over to (b)(3), (b)(6) for a status update several times and (b)(3), (b)(6) would answer. Finally (b)(3), (b)(6) answered one of my calls for patient updates, but only relayed that he had given him some pain meds. That was the first time I realized that (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the aid station. The entire time we were working on SPC Tilton and (b)(3), (b)(6) I never once heard the doctor ask for patient status' or seen him move to a patient in order to help out the medics.

We loaded two of the patients on the front of a MATV and continued care while we drove to the HLZ. Once at the HLZ we continued care until we were able to get the casualties on the MEDEVAC bird. When I left the bird another urgent casualty was carried onto the HLZ. Myself and two other medics worked on him until the next bird was able to land. Not once on the HLZ did I see (b)(3), (b)(6) treat a patient.

Shortly after returning to the base I was given an update that (b)(3), (b)(6) had gotten on the MEDEVAC bird and was now in KAF.

(b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e), (b)(3), (b)(6)

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I, (b)(3), (b)(6) would like to make the following statement concerning (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) actions during the attack on ANCOP HQ's in Kandahar City on 13 July.

After clearing our way to the Aid Station I entered to find my medics treating wounded US Paratroopers. While assessing the situation, I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) treating SPC Tilton who suffered a high velocity shrapnel wound to the head. He was in bad shape and they (b)(6) as well as providing trauma treatment. (b)(3), (b)(6) was working on (b)(3), (b)(6) who had suffered a gunshot wound to his abdomen. My medics began detailing the injuries to me to consolidate for a 9 Line submission. They were all shouting out valuable information concerning their patients' status to expedite the process. I was unawaret (b)(3), (b)(6) was in the Aid Station. At no time did I hear him say anything or provide any guidance to the medics or myself.

We then started to load the casualties up from the Aid Station into vehicles. The other medics and I jumped on to provide assistance and en route care to the HLZ. It wasn't until we were loaded up that I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) walk up to the vehicle we had our casualties on. He was not saying or doing anything. He then asked (b)(3), (b)(6) what he should do and (b)(3), (b)(6) had him grab on his kit and follow him out to the HLZ. Once we got to the HLZ further treatment was provided by my medics to the wounded casualties. I did not see (b)(3), (b)(6) provide any treatment at this time either. Once the bird landed I grabbed SPC Tilton's litter and we moved him to the bird. Once he was loaded on, (b)(3), (b)(6) grabbed me and told me he needed to get on the bird. I was confused and I thought he may want to just jump on and check their status real quick and jump off. We had several other casualties at ANCOP who needed his treatment and we knew the ones we had loaded onto the bird were going to a Role III w/ surgical capabilities. Once he got on, he did not get off. He flew away with the Medevac Bird. I read later from a report that he was treated for "Exhaustion from treating so many casualties." To my knowledge, he treated one casualty who crawled to his location for treatment. This casualty was stable and there were other casualties suffering from life threatening injuries that needed his attention more.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
HHC 1-508 PIR
Medic Platoon Leader

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Summary of Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) – 1-508 XO

2 August 2010

I have been the 1/508th BN XO since Dec 2009 and the unit has been deployed to Afghanistan since late August 2009. The BN was deployed, until recently, in the Zabul province.

Some of the major challenges during our time while deployed in Zabul province where training and equipping the ANA and having the 1/508th deployed in what had been a BDE AO. The BN has had between 10-12 KIA and around 30 WIA during our deployment - including the 13 July attack.

In mid-June we started the RIP out of Zabul with the unit taking over the AO. Concurrent to the RIP we started recon's of our new AO in Kandadar focusing on the Kandahar security ring CP's and HQ positions. The BN CDR decided that the BN HQ's would be located at the ANCOP BDE HQ's.

We were tasked with plugging the five main entry ways into the city which translated into a total of 13 check points. The BN priority of effort for barrier materials/engineer assets were the CP's. We had trouble/issues with obtaining the barriers/material required to build-up the CP's and also had trouble getting the crane operators needed to move those barriers - there were certain areas that the civilian operators were reluctant to go. The RIP, move into our new AO and CP build-up occurred in a little less than one month.

We occupied the BN HQ's/ANCOP BDE HQ's o/a 16 June, 2010. The Command Climate is the most toxic I have been involved in my 20-years in the military. The BN CDR in a dictator and Soldiers are reluctant/scared to bring up issues to him. He humiliates and belittles Officers/Soldiers in public. He has the lowest emotional IQ I have ever seen and loses control easily. He uses the word "stop" a lot when anyone brings up an issue. People are afraid to give him any kind of information and they are just trying to get through the deployment without getting yelled at or fired. The BN CDR also has a toxic relationship with the BDE CDR and remainder of the 4/82nd BDE. Additionally, the BN CDR and BN CSM do not have a good relationship either.

I feel that the ANCOP was the worse place to pick for the BN HQ's, but the main the BN CDR chose it was that it was the HQ's for the ANCOP CDR and staff. The ECP/entrance and guard towers were manned by the ANP which I believe was not good. The CSM recognized that the wall/breach site was weak, but the BN CDR stated that the CP's were the priority. Additionally (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F), but I was told by the BN CDR that the ANP had people living in there watching everything that was going on. We had a plan to improve the force protection around the camp, but it never happened. Even after the attack the force-pro was still on the CP's and not the ANCOP. After the incident the BN CDR and CSM did task Soldiers from the companies to help provide base/tower security alongside the ANP.

There was no threat out of the ordinary on the day of attack. The night that the ANCOP was attacked C/1/508th was there - I'm not sure of the exact reason they were there, but I am glad they were. Right

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before the attack I, along with rest of the key BN leadership, was in the 2000hr BN update meeting in the BN TOC. Sometime after 2100hrs we heard a loud explosion and dust was everywhere. I left the TOC went to figure out with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to figure out what was going on - we crouched behind the MKT near the ALOC. After two 2-3 minutes I heard small fire and assumed we had been breached. I returned to the TOC to help run operations. Member of C/1/508th, to include LT Goeke, went outside to help and figure out the situation. The BN S-3 was calling for support. We heard more explosions and small arms fire. The HHC 1SG was in-charge of both the perimeter and base security, but I did not talk to him throughout the attack. The BN CDR was out doing something and I had no idea what the BN CSM was doing.

The medics/BN Aid Station was near the breach site and was making MEDEVAC calls to the BN TOC - the first MEDEVAC arrived about 30-minutes after the attack. The "Monster Element"/PSD were securing the breach site and then the BN CDR came on the net and directed C/1/508th to clear the tents and look for causalities. I the TOC I was trying to get personnel accountability and running the TOC. We reestablished security at the breach site by placing a MRAP with a M2 in the hole. I asked for QRF and ISR from higher and helped process the MEDEVAC request. I hate to use the word professionals, but the insurgents knew exactly where our weak spot was and knew the perfect place to hit.

As far as the BN Surgeon I heard that had gotten injured and got on the MEDEVAC bird. I also believe that there was nothing medically that could have been done to treat/save the KIA's. AAR's comments:

- I believed we rushed to occupy the CP's and BN HQ's/ANCOP. To do this we sacrificed our force protection.

- The overall occupation of the "Security Ring of Kandahar" was done too quickly.

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HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS

Memorandum For Commander, US Forces – Afghanistan,

Subject: Sworn Statement – Summary of Statement

1. On 2 August at 0914, I conducted an interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) 1-508th PIR XO, on the events surrounding the attack on the ANCOP HQ on 13 July 2010.

2. Due to operational constraints, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not available to review or sign his statement once transcribed from audio recording. This memo serves as an official record I swore-in (b)(3), (b)(6) (audio recording of interview) and have transferred his sworn statement into interview notes.

3. The POC for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Investigating Officer

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
RSC-S HQ, Kandahar, Afghanistan	2010/08/02	0914	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

HHC/1-508th PIR

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I have been the 1/508th BN XO since Dec 2009 and the unit has been deployed to Afghanistan since late August 2009. The BN was deployed, until recently, in the Zabul province.

Some of the major challenges during our time while deployed in Zabul province where training and equipping the ANA and having the 1/508th deployed in what had been a BDE AO. The BN has had between 10-12 KIA and around 30 WIA during our deployment - including the 13 July attack.

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We were tasked with plugging the five main entry ways into the city which translated into a total of 13 check points. The BN priority of effort for barrier materials/engineer assets were the CP's. We had trouble/issues with obtaining the barriers/material required to build-up the CP's and also had trouble getting the crane operators needed to move those barriers - there were certain areas that the civilian operators were reluctant to go. The RIP, move into our new AO and CP build-up occurred in a little less than one month.

We occupied the BN HQ's/ANCOP BDE HQ's o/a 16 June, 2010. The Command Climate is the most toxic I have been involved in my 20-years in the military. The BN CDR in a dictator and Soldiers are reluctant/scared to bring up issues to him. He humiliates and belittles Officers/Soldiers in public. He has the lowest emotional IQ I have ever seen and loses control easily. He uses the word "stop" a lot when anyone brings up an issue. People are afraid to give him any kind of information and they are just trying to get through the deployment without getting yelled at or fired. The BN CDR also has a toxic relationship with the BDE CDR and remainder of the 4/82nd BDE. Additionally, the BN CDR and BN CSM do not have a good relationship either.

I feel that the ANCOP was the worse place to pick for the BN HQ's, but the main the BN CDR chose it was that it was the HQ's for the ANCOP CDR and staff. The ECP/entrance and guard towers were manned by the ANP which I believe was not good. The CSM recognized that the wall/breach site was weak, but the BN CDR stated that the CP's were the priority. Additionally (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) but I was told by the BN CDR that the ANP had people living in there watching everything that was going on. We had a plan to improve the force protection around the camp, but it never happened. Even after the attack the force-pro was still on the CP's and not the ANCOP. After the incident the BN CDR and CSM did task Soldiers from the companies to help provide base/tower security alongside the ANP.

10. EXHIBIT (b)(3), (b)(6)	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT RSC-S HQ DATED 2010/08/02

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

There was no threat out of the ordinary on the day of attack. The night that the ANCOP was attacked C/1/508th was there - I'm not sure of the exact reason they were there, but I am glad they were. Right before the attack I, along with rest of the key BN leadership, was in the 2000hr BN update meeting in the BN TOC. Sometime after 2100hrs we heard a load explosion and dust was everywhere. I left the TOC went to figure out with (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) to figure out what was going on - we crouched behind the MKT near the ALOC. After two 2-3 minutes I heard small fire and assumed we had been breached. I returned to the TOC to help run operations. Member of C/1/508th, to include LT Goeke, went outside to help and figure out the situation. The BN S-3 was calling for support. We heard more explosions and small arms fire. The HHC 1SG was in-charge of both the perimeter and base security, but I did not talk to him throughout the attack. The BN CDR was out doing something and I had no idea what the BN CSM was doing.

The medics/BN Aid Station was near the breach site and was making MEDEVAC calls to the BN TOC - the first MEDEVAC arrived about 30-minutes after the attack. The "Monster Element"/PSD was securing the breach site and then the BN CDR came on the net and directed C/1/508th to clear the tents and look for causalities. I the TOC I was trying to get personnel accountability and running the TOC. We reestablished security at the breach site by placing a MRAP with a M2 in the hole. I asked for QRF and ISR from higher and helped process the MEDEVAC request. I hate to use the word professionals, but the insurgents knew exactly where our weak spot was and knew the perfect place to hit.

As far as the BN Surgeon I heard that had gotten injured and got on the MEDEVAC bird. I also believe that there was nothing medically that could have been done to treat/save the KIA's.

AAR's comments:

- I believed we rushed to occupy the CP's and BN HQ's/ANCOP. To do this we sacrificed our force protection.
- The overall occupation of the "Security Ring of Kandahar" was done to quickly.

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT RSC-S HQ DATED 2010/08/02

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

_____
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

_____
_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____
_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

_____
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.00

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DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Printed Name/Rank

(b)(3), (b)(6)

2 Aug 10

Date

Approved for Release

Pages 19 through 20 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(5), (b)(7)(F), (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS

Memorandum For Commander, US Forces – Afghanistan,

Subject: Sworn Statement – Summary of Statement

1. On 2 August at approximately 1300, I conducted an interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), on the treatment regarding members involved in the attack on the ANCOP HQ on 13 July 2010.

2. Due to operational constraints and re-deployment, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not available to review or sign her statement once transcribed from audio recording. This memo serves as an official record indicating I swore-in (b)(3), (b)(6) (audio recording of interview) and have transferred her sworn statement into interview notes.

3. The POC for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

Pages 22 through 23 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(5), (b)(7)(F), (b)(1)1.4a per section 1.7(e), (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6).

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

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DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigation.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Printed Name/Rank

(b)(3), (b)(6)

02AUG10
Date

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Summary of Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) - 4/82 Brigade Surgeon

1 August 2010

I WAS IN MY QUARTERS WHEN I WAS INFORMED BY CELL PHONE THAT I NEED TO BE PRESENT IN THE HOSPITAL BECAUSE CASUALTIES WAS COMING FROM THE 1/508. I DIDNT KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THEY WERE COMING FROM. THEY DIDNT HAVE MORE INFORMATION SO I WAS PICKED UP FROM MY QUARTERS, IT WAS (b)(3), (b)(6) AND TRANSFERRED TO THE HOSPITAL TO WAIT FOR THE SOLDIERS COMING THAT WERE MEDAVACED. THIS WAS AROUND 2200 AND I WENT TO KANDAHAR ROLE 3 THE ER SERVICE TO WAIT FOR THE INCOMING SOLDIERS. SO I WAITED ABOUT 10 OR 15 MINUTES UNTIL THE FIRST WAVE PERSONS CAME. THE FIRST THING I SAW WAS A (b)(3), (b)(6) COMING WITH KEVLAR, IOTV, AND HIS AID BAG SCREAMING AND YELLING. HE WAS THE BRIGADE SURGEON AND HE HAD PATIENTS COMING IN CRITICAL CONDITION. THE PATIENTS THAT WERE COMING THAT WERE IN CRITCAL CONDITION WERE TRANSFERRED TO BAY 1 AND BAY 2, WHERE THE MORE CRITICAL PATIENTS RECIEVE CARING IN ROLE 3 ON KANDAHAR.

Question: This is the First Set of Casualties in the Role 3 and the Battalion Surgeon in the First Person you saw come into the emergency room?

ROGER SIR, THIS IS AN INTERVENTION WHICH HAPPENS WITH THE MEDEVAC, THE PERSON WHO IS TAKING CARE OF THE PATIENTS APPROACHES THE ER AND INFORMS THE PHYSICIAN ABOUT THE PATIENTS COMING. WHY INSIDE? BECAUSE IT IS A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT AND THEY DON'T HAVE TO PROVIDE THE REPORT OUTSIDE ABOUT THE PATIENTS COMING.

Question: Is it standard for the battalion surgeon to accompany incoming casualties?

DEPENDING ON THE SERVERTY OF THE INJURIES IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THE PHYSICAN MAY GO WITH THE PATIENTS IN THE HELICOPTER.

Question: Do you know how many casualties were still on the ground at 1/508 when this occurred?

I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE, I DIDN'T HAVE ANY IDEA.

Question: Do you know how many casualties came in on the first.....?

THREE

Question: Were they severely wounded?

YES, THERE IS A STANDARD INTERVENTION WHEN THE PATIENT WITH SEVERE INJURIES GO TO TRAUMA ONE, TWO, AND THREE. SO THE PATIENTS WENT TO TRAUMA ONE, TRAUMA TWO, AND TRAUMA THREE SO THE SEVERITY WAS CONCERNING

Question: What was (b)(3), (b)(6) demeanor? How did he behave? Was he helpful?

(b)(3), (b)(6) WAS HELPFUL INFORMING WHO HE WAS AND WHAT HE WAS DOING AND THAT WE HAD CRITICAL PATIENTS COMING WITH THE CONDITION BUT I DID FIND THAT HE WAS LIMPING AND

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HE WAS SCREAMING AND HE WAS YELLING IN THE ER. SO, I DIDN'T ASSUME THE DETERMINATION, BUT THE DETERMINATION WAS, ONE OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIANS WHO DECIDE TO CALM DOWN (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SEND HIM TO ONE OF THE BEDS, BECAUSE OF HIS STRANGE REACTION, HE WAS SCREAMING AND CRYING SO WE TOOK HIM TO ONE OF THE BEDS TO CALM HIM DOWN AND WE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE THE PATIENTS.

Question: Did he end up being admitted?

NO, HE WAS NOT ADMITTED

Question: Did he end up getting treatment?

YES, HE WAS ANOTHER PATIENT AT THE TIME AND HE WAS GIVEN TREATMENT "C" CATERGORY WHICH WAS MEANING MINOR INJURIES.

Question: Do you know of any patients that came in on the first lift who later expired?

NOT DURING THAT TIME, ONE OF THE PATIENTS WAS IN SEVERE CONDITION, THERE WAS NO INDICATION TO CONDUCT SURGERY BECAUSE THE EXTENT OF HIS INJURIES WAS SO SEVERE. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO TRANSFER HIM TO ICU AND TRY TO TRANSFER THE PATIENT TO GERMANY, LANDSCHTUL.

Question: What were the extent of those injuries?

(b)(6)

(b)(6) WHEN THEY TRANSFERRED HIM TO GERMANY

Question: In your opinion, could different treatment or more expedient evacuation have prevented any of the deaths that occurred that night? If there had been different medical care or different procedures followed prior to their arrival at the hospital, could that have prevented any casualties?

NO, THE FIRST PATIENT IN BAY 1 WAS OUT OF MANAGEMENT OF ROLE 3 - THAT DECISION WAS MADE PRETTY QUICK. THE SECOND PATIENT REQUIRED MEDICAL INTERVENTION FOR HIS INJURIES WHICH COULD NOT BE PROVIDED AT THE POINT OF INJURY. PATIENT 3 RECIEVED TREATMENT UNDER FIRE AND I THINK MEDICAL INTERVENTION FOR THIS PATIENT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR HIS INJURIES.

Question: Do you know how long from the time the people were injured to the time they arrived at the hospital?

IM NOT SURE EXACTLY HOW LONG IT TOOK FOR THE PATIENTS TO ARRIVE AT THE HOSPITAL BECAUSE I WAS IN MY QUARTERS WHEN I WAS TOLD THERE WERE PATIENTS COMING IN, I WSN"T MONITORING ANY COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE TIME OF THE ATTACK.

Question: Did you gain any information about the process of requesting the medevacs, whether it went well or whether it did not?

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NO, MY MAIN JOB IS TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL WHEN THE PATIENTS ARE COMING. BUT ABOUT WHO ORDERED THE MEDEVAC, WHEN IT WAS ORDERED IS OUTSIDE OF MY KNOWLEDGE.

Question: Was there anyone else involved in the attack that displayed the same symptoms as (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)? His demeanor of being stressed and yelling?

NO, BECUASE THERE WERE ONLY FOUR PATIENTS, ONE OF WHICH WAS (b)(3), (b)(6) THE OTHER THREE WERE IN CRITICAL CONDITION.....

Question: So nobody else came into the hospital like that, or the patients that you indicated were not ion the condition to react like that?

NO, IT WAS DIFFERENT, PATIENT ONE WAS (b)(6) (b)(5), (b)(7)(F) (b)(6)

Question: What you are saying about (b)(3), (b)(6) was he did have some sort of physical wound for which he was treated andwould you categorize that as minor?

YES, IT WAS CHARLIE, MINOR INJURIES

Question: Do you have any ideas if the soldiers that came to the hospital that night were wearing their protective gear when they were injured or did they arrive with it, do you recall?

NO SIR, THE THREE INJURIES CAME IN STRETCHERS, THEY DID NOT HAVE ON THEIR PROTECTION. (b)(3), (b)(6) CAME WITH HIS PROTECTION, HE CAME WITH HIS KEVLAR HIS IOTV, AND HIS A BAG.

Question: Who was left behind at the Camp to run medical treatment after (b)(3), (b)(6) left? Any ideas?

NO, BUT WHEN THAT SITUATION HAPPENS, THE SENIOR NCO TAKES RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEDICAL CARE

Question: Do you know if there was a physicians assistant assigned there or no?

NO, THERE WAS NO PHYSICIANS ASSISTANT AT THAT SPECIFIC COP, I DID REACT, I MADE THE DECISION ABOUT KEEPING (b)(3), (b)(6) HERE BECUASE HE WASN'T IN THE CONDITION, AND TO SEND ONE OF MY PA'S IMMEDIATELY, BUT IT WAS DELAYED BECAUSE THERE WERE SECURITY CONCERNS AT THE POINT OF CONTACT, SO HIS TRANSFER WAS DELAYED.

Question: When (b)(3), (b)(6) left, there was a period of time when there was no medical officer there until you could get the PA there based on the security and your ability to transport?

YES DURING THAT TIME THE SENIOR NCO TAKES RESPONSIBILITY

Question: How long had (b)(3), (b)(6) been here, do you know?

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IN COUNTRY, I DON'T HAVE THE EXACT DAY BECAUSE HE WENT ON EMERGENCY LEAVE AND CAME BACK, BUT I SAY ABOUT 2-3 MONTHS.

Question: Did he have the appropriate training to be a battalion surgeon?

HIS SPECIALITY IS ALLERGY AND ASTHMA, SO HE DOES NOT SEE TRAUMA EVERY SINGLE DAY. HOWEVER, HE DID GO TO THE TRAUMA COURSE BEFORE HE CAME HERE. THE TRAUMA COURSE IS MANDATORY FOR THE ORGANIC PROVIDERS IN BATTALIONS AND BRIGADES, BUT IT WAS KIND OF VOLUNTEER FOR PHYSICIANS NOT ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT, BUT HE DID DO THAT PORTION OF THE TRAINING.

Question: Had he been involved with any other treatment of severely wounded folks before?

YES, AT THE TIME I WAS NOT THE BRIGADE SURGEON, I WAS THE BATTALION SURGEON FOR 7/82ND, AND HE WAS IN ONE OF THE COP'S SOUTH OF WHERE MY FOB WAS AND HE HAS A MASCAL AND HE WENT TO ONE OF THE PATROLS IN ONE OF THE COMPANIES AND THERE WAS A KIA. SO DURING THE MASCAL HE PERFORMED VERY WELL AND I WAS IMPRESSED BECUASE HE DID SURGICAL AIRLIFT FOR ONE OF THE PATIENTS, AND HE TREATED VERY WELL THESE PATIENTS. I DID NOTICE AT THAT TIME HIS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WITH THE COMBAT CASUALTIES AND DOING A PATROL WITH THE PATIENT, THE KIA, I NOTICED THAT. SO I KNEW ABOUT THAT WHEN I WAS THE BATTALION SURGEON. SO I HAD SOME CONCERN ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO PERFORM UNDER STRESS TO PERFORM UNDER FIRE, SO MY DECISION WAS TO TRY TO GET ONE OF MY PA'S TO COME TO THE TMC, TO THE AID STATION. IT WAS A VERY EXPERIENCED PA, SPECIAL FORCES, WITH 18 YEARS OF TRAINING, SO I TOLD HIM HE WAS BETTER FOR THE COP.

Question: Was the battalion aid station - had you seen it?

I NEVER HAVE BEEN THERE

Question: Is there a reporting system that would tell you if they were short on supplies?

THEY HAVE INTERNAL CHANNELS TO REQUEST SUPPORT, IF ONE OF MY PROVIDERS WAS SHORT ON SUPPLIES I WOULD JUMP RIGHT AWAY AND REQUEST IMMEDIATELY. THERE IS A CHANNEL IN PLACE ALREADY THROUGH THE BMS OFFICE ALREADY, SO THEY REQUEST THROUGHT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND BUT INTERNAL PROVIDERS NEED ANY SUPPLIES, THEY WILL CONTACT ME AND I WILL SEND IT. THE BMSO IS (b)(3), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
NATO TRAINING MISSION - AFGHANISTAN
COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

NTM-A/CSTC-A-COS

Memorandum For Commander, US Forces – Afghanistan,

Subject: Sworn Statement – Summary of Statement

1. On 1 August at approximately 1800, I conducted an interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) Brigade Surgeon, on the treatment regarding members involved in the attack on the ANCOP HQ on 13 July 2010.

2. Due to operational constraints and re-deployment, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not available to review or sign his statement once transcribed from audio recording. This memo serves as an official record indicating I swore-in (b)(3), (b)(6) (audio recording of interview) and have transferred his sworn statement into interview notes.

3. The POC for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
4/82ND HQ	2010/08/01	1829	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(6)	(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

4/82ND AIRBONE DIVISON

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I WAS IN MY QUARTERS WHEN I WAS INFORMED BY CELL PHONE THAT I NEED TO BE PRESENT IN THE HOSPITAL BECAUSE CASUALTIES WAS COMING FROM THE 1/508. I DIDNT KNOW EXACTLY WHERE THEY WERE COMING FROM. THEY DIDNT HAVE MORE INFORMATION SO I WAS PICKED UP FROM MY QUARTERS, IT WAS (b)(3), (b)(6) AND TRANSFERRED TO THE HOSPITAL TO WAIT FOR THE SOLDIERS COMING THAT WERE MEDAVACED. THIS WAS AROUND 2200 AND I WENT TO KANDAHAR ROLE 3 THE ER SERVICE TO WAIT FOR THE INCOMING SOLDIERS. SO I WAITED ABOUT 10 OR 15 MINUTES UNTIL THE FIRST WAVE PERSONS CAME. THE FIRST THING I SAW WAS A (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) COMING WITH KEVLAR, IOTV, AND HIS AID BAG SCREAMING AND YELLING. HE WAS THE BRIGADE SURGEON AND HE HAD PATIENTS COMING IN CRITICAL CONDITION. THE PATIENTS THAT WERE COMING THAT WERE IN CRITCAL CONDITION WERE TRANSFERRED TO BAY 1 AND BAY 2, WHERE THE MORE CRITICAL PATIENTS RECIEVE CARING IN ROLE 3 ON KANDAHAR.

Question: This is the First Set of Casualties in the Role 3 and the Battalion Surgeon in the First Person you saw come into the emergency room?

ROGER SIR, THIS IS AN INTERVENTION WHICH HAPPENS WITH THE MEDEVAC, THE PERSON WHO IS TAKING CARE OF THE PATIENTS APPROACHES THE ER AND INFORMS THE PHYSICIAN ABOUT THE PATIENTS COMING. WHY INSIDE? BECAUSE IT IS A CONTROLLED ENVIRONMENT AND THEY DON'T HAVE TO PROVIDE THE REPORT OUTSIDE ABOUT THE PATIENTS COMING.

Question: Is it standard for the battaltion surgeon to accompany incoming casualties?

DEPENDING ON THE SERVERTY OF THE INJURIES ITS POSSIBLE THAT THE PHYSICAN MAY GO WITH THE PATIENTS IN THE HELICOPTER.

Question: Do you know how many casualties were still on the ground at 1/508 when this occurred?

I HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE, I DIDN'T HAVE ANY IDEA.

Question: Do you know how many casualties came in on the first.....?

THREE

Question: Were they severely wounded?

YES, THERE IS A STANDARD INTERVENTION WHEN THE PATIENT WITH SEVERE INJURIES GO TO TRAUMA ONE, TWO, AND THREE. SO THE PATIENTS WENT TO TRAUMA ONE, TRAUMA TWO, AND TRAUMA THREE SO THE SEVERITY WAS CONCERNING

Question: What was (b)(3), (b)(6) demeanor? How did he behave? Was he helpful?

(b)(3), (b)(6) WAS HELPFUL INFORMING WHO HE WAS AND WHAT HE WAS DOING AND THAT WE HAD CRITICAL PATIENTS COMING WITH THE CONDITION BUT I DID FIND THAT HE WAS LIMPING AND HE WAS SCREAMING AND HE WAS YELLING IN THE ER. SO, I DIDN'T ASSUME THE DETERMINATION, BUT THE DETERMINATION WAS, ONE OF THE ATTENDING PHYSICIANS WHO DECIDE TO CALM DOWN (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4/82 DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AND SEND HIM TO ONE OF THE BEDS, BECAUSE OF HIS STRANGE REACTION, HE WAS SCREAMING AND CRYING SO WE TOOK HIM TO ONE OF THE BEDS TO CALM HIM DOWN AND WE CONTINUED TO RECEIVE THE PATIENTS.
Question: Did he end up being admitted?
NO, HE WAS NOT ADMITTED
Question: Did he end up getting treatment?
YES, HE WAS ANOTHER PATIENT AT THE TIME AND HE WAS GIVEN TREATMENT "C" CATERGORY WHICH WAS MEANING MINOR INJURIES.
Question: Do you know of any patients that came in on the first lift who later expired?
NOT DURING THAT TIME, ONE OF THE PATIENTS WAS IN SEVERE CONDITION, THERE WAS NO INDICATION TO CONDUCT SURGERY BECAUSE THE EXTENT OF HIS INJURIES WAS SO SEVERE. THE DECISION WAS MADE TO TRANSFER HIM TO ICU AND TRY TO TRANSFER THE PATIENT TO GERMANY, LANDSCHTUL.
Question: What were the extent of those injuries?
(b)(6)
(b)(6) WHEN THEY TRANSFERRED HIM TO GERMANY
Question: In your opinion, could different treatment or more expedient evacuation have prevented any of the deaths that occurred that night? If there had been different medical care or different procedures followed prior to their arrival at the hospital, could that have prevented any casualties?
NO, THE FIRST PATIENT IN BAY 1 WAS OUT OF MANAGEMENT OF ROLE 3 - THAT DECISION WAS MADE PRETTY QUICK. THE SECOND PATIENT REQUIRED MEDICAL INTERVENTION FOR HIS INJURIES WHICH COULD NOT BE PROVIDED AT THE POINT OF INJURY. PATIENT 3 RECIEVED TREATMENT UNDER FIRE AND I THINK MEDICAL INTERVENTION FOR THIS PATIENT WAS APPROPRIATE FOR HIS INJURIES.
Question: Do you know how long from the time the people were injured to the time they arrived at the hospital?
IM NOT SURE EXACTLY HOW LONG IT TOOK FOR THE PATIENTS TO ARRIVE AT THE HOSPITAL BECAUSE I WAS IN MY QUARTERS WHEN I WAS TOLD THERE WERE PATIENTS COMING IN, I WSN"T MONITORING ANY COMMUNICATIONS DURING THE TIME OF THE ATTACK.
Question: Did you gain any information about the process of requesting the medevacs, whether it went well or whether it did not?
NO, MY MAIN JOB IS TO GO TO THE HOSPITAL WHEN THE PATIENTS ARE COMING. BUT ABOUT WHO ORDERED THE MEDEVAC, WHEN IT WAS ORDERED IS OUTSIDE OF MY KNOWLEDGE.
Question: Was there anyone else involved in the attack that displayed the same symptoms as (b)(3), (b)(6)? His demanor of being stressed and yelling?
NO, BECUASE THERE WERE ONLY FOUR PATIENTS< ONE OF WHICH WAS (b)(3), (b)(6) THE OTHER THREE WERE IN CRITICAL CONDITION....
Question: So nobody else came into the hospital like that, or the patients that you indicated were not ion the condition to react like that?
NO, IT WAS DIFFERENT, PATIENT ONE (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Question: What you are saying about (b)(3), (b)(6) was he did have some sort of physical wound for which he was treated and would you categorize that as minor?
YES, IT WAS CHARLIE, MINOR INJURIES
Question: Do you have any ideas if the soldiers that came to the hospital that night were wearing their protective gear when they were injured or did they arrive with it, do you recall?
NO SIR, THE THREE INJURIES CAME IN STRETCHERS, THEY DID NOT HAVE ON THEIR PROTECTION. (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) CAME WITH HIS PROTECTION, HE CAME WITH HIS KEVLAR HIS IOTV, AND HIS A BAG.
Question: Who was left behind at the Camp to run medical treatment after Major McClenathan left? Any ideas?
NO, BUT WHEN THAT SITUATION HAPPENS, THE SENIOR NCO TAKES RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MEDICAL CARE
Question: Do you know if there was a physicians assistant assigned there or no?
NO, THERE WAS NO PHYSICIANS ASSISTANT AT THAT SPECIFIC COP, I DID REACT, I MADE THE DECISION ABOUT KEEPING (b)(3), (b)(6) HERE BECUASE HE WASN'T IN THE CONDITION, AND TO SEND ONE OF MY PA'S IMMEDIATELY, BUT IT WAS DELAYED BECAUSE THERE WERE SECURITY CONCERNS AT THE POINT OF CONTACT, SO HIS TRANSFER WAS DELAYED.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4/82 DATED 2010/08/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Question: When (b)(3), (b)(6) left, there was a period of time when there was no medical officer there until you could get the PA there based on the security and your ability to transport?
YES DURING THAT TIME THE SENIOR NCO TAKES RESPONSIBILITY
Question: How long had (b)(3), (b)(6) been here, do you know?
IN COUNTRY, I DON'T HAVE THE EXACT DAY BECAUSE HE WENT ON EMERGENCY LEAVE AND CAME BACK, BUT I SAY ABOUT 2-3 MONTHS.
Question: Did he have the appropriate training to be a battalion surgeon?
HIS SPECIALITY IS ALLERGY AND ASTHMA, SO HE DOES NOT SEE TRAUMA EVERY SINGLE DAY. HOWEVER, HE DID GO TO THE TRAUMA COURSE BEFORE HE CAME HERE. THE TRAUMA COURSE IS MANDATORY FOR THE ORGANIC PROVIDERS IN BATTALIONS AND BRIGADES, BUT IT WAS KIND OF VOLUNTEER FOR PHYSICIANS NOT ASSIGNED TO THE UNIT, BUT HE DID DO THAT PORTION OF THE TRAINING.
Question: Had he been involved with any other treatment of severly wounded folks before?
YES, AT THE TIME I WAS NOT THE BRIGADE SURGEON, I WAS THE BATTALION SURGEON FOR 7/82ND, AND HE WAS IN ONE OF THE COP'S SOUTH OF WHERE MY FOB WAS AND HE HAS A MASCAL AND HE WENT TO ONE OF THE PATROLS IN ONE OF THE COMPANIES AND THERE WAS A KIA. SO DURING THE MASCAL HE PERFORMED VERY WELL AND I WAS IMPRESSED BECUASE HE DID SURGICAL AIRLIFT FOR ONE OF THE PATIENTS, AND HE TREATED VERY WELL THESE PATIENTS. I DID NOTICE AT THAT TIME HIS EMOTIONAL DISTRESS WITH THE COMBAT CASUALTIES AND DOING A PATROL WITH THE PATIENT, THE KIA, I NOTICED THAT. SO I KNEW ABOUT THAT WHEN I WAS THE BATTALION SURGEON. SO I HAD SOME CONCERN ABOUT HIS ABILITY TO PERFORM UNDER STRESS TO PERFORM UNDER FIRE, SO MY DECISION WAS TO TRY TO GET ONE OF MY PA'S TO COME TO THE TMC, TO THE AID STATION. IT WAS A VERY EXPERIENCED PA, SPECIAL FORCES, WITH 18 YEARS OF TRAINING, SO I TOLD HIM HE WAS BETTER FOR THE COP.
Question: Was the battalion aid station - had you seen it?
I NEVER HAVE BEEN THERE
Question: Is there a reporting system that would tell you if they were short on supplies?
THEY HAVE INTERNAL CHANNELS TO REQUEST SUPPORT, IF ONE OF MY PROVIDERS WAS SHORT ON SUPPLIES I WOULD JUMP RIGHT AWAY AND REQUEST IMMEDIATELY. THERE IS A CHANNEL IN PLACE ALREADY THROUGH THE BMS OFFICE ALREADY, SO THEY REQUEST THROUGHT THE CHAIN OF COMMAND BUT INTERNAL PROVIDERS NEED ANY SUPPLIES, THEY WILL CONTACT ME AND I WILL SEND IT. THE BMSO IS (b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

_____
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

_____
_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

_____
_____
_____
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____
at _____

_____
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

_____
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

Approved for Release

DATA REQUIRED BY THE PRIVACY ACT OF 1974

AUTHORITY: The solicitation of personal information in conjunction with this investigation is authorized under Title 10 USC 3012.

PURPOSE: The purpose for collecting this information is to obtain facts and make recommendations to assist the Commander in determining what action to take with regard to a false official statement.

ROUTINE USES: Information obtained during the course of this investigation will be used to document relevant facts regarding the matters investigated. It will be used to determine the facts leading up to the matters investigated, establish individual responsibilities, negligence, and to make recommendations for corrective actions and/or appropriate administrative actions. Any information you provide may be disclosed to members of the Department of Defense who have a need for it in the performance of their duties.

DISCLOSURE MANDATORY OR VOLUNTARY AND THE EFFECT OF NOT PROVIDING INFORMATION: The private information you furnish is voluntary. There will be no adverse effect on you for not furnishing private information, other than that certain facts or information might not be otherwise available to the Commander for his decision in this matter. The other information you furnish is mandatory. Failure to provide the requested information could result in disciplinary or other adverse action against you under Article 134, UCMJ.

Having been advised of the provisions of the Privacy Act, I hereby agree to provide information concerning this investigat

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

01 Aug 10
Date

Approved for Release

Summary of Interview with (b)(6) – ANCOP Bde S3

4 Aug 2010

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: On 13 of July, during the attack was he here?

YES

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: I want to talk to you about what happened, my understanding is the attack was around 2100, is that correct? Can he talk me through what he remembers?

ON THAT NIGHT I WAS IN MY ROOM AND WHEN THOSE THINGS HAPPENED I WENT FROM MY ROOM TO THE TOC. WE WERE WORKING TOGETHER IN THE TOC.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: I understand there were three RPGs fired into the camp during that time, is that what you remember?

HE REMEMBERS THAT THE ENEMY GUYS THEY TRY TO TAKE OUT THE TOWER WITH RPG AND ALSO THEY TRY TO TAKE OUT THE "BEEHUT"

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: So he remembers the first one being fired at the tower and then the other two being fired at the barracks?

HE SAID ON THAT NIGHT THE THING WAS WE KNOW THE FIRST THING THEY DID WAS BLOW UP THE WALL AND THEN THEY STARTED TO SHOOT THE RPG'S

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: I know the next day the village was searched; did they find anything in the village?

IN FRONT OF THE STREET THERE WAS A LOT OF BLOOD ON THE STREET

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: Have you learned anything else since then about who may be responsible for this?

TB GUYS

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: I know some of the US soldiers saw some people running away in addition to 2-3 that came into the camp, does he know anything about the numbers or anything about that?

I ALSO HEARD SOMETHING SIMILAR LIKE WHAT YOU SAID

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: Are there any other improvements we could help make with the camp that would make it safer?

HE SAID THE FIRST VISIT THE US GUYS COME HERE WITH THE US BRIGADE WE TOLD THEM THAT THEY CAN IMPROVE THIS SIDE (north) – THAT THEY CAN TAKE BARRIERS AND IMPROVE THIS SIDE. I TOLD THEM AT FIRST WHEN THEY COME – TO TAKE THERE SECURITY ON THIS SIDE

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: So you said they needed to improve security on the back wall?

Approved for Release

WHEN YOU ARE STARTING TO BUILD YOU TENTS AND YOUR TOC IT WAS PROBABLY THE WORKER GUYS WHO WERE FORCED TO TELL ABOUT THE CAMP

(b)(3), (b)(6) Question: Is there anything else you can tell me that may prevent this from happening in the future?

IT IS A GOOD IDEA TO TAKE YOUR GUYS AND PUT THEM ON THE TOWERS, IT IS A GOOD IDEA, AND ONE THING FROM MY IDEA THAT I TOLD YOU THAT THIS NORTH TOWER YOU SHOULD HAVE GUARDS ALONG THIS TOWER. YOU SHOULD BUILD YOU AREA IN A 24 HOUR SCHEDULE. HE SAID BEFORE I TOLD THE BATTALION COMMANDER THAT YOU CAN PUT YOUR GUYS IN THE TOWER AND THEY CAN SEARCH ALL NIGHT AND THEN SOMETHING LIKE THIS CANNOT HAPPEN. WITH THE ANCOP AND US GUYS, THE ENEMEY GUYS KNOW THAT THIS IS A STRONG PLACE. THIS IS MY EXPERIENCE TO YOUR GUYS THAT YOU GIVE THE ENEMY THAT YOU HAVE TO SHOW THE STRONG FORCE. NOW WE ARE WORKING REALLY HARD WITH YOU GUYS WE ARE WORKING TOGETHER, AND I AM HAPPY WITH THE BATTALION COMMANDER AND I AM HAPPY THAT YOU ARE WORKING WITH OUR CHECKPOINTS AROUND THE CITY.

Approved for Release

EXHIBITS "F" BINDER

ORDERS, PLANS, INTEL, & ASSESSMENTS

F-1: Investigation Appointment Order

F-2: Task Force Kandahar (TF-K) Command Net

F-3: TF-K Orders

F-4: ANCOP Support Through NCR Discussions

F-5: INTSUM 081900 JUL to 091900 JUL

F-6: INTSUM 091900 JUL to 101900 JUL

F-7: INTSUM 101900 JUL to 111900 JUL

F-8: INTSUM 111900 JUL to 121900 JUL

F-9: INTSUM 121900 JUL to 141900 JUL

F-10: CTKC INTSUM 121900 JUL to 131900 JUL

F-11: USFOR-A Force Protection Assessment Report

F-12: OPORD 10-28 (FURY SHIFT II)

F-13: CO TF-K Engineers FP Engineering Review

F-14: Class IV / Checkpoint Status Update

F-15: 1-Fury Priorities of Work

F-16: Email – Possible Pending Attack

F-17: Email – Historical Email Traffic on (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Pages 2 through 10 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4b
(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Duplicate of Appointment Memornadum.

Approved for Release

ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (BCT S3) [christopher (b)(3), (b)(6) @afgn.centcom.isaf.cmil.mil]
Sent: Monday, 24 May 2010 11:11
To: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I
Cc: CXI (b)(3), (b)(6) (ACO 1,508 PL)
Subject: RE: Coord between TFK and TF FURY (SECRET)

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

Yes on DIRLAUTH with 1Fury. CC'd is the forward A/S3 from 1Fury...but I don't know how often and when he checks CXI.

ATW!

(b)(3), (b)(6)
S3, 4/82 ABN
Kandahar AF
DSN: (b)(6)
SVOIP

-----Original Message-----
From: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I [mailto:tfk-j35-amn@TFA.dmil-isaf.ca]
Sent: Monday, May 24, 2010 2:12 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF FURY; ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S3 IS; (b)(3), (b)(6) (BCT S3)
Cc: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J4 OPS PLANS LCSS-I; ISAF RCS KAF TFK ENGR INT IS
Subject: Coord between TFK and TF FURY
Importance: High

Classification: ~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

Boys,

I'm sending you this email to confirm the meeting at 19h00 in the TFK TOC tonight. I had a chat with my J3 today and we'd like to expand the scope of the discussions. In addition to reviewing the SRPF Check Points one by one and receiving your recommendations, we'd like the following to be covered:

Timeline of arrival of 1FURY.
Bed down plan for 1FURY.
Tasks for 1FURY until SRPF is activated.
CSS of 1FURY.
ANCOP training, employment and partnership.

We respectfully request DIRLAUTH between TFK and 1FURY. We suggest that they attend the meeting tonight. We hear their XO is in KAF.

We will leave 22NCR out of it for now. TFK will consolidate the recommendations and brief them on the way ahead.

I hope this work for you guys.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

Approved for Release

TFK.HQ-J35

From: ENGR-HQ.OPS2
Sent: Sunday, 30 May 2010 10:46
To: TFK.HQ-J35
Cc: ENGR-HQ.PLANS
Subject: SRPF

(b)(6)

There is still no decision taken for ANCOP HQ. It will soon become a big issue as 22 NCR has to build something to accommodate their HHC (110 pers + 60 ANCOP) for the 7th of june.

Land: the product I did yesterday will most likely change a little bit as we are actually going through all the stations one by one and what I sent was an estimate. I believe 97 MP will have to present the package to the CofS soon (if it is the process that we choose to use) so we can expect an answer "quickly". Note that the package has been amended today, so pls use the 30 MAY version.

Tomorrow, 22NCR will bring their rough schedule for the SRPF construction, so we will have an idea of the FP requirements. FYI, they want to have 3 x constr sites as on 1 or 2nd June. At a certain point, they will have up to 6-7 constr sites at the same time.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TFK ENGR OPS2
CSN (b)(6)

Approved for Release

ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I

From: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I
Sent: Wednesday, 02 June 2010 04:46
To: ISAF RCS KAF TFK ENGR INT IS
Subject: FW: phone conversation with Fury 6 ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

Pour ton info.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
[mail
Sent: Tuesday, 01 June 2010 17:03
To: CXI (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury; ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I
Cc: CXI (b)(3), (b)(6) ; ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S6 IS; CXI (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA 4/82 ANCOP SFAT; ISAF RCS HQ ANCOP S1 S4 ADVISOR IS
Subject: RE: phone conversation with Fury 6 ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

ALCON,

Please be careful about sending any message about the 2nd BDE ANCOP vacating their current HQ complex. They will keep that complex after the move into the JRAC so that they can house the units that will not fit in the new facility. There will remain a need for the ANCOP to use the existing ANCO HQ facility.

v/r
ATW!
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury
Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 2010 7:55 PM
To: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I; (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)); ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S6 IS; (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA 4/82 ANCOP SFAT; ISAF RCS HQ ANCOP S1 S4 ADVISOR IS
Subject: RE: phone conversation with Fury 6 (SECRET)

In a phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) (2nd BDE ANCOP Commander), I got permission for construction at the ANCOP HQ.

I asked on behalf of 1 Fury 6 if construction could be done on the front gate, tents for a partnered force be put up, and if measures to improve security (hesko barriers, concertina wire...).

(b)(3), (b)(6) did not give any specifics on what can be built, but he did agree to allow construction to take place.

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I spoke to him in person on 31 May 10 and reconfirmed his permission to allow construction.

He does not plan on staying at his old HQ long, as he is going to move to the JRAC as soon as it opens (expected move in date is 15 July).

Thanks,
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I [mailto:tfk-j35-amn@TFA.dmil-isaf.ca]
Sent: Tuesday, June 01, 2010 7:46 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6); ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S6 IS; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA 4/82 ANCOP SFAT; ISAF RCS HQ ANCOP S1 S4 ADVISOR IS
Subject: RE: phone conversation with Fury 6 ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

Sir, a rep from your staff confirmed yesterday that COMD ANCOP had given the green light.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Fury Deputy Commander)
[mailt (b)(3), (b)(6) centcom.isaf.cmil.mil]
Sent: Sunday, 30 May 2010 17:45
To: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S6 IS; CXI (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA 4/82 ANCOP SFAT; ISAF RCS HQ ANCOP S1 S4 ADVISOR IS
Subject: RE: phone conversation with Fury 6 ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

Francis,

I'm going to refer you to Fury 3, (b)(3), (b)(6) who will put you in touch with the right person.

v/r
ATW!

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Task Force Fury

Approved for Release

NVOIP
SVOIP (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I [mailto:tfk-j35-amn@TFA.dmil-isaf.ca]
Sent: Saturday, May 29, 2010 1:59 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6); ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S6 IS; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA 4/82 ANCOP SFAT; ISAF RCS HQ ANCOP S1 S4 ADVISOR IS
Subject: RE: phone conversation with Fury 6 (~~SECRET~~)

Classification: ~~NATO/ISAF SECRET~~

(b)(5)

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF Fury Deputy Commander) [mailto:robert.obrien@afgn.centcom.isaf.cmil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, 27 May 2010 09:28
To: ISAF RCS KAF TFK J35 LCSS-I
Cc: CXI (b)(3), (b)(6); ISAF RCS HQ ARSIC-S 1508TH PIR S6 IS; CXI (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA 4/82 ANCOP SFAT; ISAF RCS HQ ANCOP S1 S4 ADVISOR IS
Subject: RE: phone conversation with Fury 6 ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

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Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY

Folks,

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Thanks.

v/r
ATW!

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Task Force Fury
NVOIP
SVOIP (b)(6)

Classification: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA,GCTF,ISAF,NATO~~

Approved for Release

Pages 17 through 80 redacted for the following reasons:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

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Roll Call

1 Fury

- A1F
- A BTRY
- C1F
- D1F
- E1F
- HHC
- 1F1
- 1F2
- ALOC
- 1F4
- S6
- S9
- CH
- S3 Air
- CTKC LNO
- 1F AS3
- 1F3
- 1F5
- 1F9
- 1F6

External

- F3
- F4
- F5
- Fury SPO
- Fury Engineer
- CTKC
- Diablo 3/5
- ANCOP SFAT ([redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6))
- 97th MPs

Exhibit F-14

as of 13 JUL 10

1/21

Approved for Release

Agenda

- Fury Main/External Notes
- 1F AS3 – 1 Fury Partnered Disposition
- EN Update and Synch Matrix
- 1F43- COMMSTAT
- 1F4/N- Updates
  - Contracts
  - CCI Ordered
  - FOO & Title 10 ASFF
  - Log Movement Synch
  - Vehicle Laydown
- 1F40 – Solar Lights/ Billboards/Media
- 1F1 – MWR Status
- 1FAS3 – ANCOP Life Support
- Due Outs
- Alibis from CDRs/Staff
- 1F3
- 1F5
- 1F9
- 1F6

Approved for Release

Pages 3 through 8 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1) 1.4a

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FOO Title 10 & Title 10 ASFF

Unit Co, Plt	FIELD ORDERING OFFICER (FOO) TITLE 10	Status	FOO PAYING AGENT (PA) TITLE 10	Status	Remarks	Status of Money	FIELD ORDERING OFFICER (FOO) ASFF	Status	FOO PAYING AGENT (PA) ASFF	Status	Remarks	Status of Money
A Btry HQ	(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)		Complete	$,000	(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)		Ready to Draw	
A Btry 4					Complete	$50,000					Lack of personnel	
A BTRY - Co AT2					Complete	$50,000					Complete	$30,000
A CO-2nd					Complete	$14,000					Ready to Draw	
A CO HQ					Lack of personnel						Ready to Draw	
A CO-AT3					Complete	$30,000					Complete	$30,000
A CO - A Btry 1					Complete	$30,000					Complete	$30,000
A CO - A Btry 3					Complete	$30,000					Complete	$30,000
C Co HQ					Redrew	$38,000					Awaiting PR&C [4.5 days elapsed 24 hrs*]	
C Co 1					Awaiting new Paperwork	Clearing					Complete	$20,000
C Co 2					Complete	$12,000					Awaiting PR&C [4.5 days elapsed 24 hrs*]	
C CO - B CO 2nd					Complete	$10,000					Whitworth needs to meet with Finance	
D CO HQ					Lack of personnel						Complete	$30,000
D CO AT1					Complete	$50,000					Complete	$30,000
D CO AT4					Complete	$50,000					Complete	$30,000
D CO - A CO-1st					Lack of personnel						Ready to Draw	
D CO - A Btry 2					Complete	$50,000					Mattos needs to meet with Finance	
E Co					Complete	$12,000,					Cleared	
HHC					Preparing to clear	$10					Complete	$15,000
HHC Scouts					Complete	$15,000					Ready to Draw	

	No Paperwork		Need Training
	Have Paperwork		Ready to Draw
	Paperwork sent to KAF		Complete/Drew

* ASFF: PR&C "days out" are estimated dates.

Exhibit F-14

Approved for Release

9/21

Pages 10 through 17 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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1-508 MWR Status

LOCATION	UNIT	WEIGHTS	TV's	GAMES	AFN	SPAWAR	NOTES/UPDATES
(b)(1) 1.4a	TF HQ's						Working sparwar issue/gym equip in KAF
	A Co/E Co HQs						
	A Btry HQs/2A btry/Mtrs						gym equip in KAF/AFN ready for pick up
	AT2 (A Btry)						gym equip in KAF/AFN ready for pick up
	4/A Btry (A Btry)						gym equip in KAF/AFN ready for pick up
	3/A Btry (A Co)						gym equip in KAF
	1/A Btry (A Co)						gym equip in KAF
	3/A Btry (A Co)						gym equip in KAF
	AT3 (A Co)						gym equip in KAF
	2/C Co (C Co)						gym equip in KAF/AFN ready for pick up
	C Co HQs & 1/C Co						gym equip in KAF/AFN ready for pick up
	2/B (C Co)						gym equip in KAF
	D Co HQs						gym equip in KAF
	AT4 (D Co)						gym equip in KAF
	2/A Btry (D Co)						gym equip in KAF
	AT1 (D Co)						gym equip in KAF

Not in theater but on order: treadmills, stationary bikes, recreation kits (cooler,igloo), entertainment system
Enroute to KAF: Champion, Hex Dumbbells (20-100lbs), Gaming stations, Boxing bags
SPAWAR: SPAWAR rep. will contact the on-ground POC once equipment is ready for draw/installation * (12 spawar café's arrived to BAF)

Request working/ not submitted
Request submitted
Items Received

Approved for Release

Questions or Alibis

1 Fury

- A1F
- A Btry
- C1F
- D1F
- E1F
- HHC
- 1F1
- 1F2
- ALOC
- 1F4
- S6
- S9
- CH
- S3 Air
- 1F3A
- CH
- 1F3
- 1F5
- 1F9
- 1F6

Approved for Release

Exhibit F-14

Page 20 redacted for the following reason:
- -
(b)(1) 1.4a

Approved for Release

Exhibit F-16

(b)(3), (b)(6) **USA TF Fury**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2010 1:19 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: RE: Possible Pending Attack ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

We're going to bounce this off our ANCOP S-2 and see what they think. In the meantime, here's our S-2's read on this report:

"Agree with (b)(3), (b)(6) assessment and I'll get with the ANCOP S2 to get their assessment. My recommendation is to avoid getting too spun up in this. We've seen an increasing amount of reporting about significant attacks recently and will likely end up in a "crying wolf" type scenario with our paratroopers if we react/overreact to each one.
We've also seen a large increase in ANSF/CF forces in the area as well as several successful raids in and around the city leading to several key INS killed/captured. Due to these changes, I'm not sure that the indicators seen in April will be the same ones we see in July/August."

And:

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)
S3, 1-508th PIR
SVOIP: (b)(1)1.4a
DSN: (b)(1)1.4a
Roshan: (b)(1)1.4a
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
CENTRIX: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afgn.centcom.isaf.cmil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF Fury
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2010 1:15 PM

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MP BN
Subject: RE: Possible Pending Attack ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks for the heads up. 504th, as you are also new to the area, they may also be looking to test your abilities as well.

Intel reps/LNOs- please look for any other indications on any attacks, or other threat warnings.

ATW!

(b)(3), (b)(6)
S3, 4/82 BCT and Combined Team Kandahar City Kandahar Airfield/CNS NVOIP (b)(6) SVOIP (b)(6)
(b)(6)
CENTRIX: (b)(6) (MS Prefix: 64)
ROSHAN (b)(6)
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil
SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
CXI: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afgn.centcom.isaf.cmil.mil

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 2 FURY
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2010 12:03 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: Possible Pending Attack
Importance: High

Gents

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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OPSO, TF 2-508 PIR
Arghandab OCC-D, Kandahar Province
CDN SVOIP: (b)(6)
US SVOIP: (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)
SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.mil

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6) **USA TF 1 Fury**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF 2 FURY
Sent: Tuesday, July 13, 2010 12:03 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc:
Subject: Possible Pending Attack
Importance: High

Gents

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(6)
OPSO, TF 2-508 PIR
Arghandab OCC-D, Kandahar Province
CDN SVOIP: (b)(6)
US SVOIP: (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)
SIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil
NIPR: @afghan.swa.army.mil

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **USA TF Fury**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF Fury
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2010 1:32 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF SPARTAN
Subject: RE: 1 Fury Medical Operations ~~(SECRET)~~

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Categories: Red Category

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Sir, CSM-

Before you beat (b)(3), (b)(6) up too bad, I will take the blame for stirring the pot. When I discussed your MA with (b)(3), (b)(6), he was taking about putting aid stations in areas of most concern. I wrote (b)(3), (b)(6) an e-mail, saying that because you will be so close to KAF (b)(1)1.4a) please do not focus on the areas of most concern, but focus on the areas of greatest Paratrooper population. Since we have a terrific Role 3 on KAF and we do POI EVAC directly there, my greatest concern in the Kandahar City area is DNBI. Of course the most DNBI will occur at FOBs/COPs with the greatest population. I also told them that I want a provider located with the BN HQs because I need a provider to be a true BN surgeon and not just a provider. I need someone to follow-up on the guys in the rear and to advise command on various issues such as early releases from theater. I would also like a place that I can send injured Paratroopers that allows to get back to their BN, but still be under medical care. We have started doing this with 2Fury. At the beginning of the deployment, we were keeping 2F Paratroopers here on KAF for all of their appointments and we started losing them mentally. We started the last month trying to push these guys back to OCCD as soon as possible IOT for them to be seen by their BN surgeon and be around stronger influences. This has worked better and has allowed the BN leadership and medical staff to keep better tabs on their Paratroopers. Therefore, I strongly support putting a BN AS with the BN HQ and another one at a location with a high number of PAX. After MA, If you see a reason to have another provider in your AO, I am sure that we can give you support. (b)(3), (b)(6) is going on R&R when (b)(3), (b)(6) returns and will be back in mid to late June. IRT (b)(3), (b)(6), I do not think he is whining, I just think he is frustrated and feels like he can help out the BN more than he is now. He is a great guy and an excellent physician, and I would like to see his relationship with 1Fury work out. I think it will prove vital for QA/QC to have a physician overseeing your redeployment SRP/PDHAs.

ATW!

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ATW!

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury
Sent: Saturday, May 15, 2010 7:00 AM

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To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury; (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6) USA TF SPARTAN
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury
Subject: RE: 1 Fury Medical Operations ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

(b)(3), (b)(6) - Would like to ask a favor:

BACKGROUND: (b)(3), (b)(6) has seemed a bit disgruntled since he got here. The day I met him I was informed he may not be able to do much physical work because of a PT issue. (b)(3), (b)(6) worked through it and that was the last I heard about it. I saw (b)(3), (b)(6) while I was up at BULLARD a few weeks ago and he had nothing bad to say. Everything seemed fine and I gave him KUDOS about handling the suicide vest attack. He appeared positive and again, no issues. Now all of this drama and not sure why it would go straight to BDE. Some things make you go "Hmmm..."

Recommendation: I think (b)(3), (b)(6) really enjoys being in this environment (not implying at all that he didn't enjoy being at BSB). Like (b)(3), (b)(6) I think he thrives with the daily challenge and the ability to make a difference. If interested I would like to offer (b)(3), (b)(6) to be the provider for the BSB and allow me to keep (b)(3), (b)(6) as we transition to K-har. I want to keep my best providers forward with companies (decentralized) in case of the random VBIED or MASCAL event. This paid off BIG with (b)(3), (b)(6) from C CO and one life is enough justification that I think we got it right to convince me to maintain this concept. There isn't a large PAX footprint / requirement at the BN HQ and (b)(3), (b)(6) does a magnificent job tracking ALL 1F casualties, civilian CAX, and ANSF CAX.

(b)(3), (b)(6)- this is really your call. If you want (b)(3), (b)(6) back (and I wouldn't blame you) I will not pursue. Just trying to avoid drama associated with a guy (b)(3), (b)(6) who might thrive better in a different environment.

(b)(3), (b)(6) - Any idea why this guy thought he could pipe up to you without even making a whisper of this to me or (b)(3), (b)(6) or the CSM first? I had no indications this was coming or whispers he had concerns.

If everyone agrees, we could take this to F6 for approval, if not, we will make the best of it, no worries.

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 8:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF 1 Fury
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury
Subject: RE: 1 Fury Medical Operations ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Sir,
Kind of funny if you ask me, here we have a (b)(3), (b)(6) a BN Surgeon who has been put in a hot spot (FOB BULLARD) our main effort. A place where we have had soldiers killed and injured and where his training just might save lives, and he would rather be doing follow up appointment for soldiers with TBI. Sound like to me he just want to on a FOB with nicer facilities. I disagree with his assessment, we have (b)(3), (b)(6) med at FOB Lagmen for follow up appointment and although I am sure it is his responsibility to ensure the chain of command knows when their appointments are and follow up with the chain of command to see if they made

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **USA USA TF Fury**

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 8:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF Fury
Subject: RE: 1 Fury Medical Operations ~~(SECRET)~~

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Categories: Red Category

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Sir,
Kind of funny if you ask me, here we have a (b)(3), (b)(6) a BN Surgeon who has been put in a hot spot (FOB BULLARD) our main effort. A place where we have had soldiers killed and injured and where his training just might save lives, and he would rather be doing follow up appointment for soldiers with TBI. Sound like to me he just want to on a FOB with nicer facilities. I disagree with his assessment, we have (b)(3), (b)(6) med at FOB Lagmen for follow up appointment and although I am sure it is his responsibility to ensure the chain of command knows when their appointments are and follow up with the chain of command to see if they made it. He could do this from FOB Bullard by picking up a phone and calling the Chain of Command or the treatment facility. The chain command is who I hold responsible for getting the soldiers to their follow up appointments. I doubt (b)(3), (b)(6) would have made a big difference if he were here at FOB Apache, but if he just saved 1 life at FOB Bullard it would be worth having him there. I would think (b)(3), (b)(6) would have approached the BN leadership if there was concerns about where he was and how he was being used instead (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) went straight to the BCT Surgeon, completely unprofessional.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) TF 1Fury
4BCT 82nd ABN Div.
ROSHAN (b)(6)
AWCC (b)(6)
DSN (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA USA TF 1 Fury
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 7:14 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF 1 Fury; (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF 1Fury
Subject: FW: 1 Fury Medical Operations ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

-----Original Message-----
From: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF 1 FURY QALAT
Sent: Friday, May 14, 2010 5:33 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF 1 Fury
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6) USA TF Fury
Subject: 1 Fury Medical Operations ~~(SECRET)~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

(b)(3), (b)(6)

As the battalion transitions to the newest mission, please allow me to articulate the medical needs of the battalion, particularly, in respect to my role as the Battalion Surgeon . As we briefly discussed shortly after my arrival at Apache, the Battalion Surgeon is your chief medical advisor and has a myriad of roles and responsibilities other than patient care. However, out of respect for your position, and per your direction, I was submissive to your request to push out to Bullard to gain a better appreciation of the role I would serve there. Nevertheless, after working for over a month here on Bullard, I can safely say that this is not the best application of a battalion surgeon. As a seasoned battalion surgeon with a previous deployment with the 82nd, I have substantial combat experience and I have noticed several deficiencies within our battalion regarding current medical operations/medical care.

During my time here at Bullard I have had a chance to assess the current medical operations of the battalion and unfortunately, they are suboptimal at best. Current Army doctrine has established echeloned medical care which has proven itself throughout OEF and OIF with some of the lowest mortality rates of any conflict in the history of war. This echeloned medical care, however, does require the appropriate application of medical providers to achieve maximal results. For example, I am currently dealing with several soldiers that were lost to follow-up care after initially being diagnosed with Traumatic Brain Injury (TBI), as well as several other DNBI injuries and illnesses. This loss to follow-up has resulted mainly from the lack of a fully functioning Battalion Surgeon, due to pushing me out to the company minus level. When a patient is seen at a level II or level III facility, they are often discharged with follow-up care to be handled by the Battalion Surgeon (Level I). The Level II or Level III will facility (no matter how near they are) does not pursue these patients or establish any follow-up arrangements because they assume medical care at the Battalion level is operating according to standard Army Doctrine and that they will be seen at Level I. Furthermore, they cannot follow-up all these patients as it would then prohibit them from completing their Level II or Level III responsibilities. However, I cannot currently serve in such a capacity as I do not have visibility of these patients, their medical records, appropriate communication assets, or access to these Level II/III providers for consultation and I certainly cannot physically examine these patients when I am pushed forward. Although it would seem like a level II facility could easily see this patients, they do not track them and this is not the role or responsibility of the level II facility. This lies within the responsibility of the Battalion Surgeon. For example, you may recall that on Camp Taji there was a level II, but I, as a battalion Surgeon, was still located on the same FOB. We were collocated, but served distinctly separate Combat Health Support roles.

I can appreciate your perspective that a provider should be at the most likely point of injury to minimize the loss of life. On the surface that seems very plausible. However, with the limited resources and equipment that any provider would have at the point of injury, and in the limited amount of time the provider would have before the patient was evacuated to a higher level of care, there is nothing more a physician could provide to the patient compared to a combat medic. I can assure you that the role you are asking me to serve can be adequately performed by your combat line medics. I have personally observed several of your medics both inside and outside the wire when life-threatening medical care was needed. They are very competent and professional. To be completely honest, most of your line medics actually have more trauma experience than me. Moreover, years of combat casualty care have proven time and time again that the current echeloned medical care has shown that point-of-injury care by medics is the best in the world, with the lowest mortality rate ever seen in conflict. There is no evidenced-based data or other precedence set that shows pushing a provider to a more forward location improves mortality or morbidity on the battlefield.

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Therefore, I respectfully request that as we move forward with this new mission, that you locate me with the headquarters element, where I can best perform the more traditional and doctrinal role of a Battalion Surgeon. This move will allow me to be collocated with the medical Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant to optimally carry out my duties. To highlight a few of my duties in addition to providing traditional medical care, I am your top medical advisor responsible to advise you on various medical assets, medical risks of the battle field, and medical/environmental threats. I also provide you medical updates on wounded and ill soldiers. I coordinate timely assessments of soldiers requiring level II or III care for non-battle injuries and illness. I communicate with physicians and other healthcare providers in the assessment and care of assigned soldiers both in theater and in the rear, to help maximize the fighting strength of the battalion.

Also, of critical importance is the fact that I would be better able to train and mentor the medics. As you are aware, the treatment squad medics are located with the HQ element. These medics are typically the newest and least trained medics of the Battalion. It is only in a deployed environment like we have now, that a physician can train and mentor these medics. As you know, upon redeployment I will be unattached from the unit and will resume my role as a subspecialty provider at Womack. Now is the time to allow me to train and mentor these medics so that the battalion can sustain the necessary medical skills for the future. While at the company level (i.e. Bullard, I only have the opportunity to train 2-3 medics, and these medics already have substantial training and trauma experience. At the HQ element there are over a dozen medics that would benefit from the didactic and hands-on training from a physician. In essence, it is in the best interest of the battalion in the long-term to train these junior medics, while they have direct, daily access to a physician, so they are prepared to fill the shoes of the line medics for future deployments, and sustain the high level of medical care delivered on the battlefield. To dismiss this critical role, is to set the battalion up for failure in the future.

In addition, the doctrinal role of a Battalion Surgeon provides preventive medicine services, assists and/or coordinates combat stress control for battalion soldiers, supervises appropriate medical supply and medical maintenance support, including technical inspection and status reports. The Battalion Surgeon also supervises the preparation of reports regarding medical administrative records of injured, sick, and wounded personnel, advises you on the health status of the command and of the occupied or friendly territory within the your area of responsibility, reviews all battalion OPLANs and contingency plans to identify potential medical hazards associated with geographical locations and climatic conditions, advises on the medical effects of the environment, NBC, and directed-energy devices on personnel, rations, and water. I am also supposed to identify and track critical Class VIII items and establish priorities for procurement, as well as determine requirements for medical personnel and make recommendations concerning their assignments. I also submit to higher headquarters those recommendations on professional medical problems that require further research and development. Furthermore, the Battalion Surgeon advises you on the effects of accumulated fatigue, possible delayed effects from environmental exposures, as well as exposures to chemical or biological agents, and use of countermeasures and pretreatments. Finally, the battalion surgeon ensures that clear and accurate patient records are maintained of all clinical encounters for supported deployed personnel, as well as advises you on recommendations for purple hearts, PMRs, Red Cross messages and DNBIs. As you can surmise, it is virtually impossible to accomplish these tasks when I am consistently away from the HQ element.

These traditional roles simply cannot be accomplished from an outlying FOB with suboptimal communications and without the assistance and collocation of the medical platoon sergeant and MEDO. This is my second combat deployment and my past experience has proven that I would be much more beneficial to the battalion in a more traditional role as described above.

Finally, it is even more paramount that I be located with the HQ element as we begin to redeploy and start the Post Deployment Health Assessment (PDHA) process. Many soldiers have

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significant pathology (both psychological and physical) that will require coordination and consultations so they can receive the medical care they deserve as soon as possible upon redeployment. This PDHA process is time-consuming and laborious, but necessary to maintain the health and welfare of each individual soldier as well as the health of the battalion overall. In addition, many soldiers are requesting airborne training physicals, or other special school physicals that are required prior to attendance. These exams take significant amounts of time, but would best be completed prior to redeployment, to minimize the impact upon operations upon return to garrison. Our soldiers deserve this attention and care, which can best be facilitated when I am with the headquarters element .

Sir, please understand that in no way am I trying to usurp your authority or judgment. I assure you that both my personal and professional motives are to ensure that I provide the finest medical care to the entire battalion. It is my responsibility to make you aware of the current medical care/operational deficiencies. I understand your concern for helping those at the most likely possible point of injury, but by separating me from the traditional role of a BN Surgeon in hopes of potentially making a difference in the lives of one or two soldiers, may cost the battalion much greater sequela by not appropriately caring for the other soldiers that have real medical needs now. I assure you this perspective is in line with current Army doctrine and is shared by the Brigade Surgeon, (b)(3), (b)(6), as well as the Charlie Med leadership.

Very respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)
1 Fury Battalion Surgeon

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

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