HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

24 JUN 2012

USFOR-A SJA

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Central Command, 7115 South Boundary Boulevard, MacDill Air Force Base, Florida 33621-5101

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation IAW Army Regulation (AR) 15-6 – Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Allegations of Shooting of Afghan Civilians outside Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai

1. On 22 March 2012, I appointed BG Ricky Waddell as an AR 15-6 Investigating Officer. He was tasked to investigate the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations that SSG Robert Bales shot Afghan civilians outside VSP Belambai, Afghanistan on 11 March 2012. BG Waddell completed his investigation and I approved the findings and recommendations.

2. I am forwarding you the completed AR 15-6 investigation for your review and consideration. One recommendation, in particular, contained within paragraph 6a of Enclosure 3, concerns the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) process. BG Waddell recommended that conventional infantry battalions selected for the village stability operation (VSO) mission be selected as early as possible in the ARFORGEN cycle, and also included training recommendations for those battalions. Accordingly, I request that you forward the investigation to the Chief of Staff, Army for consideration of these recommendations.

3. POC for this request is (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(6) (b)(6)

Encl

JOHN R. ALLEN
General, United States Marine Corps
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces-Afghanistan

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

24 JUN 2012

USFOR-A SJA (12-008)

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation IAW AR 15-6 – Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Allegations of Shooting of Afghan Civilians outside Village Stability Platform Belambai

1. I have reviewed the subject AR 15-6 Investigation.

2. I approve the Investigating Officer's (IO's) findings and recommendations.

3. I take the following actions on the IO's recommendations:

a. I direct that this investigation be forwarded to the Commander, CFSOCC-A to execute the recommendations contained in paragraphs 6a through 6f.

b. I direct that the findings concerning inappropriate behavior identified in the report and referenced in paragraphs 6j and 6k be referred to the appropriate convening authorities for action as they deem appropriate.

c. I direct that this investigation be forwarded to the Commander, TF MED-A to consider the recommendation outlined in paragraph 6i.

d. I direct that this investigation be forwarded to the Commander, 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2nd Infantry Division (3-2 SBCT) to consider the recommendations contained in paragraphs 6g and 6h.

e. I direct that this investigation be forwarded to the Commander, CJSOTF-A and Commander, Task Force (b)(1)1.4a to consider and act upon the recommendations contained in paragraph 6 of Enclosure 3 concerning the command climate of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a

f. I direct that this investigation be forwarded to the Commander, CENTCOM. I request that he further forward it to the Chief of Staff, Army to consider the recommendation contained in paragraph 6a of Enclosure 3 concerning early selection in the Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle and training recommendations for conventional infantry battalions selected for the village stability operation (VSO) mission.

4. All tasked organizations and units must provide me a status report on the implementation of these recommendations 60 days from the date of this memorandum.

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5. I give the USFOR-A SJA and USFOR-A Deputy SJA the authority to further release this investigation as he or she determines appropriate.

6. I want to express my heartfelt sorrow for this tragic incident and to express my condolences to the families and friends who lost loved ones in the villages of Naja Bien and Alikozai. Though words and investigations cannot undo what happened, please be assured that I will continue to take every measure to ensure that our forces are well disciplined and follow the laws of armed conflict. This event and those killed and injured will never be forgotten, but I hope that this isolated incident will not work to overshadow the strong and successful partnership efforts between our forces and the people of Afghanistan.

JOHN R. ALLEN
General, United States Marine Corps
Commander,
International Security Assistance Force/
U.S. Forces - Afghanistan

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A (12-008)

MEMORANDUM FOR Commander, United States Forces - Afghanistan

SUBJECT: Report of Investigation IAW AR 15-6 – Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Allegations of Shooting of Afghan Civilians outside Village Stability Platform Belambai

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Introduction.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 22 March 2012, I was appointed by the Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan, as an investigating officer in accordance with Army Regulation 15-6 to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations that SSG Robert Bales shot Afghan civilians outside Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai, Afghanistan.[1]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The following individuals were assigned to assist in the investigation: (b)(3), (b)(6) (Deputy Investigating Officer/Special Operations expert); (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Legal Advisor); and (b)(3), (b)(6) (Paralegal). Additionally, I received assistance from (b)(3), (b)(6) (Special Assistant) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (Aide).

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) All directives from the Appointing Authority have been met. The investigative team conducted its investigation at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) from 24 March 2012 through 20 April 2012. The investigation included interviews with several individuals, including witnesses familiar with SSG Bales prior to his deployment to Afghanistan; individuals that served with SSG Bales at Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai; SSG Bales' chain of command (administrative control (ADCON) and operational control (OPCON)); individuals familiar with the command's response to the 11 March 2012 incident; and individuals familiar with the subsequent medical response and Key Leader Engagement (KLE)/Consequence Management actions.[2] The investigation also included a coordinating visit with the Kandahar Criminal Investigation Division (CID) office on the status of the criminal investigation into this matter, a site survey visit to VSP Belambai, the gathering of myriad documentary evidence related to the case, and office calls with several senior leaders. No delays were experienced in the performance of the investigation.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) A criminal investigation is ongoing into this incident. Per the guidance in my appointment memorandum, I conducted this administrative investigation in a manner to not interfere with the criminal investigation in any way.[3] Per the request of those investigating/preparing the criminal case on behalf of the Government, I limited inclusion of relevant material acquired by CID during its criminal investigation. Additionally, I refrained from pursuing the appointment memorandum line of inquiry into key warnings and indicators

[1] (U//~~FOUO~~) The Appointment Memorandum is in Enclosure 1a.
[2] (U//~~FOUO~~) Enclosure 1b provides a complete list of witnesses interviewed.
[3] (U//~~FOUO~~) Substantive investigative work began after initial coordination with CID. Enclosure 1d.

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with the witnesses located at VSP Belambai. I was unable to interview several key witnesses to this investigation, primarily SSG Bales and several other infantry Non-Commissioned Officers located at VSP Belambai at the time of the 11 March 2012 incident because they are accused or suspected of criminal activity. I was also unable to interview fully certain primary VSP Belambai witnesses due to the ongoing legal investigation.[4]

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 1 April 2012, I received guidance to expand my investigation to include allegations of command climate issues at Task Force (TF) (b)(1)1.4a and whether such command climate issues had any effect/contribution to SSG Bales' alleged criminal activity on 11 March 2012.[5] I have conducted a full investigation into the TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate, and I find by a preponderance of the evidence that the TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate issues had no effect or contribution whatsoever to what occurred on 11 March 2012 outside VSP Belambai. My investigation into the TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate issue along with my associated findings and recommendations, is set out separately in Enclosure 3 to this report.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) All documentary evidence associated with this report is credible. I found that most witnesses interviewed for this report were credible, with the exception of certain witnesses from Operational Detachment Alpha (ODA) (b)(1)1.4a and certain witnesses from ODA (b)(1)1.4a I found two ODA (b)(1)1.4a witnesses to be generally uncooperative with the investigation and not forthcoming with their answers. Although generally cooperative, I believe that certain other ODA (b)(1)1.4a witnesses and ODA (b)(1)1.4a witnesses were less than forthcoming with their knowledge of inappropriate conduct on the VSP. In short, the witnesses were forthcoming with answers about operational and tactical issues, but they hedged on questions that might place the conduct of themselves or their team members in a negative light. I also believe that certain ODA enablers and members of the 2-3 IN uplift squad[6] were not fully candid in answering questions about the actions of their superiors.

2. ~~(S)~~ Executive Summary.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) SSG Robert Bales, the suspect of the shootings of Afghan civilians outside VSP Belambai on 11 March 2012, was the Squad Leader of 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, B Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment (2-3 IN), 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division (3-2 SBCT), out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord, Fort Lewis. He deployed as a member of his organic unit, arriving at VSP Belambai, located in the "Horn of Panjwa'i" about 40 kilometers southwest of Kandahar City, on 14 December 2011.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) SSG Bales was the Squad Leader of one of the two 2-3 IN uplift squads at VSP Belambai; he was also the senior 2-3 IN NCO at VSP Belambai. The mission of the

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[4] (U//~~FOUO~~) Enclosure 1c is a list of witnesses unavailable for this report.

[5] (U//~~FOUO~~) Task Force (b)(1)1.4a is the command assumed by 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment (2-3 IN), 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), 2d Infantry Division, Joint Base Lewis-McChord, in theater. SSG Bales was in B Company, 2-3 IN. As such, 2-3 IN was responsible for B Co, 2-3 IN's preparation for deployment, and the 2-3 IN commander was SSG Bales' battalion commander. During the deployment, the relationship of 2-3 IN (TF (b)(1)1.4a to SSG Bales' squad at VSP Belambai was limited to an administrative control minus (ADCON(-)) relationship. The ADCON(-) relationship consisted of some disciplinary actions, counseling, evaluations, awards and other personnel actions.

[6] (U//~~FOUO~~) The infantry squads that served with the ODA at VSP Belambai are informally referred to as "uplift squads" throughout this report.

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uplift infantry squads was to support the Special Operations Forces (SOF) unit at VSP Belambai, which at first was Operational Detachment-A (ODA (b)(1)1.4a) and then transitioned to ODA (b)(1)1.4a about 1 February 2012, in their performance of Village Stability Operations (VSO). In general, the infantry would provide security during the performance of missions, provide extra manpower on patrols, and perform base security and other tasks that would allow the ODA to focus on VSO. SSG Bales did not have significant interaction with the local populace while in theater, and he did not participate in any shuras. The battle rhythm at VSP Belambai was suitable for the mission of the VSP and consistent with normal ODA practices and the tactical situation.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) On the date of the incident, 11 March 2012, ODA (b)(1)1.4a SOF team led by an Army Captain Team Leader and an Army Master Sergeant Team Sergeant, was in charge of VSP Belambai. The (b)(1)1.4a of the two infantry uplift squads were under the operational control of the ODA. SSG Bales, as the senior ranking member of the infantry, acted as the primary interface between the infantry and the ODA NCOs. Several ODA "enablers" rounded out the personnel on VSP Belambai, along with a partnered Afghan National Army (ANA) platoon, interpreters, and some local national workers and civilian contractors.

d. (~~S~~) On the night of the incident, SSG Bales was able to leave and enter VSP Belambai unseen by simply going out the front gate. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

e. (~~S~~) On 11 March 2012, US personnel at VSP Belambai learned that an American was outside the VSP from the ANA guards through an interpreter. In less than (b)(1)1.4a from notification, the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership had conducted a 100% accountability inspection of men and weapons, searched the compound, identified SSG Bales as missing, and notified higher and adjacent units. The tactical response to the notification that an American had left the VSP was timely and adequate. Weapons and personnel accountability and inventory procedures were done regularly at VSP Belambai and were suitable to the tactical situation.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) Upon discovery, SSG Bales had an M4 rifle, an XM-320 grenade launcher, and a 9 mm H&K pistol, which he maintained in his living quarters on VSP Belambai. The M4 and XM-320 grenade launcher were SSG Bales' personal weapons issued to him by his organic infantry company. The H&K pistol was provided to SSG Bales by the ODA after the shooting deaths in February 2012 of the two US Service personnel in Kabul. Personnel on VSP Belambai were ordered to carry a weapon at all times after the February shootings, and ODA member (b)(3), (b)(6) let SSG Bales use an issued 9 mm so that SSG Bales did not have to carry his M4 around when on base.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) The morale of the personnel at VSP Belambai and unit cohesion were fairly high. Personnel felt that they were made part of the team, were well trained, and were generally happy to be at the VSP and on this deployment. From an operational and tactical standpoint, the VSP Belambai unit was competent in the performance of their operational

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mission during patrols off the VSP and in defense of the VSP. However, the command climate at VSP Belambai suffered from low standards of personal conduct and discipline while at the VSP. Certain NCOs of ODA (b)(1)1.4a and the NCOs of the infantry uplift squads tolerated and/or participated in the use of alcohol (which was also tolerated by ODA (b)(1)1.4a), use of steroids, and inappropriate remarks and behavior with respect to Afghans. Several NCOs at VSP Belambai uttered offensive racial/ethnic slurs, but the practice was not widespread, and usually comments were made among peers and in a joking manner. The leadership of ODA (b)(1)1.4a apparently was not aware of any of the inappropriate activity. Additionally, some of the ODA personnel viewed the infantry squad leaders with some disdain. Two of the more significant occurrences not reported to the Team Leadership include an incident in February 2012 when SSG Bales punched and kneed an Afghan truck driver in the midst of many other VSP Belambai personnel, and another instance regarding a fellow infantry NCO who was concerned about SSG Bales' erratic behavior due to steroid use on a mission in the week preceding the 11 March 2012 incident.

h. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Foremost responsible for the failures in personal conduct at VSP Belambai are the NCOs that committed, participated in, or tolerated the inappropriate behavior or failed to report the behavior to a responsible authority. That said, the ODA team leadership did not establish a command climate in which they had situational awareness of the negative acts of personal conduct of either the other ODA members or the NCOs of the infantry uplift squad. The ODA team leadership was apparently unaware of the inappropriate behavior; the other senior ODA members were either unaware of the behavior, tolerated the behavior, participated in the behavior themselves, or committed their own inappropriate acts. Additionally, junior enlisted personnel who thought certain behavior was wrong felt that they could not bring the problem to their leadership because, most often, their higher infantry leadership was committing the misconduct. The ODA leadership took a "hands-off" approach and did not overtly provide guidance on standards or expectations regarding Equal Opportunity (EO), alcohol, and drug use, but rather "took it for granted" that personnel understood those standards.

i. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** In a healthy command climate, the command should have had much greater situational awareness of the discipline of its members. At a minimum, the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership should have known about the incident in which SSG Bales assaulted the truck driver and should have known about the concern of SSG Bales acting erratically due to his use of steroids. Small unit leadership failure contributed to the ODA command not knowing about this information.

j. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** The ODA leadership that served with SSG Bales (both the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership and the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership that replaced ODA (b)(1)1.4a on 1 February 2012) did not know him very well and did not have much more than professional interaction with him in the one and one-half months that they served together. Although SSG Bales did have leadership in theater that knew him very well (his organic unit, 2-3 IN, was also in theater), the 2-3 IN leadership maintained only a limited ADCON relationship with the infantry squads at VSP Belambai. Meaningful visits to VSP Belambai by SSG Bales' ADCON and OPCON chains of command were limited due to the location of the VSP and its associated kinetic tactical situation, lack of air assets and time, and the geographic dispersion of various sites for which the leadership was responsible. Special Operations Task Force (SOTF)-South, the battalion-level command in the OPCON chain for VSP Belambai, rejected a

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request for SSG Bales' organic platoon leader or platoon sergeant to serve at VSP Belambai; rather, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant served together at a different location.

k. (U//~~FOUO~~) Per the request of those investigating/preparing the criminal case on behalf of the Government, I refrained from pursuing the appointment memorandum line of inquiry into key warnings and indicators with the witnesses located at VSP Belambai. Consequently, my direct investigation regarding warnings and indicators pertained predominantly to the period up to SSG Bales' last day on Kandahar Airfield (KAF) before departing for Belambai, 13 December 2011.

l. (U//~~FOUO~~) My direct investigation of warnings and indicators included a review of SSG Bales' NCOERs and Enlisted Record Brief, discussions with SSG Bales' OPCON chain of command not located at VSP Belambai, discussions with SSG Bales' organic chain of command, and discussions with other Service Members in theater familiar with SSG Bales. During the pre-deployment period through the night before his departure from KAF for VSP Belambai, SSG Bales gave no clear warning or indication he would engage in the future violent behavior he is alleged to have committed. Further, despite some expressed unhappiness in his marriage and some financial challenges, SSG Bales did not exhibit undue anxiety over this deployment. He gave no indications of his future behavior that any of those closest to him professionally could discern.

m. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although I did not directly investigate warnings and indicators with the VSP Belambai witnesses, my investigation of the command climate at VSP Belambai revealed evidence of potential warnings and indicators of future violent behavior of SSG Bales that warrant comment. Those instances of conduct include: (a) SSG Bales' statement to his squad during his first patrol to "shoot through the ANA guy, he is not a person;" (b) SSG Bales' statement that he was not a racist "unless you count Afghanis or Iraqis;" (c) evidence of SSG Bales drinking in combination with an observation made by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) an NCO that served with SSG Bales at Ft Lewis, that SSG Bales was an "angry drunk;" (d) SSG Bales' assault on a local Afghan truck driver; and (e) the concern of SSG Bales acting erratically because of his steroid use.

n. (U//~~FOUO~~) Due to the circumstances surrounding: (1) SSG Bales' statements of "shooting through the ANA" and not being racist "unless you count Afghanis or Iraqis" and (2) the evidence of SSG Bales drinking, a reasonable person would not find them to be warnings and indicators of future violent conduct of which the command should have been aware. The leadership of ODA (b)(1)1.4a should have been aware, however, of SSG Bales' assault on a truck driver and the concern by another NCO about SSG Bales acting erratically on steroids. Both of these instances of conduct amount to warnings and indicators that SSG Bales would engage in future unwarranted violent behavior against Afghans. These instances of conduct, however, do not rise to the level of warnings or indicators that SSG Bales would commit the extremely violent acts he allegedly committed on 11 March 2012.

o. (U//~~FOUO~~) After the shootings on the morning of 11 March 2012, Afghan civilians arrived at Forward Operating Base (FOB) Zangabad, 1500 meters from VSP Belambai, seeking medical care. The exemplary medical care of five wounded local Afghans at FOB Zangabad after the shooting saved the lives of the three civilians in CAT A (category A, life threatening) status. The battalion medical team had exceptional experience and procedures

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established to respond successfully to a serious mass casualty (MASCAL) event. Additionally, the availability of a female Soldier to assist with the evaluation of a CAT A female casualty allowed the medical team to overcome cultural sensitivities and provide the female patient with life saving treatments.

p. (U//~~FOUO~~) Several critical Key Leader Engagement/Consequence Management events occurred after the incident on 11 March 2012. Later on the day of the incident, influential Afghan leaders came to VSP Belambai, along with members of the US OPCON chain of command and other US military officials[7]. The Afghan leaders took the lead in quelling an angry crowd gathering outside the VSP. Additionally, through the coordination of Afghan leaders, the US was able to conduct a "Condolence Payments" shura on 24 March 2012, through which the US was able to pay proper claimants of the shootings. The Key Leader Engagements and other consequence management activities subsequent to the 11 March 2012 incident demonstrate the value of the partnering process with Afghan National Security Force (ANSF) and Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA) officials, and the value of immediate and open communications.

q. (U//~~FOUO~~) Numerous recommendations flow from this investigation, primarily to improve small unit leadership and command climate for ODA teams in charge of conventional infantry. These recommendations include: (a) additional training for ODA leaders on how to lead conventional forces not only from an operational and tactical perspective, but also on issues of personal conduct and discipline; (b) a requirement that ODA team leadership clearly articulate specific standards of appropriate behavior to the ODA, enablers, civilians, and infantry uplift personnel; (c) increased involvement of OPCON and ADCON chains of command with respect to their small units engaged in the VSO mission where SOF and conventional infantry soldiers are working as part of the same unit; (d) the SOF community employing training and education to ensure a respectful and professional attitude toward conventional infantry within the SOF ranks; (e) SOF leadership revisiting the idea of co-locating a conventional infantry platoon leader or platoon sergeant with the uplift infantry squads at the VSP site; and (f) specific steps to improve the ODAs' integration of the uplift squads--in general, the ODA must ***lead*** the more junior NCOs and Soldiers at VSP sites, and give those Soldiers the benefit of their training and experience.

r. (U//~~FOUO~~) Additional recommendations for further investigation include: (a) the command should consult with those conducting the criminal investigation/prosecution of the SSG Bales case for additional information on potential warnings and indicators of SSG Bales' behavior manifested by SSG Bales in theater; and (b) the command should conduct additional investigations of warnings and indicators in CONUS to incorporate a thorough review of SSG Bales' previous deployments and assignments, SSG Bales' medical and mental history, and a more thorough review of the train-up for this deployment.

3. ~~(S//RUIN)~~ Background. On 11 March 2012, SSG Robert Bales, an infantry Soldier assigned to 1st Platoon, Bravo Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment, allegedly left his assigned post, Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai, Afghanistan, under the cover of darkness, and then shot and killed numerous Afghan civilians in the neighboring villages

[7] These additional personnel included (b)(3), (b)(6), the advisor to the DCOP, (b)(3), (b)(6) the BSO (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6), 1-25 SBCT.

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of Alikozai and Naja Bien. At the time of the incident, SSG Bales was the senior US member of a two-squad conventional infantry unit attached to a Special Forces Operational Detachment – Alpha (ODA) team for the purpose of providing the ODA with extra manpower in support of the ODA conducting so-called Village Stability Operations (VSO) in remote Afghanistan. To place the content of this report in context, the following paragraphs describe the location and geography of VSP Belambai, provide a brief history of VSO and the VSP Belambai site, give an overview of the personnel present at VSP Belambai at the time of the incident, and describe the command and control relationships for SSG Bales' unit.

a. ~~(S//REL)~~ VSP Belambai Description and Geography. Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai sits in the "Horn of Panjwa'i" about 40 kilometers southwest of Kandahar City. The VSP is 1500 meters west of Forward Operating Base (FOB) Zangabad, the location of a U.S. battalion headquarters (3d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment) and an Afghan National Army Kandak.[8] The area surrounding the VSP is agricultural with the predominant crop being grapes. The VSP is located in the village of Belambai. The village of Alikozai is 500 meters northwest of the VSP, and the village of Naja Bien is 740 meters to the south. Many of the dwellings in the area are uninhabited, and most of the landowners live either in Zangabad City or Kandahar City. Those who reside in the area are primarily tenant farmers and include members of the Alikozai and Achakzai tribes.[9]



[8] (U//~~FOUO~~) A "Kandak" is an Afghan Battalion. The 3d Battalion, 21st Infantry Regiment (3-21 IN), commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6) was the so-called "battle-space owner" (BSO) for its surrounding area, including VSP Belambai. However, as described further in the report, the BSO had no formal command and control relationships with VSP Belambai. Exhibit PPP: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[9] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit JJJ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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b. ~~(S//RUIN)~~ Brief History of Village Stability Operations (VSO).

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The roots of VSO began in March 2009 with the establishment of the Afghan Public Protection Program (AP3) to improve security in five districts of Wardak Province[10] by leveraging locally recruited and trained forces. From July through December 2009, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A) launched the Community Defense Initiative (CDI) in nine districts located in Regional Commands (RC)-South, East, and West, to support a GIRoA effort to engage local institutions and provide protection and services to the population. In August 2010, President Karzai signed a decree establishing the Ministry of Interior Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. The purpose of ALP was the development of Special Operations Force (SOF)-trained village defense forces that would catalyze improvements in security, governance, and development, and provide villages and districts with greater connectivity to GIRoA. These operations are known as Village Stability Operations (VSO). The VSO framework includes a Village Stability National Coordination Center in Kabul, regionally-based Village Stability Coordination Centers (VSCCs), and regionally-based Special Operations Task Forces (SOTFs) that control a number of Village Stability Platforms (VSPs).[11]

(2) ~~(S//RUIN)~~ In late 2010, CFSOCC-A requested two infantry battalions to augment the VSO mission through the use of infantry squads at VSP sites, and the use of the infantry battalion headquarters as additional VSCC or SOTF headquarters. The purpose of these "uplift" units was "to capitalize on VSO gains and set the conditions for future VSO expansion."[12] Eventually, infantry platoons would consolidate on VSP sites to assume the partnership with the ALP, allowing the ODAs to move to new locations, thus expanding the overall VSO footprint.[13] By early 2012, the VSO mission was the number one priority for CFSOCC-A in support of the International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) Campaign Plan. In April 2012, the CFSOCC-A Commander, Brigadier General (BG) Chris Haas, stated that the uplift infantry was the "most significant combat multiplier and enhancement to the VSO and ALP program." For BG Haas, the addition of the infantry to the VSO mission was the "game changer" that allowed CFSOCC-A to expand from 35 to over 90 VSO sites across the entire Afghanistan Combined Joint Operations Area.[14]

c. ~~(S//RUIN)~~ Brief History of the VSP at Belambai. Shaping operations in the Belambai area began as early as November 2010. In April 2011, ODA (b)(1)1.4a[15] located at Combat Outpost (COP) Suleiman,[16] roughly 1500 meters east from the current location of VSP

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[10] (U//~~FOUO~~) Wardak province is located in east central Afghanistan. It borders Kabul Province and Logar Province on its east, Ghazni Province to its south, Parwan Province to its north, and Bamyan Province to its northwest and west.

[11] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit A: CJSOTF-A presentation, undated, "VSO-ALP Methodology." VSP Belambai is under the operational control of SOTF-S and works in coordination with VSCC-S, both currently located at Kandahar Airfield. Exhibit B: (b)(3)(b)(6) Memorandum for Record.

[12] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit C: Situation, CJSOTF-A OEF XVII Fragmentary Order 11-342, 18 September 2011.

[13] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit C: Situation, CJSOTF-A OEF XVII Fragmentary Order 11-342, 18 September 2011.

[14] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit D: MFR of Phonecon with BG Chris Haas, 15 April 2012.

[15] (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a ODA (b)(1)1.4a Exhibit B: (b)(3)(b)(6) MFR.

[16] (U//~~FOUO~~) COP Suleiman is also known alternatively as "the old school" or "VSP Zangabad" (VSP Zangabad is not to be confused with FOB Zangabad – FOB Zangabad is 1.5 km east of VSP Belambai, and VSP

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Belambai and slightly southwest of FOB Zangabad, conducted a site assessment for a new site. The purpose of moving the VSP was to expand westward toward another VSP site (VSP Talukan) to disrupt Taliban freedom of movement in the Horn of Panjwa'i. ODA (b)(1)1.4a mission was to conduct VSO from VSP Belambai no later than 15 April 2011,[17] working with a rotating platoon from the Weapons Company, 2d Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Corps, Afghan National Army. VSP Belambai began as a checkpoint that was initially established about 4 June 2011 by a split element from ODA (b)(1)1.4a The remainder of ODA (b)(1)1.4a maintained a presence at COP Suleiman where they could support operations while infrastructure was built for the new VSP at Belambai. It was not until 30 November 2011 that the entire ODA (b)(1)1.4a consolidated at VSP Belambai.[18]

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Personnel at the VSP. At the time of the incident on 11 March 2012, VSP Belambai had (b)(1)1.4a US military personnel, (b)(1)1.4a interpreters, and a partnered Afghan National Army platoon of (b)(1)1.4a personnel assigned. The US personnel included those assigned to ODA (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a personnel);[19] two squads from 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-3 IN (b)(1)1.4a personnel);[20] (b)(1)1.4a so-called (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

e. ~~(S//RUIN)~~ Command and Control Relationships for Units at VSP Belambai.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) At VSP Belambai, the infantry squad uplift elements were OPCON to the ODA. Therefore, the OPCON chain of command for the infantry squads and ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) were the same. That is, OPCON ran from the ODA to the Advanced Operations Base (AOB – the special forces company command equivalent), to SOTF-S, and then to CJSOTF-A.[23]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) For ADCON, the infantry uplift squads and ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) had different chains of command. The ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) ADCON chain of command was the same as their

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Zangabad (aka COP Suleiman) is slightly southwest of FOB Zangabad). Exhibits B and CCCC: (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR and Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai (enclosure 2).

[17] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit E: "VSP Belambai Village Stability Operations ODA (b)(1)1.4a 30 November 2011.

[18] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit B: (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR.

[19] (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

[20] (U//~~FOUO~~) Each infantry squad included a squad leader, two team leaders, their teams, and a medic. Exhibits B, P, and X: (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR, Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[21] (U//~~FOUO~~) A JTAC is responsible for air operations and the employment of air weapons teams. Exhibit B: (b)(3)(b)(6) MFR.

[22] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit E: "Initial Brief on 17 July 2015 at 09:30 in building 1570, 28 Mech, Rm 2.C323. Both Primary and Alternate SMEs must attend.

[23] ~~(S//RUIN)~~ ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) was OPCON to AOB (b)(3), (b)(6) however, this OPCON relationship remained conditional. That is, the SOTF assumed direct OPCON of the ODA for combat missions, troops in contact, and most non-administrative movements. Shifting OPCON from the AOB to the SOTF facilitated centralized battle-tracking within the SOTF OPCEN. Exhibits CCC-FFF: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

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OPCON chain of command (that is, ODA (b)(1)1.4a organic chain of command). For the infantry squad, ADCON primarily ran through 1st Platoon, B Company's organic chain of command, which was B Company, 2-3 IN (located at FOB Mogensen) and then 2-3 IN (otherwise known as Task Force (b)(1)1.4a located at Camp Patriot, FOB Warrior, Ghazni Province, Afghanistan).[24]

(3) ~~(S//RUIN)~~ In accordance with the Request for Forces (RFF) originally submitted from US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A), the command relationship of 2-3 IN to USFOR-A is OPCON.[25] Each SOTF and Task Force (b)(1)1.4a assumed OPCON of subordinate elements coming from other units.[26]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) The following graphic depicts the command and control relationships for the VSP Belambai units:[27]



(ADCON actually ran from 2-3 IN to 3-2 SBCT, however, the commanders of 3-2 SBCT and CJSOTF-A had a "gentlemen's agreement" regarding certain aspects of ADCON).[28]

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[24] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits XX, YY, CCC, and DDD: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)

[25] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit G: Paragraph 3.A.5.F of USCENTCOM OEF Urgent Request for Forces Serial 1111209, 101914Z NOV 10.

[26] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit H: Paragraph 3.c of CJSOTF-A OEF XVII Fragmentary Order 11-339 TF (b)(1)1.4a RIP, 281000D Sep11.

[27] (U//~~FOUO~~) 3-21 IN and its higher headquarters, 1-25 SBCT are the Battle Space Owners for VSP Belambai. According to (b)(3), (b)(6) 3-21 IN Commander, the BSO does not have OPCON or ADCON of the ODA at VSP Belambai. However, the ODA at VSP Belambai must coordinate with the BSO before conducting operations in the battle space, and the BSO has "veto authority" to prevent conflict with other operations in the battle space. Exhibit PPP: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[28] (U//~~FOUO~~) When 2-3 IN deployed into theater, it had divided its squads and attached elements into 44 VSP uplift elements and 8 Forward Logistics Elements (FLE), of which only 2 VSP elements and 1 FLE fell under the operational control (OPCON) of TF (b)(1)1.4a (2-3 IN headquarters). The other units fell under the operational

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4. (U//~~FOUO~~) The following witnesses were interviewed for this report:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Infantry Uplift, 1st Squad, 1st Platoon, B CO, 2-3 IN.** (The 1st Squad Leader, (b)(3)(b)(6) was unavailable to be interviewed for this report).[29]

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Team Leader. (Exhibit I).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit J).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit K).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit L).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Team Leader. (Exhibit M).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit N).
(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit O).
(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit P).

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Infantry Uplift, 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, B CO, 2-3 IN.** (SSG Robert Bales, squad leader, and (b)(3), (b)(6) team leader, were unavailable for interview).[30]

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Team Leader. (Exhibit Q).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Squad Member. (Exhibit R).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit S).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Team Leader. (Exhibit T).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit U).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit V).
(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Squad Member. (Exhibit W).
(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit X).

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Operation Detachment-Alpha (ODA)** (b)(1)1.4 **Enablers.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit Y).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Chemical Reconnaissance Detachment (CRD). (Exhibit Z).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit AA).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit BB).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit CC).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit DD).

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) **ODA** (b)(1)1.4a

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control of SOTF-E, SOTF-SE, and SOTF-S depending on where they were located. Nonetheless, TF (b)(1)1.4a retained administrative control (ADCON) of those units, which generally meant that TF (b)(1)1.4a was responsible for non-judicial punishment, counseling, and personnel evaluation actions. The ADCON/OPCON responsibilities and practices were never formalized and instead were developed through oral discussions among CJSOTF-A, 3-2 SBCT, the SOTFs and the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership. (b)(3), (b)(6) of 3-2 SBCT, the ADCON headquarters for 2-3 IN, called this a "gentlemen's agreement." Exhibit III: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

[29] (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) was unavailable due to a concurrent criminal investigation.
[30] (U//~~FOUO~~) These witnesses were unavailable due to a concurrent criminal investigation.

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(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit EE).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit FF).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit GG).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit HH).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit II).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit JJ).
(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit KK).
(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit LL).
(9) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit MM).
(10) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit NN).

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) **ODA** (b)(1)1.4a SSG Bales' unit arrived at VSP Belambai on 14 December. At that time, the ODA on site was ODA (b)(1)1.4a ODA (b)(1)1.4a replaced ODA (b)(1)1.4a on 1 February 2012).

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6). (Exhibit OO).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit PP).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit QQ).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6). (Exhibit RR).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit SS).

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Civilians and Interpreters at VSP Belambai.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (Exhibit TT).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (Exhibit UU).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (Exhibit VV).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (Exhibit GGGG).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) Cat I Interpreter. (Exhibit HHHH).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6) (Exhibit WW).[31]

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) **B CO, 2-3 IN Personnel (ADCON Chain of Command).**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit XX).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit YY).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit ZZ).

[31] (U//~~FOUO~~) The primary difference between CAT I and CAT II Interpreters (Linguists) is their clearance to access classified materials. See United States Army Intelligence and Security Command: *Contract Linguist Handbook for the Afghanistan Theater of Operations v.3.*, May 2012. Page 10: "CAT I linguists are either citizens or permanent residents of the US or 5 eyes partner nations . . . . CAT I linguists do not hold a security clearance, have no access to classified and no access to NOFORN . . . . CAT II linguists are either citizens or permanent residents of the US or 5 eyes partner nations . . . . US CAT II linguists, as necessary, are granted interim access to SECRET . . . ."

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(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit AAA).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit BBB).

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Special Operations Forces Personnel (OPCON Chain of Command).**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4 Advanced Operating Base (AOB). (Exhibit CCC).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) Group (A) (SOTF-S). (Exhibit DDD).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (A) (SOTF-S) Night Shift OPCEN OIC. (Exhibit EEE).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (A) (SOTF-S) Night Shift OPCEN NCOIC. (Exhibit FFF).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was the predecessor to (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit GGG).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit HHH).

i. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Key Leader Engagement/Consequence Management Personnel.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit III).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit JJJ).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit KKK).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit LLL).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit MMM).
(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) BG Martin Schweitzer, Deputy Commanding General – Operations, Regional Command – South. (Exhibit IIII).

j. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Medical Response.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit NNN).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit OOO).

k. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Miscellaneous Personnel.**

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Battle Space Owner). (Exhibit PPP).
(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) (Exhibit QQQ).
(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Bales). (Exhibit RRR).
(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit YYY).
(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit ZZZ).

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(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 IN. (Exhibit AAAA).

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) (Exhibit BBBB).

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings and Conclusions. All findings are made by a preponderance of the evidence. Certain questions include a concluding paragraph summarizing the findings, where appropriate.

5.1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 1: What was the command climate at VSP Belambai at the time of the incident?

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) To assess command climate at VSP Belambai, I interviewed the following people: the infantry uplift squad members of 1st and 3rd squads; the current ODA (b)(1)1.4a the leadership and senior enlisted members of the previous ODA (b)(1)1.4a the current enablers to ODA (b)(1)1.4a and civilians and interpreters that served at VSP Belambai during the relevant time period.[32]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Overall, the morale of the personnel at the VSP was fairly high. The unit had strong cohesion. Personnel felt that they were made part of the team and that they were well trained to perform the mission. They were generally happy to be at the VSP and on this deployment. Personnel had a high opinion of the ODA leadership and expressed that they felt that the leadership cared for them. These observations applied to both ODA (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a.[33]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Adherence to standards and discipline as an aspect of command climate was mixed. From an operational and tactical standpoint, the VSP Belambai unit was a sharp, professional organization. They knew how to perform their missions, performed them well, maintained their weapons, and knew and adhered to their guard mount and security procedures. ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a were tactically and technically proficient for Tactical Ground Movements (TGMs), Combat Reconnaissance Patrols (CRPs), base defense, and interaction with the local population.[34]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) From a standpoint of personal conduct, however, standards of conduct and discipline were low. Certain NCOs of ODA (b)(1)1.4a and the NCOs of the infantry uplift squads tolerated and/or participated in the use of alcohol (which was also tolerated by ODA (b)(1)1.4a[35] use of steroids,[36] and inappropriate remarks and behavior with respect to

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[32] (U//~~FOUO~~) See generally the VSP Belambai Interviews, Exhibits I – WW.
[33] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I – WW: VSP Belambai Witness Interviews.
[34] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I – WW: VSP Belambai Witness Interviews.
[35] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits K, L, N, P, Q, S, T, and WW: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Exhibit SSS: New Year's Eve Video. The New Year's Eve Video, which (b)(3), (b)(6) filmed, shows several soldiers exhibiting boisterous and erratic behavior while firing various weapons and flares off of the roof of the OPCEN. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he believed that several NCOs consumed alcohol that night, based on the the behavior exhibited in the video, which he termed "people acting stupid." See Exhibit K: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[36] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR, Exhibit P: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Afghans.[37] The leadership of ODA (b)(1)1.4a was not aware of this activity.[38] Further, junior enlisted personnel that knew certain behavior was wrong felt that they could not bring the problem to their leadership because, most often, their higher infantry leadership was committing the misconduct, and they did not feel empowered to "jump the chain" of their infantry leadership.[39]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Drinking. Drinking alcohol in knowing violation of CENTCOM General Order Number 1B[40] was tolerated by the NCOs of the infantry uplift squads and NCOs of ODA (b)(1)1.4a [41] Several members of the infantry uplift squad have admitted drinking alcohol with each other.[42] The lower-ranking Soldiers at VSP Belambai stated that drinking occurred on special occasions like Christmas and New Year's Eve, and that they could smell alcohol on SSG Bales' breath from time to time when he came into their housing area.[43] Such behavior would be hard to miss in the NCO and team-leadership living areas, given the small size of the area. Toleration of alcohol at VSP Belambai during ODA (b)(1)1.4a tenure was a carryover from ODA (b)(1)1.4a toleration of drinking. During ODA (b)(1)1.4a tenure, (b)(3), (b)(6), an interpreter, reported that he had been told that Friday was the night for drinking for ODA (b)(1)1.4a that the Team Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) specifically had alcohol, and that (b)(6) should avoid the boardwalk areas on those nights.[44] In February 2012, (b)(3), (b)(6) a member of the infantry uplift squad, found bottles floating in the burn pit after a heavy rain, and after the 11 March 2012 incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) saw what he perceived as (b)(3), (b)(6) breaking bottles after (b)(3), (b)(6) was ordered to turn the burn pit with the bucket loader.[45]

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Racial and ethnic slurs. Several NCOs at VSP Belambai uttered offensive racial/ethnic slurs, but the practice was not widespread. When racial/ethnic slurs were used among the VSP Belambai personnel, they were predominately used among peers and in a joking manner.

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The leaders and Soldiers on VSP Belambai did not in general exhibit inappropriate racial or ethnic behavior toward each other. The senior NCOs formed a tight-knit bond among themselves, as did the lower-ranking enlisted Soldiers. Racially and ethnically specific language was used with frequency among the Soldiers in their living quarters (the "B-hut"), but none of them said this language was insensitive or inappropriate. Rather, the environment in the B-hut exhibited a close bonding among the Soldiers.[46]

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[37] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits K, N, Q, S, UU, WW, and HHHH: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

[38] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits EE-GG: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[39] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits S and P: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) however, did not think this issue needed to be raised to the command.

[40] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit LLLL: General Order Number 1B, dated 13 March 2006. Paragraph 2.c. prohibits the "introduction, purchase, possession, sale, transfer, manufacture or consumption of any alcoholic beverage within the countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan and Iraq."

[41] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits K, L, M, N, P-W, and WW: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

[42] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.

[43] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits K, P, S, U: (b)(3), (b)(6)

[44] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WW: Statement of (b)(6)

[45] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit M(1): Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[46] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I-W: Statements of the infantry uplift squad personnel.

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Similarly, (b)(3), (b)(6) mentioned the friendly exchange of ethnic nicknames between himself and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) and both enablers added to the ODA.[47] (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he occasionally heard the (b)(3)(b)(6) inbred joke" directed toward him by his fellow ODA team members, but he never took offense.[48]

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Some comments, however, were considered offensive. One Soldier, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that (b)(3), (b)(6) does not like black people (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that while doing cement work, (b)(3), (b)(6) made the comment "Here I am working like a fucking n—ger and you guys are over there just hanging out." Racial comments were overhead by one of (b)(3), (b)(6) Soldiers, (b)(3), (b)(6) who is African-American. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that upon (b)(3), (b)(6) hearing (b)(3), (b)(6) say racial remarks, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated, "That guy is racist as hell." (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) did not do anything about these remarks; they would "stay away from (b)(3), (b)(6) as long as he did not treat us differently; we didn't care if he said things like that."[49] Another African-American Soldier, (b)(3), (b)(6) are the only African-American Soldiers in the infantry squads) stated that SSG Bales on more than one occasion made insensitive comments about African-American films playing on Armed Forces Network (AFN) for Black History month. On another occasion, SSG Bales heard (b)(3), (b)(6) singing in the shower, and asked "Who's singing in there. Is it (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) responded that it was him [(b)(3), (b)(6)]. In response, SSG Bales said, "(b)(3), (b)(6)! Ha, close enough to (b)(3), (b)(6)." According to (b)(3), (b)(6) the ODA chain of command did not know of these incidents. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not feel comfortable going above SSG Bales to the ODA leadership because (b)(3), (b)(6) thought it was not an environment where you would be able to bring up your concerns and, specifically regarding racist comments, he never felt comfortable talking about it with anyone else.[50] (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that sometimes his infantry squad leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales would make comments to him such as "Hey, you're a worthless piece of white trash," which (b)(3), (b)(6) found offensive.[51]

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) Remarks and Behavior toward Afghans. Inappropriate remarks and behavior with respect to Afghans was tolerated by subordinate leaders at VSP Belambai,[52] but the ODA (b)(1)1.4 leadership was apparently unaware of this behavior.[53]

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3)(b)(6) reported that SSG Bales told his squad on their first patrol to shoot through the ANA if necessary since the ANA were not real soldiers. However, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not think that the ODA (b)(1)1.4 leadership was aware of this

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[47] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit DD: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[48] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit II: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[49] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit I: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Notably, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not acknowledge any racist/ethnic slurs during his statement. However, (b)(3), (b)(6) also did not acknowledge any knowledge/rumors of alcohol use, which a majority of infantry Soldiers acknowledged. Exhibit J: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) The likelihood of (b)(3), (b)(6) making such a comment is bolstered by other witnesses, described below, stating they overheard (b)(3), (b)(6) referring to Afghan locals as "Monkeys." Exhibits Q and WW: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[50] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit S: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[51] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits K: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[52] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits K, N, Q, S, UU, WW, and HHHH: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[53] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits EE, FF, and GG: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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incident.[54] In the case of ODA (b)(1)1.4a (b)(6), a Category I interpreter, reported that (b)(3), (b)(6), the ODA junior 18B, pulled out his pistol and, gesturing with the pistol, told (b)(6) that he was going to use the pistol to kill Afghans. Although (b)(3)(b)(6) thought (b)(3), (b)(6) was joking at the time, this rhetoric bothered him.[55] Another interpreter, (b)(6), a Category II Interpreter (and a US citizen of Afghan descent) reported that (b)(6) along with several others, would mockingly chant along with the Muslim call to prayer, despite (b)(6) advice that this was not a good thing to do in front of the ANA personnel. (b)(6) stated that (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) also would refer to local workers as "Monkeys."[56] (b)(3), (b)(6) also reported that (b)(3), (b)(6) referred to local workers as "Monkeys" and "pieces of shit."[57]

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) The second week of February 2012, a work detail formed to help unload a Class I resupply vehicle, a local "jingle truck." A "line" or "string" of Soldiers formed to unload the truck, and the Class I was tossed from one person to the next along the line. The jingle truck driver, a local Afghan, joined the line of Soldiers to offload the truck, and he preceded SSG Bales in the line. While tossing the supplies, the jingle truck driver accidently hit SSG Bales with a box. SSG Bales told the driver in English, which the driver did not understand, that the truck driver better not hit him again. Everyone in the line except SSG Bales, apparently, was enjoying themselves. The truck driver again hit SSG Bales accidently with a box, and SSG Bales attacked the truck driver, punching him and kneeing him. The man received a bloody nose and lip, and received medical attention from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) the 1st Squad medic. Numerous infantry Soldiers witnessed the incident, along with at least two ODA members, (b)(3), (b)(6) This incident was well-known among the personnel in the camp. No adverse action was taken by the ODA leadership against SSG Bales for this behavior, and there were no conversations with the infantry personnel about the incident or the proper way to treat members of the local population.[58] Despite the serious nature of the incident, numerous eyewitnesses, and notoriety of the incident among camp personnel (to include civilians on the camp and an interpreter),[59] the ODA leadership was apparently not made aware that it occurred[60] (although one witness reported that the event was briefed at the nightly Team meeting).[61] By all accounts, the actions of SSG Bales were completely inappropriate, though (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that one ODA member, (b)(3), (b)(6) "thought it was funny."[62]

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) The ODA members knew of the beating of the Afghan truck driver but handled it at the NCO level rather than bringing it to the Team Sergeant or Team Leader's attention. Because SSG Bales was the senior NCO among the infantry and a former highly regarded platoon sergeant, the lower enlisted Soldiers did not feel empowered to go

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[54] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit S: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[55] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit HHHH: Memorandum for Record, Statement of (b)(6)
[56] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WW: Statement of (b)(6)
[57] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit Q: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[58] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I, L-P, R-W, AA, JJ, UU, TT, and WW: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[59] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit UU, TT, and WW: (b)(3), (b)(6)
[60] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits EE, FF, and GG: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[61] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit AA: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[62] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit Q: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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above their infantry chain of command to the ODA leadership. As (b)(3)(b)(6) stated, "I never felt comfortable enough to talk to anyone else about that" sort of thing.[63]

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) Steroids. Steroid use was tolerated by a limited number of NCOs on VSP Belambai. SSG Bales was using steroids, and this was known by at least (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (another infantry NCO), (b)(3), (b)(6)[64] None of these individuals notified the ODA leadership of SSG Bales' steroid use.[65] Four or five days before the 11 March 2012 incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) that SSG Bales had been acting erratically on a mission that day because SSG Bales was taking steroids, and (b)(3), (b)(6) made (b)(3), (b)(6) promise not to tell anyone. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not bring the issue up with the chain of command, primarily because he did not think that it was something that "affected his [SSG Bales'] performance and getting us home alive." When asked how he thought the ODA leadership would react to this information, he indicated that he was not sure what the ODA found acceptable and that he did not necessarily have access to the higher command.[66]

(8) (U//~~FOUO~~) Certain NCO members of both ODA teams had an "Us versus Them" mentality with respect to the infantry NCOs, whom they viewed with professional disdain.[67]

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) According to (b)(3), (b)(6), ODA personnel had such a low regard for SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) that the ODA personnel sometimes directed tasks straight to the team leaders or lower enlisted Soldiers instead of through the two infantry squad leaders.[68] One member of the ODA stated that this was done because SSG Bales was incapable of operating with basic guidance and required detailed instructions on how to supervise the most basic of tasks.[69] (b)(1)1.4a

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) ODA (b)(1)1.4a personnel had a better relationship with the infantry NCOs than ODA (b)(1)1.4a However, (b)(3), (b)(6) admit to viewing the infantry squad leaders with some disdain since they were not 18 series MOS and had not been to Ranger School despite having been in the infantry for several years.[70]

(9) (U//~~FOUO~~) Foremost responsible for the failures in personal conduct at VSP Belambai are the NCOs that committed, participated in, or tolerated the inappropriate behavior or failed to report the behavior to a responsible authority. That said, the ODA team leadership's command climate did not encourage the kind of reporting that would have made them aware of the negative acts of personal conduct by other ODA members or the NCOs of the infantry uplift squad. Specifically, the ODA team leadership was apparently unaware of the inappropriate behavior; and the other senior ODA members were either unaware of the

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[63] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit S: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[64] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR; Exhibit P: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[65] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits P, EE, FF, and GG: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[66] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits P: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[67] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits HH, II, and KK: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[68] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits N, R, and U: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[69] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit PP: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[70] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits HH, II, and KK: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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behavior, tolerated the behavior, participated in the behavior themselves, or committed their own inappropriate acts. Junior Soldiers who observed the inappropriate behavior did not feel comfortable "jumping the chain" of their infantry leadership with problems they had or observed with their infantry leadership or with the ODA NCOs.

(10) (U//~~FOUO~~) The ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership did not have much interaction with the infantry personnel, having only served with them for a month and one-half at VSP Belambai. The infantry NCO with whom the ODA team leadership would presumably interact the most was SSG Bales, and the ODA team leadership did not know him well at all. Also, the ODA leadership did not overtly provide guidance on standards or expectations regarding Equal Opportunity (EO), alcohol, and drug use, but rather "took it for granted" that personnel understood those standards. However, when presented with evidence of SSG Bales' steroid use, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that although he knew the rules, he was not sure "what it was the ODA was OK with."[71] Similarly, when (b)(3), (b)(6) saw evidence of senior personnel drinking and drunkenness, he believed alcohol use was "tacitly accepted."[72]

(11) (U//~~FOUO~~) In a healthy command climate, the leadership should have had much greater situational awareness of the discipline and conduct of its personnel. If the leadership of ODA (b)(1)1.4a had established a healthy command climate, then the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership would have known at a minimum about SSG Bales' assault on the truck driver and his erratic actions while on steroids, and should have known about other instances of inappropriate behavior.[73] Small unit leadership failure by the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership team contributed to them not knowing about this negative information and not taking any subsequent appropriate action.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) The command survey for the above findings was as representative as possible; however the accuracy of the survey suffers from the following notable deficiencies:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) A significant sub-group of the VSP personnel, the NCO leadership of the uplift infantry squads, was unavailable for interview.[74] In addition to these NCOs playing a critical role in the leadership dynamics at the VSP, these NCOs also were the subject of or had direct knowledge of a major portion of the negative comments made about the climate.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Witnesses from ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a were reluctant to say anything negative about themselves or fellow team members. Whether due to team loyalty, self-preservation, or both, many ODA members (with the exception of the team leadership of ODA (b)(1)1.4a appeared not to be forthcoming with information. Given the small size of the VSP and the widespread knowledge of certain instances of negative conduct, several of the ODA enablers and some of the enlisted Soldiers also appear to have hedged their testimony. The civilians that testified appeared to be cooperative. The interpreters also appeared to be helpful. Where testimony of the interpreters conflicted with other witnesses regarding

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[71] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit P: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) further stated, however, that he did not believe the comment that was made to him was one he needed to report to the command.
[72] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit S: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[73] (U//~~FOUO~~) The other incidents of which the command should have been aware include the use of alcohol (see para. 5.1 (4)); the use of racially insensitive language (see para 5.1 (5) b); and articulated disdain for Afghans (see para 5.1 (6)).
[74] (U//~~FOUO~~) These witnesses were unavailable due to a concurrent criminal investigation.

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negative behavior, I found the interpreter's testimony more credible than the testimony of other witnesses.

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) The above observation about ODA (b)(1)1.4 team members (except for the team leadership) placing loyalty and self-preservation before candor is directly supported by the following actions of ODA members at the site. According to credible testimony from several witnesses of the infantry uplift squad, on the morning of 11 March 2012, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) – the two highest ranking ODA NCOs at the time on VSP Belambai, apparently took action to prevent the discovery of negative conduct at the VSP. According to members of the infantry uplift squads, later in the morning of 11 March 2012 (after the incident), (b)(3), (b)(6) the ODA Commander, and (b)(3), (b)(6) addressed the infantry squads in the chow hall, noting that CID was coming and that they would probably search the place. After (b)(3), (b)(6) left the chow hall, (b)(3), (b)(6) came back into the room and told the Service Members that if they had any contraband, to make sure they got rid of it.[75] Later that morning, (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to use the bucket loader to "turn the burn pit." After (b)(3), (b)(6) had done as he was told, (b)(3), (b)(6) saw what he perceived as (b)(3), (b)(6) breaking bottles in the pit. After (b)(3), (b)(6) turned the burn pit, (b)(3), (b)(6) who admitted to drinking on the VSP[76], confirmed with (b)(3), (b)(6) whether (b)(3), (b)(6) had, in fact, turned the burn pit.[77]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) Additionally, it became a concern to me during the conduct of the investigation that ODA (b)(1)1.4 members were talking to each other about their interviews. The extent to which they discussed the substance of their interviews is unknown (they certainly discussed the procedure of their interviews), but the situation became significant enough for me to address the matter with the witnesses' Battalion Commander to ensure compliance with this important proscription. The witnesses were not sequestered and had every opportunity to discuss their testimony with one another.

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Given the above observations, where an enlisted Soldier's testimony of an event conflicted with an ODA member's testimony, I generally considered the enlisted Soldier's testimony more reliable.

Question 5.2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 2: What was SSG Bales' chain of command, and how well did they know him? How much interaction did they have with him? For the chain of command located off of VSP Belambai, how frequently did the chain of command visit and make meaningful contact with SSG Bales and the element he was a part of?

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) On VSP Belambai, SSG Bales was the senior member of the infantry uplift squad, often referred to as the quasi-Platoon Sergeant for the group. His chain of command on VSP Belambai ran from the ODA Team Sergeant to the ODA Team Leader. From the infantry arrival on 14 December 2011 until 31 January 2012, SSG Bales'

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[75] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits M(1), O(2), S(1) Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[76] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpt MFR (b)(3), (b)(6).
[77] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit M(1) (Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)). We have no evidence that this was related at all to SSG Bales' activities.

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operational chain-of-command (OPCON) ran through the ODA (b)(1)1.4a Team Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to the Team Leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) [78] From 1 February 2012, the chain-of-command ran through the ODA (b)(1)1.4a Team Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) [79] to the Team Leader, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership had daily professional interaction with SSG Bales but did not know him very well. From the time of arrival of ODA (b)(1)1.4a until the incident, SSG Bales had only spent about 50 days with the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership on Belambai.[81] (b)(3), (b)(6) saw SSG Bales daily, at least at the evening team meeting, but he was not around the infantry uplift NCOs very much.[82] (b)(3), (b)(6) also saw SSG Bales daily. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SSG Bales' direct point of contact with the ODA was (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) The ODA leadership kept their distance from the lower-ranking NCOs after hours.[83]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) ADCON Chain of Command.

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) SSG Bales deployed to theater with the rest of his battalion, 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment. The 2-3 IN chain of command maintained an ADCON relationship with SSG Bales' unit at VSP Belambai. For ADCON, SSG Bales reported through his Platoon Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6), and his Platoon Leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) both serving on VSP Ezabad, and from there to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) of B Company, 2-3 IN, both located with SOTF-SE at AOB Trident on FOB Mogensen inside FOB Laghman.[84]

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Due to their prior interaction and relationships, SSG Bales' ADCON chain of command knew him "pretty well" to "very well." (b)(3), (b)(6) the B Company Commander, had known SSG Bales since 30 June 2011 when he took command. When the VSO mission came to the Battalion in July 2011, (b)(3), (b)(6) worked with SSG Bales through the train-up period, including the National Training Center (NTC) rotation, before SSG Bales was relegated to a squad leader position in late September 2011 (he was previously serving as the acting Platoon Sergeant). (b)(3), (b)(6) was relegated back to a squad leader position when B Company received an E-7, (b)(3), (b)(6) to fill the platoon sergeant position.[85] (b)(3), (b)(6) had known SSG Bales since August 2010, when SSG Bales came to B Company. They had been platoon sergeants together in Bravo Company, and (b)(3), (b)(6)

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[78] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit OO: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[79] (U//~~FOUO~~) After (b)(3)(b)(6) MEDEVAC as a result of an IED incident on 5 March, (b)(3), (b)(6) became the acting (b)(1)1.4a Team Sergeant. Exhibit EE, GG, and MM: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6)

[80] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit EE: Statement of (b)(3)(b)(6)

[81] (U//~~FOUO~~) Similarly, the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership only spent about one and a half months overlapping with SSG Bales and his unit. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he interacted with SSG Bales every day, and that he knew SSG Bales as well as he could "within the constraints of the mission." Exhibit OO: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) the ODA (b)(1)1.4a Team Sergeant, stated that he interacted with SSG Bales every day "and we patrolled about every three days, and that was about it. I didn't know him very well." Exhibit QQ: Statement of (b)(3)(b)(6)

[82] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit EE: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[83] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit GG: Statement of

[84] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX: Statement of

[85] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX: Statement of

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(b)(3)(b)(6) considered SSG Bales "a friend."[86] (b)(3), (b)(6) was the B Company Executive Officer. When (b)(3), (b)(6) was a platoon leader, SSG Bales was a platoon sergeant for another platoon in B Company. They had connecting desks in their work space, and (b)(3), (b)(6) considered SSG Bales a mentor and felt that they were "very close."[87] (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was SSG Bales' platoon leader. SSG Bales was his platoon sergeant when (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived as the platoon leader, and (b)(3), (b)(6) felt they had a fairly close relationship in terms of "learning day to day operations of the platoon" and working together on "pretty much all the issues that we had."[88] (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the unit in September 2011, displacing SSG Bales as Platoon Sergeant for 1st Platoon. He stated that although he did not know SSG Bales very well at all when he assumed his role as platoon sergeant, by the time of the unit's deployment, (b)(3), (b)(6) felt he had "a pretty good feel for him."[89]

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) Due to the geographic dispersion of B Company units, the roles assigned to the B Company leadership in theater, the kinetic location of VSP Belambai, and decisions made by SOTF-S regarding involvement of the platoon and/or platoon leadership at the VSP, physical visits to VSP Belambai by the ADCON chain of command were extremely limited. Contact was limited primarily to e-mail and phone calls.[90]

i. (U//~~FOUO~~) Before the 11 March 2012 incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) visited VSP Belambai on one occasion for two days in February 2012. He stated that physical contact with his unit was limited due to the "decentralized nature and geographic dispersion of our forces"[91] and that many of the locations of his forces, to include VSP Belambai, were only accessible by aircraft, which did not fly to these locations on a regular basis. Complicating (b)(3), (b)(6) ability to visit his personnel was his assignment as the S3 for an AOB under SOTF-SE at FOB Laghman, Qalat. (b)(3), (b)(6) contact with his subordinate units was primarily through e-mail. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not feel that the command and control relationships on the conventional side were adequate, and he expressed that he would like to see more physical interaction with the sites.[92]

ii. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) is stationed with (b)(3), (b)(6) at Qalat. He was able to visit VSP Belambai in February 2012 along with (b)(3), (b)(6) His primary interaction with his subordinate units is via e-mail and phone. (b)(3), (b)(6) also expressed concerns about the sufficiency of the command relationships in place. (b)(3), (b)(6) believes that the B Company leadership should be able to talk a little bit more with their personnel to "let them know more about what is going on." According to (b)(3), (b)(6) "We know our guys best." (b)(3), (b)(6) expressed that not knowing what his personnel were doing operationally, it would be hard for the company leadership to "spot [any] triggers" because "we were kept in the dark about their operations." (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he would normally take responsibility for the Soldier care of the uplift NCOs and men at VSP Belambai, but it was very difficult to do that "when they were cut off."[93]

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[86] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit YY: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[87] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit ZZ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[88] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit AAA: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[89] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[90] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[91] (U//~~FOUO~~) In theater, B Company is split between two SOTFs at 14 different sites in two provinces. Exhibit XX: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[92] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[93] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit YY: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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iii. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he never got a chance to go to VSP Belambai while he was in country. He is also serving at FOB Laghman, Qalat, while in theater.[94]

iv. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) is stationed at VSP Ezabad in the Maiwan district. Prior to the 11 March 2012 incident, he had not been to VSP Belambai. His primary interaction with his 1st and 3d squads at VSP Belambai was through e-mail and phone. In theater (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon is split in half. Two of (b)(3), (b)(6) squads (1st and 3d squads) are located at VSP Belambai. The other two squads are with (b)(3), (b)(6) at VSP Ezabad where he is co-located with his Platoon Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6). Pre-deployment, when (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) saw the disposition of their squads and where they would be located, (b)(3), (b)(6) suggested to (b)(3), (b)(6), who further suggested to SOTF-S, that he (b)(3), (b)(6) be placed at VSP Belambai and (b)(3), (b)(6) at VSP Ezabad to distribute the platoon leadership. According to (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-S denied the request.[95]

v. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) was located at VSP Ezabad, and he has not been to VSP Belambai. He communicates with his personnel at the VSP by phone and e-mail. He had talked with SSG Bales twice and (b)(3), (b)(6) only once since 1st and 3d squads arrived at VSP Belambai. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was concerned by the inability to visit the VSP, not because he was worried about his men, but because of some things they may have been exposed to by the Special Forces personnel. He felt that he did not have a direct role in the care of the infantry at the VSP, rather, the Special Forces had a bigger role. However (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that the expectation of the infantry NCOs selected to go to VSP Belambai was that "they could handle it and that is why they went there. They were going to be there by themselves, they were going to be the senior guys, and the care of the Soldiers was going to be on their shoulders."[96]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) OPCON Chain of Command. The OPCON chain of command for SSG Bales' squad at VSP Belambai ran through the Team Leader located at VSP Belambai up through Advanced Operations Base – Simmons (b)(1)1.4a commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to SOTF-S, commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6) to CJSOTF-A, commanded by (b)(3), (b)(6).[97] None of these commanders knew SSG Bales very well, and command visits to these sites were very limited. (b)(3), (b)(6) and his senior enlisted advisor, (b)(3), (b)(6) spent Christmas Eve and part of Christmas Day at Belambai.[98] The incoming SOTF-S commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) visited VSP Belambai briefly on or about 1 February for the official Relief-in-Place between ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a.[99] The operational chain of command reported that travel to VSP Belambai required air travel, and

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[94] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit ZZ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[95] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit AAA: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[96] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[97] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits CCC, DDD, HHH: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[98] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit HHH: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[99] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit DDD: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) It is possible that SSG Bales met with other senior US military leaders on two other occasions. District-level shuras were scheduled for Mondays at the Panjwa'i District Center. These meetings were typically attended by the ODA leadership, the Battle Space Owner (3-21 IN), and ANSF Representatives, including the acting District Governor. SSG Bales made two trips to the District Center on 19 December 2011 and 2 January 2012, where he might have encountered leaders from 3-21 IN or (b)(3), (b)(6) from the AOB, and other leaders from SOTF-S. Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP for period 1 December 2011 – 8 March 2012 (SITREPs for 19 December 2011 and 2 January 2012).

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several factors limited battlefield circulation, to include the location of VSP Belambai, availability of air assets, and time. Routine interaction with the VSPs would occur through video teleconferences (VTCs), e-mails, and phone calls, none of which included interaction with SSG Bales.[100]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion. The geographic dispersion of the VSP sites made battlefield circulation by the OPCON and ADCON chains of command difficult because air assets were required. The location, availability of air assets, and the kinetic tactical situation meant that neither the OPCON nor ADCON chains of command made frequent, meaningful visits to Belambai in the 89 days between the arrival of SSG Bales and the 11 March 2012 incident.[101] Nobody in the immediate operational chain-of-command above SSG Bales had any interaction with Bales before his arrival at VSP Belambai and would only have been able to form immediate assessments of him on the Belambai site.[102] For the administrative chain of command, the roles assigned to the B Company leadership in theater and decisions made by SOTF-S regarding involvement of the platoon leadership at the VSP further limited their ability to conduct physical visits to VSP Belambai and/or maintain meaningful contact with the 2-3 IN squads. The wide dispersion of VSP sites makes effective administrative control by infantry platoons, companies, and battalions difficult at best. Higher OPCON and ADCON headquarters were not entirely sensitive to these challenges.[103]

5.3. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 3: What unit was SSG Bales a part of, and what was their mission? How long had SSG Bales been in Afghanistan? Did SSG Bales deploy as a member of a unit or as an individual augmentee? At the time of the incident, was he serving with personnel with whom he deployed? What was SSG Bales' duty position, and what were his responsibilities at the VSP?

(U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) SSG Bales was the Squad Leader of 3d Squad, 1st Platoon, B Company, 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment (2-3 IN), 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team, 2d Infantry Division (3-2 SBCT), out of Joint Base Lewis-McChord.[104] SSG Bales was the senior infantry NCO on VSP Belambai. According to many witnesses, SSG Bales functioned as and held himself out to be the acting Platoon Sergeant on a daily basis for the 1st Platoon contingent at VSP Belambai, leaving the 3d Squad Leader duties to (b)(3), (b)(6)[105]

b. (~~S~~) The mission of SSG Bales' unit, which was the mission of all infantry units OPCON to the SOTFs and the ODAs at VSPs, was to provide dedicated infantry/combat power in support of VSO, to include "facilitating community development shuras, connecting village leadership to adequate governance . . . providing a platform for delivery of essential services and addressing essential village needs, and finally leveraging temporary security

[100] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits CCC, DDD, GGG, HHH: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[101] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits XX, YY, AAA, BBB-DDD: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[102] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits CCC and DDD: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[103] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits XX, YY, AAA, BBB: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
[104] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I, XX, YY: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[105] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I, M, GG, QQ: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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force (ALP) to fill security gaps where no ANSF operations occur in order to build local resilience."[106] (b)(3), (b)(6) described the mission of SSG Bales and the infantry uplift squad as providing infantry support to VSP Belambai and integrating with the ODA, providing the fullest support possible within the scope of their responsibilities. On the ground, the infantry would take positions in base defense, pull guard, and help with camp improvement and expansion. The uplift squads would also go on combat patrols to help support VSO.[107]

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) SSG Bales deployed as a member of his organic unit, arriving at Kandahar Airfield (KAF) on the evening of 7 December 2011. He subsequently arrived at VSP Belambai on 14 December 2011 and had been on site for 89 days before the 11 March 2012 incident.[108] At VSP Belambai SSG Bales was serving with personnel from 1st and 3d Squads of his parent platoon with whom he had deployed.[109]

5.4. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 4: What was SSG Bales' relationship to the Special Operations unit operating out of VSP Belambai?

(U//~~FOUO~~) Findings: The infantry squads at VSP Belambai, of which SSG Bales was a member, were OPCON to the ODA at VSP Belambai. According to multiple witnesses, both ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a dealt with SSG Bales as the senior NCO for the infantry,[110] especially since his Platoon Sergeant expected SSG Bales to be the one in charge of administrative responsibilities for all of the B Company, 2-3 IN personnel on Belambai.[111]

5.5. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 5: How long had the ODA been at the location? What other units were attached to the VSP, and how long had they been there?

(U//~~FOUO~~) Findings: The initial elements of ODA (b)(1)1.4a began arriving at Belambai on 18 January 2012.[112] When ODA (b)(1)1.4a arrived, the other units on site were the Soldiers from 1st and 3d squads of 1st Platoon, B Company, 2-3 IN, and a rotating platoon from the Weapons Company of the 2d Kandak, 1st Brigade, 205th Corps of the Afghan National Army. The Transfer of Authority (TOA) between ODA (b)(1)1.4a occurred on 1 February 2012.[113] Other personnel present at VSP Belambai are as described in paragraph 3.c. above; they served as individual augmentees to the ODA.

5.6. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 6: Were there any warning signs that SSG Bales might engage in this behavior, and, if so, what action was taken? Specifically, were there any recent incidents in SSG Bales' personal or professional life that may have triggered his violent behavior? If so, what were those incidents, who knew about them, and what action was taken in response to awareness of these incidents?

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[106] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit UUU: Paragraph 3.A.4.A, FORSCOM WARNORD for Potential Deployment 3/2ID SBCT ISO OEF, 211520Z May 11.
[107] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[108] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit VVV: Memorandum from (b)(3), (b)(6) 19 March 2012.
[109] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I, XX: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[110] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I, M, GG, QQ: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[111] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[112] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP for period 1 December 2011 – 8 March 2012 (SITREPs for 18 January 2012).
[113] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit DDD: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Per the request of those investigating/preparing the criminal case on behalf of the Government and in accordance with my concern to protect the criminal proceedings, I refrained from directly investigating the appointment memorandum line of inquiry into key warnings and indicators with the witnesses located at VSP Belambai.[114] Consequently, my direct investigation of warnings and indicators pertains predominantly to the period up to SSG Bales' last day on KAF before departing for Belambai on 13 December 2011.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) My direct investigation of warnings and indicators primarily included a review of SSG Bales' NCOERs and Enlisted Record Brief, discussions with SSG Bales' OPCON chain of command not located at VSP Belambai, discussions with SSG Bales' organic chain of command, and discussions with other Service Members familiar with SSG Bales.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) SSG Bales' Non-Commissioned Officer Evaluation Reports (NCOERs) from 1 February 2006 until 30 September 2011 indicate a motivated and talented NCO with significant potential for advancement.[115] SSG Bales' Enlisted Record Brief does not include any indicators of severe combat stress or trauma, such as the award of a Purple Heart.[116]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) When asked about warning signs and indicators pertaining to SSG Bales, SSG Bales' operational chain of command located off VSP Belambai, to include (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) predecessor as the SOTF-S Commander), all indicated there were none.[117]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) The previous B Company Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) the previous B Company Executive Officer (XO), (b)(3), (b)(6), and a former Platoon Leader in B Company, (b)(3), (b)(6) remember SSG Bales as competent and as a mentor to young Lieutenants. They indicated they were not aware of any clear warnings or indicators.[118] However, the Scout Platoon Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not like SSG Bales' leadership style as the Sniper Section Leader when (b)(3), (b)(6) assumed the platoon in mid-2010 shortly after 2-3 IN's redeployment from Iraq. He thought SSG Bales was "more of a yeller and a punisher than a teacher" who preferred teaching by PowerPoint rather than by training outside. (b)(3), (b)(6) also reported seeing SSG Bales drunk at the

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[114] (U//~~FOUO~~) Both (b)(3), (b)(6) the ODA leadership at VSP Belambai preceding ODA (b)(3), (b)(6) were asked the questions about warning and indicators. When asked about whether there were any warning signs or indicators regarding SSG Bales or any recent incidents in SSG Bales' personal or professional life that may have triggered violent behavior, both (b)(3), (b)(6) stated there were none. Exhibits OO and QQ: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3)(b)(6).

[115] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XXX: SSG Bales' NCOERs.

[116] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit KKKK: SSG Bales' Enlisted Record Brief.

[117] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits CCC, DDD, and GGG: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[118] (U//~~FOUO~~) When asked about possible warnings and indicators, these officers speculated about Bales "passion for Soldiers" (b)(3), (b)(6) and that SSG Bales was "offensive-minded" (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that there were "no warning signs." Exhibits YYY, ZZZ, and ZZ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Battalion Re-deployment Ball in 2010; the more he drank, "the more he [Bales] got loud and wanted to be heard and seen." To (b)(3), (b)(6), SSG Bales seemed an "angry drunk."[119]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) B Company's current leadership was not aware of any warnings and indicators. B Company's current leadership, including SSG Bales' Company Commander, First Sergeant, Platoon Leader, and Executive Officer, had a uniformly positive view of SSG Bales' commitment, enthusiasm, and competence. The B Company leadership was aware of the kinetic challenge at VSP Belambai and chose SSG Bales for the job as the senior member of the uplift squads based upon their impressions of his qualities as an NCO.[120]

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The Executive Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) who had once shared a desk with SSG Bales, described SSG Bales as a mentor when (b)(3), (b)(6) first arrived as a new platoon leader, even though SSG Bales was not in his platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that from his perspective, there were no warning signs.[121]

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) was forthcoming but was clearly impacted by the allegations against SSG Bales. When asked about SSG Bales' personal life, (b)(3)(b)(6) said that SSG Bales loved his kids, but ' (b)(6) The First Sergeant had also spent considerable time getting SSG Bales ready for the E-7 Board. He stated that SSG Bales was concerned about the board but that at the time of the incident, the E-7 list had not been released.[122] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the 11 March 2012 incident came as a big shock and that he considered SSG Bales as one of the best in the company.[123]

(c) (U//~~FOUO~~) The Company Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6), and Platoon Leader (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had clearly relied on SSG Bales' leadership and competence. Neither saw any warning signs with SSG Bales.[124] The commander had rated him the best platoon sergeant in the company in late September 2011, two months before deployment.[125] Because of SSG Bales' experience and success as the Battalion's Sniper Squad Leader, his previous combat tours, and his more than a year of experience as a platoon sergeant, B Company leadership chose SSG Bales to lead the uplift contingent at VSP Belambai, which was known to be a highly kinetic site. SSG Bales then led company-wide long-range marksmanship training to prepare soldiers for the coming tactical challenges of VSO. Given the expected physical challenges of dismounted patrolling at VSP Belambai, the leadership chose (b)(3)(b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) squad for VSP Belambai, as it had the highest average on the Army Physical Fitness Test (APFT). Moreover, as (b)(3), (b)(6) was the junior-most squad leader in the platoon, the leadership thought that he would benefit from SSG Bales' experience. In

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[119] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit AAAA: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6). In comparison, (b)(3), (b)(6) states that he saw SSG Bales drinking "every once in a while" at a local restaurant, but never saw him get angry. Exhibit BBBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6).

[120] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits XX – AAA: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[121] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit ZZ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[122] (U//~~FOUO~~) SFC Bales' (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SSG Bales had been passed over for E-7 in the promotion board results that were announced in early Spring 2011. This was a surprise and disappointment for SSG Bales because he had good NCOERs and had already served in a Platoon Sergeant role. Exhibit JJJJ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[123] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit YY: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[124] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX and AAA: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[125] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XXX: SSG Bales' NCOERs.

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summary, B Company leadership had a tactical plan for what they thought would be the most challenging of their VSP sites, and they chose leaders and Soldiers to meet that challenge.[126]

(d) (U//~~FOUO~~) The company chain of command identified (b)(3), (b)(6) as a friend of SSG Bales and someone who knew SSG Bales very well. (b)(3), (b)(6) had been a squad leader for SSG Bales during SSG Bales' year-long tenure as Platoon Sergeant of 1st Platoon, B Company, and then served alongside SSG Bales as a fellow squad leader. When interviewed, (b)(3), (b)(6) was clearly deeply hurt by SSG Bales' actions and could not recall any warning signs or indicators. He said only that SSG Bales was passionate about his Soldiers and thoroughly committed. Despite their closeness in the workplace, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not report much social interaction with SSG Bales, although he had met his children. (b)(3), (b)(6) noted that he and SSG Bales had been working for nearly ten months before the deployment to secure positions as Army recruiters, stating that after the past deployments they both felt like it was time for a "break." Nonetheless, (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that SSG Bales did not have significant reservations about the deployment.[127]

(e) (U//~~FOUO~~) The most impartial and professional assessment of SSG Bales I received during my investigation came from SSG Bales' current Platoon Sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) displaced SSG Bales as the Platoon Sergeant for 1st Platoon when (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at the unit in September 2011. SSG Bales then became (b)(3), (b)(6) senior Squad Leader. (b)(3), (b)(6) arrival at the unit was after the unit's main train-up period and two months before the unit's deployment, which required him to do a rapid assessment of SSG Bales.[128]

i (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SSG Bales was disappointed with being demoted from his platoon sergeant role. He addressed the issue directly with SSG Bales, and SSG Bales responded professionally. As potential warnings and indicators in hindsight, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that SSG Bales talked of potential divorce, but not in ways different from many other Soldiers in the Army. (b)(3), (b)(6) said that SSG Bales was also behind on mortgage payments for one of his two houses but had engaged a lawyer to help. He did not perceive this situation to be causing undue stress for SSG Bales. As the deployment approached, SSG Bales did voice his stress over late arriving "go home tasks." That is, at one point late in the deployment cycle, B Company was told that they might not deploy until April 2012 and that their mission would not include VSO. The VSO mission and December 2011 deployment were later confirmed, causing the Company to scramble to get tasks done before the leaders and troops could "go home" at the end of the day as their departure for Afghanistan rapidly approached.[129]

ii. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) further stated that on 13 December 2011, at the completion of Receipt, Staging, Onward Movement and Integration (RSOI) training at Kandahar Airfield, SSG Bales made statements about the kinetic situation at Belambai and the inherent dangers there to the troops. (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled SSG Bales aside and counseled him to not make such statements in the presence of the junior Soldiers, some of whom had arrived into the company directly from One Station Unit Training just before departure from Joint Base

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[126] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits XX—AAA: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[127] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit RRR: Statement of
[128] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[129] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of

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Lewis-McChord (JBLM). (b)(3), (b)(6) also told (b)(3), (b)(6) to keep an eye on SSG Bales to ensure that SSG Bales did not continue to talk about the dangers in front of the troops, thus alarming them.[130]

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) Although I did not directly investigate warnings and indicators with the VSP Belambai witnesses, my investigation of the command climate at VSP Belambai revealed evidence of potential warnings and indicators of SSG Bales' future violent behavior that warrant comment. Those instances of conduct include: (a) SSG Bales' statement to his squad during his first patrol to "shoot through the ANA guy, he is not a person;" (b) SSG Bales' statement that he was not a racist "unless you count Afghanis or Iraqis;" (c) evidence of SSG Bales drinking in combination with the observation made by (b)(3), (b)(6) that SSG Bales was an "angry drunk;" (d) SSG Bales' assault on an Afghan local truck driver; and (e) (b)(3), (b)(6) concern that SSG Bales acted erratically because of his steroid use.[131]

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) The circumstances surrounding the statements that SSG Bales was not racist "unless you count Afghanis or Iraqis" and the evidence of SSG Bales drinking in conjunction with the statement that SSG Bales was an angry drunk do not rise to the level of warnings and indicators of future violent conduct toward Afghans about which the command should have been aware. These statements were known to too few people and too attenuated from actual violence against Afghans for those who heard the statements to have raised them to the chain of command as concerns about future behavior. The circumstances surrounding SSG Bales' statement, reported by only one interviewee, during his first patrol to "shoot through the ANA guy, he is not a person" also does not rise to the level of a warning and indicator of future violent conduct toward Afghans about which the command should have been made aware.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) The leadership of ODA (b)(1)1.4a should have been aware, however, of SSG Bales' assault on a truck driver and his erratic actions while on steroids. Both of these instances of conduct amount to warnings and indicators that SSG Bales would engage in future unwarranted violent behavior against Afghans. The circumstances of these two incidents are set out in the command climate portion of this report. These instances of conduct, however, would not rise to the level of warnings or indicators that SSG Bales would commit the extremely violent acts he allegedly committed on 11 March 2012.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) While on a mounted patrol from FOB Zangabad to VSP Belambai on 5 March 2012, one of the vehicles in the patrol hit an improvised explosive device (IED), injuring five personnel from VSP Belambai. During the response to the incident (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), an EOD expert and enabler to ODA (b)(1)1.4a stepped on another IED, losing his leg below the knee. From the evidence I obtained, SSG Bales' behavior in response to this incident did not constitute a warning or indicator of future unwarranted violent behavior. SSG Bales was not present either for the initial IED incident or the following incident concerning (b)(3), (b)(6).[132] I asked certain witnesses about this incident with respect to command climate, and no witness indicated a response that would constitute a warning or indicator of potential future violent behavior with respect to SSG

[130] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[131] (U//~~FOUO~~) For this paragraph and the following two paragraphs, see the command climate portion of this memorandum for more underlying detail on these incidents.
[132] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit LL: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Bales. For example, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he would not say that people took the 5 March 2012 IED incident badly. He stated that people were upset that it happened, but that people handled the stress well and dealt with it.[133] When asked directly about the 5 March 2012 IED incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he had talked by telephone to his friend, SSG Bales, and (b)(3), (b)(6) after the incident. (b)(3), (b)(6) formerly supervised one of the Soldiers injured in the blast and was concerned about his welfare. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that both (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales seemed distraught about the incident, but that SSG Bales seemed normal and exhibited nothing to show concern about. Of note, when asked about whether SSG Bales mentioned (b)(3), (b)(6) in their conversation after the 5 March 2012 IED incident (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SSG Bales did not mention him.[134] One witness (b)(3)(b)(6) (b)(6) did note that after the 5 March 2012 IED incident that SSG Bales was "kind of different." (b)(3)(b)(6) stated he would see SSG Bales sitting by the fire pit, in deep thought.[135]

(a) (U//~~FOUO~~) For further information on SSG Bales' potential warnings and indicators leading up to his alleged actions on 11 March 2012, I recommend coordination with those personnel preparing the criminal case against SSG Bales on behalf of the US Government.

(b) (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion: In the pre-deployment period through the night before his departure from KAF for VSP Belambai, SSG Bales' behavior gave no clear warning or indication he would engage in the future violent behavior he is alleged to have committed. SSG Bales' assault on a local Afghan truck driver and his erratic actions while taking steroids were warnings and indicators that SSG Bales would engage in future unwarranted violent behavior against Afghans. These instances of conduct, however, do not rise to the level of warnings or indicators that SSG Bales would commit the extremely violent acts he allegedly committed on 11 March 2012.

5.7. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 7: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any Shuras in the villages? What types of missions did SSG Bales participate in, and how many missions had he been on?

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) According to the mission logs provided by SOTF-S, SSG Bales had been on 29 total missions outside the perimeter of VSP Belambai in the 89 days between SSG Bales' arrival and the 11 March 2012 incident.[136] Of these missions, 10 missions were to disrupt insurgent freedom of movement and make contact with locals; one was a familiarization patrol during the transition between ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a; one was a traffic stop on Route Hyena; one was for biometric enrollment; one was a shura in the village of Belambai, and two were district shuras.[137]

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[133] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit P: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Also see Exhibit EE: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) and generally the statements of all the other ODA (b)(1)1.4a members.
[134] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit RRR: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[135] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WW: Statement of
[136] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP for period 1 December 2011 – 8 March 2012.
[137] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP for period 1 December 2011 – 8 March 2012 (Individual SITREPs enclosed).

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(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The ODA (b)(1)1.4a Team Leader and Team Sergeant stated that SSG Bales would have been on patrols to the shuras, but would have only performed duty in the outer security perimeter.[138] The testimony of the ODA team leadership is consistent with the statements of the lower-ranking infantry Soldiers interviewed, who remember SSG Bales interacting with local nationals during patrols by handing out candy to children, or giving hand signals to local adults to keep them away from the security perimeter.[139] None of the ODA (b)(1)1.4a members or the lower-ranking infantry Soldiers remember seeing SSG Bales participate in any shura.[140] Members of ODA (b)(1)1.4a have the same recollection; their Team Leader or Team Chief would have been in charge of contact with local leaders during any patrol.[141]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) According to all witnesses, SSG Bales' job was to oversee the security element provided by the infantry.[142] In seven of the ten disruption missions, SSG Bales was listed as the senior man in one of the overwatch vehicles.[143] The last mission in which SSG Bales participated before the 11 March 2012 incident was a mission to FOB Zangabad and return on 8 March 2012. The mission included disruption of insurgent freedom of movement. SSG Bales was in charge of one of the vehicles.[144]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion: SSG Bales did not have significant interaction with the local populace and did not participate in any shuras.

5.8. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 8: How was SSG Bales able to leave VSP Belambai by himself? What were the security procedures at the VSP? How could a Soldier depart and return without notice? Were guard mount and stand-to procedures sufficient?

a. (~~S~~) Findings:

(1) (~~S//RUIN~~) VSP Belambai is a relatively small outpost with a perimeter of HESCO barriers[145] topped with concertina wire and a single Entry Control Point (ECP) on the south side of the VSP. Exhibit CCCC of this report, Site Survey Visit to VSP Belambai, includes photographs and diagrams, including the one below, of the VSP that provide a good visual representation of the VSP perimeter and the layout of the VSP itself.[146]

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[138] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits OO and QQ: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[139] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I – X.
[140] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits OO, QQ, and I – X.
[141] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits EE and GG: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[142] (U//~~FOUO~~) For example, refer to Exhibits I – X, EE, GG, and OO.
[143] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP for period 1 December 2011 – 8 March 2012 (Individual SITREPs enclosed).
[144] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP for period 1 December 2011 – 8 March 2012 (CONOP 8 March).
[145] (U//~~FOUO~~) A "HESCO barrier" is a collapsible wire mesh container and heavy duty fabric liner that can be used for military fortification. Assembling the HESCO involves unfolding the mesh container and filling it with sand, dirt, or gravel.
[146] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai.

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(b)(1)1.4c

(2) ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a The ECP gate itself, a wooden beam covered by concertina wire, is (b)(1)1.4a and there are not any lights on the gate.[147] When the VSP was built, it was built to keep people out, not in. While ODA (b)(1)1.4a was at VSP Belambai, the VSP had not taken any contact at night and apparently neither had ODA (b)(1)1.4a[148]

(b)(1)1.4a

[147] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits L, W, EE and II: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai.
[148] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits P and EE: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[149] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit M: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai. (S)

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(b)(1)1.4a

(7) ~~(S)~~ ANA guards saw SSG Bales when he entered the gate upon returning, presumably from Alikozai, and when he left again, presumably to go to Naja Bien. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

b. ~~(S)~~ Conclusion: SSG Bales was able to leave and enter VSP Belambai unseen by going out the front gate. A person knowing the layout of the VSP and the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a could have snuck out in the dark, risking only discovery by an attentive ANA guard.

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[150] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits W and II: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~(S)~~; Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai. (S)
[151] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits W and II: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~(S)~~; Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai. (S)
[152] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai ~~(S)~~; Statement made by (b)(3), (b)(6) during site survey visit; the (b)(1)1.4a was still awaiting repair on the date of the visit.
[153] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.
[154] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit P: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai.
[155] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai. See generally Exhibits I-SS

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The guard mount and other procedures were not sufficient to prevent a person from leaving the VSP, which was considered a non-existent threat.

5.9. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 9: What access did SSG Bales have to the weapons he used? How did he get them?

~~(S)~~ Findings: Upon discovery, SSG Bales had an M4 rifle, an XM-320 grenade launcher, and a 9 mm H&K pistol. The M4 and M-320 grenade launcher were SSG Bales' personal weapons, issued to him through his organic infantry unit. The H&K pistol was not part of his weapons issue. (b)(3), (b)(6) gave him the weapon after the shooting deaths of the two US Service personnel in Kabul in February 2012. Personnel on VSP Belambai were ordered to carry a weapon at all times after the February shootings, and (b)(3), (b)(6) let SSG Bales use the SOF issued 9 mm so that SSG Bales did not have to carry his M4 around when on base. SSG Bales maintained his weapons in his room.[156] As expressed by the CJSOTF-A Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) the expectation of those on the VSP was to be armed at all times and to sleep with their weapons or at least have them within arms reach.[157]

5.10. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 10: What was the battle rhythm at the VSP?

a. ~~(S)~~ Findings:

(1) ~~(S)~~ The daily battle rhythm at VSP Belambai was driven by patrols outside the VSP, some of which left in the early hours of the morning. Some patrols were overnight patrols. The battle rhythm did not include a mandatory "stand-to" in the mornings. The ODA followed their standard mission planning, incorporating the infantry personnel designated for the mission. After patrols, the ODA led After Action Reviews and the individuals cleaned their weapons. Those personnel not on patrol worked on improving the VSP site and providing base defense. In the late afternoon, the ODAs led a daily meeting. According to some of the infantry, ODA (b)(1)1.4 incorporated everybody in the daily meeting, whereas ODA (b)(1)1.4 only incorporated the uplift NCOs.[158] The ODA (b)(1)1.4 leadership only remembers including the uplift NCOs due to space constraints in the OPCEN building.[159]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) The battle rhythm was suitable for the mission of the VSP and consistent with normal ODA practices and the tactical situation.

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[156] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.
[157] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit HHH: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[158] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I-W: Statement of Infantry uplift squads.
[159] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit SS: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[160] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits I-W: Statement of Infantry uplift squads.

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5.11. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 11: What are the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?

a. ~~(S)~~ Findings: According to (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander of CJSOTF-A, personal weapons were to be on the individuals or within reach.[161] After each patrol, 100% accountability was conducted on men, weapons, and equipment, which was then logged into the daily situation report (SITREP) to the AOB. Additionally, B Company, 2-3 IN required a monthly 100% serial number inventory of all squad and platoon equipment.[162]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion: Weapons and personnel accountability and inventory procedures were done regularly and were suitable to the tactical situation of VSP Belambai.

5.12. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 12: When did personnel at VSP Belambai first notice that SSG Bales was missing? When was the chain of command first notified? What procedures did the chain of command take to regain accountability of SSG Bales?

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Although accounts differ, most witnesses placed the discovery of SSG Bales' absence between 0230 and 0330 on 11 March 2012. The most likely timing is reported by (b)(3), (b)(6) who assumed his guard position on the top of the OPCEN at 0300. (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that almost immediately after assuming guard duty (0305), an ANA soldier reported to him through an interpreter that someone speaking English was outside the VSP.[163] (b)(3), (b)(6) was on guard with (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately ordered (b)(3), (b)(6) who was in the area after his guard shift, to wake up (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) told him to wake SSG Bales (who lived in the Connex across from (b)(3), (b)(6)) and get 100% accountability of the infantry personnel. (b)(3), (b)(6) went to SSG Bales' room, but he was not there. (b)(3), (b)(6) then checked the latrines, the MWR room, and the rest of the OPCEN, and then reported SSG Bales missing, presumably to (b)(3), (b)(6) at the OPCEN. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) woke him at 0310. (b)(3), (b)(6) the assistant detachment commander, remembers (b)(3), (b)(6) waking him up at 0320 while (b)(3), (b)(6) was conducting 100% accountability for the ODA personnel.[165]

(2) ~~(S)~~ According to (b)(3), (b)(6) awoke him, (b)(3), (b)(6) ordered both US and ANA personnel to conduct a 100% accountability inspection of their personnel and other personnel on the VSP site, at which point they discovered that SSG Bales was missing. After searching the entire compound and determining that SSG Bales was nowhere to be found, (b)(3), (b)(6) called the Battle Space Owner (BSO) (3-21 IN) requesting assistance from the (b)(1)1.4 in searching for SSG Bales around the vicinity of the VSP site. (b)(3), (b)(6)

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[161] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit HHH: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[162] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit XX: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[163] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.
[164] (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) states he was notified by the ANA through an interpreter to notify (b)(3), (b)(6) but in any event (b)(3), (b)(6) next action was to wake up (b)(3), (b)(6) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.
[165] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.

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then notified (b)(3)(b)(6) SOTF-S Night Battle Captain, at around 0345.[166] By 0430, (b)(3), (b)(6) had a patrol element put together to search for SSG Bales. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his initial thought was that the person leaving the compound was sleepwalking, and that was the report he passed up to FOB Zangabad.[167] SOTF-S and CJSOTF-A both engaged their Personnel Recovery battle drills.[168] (b)(3), (b)(6) the AOB Commander, recalled being awoken between 0330 and 0400 about the incident. He immediately thought this may be another SGT Bergdahl (that is, kidnapping) event. When the AOB reached (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) explained the measures he had already taken, the AOB Commander determined that the ODA was already doing everything that needed to be done, so the AOB stood by monitoring the situation, waiting to assist if needed.[169]

b. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Conclusion: In less than (b)(1)1.4a minutes from notification of an American outside the VSP, the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership had conducted a 100% accountability of men and weapons, identified SSG Bales as missing, searched the compound, and notified higher and adjacent units. The tactical response to the notification that an American had left the VSP was timely and adequate.

5.13. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 13: What type of training did SSG Bales incur leading to this deployment?

a. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Findings:

(1) **(U//~~FOUO~~)** (b)(3), (b)(6) the B Company commander, remembers receiving the VSO mission in late June 2011 just as he was assuming command. (b)(3), (b)(6) focused his company's training on combat fundamentals necessary for the types of tasks to be undertaken on VSP sites. Additionally, (b)(3), (b)(6) had his company train for 20 days leading up to the NTC rotation on cultural awareness, population engagement, key leader engagements, tactical questioning, and counter-IED.[170] B Company conducted the NTC rotation as part of 3-2 SBCT; however, the brigade rotation was focused on full spectrum operations against a near peer enemy because there was not enough time to have NTC construct a VSO-type rotation for 2-3 IN.[171] The scenario for 2-3 IN was Afghanistan-based. It consisted of normal infantry company operations from a company COP but also involved role-playing with Afghan civilians.[172]

(2) **(U//~~FOUO~~)** SSG Bales was the Platoon Sergeant through the NTC rotation until late September 2011 when (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived. In the remaining two months before deployment, B Company executed a number of weapons and marksmanship training events and a squad-focused Situational Training Exercise (STX) based on six "lanes" requiring squad-level battle drills such as movement to contact, reaction to contact, and indentifying and reducing IEDs. With SSG Bales' experience as the 2-3 IN sniper team leader, B

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[166] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he was notified about 0340. When (b)(3), (b)(6) was notified, the SOTF-S S-3, (b)(3), (b)(6) was already in the OPCEN. (b)(3), (b)(6), the SOTF-S Commander, received a briefing by (b)(3)(b)(6) shortly after on the situation. Exhibit EEE: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[167] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.
[168] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Exhibit EEE and HHH: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[169] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Exhibit CCC: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[170] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Exhibit XX: Statement o
[171] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Exhibit III: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[172] **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Exhibit XX: Statement o

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Company tasked him to run long-distance marksmanship training for the entire company, a skill the company leadership had identified as desirable for VSP base defense.[173] (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) also conducted written counseling and a 60-minute briefing with all squad leaders and team leaders focused on standards and discipline, serving honorably, training, and maintenance while on the VSP sites. (b)(3), (b)(6) comprehensive written guidance to his squad leaders and team leaders was twenty-two pages long.[174] Finally, 3d Special Forces Group sent out a Mobile Training Team to JBLM on 17-22 October 2011 to teach VSO-specific operations.[175] SSG Bales was an active participant in that training.[176]

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) While at KAF, from 7-13 December 2011, SSG Bales participated in RSOI training that included escalation of force, rules of engagement, Law of War, and cultural awareness. He also received vehicle, weapons system, and counter-IED training.[177]

5.14. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 14: In the train-up for deployment, did SSG Bales exhibit any concerns about his upcoming deployment?

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings: One of those who was closest to SSG Bales during the train-up before deployment, (b)(3), (b)(6), said that SSG Bales "seemed ready to go. He didn't indicate any kind of stress or if it bothered him. He was always about the mission." (b)(3), (b)(6) did state, however, that "SSG Bales (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) considered SSG Bales "as one of our best in our company." (b)(3), (b)(6) also stated that SSG Bales was worried about the upcoming E-7 list.[178] SSG Bales' close friend and fellow squad leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he and SSG Bales had considered putting in for recruiting duty in February 2011, since they needed a break, but (b)(3), (b)(6) did not notice anything of concern from SSG Bales about the deployment.[179] (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that SSG Bales was behind on mortgage payments for one of his two houses but had engaged a lawyer to help. He did not perceive this situation to be causing undue stress for SSG Bales.[180] SSG Bales' Platoon Leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) impression was that "SSG Bales was excited for the deployment and he couldn't wait to get over here."[181]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion: Despite some expressed unhappiness (b)(6) and some financial challenges, SSG Bales did not exhibit undue anxiety over this deployment.

5.15. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 15: After the incident, what Key Leader Engagements have occurred with the local leadership concerning the incident? What other consequence management activities have been taken with the local leadership/population concerning the incident?

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[173] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits XX, YY, and BBB: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[174] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit DDDD: (b)(3), (b)(6) Memorandum For Squad Leaders and Team Leaders, 27 November 2011.
[175] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit EEEE: E-mail from (b)(3), (b)(6)
[176] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit QQQ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Memorandum For Record.
[177] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit FFFF: B CO, 2-3 IN Train-up Sheet for Deployment (provided by (b)(3), (b)(6)).
[178] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit YY: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Various statements from personnel at the VSP further support that SSG Bales (b)(6) For example, see Exhibits S and WWW: Statement of PFC Alexander and CID Statements Excerpt MFR (Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[179] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit RRR: Statement of
[180] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit BBB: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[181] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit AAA: Statement of

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(U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) After notification of the incident on 11 March 2012, (b)(3), (b)(6) the SOTF-S Commander; (b)(3), (b)(6) the AOB Commander; (b)(3), (b)(6) the commander of 3-21 IN at FOB Zangabad; and (b)(3), (b)(6) the Commander, 1-25 SBCT, all traveled to VSP Belambai.[182] Important Afghan leaders also arrived at VSP Belambai, including (b)(6) (b)(6) the District Chief of Police (DCOP) (along with his mentor, (b)(3), (b)(6)); (b)(3), (b)(6) the commander of the 2d ANA Kandak at FOB Zangabad; BG Habibi, the commander of 1st Brigade, 205th Corps; MG Hamid, 205th Corps Commander; Assadullah Khalid, Special Security Coordinator for the South; BG Razziq, the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP); and Haji Faizil Muhammad, the Deputy District Governor. These key Afghan leaders met with the US military leaders as an angry crowd was assembling outside the VSP's gate. The Afghan leaders told the American leaders to stay on VSP Belambai, and the Afghan leaders went out to meet the crowd. Later, the Afghan leaders hosted a shura on VSP Belambai in the building used to house the ANA detachment, but without American attendance.[183]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Elsewhere on 11 March 2012, key ISAF leaders, including the ISAF Deputy Commander (DCOMISAF), the IJC Commander (COMIJC), and the Commander of RC-South contacted their normal counterparts to discuss the incident. DCOMISAF handled national-level and embassy notifications. COMIJC called General Wardak (the Minister of Defense), General Karimi (the Chief of Staff of the ANA), and the Deputy Minister of the Interior (in lieu of the Minister who could not be reached). MG Huggins, the RC-South Commander, called Assadullah Khalid and Qayoom Karzai[184]. Other RC-South officers spoke to the Corps, Brigade, and Kandak commanders.[185]

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 12 March 2012, the regularly scheduled Panjwa'i District shura was held at the Panjwa'i District Center with various US military leaders. Mention was made of the incident, with US military leaders promising a full investigation. The discussion then shifted to unrelated matters on the agenda.[186]

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Two days after the incident, General Karimi and a high-level delegation of parliamentarians and other officials arrived on IJC-arranged aircraft from Kabul to KAF, and then flew from KAF to Belambai. The delegation met with local village leaders and walked the site of the alleged murders. While on site, the enemy attacked the delegation, killing one ANA soldier. When the delegation returned to KAF, MG Huggins met with them, and then US CID agents briefed the delegation on the status of the criminal investigation.[187]

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) The next significant consequence management event was the shura and processing of condolence payments to the shooting victims and their families that occurred

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[182] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits PPP and JJJ: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[183] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits DDD, PPP, JJJ, and MMM: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)
[184] (b)(6) the President of Afghanistan and a notable figure in Kandahar Province.
[185] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit IIII: Meeting with BG Schweitzer, Memorandum for Record, Exhibit KKK: Statement of (b)(3)(b)(6)
[186] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit MMM: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[187] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit KKK: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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on 24 March 2012. The event began with a shura led by Provincial Governor (PGOV) Wesa, at which (b)(3), (b)(6) made a speech of condolence, grief, and sorrow to a large audience containing village elders and shura members from Panjwa'i and Kandahar. Claims were then paid by a Foreign Claims Commission (FCC) in a separate room with a smaller audience. The PGOV; PCOP; district officials; tribal leaders from the Alikozai and Achakzai tribes; and BG Habibi, commander of 1st Brigade, 205th ANA Corps, were present. In addition to (b)(3), (b)(6) were also present representing the US military. According to (b)(3), (b)(6) BG Habibi was a fundamentally important adviser on the set-up of the shura and payment ceremony.[188]

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) The condolence payment proceedings were done in accordance with advice from the PGOV, the PCOP, district officials, and the RC-South cultural advisors. The FCC made a total of 22 claims payments to four heads of household.[189] The GIRoA officials were invaluable to the process as they verified that the claimants were the heads of the affected households and therefore proper claimants, explained the process to the claimants, and generally made the local and district leaders comfortable with the process. BG Razziq, the PCOP, collected mouth swabs for DNA forensics from the heads of households to assist with the US criminal investigation, demonstrating the process first on himself. After the condolence payments, attendees ate lunch together where (b)(3), (b)(6) received feedback from each of the four heads of household. The families indicated their appreciation of the rapid treatment of the survivors and the MEDEVAC to the Role III hospital. The GIRoA leadership's feedback was that the condolence payment process went "as good as you can make one of those events."[190] The mentor to the DCOP, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the SFAT Leader for 1st Brigade, 205th ANA Corps, (b)(3), (b)(6) were important facilitators of this crucial GIRoA support.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) Subsequent to the condolence payments, there have been no significant KLEs focused on this event, although it has come up in conversations during other KLEs. At the recent district shuras, the event has not come up at all. In fact, recent discussions at the shuras have been dominated by topics unrelated to the 11 March 2012 Belambai incident, such as issues concerning seed distribution.[191] IJC has offered to have its lawyers meet with General Karimi's representatives on a weekly basis to discuss the case's progress.[192]

5.16. (U//~~FOUO~~) Question 16: What was the medical response provided by US and/or NATO personnel concerning the victims of this incident? Was the medical response adequate? If not, what improvements should be made?

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Findings:

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) At about 0330 on 11 March 2012, (b)(3), (b)(6), the 3-21 Battalion Surgeon, was notified by one of his medics of casualties at the gate of FOB Zangabad. At the time, (b)(3), (b)(6) was in his sleeping quarters in the trauma bay. The medic who awoke (b)(3), (b)(6) was unaware of the extent or number of casualties, but he was

[188] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit JJJ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[189] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit LLL: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[190] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit JJJ: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[191] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit MMM: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[192] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit KKK: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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gathering all medical personnel to respond to the contingency. As per their "Casualties at the Gate" SOP, five wounded civilians were brought into the Battalion Aid Station. Fortunately, (b)(3), (b)(6) of 1-25 SBCT, was on battlefield circulation at FOB Zangabad, and he responded to the arrival of the casualties alongside (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) sounded the mass casualty (MASCAL) alarm, calling all medical and Combat Life Saver (CLS) personnel to the aid station.[193]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) The medical team triaged the patients and then worked to stabilize those in the most danger. One adult female casualty and her male family member would not consent to an examination without a female present. (b)(3), (b)(6) summoned a Female Engagement Team member, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the examination proceeded. The female patient had a gunshot wound to the chest, and the medical team was then able to take immediate life saving measures. Another patient, a young girl, was initially triaged as expectant.[194] The medical team was able to stabilize her, however, and ultimately all five patients survived.[195]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) Once the doctors had stabilized the patients, they called for air MEDEVAC to KAF Role III of the three most critical, considered CAT A, in accordance with the Medical Rules of Eligibility (MREs). The remaining two patients, initially considered CAT B, were prepped for eventual ground evacuation to an Afghan hospital by ANSF, in accordance with the standing MREs for Afghan casualties of CAT B status. At this time, though, information arrived that indicated to the doctors that this could have been a civilian casualty (CIVCAS) event, which upgraded the evacuation priority per the MRE to CAT A. Another MEDEVAC was called, and an Air Force PAVEHAWK was dispatched, which was capable of flying in the worsening weather conditions.[196]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) credits the success of the response to the experience of his medical team. 3-21 IN was nearing the end of its deployment, and the medical team had honed its battle drill by previously facing 20 MASCAL events (although this one was different because of the severity of the injuries involved). (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his team trained hard before the deployment, especially at the Fort Wainwright MASCAL center and at NTC. Furthermore, (b)(3), (b)(6) is a PROFIS (Professional Filler System) doctor who just happened to come from the same installation as his brigade. This provided (b)(3), (b)(6) with a unique opportunity to spend more time in the train-up to the deployment than would typically be expected. The battalion has a MASCAL SOP in place, which they trained on through exercises and through the frequent execution of the SOP in real-world scenarios. In retrospect, (b)(3), (b)(6) thinks he could have used additional medical personnel on station and will look to formalize a requirement of having additional CLS-type personnel available.[197]

(5) (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that among the medical community, lessons learned are primarily shared internally through the battalion and brigade, and he has not had the opportunity to share them beyond the brigade.[198]

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[193] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit OOO: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[194] (U//~~FOUO~~) Patients determined to be expectant during the triage process are those who are likely to die regardless of medical intervention.
[195] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits NNN and OOO: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[196] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits NNN and OOO: Statements of
[197] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit OOO: Statement of
[198] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit OOO: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Conclusion: The overall medical response was commendable and no doubt resulted in saving the lives of three severely wounded civilians. The battalion medical team had exceptional experience and procedures established to respond successfully to a serious MASCAL event. The availability of a female Service Member to assist with the evaluation of the CAT A female casualty allowed the medical team to overcome cultural sensitivities and provide the female patient with life saving treatments. Part of the success was also due to the availability of the Air Force PAVEHAWK, which was capable of flying in the worsening weather conditions.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) **Recommendations**.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Prior to any deployment that includes conventional infantry uplift troops, ODA leaders must be trained on how to lead conventional forces not only from an operational and tactical perspective, but also on issues of personal conduct and discipline. Standards and discipline on issues such as alcohol, drug use, and Equal Opportunity must be announced and enforced. Such training must extend to all members of the ODA, some of whom may not have any conventional force experience.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) ODA team leadership must be specific on the standards of appropriate behavior for and between the ODA, enablers, civilians, and infantry uplift. ODA leadership must state explicitly what behavior toward local nationals is acceptable and that any deviation from those norms must be reported immediately to the Team Sergeant, Team Chief, and Team Leader.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) The integration of conventional infantry uplift troops into the VSO mission requires the OPCON and ADCON chains of command to take additional steps to increase their involvement with and their situational awareness of the conduct of their subordinate units. Measures may include published standards of personal conduct and discipline, increased battlefield circulation, inspections, and counseling and training of small-unit leaders. Additionally, ADCON and OPCON chains of command should develop clear, written agreements regarding the division of administrative and tactical responsibilities. The current practice of managing this command relationship through informal "gentlemen's agreements"[199] is insufficient to ensure appropriate command oversight. Finally, as noted below, a member of the ADCON chain of command should be co-located with the infantry uplift soldiers where possible.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) The SOTF commander should consider splitting infantry platoon leadership so that platoon leaders and platoon sergeants are on different VSP sites in order to enhance infantry leadership and permit more effective administrative control. In addition to the reasons expressed in my findings for this recommendation, in my opinion it is unfair to hold the ADCON headquarters responsible for the day-to-day disciplinary behavior of their assigned troops not under their direct operational control.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) The SOF community must take measures to weed out manifestations of disdain or dislike for conventional infantry among some members of its community through training and education. Just as it would be unacceptable for military professionals whose

[199] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit III: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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doctrinal mission requires training indigenous forces to exhibit an attitude of disdain for the very people from which the forces are drawn, such an attitude applied to one's own countrymen or allies who happen to be conventionally trained cannot be tolerated.

f. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** ODAs need to make greater efforts to integrate the uplift squads, reach out to the infantry leadership, and provide cross-training and mentorship, while also doing a rigid assessment of that leadership and removing any NCO that presents any risk to the VSO mission with the surrounding populace. In general, the ODA must ***lead*** the more junior NCOs and Soldiers at VSP sites and give those Soldiers the benefit of their training and experience.

g. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** As indicated in the introduction to the report, my investigation into warnings and indicators in theater was limited so as not to interfere with the criminal investigation/prosecution of the case. The command should consult with those conducting the criminal investigation/prosecution of the SSG Bales case for additional information on potential warnings and indicators of SSG Bales' behavior manifested by SSG Bales in theater.

h. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Additional investigation of warnings and indicators should also be conducted in CONUS (particularly at JBLM) to incorporate a thorough review of SSG Bales' previous deployments and assignments, SSG Bales' medical and mental history, and a more thorough review of warnings and indicators during the train-up for this deployment. I did not do this as part of my investigation due to access reasons and due to the need to complete this investigation in a timely manner.

i. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** The lessons learned from the MASCAL response at FOB Zangabad should be captured and distributed among the medical community. The medical responders should be recognized for their exemplary performance. Additionally, appropriate personnel should consider (b)(3), (b)(6) comments about the PAVEHAWK's superior ability to fly in bad weather as compared to a normal MEDEVAC and whether such a consideration warrants a change in how MEDEVAC procedures are conducted in theater.

j. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** The results of this investigation should be sent to the appropriate command superior to ODA(b)(1)1.4a for consideration of administrative/disciplinary action as the command sees fit regarding inappropriate behavior identified in this report. Specifically, refer to paragraph 5.1.b(4) regarding evidence of drinking while ODA(b)(1)1.4a was at VSP Belambai.

k. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** The results of this investigation should be sent to the appropriate command superior to ODA(b)(1)1.4a for consideration of administrative/disciplinary action as the command sees fit regarding inappropriate behavior identified in this report. The appropriate command superior to ODA(b)(1)1.4a that would exercise discipline over the ODA(b)(1)1.4a needs to coordinate with government counsel for *United States v. SSG Bales* to ensure the command has all relevant information concerning potential disciplinary issues relevant to ODA(b)(1)1.4a

l. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** My recommendations specifically do not include any suggested changes to guard mount procedures to prevent personnel exiting the site for unauthorized activities. Safeguards against such an occurrence should take the form of better enforcement of

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standards and discipline as outlined elsewhere in this report. The design of the site, the base defense plan, and other force protection measures must necessarily be focused on keeping the enemy out. However, at the Belambai Entry Control Point, to prevent a similar, although unlikely event, the units involved should complete the concertina wire enclosure of the areas at both ends of the wooden beam used as a gate (this work was underway at the time of the site visit).

7. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Additional Observations and Concluding Remarks.

a. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** The VSO/ALP programs are consistent with best historical practices in counterinsurgency. In conjunction with counter-terrorist and counter-guerrilla operations that focus on enemy leadership, manpower, and material resources, Village Stability Operations reduce insurgent freedom of movement in the generally tribal village networks of rural Afghanistan. Without that freedom of movement, the insurgency has difficulty moving fighters and supplies, and establishing safe havens, caches, and command-and-control nodes. Given that 80% of insurgents are killed or captured within a few kilometers of their home villages, VSO hurts the insurgent fighters where they live, and reduces the effectiveness of the traveling insurgent leadership. By connecting village populations and leadership to the central government and the Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF), VSO promotes resolution of local grievances. In short VSO, combined with counterterrorism and counter-guerrilla efforts, gives insurgents a reason to quit. The ALP program combined with the Afghan Peace and Reintegration program (APRP) gives insurgents an honorable way to quit.

b. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** The Key Leader Engagements and other consequence management activities subsequent to the 11 March 2012 incident demonstrate the value of the partnering process with ANSF and GIRoA officials and the value of immediate and open communications. The VSO program is a vital part of the partnering process at the village and district level.

c. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** I recommend not removing VSP Belambai as a VSO site. Removing the site would give the enemy an unearned propaganda victory. The creation and reinforcement of VSP Belambai in 2011, located 1500 meters further into enemy terrain from the previous location at COP Suleiman, has clearly disrupted insurgent freedom of movement and has drawn the insurgents to attack the VSP, thus causing the enemy to expend men, materiel, and time that otherwise would have been available for use against ISAF or GIRoA targets elsewhere. The appropriate command should consider leapfrogging another checkpoint either south or west of Belambai to further constrict insurgent freedom of movement and to create "white space" around VSP Belambai to set the conditions for the possible creation of an ALP force. This will require even closer coordination between SOTF-S, RC-South, and the ANSF and will require even more conventional infantry as the necessary "thickener" on the VSP sites.

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d. **(U//~~FOUO~~)** Several of the ODA members came across as less than credible in their interviews through a desire either for self-preservation or to protect their team members. I recommend reinforcing among the Army Special Forces community that fealty to the Army values trumps fealty to team members; that the Army values form the essential bond of trust between Soldier and nation; and that we must have that trust for our best Soldiers sent on our toughest missions – the Special Forces – because their actions, by their very nature, often have strategic consequences.

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8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)(b)(6)

Rick Waddell

RICKY L. WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

3 Encls
1. Enclosure List (w/ Encls)
2. Exhibit List (w/ Exhibits)
3. Task Force (b)(1)1.4a Command Climate Investigation (w/ Encls and Exhibits)

(U) DERIVATIVELY CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6) CJIATF-Shafafiyat (b)(3), (b)(6)
(U) DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
(U) DECLASSIFY ON: 20210531

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SECTION VI - AUTHENTICATION *(para 3-17, AR 15-6)*

THIS REPORT OF PROCEEDINGS IS COMPLETE AND ACCURATE. *(If any voting member or the recorder fails to sign here or in Section VII below, indicate the reason in the space where his signature should appear.)*

Rick Waddell

BG Ricky L. Waddell

(Recorder)	*(Investigating Officer) (President)*
(Member)	*(Member)*
(Member)	*(Member)*

SECTION VII - MINORITY REPORT *(para 3-13, AR 15-6)*

To the extent indicated in Inclosure _____, the undersigned do(es) not concur in the findings and recommendations of the board.

(In the inclosure, identify by number each finding and/or recommendation in which the dissenting member(s) do(es) not concur. State the reasons for disagreement. Additional/substitute findings and/or recommendations may be included in the inclosure.)

(Member)	*(Member)*

SECTION VIII - ACTION BY APPOINTING AUTHORITY *(para 2-3, AR 15-6)*

The findings and recommendations of the *(investigating officer) (board)* are *(approved) (disapproved) (approved with following exceptions/ substitutions). (If the appointing authority returns the proceedings to the investigating officer or board for further proceedings or corrective action, attach that correspondence (or a summary, if oral) as a numbered inclosure.)*

See attached memorandum, Subject: Final Action, AR 15-6 Investigation (Facts and Circumstances Surrounding Alleged Shooting of Afghan Civilians Outside VSP Belambai, Afghanistan).

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Enclosure 1: List of Enclosures

a. AR 15-6 Appointment Memorandum.

b. List of Witnesses Interviewed.

c. List of Witnesses Unavailable for this Report.

d. Initial Coordination Visit to Kandahar Criminal Investigation Division (CID).

e. Extension Request Memorandum.

f. Investigative Chronology.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A-SJA (12-008)

22 MAR 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Ricky L. Waddell

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Appointment Order – Alleged Shooting of Afghan Civilians Outside VSP Belambai, Afghanistan

1. You are hereby appointed per Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Chapter 2, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations that SSG Robert Bales shot Afghan civilians outside Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai, Afghanistan, on 11 March 2012. This investigation is your primary mission until you tender your completed findings and recommendations to me. Complete your report NLT 30 days from your date of appointment. If you need an extension, submit requests to me through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A. Unless I release you sooner, your appointment remains in effect until you complete the investigation and I determine that no further investigation is required.

a. CFSOCC-A will identify a Deputy Investigating Officer to assist you with your investigation. You will also have a dedicated paralegal to assist you with your investigation. You may request the appointment of additional personnel to assist you in your investigation. You should coordinate their appointment through your legal advisor.

b. (b)(3), (b)(6) is hereby appointed as your legal advisor and a member of the investigative team. You will consult with (b)(3), (b)(6) before making any substantive efforts regarding your investigation. Advisor's e-mail address is (b)(3), (b)(6) and he can be reached at DSN (b)(6)

2. The scope of your investigation is as broad as necessary. However, you will at a minimum determine the following:

a. What was the command climate at VSP Belambai at the time of the incident? What was SSG Bales' chain of command? How well did they know him? How much interaction did they have with him? For chain of command located off of VSP Belambai, how frequently did the chain of command visit and make meaningful contact with SSG Bales and the element he was part of?

b. How long had SSG Bales been in Afghanistan? Had he been at any other locations? How long had SSG Bales been at VSP Belambai? What unit was he a part of? What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit? What was SSG Bales' relationship to the Special Operations unit operating out of VSP Belambai? How long had the ODA been at the location? What other units were attached to the VSP and how long had they been there?

c. Were there any warning signs that SSG Bales might engage in this behavior and, if so, what action was taken? Specifically, were there any recent incidents in SSG Bales' personal or professional life that may have triggered his violent behavior? If so, what were those

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incidents, who knew about them, and what action was taken in response to awareness of these incidents?

d. Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any Shuras in the villages? What types of missions did SSG Bales participate in and how many missions had he been on?

e. How was SSG Bales able to leave VSP Belambai by himself? What access did SSG Bales have to the weapons he used? How did he get them? What were the security procedures and battle rhythm at the VSP? How could a Soldier depart and return without notice? Were guard mount and stand-to procedures sufficient?

f. What are the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai? When did personnel at VSP Belambai first notice that SSG Bales was missing? When was the chain of command first notified? What procedures did the chain of command take to regain accountability of SSG Bales?

g. What was his duty position? What were his responsibilities at the VSP? What type of training did SSG Bales incur leading to this deployment? Did he deploy as a member of a unit or as an individual augmentee? At the time of the incident, was he serving with personnel with whom he deployed? In the train-up for deployment, did SSG Bales show any warnings about his future behavior? Did he exhibit any concerns about his upcoming deployment?

h. After the incident, what Key Leader Engagements have occurred with the local leadership concerning the incident? What other consequence management activities have been taken with the local leadership/population concerning the incident? Your recommendations shall include any additional consequence management activities you determine appropriate concerning this incident.

i. What was the medical response provided by US and/or NATO personnel concerning the victims of this incident? Was the medical response adequate? If not, what improvements should be made?

j. Any other matters pertaining to this incident you deem relevant.

3. There is an ongoing criminal investigation into this incident. The criminal investigation takes priority and your investigation will not interfere with the criminal investigation in any way. If you have any questions about potentially interfering with the ongoing criminal investigation, you will consult with your legal advisor. You and your legal advisor will consult with Criminal Investigation Division (CID) before conducting any investigative activity to ensure your investigation does not interfere with CID.

4. This incident is a matter of significant unrest and concern for the Afghan population. You will ensure that your investigation is conducted with great care toward respecting Afghan culture. Further, you will ensure that you conduct your investigation with appropriate security. To that end, you will consult with the Battle Space Owner through the RC-S legal office to ensure that conditions are safe for investigative activity in the region. Your

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CFSOCC-A Deputy IO will assist you with coordinating with the VSP personnel to ensure that you have adequate security to conduct your investigation.

5. You are to conduct this investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapter 3, AR 15-6. No individual has been named as a respondent at this time. All witnesses will be sworn before their interview. You are to document thoroughly all witness interviews in writing on a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). You will interview all witnesses in person, if practical. Reduce any oral statements to memorandums for record.

6. If, in the course of your investigation, you come to reasonably suspect that a person committed criminal conduct, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ (right against self-incrimination, outlined in DA Form 3881 warnings), or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate. Witness waivers of their Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights will be documented on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate). In addition, you may need to provide a witness with a Privacy Act statement before you solicit any personal information. You are strongly encouraged to consult your legal advisor in the event you suspect someone of an offense or if you have questions regarding these procedures. Additionally, should you determine in the context of your investigation that a Soldiers' status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in AR 600-8-2, Suspension of Favorable Actions (FLAGS), coordinate with the appropriate officials to initiate a FLAG.

7. You may interview and examine documents of personnel senior to you. If, in the course of your investigation, you determine that the investigation will require you to examine the conduct or performance of duty of a service member senior to you, or to which you have a moral or ethical conflict, then you shall report that fact to your legal advisor immediately.

8. From the evidence, and in concert with your legal advisor, you will make findings and recommendations.

a. Findings will be as thorough as necessary to fully capture the facts and circumstances surrounding the scope of this investigation. You have the discretion to use any of the following methods: examination of relevant documents; visiting relevant locations; evaluating procedures; conducting inventories; taking pictures; and interviewing witnesses, documenting all in writing or otherwise. You are not limited to these means of investigation, and your legal advisor may provide you with additional guidance.

b. In developing your recommendations, ensure that your findings support your recommendations. Develop in your recommendations any courses of action that seem appropriate to resolve any issues or problems raised by your findings, and recommend whether judicial or non-judicial proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or further investigations are warranted.

9. Your final report will include a table of contents, and all exhibits will be tabbed. Submit the completed report, along with the completed DA Form 1574, to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), USFOR-A, for a legal review immediately following completion of your investigation. Submit any request for delay or modification of the scope of your investigation to the OSJA, USFOR-A, through your legal advisor. In assembling your report, ensure that you also include the following:

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a. This memorandum of appointment.

b. An executive summary (classified and unclassified versions).

c. An index of exhibits and all exhibits labeled in successive order.

d. A chronology of your investigation.

e. A list of all people interviewed.

f. Proper classification markings for each paragraph, page, and exhibit.

10. To the extent practical, use unclassified materials in your report.

11. This appointment authorizes the investigating officer and his team priority 1 travel status throughout the AOR to conduct the investigation.

12. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6) USFOR-A, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at SVOIP (b)(6)

JOHN R. ALLEN
General, United States Marine Corps
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces - Afghanistan

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Enclosure 1b: List of Witnesses Interviewed

1. BG Christopher Haas, CDR, CFSOCC-A.

2. BG Martin Schweitzer, Deputy Command General – Operations, Regional Command - South

3. (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. (b)(3), (b)(6)

5. (b)(3), (b)(6)

6. (b)(3), (b)(6)

7. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6).

8. (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. (b)(3), (b)(6).

11. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a Advanced Operating Base (AOB) (b)(3), (b)(6)

12. (b)(3), (b)(6)

13. (b)(3), (b)(6)

14. (b)(3), (b)(6)

15. (b)(3), (b)(6), B CO 2-3.

16. (b)(3), (b)(6) 3/21 IN, 1-25 SBCT.

17. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

18. (b)(3), (b)(6), ODA (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

19. (b)(3), (b)(6), B CO 2-3.

20. (b)(3), (b)(6) B CO 2-3.

21. (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Enclosure 1b: List of Witnesses Interviewed

22. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

23. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA

24. (b)(3), (b)(6).

25. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

26. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

27. (b)(3), (b)(6)

28. (b)(3), (b)(6)

29. (b)(3), (b)(6)

30. (b)(3), (b)(6)

31. (b)(3), (b)(6)

32. (b)(3), (b)(6)

33. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a

34. (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a

35. (b)(3), (b)(6)

36. (b)(3), (b)(6)

37. (b)(3), (b)(6)

38. (b)(3), (b)(6), B CO 2-3.

39. (b)(3), (b)(6)

40. (b)(3), (b)(6)

41. (b)(3), (b)(6).

42. (b)(3), (b)(6)

43. (b)(3), (b)(6)

44. (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Enclosure 1b: List of Witnesses Interviewed

45. (b)(3), (b)(6)

46. (b)(3), (b)(6)

47. (b)(3), (b)(6)

48. (b)(3), (b)(6)

49. (b)(3), (b)(6)

50. (b)(3), (b)(6)

51. (b)(3), (b)(6)

52. (b)(3), (b)(6)

53. (b)(3), (b)(6)

54. (b)(3), (b)(6)

55. (b)(3), (b)(6)

56. (b)(3), (b)(6)

57. (b)(3), (b)(6)

58. (b)(3), (b)(6)

59. (b)(3), (b)(6)

60. (b)(3), (b)(6)

61. (b)(3), (b)(6), 2-3 INF.

62. (b)(3), (b)(6)

63. (b)(3), (b)(6), 2-3 INF

64. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

65. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

66. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

67. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

68. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

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Enclosure 1b: List of Witnesses Interviewed

69. (b)(3), (b)(6), 2-3 INF.

70. (b)(3), (b)(6), 2-3 INF.

71. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

72. (b)(3), (b)(6) (CJSOTF-A).

73. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

74. (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

75. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

76. (b)(3), (b)(6), 2-3 INF

77. (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

78. (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a

79. (b)(6)

80. (b)(6)

81. (b)(6)

82. (b)(6)

83. (b)(6)

84. (b)(6)

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Enclosure 1c: List of Unavailable Witnesses

1. SSG Robert Bales (undergoing criminal investigation).

2.

3.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4.

5.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

8 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Regional-Command South, Criminal Investigation Division Briefing on Staff Sergeant (E-6) Robert Bales Criminal Investigation

1. On 24 March 2012, Regional Command-South (RC-S) Criminal Investigation Division (CID) briefed me and my investigation team on the current status of the CID investigation concerning the investigation surrounding the alleged shooting of Afghan Civilians outside VSP Belambai, Afghanistan. The briefing was held at the RC-S CID office.

2. To help inform me regarding my investigation, CID provided me with copies of all relevant draft Agent Investigative Reports, sworn statements, and pictures gathered in the course of their interviews and site visit to Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai. CID also played for us a (b)(1)1.4a video relevant to the criminal investigation.

3. We discussed the need for continued coordination throughout my investigation to ensure, among other things, that my administrative investigation did not interfere with the criminal investigation into this matter.

4. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3), (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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Encl 1c

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

USFOR-A SJA (12-008)

29 APR 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR BG Ricky L. Waddell

SUBJECT: Request for Extension of Deadline to Complete Investigation

I have reviewed your request for an extension of the deadline to complete the AR 15-6 Investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations that SSG Robert Bales shot Afghan civilians outside Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai, Afghanistan on 11 March 2012. Your request is hereby approved. Submit your findings and recommendations no later than 29 April 2012.

FOR THE COMMANDER:

(b)(3)(b)(6)

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Investigating Officer's Chronology of Investigation

20 March 2012	MG Rapp phone call with BG Waddell to inform him to prepare for a possible investigation, without revealing the specific subject.
21 March 2012	(b)(3), (b)(6) ISAF SJA, office call with BG Waddell to deliver the draft appointment memorandum for the Belambai investigation (b)(3), (b)(6) (Legal Advisor) phone call with BG Waddell re: logistics and travel schedule
22 March 2012	BG Waddell receives appointment letter from ISAF/USFOR-A CDR, dated 22 March 2012, to investigate the 11 March 2012 incident outside VSP Belambai, Afghanistan, that resulted in the death of Afghan Local Civilians Arrangements made for preliminary administrative support and travel from ISAF HQ to KAF. (b)(3), (b)(6) sends AR 15-6 information and classified story boards to BG Waddell (b)(3), (b)(6) office call with BG Waddell; BG Waddell presents draft Mission, Intent, End State and plan of investigation; discussion of interview plan, necessary preparations and travel schedule BG Martin Schweitzer, 82nd Airborne Division Deputy Commanding General, phone call to BG Waddell to offer support from RC-South
23 March 2012	BG Waddell phone call with BG Haas, CFSOCC-A Commander, re: background information on VSO
24 March 2012	Investigative team arrives at KAF BG Waddell receives brief from RC-S CID concerning evidence gathered in the investigation surrounding the alleged shooting of Afghan Civilians outside VSP Belambai; RC-S CID provides draft investigation report.

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	Investigation team secures billeting, office space and administrative support. (b)(3), (b)(6) provides initial legal briefing to BG Waddell
25 March 2012	BG Waddell briefing to investigative team members on the investigation background; duties/responsibilities of the investigation team and investigation work plan.
27 March 2012	Site visit to Zangabad FOB and meeting with Company CDR. Collected reports and preliminary data. Site visit to VSP Belambai to perform a site survey and take photographs of the area. Meeting with current VSP leadership team.
29 March 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
30 March 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
31 March 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
1 April 2012	Investigation expanded to include allegations of command climate issues at Task Force (TF) (b)(1)1.4a and whether such command climate issues had any effect/contribution to SSG Bales' alleged criminal activity on 11 March. Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
2 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
3 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
4 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) Meeting between BG Waddell and BG Schweitzer re: role of RC-S in key leader engagements and consequence management following 11 MAR incident
5 April 2012	Interview: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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6 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
7 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
8 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
9 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
10 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
11 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(6) (b)(6)
12 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
13 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
14 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
15 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) BG Waddell and (b)(3), (b)(6) phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a XO
16 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
19 April 2012	BG Waddell phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) re: TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate issues BG Waddell phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) re: TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate issues BG Waddell phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) re: TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate issues
20 April 2012	Interviews: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

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	Legal team departs Kandahar for Kabul
22 April 2012	BG Waddell departs Kandahar for Kabul

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Enclosure 2: List of Exhibits

Exhibit A: CJSOTF-A presentation, undated, "VSO-ALP Methodology."

Exhibit B: (b)(3), (b)(6) Memorandum for Record.

Exhibit C: Situation, CJSOTF-A OEF XVII Fragmentary Order 11-342, 18 September 2011.

Exhibit D: MFR of Phonecon with BG Chris Haas, 15 April 2012.

Exhibit E: "VSP Belambai Village Stability Operations ODA (b)(1)1.4a," 30 November 2011.

Exhibit F: E-mail from (b)(3), (b)(6), dated 28 March 2012.

Exhibit G: Paragraph 3.A.5.F of USCENTCOM OEF Urgent Request for Forces Serial 1111209, 101914Z NOV 10.

Exhibit H: Paragraph 3.c of CJSOTF-A OEF XVII Fragmentary Order 11-339 TF (b)(1)1.4a RIP, 281000D Sep 11.

Exhibit I:

Exhibit J: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit K: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit L: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit M: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit N: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit O: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit P: (b)(3), (b)(6).

Exhibit Q: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit R: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit S: (b)(3), (b)(6).

Exhibit T: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit U: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit V: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Exhibit W: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit X: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit Y: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit Z: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit AA: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit BB: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit CC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit DD: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit EE: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit FF: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit GG: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a

Exhibit HH: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit II: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit JJ: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit KK: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit LL: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit MM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit NN: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit OO: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit PP: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit QQ: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit RR: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit SS: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit TT: (b)(6)

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Exhibit UU:

Exhibit VV:

Exhibit WW:

Exhibit XX:

Exhibit YY:

Exhibit ZZ:

Exhibit AAA

Exhibit BBB

Exhibit CCC

Exhibit DDD

Exhibit EEE:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit FFF:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit GGG

(b)(3)(b)(6)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

Exhibit HH

Exhibit III:

Exhibit JJJ:

Exhibit KK

Exhibit LL

Exhibit MM

Exhibit NN

Exhibit OO

Exhibit PPP

Exhibit QQ

(b)(3)(b)(6)

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Exhibit RRR: (b)(3)(b)(6)

Exhibit SSS: New Year's Eve Video. (On Disc)

Exhibit TTT: CONOP ROLLUP SITREPs for period 1 Dec 2011 - 8 March 2012. (Individual CONOPs are enclosures to the roll-up).

Exhibit UUU: Paragraph 3.A.4.A, FORSCOM WARNORD for Potential Deployment 3/2ID SBCT ISO OEF, 211520Z May 11.

Exhibit VVV: Memorandum from (b)(3)(b)(6) 19 March 2012.

Exhibit WWW: CID Statements Excerpts MFR.

Exhibit XXX: SSG Bales NCOERs.

Exhibit YYY: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit ZZZ: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit AAAA: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit BBBB: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit CCCC: Summary of Site Visit to VSP Belambai.
- Enclosure 1 (Diagram of the VSP)

Exhibit DDDD: (b)(3), (b)(6) Memorandum for Squad Leaders and Team Leaders, 27 Nov 11.

Exhibit EEEE: E-mail from (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit FFFF: TRAIN-UP SHEET PROVIDED BY (b)(3)(b)(6) IN THE CJSOTF BINDER.

Exhibit GGGG: (b)(6)

Exhibit HHHH: (b)(6)

Exhibit IIII: BG Martin Schweitzer, Deputy Command General – Operations, Regional Command - South

Exhibit JJJJ: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit KKKK: SSG Robert Bales, Enlisted Record Brief.

Exhibit LLLL: General Order Number 1B (GO-1B).

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Enclosure 3: List of Exhibits

Exhibit 1: IO Appointment Memorandum.

Exhibit 2: Paragraph 1, USCENTCOM OEF Urgent Request for Forces Serial 1111209, 101914Z Nov 10.

Exhibit 3: Paragraph 3.A.5., USCENTCOM OEF Urgent Request for Forces Serial 1111209, 101914Z Nov 10.

Exhibit 4: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 5: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF

Exhibit 6: E-mail from (b)(3), (b)(6).

Exhibit 7: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF

Exhibit 8: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF

Exhibit 9: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF

Exhibit 10: MFR of phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 11: Command Climate Survey Comments Overview.

Exhibit 12: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit 13: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 14: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit 15: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit 16: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit 17: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit 18: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF.

Exhibit 19: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 INF

Exhibit 20: (b)(3), (b)(6) Counseling Statement to (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 21: MFR of phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Enclosure 3: List of Exhibits

Exhibit 22: MFR of phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 23: RFF 12-001 CJSOTF-A IN BN RFF REWRITE.

Exhibit 24: "5W: Monkey Bite" email sent by (b)(3), (b)(6)

Exhibit 25: Slide entitled "TF (b)(1)1.4a Specific Training at SOTF-E (7-45 days)."

Exhibit 26: Awards Tracker.

Exhibit 27: 2-3 Command Climate Survey.

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ENCLOSURE 3: Report of Investigation IAW AR 15-6 – Facts and Circumstances Surrounding the Command Climate of Task Force (b)(1)1.4a 2-3 Infantry Pertaining to Allegations of Shooting of Afghan Civilians outside Village Stability Platform Belambai

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) Introduction.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 22 March 2012, I was appointed by the Commander, United States Forces – Afghanistan, as an investigating officer in accordance with Army Regulation 15-6 to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations that SSG Robert Bales shot Afghan civilians outside Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai, Afghanistan.[1]

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 1 April 2012, I received guidance to expand my investigation to include allegations of command climate issues at Task Force (TF) (b)(1)1.4a and to determine whether such command climate issues had any effect/contribution to SSG Bales' alleged criminal activity on 11 March 2012.[2]

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) Executive Summary.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) I have conducted a full investigation into the TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate, and I find by a preponderance of the evidence that TF (b)(1)1.4a did have a poor command climate, but the command climate had no effect or contribution whatsoever to what occurred on 11 March 2012 outside VSP Belambai. The troubled command climate was attributable to: a rushed deployment timeline; a new and unfamiliar mission-set; unforeseen obstacles in establishing the Task Force headquarters site; an unusually harsh winter in Afghanistan; a poor relationship between TF (b)(1)1.4a and its parent headquarters, Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force – Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A); and weak leadership in managing and addressing the resultant issues. Some of these issues were within the control of the TF (b)(1)1.4a and CJSOTF-A leadership, while several others were not.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) 2-3 IN/TF (b)(1)1.4a deployed into theater under very challenging circumstances. They had very short notice of their deployment and mission-set. Additionally, they executed their primary collective training at a National Training Center (NTC) rotation where they operated as part of their organic brigade and were able to secure specific Village Stability Operations (VSO) training for only one of their platoons. In the three months after their NTC rotation, the battalion had to: reorganize all of their squads; sign-over much of their equipment and property; integrate and train 130 new Soldiers and leaders; complete Soldier Readiness Processing (SRP); plan and execute VSO training; conduct the pre-deployment site survey in Afghanistan; prepare for movement; and take block leave. As a further complication,

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[1] (U//~~FOUO~~) The Appointment Memorandum is at Exhibit 1.

[2] (U//~~FOUO~~) Task Force (b)(1)1.4a was the command assumed by 2d Battalion, 3d Infantry Regiment (2-3 IN), 3d Stryker Brigade Combat Team (SBCT), Joint Base Lewis McChord, in theater. SSG Bales was in B Company, 2-3 IN. As such, 2-3 IN was responsible for B Co, 2-3 IN's preparation for deployment, and the 2-3 IN Commander was SSG Bales' battalion commander. During the deployment, the relationship of 2-3 IN (TF (b)(1)1.4a to SSG Bales' squad at VSP Belambai was limited to an administrative control (-) relationship. This ADCON (-) relationship consisted of some disciplinary actions, counseling, evaluations, awards, and other personnel actions.

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their mission was turned off and then back on in the month before departure, and one of their Soldiers passed away a few days before deployment.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Upon their arrival in Afghanistan, TF (b)(1)1.4a learned that the build-out of their headquarters site was not complete. They eventually were able to move to the site but spent several months developing adequate living facilities and life support accommodations for the Soldiers. One of the worst winters in recent history severely hampered this effort and limited TF (b)(1)1.4a ability to provide support to subordinate units.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Although TF (b)(1)1.4a inherited very challenging circumstances, weak leadership by the TF (b)(1)1.4a Commander, Command Sergeant Major and Executive Officer exacerbated the situation. The command group was generally out of touch with the needs of their Soldiers and created a perception among subordinates that the leadership enjoyed a sense of entitlement and did not make Soldier welfare a priority. Several specific incidents reinforced this perception, including the location of the MWR tent near the quarters of the command team and the designation of an "E-8 and above" latrine at a time of limited latrine availability. Additionally, the relationship between TF (b)(1)1.4a and CJOSTF-A was strained and ineffective and prevented the type of communication and cooperation required to address the challenges facing the Task Force. The command teams of both CJSOTF-A and TF (b)(1)1.4a share responsibility for this breakdown.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) The result of these many challenges and the failure to address them through strong leadership and a well-functioning relationship between a higher and subordinate headquarters was low morale among the Soldiers of TF (b)(1)1.4a This led to a breakdown in standards and discipline within the Task Force headquarters. The Soldiers at VSP Belambai, however, were under the operational control of another task force headquarters and remained almost entirely insulated from the impacts of TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate. As such, it is very clear that the poor command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a had absolutely no impact on the events of 11 March 2012 even though 2-3 IN was the ADCON Battalion Command for the Infantry units at VSP Belambai.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) Specific recommendations for subsequent action follow at the end of this report. They include the further evaluation of certain key leaders; prescriptive actions aimed at improving the command climate; and steps to improve the training, deployment, and integration of conventional infantry units in support of Village Stability Operations.

3. (~~S~~) Background facts.

a. (~~S~~) USCENTCOM Requirement, November 2010. In November 2010, the Commander of US Forces-Afghanistan (USFOR-A) requested a conventional infantry battalion "to provide dedicated infantry support to the Combined Forces Special Operations Component

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Command – Afghanistan (CFSOCC-A)," with a latest arrival date of 15 January 2011.[3] The USFOR-A commander termed the deployment of this battalion a "strategic priority." These conventional infantry forces were for the expansion of the Village Stability Operation (VSO) as "thickening assets" that would permit CFSOCC-A to expand VSO beyond its organic capability of only 30-35 sites.[4] The USFOR-A Commander estimated that the duration of this requirement would be for the duration of Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF), with normal force rotations authorized.

b. ~~(S)~~ FORSCOM WARNORD Requirements, May 2011. US Army Forces Command (FORSCOM) notified I Corps and Joint Base Lewis-McChord in May 2011 that the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division faced potential deployment to Afghanistan for OEF. Originally, 3d Brigade was to provide two combat arms battalions for the VSO mission. Eventually, only 2-3 IN deployed as intended to support VSO in early December 2011.[5]

c. ~~(S)~~ NOTIFICATION of 2-3 IN. The 3d Brigade (b)(3), (b)(6), remembers being alerted for deployment in June 2011 following a Brigade-level Field Training Exercise. The Brigade was also scheduled for a rotation at the National Training Center (NTC) for a full spectrum scenario against a near-peer competitor in August 2011. Time was too short to re-tool the NTC scenario. 3d Brigade was able to give the rotation a counterinsurgency focus for 2-3 IN, but not a full VSO training experience. The NTC rotation occurred in the thirteenth month after the Brigade's return from its last Iraq deployment, a couple of months earlier than desirable in the Army Forces Generation (ARFORGEN) cycle. Consequently, the Brigade did not receive its final new Soldiers and new leaders until after the NTC rotation. Because 2-3 IN was the first of the Brigade's battalions to deploy, this meant assimilating the new Soldiers and leaders during the last 10-12 weeks before deployment. Then, just before 2-3 IN was going on pre-deployment block leave, the deployment was postponed to possibly April and the mission changed from VSO, only to be turned on again a few days later while the unit was on block leave.[6]

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) List of personnel interviewed for this report.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Division.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (CJSOTF-A).

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)

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[3] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 2: Paragraph 1, USCENTCOM OEF URGENT REQUEST FOR FORCES SERIAL 1111209, 101914Z Nov 10. (S)

[4] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 3: Paragraph 3.A.5., USCENTCOM OEF URGENT REQUEST FOR FORCES SERIAL 1111209, 101914Z Nov 10. (S)

[5] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 4: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) (S)

[6] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 4: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) (S)

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e. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a
f. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a
g. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
h. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Officer (S-3).
i. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
LNO to TF (b)(1)1.4a

j. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Commander.
k. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
l. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6).
m. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6).
n. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(6)
(VSCC) Director.
o. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
p. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
q. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
r. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
s. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)
t. (U//~~FOUO~~) (b)(3), (b)(6)

5. ~~(S)~~ Findings.

a. ~~(C)~~ Train-up period.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) The Battalion (b)(3), (b)(6), and the Battalion (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), remember receiving the VSO mission in mid-July, close to their deployment to NTC. Given the limited time for NTC to modify the training scenario, only one platoon in one company was able to train in a VSO/Afghan Local Police (ALP) scenario. SSG Bales' B Company was placed into a Combat Outpost on the outskirts of a mock Afghan village, but did not conduct a VSO-style scenario. During and after NTC, the Battalion focused on marksmanship and Field Manual 7-8 infantry battle drills and tasks. The 2-3 IN leadership believes, however, that the lack of time to prepare for deployment negatively impacted their training for the VSO mission.[7]

(2) ~~(C)~~ To prepare the leadership for the VSO mission, the Battalion command team attended a SOF Academic Week, 12-16 September 2011. The S-3 and Operations NCO attended a CJSOTF-A Mission Readiness Exercise, 19-23 September 2011. The Assistant S-3 attended a training session with TF (b)(1)1.4a at Ft Benning. A Sea, Air, Land (SEAL) Team was invited to visit and provide training to one of the Battalion's companies, and a 3d Special Forces

[7] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 5 and 7: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Group Mobile Training Team worked with 2-3 IN leaders and NCOs and observed some of a squad Situational Training Exercise, from 17-22 October 2011.[8] Additionally, in early October, a small party, including the Battalion Commander and S-3 made a Pre-deployment Site Survey (PDSS) visit to Forward Operations Base (FOB) Warrior and left behind their plan for the build-out of Camp Patriot on FOB Warrior. The 2-3 IN leaders were convinced at this time that CJSOTF-A was working to deliver the Camp Patriot design.[9]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) In the three months remaining to the Battalion after the NTC rotation, the Battalion had to task organize to create 44 VSP elements and 8 Forward Logistics Elements out of its 32 infantry squads and attached enablers.[10] Moreover, the Battalion had to do this while splitting its property books, turning in all of its Strykers and other vehicles, assimilating 130 new personnel, and going through an individualized Soldier Readiness Process (SRP) requiring individual deployment orders.[11] Forty-eight hours before the Battalion left on block leave, 3d Brigade informed the leadership that the VSO mission was cancelled and deployment delayed until early 2012.[12] Many Soldiers had already arranged to move their families and store their household goods. Then, in the middle of the leave, the Battalion was informed that they would deploy as originally planned.

FINDINGS (U//~~FOUO~~): Despite these challenges, the 2-3 IN chain of command provided their troops with the minimum requisite intellectual understanding of the VSO mission and were able to provide refresher training on marksmanship, weapons systems, and basic combat fundamentals in the midst of successfully completing rushed deployment requirements. The lack of time to adequately prepare for the uplift mission negatively impacted the overall command climate of 2-3 IN but did not have any impact on the 11 March 2012 incident.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) RSOI and movement to Camp Patriot.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) Despite following up with CJSOTF-A on the Camp Patriot build-out plan during periodic video teleconferences, 2-3 IN learned upon its arrival at Bagram on 6 December 2011 that the camp would not be ready. After completing initial Reception, Staging, Onward Movement, and Integration (RSOI) training, the Battalion sent an advanced party to Camp Patriot on 10 December 2011 to help complete the Operations Center (OPCEN), Support Center (SUPCEN), and Base Defense Operations Center (BDOC) which were not yet completed and wired for use.[13] Rather than new B-huts as indicated in the PDSS design, CJSOTF-A provided a 150-man "Bare Base" kit of tent structures to be erected once 2-3 IN arrived on site. However, only five of the eight tents were included in the kit. Moreover, a

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[8] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 6: Email from (b)(3), (b)(6) to CJSOTF-A. (C)
[9] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[10] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 7: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[11] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 8: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Previous deployments had been done by units based on a roster of names, or "alpha roster."
[12] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[13] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 9: Statement of

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SEAL team was still living in the existing B-huts, and would stay for three weeks after 2-3 IN's arrival. (b)(3), (b)(6) remembers there only being 5-6 SEALs on Camp Patriot, but they only relinquished two of the six residential B-huts, and only one of the two pre-existing B-hut latrines; the SEALs kept the other latrine locked for their own use.[14]

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Upon arrival at Camp Patriot on 26 December 2011, the Battalion billeted most of its people in the operations centers as the unit began erecting the Bare Base tents. They used the Bare Base dining tent as additional billeting. As winter set in, the Bare Base heater systems were insufficient. The one B-hut latrine available was clearly insufficient for 150 personnel. CJSOTF-A had sent Life Support System latrine trailers, but the systems had European wiring on a camp with an American system; the required piping for the trailers was also missing. Similarly, the "Force Provider" latrine and shower tents in the Bare Base system were missing critical components of the heating and pump systems and were only weatherized for temperatures above 20 degrees Fahrenheit. By the time the SEALs left and the other B-huts became available, harsh winter temperatures had set in, freezing even the B-hut latrine plumbing. To compensate for the lack of latrines, 2-3 IN arranged for additional chemical toilets and built burn-out latrines as a back-up (which were never used). Crowded latrines and showers were also available 400 meters away on the Polish side of FOB Warrior.[15]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) The remoteness of the location of the TF (b)(1)1.4a and the winter weather inhibited the delivery of building supplies. When the lumber finally arrived in mid-January 2012 for the B-hut structures that had been requested originally during the early October PDSS, the new CJSOTF-A Facilities, Access, Maintenance, and Construction Board (FAM-C) rejected the TF (b)(1)1.4a request to use the lumber to build the B-hut billets, dining facility, and gym structures that they had submitted in their PDSS packet, and had been led to believe would be built by CJSOTF-A for them ahead of their arrival. The FAM-C Board explained that the structures had been rejected by the CJSOTF-A Commander.[16] The CJSOTF-A Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware of the deficiencies and difficulties with the Bare Base system or the Life Support System latrines, so he prioritized his scarce engineer assets for use at other VSP sites. Meanwhile, (b)(3), (b)(6) had been to Bagram on trips to scrounge tents, plumbing supplies, morale equipment, and heaters, with good success. By early March, most of the latrines were functional, a Morale Welfare and Recreation (MWR) tent was added to the site, and additional living tents were erected.

(U//~~FOUO~~) FINDINGS : The conditions on the ground at Camp Patriot when 2-3 IN / TF (b)(1)1.4a arrived at Bagram in December 2011 were insufficient to support Task Force operations. CJSOTF-A had not completed the work contemplated as a result of the October PDSS. CJSOTF-A and an advanced party from 2-3 IN worked to get the command-and-control facilities finalized for the 26 December 2011 movement to Camp Patriot, but TF (b)(1)1.4a had incomplete and insufficient engineering, materials, and equipment to remedy the living situation due to a

[14] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[15] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[16] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 10: MFR of phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6)

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general lack of engineering personnel and missing tents, plumbing, and electrical components. CJSOTF-A further complicated their attempted solutions by cancelling their planned construction, despite the arrival of the required building material in mid-January 2012. The poor living conditions and poor logistical supportability were exacerbated by one of the coldest and snowiest winters in decades. TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership took the initiative to ameliorate the conditions by going personally to Bagram to scrounge materials that those living on other FOBs took for granted. Nonetheless, it took almost 90 days for the situation to improve significantly.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Command climate.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) In late March 2012, the CJSOTF-A Commander (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) mandated a Command Climate Survey for TF (b)(1)1.4a The survey results were mediocre at best, with 42% of the Soldiers expressing that the Commander, Command Sergeant Major, and the Executive Officer did not "look out for the welfare of the Soldiers."[17] The handwritten statements on the survey sheets, though, were generally scathing.[18] (b)(3), (b)(6) considered the command climate one of the worst he had ever seen.[19] (b)(3), (b)(6), the Battalion Equal Opportunity (EO) NCO, also expressed that the responses were the worst among all the command climate surveys that he had ever administered.[20] The survey took place near the end of the 90-day period of extreme cold and snow and poor living conditions mentioned above.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Incidents noted on the survey sheets and in interviews with a number of witnesses included: (1) the location of the MWR tent near the quarters of the command team; (2) the running of an internet line from the MWR tent to (b)(3), (b)(6) billet for his own personal use on an MWR computer; (3) (b)(3), (b)(6) walking around smoking a pipe in contravention of Battalion rules against walking and smoking; (4) an "E-8 and above" latrine at a time of limited latrine availability; and (5) the attempted use of Light Tactical All-Terrain Vehicles (LTATVs) as "FOB runners" rather than as tactical vehicles.[21] An additional incident that two witnesses raised occurred pre-deployment when the Battalion leadership denied one Captain's request to miss a day of pre-NTC training on Joint Base Lewis-McChord (their home station) to get married, when two other Captains were permitted to leave pre-NTC training at NTC to attend a friend's wedding.[22]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) This set of incidents, combined with the rough living conditions and the harsh winter weather produced a toxic climate among several of the key staff members of TF (b)(1)1.4a and its Headquarters Company. The resulting perception was that the "Top Three" –

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[17] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 11 and 12: Command Climate Survey Comments Overview and Comments, and Statement of SFC Louis.
[18] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 27: 2-3 Command Climate Survey.
[19] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 13: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[20] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 12: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[21] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 14-16, 27: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6); Exhibit 27: 2-3 Command Climate Survey.
[22] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 17-18: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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the Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) the Executive Officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) and Command Sergeant Major, (b)(3), (b)(6) – were out of touch and had a sense of personal entitlement. Some of the NCOs and officers interviewed for this report had views that verged on outright disrespect for their senior leadership.[23] This environment of disrespect and insubordination was mentioned in written comments to (b)(3), (b)(6) from (b)(3), (b)(6), a SOF LNO embedded in TF (b)(1)1.4a by CJSOTF-A.[24]

(4) (U//~~FOUO~~) The view of the Top Three was not uniformly negative. Some of the written responses on the survey praise (b)(3), (b)(6) for his willingness to help.[25] Also, the TF (b)(1)1.4a S-3, the Headquarters Company Commander, and First Sergeant were not negative in their views of the command climate. However, the 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a ADCON commander (and their home station commander), noted that (b)(3), (b)(6) "builds cliques and works through key individuals."[26] (b)(3), (b)(6) went on to note that (b)(3), (b)(6) greatest challenge was the way he treated people, even though he was intelligent, had built a solid team, and had over 500 people attend his Family Readiness Group meetings before the deployment.

(U//~~FOUO~~) FINDINGS: The Top Three of TF (b)(1)1.4a allowed a toxic command climate to develop and fester among the 150 personnel assigned to Camp Patriot. Perceptions of the leaders' sense of entitlement and disconnection fueled this negative climate. The impact of this command climate was low morale among an unusually high percentage of TF (b)(1)1.4a Soldiers, a breakdown in good order and discipline, and actions by junior officers and NCOs that at times bordered on insubordination. Even though trying to improve the living conditions, the TF (b)(1)1.4a Commander, Command Sergeant Major, and Executive Officer failed to lead adequately through the adverse conditions.

d. (~~S~~) Command relationship between TF (b)(1)1.4a and CJSOTF-A.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the poor command climate dynamics within TF (b)(1)1.4a the relationship between the commanders and headquarters of TF (b)(1)1.4a and its parent unit, CJSOTF-A, was strained and ineffective during the period from TF (b)(1)1.4a arrival at Bagram through the end of March 2012.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) As noted above, TF (b)(1)1.4a arrived in theater in December 2011 to find that the improvements to Camp Patriot under the responsibility of CJSOTF-A were incomplete, and the site was unprepared to receive Soldiers or support operations. Despite these challenges, which directly impacted TF (b)(1)1.4a ability to execute its mission, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that he only communicated these challenges to (b)(3), (b)(6) through the daily Situational Reports (SITREPs) that TF (b)(1)1.4a sent to CJSOTF-A. At one point, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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[23] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 14 and 19: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6)
[24] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 20: (b)(3), (b)(6) counseling statement to (b)(3), (b)(6)
[25] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 11: Command Climate Survey Comments Overview and Comments.
[26] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 4: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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issued guidance to his subordinate commanders to cease including logistical issues on the daily SITREPs, and (b)(3), (b)(6) understood this guidance to be a direct reference to the TF (b)(1)1.4a camp build-out issues. From that point forward, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not raise these issues with (b)(3), (b)(6) through any other forum and instead relied on his XO and S-4 to address the continued delays and challenges in establishing sufficient housing and latrines for the TF (b)(1)1.4a Soldiers. After the unit had been on site for about one month, CJSOTF-A determined that it was no longer willing to resource the camp build-out plan. This decision was never communicated directly from the CJSOTF-A Commander to the TF (b)(1)1.4a Commander, but instead was communicated to the XO through the proceedings of the CJSOTF-A FAM-C Board.[27]

(3) (U//~~FOUO~~) As a consequence of this lack of direct communication, neither (b)(3), (b)(6) nor the CJSOTF-A Command Sergeant Major, (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware of the details of the insufficiencies of the Bare Base set and the Life Support Latrines. (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) tried to get to Camp Patriot on several occasions, only to have their flights cancelled due to weather or lack of available aircraft. The CJSOTF-A J-4, (b)(3), (b)(6) was also not fully aware of the plumbing and electrical needs in the early weeks of TF (b)(1)1.4a operating from Camp Patriot because the daily SITREPs did not report these needs; additionally, in the periodic "Log Sync" meetings, TF (b)(1)1.4a also did not surface these issues even though (b)(3), (b)(6) reported a good professional working relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6) CJSOTF-A's mid-January 2012 decision not to authorize further wooden construction for Camp Patriot was due to the belief that the Bare Base set plus the B-huts vacated by the SEALs were sufficient and were equivalent to what TF (b)(1)1.4a had in Regional Command (RC)-North. Therefore, CJSOTF-A prioritized its scarce engineer assets to other CJSOTF-A work.[29]

(4) (~~S//RUIN~~) Separately, (b)(3), (b)(6) embedded in TF (b)(1)1.4a from CJSOTF-A, wrote a scathing memo to (b)(3), (b)(6) about the weakness of the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership, and blamed the "late arrival" of 2-3 IN to Camp Patriot on "multiple failures of 2-3 INF [sic] staff."[30] No mention was made by (b)(3), (b)(6) of the inadequate build-out of Camp Patriot, which was under the control of CJSOTF-A. There was also no mention of the fact that the original plan for movement to Camp Patriot, as contained in a CJSOTF-A command briefing sent to 2-3 IN in August 2011, foresaw a 7-to-45-day train-up period with SOTF-East, presumably on Bagram, before TF (b)(1)1.4a went fully mission capable on Camp Patriot.[31] After their initial RSOI training, 2-3 IN did receive 15 days of training with SOTF-East, including a trip by key leaders to visit the headquarters of TF (b)(1)1.4a in RC-North to observe how an infantry battalion headquarters with the same VSO mission was performing. Finally, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) noted in his counseling statement of 21 March that he had admonished (b)(3), (b)(6)

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[27] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

[28] (U//~~FOUO~~) TF (b)(1)1.4a was the other conventional infantry battalion headquarters serving as a SOTF, located near Mazar-e-Sharif in Balkh Province.

[29] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 10, 21 and 22: MFRs of phone conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

[30] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 20: (b)(3), (b)(6) counseling statement to (b)(3), (b)(6)

[31] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 25: Slide entitled "TF (b)(1)1.4a Specific Training at SOTF-E (7-45 days)." (~~S//RUIN~~)

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for the high number of disciplinary issues among 2-3 IN Soldiers in areas not under (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) operational control. Worth noting is that despite (b)(3), (b)(6) concerns, he and (b)(3), (b)(6) made only one visit to TF (b)(1)1.4a on 21 March 2012, 87 days after TF (b)(1)1.4a arrival at Camp Patriot.[32] In fact, from arrival on 26 December 2011 until the SSG Bales' incident of 11 March 2012, TF (b)(1)1.4a received only one visit from a higher headquarters when BG Haas, the CFSOCC-A Commander, visited on 30 January 2012.[33]

(5) ~~(S)~~ Additionally, (b)(3), (b)(6) had the impression that CJSOTF-A only wanted the infantry line companies without the battalion headquarters.[34] When he arrived in country at Bagram, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported that the CJSOTF-A Command Sergeant Major (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) "said only two sentences to me on the way in here. Zero emails, zero phone calls. Nothing."[35] According to (b)(3), (b)(6) would send out emails to a wide distribution list, pointing out whenever a 2-3 IN Soldier had a discipline problem, even on sites not under the operational control of TF (b)(1)1.4a The emails would address everybody else by name, but would only refer to (b)(3), (b)(6) as "TF (b)(1)1.4a"[36] (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered having a 30-45 minute meeting with (b)(3), (b)(6) upon 2-3 IN's arrival. (b)(3), (b)(6) also reported calling (b)(3), (b)(6) by phone without making contact, but leaving messages. On 26 January 2012, (b)(3), (b)(6) did attend a gathering of Sergeants-Major at (b)(3), (b)(6) invitation to meet the new (b)(3), (b)(6) on Bagram Air Field.

(6) (U//~~FOUO~~) These communication challenges and the ineffective relationship between the two units extended beyond the respective Commanders and Command Sergeants Major as well. (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a S-3, reported that he got the impression that CJSOTF-A considered the Task Force "needy" because they kept asking for things to build out Camp Patriot.[37]

(7) (U//~~FOUO~~) Finally, there was a particularly troubled relationship between the TF (b)(1)1.4a XO, (b)(3), (b)(6) and several of the logistical elements within CJSOTF-A (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) specifically referenced conflicts with the SOTF-E XO, the SOTF-E Commander and the SOTF-SE Commander. These conflicts appear to be driven by both personality differences[38] and by the relative difficulties of resourcing the TF (b)(1)1.4a Operational Detachment Alphas (ODAs) through the TF (b)(1)1.4a HQs rather than through the Advanced Operations Bases (AOBs) (the

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[32] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 13: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[33] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 8: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[34] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 23: RFF 12-001 CJSOTF-A IN BN RFF Rewrite; this is consistent with a revised Request for Forces developed by CJSOTF-A requesting two battalions of infantry uplift, but only one battalion headquarters. (S)
[35] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 8: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[36] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 8: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6). See also Exhibit 24: E-mail Entitled "5W: Monkey Bite." ~~(S)~~
[37] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 7: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[38] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 8 and 18: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) Several witnesses noted that (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had difficulty building relationships within other organizations. In reference to (b)(3), (b)(6) interaction with the personnel of other organizations, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that "sometimes you have to do some fixing with some phone calls."

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ADCON headquarters for the ODAs placed OPCON to TF (b)(1)1.4a which were generally situated in locations that were more accessible to the established lines of communication.[39]

(U//~~FOUO~~) FINDINGS: During the first four months of 2-3 IN's time in Afghanistan, the relationship between the leadership of CJSOTF-A and TF (b)(1)1.4a was ineffective. This breakdown is attributable to three primary factors: the lack of effective communication between the two commanders and command sergeants major; CJSOTF-A's inability to complete Camp Patriot before arrival of 2-3 IN; and a strained relationship between the TF (b)(1)1.4a XO and CJSOTF-A logistical support elements. The failure of the two headquarters to work together effectively had a direct and material negative impact on the establishment of Camp Patriot and, by extension, on Soldiers' perception of the TF (b)(1)1.4a command climate.

e. ~~(S)~~ TF (b)(1)1.4a mission.

(1) ~~(S)~~ TF (b)(1)1.4a mission is to conduct VSO in two Afghanistan Districts in Ghazni Province. Additionally, TF (b)(1)1.4a managed VSCC operations for Ghazni Province. The Task Force originally had a mission set that included three VSP sites and a Foreign Internal Defense Mission, but this mission was descoped by BG Haas.[40] By contrast, their parallel organizations around Afghanistan—the SOTFs—typically control 12-16 VSP sites and up to two AOBs. Although TF (b)(1)1.4a has ADCON responsibilities for its Soldiers that are OPCON to the other SOTFs (primarily discipline and administrative duties), by all accounts it had more than enough capacity to battlefield track the two VSP sites.[41] In fact, this task is considerably less demanding than the task for which the staff trained at NTC—tracking a full Stryker battalion through counterinsurgency (COIN) operations. A result of this limited mission-set was a Task Force Headquarters staff that was not used to the best of its abilities.

(2) (U//~~FOUO~~) Additionally, unlike the other SOTFs, TF (b)(1)1.4a is located at a site that is not accessible by regular fixed-wing aircraft, only the much smaller Short Take-off and Landing (STOL) aircraft. It is difficult to reach by ground convoy because of the mountainous terrain, the distance from major logistics hubs, and the impact of winter weather. This significantly impacts the ability of the Task Force to resource the VSPs. A recurring issue was that OPCON VSP Commanders were reaching back to the nearest AOB/SOTF for logistical support because they knew that they could get their resources more quickly than if they went through TF (b)(1)1.4a.[42]

(U//~~FOUO~~) FINDINGS: TF (b)(1)1.4a mission-set is too small to justify the employment of a full battalion headquarters, and its location at FOB Warrior unnecessarily burdened the resupply processes for both the headquarters element and the VSP sites. As a result, the reduced mission set and difficult logistical location contributed to the perception that TF (b)(1)1.4a was not equal to,

[39] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[40] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 9: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[41] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 7 and 9: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[42] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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and was less capable than, the other SOTFs, and this perception had a negative impact on the morale of the Soldiers and leaders. TF (b)(1)1.4a mission-set was outside the control of the 2-3 IN command.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) OPCON/ADCON control issues.

(1) (U//~~FOUO~~) When 2-3 IN deployed into theater, it had divided its squads and attached elements into 44 VSP uplift elements and 8 Forward Logistics Elements (FLE), of which only 2 VSP elements and 1 FLE fell under the operational control (OPCON) of TF (b)(1)1.4a (2-3 IN Battalion headquarters). The other units fell under the operational control of SOTF-E, SOTF-SE, and SOTF-S depending on where they were located. Nonetheless, TF (b)(1)1.4a retained administrative control (ADCON) of those units, which generally meant that TF (b)(1)1.4a was responsible for non-judicial punishment, counseling, and personnel evaluation actions. The ADCON/OPCON responsibilities and practices were never formalized and instead were developed through oral discussions among CJSOTF-A, 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division (SBCT), the SOTFs and the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership. (b)(3), (b)(6) the Commander of 3d Brigade, 2d Infantry Division, the ADCON headquarters for 2-3 IN, called this a "gentlemen's agreement."[43] This was a particular challenge given the wide geographic disbursement of the units and physical separation between units and their ADCON leadership. (b)(3), (b)(6) termed the relationship as leadership by "remote control."[44] Additionally, at the VSP sites, there is some evidence that the OPCON ODA chains of command did not always fully embrace the conventional infantry Soldiers as their own troops.[45] Despite these challenges, (b)(3), (b)(6) and others in CJSOTF-A held the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership to account for discipline issues that arose with 2-3 Soldiers that were OPCON to the other SOTFs.[46]

(U//~~FOUO~~) FINDINGS: Confusion exists at several levels of command about the duties and responsibilities of those in the ADCON and OPCON chains-of-command of the non-SOF units involved in VSO. Transferring operational control of a unit from one parent unit to another always requires careful coordination, but this is a particular concern when the units include a mix of SOF and conventional forces.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) Recommendations:

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) Select conventional infantry battalions for the VSO mission early in the ARFORGEN cycle to give them enough time to achieve a proper understanding of the VSO/ALP program, train on mission essential tasks, and prepare administratively to deploy. Ensure that Special Forces Groups with VSO/ALP experience participate in the train-up period. A single

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[43] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 4: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)
[44] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 9: Statement of
[45] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 5: Statement of
[46] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibits 8 and 9: Statements of (b)(3), (b)(6) See also Exhibit 24, E-mail Entitled "5W: Monkey Bite" (sent by (b)(3), (b)(6) (Commander, SOTF-East)) and Exhibit 20: (b)(3), (b)(6) counseling statement.

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four-day Mobile Training Team and an academic week for leaders are insufficient. The battalion selected should have the opportunity to practice the VSO mission at a combat training center rotation before deployment and work with ODAs during the rotation, preferably the ODAs with whom they will serve in theater.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Continue to use conventional infantry battalion headquarters as command-and-control elements equivalent to Special Operations Task Forces. Ensure that the infantry battalion staff is properly manned, equipped, trained and exercised for this mission before deployment. CJSOTF-A must give this battalion a real mission commensurate to a battalion HQ and must treat them like any other SOTF. Make all OPCON and ADCON relationships abundantly clear at each level of command via formal documents. The battalion headquarters should be sited at a location from which it can provide timely logistical support for the VSPs, which are typically dispersed across remote areas. In cases where this is not feasible, the battalion headquarters should establish a separate logistics node at a location that will allow it to provide this support.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, CJSOTF-A, must assess whether the Commander and Command Sergeant Major of TF (b)(1)1.4a have made sufficient progress since the Command Climate Survey of March to remain in their positions. Conduct another command climate survey to measure progress NLT than one month from the date of the approval of this investigation.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, TF (b)(1)1.4a must assess whether the leadership style of his Executive Officer is detrimental to the command climate.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the requirements listed in (b)(3), (b)(6) counseling statement to (b)(3), (b)(6) of 21 March 2012, the Commander, TF (b)(1)1.4a must take immediate and effective measures to restore an environment of mutual respect between the ranks with zero tolerance for acts of disrespect or disobedience.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, CJSOTF-A, must assess whether the current CJSOTF-A LNO to TF (b)(1)1.4a is in a position to foster an open and positive relationship between TF (b)(1)1.4a and CJSOTF-A, given events leading up to this investigation.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) Commander, CJSOTF-A, should direct the appointment of a TF (b)(1)1.4a LNO to CJSOTF-A to facilitate improved logistical and operational coordination.

h. (U//~~FOUO~~) VSO and its infantry uplift component can and should remain a priority effort in ISAF's comprehensive campaign of counterinsurgency. The alleged actions by SSG Bales at VSP Belambai, in the heart of territory that has long been controlled or intimidated by the Taliban, were the very antithesis of VSO intent, and of the long-standing tradition of US Special Forces to embed in threatened populations to help them build a self-defense capability. Despite this event, there is much to commend in the work of SOF and uplift infantry, and the VSO/ALP effort should be continued.

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7. (U//~~FOUO~~) Additional Observations and Concluding Remarks.

a. (U//~~FOUO~~) The facts surrounding this investigation shed additional light on the broader issue of employing conventional infantry forces as an integrated component of a Special Operations Task Force, particularly for the VSO mission. The VSO mission is an important one, and adding conventional infantry Soldiers to that mission as a "thickening force" is a valid and valuable way of extending the reach and capability of VSO. In order for this structure to be most effective, however, leaders at the most senior levels must recognize that this mission places unique demands on traditional infantry units, and it is therefore essential that these infantry units are afforded the appropriate time, training, and equipment to prepare for and execute the mission.

b. (U//~~FOUO~~) Village Stability Operations is a corollary component of current counterinsurgency doctrine and an outgrowth of counterinsurgency history. VSO is a "bottom up" stability effort that uses the approach of "shape, hold, build and transition" in strategic rural locations to achieve specific governance, development and security outcomes that are the foundation for long term stability. By setting the conditions for stability and standing up an Afghan Local Police (ALP) force in a particular location, Special Operations Forces enable the return of local governance and thereby deny terrain and population to the Afghan insurgent groups. Since 80% of the insurgents captured or killed are operating within 10 km of their homes, the insurgency is largely based on local grievances. Therefore, the 12,000+ Afghan Local Police currently connected to the VSO program represent military-aged manpower that otherwise could be exploited by the insurgency. In turn, the ALP disrupts insurgent freedom of movement and sanctuaries.

c. (U//~~FOUO~~) VSO falls under the control of CFSOCC-A, and VSO missions are led by Special Operations units. Over the past fourteen months, these SOF units have been supported by conventional infantry Soldiers (SOF uplift) who integrate as members of the unit. The role of the uplift infantry is to "thicken" the VSO program—providing additional security and manpower to enable the SOF to increase their OPTEMPO and expand their geographic reach. In order for this partnership to be effective, it is essential that the conventional infantry and SOF personnel operate seamlessly, and do not exhibit an "us versus them" attitude. This is as true for a specific VSO site (Village Stability Platform "VSP") as it is at the Task Force level, where traditional infantry battalion headquarters are, in some cases, granted operational control of VSPs and are functioning as a Special Operations Task Force equivalent rather than as a battle space owner.

d. (U//~~FOUO~~) As the Army transformed during the past decade of war, we restructured the force such that division headquarters could be separate from their previously organic brigades. In turn, the new Unit of Action – the Brigade Combat Team (BCT) – had a design that facilitated more rapid deployment and, if necessary, independent employment. However, for the VSO mission we are now also splitting BCT headquarters from their organic battalions and further fracturing those battalions and their companies and platoons. At a minimum, as we have seen in the case of 2-3 IN, this makes "training as you will fight" an almost impossible task,

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especially when the mission and deployment order are issued less than five months before embarking. As a further complication, it is the current practice to leave the conventional infantry Soldiers under the administrative control (ADCON) of their organic leadership, even though that leadership (platoon, company, and battalion) may be located several hundred kilometers away. This means that personnel management—most importantly, performance evaluations and disciplinary action—is accomplished through phone calls, VTCs, emails and infrequent site visits.

e. (U//~~FOUO~~) As the integration of conventional infantry into VSO illustrates, fracturing organic units down as far as the squad level can create unique and powerful operational advantages. Doing so, however, also carries risks that must be mitigated. Specifically, we raise the risk to our troops and our mission if we do not clearly specify, document, and explain the command relationships down to the lowest, practical level of action – the infantry squad on a VSP. "Gentlemen's agreements"[47] on UCMJ and mission deconfliction may work between exceptional commanders, but cannot be enough when the Army has to prepare and rotate forces every nine months, precisely because it makes training for the next deployment that much harder.

f. (U//~~FOUO~~) In addition to the task-organization challenges that VSO presents in managing individual Soldiers, it also requires the integration of Special Operations and conventional forces at all levels up to the Group/Brigade Headquarters. SOF and conventional units traditionally operate within different cultures and structures, and the specific responsibilities that reside at a particular level of command within the SOF community may reside at another level of command in the conventional infantry. Leaders cannot anticipate that commanders and staff from one community will seamlessly transition to a new system without the appropriate training and experience.

g. (U//~~FOUO~~) Accordingly, the Army must have flexibility and adaptability on behalf of BCTs, battalions, companies, platoons, and squads to undertake new, unique missions like VSO that are born of wartime requirements. We owe those units and their Soldiers the maximum of clarity and time to man, train, organize, and equip. And, we must work harder to better integrate SOF and conventional forces at every level. Doing so will give US forces an important and potent force multiplier.

[47] (U//~~FOUO~~) Exhibit 4: Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

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8. (U/~~FOUO~~) The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at ricky.l.waddell@afghan.swa.army.mil, DSN: (b)(6)

Encl
Exhibit List (w/ Exhibits)

RICKY L. WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

(U) DERIVATIVELY CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6) CJIATF-Shafafiyat
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(U) DERIVED FROM: Multiple Sources
(U) DECLASSIFY ON: 20210531

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Village Stability Coordination Center

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INFORMATION BRIEFING

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS (VSO) METHODOLOGY



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Village Stability And Afghan Local Police

VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

- CFSOCC-A Initiative
- Defensive in Nature
- Follows 3 Lines of Operation
- Doesn't Pay Local Defenders
- No Weapons or Ammunition
- CERP Funding
- Sites nominated through CFSOCC-A

AFGHAN LOCAL POLICE

- GIROA/MOI Initiative
- Defensive in Nature
- Follows 3 Lines of Operation
- Pays Local Defenders
- Provides Weapons or Ammunition
- ASSF Funding
- Sites nominated through Joint Committee (GIRoA-ISAF)

"You can execute VSO without ALP, but you can't execute ALP without VSO"

BG Scott Miller CFSOCC-A Commander

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VSO Methodology

Unclassified ~~For Official Use Only~~

SHAPE

GIROA

(b)(6)

Select the Village

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Reduce Intimidation

Live in the Village

(b)(6)

Gain Trust

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ANA SF

JIRGA

VILLAGE

HOLD

(b)(6)

DC Capacity Buliding

(b)(3), (b)(6)

VSCC DAT/PAT

Econ Dev

VSO/ALP ANSF

(b)(6)

Empower Informal Gov

BUILD

(b)(6)

District Development Shura

District Center

ALP-ANSF INTEGRATION

DG ASOP DST

TRANSITION

ALP Demobilization
ALP Join ANSF
ALP Security Arrangement

(b)(6)

DG Credibility
Village Participation
Afghan Ministries

LEGEND

= Security

= Development

= Governance

Unclassified ~~For Official Use Only~~

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VSO A Closer Look

Unclassified ~~For Official Use Only~~

LOOs	SHAPE	HOLD	BUILD	TRANSITION
	Move in the Village	Stability Bubble	Connect to GIRoA	Enduring Stability
SECURITY	-Village Human Terrain -Intimidation Network -Village Selection -Village Assessment -Shaping (Reduce Intimidation)	-Intimidation Network -Guardians -Comm Watch -Organic Capacity -Partnered Force -Local ANSF -Transition to ALP	-ANSF Will/Capacity to expand to village -ALP integrate w/ANSF -ANSF Expansion to Village	-Will/Capacity for Afghan Security lead -ALP Demobilize -ALP join ANSF -ALP/ANSF standing Security arrangement
DEVELOPMENT	-Dist. Stab Framework -DC Development Assessment -CERP to gain entry	-Projects Desired by Shura -Cash for work -Contract Projects -Crowded House	-Development Gaps in Village for DC Assistance -DC Dev Shura Participation -USAID Project to VSP -MRRD to VSP	-Will/Capacity for MRRD Dev Lead -NSP CDCs in Village
GOVERNANCE	-Trad Gov Capacity/History -DC Gov Assessment -Engage Shura to gain entry into village	-ID Village Leaders -Empower Traditional Governance Capacity -Conflict Resolution -VSCC Rep to DC	-Will/Capacity for DC Connection to VSP -DG reach out to VSP -Elders participate in Shura Process -DST leverages VSP	-Capacity for GIRoA-Traditional Gov Balance -DG active in Village -Elders participating in DC Shuras -IDLG DDP in place
INFORMATION	Afghans: Focus on Village entry COI: Passive Threat: Tgt Local INS	Afghans: Stand up for your village (All LOOs) COI: Passive Threat: Opportunity In the Village	Afghans: GIRoA Outreach to VSP for Cred COI: Afghans Standing Up Threat: Walk away from violence and return home	Afghans: Afghan Positive Future COI: Afghans leading Afghan's Future Threat: TB and INS irrelevance

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Questions / Discussion / Guidance

VILLAGE STABILITY COORDINATION CENTER

VSCC - SOUTH

CONNECT. BROKER KNOWLEDGE. AMPLIFY

"DA KELAI SEKHA"
"FROM THE VILLAGE"





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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

17 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Input from (b)(3), (b)(6) on the subject of Village Stability Operations (VSO)

(b)(3)(b)(6)

3. Village Stability Operations (VSO). This is a bottom-up counterinsurgency (COIN) strategy that encompasses three Lines of Operation (LOO): security, development and governance. The security LOO focuses on the expansion of security and stability bubbles around rural villages. These bubbles are frequently referred to as "white space." The strategy is aimed at forcing the insurgents out of the area by expanding and connecting these security bubbles. Concurrently, the governance and development LOOs focus on connecting local governance to the district government, and the district governance to the provincial and national governments. At the heart of VSO is a team, or platoon-sized element, that embeds in the village by moving into and living in a local house or compound. By embedding in this manner, the team or platoon has persistent engagement with local Afghans at all levels.

4. A Brief History of VSP Belambai.

a. VSP Belambai was initially established as a check point in the village of Belambai, Panjwa'i, which sits along Route Charlottetown between COP Suleiman and VSP Talukan. In June 2011 the ODA was based out of VSP Zangabad (aka COP Suleiman) located southwest of the larger FOB Zangabad.

b. From July through November 2011, the ODA operated in a split-team configuration at the Belambai check point and VSP Zangabad. During this time, the Belambai CP was expanded to accommodate a larger, more permanent SOF team presence while

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infrastructure was being built to improve security and life support. On 30 November 2011, the ODA and enablers consolidated on VSP Belmabai.

5. Basic Organization of Special Forces.

(b)(1)1.4a

8. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3), (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigating Officer

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Enclosure. (SBCT Infantry Squad Diagram)



RIFLE SQUAD (x 3)

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UNCLASSIFIED //~~FOUO~~

Copy no. ____ of____ copies
CJSOTF-A
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
DTG: 152160 DSEP11

CJSOTF-A OEF XVII FRAGMENTARY ORDER FRAGO 11-342 INFANTRY SQUAD REALIGNMENT	
CJSOTF-A INFANTRY SQUAD REALIGNMENT	REFERENCES: 1. ANNEX C – KEY REALIGNMENT SITES

SITUATION

1.A. IN ORDER TO CAPITALIZE ON VSO GAINS AND SET THE CONDITIONS FOR FUTURE VSO EXPANSION, CJSOTF-A EXECUTES RE-ALIGNMENT OF INFANTRY ELEMENTS PRESENTLY REINFORCING VSO LOCATIONS. THIS REALIGNMENT SUPPORTS FUTURE CONSOLIDATION OF ORGANIC INFANTRY PLATOONS CAPABLE OF ASSUMING PARTNERSHIP WITH ALP, WHICH WILL ALLOW SOF ELEMENTS TO EXPAND TO NEW VSO LOCATIONS. THIS REALIGNMENT ALSO BETTER ALIGNS COMMAND AND CONTROL FOR INFANTRY UNITS AND ALLOWS THEIR PARENT BATTALIONS TO BETTER SUPPORT THEIR SOLDIERS.

MISSION

NO CHANGE

EXECUTION

3. A. COMMANDER'S INTENT:
3.A.1. EXPANDED PURPOSE: EXTEND THE CAPACITY OF LIMITED RESOURCES AND SOF ELEMENTS, BY REALIGNING INFANTRY TO BETTER INCREASE THE CAPABILITY OF CJSOTF-A.

3.A.2. KEY TASKS:
3.A.2.A. REGIONALLY ALIGN INFANTRY BATTALIONS.
3.A.2.B. INCREASE FREEDOM OF MANEUVER FOR SOF ELEMENTS TO EXPAND.
3.A.2.C. SUPPORT UNITY OF COMMAND FOR INFANTRY BATTALIONS.
3.A.2.D. SET CONDITIONS FOR CJSOTF-A TO MAINTAIN OPERATIONAL CAPACITY DURING CONVENTIONAL FORCE DRAW DOWN.

3.A.3. ENDSTATE: 2-3 IN UNITS CONSOLIDATED IN SOTF-S, SOTF-SE, AND SOTF-E. 1-505 PIR (1-23 IN) UNITS CONSOLIDATED INTO SOTF-W AND TF (b)(1)1.4a FINAL DISPOSITION SET FOR 2-3 IN AND 1-23 IN RIP IN DECEMBER 2011 AND FEBRUARY 2012. CJSOTF-A ABLE TO TRANSITION ESTABLISHED ALP TO INFANTRY PLATOONS AND EXPAND SOF ELEMENTS TO NEW LOCATIONS.

3.B. CONCEPT OF THE OPERATION:

THIS OPERATION WILL BE CONDUCTED IN THREE PHASES:

3.B.1. PHASE 1: PLANNING AND COORDINATION.
3.B.2. PHASE 2: REALIGNMENT OF VSO LOCATIONS.
3.B.3. PHASE 3: INTEGRATION/ FAMILIARIZATION OF INFANTRY UNITS INTO NEW LOCATIONS.

3.C. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS:

3.C.1. TF (b)(1)1.4a
3.C.2.A. RECEIVE ATTACHMENT OF 1-505 PIR FLE FROM GARDEZ ONCE THE RIP WITH 2-3 IN FLE IS COMPLETE.

3.C.2. SOTF-W
3.C.2.A. COORDINATE WITH SOTF-S AND SOTF-SE FOR REALIGNMENT OF INFANTRY SQUADS AT VSP BALA MORGHAB, DARRAH-I-BUM, SAHOWGHAN, HERITIA, KHAKESAFID, AND PARMAKAN.
3.C.2.B. BACKFILL 5 X 1-16 IN PAXS AT CAMP LAWTON DURING 2-3 IN AND 1-16 IN RIP
3.C.2.C. 1-16 IN FLE WILL MAINTAIN FLE AT SHINDAND UNTIL RELIEVED BY 1-505 PIR FLE AFTER 2-3 IN RIP.

3.C.3. SOTF-SE
3.C.4.A. COORDINATE WITH SOTF-W FOR REALIGNMENT OF INFANTRY SQUADS AT VSP SINAN AND VSP NAWHABAR.
3.C.4.B. 1-505 PIR FLE WILL MAINTAIN CURRENT POSITION AT VSSA MOGENSON UNTIL RIP

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

24 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone Conversation with Brigadier General Christopher K. Haas

1. BG Rick Waddell spoke with BG Christopher Haas, Commander, CFSOCC-A, via telephone on 15 April 2012 to discuss the objectives of the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and its connected Afghan Local Police (ALP) program, and the role of the Infantry Uplift. A summary of significant points from this meeting follows.

2. Village Stability Operations and Afghan Local Police:

BG Haas mentioned the Village Stability Operations (VSO) and the connected Afghan Local Police (ALP) program are the number one priority in support of COMISAF's campaign plan. The objective of VSO is to mobilize the Afghan population in order to establish security for villages and districts in rural Afghanistan. VSO sets the conditions for this mobilization. VSO and ALP are done in conjunction with the Afghan Ministry of Interior that approves the ALP locations and tashkils.

3. Role of the Infantry Uplift:

a. BG Haas stated the infantry uplift is the "most significant combat multiplier and enhancement to the VSO and ALP program." The infantry are the "game changer" that permits a larger and more robust presence. The addition of two battalions of infantry has allowed CFSOCC-A to establish over 90 VSO sites across the entire CJOA-A, and to operate in remote and contested areas. Without the infantry, CFSOCC-A would be in less than half of the current sites.

b. BG Haas also mentioned that CFSOCC-A has benefited from the infantry battalion and company headquarters elements for command and control. Their enabling and logistical elements help to keep CJSOTF-A in the fight.

4. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3)(b)(6)

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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~~SECRET // REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO//FOR DISPLAY ONLY TO AFG~~

VSP BELAMBAI
VILLAGE STABILITY OPERATIONS

ODA (b)(1)1.4a

PANJWAYI DISTRICT, KANDAHAR PROVINCE

EXECUTION DTG: 150000DNOV11 – 152359DFEB12

CONOP SYNOPSIS
TOTAL PAX (b)(1)1.4a
VSP BELAMBAI CONDUCT VSO

QRF:
INTERNAL
REACTION TIME: (b)(1)1.4a
C/21 IN BSO
REACTION TIME (b)(1)1.4a

ASSETS:
VEH PKG:
ODA (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

LEVEL 0

MISSION: ODA (b)(1)1.4a conducts Village Stability Operations IVO Belambai, Panjwai District (b)(1)1.4a NLT 15 APR 11 IOT expand the reach of GIroA, create an environment inhospitable to insurgent influence and set conditions for development of a secure environment.

APPROVAL PROCESS
- **AOB CDR APPROVAL:** 30NOV11 SCW
- **SOTF CDR APPROVAL:**
- **RC-S CONSENT:**

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OPERATIONS BLUF

- **RC SUPPORT:** This operation supports the COMISAF approved VSO program and is nested with ISAF Campaign Plan. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

- **BSO SUPPORT:** This operation supports 3/21 IN operations in Panjwayi District. There is an established relationship between the BSO and VSP Belambai that will continue to be valuable as operations expand throughout the AO. The VSP is directly tied into the BSO's Campaign Plan and is working with them to achieve the best effects. VSP Belambai is supported for MEDEVAC through KAF and FOB Pasab.

- **BACKGROUND:** The shape phase began in November 2010 when the previous VSP conducted a site assessment to determine the availability of a potential embed site . The SHAPE phase is still ongoing as we work with 5/1 ANCOP and a PLT of ANA from 2nd KDK, 205th BDE to conduct operations along all three LOEs.

- **DESIRED EFFECTS:**
  - Population secure and free from insurgent influence.
  - Empowered Local Shura effectively linked to the Panjwayi District Government.
  - Sustainable development initiatives nominated and managed by and through the Local Shura.

- **EXPANDED PURPOSE:** The expanded purpose of this operation is to support GOA capacity and influence through local development and the establishment of the ALP.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) **MIL USA USFOR-A SJA**

From: CFSOCC-A BROWN VSCC (b)(6)
(b)(3)(b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, March 29, 2012 8:51 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MIL USA USFOR-A SJA
Subject: FW: RFIs for (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~(SECRET)~~
Attachments: RFI - TASKORG - 10MAR2012.docx

Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

From: SOTF-SOUTH BELAMBAI (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 28, 2012 10:27 PM
To: CFSOCC-A BROWN VSCC (b)(6)
Subject: RFIs for (b)(3)(b)(6)

This email is meant for (b)(3), (b)(6)...

I would've sent this earlier but we had some sniper fire at the VSP site right after you called, and then the red side went down for a bit...

Attached is the TASKORG for the night of 10-11 March of all individuals assigned to the VSP listed with their location during the shooting incident. This was pulled directly off my SITREP.

I don't remember the exact date my ODA arrived to Camp Brown, but I believe I arrived on 15 Jan and linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6), who arrived before me (don't remember exactly how long they were here before me, but I think it was probably only a couple days). Myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) were the first individuals to make it to VSP Belambai, and I believe we both arrived on 17 Jan, and the main body arrived the next day on 18 Jan. Those dates may not be 100% accurate, but they should be +/- two days.

Please let me know if you need anything else.

V/R

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SFODA (b)(1)1.4a

VSP Belambai, Panjway District, Kandahar Province

SVOIP: (b)(6)

e-mail: (b)(6)

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Attachment Caveats: No Caveat
Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Caveats: No Caveat

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7TH SFG (A) VSP BELAMBAI OD (b)(1)1.4a PAX AND ATTACHMENTS: O/WO/E/C: 1/1/37/6
PARTNERED ANSF UNIT (O/W/E): 0/0/38 ANA

MOS	RANK	NAME	SSN	BR NUMBER	LOCATION
(b)(3), (b)(6)					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					KAF ROLE III
					KAF ROLE III
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					KAF
					KAF ROLE III
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
		ATTACHMENTS			
(b)(3), (b)(6)					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
11B	SSG	BALES, ROBERT	(b)(3), (b)(6)		VSP BELAMBAI
(b)(3), (b)(6)					KAF
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					LEAVE
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
		INTERPRETERS			
(b)(6)					LEAVE
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI
					VSP BELAMBAI

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	(b)(6)	VSP BELAMBAI
		VSP BELAMBAI

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3.A.5.D. ~~(S//REL)~~ THIS REQUEST IS FOR ADDITIONAL FORCES (NOT A ONE-FOR-ONE REPLACEMENT OF CURRENTLY DEPLOYED FORCES).

3.A.5.E. ~~(S//REL)~~ THESE REQUIREMENTS ARE NOT CURRENTLY ON A JOINT MANNING DOCUMENT (JMD) DESIGNATED AS INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTATION (IA) OR DESIGNATED TO REPLACE ANY IA POSITIONS ON A JMD.

3.A.5.F. ~~(S//REL)~~ COMMAND AND CONTROL RELATIONSHIP: OPCON TO USFOR-A.

3.A.6. ~~(S//REL)~~ TRAINING REQUIREMENTS: ALL USCENTCOM REQUIREMENTS FOR ENTRY INTO THE USCENTCOM AOR.

3.A.7. ~~(S//REL)~~ EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS: THE REQUESTED FORCES MUST DEPLOY WITH ALL INDIVIDUAL WEAPONS, CLOTHING AND EQUIPMENT TO SUSTAIN OPERATIONS IN EXTREME HOT AND COLD WEATHER CONDITIONS. TASKED PERSONNEL MUST DEPLOY WITH MISSION ESSENTIAL AND SUPPORT EQUIPMENT ORGANIC TO THE UNIT. ALL EQUIPMENT REQUIREMENTS WILL BE JOINTLY MET BY TASKED UNIT AND CJSOTF-A.

3.A.7.A. ~~(S//REL)~~ THEATER PROVIDED EQUIPMENT (TPE) AVAILABLE: NONE.

3.A.7.B. ~~(S//REL)~~ REQUIRED NON-ORGANIC MISSION ESSENTIAL EQUIPMENT LIST

(b)(1)1.4a

3.A.7.C. ~~(S//REL)~~ SPECIAL EQUIPMENT: NONE.

3.A.8. ~~(S//REL)~~ SPECIAL REQUIREMENTS: EACH PLATOON REQUIRES ENOUGH (b)(1)1.4a THEY WILL SUBMIT A REQUEST THROUGH THE CFSOCC-A J4, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

GENTEXT/ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS/
4. (U) ADMINISTRATION AND LOGISTICS. PER REF A.//

GENTEXT/COMMAND AND SIGNAL/
5. (U) POINTS OF CONTACT (POCS).

5.A. (U) CFSOCC-A J3 POC (b)(3), (b)(6) USA; DSN (b)(6) SIPR EMAIL: (b)(3), (b)(6)

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3.C. TASKS TO SUBORDINATE UNITS:

3.C.1. SOTF-SE
3.C.1.A. ASSUME OPCON OF 2 X COMPANY HQS, 5 X PLATOON HQS, 18 X SQDS, AND 2 x FLE ELEMENTS FROM 2-3 IN IAW ANNEX C.

3.C.2. SOTF-S
3.C.2.A. ASSUME OPCON OF 4 X PLATOON HQS, AND 14 X SQDS FROM 2-3 IN IAW ANNEX C.

3.C.3. SOTF-E
3.C.3.A. ASSUME OPCON OF 1 X COMPANY HQS, 5 X PLATOON HQS, 19 X SQDS, AND 1 x FLE ELEMENT FROM 2-3 IN IAW ANNEX C.
3.C.3.B. EXECUTE RSOI FOR THE 2-3 IN BATTALION HEADQUARTERS.

3.C.4. TF (b)(1)1.4a
3.C.4.A. PROVIDE ONE INTEL ANALYSIS 35F TO CJSOTF-A JISE.
3.C.4.B. PROVIDE ONE 42A TO CJSOTF-A J1.
3.C.4.C. PROVIDE ONE 92Y (E-6 OR ABOVE) TO CJSOTF-A JLOC.

3.C.5. TF (b)(1)1.4a
3.C.5.A. 2-3 IN ESTABLISHES BATTALION HQ IN GHAZNI PROVINCE.
3.C.5.B. ASSUME OPCON OF 2 X ODA FROM 3RD SFG (A).
3.C.5.C. PROVIDE TWO PAX LNO TEAM (DAY/NIGHT) TO CJSOTF-A JOC.
3.C.5.D. PROVIDE ONE INTEL ANALYSIS 35F TO CJSOTF-A JISE.
3.C.5.E. PROVIDE ONE 92Y (E-6 OR ABOVE) TO CJSOTF-A JLOC.
3.C.5.F. PROVIDE ONE 42A TO CJSOTF-A J1.
3.C.5.G. ALL PERSONNEL MUST HAVE ISOPREP DONE VIA PRO-FILE ON AKO PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.
3.C.5.H. DRAW BLOODCHITS, ONE PER-MAN (ACCOUNTABLE ITEM, ASSIGNED TO INDIVIDUAL) PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.
3.C.5.I. ALL PERSONNEL MUST COMPLETE SERE 100.1 ONLINE THROUGH AKO PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.
3.C.5.J. ALL PERSONNEL MUST RECEIVE HIGH RISK OF ISOLATION BRIEF PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.
3.C.5.K. IDENTIFY ONE DEDICATED PERSONNEL RECOVERY (PR) MANAGER, E-7 OR ABOVE.
3.C.5.L. OPCON EITHER PROFIS DOCTOR OR PHYSICIANS ASSISTANT TO CJSOTF-A FOR OPERATIONAL NEEDS AROUND THE CJOA.
3.C.5.M. RIP WITH 2 X PAXS AT VSSA DAVIS (1 X 11B, 1 X 91B).
3.C.5.N. RIP WITH 2 X PAXS AT VSSA LANE (1 X 11B, 1 X 92G).
3.C.5.O. ALL DEPLOYING PERSONNEL MUST RECEIVE RABIES PRE-EXPOSURE PROPHYLAXIS PRIOR TO DEPLOYMENT.

3.C.6. JLOC
3.C.6.A. TRACK AND PROVIDE DAILY UPDATES TO SOTFS AND CJSOTF-A STAFF ON TF (b)(1)1.4a 2-3 IN ARRIVAL FLIGHTS.
3.C.6.B. PROVIDE AND COORDINATE FOR TRANSPORTATION FROM BAF TO DESIGNATED SOTF FOR ALL 2-3 IN SUPPLY NCOS.
3.C.6.C. FACILITATE THE TRANSITION OF FLE LOGISTICAL HUBS TO TF (b)(1)1.4a 2-3 IN.

3.C.7. J4
3.C.7.A. COORDINATE TRAINING PACKAGES FOR FAMILY OF SPECIAL OPERATIONS VEHICLES (FOSOV) DRIVER'S TRAINING AND TRAINING ON SOF PARTICULAR SYSTEMS AT DESIGNATED APODS.
3.C.7.B. PROVIDE ASSISTANCE TO SOTFS TO ENSURE THAT APPROPRIATE NUMBERS OF VEHICLE PLATFORMS ARE STAGED AT TRAINING HUBS TO SUPPORT RSOI TRAINING, MOVEMENT TO VSO LOCATIONS ACROSS THE CJOA, AND TF (b)(1)1.4a OPERATIONS.
3.C.7.C. TRACK OPERATIONAL NEEDS STATEMENTS FOR TF (b)(1)1.4a

3.C.8. J3 SGM: ICW SOTFS, TRACK LOCATIONS AND TRAINING ACCOMPLISHED BY TF (b)(1)1.4a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/06	0935	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) I'm stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Almost 5 years in August. I am an 11 Bravo. This is my second combat tour. I've been to Iraq in 2009.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who was in your team?
A: In my team I had (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) was above me. SSG Bales kind of made himself a Platoon Sergeant, but wasn't really a platoon sergeant. Then above them (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team sergeant and (b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge of the team. And before them it was (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What was SSG Bales' duty position?
A: SSG Bales was the squad leader of 3rd Squad and he kind of took his own role as Platoon Sergeant.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - Shuras, for example?
A: Yes. I would give kids candy but I really didn't interact with the adults. You would always see the kids out in the towns, especially in Alikozai. Most of the adults were out in the fields doing work. I didn't see any kids in Naji Bien, mainly adults and the ODA teams talked to them.
Q: Did you participate in any shuras?
A: No, just provided security. If they had a shura in the district center, we would ride out there with them but wouldn't go in to the shura. And we'll have a weekly shura in Belambai, but we'll usually just provide security. We'll just get on the roof and provide security.
Q: Where did they conduct the shuras in Belambai?
A: Sometimes they held it across the street at the school and sometimes it was out on the HLZ.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while in Belambai?
A: Quite a bit, actually. It has its cold and hot spots; when we first got there it took about a week before we got in to a 4 hour TIC. Then it would be really dull for a while and then it would be really hot for a week, like almost every day.
Q: Did you take contact while on patrol?
A: I got blown up by an IED right before all this happened, on 5 Mar. And a couple weeks before that, we were heading to Naji Bien, Intel was saying that there was IED and an ambush waiting for us. We found the IED, so they figured it was good information, so we went around the back side of Naji Bien and as we walked we took PKM fire from the south. We took pretty close contact from that.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: What was the command climate of your team?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: We were told that our part was to do anything the ODA wanted us to do. If it was to burn shit, we would burn shit. If it was to pull security for them or go on a mission with them, it was expected to do whatever they wanted us to do.
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai?
A: I never saw it personally; it was one of those things that were always around. It wouldn't surprise me if someone had it happened. But I was actually surprised when all of this came out.
Q: Who was your roommate in the cans?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: Just joking around, but nothing derogatory. Nothing that would cross the line or where someone took offense. There was one guy: (b)(3), (b)(6). Sometimes it would be a little if-fy on the things he would say. I would feel uncomfortable about it.
Q: Like what?
A: Well he definitely doesn't like black guys. It didn't seem like it or the things he would say, at least. For instance, like some of our guys weren't doing cement work and (b)(3), (b)(6) was working with us, he said "Here I am working like a fucking nigger and you guys are over there just hanging out." I was just shocked. Not all the time, but you'll catch him saying stuff like that once in a while.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: I don't care much for them, I mean I don't dislike them I just have more concern about the welfare of my guys. I don't hate them, but I don't like them. SSG Bales typically didn't like the people. Everybody had their likes and dislikes.
Q: What do you mean when you say "You don't like them"?
A: Because they try to kill us every day.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In your mind, is there a difference between the enemy and civilians?
A: Yes, most definitely. The civilians are just trying to live their lives, I have nothing against them. There's definitely a difference between the enemy and civilians. The enemy is the one I don't like; the guys that are trying to kill us. I actually really cared about the 3 workers on the base.
Q: Did you guys interact with the ANA?
A: Sometimes we would play soccer with them on the HLZ. Our interaction with them was pretty good. Whenever they came up for guard on our tower, we would talk to them and joke around with them.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior soldiers?
A: There are a couple of instances where SSG Bales has talked about how one thing would be going right at home with his wife and then it would be horrible at the VSP or it would be the opposite.
Q: Was that a normal thing?
A: Sometimes you'll catch yourself slippin', like complaining about a certain task in front of the junior guys. I know I've caught myself doing that.
Q: In general, how did the leadership of the 2-3 and ODA get along? Was there a difference between how the (b)(1)1.4a ODA and (b)(1)1.4a ODA got along with the 2-3 leadership?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: I think it would have to do with a lot about timing, because up on that roof you can only see so much and it also depends on how

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: On the perimeter, how would have anybody gotten out?
A: They would have to crawl over the c-wire because there's c-wire almost, entirely everywhere and you would really have to try or you could just walk out the gate.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: I don't think he went to any shuras. He just did security like we did security. We've all gone out on missions to the villages, but nothing like a negative vibe from the civilians.
Q: What were SSG Bales interactions with the ANCOP?
A: I was usually staying back to keep positive control of the camp, so him and (b)(3), (b)(6) went down there most of the time. I did go down there one time and he was really excited about doing it because he's one of those control freak guys, so he was like, "We're going to do this my way."
Q: How about his interactions with ANA and the workers on the camp?
A: He definitely doesn't trust any of them. I remember one time where we were unloading food cases, so all the guys were helping out having fun throwing the cases of food at each other and catching the cases, so the truck driver decided to help out and he was just trying to have fun too, so he threw one case and it hit SSG Bales. I guess SSG Bales didn't catch it right or it hit him wrong, so the truck driver started laughing and having fun with us, so SSG Bales got kind of mad and we just kept going. So it happened again and SSG Bales punched the dude and kneed him a couple of times. I was right there when it happened.
Q: What happened to the truck driver? Was he hurt?
A: He was bleeding out of his mouth a little bit. We had our medic help the guy out. I think (b)(3)(b)(6) took him over to the Med Shed.
Q: What happened to SSG Bales?
A: He was just walking around all pissed off. I think he got the vibe that we were all pretty upset about it. Then he pulled one of the interpreters to the side and was apologizing to him.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did the chain of command know about what SSG Bales did?
A: I'm not entirely sure if someone told them or not, but there was ODA there because (b)(3)(b)(6) was in the truck. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did anybody talk about it?
A: I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) about it. I didn't like what happened.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was it on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: Quite a bit actually. We would get together and go lift weights. It was just a way to pass time. For the most part, I didn't have to make my guys do it, they enjoyed doing it.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: Quite a bit because if we would fire them that day, then we were cleaning them that day. If you didn't clean it in awhile and it looks dirty, then you need to clean it.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you for guard and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: It was briefed to us by (b)(1)1.4a when we got there. For handover, we would brief any significant events that happened while on shift. You did one hour on guard shift, two guys were up there.
Q: Who ran the guard roster?
A: I don't know who changed it every day, probably (b)(3), (b)(6) But we had a number system, 1- 40 and we would operate the roster like that.
Q: How was SSG Bales temperament? Was he moody?
A: He's a moody person. He could be all happy one minute, but if you have a task and you don't do it to his liking or his way, he would freak out on you. If you didn't do what he said, he would make it known...For instance (b)(3), (b)(6) was driving one day and we had a patrol out to Zangabad and they had guys in front of their vehicle, so SSG Bales would tell (b)(3), (b)(6) keep driving and every time (b)(3), (b)(6) got too close to the soldiers, he would stop. SSG Bales would yell at him and say, "What are you stopping for you idiot?!" He would get mad if you didn't do things his way.
Q: How would that affect the morale of the unit?
A: The guys didn't like working around him, I know I didn't either. I know if I was doing something and SSG Bales came over, I would go somewhere else and go work on something else.
Q: Did it have an overall effect on command climate?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: About the reaction about the truck unloading incident with SSG Bales, what did you say to your soldiers about that?
A: I was really surprised. Everybody knows SSG Bales is the freak out type and we just all discussed it together.
Q: But as a command issue, did you discuss the proper treatment of Afghans and the proper way to interact with the locals?
A: Courtesy and respect. Our guys knew better. They knew not to be hostile with the Afghans.
Q: Was there a shared frustration in the platoon about the deployment coming up?
A: They were surprised because we were told that we weren't going to leave for a year. Our train up was initially for Korea, and all of a sudden we were at NTC and we get a notice that we probably are going to be deployed. I could see it being frustrating along the levels with family because guys just got to the unit and they were told they had short notice deployment, so they would have to move their families and that can be stressful. The fact that we were not scheduled to deploy and then they dropped it on us. They had us training so much that we didn't had the time to take care of our personal needs.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: You said SSG Bales kind of assumed the Platoon Sergeant role, how did that affect the working chain of command?
A: SSG Bales thought he was going to make the E-7 list and he was the Platoon Sergeant prior to coming to Afghanistan, and then a month before we left we got a SFC, so he lost his Platoon Sergeant spot. So when we got to Belambai, he was always freaking out about it, so (b)(3), (b)(6) tried to make it to where (b)(3), (b)(6) would take the Squad Leader role just so they would only have to deal with the squads instead of dealing with SSG Bales. That was their kind of way of protecting us from SSG Bales.
Q: So they internally elevated SSG Bales role so the junior soldiers would only have to interact with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Yes. That was the way they had it.
Q: While you were at Belambai, did your leadership visit you?
A: Yes, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) came out and checked on us. They came to see how we ran things, to check on the soldiers' welfare and to make sure we were being treated alright. CJSOTF came out on Christmas. They came and talked to us and gave guys some coins.
Q: Do you think the senior leadership that was off of Belambai cared about you?
A: Yes, definitely. Especially since we had so much contact via email and stuff. You could tell they cared about us. I remember (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) saying to (b)(1)1.4a "If any of my guys get hurt, we're coming out there."

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/05	1110	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) I am an 11 Bravo.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Since September 2011.
Q: What was your duty position and duties at VSP Belambai?
A: A grenadier. Patrol and help build up the VSP.
Q: Who's in your chain of command?
A: My squad leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) my team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) For SF as for as the leadership, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team captain and team sergeant used to be (b)(3), (b)(6) but then he was replaced by (b)(3), (b)(6) The leadership in the ODA before them was (b)(3), (b)(6) as the team leader and team sergeant was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: Yes, I participated in the patrols. As far as interactions, we would speak to the kids and give them candy. That was pretty much it.
Q: Did you participate in shuras?
A: I didn't personally, but I was around when they were going on. I would do security.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: Out on patrol, we didn't take too much contact since I've been there. I could only remember two incidents, the first one we were on patrol to FOB Zangabad and we took a couple of indirect rounds. The other incident was when we were patrolling to Naji Bien where we took some small arms fire. All the other contact we took was at the VSP. I would say just recently we've taken contact about 4 days in a row and before that it was about 2 or 3 times a week.
Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: It's not the same as AIT, but I had a good idea of what I was getting myself into, so it wasn't a big difference.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 05 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was the command climate of your unit? Positive/Negative? Healthy/Unhealthy?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission?
A: I had an idea.
Q: What do you understand that mission to be?
A: From my understanding, we were going out to villages to just help stabilize the government, their security and to help them provide for themselves.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift?
A: I think we were all on the same mission.
Q: Did your chain of command tell you about what you'll be doing most of the time?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur? Were these actions brought to the attention of the chain of command? If so, what actions did the chain of command take regarding these instances?
A: Possibly, but nothing I was sure of but some assumptions were made.
Q: Can you please explain?
A: The instance I'm talking about was when SSG Bales went out.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 05 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: The 11 March incident?
A: Yes.
Q: What about before that incident?
A: No, not that I can think of.
Q: Did you see any drinking or any bottles?
A: No.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: No, not at all sir.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: Not really. Not necessarily towards the villages or Afghan people but most likely towards the Taliban.
Q: In general, do senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound?
A: There were ANA at the front gate and I guess you could just walk out, because if anybody were to stop you, it would have to be them because we are all at the back of the compound. So if they didn't stop you or if they didn't tell anybody, then you're good to just leave. If you wanted to leave, it would most likely be at night.
Q: On guard duty, which way are you facing?
A: Most of the time it was towards the north, but every once in a while we would scan around the base.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Did he attend any shuras?
A: Not that I know of, sir.
Q: What about the local workers on the base?
A: Not that I know of.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: Every day we would go to the gym at about 1700 on our own.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: There were a lot of sand storms, so mostly you would wipe it down every day. We cleaned them whenever we used them or weekly if you didn't use them at all.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: It was explained when we first got there; from the first ODA team. They basically said, just watch the perimeter and they told us that the ANA have two guard towers. Basically you're just up there with your NODs and just looking for anything suspicious.
Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: If anything happened or you saw any activity on your shift, you would brief that to the next shift.
Q: What was your battle drill when you heard gun fire while on guard duty?
A: Since it wasn't coming at us, we were just trying to see where it was going. After hearing a couple more shots, we were trying to figure out where it came from so we shot an illume round. We still couldn't see anything after shooting an illume but the gun fire stopped after we shot the illume round. After that, we got relieved and we let the guys coming on shift know what happened.
Q: Did you guys let the OPCEN know; was that part of your battle plan?
A: It depends on the situation, because if we hear shots, they really can't do anything about it. We let the OPCEN know though.
Q: So on the base, you never saw SSG Bales interact with any Afghan workers or local nationals?
A: No.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 05 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/07	0808	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) Fort Lewis, Washington. I am an 11 Bravo/Rifleman.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 1 year and 3 months.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: I was a rifleman, sir.
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: My team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) and my squad leader was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: And above them?
A: Well SSG Bales appointed himself the platoon sergeant, but he actually wasn't. He was a squad leader for 3rd Squad.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages?
A: Yes, sir. I only went out like 3 times because I broke my foot in January.
Q: In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: Yes, sir. I would hand out candy to the kids. Our duty was not really to talk to the civilians; it was more to pull security, sir. We would stand outside the doors of the shuras and pull security.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: We never had any contact outside the wire, but on the base I think we were in 6 TICs between when we first got there and 6 January when I left.
Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: Everyday casual conversations. We would see them in the gym. I don't know if you want to call it being "Buddies", but we did stuff together.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes, sir. 3rd Group trained us on all the heavy guns, radios; other than that, I think I missed a lot of the training that 3rd Group conducted.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Was the morale higher or lower when you got back from medical leave?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission? What do you understand that mission to be?
A: Actually sir, 1st squad, (b)(3), (b)(6) squad, had to read a report on it. We've gotten a big ~~40 page~~ document from the group explaining about the operation, sir. I don't know about anybody else in the company, but that's we had to study and read on. So we knew we were coming here to not be a on a fire mission, but was there to communicate with the villagers and all that stuff. We did understand that, sir.
Q: Was it different than what you expected when you got there?
A: Yes. It was different than what we expected. We weren't expecting to jump in to an active area like that.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: We were sent there to plus up their numbers and to learn a lot from them. To help them with anything they needed, sir. And we were told that you're not there to be the "Bitch", you're there to help out
Q: Do you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Sir, yes. You know training is always something you can have more of. We were prepared, but anybody could of have been more prepared for that kind of area. We could have probably studied more about VSO on how to deal with villagers and stuff like that, sir. But as far as prepared, yes we were, sir. We came ready, but could we have come more ready? Yes, if we'd known more things about it before we came here, sir.
Q: Thinking back on it, if you were the platoon sergeant and you were getting your troops ready for this deployment, what would you have done differently?
A: At NTC, we really didn't do like a VSO type training. It wasn't like anything we were doing here, sir. They really didn't train us on what we were going to do here.
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like your leadership taught you effectively how to handle stress?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: When we first got there we were all kind of nut to butt in those little rooms we were in. It didn't smell too good in there because you had 15 sweaty nut sacks in there. But we had showers and weren't expecting not to have to burn shit too. Other than that it was actually better than we thought. I thought we were going to be out there and not shower for months.
Q: In general, did you feel like the standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai?
A: Did I visually see alcohol? No, sir. I never saw the consumption of alcohol. Now I have suspected someone of drinking? Yes, sir.
Q: Indications?
A: Yes, sir. Just their actions. People acting retarded.
Q: Can you describe any of those instances where you saw people acting retarded?
A: New Year's and Christmas.
Q: Where were you lower enlisted soldiers when this was happening?
A: We were all in the chow hall or in our room. We're not allowed to go into leadership "Cans", sir. We're only allowed if we're authorized to go get someone. So if something was going on there, we would not know about it, sir.
Q: So on Christmas or New Year's someone must of came over to see you?
A: Well on New Year's, we were all actually getting ready to go on the roof and shoot off flares. They had set up bottles of fuel that the EOD were going to blow up. So we all got together up on the roof, sir.
Q: Is that where you smelled alcohol and saw people acting stupid?
A: Yes, people were acting stupid. And that's when we starting conversing amongst ourselves saying, "That guy has to be drunk, he's acting retarded."
Q: Nobody came around and offered you guys any?
A: Negative, sir. They're stingy bitches. Motherfuckers kept that shit.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: That's just going to happen everywhere, sir. Some people might take offense to it when people are joking. We bust each other's balls all the time in the B-Hut.
Q: Did anybody take offense to that?
A: Negative, sir. We just kind of joked back and forth all the time. There's point where you just don't cross that line.
Q: Did the leadership say any racist or insensitive comments?
A: Yes, sir. There was some of that between (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales. Sometimes they would go a little over board with degrading comments. They would say, "Hey, you're just a worthless piece of white trash." It makes you feel like saying "Aww man he needs to shut the fuck up, he does not have the right to say that."
Q: Anything like that from the ODA?
A: Not the ODA. Never heard any racist stuff, sir.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: SSG Bales would mention sometimes that they're all pieces of shit. I've had a conversation with him when I said there's good people over here just like there's bad people in the U.S.
Q: Beyond SSG Bales, was there anything like that from other people? Was that the general attitude on the camp?
A: Not really. One of the important things we were taught was that the kids are the ones we got to work with. Because they're the ones that go back and talk to their parents. If they think you're a jackass, they're going to run and tell their parents that. The plan was to win over the kids.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, how did the leadership of the 2-3 and ODA get along? Was there a difference between how the (b)(1)1.4a ODA and (b)(1)1.4a ODA got along with the 2-3 leadership?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen? How would you have done it?
A: Just to say, first of all I wouldn't do it because I would be scared shitless to even walk outside that fucking wire at Belambai. I never really sat down and thought about it. That's something that I wouldn't even do.
Q: What's the easiest way to get out?
A: I wouldn't really say there's been really an easy way because there's c-wire up everywhere. So just as hard it is to come, it's just as hard to get out.
Q: Well from the roof top can you see the gate?
A: (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: What about at night, can you see the gate with your NODs on?
A: (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? He attended any shuras in the area?
A: At the time I was there at first, he was still the squad leader for 3rd Squad. So I'm pretty sure he went out, he went with 3rd Squad.
Q: Were you there for the truck incident?
A: I heard about it but I was not physically there.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: I and (b)(6) were in the gym every day. Our leadership didn't have to tell us to do PT, we just did it.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: If we went out, you definitely cleaned it that day. But if you were sitting around not doing anything, then you would clean it. The big weapons were cleaned once a week.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: When we first got there, the ODA sat (b)(3), (b)(6) down and explained the process to him. Then he would come down and explain the process to us. Just a good briefing on what to do.
Q: What did you normally take up there with you?
A: Your kit, your weapon, your NODS and a radio.
Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: You would brief them on what you saw during your shift, then you handover the radio and thermals.
Q: Did SSG Bales say any other derogatory comments about Afghans?
A: Before we deployed I heard, "We're going to kill all those motherfuckers and get rid of the Taliban." He did talk about that a lot.
Q: Was that his summary of the mission?
A: Yes, and it was said before we deployed, he was like, "There's some stuff that's going to happen there, that might have to stay there." That comment was made about 2 months before we deployed.
Q: Were comments like that, brought up to the chain of command?
A: It was more like a whole platoon thing. It was when we were all together, he would say those things.
Q: What did the platoon think about a comment like that?
A: We weren't too sure about that. Most of us in the platoon are young and we've never been deployed so we really didn't know quite what he was talking about, sir. He would always refer to his 1st and 2nd deployments, so we really didn't know what we were getting into, sir.
Q: Was that kind of comment or attitude accepted in the platoon?
A: Negative, sir. We didn't want to come to here and do some retarded shit and get sent home. We wanted to come here and do the right thing.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: You said that SSG Bales appointed himself platoon sergeant, how did that come about?
A: I guess it was one of his bright fucking ideas, sir. Sometimes he just got those things...and some of them sound retarded.
Q: Was it announced to you that that was the position he was going to be or was that something he presumed by the actions he was taking?
A: He appointed (b)(3), (b)(6) as the squad leader and he said he was the platoon sergeant now.
Q: Which leadership did you think had a negative command climate at VSP Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: You referred to (b)(3), (b)(6) as doing "stupid shit"; can you describe that or what you were referring too?
A: Like stuff was instructed for him to do but instead he'll make us do his bitch work. Anything retarded that did not need our help, he would put us in that position to do that.
Q: Say if you had issues with what (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing or any other problems you saw, who was it you can approach you felt with your problems?
A: Me personally, I'm the type of person that would go talk to that person after the situation happens.
Q: So you felt your NCO chain was approachable?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Who was acting stupid on that New Year's night you mentioned?
A: We were all on the roof, but it was only leadership that was acting stupid. (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales.
Q: Was any ODA members up there?
A: Yes, sir. There was the team sergeant, team leader, the medic, the echo and both Charlies were up there.
Q: What were the team sergeant and team leader names?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Can you describe more in detail on how people were acting that night?
A: We made a video that night because we were shooting off flares and you could only here one voice on the video and that's SSG Bales, just being retarded. He was yelling, "We want GREEN, GREEN, GREEN!!!" We were yelling and we were like shut the fuck up. You can probably hear (b)(3), (b)(6) say, "Grow a pair of balls and stop acting like a kid"; he was referring to SSG Bales, because he was acting like an idiot.
Q: You can actually hear voices on the video?
A: Yes, you can hear SSG Bales in the background yelling this color and this color...just there being an idiot. But the 3rd Group guys would set SSG Bales in his place. So we all would giggle at that because they were making him look like a little bitch.
Q: So it was clear that the team didn't like him?
A: Yes, it was clear.
Q: Was it clear to everyone around him that he'd been drinking?
A: Yes. It was one of those things you could tell, but you did not see him drink anything.
Q: Did the chain of command ever address it or talk about it?
A: Not at our level. Maybe at (b)(3), (b)(6) or SSG Bales level, they might have addressed that to them personally but not as a whole unit.
Q: Did you and the lower enlisted think that alcohol was accepted at the VSP?
A: Not with us, because we were strictly told by the guys and I can tell they were acting stupid when they said, "You're not allowed to have alcohol you son of a bitch." That was his exact words, because that's how Sergeant Bales talked. Every other word was either fuck or bitch; out of his mouth.
Q: How would describe the command climate with an attitude towards alcohol? Was it accepted/not accepted?
A: For us, I know it wasn't accepted. Now after seeing their actions, they accepted it for themselves. They were being stingy and weren't sharing with us, I know that much.
Q: You said that the first ODA group, 3rd Group realized that SSG Bales was a "tool bag", how did that become apparent to you?
A: Different guys on team would say stuff about SSG Bales. They would ask us, "Does this guy always act like this?", "Is he always this high strung and over does everything?" We would respond with a yes. Then we would get reports from (b)(3), (b)(6) saying the ODA does not like SSG Bales.
Q: (b)(3), (b)(6) would tell that to you guys?
A: Yes, sir. It happened once...SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) went to a meeting and then they told SSG Bales that he needs to sit down and they were going to tell (b)(3), (b)(6) all he needs to know, because SSG Bales is a retard. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) came back and told us that apparently they don't like SSG Bales. SSG Bales would always overact if we got into contact, that's probably why they didn't like him. I don't think anybody really like the guy. We respected his position, but not the person.
\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/07	0946	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: About 14 or 15 months. I joined the Battalion on 27 June 2011.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: I was the (b)(6) sir
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: My team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) and my squad leader was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: And the ODA?
A: There was a chief, we just called him chief, and then there was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What was SSG Bales duty position?
A: He was the squad leader for 3rd Squad.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: I did, sir. I went on one patrol to the villages and that was to Alikozai. We got to talk to some of the kids and to play with them a little bit.
Q: Did both squads go out on the missions?
A: Yes. We took turns. One week it would be 1st Squad and the next week would be 3rd Squad.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: I do feel like I was trained enough. We did take a lot of contact; I don't know how much, I didn't really count. Most of the contact happened while on base.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: I had confidence in them.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: With 3rd Group, they were more interactive with us than 7th Group was. They would always hang out with us and talk to us. 7th Group, not so much. There was a little bit of distance between us and 7th Group, sir.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes, sir. We received training on the mini-gun. Some folks got mortar training. I mainly used my saw gun on base defense.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was the command climate of your unit? Positive/Negative? Healthy/Unhealthy?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What do you understand that mission to be?
A: We were to be at a VSP and help the villagers establish a better economy, to build up the base; leave it for either the ANA or ALP so they will be able to support themselves and their economy.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: I thought we were there to help out the ODA. Not to really do anything big, but just to help them out with the little things.
Q: Like what little things?
A: Just guard and help build up the VSP; base defense and patrols. I enjoyed being on patrols.
Q: Did you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: Yes, sir. They were pretty good.
Q: In general, did you feel like standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai?
A: I did.
Q: Can you describe that, please?
A: I think on New Year's. We were on the roof and SSG Bales seemed pretty wild that night. He was just kind of loud and obnoxious.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Other than that, that was the only time I ever saw that.
Q: Did you see anybody else?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within you unit?
A: The only comment I heard was, "I hate Afghans."
Q: In what context did you think the comment was made?
A: It would be after a TIC, so I'm assuming they weren't actually saying it to all Afghans but just to the Taliban.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: I never really saw any hatred. I just heard words like, "I hate Afghans."
Q: Any generalized hatred toward Afghans.
A: No, sir.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(1)1.4a, 1.4b , (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Did he attend any shuras?
A: I believe there was one in Naji Bien, but I was not on that mission and I think they went to Alikozai too. But I believe there was a shura at Naji Bien.
Q: Were you there for the incident with the truck driver?
A: Oh when he got in to a fight with the truck driver?
Q: Yes.
A: Yes, I was there for that. We were unloading drinks and I was in line helping pass down the drinks. The truck driver decided to help pass down the drinks too. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) would pass the drinks to the truck driver and he would pass the drinks on to SSG Bales. I think the truck driver hit SSG Bales a few times when he wasn't looking; the truck driver thought we were all playing but SSG Bales got kind of serious about it and I guess SSG Bales punched him a few times. But I didn't see it, sir
Q: Did you see the truck? Was he hurt?
A: I think he had a bloody nose.
Q: Did anybody treat the truck driver?
A: Yes. I think their medic gave him a few bandages and cloth to wipe up the blood. I think 7th Group was pretty upset with SSG Bales about it. I think they talked to him; they told (b)(3), (b)(6) that he needed to talk to SSG Bales as well.
Q: Do you think 7th Group knew about the incident?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So did the 7th Group's medic help the truck driver?
A: I believe so. It might have been one of our medics as well.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: I did quite a bit PT. Most of the squad would work out on their own.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: Usually after a patrol we would come back and wipe them down. After every TIC, we definitely cleaned them.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: When we first got there, 3rd Group showed us what to do. They said to show up with your NODs, a radio and your weapon. We would sit there and look through our NODs and call base if would saw anything out in the fields.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you and after you?
A: Every time the next shift came up, you would let them know where the radio was located and brief them on any activity that was on your shift.
Q: How did you know that 7th Group knew about the truck incident and how did you know they had talked to SSG Bales about that incident?
A: I knew that they knew, because the truck driver was upset and confused about what happened and they needed an interpreter to talk to him. (b)(3), (b)(6) is the one that signs the paperwork for the truck driver; he was upset about it, so I believe he knew about it. And I believe he would have gone to tell his chain of command about it. I'm not completely sure but I think someone from the ODA told (b)(3), (b)(6) that he needed to straighten up his boy. I don't remember exactly who said it.
Q: Was it something you overheard?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Not much was said about incident after that?
A: No sir, not much.
Q: Who did (b)(3), (b)(6) share a conex with?
A: SSG Bales, sir. It was during the RIP with 7th Group and 7th Group needed more room. But later on they ended up getting their own separate conex.
Q: What do you remember about how you know that 7th Group talked (b)(3), (b)(6) ?
A: I overheard someone saying that. But I believe it was said towards (b)(3), (b)(6) because they usually hung out with each other and they shared a conex. I believe one of the ODA.
Q: So you thought you might have remembered the ODA members speaking to (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Yes, I believe it was one of the ODAs but I just can't remember who it was.
Q: In general, what were you taught at the site with regard to drug and alcohol use by your leadership?
A: Don't do it. (b)(3), (b)(6) said if we do it, he'll crush us. He said don't do it.
Q: So after the New Year's incident, was there a discussion about the violation of standards?
A: No, sir. They talked about it in the beginning, so they just probably assume they weren't going to have to talk about it anymore.
Q: When you say they talked about it in the beginning, what do you mean by that?
A: When we first got to the VSP, they gave us a safety brief; the do's and the don'ts.
Q: Who gave you the safety brief?
A: It was both (b)(3), (b)(6) and...SSG Bales. .
Q: Did you get sort of a safety brief from the ODA about the standards on the camp?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who provided you with those briefs?
A: It was with 3rd Group...it might have been their Chief, because when we first got there, their Chief wanted to have a meeting with us. I believe we did that, but I just can't remember who.
Q: Did you receive a briefing from the ODA about standards and conduct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you see violations of those standards and conduct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Any in addition to instances we've talked about?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What additional instances?
A: It might have been New Year's Eve? I think 3rd Group might have been drunk. I heard from other people that were on guard say they were laughing a lot and stumbling around; just acting silly.
Q: Who's the "They"?
A: 3rd Group.
Q: So you didn't see it, you just heard about it?
A: Yes, sir. I just heard about it.
Q: After the truck driver incident, did your team leader talk to you about it?
A: Negative, sir
Q: Did anyone in the chain of command talk about that incident.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 April 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Negative, sir.

\\\

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/04/04	1058	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3)(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)(b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 Infantry, 2nd Infantry Division.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: A little over 2 years, sir. This is my second combat tour. My first tour was to Iraq.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: I was the Alpha team leader for 3rd Squad. My sole job was to make sure my team was prepared for the mission; help out when necessary. My team was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: It was SSG Bales and then the team sergeant. Then above the team sergeant, obviously it was the Captain out there. I had two team sergeants and team leaders during my time at Belambai. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team sergeant in the first group; for the second group it was (b)(3), (b)(6) was with the second group and I can't remember the name of the other Captain.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - Shuras, for example?
A: I did participate in patrols, I didn't interact with the adults but I did give candy to the kids that came up to us. I just provided security for the shuras.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: We took a lot of contact, sir. I cannot give you an exact number sir; but fours day of being at Belambai, we got our first TIC; it was 20 December. It was the first combat TIC for me; we took small arms fire while we were outside the wire. I went through Iraq without hearing a shot fired. (b)(3)(b)(6)
Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with deal these threats?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes, sir. They were very good. If they were aware that an IED would lead us to an ambush, they would change the basic maneuvers on the field, to avoid that particular ambush.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members? Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: 3rd Group was pretty cool; they took us in under their wings. They taught what we needed to know about the VSP and the villages around the VSP site. They let us know to do and what not to do while on patrol. They taught us the basics on how to survive in Belambai. 7th Group came in and it took a while for us to get used to the team change. It took a while to integrate but it didn't take that long, sir. It was surprisingly quick; we bonded. They did cross-training; I never shot a 9 mm in my whole military career until I got to VSP Belambai. They gave us in-depth training on various weapon systems.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 04APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission? What do you understand that mission to be?
A: Yes, roger that sir. I understood VSO as; going to a Taliban infested village and trying to get the locals to rise up, like stand up to these guys and push them out. And a VSO is to help the locals have their own security force and ways to make an income for the community itself. But that's not what I found Belambai to be. Our mission didn't get quite to that point.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: The mission statement that our Battalion Commander gave to us was to go there and support the ODA on this VSO and to help out the Afghan community. From my understanding we were more hands and more boots on the ground and to provide security forces for the ODA.
Q: Did you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Yes, sir. Prior to coming out here we had just gone to NTC and that was the main focus, VSO training. Such as, IED identification, contact and reaction, and how to interact with the locals.
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: Not that I can tell of lately, but I did hear rumors about some of the ODA guys having alcohol. And by how people wake up in the morning, you could tell the guys had a rough night, when nothing happened. They would have blood shot eyes, just hangover symptoms. When they would throw out the trash, you could find empty bottles in the burn pit. But I never saw anybody drink alcohol, sir.
Q: Did you report the empty bottles in the burn pit?
A: Yes, sir. I reported it to my squad leader. At the time it was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What did he do?
A: He just said, "I'll talk to them about it." I didn't physically see him go talk to them, but I did report it.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: Negative, sir. In typical jokes among us "Joes" in the B-Hut. Just busting each other's chops, nobody took offense to it. Nothing between us, the ODA and the NCOs.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 04APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, had anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: I didn't see that in anybody else other than SSG Bales. There was an incident when were unloading a refrigerator truck that came in with food supply. We setup like an assembly line to unload the truck and one of the Afghan workers turned too quick and hit SSG Bales on the side. And SSG Bales just jumped and went to town on him. I was on the forklift, so I couldn't see every detail but I just heard a rumble and people breaking them up. Then I was later told that SSG Bales punched the Afghan worker.
(b)(3),(b)(6) Q: Did you see the Afghan worker? Was he treated?
A: There weren't any bruises but the Delta did give him a thorough check out on the side, over at the med shed.
Q: Did anybody tell the chain of command that?
A: The whole chain of command was there, sir. Well, not all the way to the Captain, but I'm pretty sure it got to them; because most of the ODA guys were there too. They helped download the stuff. I didn't see them tell their chain of command, but I'm pretty sure they told them at some point.
Q: In general, do senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(1)1.4a , (b)(3), (b)(5)

Q: Are there any other spots anyone could use to leave the VSP?
A: Negative, sir. Any vulnerable spots have c-wire over those areas.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: I don't know of any altercations with the locals but he was like the head of security for most of the shuras.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: It was on our own volition, sir.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: It was mandatory, sir. After every mission or just sitting around the VSP doing nothing.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: They explained guard to us when we first got there. When you went to relieve the guy before you, they would give you a brief of what happened during their guard shift and turnover the equipment, like NODs and radios.
Q: Did anybody check you for guard?
A: Not like a spot check, but like our JTAC would come up and let us know if a bird was coming in, to make sure we would watch certain sectors for the incoming bird.
Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: When we first got there they didn't have a B-Hut, so we lived in a back room with one squad on one side and one squad on the other side. We built our B-Hut and we moved in there. Our chain of command had their own cans. All the team leaders were sleeping in the B-Hut. It was good. Better than I expected.
Q: What was the relationship between the 2-3 NCOs and the ODA leadership?
A: It was very tight, sir. They were very well accommodated with each other. There was no hate. It was very good.
Q: Did the ODA work directly with your leadership or did they work with everyone?
A: When they needed stuff done and our NCOs weren't around, they'll just tell us; but if they were around, they would definitely go to our chain of command.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 04APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/12	0937	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3)(b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: The morning of the incident with SSG Bales, do you recall (b)(3), (b)(6) having a conversation with you and the other Infantry guys about investigators coming?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Tell me about the conversation.
A: They just briefed us on what happened. They told us not to speak about it to each other and not to put up anything about it on the internet, like facebook. They did advise us that CID was coming to do an investigation; they told us to be truthful and cooperative towards the investigation.
Q: Did they say anything to you about contraband?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Who said something you about contraband and what did they say?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) and he just told everybody that there was going to be a health and welfare inspection and if you possessed anything that was not legally supposed to be there, get rid of it.
Q: When he said that to you, who else was in the room?
A: Everybody in my squad and the other squad.
Q: Was there any senior ranking personnel present?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Was anybody from the ODA there?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Is it possible that (b)(3), (b)(6) may have left the room when (b)(3), (b)(6) made that statement?
A: It is a possibility, sir.
Q: Is it possible that maybe (b)(3), (b)(6) may have came back inside the room and said that after (b)(3), (b)(6) left or what is your chain of events?
A: They came in and briefed us on what happened and...I'm not sure. I'm not sure if (b)(3), (b)(6) was there now...but I know (b)(3), (b)(6) did tell us about the health and welfare.
Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) use the words, "CID is coming"?
A: That was (b)(3), (b)(6). He advised us that CID was coming for an investigation and (b)(3), (b)(6) said if you have any contraband with you that you're not supposed to have, to get rid of it.
Q: Who did you understand was going to do the health and welfare?
A: I was under the assumption that it was going to be our leadership along with the ODA guys.
Q: Was there an understanding that CID was going to search as well?
A: I was under the impression that CID was going to do their own health and welfare.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 12APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Was the understanding that the reason to get rid of the contraband was so that CID wouldn't find it?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: This was after the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: This occurred on 11 March?
A: Yes.
Q: Where did this conversation occur?
A: In our dining facility.
Q: After (b)(3), (b)(6) made that statement, did anybody say anything with regard to what (b)(3), (b)(6) said about contraband?
A: We just all looked at each other nodded our heads and shrugged our shoulders. We have nothing to hide so that was one process we didn't have to worry about. I'm talking about the health and welfare...that's a process we didn't have to worry about.
Q: Did the junior enlisted have any contraband?
A: None of us had any contraband.
Q: What about the NCOs that were present?
A: They didn't say anything at the moment...and I didn't know if they had anything because they don't live in the B-Hut with us, they have their own "Cans." So whatever they do is very limited to our eyes.
Q: Now after this conversation had occurred, did you take any action with regard to the contraband?
A: Not within the B-Hut, but I was instructed by (b)(3), (b)(6) to grab the bucket loader and toss up the burn pit; to make sure it was all mixed well together. After a couple of tosses, he told me I was good. As I was backing away, he was inspecting the burn pit for bottles...I think he found like two bottles and he started breaking them.
Q: How did that conversation come about? How did (b)(3), (b)(6) contact you?
A: I was on the roof of the OPCEN over watching gate with all the people swarming in from the villages, and he just called for me and said, "I need you to grab the bucket loader and toss the burn pit around."
Q: Did he tell you why?
A: No, he didn't tell me why, sir. He just told me to toss up all the garbage that was in there.
Q: He didn't say anything about contraband being in there?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did you see anybody taking contraband to the burn pit that morning?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: As you were moving the dirt around with the bucket loader, did you see contraband?
A: Not as I was tossing up the dirt, but as I slowing pulled away I could see him going in the burn pit and what it seemed to me, he was breaking bottles because he was grabbing rocks and throwing them in the burn pit.
Q: You had told us in your statement before that you have seen bottles in the burn pit, correct?
A: Yes.
Q: So was this the same kind of bottles you've seen before?
A: It's a very good possibility, sir.
Q: What did he say to you afterwards?
A: He didn't say anything...he just waved me off, told me I was good. And that's when I went back up to the roof.
Q: Was there any discussion about who might have brought stuff out to the burn pit to get rid of it?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: Were there any other conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6) about this?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: Was there any indication that (b)(3), (b)(6) could have said the same thing to the ODA guys about getting rid of the contraband?
A: There is a possibility, sir...I did not hear it, but there is a good possibility.
Q: Was there any discussion about that?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: Do people there know they can get in trouble for having contraband?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Was there any discussion about people being concerned about getting in trouble?
A: When we first got there they said that this is not the right place to be doing that kind of stuff, due to all the threats around here. You might not want to be doing it.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 12APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Who's they?
A: 3rd Group. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: I'm sorry, what was that conversation about again?
A: He just told us that it's not wise to have contraband. It was the right thing to be in the right state of mind to be at Belambai. Not to have any alcohol or drugs.
Q: Was that in response of people having things?
A: It might have been. But I just took it as advice from him...to keep a good state of mind while we were out there.
Q: Did you know why you were tossing up the burn pit?
A: I sort of had a feeling that something was in there that he was trying to hide. I just had that inside gut feeling. But I didn't want to ask because he was a high ranking person.
Q: So you kind of felt like you had to do it because he was telling you to?
A: Yes, sir
Q: But you had an inside feeling of something's not right?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you tell anybody about that?
A: I really didn't tell anybody but when I went back up on the roof, (b)(3), (b)(6) asked if (b)(3), (b)(6) asked me to toss the burn pit. And I agreed that (b)(3), (b)(6) did ask me to go toss the burn pit.
Q: Oh really? What did (b)(3), (b)(6) say about that?
A: He just did his old (b)(3), (b)(6) ...he shrugged his shoulders.
Q: So he observed you toss the burn pit?
A: Yes. From the roof, you can see the whole camp.
Q: So people had a general idea that you were tossing the burn pit?
A: Yes.
Q: Did anybody else talk to you about tossing the burn pit?
A: Just (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Do you know if anybody else did anything or took any other actions in the room with regard to the comment (b)(3), (b)(6) made in the dining facility?
A: Not that I can remember, sir. It was just me and my fellow soldiers looking at each other and said we don't have to worry about that, we have nothing to hide.
Q: When we previously interviewed you about this case, you were asked the question about whether you'd ever seen indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai, you stated "Not that I can tell of lately, but I did hear rumored about the ODA guys having alcohol." Do you remember that conversation?
A: Yes, sir
Q: When we had that conversation, why didn't the discussion of the burn pit come up?
A: I just didn't feel like it was necessary, sir. I would have brought it up if...
Q: You just didn't think the question was on point?
A: Yes, sir. I'm not trying to hide anything.
Q: Is there anything else with regard to indication of alcohol or discipline issues that you've thought about since we've talked last time, that you think would be relevant for us to talk?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: Was it pretty well known that there was stuff in the burn pit?
A: Not until the point when they made me toss the burn pit. Then people really started asking questions. There was one day when it rained and it flooded the whole VSP...that day you could see bottles floating in the water.
Q: Oh really? So that was kind of a standard practice of having bottles in the burn pit?
A: That was in the first burn pit.
Q: When did it rain?
A: I can't recall it, sir...But it was in the month of February.
Q: How many bottles would you estimate was in there?
A: I personally saw three, sir. I saw three bottles when the flood came; floating in that water.
Q: Were there more?
A: There was probably more, but I could only observe three, sir.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 12 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did other people actually report seeing more?
A: I don't know, sir. The only reason why I saw the bottles is because I was trying to dig a separate trench next to the burn pit, so that the water can flow into the burn pit.
Q: At that time when the floods happen, was that the burn pit people were using?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did the burn pit get moved to the different location?
A: As soon as it dried up.
Q: So the burn pit you tossed up was established in February?
A: It was a little later than that because one side took longer to dry up. I would say in March. That burn pit was fairly new, but it got filled up quick once it got up. They would burn trash daily.
Q: When (b)(1)1.4a was there, did you see bottles in the burn pit.
A: Negative, sir.
Q: Did you ever see them under the influence of alcohol?
A: Negative, sir.

\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 13 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/08	1504	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I started basic training in February 2011 and I got to the unit in June 2011.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: My team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) and my squad leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Bales assumed control over all of us.
Q: And the ODA?
A: Usually our chain of command would report up to the team sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) and then (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What was SSG Bales duty position?
A: When we got there he was 3rd Squad's squad leader; then around January or February kind of took control of both squads and (b)(3), (b)(6) became the squad leader of 3rd Squad.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: Yes, sir. Usually we just interact with the children; give them toys and candy. The leadership would usually talk to the males.
Q: Did both squads go out on the missions?
A: Roger, sir. It would be kind of a mix; either one squad or the other.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: We took quite a bit, sir. I don't know the exact number.
Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: Yes. Roger, sir.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes. Roger, sir.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: I thought our relationship was pretty good, sir. I enjoyed being with them.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes, sir. We learned a lot; more than I think we would have by just being infantrymen.
Q: What did you learn?
A: We learned about the different guns they had; just mostly that. We learned about the trucks. We learned about C4 explosives, medical training and pistol training.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 08APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission?
A: Roger, sir.
Q: What do you understand that mission to be?
A: Pretty much to get the locals in a village to be more comfortable with the ANA and ANCOP. Having them feel that the ANA and ANCOP can keep them safe from the Taliban.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: I believe we were supposed to work together.
Q: Did you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Roger, sir. During NTC our training had a village attached to our FOB. So it was kind of like the same thing here, sir.
Q: Do you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: They got better over time. When we first got there, we were living in a mud hut. All the privates were living in two little rooms. Then we built a B-Hut and we got two people to a room. So it got better as time went on, sir.
Q: In general, did you feel like standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?
A: Yes. Roger, sir.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within you unit? Were you exposed to any racist materials?
A: Not at all sir, until one day we were all joking around in the B-Hut saying how some folks have a little bit of racism in them, then SSG Bales came in the room and said, "I don't have any at all, unless you count Afghani's or Iraqi's." I thought it was weird but I didn't know if he was kidding or not.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes towards Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?
A: Not really, sir. Not to me at least. We would have a casual conversation but nothing too personal.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 08 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, how did the leadership of the 2-3 and ODA get along?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did the command climate change after the 5 March IED incident?
A: (b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: (b)(1)1.4a lk
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: Would you go over the wall or go out the gate?
A: (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: Not that I know of. I know we had the ANCOP down the road and he was the person that dealt with them. Once they left, I don't know of any other interactions he may have had.
Q: Were you around for the truck driver incident?
A: I was in the DFAC when it happened and came out at the end of it. The only thing I know of it, is what I've been told.
Q: You didn't see anything?
A: No I didn't see anything, sir.
Q: Did you see the truck driver?
A: I saw him holding something to his nose and I saw blood on it; he had a cloth on his nose. That was all I saw, sir.
Q: Did he get treated by the medics?
A: I came out when he was walking back to his truck, so I don't know if they treated him. I just saw the cloth to his mouth.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: I worked out every night. I pretty much did it on my own.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: Whenever we got into a fire fight or a TIC, obviously we would clean them after that. Other than that, I would clean them every other night...dust it off, put a little bit of CLP on it.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: When we first got there they briefed us. They said to bring your NODs, your weapon and a radio. When 7th Group got there, they started to bring up thermals. They told us about the area and where we would take contact from.
Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you and after you?
A: They would brief you on what happened during the shift and then hand over the radio and thermals.
Q: Where did most of the contact come from?
A: I would say most of the contact came from the west, but the longer fire fights we've had usually came from the east.
Q: Did you ever hear any negative comments from SSG Bales about Afghans or the VSO mission?
A: Negative, sir. As far as I was tracking it seemed like he was enjoying the mission just as much as anyone else, sir.
Q: Were you guys pretty happy to be at Belambai?
A: I'm happy to be at Belambai, sir. I can't wait to go back and I believe most of the squad would too, sir. We were enjoying our time there.
Q: Were you there with the group in December?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Were you aware of any alcohol use?
A: People have said there were but I never saw or heard...I've never seen anyone acting drunk.
Q: You've never seen it, but were people talking about them?
A: Yes, sir. They would say they thought someone was drunk or drinking, but I never knew of any knowledge of it, sir.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 08APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: So you didn't have firsthand knowledge or have seen it yourself?
A: Negative, sir.
Q: Were there any specific instances people would talk about or who they would talk about?
A: The only one that stands out to me was on New Year's when everyone was yelling and screaming, but it was New Year's, so to me it was just New Year's.
Q: As a young soldier, what kind of impression did that make upon you, if you were told that someone might be breaking the rules?
A: If I didn't see it and I didn't think they were out of control, it wouldn't or didn't bother me that they were doing it...If don't know firsthand or I didn't hear someone tell me they were drunk, it didn't affect me, sir.
Q: Did they command put out any information with regard to alcohol and drug use.
A: Negative, sir.
Q: In your opinion, was it accepted or not accepted?
A: I believe it would have been unaccepted...they told us it wasn't going to happen, so I figured they wouldn't either, sir.
Q: How old are you (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: I'm 21, sir.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/06	0806	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: I've been in the military since 15 May 2011. My MOS is an 11 Bravo.

Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Who is your chain of command?

A: My chain of command consisted of (b)(3), (b)(6) as the squad leader of 1st Squad. (b)(3), (b)(6) was one team leader and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was my team leader. Above them on the ODA side was (b)(3), (b)(6) and I'm not really sure what the Chief's name was. The ODA before them was (b)(3), (b)(6) and forgot that Chief's name.

Q: What was SSG Bales' duty position?

A: He was the squad leader on 3rd Squad.

Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages?

A: Yes we did. There were several dismounted patrols that we took down to Zangabad. Or we went down to the school where ANCOP were stationed there for maybe a month. We also did dismounted patrols to Alikozai and Naji Bien.

Q: In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - Shuras, for example?

A: Not myself, personally. They were a couple of times I would hand out rice crispy treats or candy to the kids. I never participated in any shuras.

Q: How many missions have you gone on while you have been at the VSP?

A: I don't remember, sir. There were times when they needed someone to drive a truck, so I would drive a truck.

Q: Would both squads go on the missions?

A: I think maybe the first month we were there with 3rd group, that SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) would have disputes about which squads would go out. At first, it was kind of a mix between both, with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) participating; but then down the road it turned into a "week off/week on" thing. So it would be like 3rd Squad would be gone and 1st squad would stay back to do whatever needed to be done on base.

Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?

A: We did a lot of base defense, sir. I was only on one dismounted patrol when we went to Naji Bien, and we took PKM direct fire. As far as training wise, I didn't go to any of the training sites with my team and squad when I got to the unit because I got there so late.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

But as I got there, I felt that VSP Belambai was a good learning spot to further my knowledge.
Q: Do you remember when you got to the unit?
A: I got to Bravo Company I think on 13 September.
Q: So was your Basic Infantry training good enough for what you were doing out there?
A: Yes, sir. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did you feel like the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: I felt good about them, sir.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: Basically, since I was only a private there and they were ranked above me, I would stay out of their way, but unless they needed help with anything, I'd snapped into action and got it done and helped them.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes, sir. I teamed up with (b)(3), (b)(6) he's an Echo, and I helped him a lot with the comm. stuff, so I got good cross-training with him. Their EOD team taught us a lot about charges and detonating things. Also with the Bravos, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) he taught us a lot about the heavy weapons, the AT-4s; we had a pistol training class as well.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: What was the command climate of your unit? Positive/Negative? Healthy/Unhealthy?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like you were made part of the team?
A: Yes, sir. There was good chemistry with all of the junior soldiers. I got along with all the guys.
Q: Did you feel like your leadership cared for you? NCOs? Officers?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission? What do you understand that mission to be?
A: They gave us paperwork on what it's supposed to be like and it talked about working with the ANA. And that we were there to win hearts and minds of all the villagers. But in my mind, I didn't think it was going to be as small as it was. I thought maybe it was going to be bigger, kind of like a FOB. I was expecting it to be like FOB Zangabad. I thought it was going to be safe.
Q: When you got there, did you feel like the mission was different than what you were briefed on?
A: No, sir. I was just amazed how small the compound was and the smaller group of guys.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 APRIL 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: I knew that we were there to support and aid the ODA on anything they needed to be done, sir. I knew that we as infantry weren't going in there to kick down doors and to take on the lead role. We were just there to fall back, to aid and assist.
Q: Did you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur? Were these actions brought to the attention of the chain of command? If so, what actions did the chain of command take regarding these instances?
A: I did not see anything like that, sir. There were rumors, but I never came into contact with anybody I thought that could be under the influences of either of those.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? Were you exposed to any racist materials? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: No, nothing that anybody took to heart. A lot of these guys have strong, thick skin so we joke around with each other, but nothing to where I would be offended.
Q: What about the chain of command, have you heard any racist comments from them?
A: I've never heard anything negative. I have never heard them say anything racist.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans? Were these actions brought to the attention of the chain of command? If so, what actions did the chain of command take regarding these instances?
A: Well, not the Afghans, but maybe the insurgents, the Taliban and anyone else who was out there trying to hurt us. But not in general toward the civilians.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 APRIL 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: When standing guard duty, what was your normal orientation?
A: We were mainly facing north. With a slight turn, you could see East or West.
Q: How could someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: I guess, if was me, I would sneak out during the night time. Personally, I don't think it would be that hard to sneak out just because when you're on guard, there are always guys walking to and from latrines or walking behind the OPCEN to go to the chow hall, etc...While on guard, once someone passes your line of sight, they're pretty much towards your back by then, unless you're sitting there watching them.
Q: If your scanning North, West and East on guard duty, how would a person get out?
A: Well the gate is towards the south, so since that's the case, you'll just keep walking south and disappear in the night.
Q: Could anybody leave the compound on the north side?
A: I would guess there is, but there are big hescos with small hescos, and on top of that there is c-wire. I just don't think it would be possible without someone seeing them looking directly north.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: I don't know if he attended any shuras, sir. I'm really unsure if he had any interaction with the locals, either.
Q: Did he have any interaction with the Afghans on the compound? The ANA? The workers?
A: I don't really know, sir. The ANA kind of separated themselves. There was one incident when we had a jingle truck come in, but I was in the gym working out when the truck pulled up to our food storage area. I went out and helped unload the boxes but I was in the conex where they stored the food. We were setup in a line so we could pass the boxes down; so someone said that the jingle truck driver was passing drinks to SSG Bales and one of the boxes hit SSG Bales but he played if off. Then the second box hit him and I guess he either like, pushed him, or came into contact with him. But I didn't see it, they were just rumors.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: I did a lot of weight lifting, but not so much cardio. We would play soccer on our HLZ with the ANA. We did this on our own.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: I cleaned my weapon like every other day because the dust and the dirt was pretty bad. We would clean the heavy weapons every other day.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you for guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: The first day we got there we were told to take our NODs, and our weapon. They said there's always a radio up there at all times. We were basically told to scan north and make sure nothing is going on. (b)(1)1.4a 3rd Group told us that nothing ever happens at night time; you would hear shots fired or flares once in awhile, but nothing was ever directed towards us or in our direction. If something happened while you were on guard, you would brief that to the next 2 guys coming on shift after you and give them the radio.
Q: Why do think (b)(3), (b)(6) didn't like SSG Bales?
A: I think he was trying too hard to ingratiate himself with them. And he would always try to take charge and that really wasn't his position to do so.
Q: What kinds of comments were made?
A: Comments like, "Hey Bales step off to the side. This is my stage right now; I'll let you talk when I'm gone." Just little stuff like that.
Q: Was SSG Bales a big talker?
A: Yes. From what I knew of him, sir. I really didn't know him but that was one thing I knew; he was always a talker.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 6 APRIL 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/07	1103	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)(b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, unit and duty position.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I started in January 2011.
Q: When did you get to 2/3 IN?
A: August 2011.
Q: During or after the NTC rotation?
A: They were at NTC when I arrived. I did not join them at NTC.
Q: What was your duty position out at Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What was your role during a TIC (Troops in Contact)?
A: I was usually at the OPCEN. I staged there.
Q: What was your chain of command at Belambai?
A: In First Squad, I reported directly to (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Bales. After SSG Bales, it would go up to the ODA-to their Team Sergeant or their Chief, depending on who was around. With (b)(1)1.4a would go (b)(3), (b)(6) was their senior medic on site. Next up would be the Team Sergeant— (b)(3), (b)(6) The Team Leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) For (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) was their senior medic. (b)(3), (b)(6) was their Team Sergeant and (b)(3), (b)(6) was their Team Leader.
Q: What was SSG Bales' duty position?
A: When we got to the site, he was Third Squad Squad Leader. That changed after a couple of weeks. SSG Bales was made the Platoon Sergeant, and (b)(3), (b)(6) was made the Third Squad Leader.
Q: Did you participate in patrols out to the villages? Did you have contact with the Afghans when you went out?
A: Yes. Sometimes they would need medical attention and sometimes locals would need medical attention and would come to the gate.
Q: Did you bring people in and treat them in the Med Shed, or did you treat them in the clinic across the street?
A: We treated them on the camp in the Med Shed.
Q: So you had more interaction with the locals than most of the people did?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you participate in any of the shuras?
A: No. Sometimes I watched from a distance, but I never participated.
Q: Was the standard that the infantry guys were pulling security while the shuras were going on?
A: Yes.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What types of missions and how many missions did you go out on?
A: Most of them were patrols to the local villages to engage the local population to get a gauge on what was happening in the town. I would estimate that I went out on probably twenty or twenty-five missions.
Q: About how often did locals come up to the gate?
A: When Third Group was there, it happened quite often. I usually saw either a local or an ANA every day.
Q: For locals coming in the gate, what types of things were you typically treating them for?
A: A lot of it was chronic ailments—back pain, shoulder pain. Sometimes you would get somebody with some kind of trauma, usually nothing major—a cut or bruises. It was mainly adults, but I saw a few children.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take?
A: We had some type of enemy contact once every three days.
Q: What about the patrols?
A: I can only remember two or three times when we took contact outside the wire when I was out there.
Q: What were those contacts like?
A: It was a mix of IEDs and direct fire. On one of our 36-hour missions, we came across five IEDs. On another patrol down in Naji Bien, we took small arms and PKM fire. On another 36-hour mission, we took small arms as well.
Q: Did you shoot your weapon?
A: Yes. I shot my M-4.
Q: In which of those engagements did you fire your weapon?
A: The one in Naji Bien and another one in a village to the northwest. It was not Alikozai; it was another village.
Q: Was it suppressive fire, or could you identify the targets?
A: We saw where he was shooting from. He was shooting from a doorway inside a compound. We put suppressive fire on the compound.
Q: Did you feel like you were adequately trained for those types of threats?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you feel like your chain of command from the squad leader up through the ODA Captain could lead you through those types of actions?
A: Yes.
Q: And the same on base defense?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you ever shoot your weapon on base defense?
A: For the most part, I manned the CCP. On one instance, our Delta (medic) who was normally on the roof, had to go down to attend to something else, and I took his spot on the roof. I fired my weapon in that instance.
Q: How well did you interact with the ODA members?
A: Overall, I interacted well. When we first got there, Third Group was there. There seemed to be a better connection there with Third Group. They were better at integrating the infantry troops and taking us under their wing. When Seventh Group got there, it was a little bit rocky as we tried to figure out our role. After about a month, that got better as well.
Q: Did you get some good cross training?
A: Yes. Mostly from the medic, but almost all of the ODA guys were open to that. If you wanted to learn something, you just had to go up to them and ask.
Q: What did you learn, aside from the medical stuff?
A: I tried to get my hands on the weapons systems, some of the stuff that we hadn't seen before.
Q: So you felt like you got everything you could get from them?
A: Yes.
Q: Who were the ODA medics?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (Third Group). (b)(3), (b)(6) (Seventh Group).
Q: But you guys called them by their first names?
A: Yes.
Q: How would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?
A: (b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: How was the overall climate of the unit?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Before you left Ft. Lewis, did you feel that you understood the VSO mission?
A: Yes.
Q: Please describe what you understood it to be.
A: We as infantry would be coming to work alongside the ODA teams. Their role was to help build up the villages to take over security.
Q: Did you feel like you were adequately trained for this mission?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you feel like the leadership on Belambai provided you with adequate counseling and feedback on your performance? How did they do that?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How were the living conditions overall at Belambai? Were they adequate?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: When we first got there it was a little tight for the infantry guys. It took us about a month to build our own barracks. Once we got that up and going, we were pretty comfortable.
Q: How about the food?
A: The food was alright, depending on the cook. A few times (3-4 weeks total), (b)(3)(b)(6) We didn't have a cook there. People ended up liking our food pretty good. I used to be a cook, so I enjoyed it. Also as a (b)(3)(b)(6) (b)(3)(b)(6) I thought it was important to have someone in the kitchen who knew what they were doing.
Q: In general, do you think the standards and discipline were maintained at Belambai consistent with the tactical situation?
A: Yes.
Q: Were people serious about what they were doing?
A: Yes. There was a time back in your room to joke around, but when it was time to work, people worked hard.
Q: You felt safe? People knew how to handle their weapons and NCOs enforced that?
A: Yes.
Q: In addition to the incidents that you mentioned about the drinking, did you see any other evidence of drunkenness or drug use?
A: It was brought to my attention, maybe 4 or 5 days before this incident, that SSG Bales was using steroids, something by the name of Winstrol.
Q: That was brought to your attention before the incident? Who brought it to your attention?
A: Yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) told me when we were on guard duty. That day there had been a mission. SSG Bales had been acting erratically, kind of lashing out at people, and I think that he was kind of venting.
Q: What did he say?
A: Several times he made me promise not to tell anybody. He said SSG Bales is using steroids and that's why his demeanor would change or be erratic.
Q: Had you ever heard of that steroid before?
A: No. I don't know much about steroids
Q: Was that information ever brought to the chain of command?
A: Not by me.
Q: How do you think the chain of command would react to that type of information?
A: I'm not sure. I'm not sure what the ODA is okay with. I know what the rules are, but it kind of puts me between a rock and a hard place when my leadership tells me stuff like that. I don't necessarily have access to anyone higher up the chain of command.
Q: What did you think when you learned that information?
A: It made sense in my mind. It put a missing piece together about why he was acting the way he does sometimes.
Q: Was it such that you thought you needed to go to the chain of command?
A: No. I didn't see it as something that affected his performance and getting us all home alive. That was my main concern.
Q: Did you assume that the chain of command knew about the alcohol?
A: They could have. I'm not sure. In the evening, infantry guys stay on one side and the leadership stays on the other side.
Q: Including the infantry leadership?
A: Yes. Occasionally they would come over to the barracks.
Q: But you guys were separated either in the B-huts or over in the OPCENTER, where you originally lived?
A: Yes.
Q: Who else was living with you?
A: A mechanic. That was the only other person who lived with us.
Q: What about the weather guy, (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: No. He didn't live with us.
Q: Did you interact much with the EOD guys or the Air Force soldiers?
A: No. They lived over in the cans with the other senior leadership.
Q: In general did you hear any racist or insensitive comments?
A: Jokingly there were comments made. Nothing that crossed a line.
Q: Where was that line?
A: There is that line when someone knows its joking and when someone gets upset or uncomfortable. If it ever got close to that line, it would be brought up and it would stop right there.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 8 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Was that in the B-hut?
A: Yes.
Q: So you guys were just busting each others' chops, but people were sensitive to that line?
A: Yes.
Q: Were you guys close in there?
A: Yes. Even though we were two different squads, it just felt like one big squad.
Q: Brotherhood?
A: Yes.
Q: And you guys legitimately liked each other?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you hear any racist or incentive comments coming from the ODA or your own NCO chain of command?
A: Same type of thing. Just jokingly. Nothing that ever really upset anybody or crossed the line.
Q: In your own view, when you heard your own NCOs doing that type of thing, did you ever think "hey that guy's an NCO, he probably shouldn't be doing that type of thing?" Kind of like the drinking?
A: Yes. There are things that I look for in good leadership above me. If you're going to do that type of thing, then do it within your NCO corps. But don't expose the people that you're leading.
Q: And there was some of that in the form of joking around?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you see any kind of dislike toward Afghan civilians or any kind of hatred?
A: Each person has their different view on the locals and why we're here. Some people want to blame everyone in the country. Some people felt like we could get along unless they were shooting at us.
Q: What about your chain of command? Did any of them express this kind of disdain toward civilians?
A: Two incidents come to mind. Both involve SSG Bales. The first was a food truck that came to drop off food. The driver was out helping us to unload, which was nice. It was unusual. SSG Bales was in the back of the truck with him. I don't know what occurred; I wasn't in the back of the truck. But SSG Bales ended up beating this guy up. He punched him in the face a few times. The second one was when a group of us was sitting around talking about racism. Somebody said that everyone is a little bit racist. SSG Bales overhead that and said that he didn't think he was racist at all. He then asked whether Iraqis and Afghanis count in terms of being people. Someone said, "yes, they count as people," and then he said "well okay, then I am racist."
Q: So you guys were just sitting around the fire pit talking?
A: Yes.
Q: You had a pretty diverse squad. You guys felt comfortable talking about that stuff?
A: Yes.
Q: But SSG Bales looped himself right in?
A: Yes.
Q: Referring to the truck incident, were you in the line helping to unload the truck?
A: Yes. At one point I was in the line, but I stepped away to do something else. When I came back, I saw that the driver's nose was bleeding and that his lip was bleeding. I actually took him over to the Med Shed to clean him up.
Q: Did anyone talk to him?
A: I believe one of the interpreters did, but nobody from the leadership did.
Q: Was it just you alone, or did the Delta come over and help?
A: No. It was just me. At first I thought he just had a bloody nose, but later I found out what happened.
Q: Did anyone in the chain of command know that this happened?
A: I believe they did. Most of us were pretty upset and embarrassed when it happened. I don't remember who I mentioned it to, but they said that they were planning on talking to SSG Bales.
Q: But you did mention it to one of the other NCOs?
A: Yes. I believe I actually mentioned it to (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: So the ODA definitely knew about it?
A: Yes.
Q: Did they take any action that you know about?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Not that I know about or not that I saw.
Q: Did they sit you guys down and talk to you about it?
A: No. We all knew what he did was wrong. I never saw anyone say "hey good job SSG Bales or anything like that." Most of the guys were actually pretty embarrassed.
Q: In general, did senior personnel talk to junior soldiers about personal problems?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Did you notice any differences in people after the 05 March incident? Did people take it badly?
A: I wouldn't say that people took it badly. People were upset that it happened. But people handled the stress of it well. People dealt with it. We grieved that evening, and the next day there was still work to be done.
Q: The five guys who were MEDEVACd came back to the Belambai Med Shed first before they started showing symptoms, is that correct?
A: We knew. We spent a long time waiting in the Med Shed for them to come back. We knew that some people were more shaken up than others. We knew that a few of the ODA guys had a history of TBI. We were looking for that right off the bat. We pretty much did a head-to-toe on anyone who was out there.
Q: You have been on guard duty up there. How could an individual leave the camp without being seen?
A: When they built that base, they built it to keep people out not to keep people in. If someone wants to leave that base, you can probably leave that base at any point in the perimeter. Some places are easier than others. If you went to the northwest, northeast or southwest corners of the compound, you could get out pretty quick over the corners. When we originally got here, our burn pit was on the northwest corner. Now that that is gone, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Same thing with the northeast. In the southwest corner, you have the ANA on the gate but behind that you have the ramp that we pull the RGs up on. It would be pretty easy to get over that.
Q: When you guys are up on the roof in the middle, which way did you scan?
A: I would normally start on the northeast corner and scan west, looking back occasionally toward the ANA side and the gate. We also had to trust them to do their part on that side.
Q: How far can you see in those NODs?
A: It depends on the night. There are some nights where you can only see (b)(1)1.4a On a clear night, you can see (b)(1)1.4a
Q: You guys never took contact at night?
A: Right. Not once. That's the same thing that Third Group told us.
Q: How much PT did you do?
A: I tried to PT four times per week. We had one treadmill that was working, and when that was free I would try to jump on it. We also played a lot of soccer out on the HLZ. It seemed to boost morale and relieve stress a little bit.
Q: How often did you clean your weapon?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: If I hadn't used it, I would at least dust it off every other day. When we went on patrol, whether we used it or not, we'd take it apart and clean it. If we used it, as soon as we were done, we'd take it apart and clean it.
Q: Did NCOs manage that?
A: Yes. At first, they'd look over our shoulder but after a few weeks they didn't need to do that anymore.
Q: How did you know what to do on guard shift?
A: When we first got there, it was explained to us. We were supposed to be scanning and watching and making sure the ANA was doing what they were supposed to be doing.
Q: How did you manage the handover of guard duty?
A: We made sure that the radio was filled and that we had enough battery left to get through the next shift. Once we had thermals, we made sure those physically got into the next persons' hands. If anything out of the ordinary happened, you would make sure to tell the next person about it.
Q: How did you use the thermals?
A: One guy had thermals; one guy had NODs.
Q: On the night of the event, when did you come on duty?
A: 0300 is when I started.
Q: When did you wake up?
A: I got woken up at about 0255. Originally my shift was supposed to be 0400, but somehow it got messed up. I ended up being ten minutes late, because usually we are there ten minutes early. So I got up there exactly at 0300.
Q: Then what happened?
A: Within the first five minutes on the roof, the ANA soldier and the interpreter came over. We were up on the roof (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and I. We were looking down talking to the interpreter and they told us that someone was outside the gates.
Q: What happened at that point?
A: At that point, (b)(3), (b)(6) instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to go into the B-hut and get accountability of all personnel. He didn't wake them up at that point. (b)(3), (b)(6) came back a few minutes later and said that everyone was in their beds. At that point, (b)(3), (b)(6) told him to go check and see if (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales were in their cans and to wake up the ODA leadership.
Q: Are you guys all still on top of the OPCEN at that point?
A: Yes. As (b)(3), (b)(6) was doing that, we heard a few shots coming from the south, closer than usual for shots that we hear at night. (b)(3), (b)(6) came back up and said (b)(3), (b)(6) is in his can but that he couldn't find SSG Bales. He looked in the latrine, in the OPCEN and in the DFAC. At that point the ODA leadership was up and moving around. We assumed that they were getting accountability of all of their guys. I wasn't on the roof too much longer. By about 0330, I came off the roof, and we were told to start searching the entire camp for SSG Bales.
Q: After the truck driver incident, did the chain of command address that in any way?
A: Not that I saw.
Q: Did that action and the lack of a response have any impact on the morale of the unit or of the command climate of the unit?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What was the overall command climate perception of the treatment of Afghans and the treatment of third party nationals?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Was it anyone in particular?
A: It seemed to be a general group thing.
Q: Do you know what to attribute that to?
A: It just seemed like a difference in philosophy between the two teams. I can't really tell you why.
Q: What was the general feeling among the group about the command's view of alcohol or drug use?
A: We never sat down and had a brief about what you can do or not do at Belambai. I never realized those things were out there at Belambai.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 7 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Was it just understood?
A: For those of us in the B-hut, it was just understood.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 8. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/03	1227	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 2nd ID. Stationed at Fort Lewis, Washington.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 2 years and 3 months. This is my first combat deployment.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) and I guess SSG Bales made himself a Platoon Sergeant. Above them, (b)(3), (b)(6) was our ODA Leader and I guess the (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - Shuras, for example?
A: Yes, sir. Just talked to them and gave them candy; mostly with the kids. I just provided security for (b)(3), (b)(6) at the shuras.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: I think we had 20 confirmed TICs with 7th Group and I'm not sure with 3rd Group.
Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: Somewhat, sir. I feel like when we were at the garrison we could have done more training. I felt like we did more Admin paperwork type stuff then actually preparing for a deployment, sir.
Q: How long have you been with your unit?
A: I have been in the company since June 2010, so I went to all the pre-deployment training. NTC was the first time I did anything to get training for this Afghanistan deployment. We did like a VSO type mission. We also did basic contact fundamentals, reaction contact, etc...Prior to NTC, I don't think those special combat skills training helped for this deployment. We were doing things like movement in wedges and things like that; we don't do that at all out here. We move in files out here.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: I don't think our squad leaders, but I did have faith in the ODA. I felt like we didn't get the adequate training and our squad leaders weren't confident when we were in contact, sir.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: We really didn't talk too much, sir. I guess the only time is when we work together doing so sort of detail. Other than that we really didn't interact. We weren't allowed in their cans.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: We did pistol training one time, AT-4s and LAWs a couple of days ago, sir. They held a class for mortar training for our designated mortar man, but for everybody else they gave like a 10, 15 minute briefing on mortars.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 03 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6),

Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: They were a lot better than I thought they would be. I didn't think we were going to have a laundry room; I didn't think we were going to have a shower. So it was a lot better than I thought it would be. We built a B-Hut, because when we first got there we had 9 people to a room.
Q: In general, did you feel like the standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: The only time was on New Year's Eve, sir. That's the only time I can really recall seeing alcohol use. I specifically remember we were at the burn pit; it was myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) and we were pretty positive that (b)(3), (b)(6) was drunk. And he had said "3rd Group tried to give us alcohol but SSG Bales wouldn't allow it." We were just hanging out, so we could shoot off some flares to celebrate.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: People joke around but nothing too serious to where people would actually get offended. Nobody took offense too it; not to my knowledge.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: People would just talk bad about the Taliban.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 03 May 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with juniors Soldier while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: I know when we're pulling guard on the OPCEN, we're looking north on to Alikozai. So the only thing I could think of is maybe the (b)(1)1.4b (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Is there any other way somebody could have gotten out?
A: The only way is to hop a wall. But most of it is covered in c-wire. On our range, there is an open section of c-wire, but the people on guard are looking in that direction towards Alikozai, so they would see someone jumping that wall.
Q: Did you ever see SSG Robert Bales interact with the local Afghans? If so, can you describe SSG Bales' conduct during these encounters?
A: I've seen him give kids candy. And I did see him attack a jingle truck driver. We had just gotten our food supply and were having a chain to unload the truck. That's the first time I saw the jingle truck driver actually help us unload the truck. So everybody is having a good time throwing to each other and the jingle truck driver the food and it hit SSG Bales in the face, the first time. He just kind of laughed it off. It happened again, and the jingle truck driver kind of giggled at him and that's when SSG Bales freaked out. He hit him in the face and kneed him. And then he was really worried about it for the rest of the day. He thought he was going to get in trouble for it. I guess it was kind of kept in house.
Q: What did they do with the jingle truck driver?
A: They gave him medical attention and sent him on his way, sir. I think (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you remember when this happened?
A: Mid February (b)(1)1.4a was at VSP Belambai by that time.
Q: Did anybody tell the ODA chain of command?
A: I figured they told the chain of command, I just didn't see them talking to them about it.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad?
A: Not organized PT. It's pretty much whatever you want to do it.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: Before and after a patrol. Or if we had nothing to do, we'd just clean our weapons. And always after contact.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: Yea, just wear your NODs and if see anything suspicious to call it up to the OPCEN.
Q: Did anybody check you for guard?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: Before and after, we would give a good handover the equipment, like thermals, the radio and we just tell them what happened during our shift.
Q: You said your Squad Leaders weren't confident during an attack; can you describe that just a little bit more?
A: One time, we took contact on the base, (b)(3), (b)(6) was eating his food then he jumped behind a propane tank without worrying about the rest of his guys. I know they were ambushed in Naji Bien, and instead of controlling his guys, he ran into an alley and hid there; he didn't return fire. I know (b)(3), (b)(6) were pinned down, and he wouldn't allow his automatic rifleman to go out there and help them; but he went anyway.
Q: Did those kinds of actions have an effect on your unit as a whole?
A: Yes, sir. We didn't have any respect for him as a combat leader. That kind of had an effect on our whole group.
Q: You also described about the morale of the unit as a whole getting tired and exhausted, what about your morale?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 03May 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: If you couldn't turn to your NCOs, who did you turn too?

(b)(1)1.4a , (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Who are the members on your team?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) sir.
Q: When you're dealing with negative information like that, how did you work your leadership with your team?
A: I would tell them not to worry about it or there's nothing we could do about it.
Q: With regard to the racist and insensitive comments, you said that folks would joke around but not too seriously, what comments are we talking about and how frequently were they used?
A: 7th Group treated our local national workers really bad. And I know we had 3 workers quit because of how they treated them.
Q: Can you explain that a little more?
A: They would say, "All you stupid monkeys," "Hurry up you guys are pieces of shit." Our concrete guy quit and recently about 2 weeks ago, our starers that worked at the Ops Center quit, because they just didn't like the way they were being treated.
Q: Who would call them "Stupid Monkeys?"
A: Specifically, I know (b)(3), (b)(6) is the other Bravo.
Q: What was the accepted practice for how Afghans or local nationals could be treated?
A: Well I know with us, we would give them drinks; always say "What sup," to them.
Q: Did they ODA teach you and give you classes on how to interact with the locals?
A: No, negative sir.
Q: The incidents with the drinking did your command at VSP Belambai put out or discuss any policy or how they would deal with drug or alcohol problems?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did they ever talk about drug use or alcohol use at all?
A: They told us to don't do anything illegal. We were told that about 3 or 4 times.
Q: Who would tell you that?
A: SSG Bales.
Q: With that New Year's incident that was described, was anything put out by the chain of command, either for or against that activity?
A: For illegal drug use, yes. But for alcohol use, there wasn't anything released saying you cannot have alcohol out there. We knew we couldn't, but they didn't say we couldn't have it there.
Q: In general, did it seem like it was accepted?
A: I would say amongst the squad leaders and above...yes, sir.
Q: What was your perception about the acceptance of alcohol there, on the FOB?
A: I think the chain of command accepted it.
Q: Can you recall any other incidents where you suspected alcohol was involved?
A: On the night of the 11 March incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) smelled like alcohol when he came to the B-Hut to wake us up.
Q: Did the chain of command say anything or do anything about the Afghan jingle truck incident?
A: After that day, it was never brought up again, sir.
Q: Where you ever addressed by someone senior to you about the proper treatment of Afghans and whether or not that type of activity was condoned?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 03May2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I know, specifically (b)(3), (b)(6) thought that was pretty funny. But I don't think they thought it was a big deal.
Q: How about the people on your team?
A: Honestly, we all were pretty embarrassed. Like we thought that was unprofessional. You're supposed to be the platoon sergeant and you're running around acting like you're 16 years old; punching people for no reason.
Q: For the people that thought it was funny, did their chain of command, team leader or squad leader address it with them.
A: No. Not that I saw personally.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 9 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/04/04	1335	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6) WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), 2-3 Infantry, 3rd Brigade, 2nd ID
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I left for basic 17 May 2011.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: I went out there as a rifleman. I had positions in trucks and on the roof; stuff like that.
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: When we first got there, my team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6). And then I was put on the (b)(3), (b)(6) team. SSG Bales was in charge of the squad, but he kind of handed the role over to (b)(3), (b)(6) and he kind of took on the role of overseeing both squads, becoming the platoon sergeant out there. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team leader and the MSG was the team sergeant. I called him (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: I've been on several patrols outside the wire. I haven't had much interaction with the Afghans; I've waved at kids on the road, that's pretty much it.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: I think the count was about 40.
Q: Do you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: I think I've learned more there, than I what I did at the unit.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: I believe so sir, yes. I definitely had more confidence in the ODA team sergeant and team leader; more than our leadership. Our leadership seemed pretty scrambled when everything was going on. The 2-3 team sergeants would panic a little more and ODA team sergeants kept their composure.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: Pretty much all my interaction was, if they needed something to get done they would pass it down to myself or the other infantry soldiers and we usually go out and do it. When work hours were over, I didn't have much interaction with them at all.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes, sir. When 3rd Group was there, we were working with the Afghan Police so they went over a lot of things with us before we went down there. We learned a lot of medical training. The only weapons training we really had was the M9 pistol training. We built a range when 7th Group was out there, so we used that range to shoot our weapons. When we got out there they kind of did a brief or a class on everything.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 4 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: We were told we were assets of the ODA team; so to pretty much do whatever the ODA team requested of us. Things like build up the site; we were integrated on patrols so we did everything that was expected of us while we were on patrols; we were integrated on base defense, half of us manned the trucks around the VSP, while the other half manned the roof and the two towers out there.
Q: Did you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Yes, sir
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: Yes, sir. Once we built it up. Yes, sir.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: Personally, I didn't see anybody take anything or drink anything, but I heard there were a few questionable instances out there. The only one I can think about off the top of my head is New Year's Eve. SSG Bales definitely appeared to be a little sloppier than usual. A little before midnight, we all went to the roof and we were going to shoot off flares and the EOD guys that were out there had a nice little explosion set up; when SSG Bales came on the roof, he appeared to be intoxicated, he started the countdown and he was stumbling through that. We were shooting off red and green flares; he was getting upset because people were shooting too much red and not enough green. Then he pulled us to the side that night and was just saying stuff that was kind of weird. Stuff like; if you don't enjoy this deployment then this is the wrong career for you. He was just acting really strange that night.
Q: Did anybody ever offer you any drugs or alcohol?
A: I was never offered anything.

INITIA (b)(3), (b)(6) G STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 4 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) " That's all I know.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: I don't think anybody did anything like that. But, there were like a few times SSG Bales would refer to everybody outside of the VSP wanted to kill us. He did have any incident with a truck driver; I didn't actually see it but word spread really quick about what happened. I guess an Afghan civilian truck driver was helping unload the truck, I guess he tossed a box that ended up hitting SSG Bales, so from my understanding I guess SSG Bales got a little upset and got into a fist altercation with him.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?
(b)(6), (b)(5)
Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: When we're on guard, we're in charge of north, west and the ANA is in charge of south, where the gate is. (b)(1)1.4b (b)(1)1.4b that definitely got passed along. I don't really know how they would leave without being seen.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: I never really saw him interact with any of the locals around there. For the shuras, I don't recall him being a part of them; that was pretty much the ODA's thing.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: We had a gym there, I wouldn't say it was organized PT, it was do it on your own. There's really not much to do in your free time, so most people spend their hours in the gym. I would go to the gym in the mornings before everybody got there.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: We cleaned it after patrols. If we got into a fire fight on base defense that day, we definitely cleaned it afterwards. Pretty much whenever I laid it down, I would break it down and clean it.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you for guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: If anything happened before our guard duty shift, the people before us would let us know. It was not unusual to hear shots fired or IEDs go off towards the area of Talukan or Hyena, they would say there were a couple bursts out here or there etc... We were pretty much told to keep a look out toward the north, west and east. When we first got there (b)(1)1.4a explained to us what kind of equipment they had and how to use it.
Q: Did your chain of command do anything to address the alcohol incident you describe happened on New Year's Eve?
A: They really didn't address anything about it.
Q: Did the chain of command put out any guidance to the group with regard to alcohol use?
A: No, sir. They didn't say don't do it, but they definitely didn't encourage us to do it. They definitely didn't make it seem like it was acceptable behavior. I got the feeling they were like, if you're stupid enough to do it, don't get caught doing it. That's just the impression I was getting off of them.

\\END STATEMENT\\

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 4 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Deponent)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/04/04	0805	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Since November 2010, sir.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: Basically Infantry man support/ (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: At first it was (b)(3), (b)(6), but they are currently gone. Now I fall under (b)(3), (b)(6) Above him it goes to the 1SG, I believe? (b)(3), (b)(6) My chain of command at the site is, I don't know how to say his name so I just call him (b)(3), (b)(6) Then above him I guess it would be (b)(3), (b)(6) and then (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team leader.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - Shuras, for example?
A: Absolutely, yes, sir. Never directly in Shuras, only in security on the outside of that. We'd intermingle with the Afghans in Alikozai and Naji Bien. We'd give children candy; basically engaged with the locals.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: We took contact pretty heavily for pretty much the time we were out there. As far as training, not necessarily. I mean on our side of things, I never shot my weapon a whole lot before we got to Belambai. These were live rounds; we did at NTC, but two weeks in a box isn't really compared to anything like Belambai. I shot my weapon at Belambai quite a lot, sir, both outside the gate and on base defense.
Q: Can you describe your NTC train-up?
A: I can only speak for myself, but I was a driver at the time; so I didn't see much ground time. Driving a Stryker around, you really do not get to do much patrolling.
Q: What about after your NTC training, did you learn more skills to conduct your mission?
A: Absolutely yes, sir. Although we still learned to (b)(1)1.4a Basically just going over if we were to take contact from this direction, what we would do; reaction on contact. IED training was a big part of training.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Absolutely. I had tremendous confidence, especially in the Special Forces.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How did you interact with the ODA members? Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Absolutely. When I first joined the Army, that's what I wanted to do, Special Forces. My recruiter talked me into enlisting first in the regular army side, just to kind of get my feet wet. So from my stand point, it was any eye opening experience. I got to see what they did on a regular basis. They really took us in as equals; we rubbed shoulders, ate chow together, we filled hescos together, filled sand bags together. I guess that's kind of the nature of Belambai. I learned Det-cord from the EOD guys, as well as the (b)(3), (b)(6) was a formerly a SIG-IN guy, so he kind of really mentored me with the wolf hound. He showed me the ways. We got to shoot AT-4s, Gustavs. We trained with all those weapon systems that were previously foreign to me.
Q: Any difference between the two ODAs? (b)(1)1.4a.
A: Absolutely (b)(1)1.4a seemed a lot more receptive to the idea of unity between the infantry and the SF (b)(1)1.4a was a little different. When they first got there, they were kind of more stand-off'ish like, "Hey we're Special Forces, you're here to support us." Which is our mission, but I think after the first few bullets started flying, they got the idea that we're all here together.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?
A: Honestly, we were a pretty tight group before we left, so we all kept each other's spirits pretty high. As far as in relations to SSG Bales, not so much. He was formerly our platoon sergeant, so we never really worked with him very closely, you know, he was always kind of ordering us around, that kind of thing. But then he became our squad leader, we had to work with him more and more, and you could kind of see and feel the distance between our elements of privates and team leaders.
Q: What was the command climate of your unit?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3),(b)(5)(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you feel like your leadership taught you effectively how to handle stress?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you think the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: Honestly they were what I expected. (b)(6) and he had told me he'd done sorties over Helmand and seeing, you know Camp Robinson and seeing some of the outlining camps and told me how it was. So I had some basic idea of what it was going to be like. But when we got there I was a little shocked to say the least. That's just the nature of it. We all took in stride and realized this is what it is, so let's make the best of it.
Q: In general, did you feel like the standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?
A: Absolutely. We never did anything that would jeopardize one another. As far as standards and discipline, if we knew someone was coming in, we made sure we'd look presentable. But on a daily basis it was basically be comfortable but still in uniform. Weapons maintenance was a huge thing.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: Yes, sir; on multiple occasions. On 25 December, I witnessed all of my NCOs in my chain of command, in my immediate command, were drunk. On New Year's, again, same thing. And a few days before the incident.
Q: How did you know they were drunk?
A: Well none of us junior guys had alcohol, so we could pretty much smell it; how they were acting; SSG Bales even said on Christmas, that he didn't care what we did as long as anybody didn't smoke anything because, in his own words, he said he wouldn't be able to cover it up. But he said you could drink, if you want someone to send you a package with alcohol it wouldn't be a problem and he would cover for us. The party was going on in the "Cans"; in an area we were told we were not allowed to be.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within you unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: I have. Originally SSG Bales seemed like a normal kind of squared away guy, but once I started to interact with him more, I could tell he was a little...he really didn't like black people. I could tell that and (b)(6) it was kind of offensive. There were a couple of incidents in February. For Black History, AFN was playing black movies. We were all in the chow hall watching these "ghetto" movies, but there was nothing offensive in the movie. He would make comments like "Look at these thugs, look at these gangsters; turn this stuff off, nobody wants to see this." On another occasion, I was singing in the shower and he came in the bathroom and he asked, "Who's singing in there? Is it (b)(3), (b)(6)" I said, "No sir, its (b)(3), (b)(6)." Then he said, "(b)(3), (b)(6) Ha, close enough to (b)(3), (b)(6) There were little things like that. It bothered me but at the same time it was something we all dealt with. It was joking around in the junior ranks; it was something we all did to each other. But never from a senior guy have I heard that before.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes towards Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: Yes, sir. I saw it from SSG Bales mostly. The truck driver incident. The truck driver was unloading bottles, and SSG Bales kind of freaked out and started pounding on the guy pretty good. I didn't see it but you could hear the commotion and see the truck moving, so I was right there next to it.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: How could someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: They would have to sneak to the ANA side; that would be the only way they could possibly do that. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

So they would have had to walk to the ANA side and scurried against wall. That's the only way I could've imagined someone leaving without being seen.
Q: When you were on guard duty, which way were you oriented mainly?
A: (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did you ever see SSG Robert Bales interact with the local Afghans? If so, can you describe SSG Bales' conduct during these encounters?
A: Other than the altercation with the truck driver, when we'd go out on patrol we'd set up kind of a security position and he would tell us to send the ANA out in front but if something where to happen, to shoot through the ANA, they are not people, don't worry about it they're not real soldiers anyway. If you see someone, and you could possibly have PID, then shoot first and ask questions later. He kind of had that mentality. Which honestly was very secular to himself, we all did pretty much what the Special Forces wanted us to do; and no one there wanted us to do anything that was against the law or against what we have been trained as far as PID and ROE.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: I did PT on my own. (b)(3), (b)(6) kept me in the gym all the time, but it was never a squad PT or anything like that.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: I cleaned my M4 pretty much whenever we got in contact or whenever we had gone a mission. The heavy weapons were cleaned at least twice a week.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you for guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: It was explained to us the first day we got there by (b)(3), (b)(6) Typically, (b)(3), (b)(6) would come on shift after me, so we would let them know where all the gear was and then we'd explain if we saw anything during our shift.
Q: The comments SSG Bales made during patrol, was that something he said verbatim?
A: He did verbatim say, "Shoot through the ANA guy, he is not a person." He said that on our first patrol. He was being dead serious when he'd said that.
Q: What did the chain of command do with that kind of information?
A: My immediate chain of command, my leadership, kind of all despised the Afghans; you could tell that was their idea. But the ODA chain of command, they were willing to work with the Afghans.
Q: So you had a command climate that had different views on Afghans?
A: Yes, sir; but to be honest, my chain of command would do anything the Special Forces told them to do. So if they would have said, "Hey, go out here and interact with these guys," they would have done it.
Q: Was alcohol tacitly accepted by the chain of command?
A: As far as I could tell, yes sir. It was just a way of passing time during the deployment.
Q: Was it tacitly accepted within the uplift squad or was it tacitly accepted within the VSP as a whole?
A: I never saw any of the Special Forces guys drink at all.
Q: Was there any guidance or information put out to you from the command with regards to drugs and alcohol use?
A: Zero tolerance.
Q: With regards to the racist comments that were mentioned, what did the chain of command do, if anything, about racist comments?
A: From my aspect, who am I going to tell? If SSG Bales is the one making the comments, I can't send it up to him. With the Special Forces guys, you can kind of tell they took it in stride, but realistically, nothing is going to happen. It's just going to make more problems for me in the long run.
Q: Specifically, was it a command climate that accepted racist comments?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you only hear these racist comments from SSG Bales or did anybody else make these comments?
A: Just SSG Bales, sir.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/04

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you think he was trying to be funny?
A: If he was, it was a terrible attempt.

\\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 12 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/02	1750	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	[redacted]	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) at VSP Belambai. I am Currently at KAF getting ready to redeploy for R&R.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 3 and half years. This is my third deployment. My first deployment I was located at KAF. I did a short tour at FOB Shank and then a short tour at BAF. My first deployment was October 2010 to January 2011. My second deployment was July 2011 to August 2011.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) We had rotating shifts as far as base defense was concerned. Certain individuals were on the roof and then one squad would manage the trucks. On the roof I was the mortar man. On trucks I managed the gate truck and the truck by the ANA tower.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: Yes, sir. I've never had personal interactions with the Afghans. I've only seen Afghans and maybe give commands if they would get too close to the formation.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats? Did you feel that the chain-of-command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes, sir. Very much so. I never took any contact on a foot patrol. We don't have an official count, but we have had about 38 Troops In Contact (TIC) for the total deployment from the time we arrived on 14 December. I absolutely felt like I was trained adequately. I also felt the chain-of-command at Belambai could lead us through these actions.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members? Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: I believe we were seen more as a combat multiplier. We were kind of an enabler, a combat multiplier. Generally we did our, shall I say we stayed in our lane. But if there was any reason for us to go outside the typical infantry mission, to sort of help out with something the ODA needed, we definitely got the training from the ODA. We received additional training.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like you were made part of the team?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: While we were building the B-Hut, we had a small little room, maybe the size of the inside of here. It had eight people living in sleeping on cots. (b)(3), (b)(6) was the one who helped build up the B-Hut. Other than that, living conditions were ok.
Q: In general, do you feel like standards and discipline was maintained at VSP Belambai?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: I saw it once, sir. It was alcohol. We had a New Year's party at Belambai. There was alcohol being consumed. I'm not saying no other person was drunk, but the only person that was visibility drunk to me was SSG Bales.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: No racist remarks. Maybe, periodically insensitive remarks. Like "Kill Afghans or locals." If you don't mind I would like to say this in defense, it's kind of similar to the slangs we have all throughout the military. Kind of like, you know Muslims, but people say things like "You fucking Muslims." The chain-of-command didn't take any action on that.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: No, sir.
Q: In general, do senior personnel discuss the personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?
A: I never heard anybody talk about any personal issues. I never heard anybody complain about any problems or anything like that.
Q: Where were you at the time of the events early on the morning of 11 March?
A: I was woken up for 100%. I was told we need 100%. (b)(3), (b)(6) came and then he told us to go back to bed after he got 100%. Maybe about 5 minutes later I was woken up again and was told that SSG Bales was missing.
Q: What did you do after the 100% personnel accountability?
A: We were told by (b)(3), (b)(6) at this point to get the vehicles up for base defense and for everybody to stay in battle buddy pairs. We didn't know if SSG Bales had been kidnapped or something. So I got (b)(3), (b)(6) and we ran out to the trucks together. I ran out with (b)(3), (b)(6) since I was in charge of the two trucks they manned at the gate and the ANA tower. I ran over to (b)(3), (b)(6) truck, dropped him off, and then went over to (b)(3), (b)(6) truck and dropped him off.
Q: What actions did you observe the chain of command take during the incident response?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) were putting together a small group of guys and they were going to look for SSG Bales. As far as I know, they never went to look for him.
Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen? Could someone go over the fences in the back? [Interviewer describes the camp layout]. Do you think you could climb over the single hescoes in the back that did not have any barbed wire?
A: I believe I could if I really tried , Sir.
Q: Otherwise, how could someone get out of the compound?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Out the gate, Sir.
Q: Did you ever see SSG Robert Bales interact with the local Afghans? If so, can you describe SSG Bales' conduct during these encounters?
A: Never during the patrols. As far as I know he always got along with our local workers, but there was a time when a delivery driver decided to help unload the drinks off his truck and SSG Bales ended up hitting...I didn't see it all happen. But I saw the local come out of the truck with a bloody nose. I heard SSG Bales say to the ODA, "Should I te(b)(3), (b)(6) meaning the team sergeant. He ended up telli(b)(3), (b)(6) the medics treated the local. I'm not sure of everything that happened after that, sir.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: I generally did gym PT with one of the privates in the other team from another squad and the privates from my squad. While the other private in my team would go at night by himself. Generally speaking, I went to the gym every day. It was not a requirement.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: After I fired it. Every time I put rounds through it. I generally wouldn't open up my weapon if it was not fired, I would use a duster can or baby wipes.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you for guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: I would say, there really was no guidance or details. There was no talk about it. I showed up late to the site so there might have been something that was put out before I got there. But I never had any guidance on anything other than you must wear your NODs.
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: Who did you stand guard with? Did it change over time?
A: Yes, sir. There were two officers that were killed in BAF, so up until then, there was only one person on guard at night, after that incident it went to two people on guard.
Q: How would change over go?
A: Show up for the guard shift and the person before would give you a little briefing if there was any activity, as far as lights, gun fire etc...Things we would hand off would be (b)(1)1.4a
Q: While you were on guard duty, what were the tactical rules of engagement? When could you start shooting back?
A: Positive I.D., sir.
Q: Do you remember the time frame when the scuffle happened with the truck driver?
A: I would guess it would be late February, sir.
Q: So it was during (b)(1)1.4a tenure?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did the chain-of-command take any action on that altercation? Did any guidance or regulation come out in result of that?
A: Nothing by the ODA. Nothing official.
Q: Was that the only physical altercation you're aware of with any local help?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said you were frustrated by the restricted ROE, can you explain that a little bit more?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: How would you compare your thoughts about command climate between 3d Group and 7th Group?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: You said the local populous kind of sided with whoever was in charge, how did you develop that thought?
A: We were taking a lot of direct and indirect fire, and in my opinion, it's really difficult to not notice somebody with a machine gun. People were shooting at us and it is right next to someone's house and that person could see them shooting at us. Then we would visit them and they would be friendly with us. They really didn't want to get involved with anything. I guess playing neutral parties were in their best interest. I would say that for all the villages around us with the exception of Alkozai. They would be friendlier to the Americans if they had a choice. I would say Naji Bien would have chosen the Taliban over the Americans.
Q: Can you describe the alcohol incident on New Year's Eve? Was the ODA involved in that as well?
A: Honestly sir, I can't say that I saw anybody drinking alcohol. The only thing I saw was SSG Bales was visibility drunk.
Q: What did the chain-of-command do about that incident?
A: That was first time I ever saw the alcohol or ever knew about it, and for lack of better words, I guess it was just brushed under the rug. Nobody really thought anything about it. (b)(3), (b)(6) actually approached us at the fire and told us they been drinking and he said he was going to try and get us some alcohol. I don't know if the chain-of-command did anything about the incident. They would have done all the drinking down at the conexes.
Q: The drinking was pretty much done out in the open?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: You said comments like "Kill the Afghans" and "You fucking Muslims" were used commonly, who was the comments frequently used among, the NCOs, lower enlisted or from everybody?
A: We lower enlisted, it wasn't like a routine or used in a demeaning way. It was normally used after we got attacked like "You fucking Muslims." People didn't talk about killing Muslims. These comments were used maybe, daily or every other day. I couldn't give you an exact number, but I would say it happened fairly frequently. Never in true animosity.////END OF STATEMENT////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INTERFERENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

USFOR-A

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/04/03	0926	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) 11 Bravo, (b)(6) attached to ODA (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Coming up on about a year, sir.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: 11 Bravo, basically base defense; anything the ODA needed.
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: Sergeant Bales was my former squad leader; (b)(3), (b)(6) is my PL and (b)(3), (b)(6) my commander.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: No sir, I never participated in any shuras. I never really had any direct action with them, besides saying "Hello", "How are you doing?" But that's about it. Yes, I did go on patrols but other than that, that's about as much interaction I had.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats? Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: We took contact at least 3 maybe 4 times a week. It was pretty dicey out there, but it wasn't anything we couldn't handle; our base defense was adequately laid out, with (b)(1)1.4a everyone had a base defense position, I felt like we had that down pretty well.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members? Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes. They gave us classes on weapons systems we weren't familiar with. For example, the mini-gun; we did a whole 2 day class for that. Any type of weapon system we weren't familiar with, the Bravos were there to help us out. Along with the demolitions; the Charlies were there to do demo things with us. We'd interact with the ODA every day. We hung out, ate with them; we did everything together, so we were pretty close knit.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission? What do you understand that mission to be?

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: Absolutely. Just for the first 2 or 3 months we were there, the ODA was helping us build a B-Hut; they were really "gung-ho" about it. They brought in electricians and etc...they really squared us away when it came to living conditions. From what I hear, we have probably one of the best B-Huts out there.
Q: Did your chain of command come by and check your rooms?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) showed up a few times and so did (b)(3), (b)(6) they showed up twice before the incident. The Squad Leaders wouldn't leave the place.
Q: In general, did you feel like standards and discipline was maintained at VSP Belambai?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: I have seen individuals under the influence of alcohol, but take it that was on special occasions; it was on New Years, and Christmas. Sergeant Bales from time to time, would come in and you could smell it on his breath and he'd be acting a little loopier than usual. But, he was never aggressive or nothing like that, just a little too happy for his own good. They have their own cans we have ours. What happens there, that's their business; no one saw anything.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: Never, sir
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: Not really. When (b)(1)1.4a showed up, obviously there was a big amount of distrust towards Afghans; the ANA and the workers (b)(1)1.4a showed up when all those blue and green incidents occurred, so there was a little animosity there; but mainly just distrust at the time.
Q: In general, do senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a,

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Is there any other way?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did you ever see SSG Bales interact with the local Afghans? If so, can you describe SSG Bales' conduct during these encounters?
A: Well we had a truck driver once; I witnessed him pretty much beat that guy up. A refrigerator truck had pulled up next to the conexes, and we had a chain going to unload the truck. Everyone's laughing, having a good time, trying to see how fast we can go; just goofing around. Then all of a sudden, I see Sergeant Bales just rush the Afghani truck driver; like he put a knee into him then he starting whaling on him. The guy leaves like holding his head and crying and Sergeant Bales said during unloading the truck, the truck driver hit him in the eye with the food he was passing along. Sergeant Bales said he just brushed it off the first time; then the second time he said he did it again but this time he was laughing, but at the same time, everyone was laughing just having a good time. Sergeant Bales took it to heart like ~~we were~~ laughing at him, so he rushed him in the back, took care of business. He felt bad after it, I don't know if he felt bad for the Afghani, but I think he felt there was going to be some reprimand; but everyone in the ODA was like, "It's cool, shit happens, just don't do it again." This happened under (b)(1)1.4a The truck driver (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did they talk to Bales about it?
A: Honestly, the higher leadership was not notified about it. There were probably two sergeants from the ODA present.
Q: What did they do for the Afghan?
A: They brought him to the aid station; they took care of him medical wise.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: They didn't have like a set PT schedule, but I know my squad, we were very "Hooah" about working out. We would at least set aside 2 hours to work out. That was pretty much what I would look forward too. We did it on our own.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: After every TIC, after every base defense. Also down at the MWR, we would play some music and clean our weapons.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Who checked you for guard?
A: In the beginning the NCOs would come up, just find out if there was anything we weren't doing right. But that only happened like the first three weeks.
Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, after you?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Can you compare the command climate between 3rd Group and 7th Group?
A: There really weren't any big changes. 3rd Group just laid out how we did things and 7th Group just picked it right up.
Q: Did you perceive any tension between the ODA leadership and uplift leadership?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Did everybody hate Bales or just certain people? How would you categorize it?
A: Everyone who made decisions didn't like Sergeant Bales. Like from the Chief to the head Bravo; this was in (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did the team leader and team sergeant indicate any opinion of Bales?
A: Yes. I mean pretty much. They didn't care for him. They'd voice it to us.
Q: What was the chain of command's attitude towards drinking?
A: I really couldn't tell you; it was never addressed. I'm sure if there was a problem, it was handled internally. But then again, Sergeant Bales would never become belligerent or anything like that, so I guess it really didn't become an issue.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) | PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT *Kandahar* DATED *2012/04/03*

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did the ODA leadership talk about drug usage or alcohol use?
A: Yes. At the time when we got there, the original ANA would be smoking hashish 24/7. You could just smell it from the guard tower. The ODA would be like, "You're not smoking that hashish, that's out of the question!" They really didn't address alcohol, because at the same time no one had gotten caught with it. No one in the infantry had anything like that. I'm sure if someone did get caught with it, there would be a class on it or something like that; but the only thing we were vocally warned about was hashish.
Q: Did you guys have room inspections?
A: We had one health and welfare inspection, right when we got there.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE *4*. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this *10* day of *April*, *2012*
at *Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan*

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE *4* OF *4* PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/03	1641	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 22 months. This is my first combat tour. I've been with (b)(6) since October 2010.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: My duty position was a rifleman. Our duties would change every 1st and 15th. Mostly Force Protection would switch from the roof to the vehicles. So I would either be on a roof doing Force Pro or on a truck. I would alternate trucks, so I've been on pretty much every truck. I'm an 11B (Bravo) by MOS.
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: My chain of command, officially, I believe it was (b)(3), (b)(6), who was my squad leader. He had me as a team leader, but then I soon got switched due to people getting promoted. They wanted people to get a feel for leadership. I got put into (b)(3), (b)(6) squad and I was under (b)(3), (b)(6) Next in chain of command would probably be straight to (b)(3), (b)(6) the team commander.
Q: Did you have two teams out there?
A: At a time we had integrated when they were RIPing, but we experience being two different teams.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: Yes, I did. I personally didn't verbally interact; I would have to kids and give them candy. We were never really part of shuras; we would more be a security force.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel, like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: Yeah, I believe we've been trained. The amount we've experienced, I wouldn't say it was a lot but more than average.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members?
A: Not very much. Never really got on personal level. It was more like the infantry guys would hang out in our B-Hut and do our own thing.
Q: Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: Yes. They trained us with pistols, grenade training, explosives, and rockets; pretty much advance marksmanship and just procedures that we would take when taking contact out there. I'd said we had more training with the second team.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 3 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission?
A: Yes, I believe I had. I have some type of understanding. Back in the states, we trained against the opposition as more of a conventional army, unconventional warfare. We trained with the strykers; it was a big difference, a big change.
Q: What did they tell you the mission would be like for the infantry unit?
A: First thought, we were just going to be Force Pros, gate guards; that was a big part of what we did. Also, we got to go on missions but were mainly security elements.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: Extra barrels. Just if you take contact, you return contact.
Q: Do you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Do you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: When we first got there it wasn't quite so. We had a squad in like these back rooms; we called it the dungeon or cave, they were really small. Shortly after we arrived there we started to build a B-Hut for ourselves. That took us about two months; then we moved right into the B-Hut. It was pretty nice, it was adequate. We felt good that we build it up ourselves.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: With drugs, I didn't see anything. With alcohol, I'd suspected on a couple of occasions, the higher ups/leadership. To me, I just stood back and just made sure nothing fell onto our levels; made sure my guys were NOT doing drugs or alcohol. Just staying out of trouble.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 3 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What made you suspect that there was alcohol on a couple of occasions?
A: I never witnessed anyone drinking. But there were times I thought like (b)(3), (b)(6) or Sergeant Bales was drunk. But I didn't ask them if they were drunk.
Q: What made think they were drunk?
A: Just a change in attitude. They would be happier. There was incident where (b)(3), (b)(6) was too happy with everyone on guard.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist of insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: No, nothing derogative. We did once in awhile, but we didn't cross the line that would offend someone.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: There was one incident, I'm kind of confused if it was out of line or not, but we had a class one truck that brought drinks and the driver was an Afghan local; he decided to help us unload the truck and he was passing stuff to SSG Bales, I didn't see it personally but from what everyone said, SSG Bales hit the worker; or something like that.
Q: Other than that, did people talk bad about the Afghans?
A: No. We got along with the workers that were on the camp. They were really good; I have nothing bad to say.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: When you guys were on patrol and you took incoming fire, did the NCOs handle that okay?
A: Yeah. (b)(3), (b)(6) was a little more paranoid. He would always try to do his job as a squad leader to make sure everyone was okay. Making sure we were in the right placement. But when stuff would happen, he would be more skittish.
Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: How could you sneak out?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: You were on guard duty with (b)(3), (b)(6) 0200-0300 - which way were you oriented mainly - West? North?

(b)(1)1.4a(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see SSG Robert Bales interact with the local Afghans? If so, can you describe SSG Bales' conduct during these encounters?
A: No, not really.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: That's pretty much it, just lift weights. It would depend on the day of how much work we had to do.
Q: Anyone ever inspected your rooms?
A: Yes. The team leader or the squad leaders would come by. If the room had like dirty clothes lying around, they would tell us to clean it up.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: After every mission, we'd dust them down. If we had to use our weapons, we'd get into a full detail clean.
Q: Did you ever have to fire your weapon?
A: Yes. Both on patrol and while on base defense.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you for guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: When we first got there. We were trained on procedures; where you're not allow to have your w weapon. Have your kit up there.
Q: On the 5 March IED incident, was that the first causality you knew in theater?
A: Yes.
Q: Did your command address your group in any way, with regard to that incident, on how your group would deal with the loss of a team member?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 3 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Pretty much, our squad leaders and above got with the ODA guys; the ODA guys briefed them something. Like there was a meeting that lower guys weren't invited too. And then our leadership told us that phones or computers weren't going to be used for a while, until his family was notified. We understood, like on the next day he was in good condition, but he did have an amputation.
Q: Did you get some feedback initially, on how to deal with it?
A: Not really. They just kind of relaxed our work load. The next day was just like, real relaxed day.
Q: But nothing that you recall of anyone coming to you as leaders saying anything on how to handle that situation?
A: Not really. Our leaders haven't really experienced that kind of situation on previous deployments.
Q: What was the general mood of your unit after this incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did the command ever put out any information about drug use or alcohol use?
A: Yea, we knew there was zero tolerance with alcohol or drugs.
Q: Did you leadership out at the VSP talk to you about drugs or alcohol?
A: Yea, there were a couple of times; but it's kind of hard for me to memorize because that's something I would not be a part of.
Q: Were you given any training or guidance on how to work with the local nationals?
A: Yeah, there was a little bit during NTC. We did like a VSO simulation next to a village.
Q: Were given guidance in theater on how to deal with the local nationals?
A: No, just ROEs. Treat them how we would treat Americans in America.

\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITH[redacted]R REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, (b)(3), (b)(6) NT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/04	0931	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 1 year this month, sir. This is my first combat tour.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: (b)(6) All I would really do is go out on patrols covering trucks; if we were in the trucks I would be a primary gunner and then on base defense I would be on a truck. I am an 11 Bravo.
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: At Belambai it would be directly to SSG Bales when we first started. Later on, SSG Bales squad got turned over to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) so (b)(3), (b)(6) was my new squad leader and SSG Bales functioned as our platoon sergeant. Above SSG Bales I would believe it would be (b)(3), (b)(6) then up to (b)(3), (b)(6). For (b)(1)1.4a team leader was (b)(3), (b)(6) team sergeant was (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you participate in patrols to the villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - shuras, for example?
A: Not much. We had one; I believe it was to Alikozai, in which I actually got to interact with some of the locals, but that's probably the only one where I was personally involved. We would give the children candy when they would come by.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai? Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: I would say I was adequately trained, sir. Most of December we would get into two or three TICs a week. Then after RIP/TOA of 3rd Group to 7th Group, things seemed to calm down; then ~~we~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) would ~~try~~ to engage the ANCOP near Zangabad. Then when we started to push further west or north, trying to get more white space, we would pretty much get into a TIC every time we went on a patrol that way. The base would take fire in the month of February, I would say maybe two times a week.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes, sir. I was confident in my chain of command.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members? Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: (b)(1)1.4a was very open with us, like we were pretty much part of the team the first day we got there. They gave us training for the whole week on pretty much everything they had there; that's how I got proficient with the mini-gun. They were very understanding of what we needed to do and what they needed out of us. When 7th Group came in, it was a little different. They were under the impression that their SGM wanted us to just kind of stay on base. So it took them a little while longer to warm up to us, but eventually the same thing applied where they would give us training. They would take us out on missions; for white space/36 hour missions, stuff like that.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 4 APRIL DATED Kandahar

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

They were pretty open with us, but it took about 2 or 3 weeks.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: Our infantry mission would basically be to assist the ODA in smaller tasks that would slow down whatever it is they were trying to do. Obviously we're going to pull security because that's what infantry does. We were going to be a fire power of superiority towards them, because we carry heavier weapons than they do. And then assist in any way possible to make their mission easier.
Q: Do you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: As someone who literally just came from basic training to Fort Lewis, then I got deployed; I was pretty rushed through it. I thought that basic training went very well; SSG Bales went out of his way, I would say, to make sure that we had an understanding of what we were getting into; and if we had any questions, he would make sure we got as much "together time" as possible. Our squad was rushed together pretty quickly; SSG Bales was originally the Platoon Sergeant then bumped down to Squad Leader and then we had a bunch of soldiers fresh out of basic training in our squad. My team leader was sent to us like a couple weeks before we came out. Then (b)(3), (b)(6) was literally thrown on us a week, maybe two weeks before we came down out of the sniper element. Considering the circumstances I'd say we did pretty well.
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 4APR12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: They were a lot better than what we expected. Because we got a brief saying, just get use to shtters and living in a mud hut with no heat, and no showers. Then we get there, we had a MWR with full internet access, we a TV and phones. Eventually, we built our own B-Huts. It was pretty nice out there.
Q: In general, do you feel like standards and discipline was maintained at VSP Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Did you ever see any indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: I have a theory sir, of indications. Usually late at night you'll run into someone who was just kind of, "out of it." They would appear drunk but I never actually seen anyone drink alcohol. I would say anyone above E-5, like there's at least one or two times I wasn't sure if they were sober or not.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? If so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: The only kind of things we heard that I would say are racist would be calling some local "Haji," that's kind of a common term. I wouldn't necessarily say it was actually out of racism; I don't think anyone actually hated any of the locals.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: There was one time we were unloading a truck, and SSG Bales got hit in the face while passing cans, so he told the truck driver, "Hey, if you do that again, I'm going to beat the shit out of you." Of course the truck driver doesn't speak English, and SSG Bales was laughing and everyone else was laughing. So the second time SSG Bales got hit in the face with a bunch of cans, he beat the crap out of the dude. I was on the opposite side of the truck, but I believe either (b)(3), (b)(6) were a witness to it. The truck driver came out, he was all bleeding from the nose; SSG Bales came out, he was all red and mad.
Q: So what happen to the truck driver?
A: I believe he was taken to the medic station. And they took care of him there. I'm not sure if he was compensated or how it was dealt with from there. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) took to him the med shed.
Q: In general, did the senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?
A: SSG Bales was pretty forward with pretty much almost everything; except for like super details of his personal life. I remember me and him talked for like 2 hours, and the closest thing I know is he was frustrated about not making the E-7 list. (b)(3), (b)(6) never talked about his personal life; (b)(3), (b)(6) never talked about his personal life.
Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: What about anywhere else on that perimeter, can anybody go over the wall?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: I believe he went to a couple of shuras and for a little while, when we where training the ANCOP, he was in charge of that.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 4 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I think (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) may have more information about those interactions.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: We were instructed to work out at least once a day. We had a pretty decent gym. Some of us would work out 2 to 3 times a day. I would be more of a lazy person, where I would work out 3 times a week. I was happy with that. And others would just not do anything at all. We would play soccer with the ANA.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: I personally cleaned my weapon every two days. If it was fired, I would clean it immediately. Any of the heavy weapons, we would clean those once a week. If they were fired, we'd clean those immediately. That was the standard.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: The first day they gave us like guidance when we first started doing it.
Q: Did anybody check you for guard?
A: Occasionally, the first couple of weeks the squad leaders would come by and make sure we were awake. But then that kind of slacked off after a while.
Q: How did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: Basically, if we had (b)(1)1.4a we would tell them what was going on during our shift and then we'd give them the (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did the chain of command give you guidance with regards to how to interact with the local nationals?
A: Generally, they'd warned us that kids were going to come up to us and they would want to have things. So they would say prepare to have candy and give it to them, stuff like that. They said make sure you wear gloves, don't touch anyone. They gave us kind of like a brief, an understanding of it and don't be afraid to talk to them; be friendly with them even though you don't understand the language.
Q: Did the chain of command do anything in response to the truck incident?
A: To be honest with you sir, I am not sure if (b)(3), (b)(6) ever found out about it. Because the situation with (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales is that SSG Bales was really adamant that he doesn't want (b)(3), (b)(6) to know.
Q: What effect did it have on the climate of your unit?
A: Personally myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) were disgusted by it. Because it was just the wrong thing to do. We were ashamed of it.
Q: Did you feel like there was anything you could do to bring it to your leadership's attention?
A: Honestly sir, it was just kind of out of our lane. We had a feeling they knew about it, because I know the medics took care of the guy. I believe (b)(3), (b)(6) was with them, he's in charge of all the money transactions, between the Afghans and ourselves. I know they talked to him for a while and took care of him. So if anything was going to be done, I believed it could be taken care of.
Q: In general, was your chain of command approachable for things that you thought were wrong?
A: Not against them, sir. There was an instance after the IED and before the massacre, in which we all got smoked before a mission because the links on the 50 cal were upside down; by Sergeant Bales, (b)(3), (b)(6) So if you know anything about a 50 cal, that's like impossible; so were getting smoked for absolutely no reason because they didn't know what they were doing. And you would not want to say they didn't know what they were doing.
Q: Who was all in first squad?
A: First squad originally was (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) The other squad would be Sergeant Bales, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself. Then eventually (b)(3), (b)(6) was switched to first squad later on as a team leader and (b)(3), (b)(6) was bumped up to team leader and (b)(3), (b)(6) was given to third squad.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 4 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/04/03	1425	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Going on about 16 months.
Q: What was your duty position at VSP Belambai?
A: I was a medic for (b)(6) MOS 68 Whiskey.
Q: Who is your chain of command?
A: SSG Bales was my squad leader, and (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team leader. Above them, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the commander and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was the team sergeant.
Q: Did you participate in patrols to villages? In your patrols outside the gate into the villages, did you have personal interaction with Afghans? In what manner - Shuras, for example?
A: I didn't' have any personal interaction but I did go on patrols outside the gate. I didn't go to shuras.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: Since we've been there, I think the count is to like 37 to 38 TICs, since December.
Q: Did you feel like you had been trained adequately to deal with these threats?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you feel that the chain of command on Belambai could lead you through such action?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How did you interact with the ODA members? Did they provide cross-training, guidance, mentoring to you?
A: We were just about to start some kind of cross-training, but it didn't happen. But before that, we got a little pistol training from them, which was good. I got training from the Delta medic; just basic refresher training.
Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole?

(b)(5)(b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 03 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like you were made to understand the VSO mission? What do you understand the mission to be?
A: I kind of understood the mission. The mission was basically to go set up village stability with the local people. Try to help them out and train the ANA, ANCOP, ALP or whatever...the Afghan forces to take over for themselves and we could go home.
Q: What was your mission as a member of the uplift squad?
A: Basically to go out there and work with the Special Force. Do the mission with them and hopefully we could get the mission accomplished together.
Q: Did you feel that you were adequately trained to perform this mission?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did you feel that the leadership at VSP Belambai provided you with adequate feedback/counseling on your performance?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you feel like the living conditions at VSP Belambai were adequate?
A: They weren't bad. We actually built our B-Hut we were living in. We built that from the ground up when we first got there. Two man rooms weren't bad, nice size rooms. We had working latrines and showers. The living conditions were fine. The food wasn't bad either.
Q: Did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai? How many incidents? Where did these instances occur?
A: No, sir. I haven't seen it, sir.
Q: In general, did you feel like standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit? Is so, what action did the chain of command take?
A: No, sir.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: No, sir. Not that I've seen, no sir.
Q: In general, did senior personnel discuss their personal problems with junior Soldiers while at VSP Belambai?

(b)(6), (b)(5)

(b)(6) I guess that was kind of normal with him.

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: It actually wouldn't be as hard as people would think. On a little VSP like that, we have one gate and ANA guards the front gate, and how they guard someone might have been sleeping; they are not as adequate at guarding as we would be. So it wouldn't really be that hard to just slip out in the dark; go to the front gate and just walk off.
Q: What about any other place on the perimeter?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did you ever see SSG Bales interact with the local Afghans? If so, can you describe SSG Bales' conduct during these encounters?
A: When we're on patrols, I would see him provide candy to the kids and stuff. If people would come up to us on bikes, he would stop them and search them. That's pretty much all the interaction I've seen.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 03 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I would say he was around some of the shuras, but not actually in the midst of it. We had a couple of shuras close to the VSP, so he would just pull security at the shuras.
Q: How did he interact with the ANA or the local workers at the VSP?
A: From what I've seen it was just normal stuff, like walking by saying "Sengay," or "How are you doing?" And just keep on moving.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your volition, or was it required by your squad leader?
A: It wasn't a requirement. It was basically; go to the gym on your free time. If you wanted to go, you could go. Other than that, it wasn't forced. I didn't do much, personally.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: Honestly, I haven't shot it as much since I've been here. I would clean it a couple times a week. I never had to responsd to contact.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, and how did you conduct handover with the guards on shift before you, and after you?
A: SSG Bales explained it. When we first got there, they set up the guard roster, and explained what we were going to do. Show up 10 minutes prior to your shift, bring you (b)(1)1.4a and gear. While on guard for an hour, scan the whole area. When your relief comes, brief them if anything happened; hand over the radio and the (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did the NCOs come by and check you for guard?
A: Not really, sir. Earlier on they would sometimes come by and pop their head up, but it wasn't consistent.
Q: As the squad leader, did you see SSG Bales or (b)(3), (b)(6) interact with the ODA leadership?
A: Yes, they interacted with them quite a bit. With 3rd Group, the NCOs interacted a lot with them. They had meetings all the time, pretty much every day. As far as walking around on camp, everybody seems cool. It was pretty much the same with 7th Group.
Q: So you're saying for your time there, you didn't see any issues between the infantry and ODA?
A: No, sir.
Q: For the junior enlisted, did you guys pretty much stay to yourselves?
A: Yeah, just tried to steer clear of the NCOs. They would come get us for tasks and we'll get the tasks done.
Q: There was never an incident with an Afghan at any time?
A: Well there was one time with one of the Jingle truck workers; I didn't specifically see it, but I heard about it. SSG Bales snapped on the driver. I wasn't present at the time. They were unloading the food from the truck and I guess the guy was throwing the food off the jingle truck and it hit SSG Bales; I guess he flipped out on him and hit him a couple of times. But other than that, that's the only incident I ever heard about.
Q: What happened to the driver?
A: I really don't know, I didn't see him. I just heard about it after the fact.
Q: Did the chain of command address that incident?
A: To us, no. I don't know if they did anything to him. I don't know what came out of that from the command.

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 10 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/10	1109	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, unit and duty assignment
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Is this your first combat deployment?
A: Yes.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?
A: (b)(6)
Q: When did you arrive at VSP Belambai?
A: February 25.
Q: How much enemy contact did you have?
A: 1 or 2 TICs.
Q: Did you go out on the walking patrols?
A: No. I was there and getting settled in when they were preparing for a multi-day mission that I was going to go on. The incident brought our operations to a standstill.
Q: Who was your chain of command while out at Belambai?
A: I was under (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Team Sergeant, and I would report daily to the (b)(6) at BAF.
Q: What kind of relationship did you have with the infantry squads?
A: A loose working relationship. I talked to them and got along with them. My job was pretty much solo.
Q: Were you in the OPSCEN?
A: Yes. I would send out an email to the ODAs on the (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Where were you doing that?
A: On the roof.
Q: What was your relationship to the ODA personnel?
A: I saw them a lot. I was probably more involved with the ODA than I was with the infantry. We are supposed to be integrated into the ODA itself as a tactical asset.
Q: Did you have any prior experience with Army Special Forces?
A: Some in different schools, but this is my first time working with them.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your initial impressions about the VSP?
A: The VSP seemed well established. I got that impression from guys on my team. It sounds like one of the more established sites.
Q: What did you think about the standards and discipline when you got there?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I thought it was fine; what I would expect from the ODA. The infantry guys seemed to have a pretty good structure as well.
Q: Did the team sergeants sit down and explain to you any of the rules at the VSP?
A: Yes. When I got in, (b)(3), (b)(6) gave me a tour and told me what goes on from day to day. (b)(3), (b)(6) gave me the full run-down.
Q: How would you describe the overall climate?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Do you think that you were adequately trained to perform the mission you performed out at the VSP?
A: Yes.
Q: What kind of training did you do?
A: We have a two year pipeline—jump school, SERE, and advanced skills training. We did a lot of patrolling and infantry skills. Then we did advanced medical training and shooting once I got to the team.
Q: Did you get adequate feedback on your performance at the VSP?
A: I don't think I was really there long enough.
Q: What was your stress level like?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you ever see any indications of drinking, drunkenness, drug use or drug abuse at Belambai?
A: No.
Q: Did you hear any racist or incentive comments out there?
A: No.
Q: Did anyone exhibit dislike, disdain, inappropriate behaviors or make comments about the Afghans or local nationals?
A: There was a common dislike for mainly the Taliban. But nothing toward the ANA, the civilians, or the people who work on base. When I arrived it seemed like they were starting to establish a pretty good rapport with the local civilians.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did the chain of command brief you on how to deal with the workers, local nationals and civilians?
A: Yes. I don't remember a specific moment, but I have been watching and learning and they have been explaining things to me. One example is that they didn't want anyone going near the ANA compound by themselves. Shortly after the shooting in Kabul, they wanted everyone to keep a weapon with them.
Q: Did you hear anything about SSG Bales having an altercation with a truck driver?
A: I didn't know anything about that.
Q: Did anybody ever bring it up to you?
A: No.
Q: Did you hang out with the junior enlisted infantry soldiers?
A: I associated with them. I got to know a couple of them a little bit.
Q: Were you aware of any inappropriate behavior of any kind that occurred while you were at Belambai?
A: No.
Q: Did you perceive any change in the climate or morale after the 05 March IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did anyone from higher command or higher headquarters visit during the time you were there (before the incident)?
A: Not that I can recall.
Q: Did you stand guard on top of the compound?
A: Yes.
Q: How could someone get out of the compound without being seen?
A: I would probably just go out the front gate. There are more things to hide around. The ANA was more focused on the south side. We maintained a view of what the ANA was doing, but the south would probably be the least watched area.
Q: Do you know whether SSG Bales had any previous interaction or familiarity with local nationals in the area?
A: Not that I know of.
Q: Had you already gotten into a PT routine?
A: The gym wasn't the best, especially because the treadmill is broken, but it was encouraged to get in there and work out.
Q: Were people in the gym a lot?
A: Yes.
Q: How often did you clean your weapon?
A: Whenever it was dirty. I tried to keep the bolt clean, and I just cleaned the outside when it was needed.
Q: Did you ever fire your weapon?
A: Yes. From the rooftop. After the incident, we had a good amount of contact.
Q: Who explained to you what to do on guard?
A: My first guard shift was with (b)(3), (b)(6) He explained everything to me.
Q: What did he explain?
A: Which areas to watch out for. Even the team prior to us wasn't attacked at night. He told me that I didn't need my full battle rattle, just my weapon and the radio. The most dangerous times were just before sunrise and just after sunset. He told me to be here early before my shift.
Q: Which can were you in?
A: I was in the south end. The first one on the right. Caddycorner from SSG Bales.
Q: Was he a loud, talkative guy?
A: I would say so, but I had minimal interaction with him.
Q: What was the routine of the infantry NCOs at night? Did they hang out? Could you hear them?
A: I wouldn't know. I never hung out with them. Most guys went to bed somewhat early and weren't too loud.
Q: What about the guys in the B-hut? Did you have any interaction with them?
A: Not really. I didn't really have a lot of interaction with them. I only went into their living area once to wake one guy up for guard duty.
Q: Did you have any informal contact with them?
A: I talked to them here and there. We would joke around a bit.
Q: Did they ever confide in you about their perceptions of their NCOs?
A: No.
Q: You said that the standards of behavior are "what you would expect from an ODA." What would you expect from an ODA?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Maturity. Know their job and do their job. You wouldn't have the team sergeant yelling at guys for not doing their job.
Q: You said that (b)(3), (b)(6) gave you an inbrief when you arrived. What did he tell you?
A: He gave me a tour around the camp and showed me where everything was. He gave me a little refresher on emergency close air support. He showed me where we got attacked from. He gave me a little orientation to the surrounding area.
Q: Do you look up to him as the senior Air Force guy?
A: I do. He has a lot of experience; he has a couple of tours out here. I do look up to him.
Q: When you guys talked when you were brought on to the site, did he say anything about the infantry guys?
A: He said they were pretty solid. He said that as far as the junior enlisted, they were good kids and hard workers.
Q: What discussion did you have about the infantry NCOs?
A: We didn't really talk about the infantry NCOs. He just said they were pretty solid.
Q: Did you have any discussion about their NCO leadership?
A: Not that I can recall.
Q: You said you hung out with a few of the infantry soldiers. Which ones?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) would be the one I got along with the best.
Q: Did you spend a fair amount of time together?
A: Not necessarily. My job requires me to perform duties every hour. After our team meeting, things slowed down and I would get prepped for the next day before going to bed.
Q: Do you think that (b)(3), (b)(6) is a conscientious individual?
A: He's a good guy.
Q: Did he ever confide in you about any issues that any of the infantry soldiers were having?
A: Not that I can recall.
Q: Did you hear anything, even second or third hand, from the lower enlisted about drinking or drugs on the camp?
A: No.
Q: Anything second or third hand about interactions with the locals?
A: No.
Q: Do you have any additional information that you believe would be important to my investigation?
A: No.
Q: Do you know of anyone else who could provide information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: No.
Q: Do you share a CONEX with anybody?
A: No.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

19 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), 7th SFG (A), regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) at 1630 hours local Afghan time on 16 April 2012 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the incident at VSP Belambai. After being sworn to his testimony (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he has served in the Army for nine years. He said that he arrived at the VSP on 30 January, 2012. His duties as a (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) collecting biometric data and assisting the Intelligence Section. This deployment is his sixth combat deployment since entering the Army. While at VSP Belambai, he lived in a man-can on the western side of the ODA living area.

2. (b)(3), (b)(6) was attached to ODA (b)(1)1.4a and reported to (b)(3), (b)(6) the ODA Team Sergeant. He said that he first met the ODA at Fort Bragg where he conducted a train-up with them prior to deploying to Afghanistan. He accompanied the ODA and infantry on numerous patrols in the local area. When asked about the command climate at VSP Belambai, he said that the morale was "good." He acknowledged VSP Belambai was the most kinetic location he has served at to date, but he thought that the facilities were better than other locations and, consequently, his morale was always high. (b)(3), (b)(6) felt that he was welcomed by ODA (b)(1)1.4a and that the leadership was very approachable. He also said that he got along well with (b)(3), (b)(6), the K-9 handler.

3. When questioned about the leadership style of the infantry squads, he thought that SSG Bales' leadership was normal and SSG Bales actually reminded him of squad leaders he knew from the 82nd Airborne Division. He never heard anything racist or insensitive on the VSP. When asked about a reported altercation that occurred between SSG Bales and a local Afghan truck driver, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he had not heard about it. He recalls SSG Bales being in charge of security and controlling the infantry squads on patrol. He does not recall Bales attending any shuras with the locals.

4. (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he did not notice an appreciable change in morale at the VSP following the 5 March IED incident. When asked about security at the VSP, he said he

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USFOR-A
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) 7th SFG (A), regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

pulled guard on the OPCEN roof. During base defense actions his position was in the OPCEN where he could biometrically enroll persons of interest, if required. When asked about how someone could leave the VSP undetected, he said that such an action would be very difficult.

5. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(3), (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/13	1505	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 4 years.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A: Between 2 and 3 years.
Q: What was your previous background?
A: I went to college and graduated. I worked a 9 to 5 job for about a year and then joined the military after that.
Q: How long have served with this ODA?
A: Since January 2012.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: I would say there were probably about 15 TICs, we've rendered 7 IEDs safe and 2 additional IEDs were not rendered safe.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions while at the VSP?
A: I would say (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself were on every mission because we worked as a pair. We probably did roughly two patrols a week and sometimes it was as many as 4. But I would say we average about 2.
Q: Would SSG Bales go with you on these missions?
A: Occasionally.
Q: What was his role?
A: He was an element in patrols, so he was some type of security; he was just serving as a shooter in the patrol.
Q: What was your chain of command while you were at Belambai?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Belambai I would report to (b)(3), (b)(6), then the team sergeant and then (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who supervised you?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6); but then he got injured, so (b)(3), (b)(6) took his spot.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 13 APRIL 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your relationship to the uplift squad?
A: It was very professional and due to the small number of American troops at the site, I would say that everybody got to know each other a little bit better.
Q: Who lead the uplift squad?
A: SSG Bales.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your impressions about the VSP?
A: I thought that it was built up and developed more than I expected. It had more comforts for the soldiers than I had planned on. I thought it was larger and overall more developed than what I expected.
Q: What were your impressions of the uplift squad?
A: I thought they did their job very well. They were professional. They were definitely people you could rely on.
Q: What did the previous ODA pass on to you about the VSP?
A: We discussed some of their past operations; just to have them explain how they were operating over the past 8 months they were there. I believe we also did one RIP patrol to where both ODAs (b)(1)1.4a and the ANA all worked together to explain the operation as a whole.
Q: Anything about the 2-3 uplift squad and how to work with them?
A: No, sir.
Q: Were you told about the 2-3 leadership?
A: It was never directly told to me that SSG Bales was in charge but I just inferred from seeing him being the guy giving all the briefings and directions to the soldiers.
Q: While you were at the VSP, what was the command climate like?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 13 APRIL 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like your leadership taught you effectively how to handle stress?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: No, sir.
Q: We've received evidence that on VSP Belambai there were certain instances of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instances where someone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: No, sir.
Q: What about towards the Taliban or the enemy?
A: I think that would be a little different, in other words; if there was reason that people we talk to on patrols couldn't be trusted, had changed their story up or in things they had said weren't making sense to us, then I could say that people did show some disdain towards people that did that, but it was never due to the fact that they were just Afghan.
Q: Did the chain of command ever put out a policy or standards concerning proper treatment of Afghans?
A: Yes, sir. We were told to let the ANA handle as much of the physical interaction as they possibly could. And we normally had an interpreter with us.
Q: How did the ODA treat the Afghans?
A: They probably treated them the way I did. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4c, so they may have had to interact and talk with them through the interpreter more than I did. It seemed like they were treating them well.
Q: What do you know about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver on VSP Belambai?
A: I just heard the story relayed from somebody. The way I heard it was that the Afghan was unloading whatever items off the truck too fast and the first time the box or whatever he threw hit him in the chest or something. He didn't like that, so he said something like slow it down and the guy...I think it happened twice before he beat him up. I'm not sure what happened because I didn't witness it, but that's the way it was relayed to me.
Q: Do you remember who relayed it to you?
A: I don't remember but I think it was a member of the ODA.
Q: Did the chain of command talk about it?
A: I think it was brought up at the meeting.
Q: The end of the day meeting?
A: Yes. We had a daily meeting and I think somebody mentioned it then. It was kind of said like, "If there's a problem, bring it to someone else's attention before you do that."
Q: And was SSG Bales at that meeting?
A: I don't recall exactly if he was there, but he was always there at the nightly meetings so I don't see why he wouldn't have been at that one, unless there was something going on.
Q: We've heard that certain Afghans walked off the job because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about this?
A: I've never heard of that, sir.
Q: Did the command climate change after the 5 March IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: I don't think it would have been extremely challenging just because it was a smaller scale base and just the walls are very high. So if somebody gets into the vicinity of the gate, he could probably easily walk out.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Did he attend any shuras in the area?
A: Not that I remember. I haven't been in the actual building on any of the shuras, so he may have been a security person there.
Q: How often did you clean your weapon?
A: Once a month.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai?
A: I did PT nearly every day. Just to past time.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 13 APRIL 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you recall who brought it up or how the SSG Bales truck incident was brought up at the nightly meeting?
A: I don't remember exactly, but I'm pretty sure it was either the Captain or the Team Sergeant and I believe it was stated...Nobody really asked any questions because I think that everybody had got the point and overall it was considered an accident and kind of as somebody caught him at a bad time. We didn't think it was anything more than just somebody catching somebody on a bad day when they were annoyed.
Q: What the Chief be at those meetings as well?
A: Everybody from the ODA would be in the meeting, along with the enablers and the top four of the infantry platoon. I believe that's it.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

AFFIDAVIT

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(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/10	0929	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Since February of 1998
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?

(b)(6)

detachment is my job. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: Quite a bit. I would say before (b)(1)1.4a was with 3rd Group...I took a little bit with them. I would say initially it was once a week, if that, then it kind of slowed down. It stayed somewhat slow until January when the newer team came in (b)(1)1.4a and then of course it started picking up as the weather got nicer.
Q: What was your chain of command while you were at Belambai?
A: Our JAG zero one, I guess our immediate supervisor and he's up at the CJSOTF. That's who we go to with any issues. Then basically our chain of command falls within the ODA as far as the team sergeant and the team captain.
Q: Who supervised you on a daily basis?
A: I'm pretty much my own supervisor, sir.
Q: What was your relationship to the uplift squad?
A: I didn't really have much a relationship with them, sir. This was the first I've ever worked with a conventional force, I didn't even know they put conventional guys out on the VSOs. This was my first VSO mission.
Q: What was your relationship to the ODA?
A: On a daily basis.... I would find out if there were any helos coming in and just helped out with whatever little projects they were doing around the VSO.
Q: Did you have prior experience with Special Forces?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: When did you arrive at the site?
A: I can't remember the exact date but it was the middle of November. Before Thanksgiving.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 Apr. 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your initial impressions about the VSP?

(b)(6), (b)(5), (b)(3)

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Khandahar DATED 10 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel like your leadership taught you effectively how to handle stress?

(b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Where did you live on VSP Belambai?
A: I lived in the living CONEXs. I lived on the west side of the VSP. I was in the very last container.
Q: Did you think the living conditions were adequate?
A: Yes, sir. They were better than what I expected.
Q: In general, did you feel like the standards and discipline were maintained at VSP Belambai?
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: In general, did you ever see indications of drunkenness or drug usage on VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: Nothing that I saw that was directed to be offensive towards anybody. I never saw any of that. You get a bunch of guys together and they will joke around but nothing that was taking in the context to be offensive towards anybody. I was kind of a hobbit, at the end of the day I would just go in my room and kind of mind my own business.
Q: In general, has anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: I wouldn't say that, sir. No disdain or hatred towards them. I guess we all are bitter towards the Afghans at some point, because we're getting shot at on a daily basis. Never towards the workers, in fact, most of the guys respected the workers quite a bit. The workers that we had were very hard workers. We got along with the Afghans in the two villages (b)(1)1.4a(b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a(b)(1)1.4c was the same thing with both teams. As far as interaction with the locals, I never saw any inappropriate behavior from the teams. They were very professional. I never saw the infantry interact with the local people. The only people I saw interact were the team sergeant and the team commander with the terps. I thought we had a good relationship with the locals. The only disdain we would have is with the people that were shooting with us. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did the chain of command put out any policy or standards concerning proper treatment of Afghans?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did the ODA treat the Afghans?
A: With respect.
Q: Are you aware of an incident concerning SSG Bales having an altercation with an Afghan truck driver on VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you aware of any other inappropriate behavior that occurred while you were at VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir. It was pretty straight laced rapport there, sir. The infantry were terrified, because they were working with the ODA and they looked up to them.
Q: Did the command climate change after the 5 March IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: Fairly easily. It's not hard to leave the compound; the question is why would somebody leave the compound.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Our concern was people coming into the compound. We had guys on the roof top who covering the northern sector. Then we have the ANA covering the southern sector.
Q: Do you ever look back at the gate at night?
A: (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was it on your own volition?
A: I PT on my own and I PT usually every day. That's how I keep my sanity there, just working out. They have a pretty decent gym for that site.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: Every time we went out. Every time we shot. I usually clean mine once a week, just to get the dust off it.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard?
A: Basically the guy I RIP'd out with explained to me what the roof top procedures were. Just go up there with (b)(1)1.4a your weapon. Keep an eye out for any suspicious activity outside the wire.
Q: Are there any other matters that we haven't covered that you may believe it may be important to our investigation?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know of anyone else who can provide further information concerning these issues?
A: Everyone who was there.

\\END STATEMENT\\

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) *king Statement)*

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/13	1113	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the Army?
A: 5 years in May.
Q: Is this your first combat tour?
A: Yes.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities at Belambai?
(b)(6)
Q: How much enemy contact did you take at Belambai?
A: I believe it was 24 TICs.
Q: Did you go on patrols?
A: No. I just worked inside the wire.
Q: What was your job as part of base defense?
(b)(6)
Q: Who supervised you at Belambai?
(b)(3), (b)(6) got hurt.
Q: What was your relationship to the infantry uplift squad?
A: We were somewhat close—the lower enlisted guys. I didn't know the NCOs too well.
Q: Are you typically part of (b)(1)1.4a
A: No. I didn't know them at all before I got out there. I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) a lot but I didn't talk to the other guys too much.
Q: Before you were assigned to the Special Forces, where were you assigned?
A: To the 82nd Airborne.
Q: When did you get to Belambai?
A: Around 22 JAN—just after the Team arrived.
Q: What was your first impression about the VSP and the people there?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Overall how would you describe the command climate?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 13 Apr. 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Was the B-hut done when you got there?
A: Yes. At first I was in the Man Cans, but I got moved to the B-hut. (b)(3), (b)(6) complained that I had my own room, and he moved into my room.
Q: Were the living conditions adequate?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 13 Apr. 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Yes. They were better than I expected.
Q: Did you resent being moved?
A: No. It was kind of fun in the B-hut; we all got along.
Q: In general, do you think the standards and discipline were maintained?
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: Did you ever see any instances of drunkenness or drug use at Belambai?
A: No.
Q: Did you hear any racist or insensitive comments within the unit?
A: No. Jokingly-sometimes; but we all got along and knew where the limit was. Nobody took offense.
Q: What about the NCOs? Did you ever hear anything like that from them?
A: No.
Q: What about any hatred toward the Afghans?
A: No. Most of the guys treated the local workers like one of our own.
Q: Did the chain of command ever put out any policies, standards or rules about how to treat the Afghans?
A: Yes. They went over it quite often—treat the Afghans the way you want to be treated; especially after the green on blue incidents.
Q: How did the ODA treat them?
A: Good.
Q: Are you aware of an incident where SSG Bales had an altercation with an Afghan truck driver on Belambai?
A: I think I heard something about it, but I didn't see anything. I heard that he kind of went off on him; charged at him. I just heard it through rumors.
Q: Who did you hear from?
A: Just some of the guys in the B-hut.
Q: Did the climate change after the 05 MAR IED incident?
(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6),
Q: Before 11 MAR, were you aware of any high level command visits to Belambai?
A: Our command—the CSM and Commander came out once.
Q: Did you ever get off the VSP?
A: No.
Q: How could someone leave the VSP without being seen?
A: I guess you could climb one of the walls, but the roof guard should see you. We have the ANA at the front gate.
Q: Which way did you look when you were on roof guard?
A: The ANA faced south; we faced north and scanned west to east.
Q: So the roof guard might not see someone going out the gate?
A: Maybe not. We mostly looked north, but we did look back and check on the ANA.
Q: As far as you know did SSG Bales have any previous interactions with the local nationals in the area? How did he treat the workers and the ANA?
A: I never saw him treat the guys badly.
Q: How much PT did you do?
A: I went to the gym every other day with some buddies.
Q: How often did you clean your weapon?
A: At least once a week and whenever I fired it.
Q: Did you ever fire your weapon?
A: Yes. When I was on guard and we got into a firefight.
Q: Did you get any cross training on the other weapons?
A: Yes. The CROW system, the 240B, the M9 and the sniper rifle.
Q: How did you know what to do on guard shift?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) trained us on base defense and guard when we first got there.
Q: How did you conduct handover on guard?
A: The new guy would come up—(b)(1)1.4a—we would hand over the (b)(1)1.4a and tell them if we saw anything.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 13 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: When did the Commander and CSM come out?
A: In February for their initial visit.
Q: Do you know anything about local workers on the VSP getting fired?
A: None of them were fired as far as I know. I didn't know of any workers getting fired.
Q: Did you ever hear anyone call the local workers monkeys?
A: I did here that a few times.
Q: Who said it?
A: I don't really recall. I would hear it. I know someone said it when they put the wrong fuel in the Polaris ATVs.
Q: What did you think when someone used that term?
A: I don't think it's right. But I didn't pay it any mind.
Q: In general, what was the attitude toward Afghans?
A: I thought it was fine. I didn't really see anybody talking down to them or beating them up.
Q: How often would you hear someone use a term like "monkey" when talking about the Afghans?
A: Maybe once or twice a week. It was always us talking to one another. I never saw it directed at an Afghan.
Q: After the 11 MAR incident, was there any discussion about a potential health and welfare inspection or getting rid of contraband?
A: No.
Q: Were you with the rest of the infantry guys when they were addressed by (b)(3), (b)(6) in the chow hall after the incident?
A: Yes.
Q: Was there any discussion at all about CID coming?
A: I don't know if there was at that meeting. At certain points, they did talk about CID coming.
Q: Was there anything in relation to that discussion where they talked about getting rid of contraband or any things you shouldn't have?
A: No.
Q: Who were your closest friends in the uplift squad?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) and I roomed with (b)(3), (b)(6) got closer with them, especially during the time before we left.
Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) tell you anything about turning over the burn pit the morning after the event?
A: No. I know that they turned the burn pit and relocated it. But I didn't know anything before they did it.
Q: When you talk about relocating the burn pit, was that the day of the incident or prior to that?
A: I'm not sure what date it occurred.
Q: Is there anything that we didn't ask you about that you think might be important to the investigation?
A: There were rumors of SSG Bales drinking alcohol, but that was just rumors. I never saw anybody drinking alcohol.
Q: Did you ever see any bottles in the burn pit?
A: No.
Q: Do you know of anyone else who could provide additional information?
A: No.

\\END OF STATEMENT\\

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) AT KAF DATED 13 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

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AVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/15	1110	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6).
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: National Guard beginning in January 2000; entered active duty in 2003
Q: How long have you been in Special Forces?
A: Since 2005.
Q: What was your job before that?
A: (b)(6)
Q: How long have you served with ODA(b)(1)1.4a
A: I arrived at Belambai around 20 JAN 12.
Q: What were your duties and responsibilities?
A: I was the (b)(6) and offered my services as an 18B if needed.
Q:
A: (b)(6)
Q: How much enemy contact did you take up until 11 MAR?
A: Maybe 1 or 2 contacts every couple of weeks. After the incident, it picked up to nearly every day.
Q: What were the types and frequencies of your missions outside the wire?
A: I went on almost every foot patrol, except the shuras.
Q: Did SSG Bales go out with you on those patrols?
A: He went on most of them.
Q: Normally what was his role on the patrols?
A: I always thought he was squared away. Talking to other people, I know that some people didn't think he was that great. We talked a lot about sniper stuff. From my point of view, I thought the infantry NCOs were squared away.
Q: Were they the security element on the patrols?
A: Pretty much. When we took trucks, the infantry would drive or TC.
Q: What was your chain of command at Belambai?
A: I reported to (b)(3), (b)(6) the Team Sergeant. They usually let me do my own thing. I never trained with the ANA. (b)(6) doesn't really like the ANA.
Q: Did he get along with the Americans?
A: Yes.
Q: (b)(6)
A: Since November 2007.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 15 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: This is my fourth time in Afghanistan- (b)(6) I first came in 2007, then 2008, and then 2009.
Q: What was your relationship with the conventional infantry?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did anyone brief you on specific rules, standards or procedures for the VSP?
A: I don't recall anyone really briefing me on that. Some of the guys did tell me to go to the ANA tower if we got shot at.
Q: What was your role in base defense?
A: I would go to the ANA tower with (b)(3), (b)(6) Sometimes there was an infantry guy there with us.
Q: In general, what was the command climate like?

(b)(3),(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you think that the infantry leadership set a good example?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 15 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: We received some evidence that certain NCOs had or used alcohol on the VSP. Did you ever see or hear anything about drinking or drug use on the VSP?
A: No. There was nothing that I witnessed. If it was going on, I never got invited. I didn't really hang out with the Team guys. I do know that (b)(3), (b)(6) always played video games. The infantry guys had the MWR room in the B-hut. Most of the time if I wasn't in my room, I would watch movies with them in there.
Q: In general, did you hear any racist or insensitive comments by people?
A: Not really. I did sometimes joke around with (b)(3), (b)(6) We are (b)(6) and would joke about it.
Q: Did you ever hear or see any inappropriate behavior toward Afghans? Anything that showed a dislike or hatred for Afghans?
A: I didn't witness any of that. (b)(6)
Q: Do you know anything about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver?
A: I did hear about that a couple of days ago. But I didn't know anything about it out on the site.
Q: Did the chain of command ever put out policy or direction about how to treat the Afghans?
A: I don't recall anything getting put out. We didn't have any specific training before we left. We just knew not to do anything to piss them off.
Q: We also heard that one or two Afghan workers who were employed on the site walked off the base because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about that?
A: That is the first time that I heard anything about that. I just thought that they quit because it was getting dangerous. The guy that was doing our laundry and one of the maintenance guys said they were going on vacation, but the terp told us that they were leaving because it was too dangerous.
Q: Were you aware of any inappropriate behavior that occurred at the VSP?
A: No. I don't know of anything.
Q: How could someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: I really don't know. When that incident happened, we had two people on guard on the roof. I could see how it could have happened. If you left the billeting area, the guards may have thought that the person was going toward the computers.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any interaction or familiarity with local nationals? Did he attend any shuras?
A: Not that I am aware of.
Q: Did you do PT out there?
A: (b)(6) Otherwise, I'm not much one for weightlifting. I didn't do much PT. I played soccer.
Q: Did you clean your weapons regularly?
A: Those weapons would get dusty pretty quick. We would keep them cleaned, especially after TICs. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) handled the cleaning with the infantry.
Q: What was the routine for guard?
A: (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
Q: When you got there, did you feel like you were integrated into the Team?
A: It was a function of my personality that I didn't hang out with the Team that much.
Q: How did you see the ODA's relationship with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6)? Did they socialize?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 15 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I don't know if they hung out or not. Knowing those 18 series guys, they're always going to think that they are better than the infantry guys.
Q: Did that manifest itself in their relationship?
A: I really don't know.
Q: Did you have a pretty good rapport with the junior enlisted guys?
A: Yes.
Q: Was there anyone else on the ODA who had that kind of a rapport with them?
A: I know that the lower enlisted guys respected (b)(3), (b)(6) a lot. They thought he was a really good guy. Chief was a very approachable guy, and they would always talk to him.
Q: If the junior enlisted soldiers had a problem with their leadership, do you think that they would have been comfortable raising those issues to the ODA?
A: I don't know. If there were problems like that, they never told me about it.
Q: Did the ODA leadership ever go into the B-huts to check on how the guys were doing?
A: I think it was left to the infantry NCOs to police up their own guys.
Q: Did you get any sense that the Team leadership had an open door that for big issues soldiers could come to them?
A: I don't know.
Q: Do you remember any discussions about frustrations with the rules of engagement?
A: (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Who disapproved?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: If you were taking fire but couldn't see the guy, were you allowed to suppress?
A: Yes. Most of the TICs came from either the graveyard or a grape hut that was about 600m away. We would respond with mortars or suppressive fire.
Q: Was that a widespread frustration?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you ever hear (b)(3), (b)(6) discuss that?
A: I can't say that I have.
Q: Was there anyone in particular?
A: I know that SSG Bales said it. I have said it. It definitely pissed me off.
Q: How did your command deal with the ROE frustration?
A: I don't recall ever talking to the command about it. I might have heard a few other people saying that it was wrong.
Q: About SSG Bales you said "although most people didn't like him, I thought he was pretty squared away." What did you mean that "most people didn't like him?"
A: The guys that were under him would say that back in the rear on Mondays he would take them out on a six mile run; they didn't like that. Also the fact that, although he wasn't fat, he was an older guy and he was smoking these kids, they didn't like that. I think some people just thought he was kind of dumb. I didn't think so. Every time I saw the guy on the computer in the evening, I saw him checking the ticker tape, and I knew he was a smart dude. I guess some people just didn't like him.
Q: How did the chain of command address this?
A: I don't think they even knew.
Q: In general did you ever see the Team leadership address any leadership issues among the infantry NCOs?
A: No. I think it was more an issue of some people not meshing. I personally didn't see any real problems.
Q: It was a pretty diverse group out there. Did everyone get along?
A: I know that I did.
Q: Are there any other matters that you think may be important to the investigation?
A: Having read the news, there was something that bothered a lot of guys on Belambai. SSG Bales had said that he witnessed his friend being blown up the day before. First of all, it was almost a week before, and secondly he wasn't on that mission—either on the primary or on the QRF. That did not sit well with anyone.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT *Kandahar* DATED *15 Apr 2012*

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you know of anyone else who can provide information on these issues?
A: No.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE *5*. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTION (b)(3), (b)(6) GE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREEL OUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this *20* day of *April*, *2012* at *Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE *5* OF *5* PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/15	1659	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)(b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank and unit of assignment
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: About seven years; about a year and a half with Special Forces
Q: What is your previous background?
A: Transportation platoon leader
Q: How long have you been with this ODA?
A: Since October 2010.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities as the Team Leader?
(b)(6)
Q: When did you arrive at Belambai?
A: Mid-January; around the 17th.
Q: How much enemy contact did you have from then until 11 MAR?
A: Maybe 10 TICs.
Q: What were the type and frequencies of your missions outside the wire?
A: Between 3-5 missions per week, ranging from resupply to KLEs at Zangabad to attempts to engage the local populous.
Q: Would SSG Bales go with you on those missions?
A: Yes.
Q: What was his role?
A: As the senior NCO for the SOF uplift, his job was to provide guidance to those infantrymen.
Q: What mission did they perform when they were on those patrols?
A: They would perform the same mission as the ODA. They were often in the vehicles, given their Stryker backgrounds.
Q: So they were like a security element?
A: Yes.
Q: Did they speak face to face with the Afghans?
A: Not typically.
Q: Before your arrival at Belambai, what was your understanding of the role of the uplift squads?
A: My understanding stems from my prior deployment as well. They were fully incorporated into all missions and base defense.
Q: What was your plan for integrating them?
A: Based off that guidance, we would provide the uplift leadership with the number of people that we would want for a given mission, and they would determine which of their troops would join for that mission.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF, AFG DATED ~~30~~ 15 APR 2012 (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your initial impressions of the VSP itself?

(b)(3),(b)(5),(b)(6)

Q: How would you describe your leadership style and that of your Team Sergeant?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF, AFG DATED ~~30~~ APR 15 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: We have received evidence that certain NCOs were drinking or had alcohol at the VSP. Did you ever hear any rumors or see anything involving drinking or drug use?
A: No.
Q: Did you ever hear any racist or insensitive comments at Belambai?
A: The short answer is yes. Some people make jokes about certain things. But based off of people's reactions, it wasn't a problem.
Q: You're talking about Team members and friends who would know each others' red lines and what would make someone uncomfortable?
A: Yes.
Q: Anything that would cross that line?
A: No.
Q: We have also heard of instances of inappropriate behavior at Belambai toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instances of behavior that showed an inappropriate attitude, dislike or hatred toward Afghans?
A: No. People have their normal frustrations working with the partner forces. But nothing that I saw that would cross a line.
Q: How did you guys treat the Afghans in general?
A: We had several different groups of ANA. It was hard to build a relationship. We would first have an introduction and exchange expectations. Overall the relationship was good enough to do our mission.
Q: How did you try to build a bond or a sense of trust with the ANA?
A: Dinners and lunches; basic training in marksmanship and route clearance.
Q: Did the local workers live and eat with you?
A: They ate with us in the chow hall and lived in the can next to me.
Q: Do you know anything about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver during one of the resupply runs?
A: No.
Q: Did anyone ever come to you to express any concern about any type of conduct?
A: No.
Q: Did anyone come to talk to you about any kind of climate issues?
A: SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) brought us an issue about their chain of command asking for SITREPs, but it was not a major issue.
Q: Was there a frustration among your unit about the ROE?
A: Occasionally yes, especially given how kinetic that area was. The insurgents have a clear understanding of our ROE, and that created some frustration as well. Even though there was a frustration, everyone had a clear understanding that we abide by the ROE.
Q: How did you deal with that frustration among your soldiers?
A: We tried to adapt our techniques and we stuck to the ROE.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF, AFG DATED ~~20~~ 19 APR 2012 (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did the climate change much after the 05 MAR IED incident and prior to the 11 MAR incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How could someone have left the compound without being seen?

A: We didn't put Afghans on the gate at night. That was a risk that I assumed based off of the enemy TTPs. We had never seen anything at night, and (b)(1)1.4c I put ANA in the tower instead, where they still had visibility of the gate (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: So somebody could have left through the gate at night by sneaking past the ANA?

A: Yes. They are focused outward primarily.

Q: Did SSG Bales have any familiarity with locals in the area? Did he ever attend a shura?

A: Not that I am aware of. Whatever interaction he had would have been during patrols.

Q: We have heard reports about SSG Bales assaulting an Afghan truck driver. If something like that were to have happened would you expect Team members to bring that to the attention of the Team leadership?

A: I would expect that. I would expect that anybody who saw that would let someone know.

Q: Did you feel like there was a good relationship with the (b)(6) at Zangabad? Was there any tension about them not supporting you guys?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF, AFG DATED 15 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Is there any other information that you think would be helpful or any other people that we should talk to about this investigation?
A: There were a few people on leave—(b)(3), (b)(6) is someone you might add to the list.

\\END OF STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of APRIL, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

TITLE 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/15	1526	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: (b)(6)
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6), sir.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 23 and a half years, sir.
Q: How long have been in Special Forces?

(b)(6)

Q: How long have served with this ODA?

(b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?

(b)(3)(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c

Q: When did you arrive to VSP Belambai?
A: Sometime in January probably around the 20th.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: It was actually kind of sporadic, sir. To be honest with you, it seemed like more when we would push out. It's like they were trying to contain us at that time. Whatever we received in the base, it was pretty sporadic and ineffective.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions while at the VSP?
A: On patrols, we seemed to be averaging every few days. But when we were really pushing out it would be once or maybe twice a week we would push out. Normally it was in conjunction with somebody else's operation, the team would do an overnight stay. And I would usually end up running base security and (b)(3)(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c sir.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDHAR DATED 2012/04/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Would SSG Bales go with you on these missions?
A: Occasionally.
Q: What was his role?
A: Seeing that he was the senior squad leader we kind of used him as a pivot point, where we would expect him to help control his individuals that happened to be on the ground with us. Now, if he had happened to be in a vehicle at that time, then normally one of the SF guys that were near the kid would secure them and make sure they were good and used them to maneuver with, sir.
Q: Before your arrival at VSP Belambai, what was your understanding of the role of the 2-3 uplift squads would perform at the VSP?
A: I was led to believe that as the uplift squads were being used, they would integrate into the detachment to assist with security and of course we used them in a larger expanded role, teaching VSO; the methodology and how it worked.
Q: What was your plan for integrating the 2-3 members with your ODA members?
A: We expected to just fall into place. This detachment had has...almost like a thought process for a lot of years, where wherever you walk in, everybody's made to be family. It's been that way ever since I got to the detachment, and it still continues to this day.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your impressions about the VSP?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What type of training did the ODA provide the 2-3 personnel?
A: I know that our medic was working very heavily with two 68 Whiskeys and that training actually paid off that day we had the incident when that Afghan patrol went to Naji Bien after the incidents. They went hands in there and worked right alongside our surgeon. Due to the increase Force Protection measures that were taken out there, we were taking some of the machine guns down and giving the machine gunner a pistol. So we were working with pistol marksmanship. What we saw coming into the future was we knew that fighting season would be coming up, so we were going to start working a little bit of CQB with those guys. So they would understand our methodology and that they won't hurt us and we won't hurt them if we ever had to go in a compound together.
Q: Did you guys talk to them about how to work with the ANA and local nationals?
A: Honestly, I didn't sir. Like I said, on a normal day to day I didn't have much contact with the infantry, sir. It's just because I was

(b)(3)(b)(6)(b)1.4c

Q: Was there some mentoring or guidance provided to the 2-3 personnel?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What role did the 2-3 uplift leadership play in the overall leadership of the VSP?
A: To be honest with you when we did our nightly synch meetings before the incident, they were the only ones that came to the meeting. And it was their responsibility to brief their troops.
Q: How did you perceive the command relationships for the 2-3 uplift personnel? Who were they TACON, ADCON and OPCON to?
A: I believed they were ADCON to us, sir, because if I'm not mistaken, SOTF-S actually owns them. We assisted the 2-3 infantry command with administrative actions. If we were with the guys and they got into contact, we made sure the paperwork for CIBs or CABs was done correctly and pushed forward. It's a team mentality; they're going to make them family.
Q: Did you have any dealings with the 2-3 Infantry's chain of command?
A: No, sir.
Q: While you were at the VSP, what was the command climate like?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT
(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDHAR DATED 2012/04/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Prior to the March 11 incident, how would you describe the morale of the unit as a whole? How was your morale?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: We've received evidence that certain NCOs were drinking/had alcohol at the VSP. In general, did you ever see or hear about indications of drunkenness or drug use on VSP Belambai?
A: I have not, sir. And if I had I would've strung that individual up.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 2012/04/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: No, sir.
Q: We've received evidence that on VSP Belambai there were certain instances of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instances where someone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did the ODA treat the Afghans?
A: We call it "Grip and Grin", sir. If you don't win them over...we've lost. And that's the way most of us feel. If you can't win that human populous, that human terrain, the VSO doesn't work, sir. So that's your key, you've got to work extra hard if you're having issues.
Q: Are you aware of SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver on VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.
Q: Are you aware of any other inappropriate conduct that has been brought to the chain of commands attention?
A: No, sir.
Q: Were there ever any issues brought to the commands attention concerning the climate of the unit?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A: I don't know, sir. That baffles me to this day.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Did he attend any shuras in the area?
A: No, sir.
Q: If something like the SSG Bales beating up the truck driver incident did occur and if members of the infantry were there to witness it, what would you expect them to do?
A: I would hope they would yank him to the side, calm him down and then let us know, so we know what we have. Because to me that's indicators of somebody that's on a powder keg. And I don't know how we would have handled it because I literally didn't know about it, sir. That's one of those surprise slaps in the face right there.
Q: If ODA members were there to witness it, what would you expect them to do?
A: I would expect them to let the big three know.
Q: Was there any tension between the local support of (b)(6)?
A: Negative, sir. That's was one of our main stays of getting over there during our RIP. I had a relationship with their S(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) we both had an understanding of if something came in hot I wouldn't email him, and I would call him. I can tell you for a fact that the Captain has called (b)(3), (b)(6), I believe was the XO, on multiple occasions to discuss what operations the (b)(6) had going on in the area and how we could support them. I never saw any issue on our side of the house, sir.
Q: Did you perceive any lack of support from their side?
A: Negative, sir. Anytime I needed PGSS support, normally it was just a phone call. As long as they weren't using it for a high priority target, I usually got it.
Q: While you're out on patrol with the ANA in front of you and if somebody had exhibited the attitude to say "If you're in a fire fight to go ahead and shoot through the ANA because they are not human." If something like that was expressed to you, how would the leadership address something like that?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 120204/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I think to be honest with you sir, we would have to pull that individual aside and figure out what his thought process is. The ANA is a partner, without them we lose. Like I said before, with the VSO being a human terrain, if I don't empower my ANA now, what's going to happen when I pull out? They need to be recognized, basically.
Q: Have you heard anything about members calling local nationals "Monkeys" and mocking the ANA while they are praying?
A: Not that I've heard, sir. To be honest with you sir, when I left I got extremely large hugs from my workers.
Q: Have you observed (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership style? If so, how would you describe his leadership style?
A: It reminds me of a ranger squad leader. It could be abrasive at times, but normally it's the way he does business. You just kind of get used to it over time, sir.
Q: Has he ever expressed to you his concerns about the ROE or the effect of the ROE?
A: Not to me, sir. No.
Q: Are there any other matters that we haven't covered that you may believe may be important to our investigation?
A: I don't believe so, sir. I think we've hit A to Z, sir.
Q: Do you know of anyone else who can provide further information concerning these issues?
A: No, sir.

\\END OF STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of APRIL, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

TITLE 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	(b)(6) 2012/04/15	1332	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank, unit, and duty assignment
A: (b)(3)(b)(6)(b)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 20 years.
Q: How long have you been in Special Forces?
A: 11 years.
Q: What was your MOS before that?
A: 11B-Infantry
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: Six. All in Afghanistan.
Q: How long have you served with ODA (b)(1)1.4a
A: Just a little over 2 years.
Q: Can you describe your duties and responsibilities?
A: I take care of day to day operations for the Team. I am responsible for mentoring the men underneath me.
Q: When did you arrive at Belambai?
A: Around 17 JAN.
Q: From that time until you were evacuated on 05 MAR, how much enemy contact did you take?
A: Contact was sporadic. We probably came in contact five or six times.
Q: What were the type and frequency of missions outside the wire?
A: We would go out to gain atmospherics and introduce ourselves to the local populous. I would say that we went outside the wire 2-3 times per week.
Q: Did SSG Bales go outside the wire with you?
A: Yes.
Q: What was his role on those missions?
A: I used him as a go-between, between me and the infantry. If we came under contact, everyone would fall under me.
Q: What was the function of the infantry when you went out on your missions?
A: They were incorporated into the ODA. I treated them like additional troops in the ODA.
Q: How about when you met with village leaders?
A: They would be outer security. The CPT and Warrant would go in to engage the leaders. I would stay outside with them to ensure security.
Q: What did you understand SSG Bales' duty position to be at Belambai?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 2012/09/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: When we first got there, he was First Squad, Squad Leader. He was pretty senior, so he became the overall rep for the 2/3 guys, like a platoon sergeant. After that, (b)(3), (b)(6) were the squad leaders.
Q: Before your arrival at Belambai, what was your understanding of the role of the uplift infantry?
A: For me, they were like additional soldiers in the ODA. They allowed us to do longer and more frequent patrols. They also helped with base defense.
Q: What was your plan for integrating the uplift infantry into the Team?
A: Everyone is treated as an equal. We briefed them on SOPs and gave them some training. Then they were integrated into the ODA on all patrols.
Q: When you arrived at Belambai, what were your initial impressions of the VSP?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you do any specific training about the VSO mission?
A: We reviewed some of the training that they had received. They understood what VSO was.
Q: Did you review anything specific about working with the ANA?
A: When we first arrived, 3rd Group had SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) working with the ANCOP up at the Old School Site. We didn't have much to do with the ANCOP after that. The ANCOP didn't want to leave their base, and they eventually displaced to another location. We worked primarily with the ANA after that. I didn't feel comfortable having the infantry work with the ANA, so I put my guys in charge of that. The infantry had a role, but not the lead role.
Q: Did you go over anything specifically about how to work with local nationals?
A: I think we had about five local workers on base. The infantry didn't handle those guys, my 18C and my senior 18B was responsible for that. It was a small base, however, so they would have seen them on a day to day basis.
Q: How did you have your ODA provide mentoring to the infantry soldiers, particularly the young guys?
A: They talked about standard military courtesies. SSG Bales' direct contact point with the ODA was (b)(3), (b)(6) followed up by me. If they had questions they would go to him or come to me. I had no problem with that. If there was an issue with one of the soldiers, on the spot corrections applied. If necessary, I would bring it up with their chain of command.
Q: What role did the infantry NCOs provide in the leadership of the VSP?
A: They provided a chain of command for their soldiers. None of the ODA answered to them. For the VSP overall, it was our chain of command.
Q: How did you perceive the command relationship between the ODA and the uplift squad?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What responsibilities did their organic command have?
A: It is a very strange command relationship for those guys. Their organic command really had no role, from the platoon sergeant on up. SSG Bales talked to his platoon sergeant on the phone. The 1SG and company commander came out once. There did not seem to be any issues. We agreed that we would send up SITREPs so they knew what was going on. If they needed anything that I thought was going to disrupt activities, I told them to run it through me.
Q: But they still had responsibility for the paperwork?
A: Yes. They handled the NCOERs.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 2012/04/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: In general, how would you describe the command climate at Belambai?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

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INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 2012/07/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: We have received evidence that certain NCOs had alcohol or were drinking at the VSP. Did you hear or were you aware of any indications of drinking, drunkenness or drug abuse on the VSP?
A: I did not. I wouldn't have allowed it if I had known about it.
Q: Are you aware of any racist or insensitive comments?
A: Yes. We've been together for a while. We make some jokes among team members. Nothing intentional or harmful. Nothing that was insensitive.
Q: Were there any instances of inappropriate statements or behavior toward Afghans? Anything that demonstrated a disdain or hatred toward Afghans?
A: Not real hatred. A guy may come back after dealing with the ANA and say "I hate these guys." He's just frustrated when he says that. The ODA treats them well, but they sometimes are a little frustrated. But no disdain or hatred. It is not something that we can afford with the job that we have.
Q: Did you guys talk to the infantry about how to treat Afghans?
A: No. It wasn't brought up. But I didn't see any problems. The younger kids didn't really have anything to do with the workers or the populous. I don't know if they had been briefed specifically, but their actions showed that they had a great understanding of it.
Q: Did you know anything about or had you heard anything about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver?
A: No. I was unaware of that.
Q: Were there ever any concerns brought to you about the climate at the unit?
A: No.
Q: Was there frustration among members of the unit with the ROE?
A: I did sit down with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) and talk to them about the ROE. It is tough. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Is the ROE different than during your last tour?
A: Yes. It changes. Each rotation it changes. It is for the best. I understand it and the ODA understands it, but it can be frustrating.
Q: How did they deal with that frustration?
A: I'd let them bitch to me. But in the end, we know that is how it is.
Q: Did you get any feel that the climate changed after the 05 MAR IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Not talking specifically about SSG Bales, how could someone get out of the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Are you aware of any contact that SSG Bales had with the local population?
A: No. He was always on the outside of any shuras that we had. He never had a direct role in talking to the local populous.
Q: What type of PT or weapons cleaning standards did you establish out there?
A: When I arrived, they were already doing PT and they would clean their weapons after patrols. I didn't think that anything more needed to be said.
Q: What were the standards for the guard shift?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did you spot check the guard?
A: I did not. The NCOs were pulling the shifts and I did not feel that I needed to check.
Q: How would you view the relationship with the battlespace owner (b)(6) out of Zangabad?
A: I think that (b)(6) liked the ODA being there. It took some of the pressure off of them. We would tell them about our missions. They would tell us if they would be working around us. They have an understanding of VSO, but the battlespace owner has a different mission. Sometimes what the battlespace owner does makes our mission more difficult. They were trying to improve the roads but they would sometimes knock down buildings or grape rows. For the Afghans, they lump us all together. We had a decent working relationship with their command.

INITIALS OF PERSON (b)(3), (b)(6) STATEMENT PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 2012/09/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you feel that you got supported well enough by them?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Based on the leadership dynamics at Belambai, would you expect that something like SSG Bales' scuffle with the Afghan driver would be brought to your attention or handled at a lower level?
A: I would expect that something like that would come to me. The only exposure that SSG Bales would have to a truck driver would be during our Monday Class I deliveries. I wasn't always out there, but most of the ODA would be out there, helping to download the truck as quickly as possible so that there wasn't time to set in an IED. I feel pretty confident that something like that would come to my attention. But it would have also been dealt with before it got to me.
Q: If something like the SSG Bales-truck driver incident happened, what would be your expectation for how something like that would be handled?
A: I would expect the senior NCO from my team on ground would address it immediately. He would say that this is not how we do business with local nationals. At no time would something like that be tolerated by someone from my ODA or by someone that we work with. And then I would expect it to be addressed at the 1700 meeting. With the NCOs on my team, I would expect that it would be brought up and addressed to everyone.
Q: It is your expectation that if something like that happened, it would be brought up in the 1700 meeting?
A: I feel confident that it would be brought up to me immediately.
Q: What kind of command visits did you receive? Did you feel like the command was in touch with your needs?
A: Yes I do. Early on, (b)(3), (b)(6) came out to visit. The (b)(1)1.4a had been out once before that. I also saw the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a every Monday. The things that we needed, we got in a relatively short amount of time. I don't feel as though we were missing anything logistically.
Q: Can you talk more about your relationship with the E-7s on the ODA?
A: We operated closely, but I keep a gap between myself and the rest of the ODA. It is not a physical gap, (b)(6) (b)(6) I am expected to provide discipline. I am on a first name basis, but I don't hang out with the guys when work is done all the time. We sometimes go to dinner, go to each others' houses. Sometimes we will go and have a few drinks when we are back in the States. We are a close ODA, but they are not my best friends.
Q: You mentioned your open door policy. Did any of the junior enlisted ever take you up on that?
A: No. I didn't counsel any of the infantry NCOs or junior enlisted, but I didn't see a need to either. If I saw something that was wrong, I would bring it up directly with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) and later with (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Was there any red-line for behavior that you told the ODA or infantry NCOs needed to come to your attention?
A: No.
Q: When you were a PFC, would you have ever gone to your E-8 to ask for something?
A: No. As a PFC in the Army you wouldn't typically feel comfortable approaching the 1SG. I felt as though I made myself approachable; I sometimes visited with the men in their barracks to see what they were doing and talk to the guys. As you say, especially after only two months, they may not have felt comfortable coming to talk to me about something.
Q: Did the ODA give any thought to how to address any issues that might arise between the infantry soldiers and their NCOs?
A: At that point, I would take more of a 1SG role in directing guidance to the platoon sergeant or squad leaders. If there were problems, I would hope that they would be addressed at the lowest level possible. But if I have to get involved, I would probably take advice from their organic platoon sergeant and 1SG. I would not allow that problem to hinder our operations. I would make sure that someone was removed immediately if I thought it was something to that effect.
Q: Is there any other information that you can think of or people that we should talk to that would be helpful in this investigation?
A: No.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END OF STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 2012/04/15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY U EMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORREC PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FR THOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

nt)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIA N MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/14	1431	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)(b) (b)(1)1.4a

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and duty position
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (18B), (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 11 years on April 12
Q: How long have you been in Special Forces?
A: Since November 2008
Q: What was your previous MOS?
A: 11B-Infantry
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: This is my fourth one. 13 months in Iraq (JAN 04-FEB 05); 7 months in Zabul, Afghanistan (JUL 09 – FEB 10); 10 months in Uruzgan (JUL 10 – APR 11); we arrived in theater for this tour in JAN 12.
Q: One tour as an 11B and two prior tours with the ODA?
A: Yes.
Q: How long have you served with ODA (b)(1)1.4a
A: Since April 2009.
Q: So your previous two tours were with the same team?
A: Yes.
Q: Please describe your duties and responsibilities.

(b)(6)

Q: When did you arrive at Belambai?
A: I arrived there a little later than the team; I arrived in late January / early February; 3rd Group had RIPd out by the time I arrived.
Q: From the time you got there how much enemy contact did you take at Belambai?
A: For the whole time that we were there, we were in 38 or 39 TICs.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions at Belambai?
A: Convoys to Zangabad; dismounted patrols into Naji Bien, Alikozai and Western Belambai. We mostly interacted with the local populous. Nine times out of ten, that turned south and we were in an engagement with the enemy.
Q: Did SSG Bales go with you on those missions?
A: I would have to look at the task organization, but I know that he went with us on the majority of them.
Q: What was his role on those missions outside the wire?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 8 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: His role in general was to be the platoon sergeant of the infantry platoon (minus) that was there. That included command and control of his element and ensuring that the RG vehicles were manned.
Q: What was your chain of command at Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who took over for (b)(3), (b)(6) when he got hurt?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself. We both assisted the CPT with any kind of tactical or administrative duties. (b)(3), (b)(6) took over the administrative role. I took over the tactical role.
Q: What was your relationship with the conventional infantry squads?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: How did the uplift infantry fit in to this command climate?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 8 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: You also had your EOD, JTAC and other SOF enablers.
A: Right.
Q: Had you trained with those guys before?
A: No, but I've never been on a deployment with an unprofessional Naval EOD guy. Those guys are the best at what they do. JTACs as well. Last year was a bad year for JTACs. One passed on one of our operations. Several others were hurt. Those guys are very professional and skilled. We don't always do work-ups with those guys; it doesn't always line up. But those guys have gone through a lot of the specialty training that is necessary.
Q: How did the ODA leadership treat the infantry squad leadership?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT kandahar DATED 14APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I never saw a blatant act of disrespect. Obviously he had some kind of control on his guys.
Q: You didn't see him in the gym a whole lot?
A: Occasionally, but not much.
Q: What was your stress level like out there?
A: I'm an operator. I deal with it. Are you asking if I have PTSD?
Q: Do you?
A: I personally think that PTSD is kind of a cop out. It's just an excuse in my mind. Yes, I've had friends die in my arms. I've put friends on helicopters. I've been shot at more times than I can think of. I've put tourniquets on guys that don't have legs. Yes I have bad dreams. I have nightmares. I have a stressed-out family life because I am always gone. (b)(6) daughter I don't even know. I'm surprised that she even knows my name or knows that I'm her father. But it's an all-volunteer Army. I just re-enlisted INDEF. I could get out any time that I want. I continue to do this because of the love of what I do and the love of the guys that I serve with. Yes it's stressful out there. It sucks getting shot at. It's 2012. The war is not what it was in 2004. It's not even what it was in 2009. We're constrained quite a bit more. Our hands are tied behind our backs. The officer that (b)(3), (b)(6) replaced last year—we got ambushed and he got both of his legs blown off. We had no clear authority for any kind of drop approval until he got his legs blown off and was almost dead. Then CJSOTF gave the approval to go ahead and bomb that village. I've seen it escalate from us being able to go in and do what we needed to do, to the point where we had to be calling in American KIAs to go and engage the enemy. There's a level of stress that goes with that, but you just work through it.
Q: Do you think that the ROE has added more stress? Is that the biggest factor contributing to the stress? How do you look at it?
A: It is a big factor. I don't know that it is the hugest factor. Being away from loved ones and seeing people killed would have to be my number one cause of stress. It is difficult, when you are looking at a buddy who could be dead or blown up and you could prevent that or take corrective measures if you had certain authorities that we used to have. I'm not even on the radio, but I can imagine that it is even more frustrating for a young O-3 talking to an O-5 or an O-6 back here. He is witnessing atrocities happening to his ODA, and there is nothing that he can do about it. I can only imagine what that responsibility is like. I'm witnessing it behind a weapons system, but the CPT is there on the radio getting told to stand by. I would imagine it is probably his number one concern. It's definitely different than what my ROE was in OIF 1 and 2. We just drive on with our mission. If we don't like it, we can get out.
Q: What did you observe about stress levels of those around you, particularly guys on their first tour?
A: I can only imagine. By the time I had deployed to Iraq, I had been in the Army two and a half years. I talked to friends and family about it; they think we're all crazy. I'm almost used to getting shot at now. I don't flinch. Death is so far in the back of my mind anymore, as far as myself. I'm somebody who has been living in the dirt for a long time. For any of these kids, I can imagine that it is a huge culture shock—the first time you get shot at, the first time you see your buddy get shot at or blown up, the first time you see a guy without a leg. It was definitely a big shock for them. It seemed like most of them held together pretty well. I didn't witness any soldiers crying or soldiers going off by themselves. I didn't see any signs of potential suicides. There have been a lot of suicides even in the Panjwa'i District. These are real factors that you have to look at. I never saw any of these kinds of signs. You think about why you were so close to the explosion and didn't catch flak or why you were in the vehicle and didn't get blown up. You have a lot of those things that go through your head. Fortunately none of these guys had to see any KIAs. The mood did get a little darker aft(b)(3), (b)(6)t blown up. He was a really good guy. When a guy like that gets blown up, it's a big hit. And he is awesome at his job. When he was up front you had a lot of confidence. I don't know how a lot of the kids took it. Some of them wanted to know why we weren't going outside the wire after that. We didn't have an 18D at that point. CJSOTF regulations are that you can't go outside the wire without an 18D. (b)(3), (b)(6) was back in the rear getting TBI treatment; he had gotten blown up in the truck. We were down to one Naval EOD guy. Those guys couldn't operate on their own. (b)(6) I can see all of the factors about why we couldn't go back outside the wire, but as an E-1, E-2, you're wondering why your buddy just got blown up and you can't go back outside the wire to kill bad guys. Shortly after that, the whole incident happened and we were on lockdown anyway.
Q: Did you hear any racist or incentive comments in the unit?
A: No. Not any racist comments like you would think about in society back in America.
Q: We've been told of some inappropriate behavior toward Afghans on Belambai. Are you aware of any incidents where someone demonstrated inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans in general?
A: An everyday hatred-no. I never saw any incidents of mistreatment of a local or a worker or anything like that. If you're talking about hearing or saying something like "screw these people, why are we even here; I hate these people," yes. I've been saying it since the beginning of the war. It usually follows one of my best friends getting shot in the face or me getting shot at or blown up. In the same ways that the Americans called the Vietnamese "Charlie" or "Gook."

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 8 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Maybe it is desensitizing yourself. Am I guilty of that? Yes. Have I ever acted upon it? No. In a fit of rage or anger, I would imagine 99% of the US Army has said something in that regard about an Afghani or Iraqi.
Q: But you don't see that as a generalized hatred of the people?
A: Absolutely not. I hate the people that are trying to kill me and my friends, but I'm the first person to give candy to a little kid or give someone a few dollars for a camel ride. There's a difference between your enemy and the people down the road who are just caught in a war-torn country, through no fault of their own. Obviously there are those people who work both sides. I can't say that I wouldn't do the same if I was an Afghani. The guy with the AK pointed at you is a lot different than the guy at the store that you buy a few things from. Like the workers—we have really good workers on base; we tried to treat them the best that we could. We worked with the ANA, ALP, and ANP. I have always taken great pride in working with my counterparts. It is a unique opportunity for the SF guys. I've shed just as many tears over dead ANA brethren as I have over dead American brethren. It's just as big a deal when (b)(3), (b)(6) gets shot in the face as when one of those guys gets killed. I've never seen any kind of hatred toward the poor people stuck in this country. You try to help them; you try to get information; you try to make their area a better place. Eventually you figure out who the shady guys are. We figure out who is Taliban.
Q: In your train-up, do you talk at the Team or AOB level about the proper treatment of Afghans?
A: We go through all of our blanket briefings. My ODA did a Commando work-up. We were originally supposed to have that mission. The rest of the company did a big VSO work-up out at Ft. Bliss. They had Afghan role players come in. They lived in mud huts. My ODA worked with a National Guard unit who replicated the Commandos. We did mostly DA hits. We did a three-day train-up on marksmanship, CQB, site exploitation and CQC. Then we were given a mission to infill and hit an objective. All the leadership on my ODA is very familiar with VSO. Minus a few of the new guys, everyone knew the mission. I actually wrote a paper (b)(6) We wanted the Commando mission, but we were well suited to do the VSO mission.
Q: What do you know about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan driver who was delivering Class I to the VSP?
A: I don't know if it happened or not. I wasn't there. If it did happen, it could have happened when I was gone. I was back at Camp Brown for a couple of weeks to draw money. When they picked up me and (b)(3), (b)(6) to come back to the site is when the truck got blown up. I personally never saw SSG Bales or anybody physically beat any kind of worker or truck driver.
Q: We've also heard that one or two Afghans walked off the job site because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about that?
A: We had two workers quit, but it was right after the shooting incident.
Q: What about before the shooting?
A: I never witnessed it. The people that walked off after the shooting were the guys who built the stairs for us. They said they were going to come back, but I knew that they weren't.
Q: This was after the 11 March incident?
A: Correct. They finished on the 13th or 14th. I paid them their salary, and they left.
Q: Those guys are different than your laundry guys?
A: Yes. The laundry guys were passed down from 3rd Group. We hired the masons for this one project but intended to keep them on. They had been there for about a month. After the incident, we had 400 or 500 people protesting at the gate. We were under regular attack. One ANA guy got killed. Three were wounded. Whether they knew what happened or didn't feel safe, they left. I am not aware of any mistreatment of them, however.
Q: How could someone have left the base without being seen?
A: I could leave this entire airbase right now without being seen. These bases are designed to keep people out not in. It is possible to just walk off a base. If you would have told me that somebody would walk out of the base, I would have thought that you were crazy. It's not something that I had ever heard of our dreamt of. I've never imagined it.

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

Q: Is there anyplace else on the perimeter where Bales could climb out?
A: You could, but it would be difficult. You'd have to deal with the wire. Somebody trying to do that would be foolish. If I was on guard and saw someone climbing over the wall, they would get shot.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any relationship with the local nationals. Was he involved in any of the shuras?
A: Shuras-no. His level of knowing the people outside the wire isn't any higher than mine—probably less. When you go out to the compounds, there could be twenty people there, but some of them may not even live in the village.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 8 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT kandahar DATED 14APR2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

There's no way of knowing who is going to be there. Many of them are gypsies. He didn't speak the language, so I can't imagine him talking to some random Afghani. He had no real reason to have interactions with locals while out on patrol. Most of the time he was in the vehicles. He would have never been doing any ASO or questioning on any of the local civilians.
Q: How much PT did you do?
A: As an ODA guy PT is on your own. We don't even really do organized PT back at home. It's part of the job. From the infantry perspective, where organized PT is the norm, there is no good way to do organized PT out on the site. There's no place to go run. You could do some sprints. The kids were pretty fit; they were always in the gym.
Q: What kind of weapons cleaning routine did you do?
A: Once a week on Sundays we'd try to implement it. We'd drop some of the weapons off of the perimeter and clean them. There was a fair amount of upkeep on weapons.
Q: And everyone did this?
A: The kids seemed to stick to the truck guns. They are mech kids, so they're pretty familiar with the crows' nest. (b)(3), (b)(6) liked to clean the mini-guns. I took the sniper guns.
Q: Was it standard for you to participate in guard duty? Did you talk the younger guys through how to do it?
A: There was a base defense plan created by (b)(3), (b)(6) I wasn't there at the beginning. I imagine that it was properly briefed to everyone. Anytime we had a new contractor or a new person, I would brief them on base defense.
Q: Did you hear anything about the Bales' incident with the truck driver?
A: I had heard through the rumor mill that this guy had kind of screamed at a worker. I don't know if there was a physical altercation.
Q: Was it in a meeting?
A: No. I think it was just in the chow line.
Q: Do you remember who told you about it?
A: No. It would have just been some random camp talk, but I can't put a face to it or a name.
Q: Was the frustration with the ROE something that the NCOs discussed?
A: Yes. It is something I wouldn't discuss with an E-3 or an E-4, but there is a fair amount of discussion among the ODA and SOF uplift. At the end, it's easy to blame the ROE and a command that you think is out of touch with what is happening on the ground. It is for me anyway. Here on the ground, it feels like nobody cares until an American is dead or severely hurt. That's all great for the O-6 or O-7 on the floor of the JOC somewhere, but that's my best friend. I'm the one holding his hand; I'm the one putting him on the stretcher; I'm the one putting the tourniquet on; I'm the one that he's crying to telling me to tell his wife that he loves her.
Q: Were there some particular contacts out at the VSP that really stoked this conversation?
A: The incident with (b)(6)(b)(3) was the one that stands out on this trip. There was one before that that sticks out. We had gotten into a firefight; we were ambushed by 1-2 PKM gunners in Naji Bien. We had come back into the gate and gotten a phone call from Zangabad COP. (b)(1)1.4a Nobody called us. That was a perfect example of where nobody gives a shit until someone gets hurt. I guarantee that if we had called in a KIA, they would have dropped a Hellfire on him. But they were not going to do it until somebody gets killed.
Q: Do you get that kind of direct feedback from higher—that your situation doesn't warrant the support that you are asking for?
A: Yes. I sometimes joke that you need to have Jesus, President Obama and President Karzai standing right next to you to give the authority to drop the bomb. Now they want boots on the ground BDA, and you have to go hug ten people after you drop the bomb, and you have to go pay ten people and rebuild a house. Maybe it wouldn't be so frustrating if it wasn't my friends who were getting killed on the ground.
Q: How would that be tied with the 05 MAR incident? Did you recognize the guy on the command wire?
A: Two days after the incident, we saw spotters plain as day just staring at us. The enemy is just as good at camouflage as we are. As far as I've read the ROE, I should be able to shoot a spotter with an (b)(1)1.4a. I have taken those shots, and I have killed spotters who were tracking us. Right after the SSG Bales incident, I was told that this wasn't enough. I got it-now we have to be more sensitive, but the next day, these guys are shooting at me. It sucks what happened, but now we're going home. The whole ODA is getting punished. At the end of the day, people are trying to kill me, but you're telling me I have to be even more careful? This is what the O-5s and O-6s who came out to the site were saying. They're not the ones getting shot at; they're not the ones getting grenades dropped in their compound.
Q: Which O-5s and O-6s?
A: Our Colonel. He said that we needed to really make sure; maybe we should make sure that we have identified the azimuth. Now you are further restricting and twisting my ROE? It is just going to end up causing more American deaths.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 8 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Giving all those families money is just going to cause more American deaths. It is frustrating. A guy gets $600,000 in US currency; he's not going to go buy a farm with it. He's going to go buy RPGs and AKs. Why didn't they buy him a tractor or some cows?
Q: How do you deal with that frustration?
A: Most of us don't deal with it until we get back home. We go hang out at the bar or have a party at the house. I consider myself a professional soldier. Though I might be sad on the ground, I don't really have time to put down my gun and be sad.
Q: How do you deal with it tactically?
A: You are more aware (b)(1)1.4a who is on the ground now would be silly if they thought that the money we just paid out wasn't going to fund the insurgents. They will have to work their (b)(1)1.4c, try to find and kill the bad guys, and take out the IEDs. We know the whole battlefield. We're on the ground 100% of the time. We live there.
Q: Do you think that more interaction or visits from the AOB would help them to understand what is happening on the ground?
A: The AOB is just as constrained as we are. They don't make any decision or have any clearance authority.
Q: Is it true that as long as you have been here, C2 has resided at the OPCEN of the SOTF?

(b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Even on your last tour, you would have had to request everything through the SOTF?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: When did the decision come down to move you from the Commando mission to Belambai? Do you know what the decision criteria were for that?
A: We heard rumors as early as November. I think it was the beginning of the year when we heard that it was Belambai. Then we heard from our "3" that when 7th Group got there, they were going to pull us back out to the Commando mission and send the SEALs out to the VSO site. I thought that was unrealistic. The reason that we heard is that the SEALs don't have the training and expertise to do the VSO mission.
Q: Going in, you knew that the conditions at Belambai were relatively tough for the VSO mission. Why were you selected for this mission and what direction were you given?
A: I believe that we were selected because we have the most senior ODA. We did have a lot of experience. We had implemented about 100 ALP on the last tour. I know that from Day 1 the CPT was pushing for this not to be VSP. He knew that this site was not ready for the VSO mission. He was pushing for a larger group of conventional troops that could kinetically control that battle space. Even with the infantry uplift, we are not big enough to really hold or control entire areas. I thought we got limited assistance from Zangabad. Up until the incident on the 11th, we were told that Strykers could not use the road and that they could not push logistics to us. I could not get a dump truck or a sewage truck down to us. On the 12th, I saw a 60' flatbed truck and Strykers drive into Belambai—all the things they said they couldn't get to us. We were just out there. Nobody cared about us until this incident happened. That is another frustration.
Q: Was that an issue before—falling under 3rd Group?
A: Yes. That was an issue on the last trip. I saw lots of helicopters landing out there, but not one piece of mail or anything for us. We still make it happen, but it does suck to feel like you've been forgotten about.
Q: What was the timeframe when you left to go back to Camp Brown to deal with money issues?
A: I arrived back at Belambai on the day that Isaac got blown up (05 MAR). I believe that I was back at Camp Brown for about a week before that. We had to have our money cleared by 01 MAR. I said before th (b)(3), (b)(6) came back with me, but he didn't. He flew back out later on a helicopter. I came back on a Monday. That was the day that we would usually drive back to Zangabad to pick up our supplies.

\\END OF STATEMENT\\

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 7 OF 8 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) AKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6)

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 9. I FULLY U DE
BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECT
CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FRE
THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

to administer oaths, this 17 day of April, 2012
at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 8 OF 8 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/14	1114	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: 18 Bravo, Junior Weapons Sergeant.
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: (b)(1)1.4a(b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: A little more than 6 years.
Q: How long have been in Special Forces?
A: Going on 3 years, sir.
Q: What was your previous background?
A: Infantry, 82nd.
Q: How long have served with this ODA?
A: A little more than a year, sir.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?
A: My responsibilities are security, weapons and tactical training for our partner forces.
Q: When did you arrive to VSP Belambai?
A: Sometime between January 15 and the 20th.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: I believe it was 39 TICs, sir.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions while at the VSP?
A: Every week we went out. Sometimes it would be every day or every other day were we will not do necessary clearing ops but just a meet and greet with the locals. Or do site evaluations.
Q: Would SSG Bales go with you on these missions?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was his role?
A: He was in charge of his infantry guys that were behind the ODA during movement; so he controlled his infantry guys.
Q: What was your chain of command while you were at Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who supervised you?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. (b)(3), (b)(6) ERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEM (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/14

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your relationship to the uplift squad?
A: Other than going on missions with them, we would train the guys up on pistol training; it was basically teaching them self security while at the compound. I did some weapons familiarization with a few of them that needed some help. Other than that was about the most I would talk to them.
Q: Did you guys issue out pistols to them?
A: Yes, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) 7 pistols to SSG Bales.
Q: Who lead the uplift squad?
A: SSG Bales
Q: Was that explained to you as his role?
A: Yes, sir. He was in charge of his guys and we didn't want to micro-manage his guys, so he took dealt with them. It was him and (b)(3), (b)(6) the two main ones that controlled them.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your impressions about the VSP?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How was your morale?
A: It was fine, sir.
Q: How did the ODA leadership treat the uplift squad leadership?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (k)(5), (b)(5)

Q: Can you elaborate on why you didn't see eye-to-eye with SSG Bales?
A: Roger, sir. For instance, SSG Bales was big on guys doing PT. The first thing I saw when I got there was that he was out of shape. That right there...having your guys doing PT, when you're an E-6 in-charge of an infantry squad and you're not in shape. My first impression of him was that he is an out of shape NCO. And he kind of ruled two different ways; when he was in front of us he was a friendly NCO...and then for instance, we were about to roll out for an op, five minutes prior to that he was smoking his guys out there for loading a 50 cal wrong. In which apparently he never taught his soldier how to load it. So I didn't think smoking a guy before an op was the best time to do that. I didn't say anything to him in front of his men, but afterwards a couple of us said something to him about how he should go about not doing stuff prior to a mission.

INITIA (b)(3), (b)(6) KING STATEMENT PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/14

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What did you say to him?
A: I told him, "If you want to take care of your guys that's fine, but before an op or something like that with time restraints to roll out the gate, don't do it. Just wait till we get back."
Q: How did he respond?
A: He just shook his head up and down. That was about it, sir.
Q: Was there any time when the ODA leadership and the 2-3 leadership didn't get along?
A: They didn't have a real animosity but you could tell they didn't like the fact that their soldiers would ask us tactical questions instead of asking them. With (b)(3), (b)(6) they would constantly ask us questions about weapons tactics. I think they saw that as not so much as a competition, but their guys just weren't going to them and asking us.
Q: Did you see other observations from the other 2-3 leadership?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: So you thought SSG Bales was out of shape?
A: He was fat. He couldn't pick up a guy to do self aid buddy care to save his life. As soon as I saw him that's what I immediately thought.
Q: What was your stress level like?
A: Honestly, I would get bored if we didn't fight. Combat to me is not really stressful; it's more of an adrenaline rush.
Q: What did you observe about the stress levels of those around you?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit
A: No, sir. I mean occasionally you'll the (b)(6) (b)(6) But it didn't bother me.
Q: We've received evidence that on VSP Belambai there were certain instances of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instances where someone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: I was yelling at the ANA guys all time for doing the wrong thing. So my name probably got dropped on there. For instance, I'd scream at them for aiming their weapon at me or they may have the [redacted] on fire and they'd aimed it at me or if they had an RPG and aimed it at you. So I would be screaming at them for that. I see (b)(3), (b)(6) personally but other than hearing stuff about SSG Bales hitting a working, it didn't hear anything else. But I didn't hear about that until maybe like 3 weeks ago.
Q: How did the ODA treat the Afghans?
A: I work with them a lot. I got along with them. They are our partner force; if you piss them off they are going to shoot you. So my jest of it was just don't piss them off to the point to where they will shoot you. But still got to maintain your security posture and have to where they understand the rules.
Q: You mentioned you heard about SSG Bales beating up the Afghan worker, what did you hear about it?
A: I just heard they were passing equipment and apparently one Afghan passed it down to him too quickly and hit him in the face, so he yelled at him...he did it again so he hit him. That's all I hear about it.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/14

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Who did you hear that from?
A: One of the infantry soldiers.
Q: We've heard that certain Afghans walked off the job because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about this?
A: No, sir. I knew we got rid of one because he lied about where he was from. That's the only thing I could think of about that. We had another guy walk off because he didn't want to get his biometrics checked. (Eye vision and finger prints)
Q: When did that happen?
A: About 2 or 3 weeks prior to the incident happening.
Q: Did the command climate change after the 5 March IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: What about going over the face on the north side?
A: No. There's 14 foot hescos with c-wire on top.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Did he attend any shuras?
A: Other than the ambush we had up north, which was the only op up north that I went on, he was there...But actually we didn't talk to any locals that day. So I don't think he would have talked to any locals then.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was that on your own volition?
A: Yes, sir. We had a treadmill that worked half the time and some gym equipment.
Q: What was your battle rhythm like?
A: Get up eat breakfast before 8. Check emails to see what had to be done. I usually went around and checked weapons to sure they were clean or not. Make sure the ANA had turned our (b)(1)1.4a back in. And made sure they were at the gate, where they were supposed to be.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: About twice a week. Also after we had contact, I would tell Bales and (b)(6), (b)(3) that the weapons had to be cleaned.
Q: What were your standards on guard duty?
A: We had two guys on top of the Mud Hut and one guy in the OPCEN.
Q: How were you guard mount procedures set?
A: The way we had it was you when you went up on the roof you had to have your (b)(1)1.4a you had to have your weapon and a radio. The infantry always had their rifles on them.
Q: What were thoughts on the SSG Bales truck driver incident?
A: I thought that he was an idiot and I thought that he was asking to get shot to get shot in the back. Just asking for trouble.
Q: Did anybody else find out about it or was it just the subject of conversation?
A: It wasn't really discussed in the team. I know maybe a few of the guys knew it or some of the infantry guys did too. But when I heard about it, I just thought he was doing something stupid, just waiting for one of us to get shot in the back because he was screwing off.
Q: Was it ever brought up in a team meeting?
A: After the whole incident happened, that's when I found out about it. SSG Bales going outside the wire was more of a topic than him punching a guy

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/14

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FR[redacted]T THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN[redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

IN[redacted]NG STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA[redacted]

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/14	0938	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Just over 13 years.
Q: How long have you been in Special Forces?
A: I started in July 2009.
Q: What was your previous job?
A: 11B-Infantry
Q: How long have you served with this ODA?
A: Just over a year.
Q: What unit were you with before that?
A: I was in school and going through the transition to SF.
Q: What were your duties and responsibilities out at Belambai?
A: (b)(6)
Q: When did you arrive at Belambai?
A: Sometime around the 20th of January. We convoyed out from Zangabad.
Q: While you were out at Belambai, how much enemy contact did you take?
A: On average, two TICs per week.
Q: Were some of those outside the wire?
A: Yes. Outside and inside.
Q: Please describe the type and frequency of your missions.
A: About 2-3 missions per week. Typically it was a combat reconnaissance patrol to get atmospherics. We talked to locals to try to get them to believe in us and understand what we are doing. We tried to help them better their villages.
Q: What areas did you patrol?
A: Western Belambai, Alikozai, and Naji Bien. We went north of Alikozai a couple of times. In all cases, we could be seen from the roof of the OPCEN at Belambai.
Q: Did SSG Bales go out with you on those missions?
A: Yes.
Q: What was his role?
A: Most of the time he was in a truck. We had him TC or drive a truck. There were a few times when he dismounted. Mostly his job was to be in charge of his guys.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you normally take a vehicle with you?
A: About 95% of the time we did. Going to Alikozai, for example, the road was small, so we took a smaller ATV-type vehicle. Otherwise, we would take either 1 or 2 of the RG-31 vehicles.
Q: How many overnight patrols did you do?
A: Three.
Q: Was SSG Bales on those?
A: Yes.
Q: When you went out overnight, where would you stay?
A: In one of the village compounds. Up in Peshingan, for example, we stayed in a big house/compound with a courtyard.
Q: Would you stay with the families?
A: They were abandoned.
Q: Was SSG Bales' role primarily security?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your chain of command?
A: Team Leader, Team Sergeant and XO (by radio). The infantry guys worked for us. My direct supervisor was the Team Sergeant. After he got hurt on 05 March, (b)(3), (b)(6) split his duties. (b)(3), (b)(6) took the tactical side of the house; (b)(3), (b)(6) took the admin stuff.
Q: Tell me a little bit more about your relationship with the conventional infantry squads.
A: They were hard workers. I would talk to SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) on a daily basis. I would get him to give me some guys to help out on projects around the camp. They would give me their privates, and the privates would work for me like I was their platoon sergeant.
Q: What role did SSG Bales have?
A: He was like a middle man. Every once in a while he would be out there helping out. Normally he got directives from us and made it happen with his men—whether it was guard, projects around the camp, or on patrols.
Q: Was he the NCOIC of the infantry?
A: Yes. Between him and (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Bales was senior. He was like the platoon sergeant.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your impressions about the VSP?

(b)(1)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: While you were at the VSP, how would you describe the overall command climate?

(b)(1)1.4a,(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Was (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Technically he was more junior, but he had been on the team longer than me.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The Team guys always called him (b)(6) On paper, I was senior. It's cut and dried now that I got my second rocker.

Q: How did the uplift squad fit in to the command climate?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: Did you ever hear any racist or insensitive comments among those around you?

A: No.

Q: We have heard that at Belambai there were certain incidents of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any times when someone demonstrated this kind of behavior or showed a dislike, disdain or hatred toward the Afghan people?

A: As far as an overall hatred—no. However I did see SSG Bales hit one of the drivers. We were in the back of the truck passing out items. One of the packages hit SSG Bales, and he took it overboard. He pushed the driver and got on top of him. He threatened him.

Q: Did you see that?

A: Yes. I was down on the ground in the chain of people passing the boxes.

Q: What happened to the truck driver?

A: I think it was (b)(3), (b)(6) who took him off and took care of him.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I told (b)(3), (b)(6) that he needed to calm SSG Bales down. I told him it was uncalled for and he shouldn't have done it.
Q: Did you guys talk about that among the ODA leadership? Did the chain of command do anything?
A: No. That was the extent of it. I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) and made sure that he understood that he needed to talk to SSG Bales. After that, nothing happened.
Q: In your pre-mission training did you discuss what the appropriate policies are regarding the treatment of Afghans?
A: I distinctly remember one thing being told to me—never lie to an Afghan. The minute you lie to them, they will lose all respect for you. Other than that—typical cultural considerations, don't put your hands on an Afghan. They are your guys; treat them as such.
Q: We also heard that certain Afghans walked off the construction job because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about that?
A: No.
Q: After the 5 March incident and before the 11 March incident, did the command climate change?
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: How could someone have left the compound at Belambai without being seen? Where were the weak points in the perimeter?
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: In the area in the east where you recently put in the range, it seemed like there were a couple of low spots there. Could someone go over the wire there?
(b)(1)1.4a
A: Yes.
Q: Other than the truck driver incident, did SSG Bales have any other interactions with local nationals in the area? Did he attend any shuras?
A: No. Not with us.
Q: How much PT did you do?
A: I started off doing well then I got busy. Towards the end, I picked it back up.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: The normal drill was to clean them every time they were discharged.
Q: What was the normal (b)(1)1.4a protocol/SOP for guard?
A: (b)(1)1.4a That came after the Koran incident. We were not in full gear at night; we just made sure to have a weapon and (b)(1)1.4a 'd always be walking around. It is easy to sit in the tower and do a 360. I always walked around, because I wanted the ANA to see me moving. If I was active, I figured they would be active.
Q: Is that a team standard?
A: No. Just commonsense.
Q: Can you describe in a little more detail the incident with SSG Bales?
A: We were passing boxes along the chain of people. I was on the ground passing boxes. From what I saw, the guys in the truck were kind of throwing the packages to each other. I guess that at one point, the guy threw the box, and I think that SSG Bales may not have been looking. It hit him in the face or in the shoulder. That's when SSG Bales turned on him and did whatever. I caught the very end of it.
Q: What did you see?
A: I saw SSG Bales over him, and I saw him knee him. Afterwards he had a little bit of blood on his face.
Q: Did that incident tell you anything about SSG Bales? Did it concern you about him or his personality?
A: No. I wasn't thinking about it much after the fact. I figured he just had some anger issues. I did talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) about it. Nobody really knows where it came from. I didn't really see any kind of aggression before or after that with him.
Q: What did (b)(3), (b)(6) say?
A: He said he would talk to him.
Q: Did you talk to SSG Bales about it?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: No.
Q: Did you see anyone talk to SSG Bales about it?
A: No.
Q: Did you or anyone notify the ODA leadership? Did it come to their attention?
A: I didn't. I don't know if anybody else did.
Q: Was it brought up in a meeting?
A: No.
Q: Especially given the VSO mission, should that incident have been a warning sign?
A: I didn't see it that way. Maybe for a minute at the time it happened, but we were so busy out there that this was not something that was in the forefront of my mind.
Q: Was it possibly talked at the Team meeting that night?
A: No it wasn't.
Q: Is there a difference in the way that 18 X-Rays deal with the infantry squads as compared to the rest of the guys?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: After the Green on Blue shootings at the MoI, how did that impact the climate at camp? What additional security measures did you take?

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a It was understood that anything was possible and that it was important to maintain a good professional relationship with our counterparts. We were aware and it was briefed that the Taliban could try to infiltrate the ANA or ALP. Guys grew a little leery. We kept an eye out to make sure that things were going smoothly with the ANA.
Q: I just want to confirm that (b)(3), (b)(6) did not see or know about the incident with SSG Bales that you described.
A: No. They weren't there.
Q: Was there any thought about the impact of the SSG Bales' incident with the truck driver on the younger infantry guys on the site?
A: No. Everyone understood the mission and why we were there. There were no incidents either before or after that indicating that anyone at the VSP had any grudge toward Afghans. It was just understood—the way you treat locals. There were no actions or words at any time after that which would have led me to think that anyone had a hatred toward Afghans. We didn't sit down and have a full-blown discussion with the soldiers. It is just a factor that is understood.
Q: What is understood—that you don't treat people that way?
A: Yes. That you wouldn't treat an Afghan citizen or any person that way. There was no indications of aggression through anybody, within the team or with Afghans. It was such an isolated incident, and it caught everyone off guard.
Q: So you look at this as an isolated incident and not indicative of something more wide spread?
A: Correct.
Q: How would you characterize the relationship between the Team Sergeant and the Team Leader?
A: It was good. On a personal level, they would joke around like brothers. On a professional level, it was operations as normal. There is a lot of joking around (b)(1)1.4a those two would joke with each other. Professionally, (b)(3), (b)(6) is an exceptional Team Leader, and (b)(3), (b)(6) is an exceptional Team Sergeant. (b)(3), (b)(6) is one of the best direct supervisors I have had in 13 years in the Army. (b)(3), (b)(6) earned being where he is, and he shows it on a daily basis.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How is the relationship between (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Team Chief?
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: Which unit were you with in OIF 1 in 2003?
A: (b)(6) 101st Airborne.
[RIGHTS WARNING/WAIVER]
Q: What were you told about the rules and standards for behavior at the VSP?
A: Typical rules and regulations of the Army. Specifically—no drugs, no alcohol, no contraband, no sex. We were briefed on the ROE, escalation of force, and the 5 s's.
Q: In general, do you think these standards and discipline were maintained at Belambai?
A: Yes.
Q: We have received evidence that certain NCOs were drinking or had alcohol at the VSP. Did you see or hear about indications of drinking, drunkenness, substance abuse, drug abuse, possession, etc. on Belambai?
A: No.
Q: In particular, were you aware of the infantry NCOs or anyone else drinking on Belambai?
A: No.
Q: Did you drink at Belambai?
A: No.
Q: Are you aware of any other inappropriate behavior that occurred while you were at Belambai?
A: No.
Q: Do you have anything else to add that is related to this matter?
A: No.
Q: Are there any other matters that we have not thought to ask you that might be important to this investigation?
A: No.
Q: Do you know anyone else who can provide me with information related to this investigation?
A: No.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHIC (b)(3), (b)(6) AGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 16

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/13	1333	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: I am the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: AOB (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Going on 8 years.
Q: How long have been in Special Forces?
A: Going on 5 years.
Q: What was your previous background?
A: I was an 18 X-Ray.
Q: How long have served with this AOB?
A: Approximately 5 years that I've been in SF.
Q: How long have served with this ODA?
A: Approximately 4 and a half years.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?
A: I was basically an augmentee to (b)(1)1.4a while (b)(3), (b)(6) recovered from his injuries during the IED blast.
Q: When did you arrive to VSP Belambai?
A: The 6th of March.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: We did one patrol to Zangabad, during the patrol we took two or three rounds of indirect and I don't believe there was any small arms fire. That was really the only contact I've received while I was there.
Q: What was your chain of command while you were at Belambai?
A: I guess (b)(3), (b)(6) was the acting team sergeant.
Q: How did you get along with the uplift squads?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 13 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: From your perception, who was leading the uplift infantry?
A: SSG Bales was introduced to me the day I got there as the infantry squad leader.
Q: Did they introduce you to the other infantry NCOs?
A: Yes.
Q: How were they described to you?
A: They were described as the team leaders and they introduced the E-6 as the other E-6. I don't know if he was a team leader or what his role was.

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Where was your base defense position?
A: I was told in the event of an attack I would be at a post in front of the OPCEN where two litters were located at. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: From what you could tell, how well did the uplift squad fit in with the ODA?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: We've received evidence that certain NCOs were drinking/had alcohol at the VSP. In general, did you ever see or hear about indications of drunkenness or drug use on VSP Belambai?
A: I did not.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments while out there?
A: No.
Q: We've received evidence that on VSP Belambai there were certain instances of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instances where someone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: As far as that is concerned, yes. That is something that is not uncommon. And yes, I'm guilty of statements like that.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 13 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What kind of statements?
A: Statements like, "Fuck these people", in the heat of the moment, getting shot at or whatever; I've said it. So in terms of that kind of behavior, I did see some of that.
Q: Besides the people who are shooting at you, were those comments direct towards the Afghan civilians, women and children?
A: Personally, when I would make a statement like that I would generally not think of women and children. It would mostly be towards the guys that were shooting at me or that farmer right there that I felt was spotting for the enemy; you know. So I guess to say "Fuck these people" as whole, that's not what I was saying.
Q: What about for the other people out there?
A: I truly can't comment on how other people meant that, but I know similar statements were made. Those kind of came up when situations like the 5 March IED blast or a fire fight we had been in prior to that day. It was never just a random comment thrown out there.
Q: Did you guys ever talk about the policies or guidance discussing the proper treatment of Afghans?
A: Yes, sir. We talked about Rules of Engagement before we went on patrol to Zangabad. In my experience with team in the past, that had been a subject that was brought up during the op order, prior to all missions.
Q: Did you hear about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver on VSP Belambai?
A: I didn't hear anything about that, sir.
Q: We've heard that certain Afghans walked off the job because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about this?
A: That's the first time I'm hearing about it, sir.
Q: Are you aware of any inappropriate behavior that occurred while you were at VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.
Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen? How would you have done it?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: I'm not aware of anything like that, sir.
Q: What about PT? How much PT did you do?
A: I did my own time. There was no structure PT schedule. We had a gym there. I worked out in the gym whenever I got a chance.
Q: When you got there, did they explain to you what to do on guard duty? How to conduct handover?
A: Yes, sir. Everything they told me was what I expected of guard handover as far as security posture at night. Everybody stands guard. (b)(1)1.4a, stay up look out and make sure nobody comes near us.
Q: How did you work with the uplift squad troops?
A: I didn't train them. If that's what you're getting at sir. I felt that that was (b)(3), (b)(6) responsibility and I didn't want to teach them some type of technique that would have conflicted with what he had already taught them. So I brought them in and ask them what were their capabilities, I didn't know if they were regular 68 Whiskeys or SCOM medics or whatever. So I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) and talked to him how we would run a trauma scenario when it was him, myself and I didn't get to meet the other medic until a couple days after I'd gotten there. So I spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) and told him how we were going to run things and what I expected him to do.
Q: In preparing for a deployment, how would you guys get prepared to bring in the infantry unit?
A: Well unfortunately they were not involved in our pre-mission training. So I think that brings me back to the statement I said before about not expecting a whole lot from them just because we've never worked with them. In my opinion it doesn't make any sense to go do my job and bring these lower enlisted guys that have very little experience, in with us and try to implement them into our mission. It doesn't make sense to me. Unless you're just talking about base defense; if they're going to be my inner ring of security, then absolutely. But from what I've seen, that's not the way they're utilized. They're utilized more on the mission as the guy behind expected to make the right decisions and frankly they're not up to par with the rest of us.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KANDAHAR DATED 13 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: So do you think bringing them on in your pre-mission training is feasible?
A: It would be better than not doing it all.
Q: What do you think the level of responsibility the ODA has to bring the uplift guys up to speed?
A: I think its 100% the responsibility of the ODA to bring those guys up to par, as soon as those two elements are combined. In my opinion sir, it's extremely difficult to do in combat. When you're expected to conduct patrols, and when you're expected to maintain operational readiness.
Q: Where did you see the most clearing deficiencies?
A: The infantry guys never showed me that they were incapable of going on patrol with us, but then again we never got into a fire fight. I wasn't involved in any kind of training the ODA did with the infantry so I don't know what they were going to do. I just knew there was a private behind me with a gun. I knew what I was going to do if we got shot at, but I know idea if he was going to run and hide in a ditch or if he had my back.
Q: Are there any other matters that we haven't covered that you may believe may be important to our investigation?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know of anyone else who can provide further information concerning these issues?
A: No one that wasn't at Belambai.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

TITLE 16
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/15	0931	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Approximately 6 years.
Q: How long have you been with Special Forces?
A: 3 years in October.
Q: What was your prior MOS?
A: I was a tanker in 1st Armor Division.
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: This is my third; all with SF; all in Afghanistan.
Q: How long have you been with ODA (b)(1)1.4a
A: Almost two years.
Q: Please describe your duties and responsibilities.
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(1)1.4c hat came in.
Q: When did you arrive at Belambai?
A: I was ADVON with (b)(3), (b)(6) I arrived around 18 JAN.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take?
A: I have some trouble with my memory, but I know that it was frequent.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions?
A: Intel and disruption patrols. We pushed out to better understand the villages and the atmospherics.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take outside the wire?
A: Almost every time.
Q: Did SSG Bales go on those missions outside the wire?
A: Yes. His role was to support the ODA—security primarily.
Q: Did he have any role meeting with the locals?
A: No. He was primarily perimeter security.
Q: What was your chain of command?
A: When it comes to ASO, I worked with (b)(3), (b)(6) I also reported to (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What was the nature of your relationship with the conventional infantry guys?
A: Professional. I was mostly in the office doing ASO stuff. I did cross train the medics. They stayed on their side; we stayed on our side.

10. EXHIBIT	11. IN (b)(3), (b)(6) N MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Khandahar DATED 15 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Who was the leader of the infantry?
A: Whichever squad leader was out there with us—SSG Bales or (b)(3), (b)(6). In a way, SSG Bales was kind of like the platoon sergeant to the guys.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what was your initial impression of the VSP?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Overall what was the command climate like?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Khandahar DATED 15 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: We have heard evidence that certain NCOs were drinking or had alcohol or controlled substances at the VSP. Did you see any of that or hear any discussion of it?
A: Not until after I got blown up. Things start spreading around. I didn't see anything before; I didn't see anything after. After 11 MAR, the rumors all started flying. I didn't talk to my unit until after ~~they got back on~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) Camp Brown. I returned from
Q: In general did you hear any racist or insensitive comments?
A: No.
Q: What about inappropriate behavior toward Afghans or people expressing a dislike or a hatred toward them?
A: There was no aggression toward them. But you would see some frustrations, especially when we got shot at or when the ANA didn't join the fight. I remember the ANA guys hiding behind the wall when we were all taking and returning fire.
Q: Was there anger toward the enemy?
A: Yes. But not toward the people—you would lose everything we were working for if that happened.
Q: How did you guys treat the Afghans?
A: Very well. Our workers loved us. The workers worked hard and never complained. One of the ANA platoon sergeants was particularly good.
Q: We heard about an incident of SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver. Do you know anything about that?
A: I didn't see anything like that, and I never heard anything about it.
Q: We have also heard that several Afghans walked off of the job site at one point allegedly because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about that?
A: I don't know anything about that. I probably was not there.
Q: Did you have some workers who left because of security concerns?
A: Yes. I do remember that. I remember one guy who lied about his background and wouldn't be thumbprinted.
Q: Are you aware of any other inappropriate behavior at the VSP?
A: Not at all.
Q: How could someone sneak out of the compound without being soon?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did SSG Bales have any interaction or familiarity with locals outside the wire?
A: He wasn't involved in any shuras. He may remember what buildings we went to on patrols.
Q: Were you doing PT and cleaning your weapon on a regular basis?
A: Yes.
Q: How did you set up your guard shifts and work the infantry into the guard shifts?
A:
Q: (b)(1)1.4a
A:
Q: How many guys on the current ODA were on your most recent prior VSO deployment in Afghanistan?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) We left there in April 2011.
Q: Is it fair to say that of all the guys on your team, you have one of the highest frequencies of contact with local nationals?
A: Yes.
Q: What was your impression in dealing with the Afghans in the local area? Did you see any general trends or patterns about their feelings toward Americans?
A: In general, they liked that Americans gave them money and free stuff. At the same time, I know that a lot of them were probably working both sides. If a guy is coming to me it is either because of money or to get more intel on me. At our location, the elders weren't really around. They were in Kandahar. So the people at the shuras weren't really willing to make decisions.
Q: Is it fair to say that Alikozai was more receptive to VSOs than the other clusters?
A: Yes. If we were going to do ALP, it would probably start with Alikozai. But it would be very hard to do.
Q: Did you think that Naji Bien was more aligned with the Taliban?
A: Yes. The Taliban did a lot of movement through Naji Bien.
Q: That must have been a difficult situation for the local population—getting pressure from the Taliban while you guys were in there restricting the Taliban's movement and reaching out to them?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Khandahar DATED 15 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Yes. And it increased after the incident. The number of times we got shot at and the number of long TICs increased. (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4c Most of the time we (b)(3), (b)(6) lost. We held our ground, but they just moved on to other areas.

Q: Was that area ready for VSO? Were the conditions set to get VSO running in that area?

A: It could have been done, especially if we had more ability to disrupt. If we could push north to Hyena, it could have been done. We just needed more disruptive operations. I think it was a difficult location.

Q: Do you know who selected the original site?

A: I don't know.

Q: Did your team have some CCIR, especially with regard to the junior soldiers? Were there some critical issues that, if they occurred, were supposed to be reported up your chain of command? Were the junior enlisted soldiers empowered to take things up to a higher level?

A: The only time I ran into that was in scheduling my (b)(6) I told them that if SSG Bales or (b)(3), (b)(6) had an issue with the timing of the training that they should come talk to me and we would work it out.

Q: Did you feel like the Team leadership had an open door to everyone? Would the junior soldiers feel comfortable bringing something up to the Team leadership?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Is there any other information that you think would be helpful to the investigation?

(b)(6)

Q: Do you know of anyone else that could assist us with this interview?

A: Just the ODA members.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY W (b)(3), (b)(6) UT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/14	1627	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 11 years and 8 months.
Q: How long have been in Special Forces?
A: Since 2010.
Q: What was your previous background?
A: (b)(6)
Q: How long have served with this ODA?
A: Since 15 February 2012.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?

(b)(6)

Q: When did you arrive to VSP Belambai?
A: It to have been around the 15th of February. to have (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: In general, I would say 2 or 3 times a week. We also received contact on one of the patrols I went on since I was there.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions while at the VSP?
A: Just local reconnaissance patrols. I only did two patrols since I was there. One patrol was to the north where we received sporadic fire and one to the bazaar in Belambai.
Q: Would SSG Bales go with you on these missions?
A: He was on the one when we received fire.
Q: What was his role?
A: He was the NCOIC for his two squads and for the personnel that went with him on that patrol.
Q: What was your chain of command while you were at Belambai?
A: Our team leader for the ODA was (b)(3), (b)(6) and senior NCO/the team sergeant was (b)(3), (b)(6) When (b)(3), (b)(6) got hurt, between me and (b)(3), (b)(6) we took the role as the NCOIC.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 14 Apr 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your relationship to the uplift squad?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Who lead the uplift squad?
A: SSG Bales. He was like the platoon sergeant. There were two squads, (b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge of one squad and (b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge of the other.
Q: When you arrived at the site, what were your impressions about the VSP? believe Fire (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Compared to other VSPs, it definitely was a lot more kinetic. I don't I've been to a ~~firing~~ base that received that much harassing fire on a daily basis. As far as the lay out it was actually nice, everyone had their own room; compared to other VSP I've been too.
Q: What was your impression of the uplift squad?
A: I had no concerns; if that's what you mean. Other than the privates need more training, but I had no concerns as far as what they could accomplish.
Q: What did the previous ODA pass on to you about the VSP?
A: No, sir. I wasn't present during the RIP (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: While you were at the VSP, what was the command climate like?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: No. Not at all.
Q: We've received evidence that on VSP Belambai there were certain instances of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instance where someone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: No. Our biggest issue was working with the ANA. They were pretty horrible at their job. I'll give you a couple of examples; whenever we'd get into fire fights, there would ANA soldiers with empty mags. Others running around trying to pick up brass, because they would sell the brass at the bazaar. Discipline within the ANA was our biggest issue.
(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT *Kandahar* DATED *14 Apr 12*

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did the chain of command put out any policy or standard concerning the proper treatment of Afghans?
A: No. At the ODA level, these are things that are common knowledge with handling the locals.
Q: Do you know about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver on VSP Belambai?
A: No.
Q: We've heard that certain Afghans walked off the job because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about this?
A: No.
Q: Did the command climate change after the 5 March IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any shuras in the area?
A: No. I don't see why he would be a part of a shura. I don't think there's ever been a shura because locals are forbidden from taken part in shuras. I don't think since ODA (b)(1)1.4a took over there's been a single shura, but I could be mistaken. The only shura the team leader would attend would be the district shura, which is every Monday. We used to go to those. But as far as SSG Bales being a part of that shura, I highly doubt. (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did you guys do PT regularly?
A: I don't think I ever saw SSG Bales do PT once; since I was there for about 3 weeks.
Q: What about you?
A: I run, but I'm not a lifting person anymore. I played plenty of soccer with the junior enlisted.
Q: Did you guys have standard procedures for guard duty.
A: Yes. (b)(1)1.4a
Q: So I know you arrived there on 15 February, so there was no talk about SSG Bales hitting an Afghan truck driver?
A: No.
Q: Did any of the witnesses this morning talk to you about what we were going to talk about in this interview?
A: No.
\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE *3*. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITH (b)(3), (b)(6) REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

...king Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this *18* day of *April*, *2012* at *Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan*

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE *3* OF *3* PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/10	1335	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: 18 Echo.
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 2 years and 10 months.
Q: How long have you been in Special Forces?
A: 11 months.
Q: What was your previous background?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have served with this ODA?
A: 5 and a half months.
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities?
A: Every aspect of communications.
Q: When did you arrive to VSP Belambai?
A: I believe it was on 17 January.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take while on Belambai?
A: Overall I would say it was pretty sporadic. We would get into TICs every now and then. A week prior to this incident we struck what we believed was a command wire IED. We took some injures, our EOD guy was a victim to an IED and was severely injured. That about covers it for as far as before the incident.
Q: What were the type and frequency of your missions while at the VSP?
A: I'd say the majority of it was to gain atmospherics between the little villages on the north, the south and towards the west. Mainly it was just trying to build atmospherics and trying to build rapport.
Q: Would SSG Bales go with you on these missions?
A: Yes, sir. Maybe not all of them but I think their squads rotated out; one week one squad would go and the next week the other squad would go out.
Q: What was his role?
A: He was kind of just put in as a standard shooter.
Q: What was your chain of command while you were at Belambai? Who was your direct supervisor?
A: My direct supervisor was (b)(3), (b)(6), then (b)(3), (b)(6) and then (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your relationship to the uplift squad?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Q: What did the previous ODA pass on to you about the VSP?
A: Unfortunately, I didn't have another Echo counterpart to RIP out with; he had left before I got there. So, the majority of who I've worked with was (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) He got me up to speed on the communications they had set up. He was pretty familiar with it too. (b)(3), (b)(6) was a prior Echo, so I was able to get with them and kind of pick his brain on the way they were running things.
Q: Were you told anything about the 2-3 leadership?
A: No, sir.
Q: Were you told anything about the rules or standards for the VSP?
A: Our Captain got us all together and reiterated ROEs...He kind of went over what should be right, what our main intent was and things of that nature.
Q: While you were at the VSP, what was the command climate like? How well did the uplift squad fit in?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How was your morale?
A: It was comfortable. It was fine.
Q: How did the ODA leadership treat the uplift squad leadership?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you think that your supervisor set a good example for you?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: We've received evidence that certain NCOs were drinking/had alcohol at the VSP. In general, did you ever see or hear about indications of drunkenness or drug use on VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.
Q: In general, have you heard any racist or insensitive comments within your unit?
A: No, sir.
Q: We've received evidence that on VSP Belambai there were certain instances of inappropriate behavior toward Afghans. Are you aware of any instances where someone exhibited inappropriate attitudes toward Afghans, or a dislike of Afghans?
A: No, sir.
Q: How did the ODA treat the Afghans?
A: We had local workers on base, and I'd say we treated them very well. We'd bring candy to the kids when we were out on patrol.
Q: Did your chain of command put out a policy or standards concerning proper treatment of Afghans?
A: Overall, the main guidance was about females. Just not to interact in any way that was forceful unless there was a major threat. As far as interaction with an interpreter, that was to be conducted by our Captain and our Chief Warrant Officer.
Q: What do you know about SSG Bales beating up an Afghan truck driver on VSP Belambai?
A: I don't know anything about it, sir.
Q: We've heard that certain Afghans walked off the job because they felt mistreated. Do you know anything about this?
A: We had two guys that built a stairway, and I honestly couldn't tell you why they left, but they did leave. I don't remember them leaving with any resentment.
Q: Are you aware of any inappropriate behavior that occurred while you were at VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.
Q: Did the command climate change after the 5 March IED incident?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How can someone have left the compound without being seen?
A (b)(1)1.4a
Q: What about the north wall, can anybody get over that?
A: Well those walls are usually single and double wrapped with c-wire, so I wouldn't say that's a way of getting out.
Q: How much PT did you do at VSP Belambai? Was this on your own volition?
A: It was on your own. We had a pretty decent gym.
Q: How often did you clean your weapons?
A: For certain, after every mission. Regardless if you fired or not, it would get pretty dusty.
Q: In general, while on guard shift at VSP Belambai, how did you know what to do on guard, who checked you and how did you conduct handover?

(b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 10 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Where did you live in the "Cans?"
A: I lived on the east side. (b)(3), (b)(6) the mechanic, me, and (b)(3), (b)(6) were all on the east side
Q: How close did you live to SSG Bales?
A: His "Can" was kind of caddy corner from mine.
Q: How did SSG Bales conduct himself in the "Cans"?
A: Overall, I really didn't interact with him outside the working environment. I can say he was very helpful with the (b)(1)1.4a systems on the trucks. I hadn't had much training on those, and he really helped me with those.
Q: After the incident did (b)(3), (b)(6) say something to the effect of "If you have contraband you need to get rid of it?"
A: No, sir.
Q: Are there any other matters that we haven't covered that you may believe may be important to our investigation?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you know of anyone else who can provide further information concerning these issues?
A: Besides the rest of the guys in the ODA, potentially the (b)(3), (b)(6) The enablers I guess.

\\END OF STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

W (b)(3), (b)(6)

USFOR-A

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 17 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Fort Bragg, North Carolina	2012/03/29	2057	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I've been in the military since 2005.
Q: On your most recent assignment to Afghanistan, what was the timeframe you served at VSP Belambai?
A: I served at VSP Belambai from (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long was your ODA at that location?
A: My entire ODA unit was there the whole time I was there.
Q: What other units were attached to the VSP and how long had they been there?
A: Initially, we had SOTF uplift element from the 82d. After they departed, we were back filled by the 1-16 Infantry from Fort Riley, Kansas. Then the 2-3 Infantry arrived about a week before Christmas.
Q: While at VSP Belambai, what was your duty position and responsibilities?
A: I was the ODA Commander and I was responsible for all personnel.
Q: How long did you serve with SSG Robert Bales at VSP Belambai?
A: For about one and a half months.
Q: What unit was SSG Bales a part of, and what were his duties and responsibilities?
A: I believe SSG Bales was a part of the 2-3 Infantry out of Fort Lewis. He was a Squad Leader and acting Platoon Sergeant.
Q: What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit?
A: The mission at the VSP was to augment the ODA and help to conduct VSP tasks.
Q: How often did you interact with SSG Bales? How well did you know him?
A: I interacted with SSG Bales on a daily basis. I knew him as well as you could within the constraints of the mission.
Q: Are you aware if SSG Bales participated in any shuras or otherwise interacted with the locals while at VSP Belambai?
A: SSG Bales interacted with the Afghan locals at shuras in a support role. He also interacted with Afghan locals while providing security and would have interaction with the local nationals at the VSP and the front gate.
Q: While you were at VSP Belambai, what were the command relationships?
A: The 2-3 Infantry was OPCON to the ODA.
Q: What was SSG Bales' relationship to the ODA?
A: SSG Bales relationship to the ODA was to act as a direct intermediary between the 2-3 Infantry and the ODA.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command? How well did they know him? How much interaction did they have with him?
A: His chain-of-command started with himself, then (b)(3), (b)(6) then to myself and then the OPCEN Director. The chain-of-command at VSP Belambai had day to day interaction with him.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Ft Bragg NC DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Were the command relationships (TACON, OPCON, Attached) sufficient to the mission at the VSP? Who was ultimately responsible for Soldier care of the Infantry NCOs and men at the VSP?
A: Yes. The team sergeant was responsible for the Soldier care on the VSP, then SSG Bales in charge of his men.
Q: How was the command climate?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How were standards enforced at the VSP? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: Enforcing standards on the VSP was not an issue, because there weren't any infractions.
Q: What were the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?
A: Weapons accountability procedures were conducted daily within the 2-3 Infantry. Personnel accountability was pretty much the same as the weapons accountability.
Q: During the timeframe you served with SSG Bales at VSP Belambai, do you recall how many days of incoming fire? Enemy initiated attacks since SSG Bales' arrival? Offensive engagements since SSG Bales' arrival?
A: Upon the 2-3 arrival at the VSP, there were plenty of days where we had kinetic activity. We did not engage the enemy using offensive operations due to the ROE during SSG Bales' time here.
Q: How many casualties had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? How many were of his unit? Were any close friends of his?
A: During SSG Bales tenure at the VSP, there was one local national that came to the gate with injures that require a helo med-evac. I was not aware of any other casualties.
Q: What was your battle rhythm?
A: Our daily battle rhythm started every morning at 0600. Depending on the day, battle rhythm varied.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did the unit have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help?
A: If anybody was stressed, or flagged for being stressed, we would give them some down time. We also conducted routine trips back to Camp Brown to give soldiers the opportunity to relax. The group has a number of available resources to deal with stress.
Q: What are the personnel at the VSP taught about identifying warnings signs in fellow Service members?
A: For the month and a half the 2-3 was at the VSP, I don't know if we had any additional requirements on stress training. But they received a hazards brief from our Medic on the ground.
Q: Were there any problems with any personnel concerning alcohol or substance abuse at VSP Belambai during the timeframe you served with SSG Bales?
A: Not that I am aware of.
Q: Were there any warning signs that SSG Bales' might engage in this behavior, and if so, what action was taken?
A: No, Sir.
Q: Specifically, were you aware of any recent incidents in SSG Bales' personal or professional life that may triggered this violent behavior?
A: No Sir.
Q: How could a soldier depart and return without notice? Did that ever occur while you were there?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Did you feel that you had sufficient guard mount, stand-to procedures, and other security measures?
A: Yes Sir.
Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: No Sir.
Q: Any other witnesses that would be helpful to this investigation that you would recommend we talk to?
A: No Sir.
Q: When SSG Bales unit arrived, did you have any particular impressions of SSG Bales? Good, bad or indifferent?
A: No Sir.
Q: What was your understanding of their pre-deployment training? Did you have any indications of how comprehensive it was? Any assesement on how disciplined they were?
A: SSG Bales and other NCOs annouced their arrival quite professionally. They called upon arriving let us know they were on their way out. They spoke to (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself in depth about the things they would need and things they had available that would

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Ft Bragg NC DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Their skills were quite capable after their arrival. We also put them through adequate training before we brought them out on patrol. We ensured they had the proper (b)(1) 1.4a training before we went out the gate. Just to ensure their safety and safety of the ODA members as well as the local civilians.

Q: So its safe to say you were satisfied with their level of competency?

A: Yes. Their disposition of competency, I was satisfied with.

Q: Did you see SSG Bales interact with any Afghans at the shuras, if so, did you have the impression of his opinion of Afghans?

A: No Sir. I saw him interact with ANCOP at the old VSP Zangabad. I did not see him interact with any local nationals that were part of the villages of Belambai or the surrounding village clusters in the Zangabad area, but there was nothing brought to my attention during or nothing I saw that would have affected us on combat patrols or taking part in any shuras in overwatch where he might have interacted with civilians.

Q: During his tenure, was there any statement on his part or any discouraging talks about local Afghans or indications that he hated them?

A: Not that I can recall.

Q: What information did you pass on to the next incoming team that took your place?

A: I let them know that the 2-3 Infantry guys were doing a great job with training the ANCOP, preparing them to conduct civil order type missions. There wasn't any negative information to pass to them.

Q: How often did you receive visits from your chain-of-command?

A: Usually every Monday, our AOB Commander was out. Since the 2-3 guys were there, the DCO, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Group CWO. They spent Christmas Eve and Christmas Day with us. During the RIP, both Commanders were there at once. The Afghan Senior members were there on regular basis.

Q: Describe briefly of what training you gave the 2-3 Infantry.

A: They were trained on base defense, they became familiar with all weapon systems, routine test fires were conduct, additional communications. We also put them throught IED defeat classes. Rehearsal were conducted as well.

//////////////////////////////END OF STATE (b)(3), (b)(6) //

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) T

WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3 . I FULL MADE

BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORR

CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT F

THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL law to

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6) administer oaths, this 30th day of March, 2012

at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) JA

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
	2012/04/16	1901	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and duty position
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 16 years; 7 years in Special Forces
Q: What was your prior MOS
A: I was previously enlisted as (b)(3), (b)(6) before that I was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: 6 or 7—in Iraq and Afghanistan
Q: When did you arrive at VSP Belambai?
A: Initially around the end of June 2012. I was back and forth from June-November, when we occupied with the entire ODA.
Q: Do you remember when 2/3 IN arrived?
A: Around the middle of December.
Q: When they arrived, what was your impression of the quality of the soldiers and their NCOs?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Based on the other NCOs that you had on site previously—from the 82nd and from 1/16—how did SSG Bales stack up against them?
A: To me, he was noticeably weaker.
Q: Given that, did your people bypass Bales and go directly to the soldiers or to the team leaders?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fort Bragg DATED 16 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: The only time that would happen is if we were reacting to direct fire. For day to day tasks, the squad leaders ran their squads and we worked through them.
Q: Did you ever hear any racist or insensitive comments?
A: No.
Q: Did anybody exhibit inappropriate actions toward Afghans? How about a dislike or disdain toward Afghans?
A: No.
Q: Did you directly explain to the infantry and your other enablers how to relate to the Afghans?
A: Yes. We included the infantry leadership in our lunches and dinners with the ANA. We did the same with the electricians.
Q: Did SSG Bales go out with the ODA on patrols? Did he interact with any local Afghans on those missions?
A: He did go out with us, and his mission was primarily security. Nonetheless, we would still talk to kids and locals when we were out there. Sometimes, I would introduce him to some locals so that he could provide continuity for the incoming ODA.
Q: Would he have been directly involved in any shuras?
A: Yes.
Q: How could someone have left the camp without being seen?
A: The only place to get out was the front gate, but there was a guard tower there.
Q: We have had sworn testimony that Friday night was considered a party night for drinking on the boardwalk outside of the man-cans. Did you hear or see anything related to that?
A: That is the first I am hearing of it.
Q: What about the use of steroids or other controlled substances?
A: No knowledge.
Q: When did you first have an initial operating presence at Belambai?
A: Around 04 JUN. We didn't fully take it over until the French-Canadian team left.
Q: When did you fully consolidate at Belamabai?
A: November 2012.
Q: Were you at the VSP on New Year's Eve?
A: Yes.
Q: Can you describe what went on, especially on the roof of the OPCEN?
A: I was down on the HLZ. I saw a few flares get shot off—homemade fireworks.
Q: We have some sworn statements that some individuals were acting drunk, particularly on the roof of the OPCEN. Did you notice anything like that?
A: No.
Q: Are there any other matters that you think could be important to our investigation?
A: I had a phone call one time from someone in SSG Bales chain of command. I don't recall who it was. When they asked to talk to one of the infantry squad leaders, they specifically said "not SSG Bales." I think it was the platoon sergeant who called.
Q: Is there anyone else that we should talk to who could provide further information?
A: Just the guys in the Detachment.

\\END STATEMENT\\

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fort Bragg DATED 16 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR (b)(3), (b)(6) INT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Making Statement)

WITN (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of May, 2012

at Fort Bragg

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

Fort Bragg, NC

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

AR 136 UCMJ

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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S

For use of this form, see AR 15-6; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Fort Bragg, North Carolina	2012/03/29	2139	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
ODA and I am AOB operations sergeant at this time.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I've been in the military for 15 years.
Q: On your most recent assignment to Afghanistan, what was the timeframe you served at VSP Belambai?
A: I believe I served at VSP Belambai from (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long was your ODA at that location?
A:. My ODA unit was there around the same timeframe.
Q: What other units were attached to the VSP and how long had they been there?
A: Other units that were attached to me were the 82nd, 505th, they were there for about 5 months. Then the 1-16 IN, 2nd Infantry Division, were there for one month. Then the 2-3 Infantry replaced them.
Q: While at VSP Belambai, what was your duty position and responsibilities?
A: I was the ODA team sergeant. My duties were to take care of my team and project manning for both sides.
Q: How long did you serve with SSG Robert Bales at VSP Belambai?
A: At least four months
Q: What unit was SSG Bales a part of, and what were his duties and responsibilities?
A: He was in 1-16th Infantry, Stryker Platoon, he was a squad leader and acting platoon sergeant and his duties were the same as mine with his personnel.
Q: What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit?
A: To help us do what ever we needed to do, mainly security. Normal things the Infantry would do.
Q: How often did you interact with SSG Bales? How well did you know him?
A: We had meetings every day and we patrolled every three days and that was about it. I didn't know him that well.
Q: Are you aware if SSG Bales participated in any shuras or otherwise interacted with the locals while at VSP Belambai?
A: I don't believe so. The only personnel he interacted with was the ANA security element.
Q: While you were at VSP Belambai, what were the command relationships?
A: I believe it was a good relationship sir.
Q: What was SSG Bales' relationship to the ODA?
A: I don't think we had any problems with him, sir. He listened to all my NCOs.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command? How well did they know him? How much interaction did they have with him?
A: SSG Bales reported to my E-7s. I think everybody got along well.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 30 March 1339 DATED 30 March 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Were the command relationships (TACON, OPCON, ATTACHED) sufficient to the mission at the VSP? Who was ultimately responsible for the soldier care of the infantry NCOs and men on a VSP?
A: Yes Sir. That responsibility would be mine.
Q: How was the command climate?
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: How were standards enforced at the VSP? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: I never had a problem with the infantry sir. They pretty much ran themselves. I never had a problem with them.
Q: What were the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?
A: After missions, we get 100% accountabilitiy on personnel. We perfom maintenance on weapons every three days.
Q: During the timeframe you served with SSG Bales at VSP Belambai, do you recall how many days of incoming fire? Enemy initiated attacks since SSG Bales' arrival? Offensive engagements since Bales' arrival?
A: I would say the frequency would be constant fire about every three days.
Q: How many casualities had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? How many were of his unit? Were any close friends of his?
A: I don't believe we had any casualities at that point.
Q: What was your battle rhythm?
A: (b)(1)1.4a before we went on missions. We do 100% AARs as well. We had (b)(1)1.4a
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did the unit have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help?
A: Sir we had a psychiatrist come out to the base when the 82d lost one of their soldiers to help out with the soldiers mental aspects.
Q: What are the personnel at the VSP taught about identifying warnings signs in fellow Service members?
A: We just talked to them and asked how they were doing, asked about their mental state. Made sure they were alright.
Q: Were there any problems with any personnel concerning alcohol or substance abuse at VSP Belambai during the timeframe you served with SSG Bales?
A: No Sir.
Q: Were there any warning signs that SSG Bales' might engage in this behavior, and if so, what action was taken?
A: Not that I'm aware of.
Q: Specifically, were you aware of any recent incidents in SSG Bales' personal or professional life that may have triggered this violent behavior?
A: No Sir.
Q: How could a soldier depart and return without notice? Did that ever occur while you were there?
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: Did you feel that you had sufficient guard mount, stand-to procedures, and other security measures?
A: I believe so.
Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: No Sir.
Q: Any other witnesses that would be helpful to this investigation that you would recommend we talk to?
A: No Sir.
Q: In your professional opinion, what was your assessment of the training of SSG Bales unit, and how well they were prepared to function in the initial environment?
A: I think they were trained to regular infantry standards. I just think that any time anyone gets into a firefight during their deployment, I think its shocking no matter how seasoned you are. Then you go through an understanding of the environment.
Q: Did SSG Bales at any time say anything that would suggest he a very low opinion or anomosity towards local Afghans?
A: No sir, not that I am aware of.
////END OF STATEMENT//

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1339 DATED 30 March 12

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

//////////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT//////////////////////////////////////

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

tement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30th day of March, 2012 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) SA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
	2010/04/16	1744	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank, and duty position
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: Two in Afghanistan; One in Pakistan
Q: When did you get out to Belambai and when did you depart?
A: (b)(6) at Belambai. I arrived at Belambai on 04 JUL 2011. We departed at the end of JAN 2012.
Q: How much enemy contact did you take?
A: A couple times per week, but it slowed down at the end.
Q: What was your chain of command?
A: The Team Sergeant was (b)(3), (b)(6) Team Leader was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you have any uplift infantry before the arrival of 2/3 IN?
A: Yes. First we had the 82nd Airborne followed by 1/16 IN then SSG Bales' group (2/3 IN)
Q: What was your relationship with the infantry uplift, particularly SSG Bales' squads?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What was the command climate like during the time when 2/3 was there?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How would you describe the relationship between the Team Leadership and the 2/3 NCOs?
A: SSG Bales was the senior NCO, so he was the point of contact for the infantry. If we needed something, we went to SSG Bales.
Q: As an ODA, did you respect SSG Bales?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 23 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6). We also had one representative from each of the enablers. The whole ODA would attend.
Q: Did the ODA members ever bypass SSG Bales and go directly to the soldiers to help with tasks on base?
A: I'm sure we did at some point for small things, but we tried to coordinate everything through him. We saw those guys as his guys, his unit.
Q: Can you describe SSG Bales' leadership style?
A: He kept his guys in line. I thought he did a good job delegating to the squad leaders, but he always took responsibility for anything that was not right, which was minimal. He would always come up and let me know if there was something that his guys needed more training on.
Q: How would you describe the leadership style of the Team leadership, particularly with respect to the uplift guys, when you were out on mission?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Where did you live at the VSP?
A: We had a living area—a section of man cans. I lived in the center of the man cans.
Q: In general, did you hear any racist or insensitive comments?
A: No.
Q: In general, did anyone exhibit inappropriate attitudes toward the Afghans—local workers, the ANA or the civilians in the villages?
A: No.
Q: When new infantry came in did the Team leadership ever provide briefings or talk to the soldiers about the appropriate way to deal with and treat Afghans?
A: Yes. Whenever a new unit arrived, we let them know what the ROE was, how to treat Afghan civilians, and what to do upon certain actions.
Q: Did SSG Bales go on patrols to local villages, and did he interact with local civilians?
A: Yes. He went on several patrols. I usually didn't participate in the KLEs or shuras, and I don't know if SSG Bales participated in those or not.
Q: Would it be normal that the infantry would deal with the locals on a mission like this or would the infantry typically be more of a security element?
A: They were usually on the perimeter security. The Team Leader and Warrant usually dealt with the village elders.
Q: Did you ever have any observations about how SSG Bales dealt with the local workers or the ANA?
A: We did have several local workers on camp and we often worked with the ANA on training for missions. I never saw any issues. It was always very professional.
Q: How could somebody have left the compound without being seen?
A: I suppose it is possible, but you'd almost have to be on guard yourself to do it. (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(1)1.4a
Q: In your mind, the only way to get on and off was probably the front gate? There wasn't any weak point in the perimeter?
A: There was concertina and Hescos around the perimeter. It was very well secured.
Q: When did (b)(1)1.4a art building Belambai?
A: We ran split team operations at first while we were building up the site. The site would have been vulnerable at that time, but it was secure by the time that 2/3 showed up.
Q: When the team was split, where was the other part of the team?
A: At VSP Zangabad, about 1km down the road.
Q: The Old School site?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT ______ DATED ______

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Yes.
Q: We have heard that Friday nights were the party nights, that soldiers were told to stay away and that there was alcohol consumed at that time on the boardwalk. Do you know anything about that? Did you ever see any indications of drinking or hear any rumors about it?
A: No. We had a very open policy. Soldiers could walk through at any time, and I never heard anything like that.
Q: Did you ever see or hear anything about the use of steroids or other substance abuse?
A: No.
Q: Are there any other indications that you can think of regarding any kind of inappropriate behavior that occurred at Belambai while 2/3 IN was there?
A: No. We never had any issues with them. This whole thing was a surprise to me. They were always completely professional while I was out there.
Q: We have heard some evidence that (b)(1)1.4a members preferred to deal directly with the soldiers because of their feelings about the 2/3 IN NCOs and SSG Bales in particular. Do you have any ideas about how someone could come to that impression?
A: We did end up going directly to the soldiers at some points, particularly if they were around and we needed something right away. That would happen when we were in contact, for example. But I think it was always out of necessity. I don't think anyone should have gotten the impression that we were trying to go around their chain of command.
Q: Did it have anything to do with an impression that SSG Bales was a micro-manager?
A: I never got that impression. I never saw that.
Q: Are there any other matters that we haven't asked you about that would be helpful to our investigation or any other people that we should talk to?
A: No.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH [redacted] ON PAGE (b)(6) FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY (b)(3), (b)(6) EWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU[redacted]T.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
[redacted]aking Statement)

WIT (b)(3), (b)(6)

Fort Bragg, NC

ORG (b)(3), (b)(6)

Fort Bragg, NC
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of May, 2012 at Fort Bragg NC

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) JA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136 UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 8 (b)(3), (b)(6) OF 8 (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FT BRAGG, NC	2012/04/16	1821	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and duty position.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) ODA (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 13 years; 6 years in Special Forces
Q: What did you do before Special Forces?
A: 11B-Infantry at Fort Drum
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: 4 tours total—Iraq as an 11B (b)(6). Afghanistan and Pakistan with the Special Forces.
Q: When did you arrive at Belambai?
A: On or about NOV/DEC 2011. Prior to that I was at VSP Zangabad. We were running split team operations up to that point as we worked to establish VSP Belambai.
Q: What was your relationship with the 2/3 IN uplift squad?
A: My relationship with 2/3 was nonexistent. My main task was to be the ANA liaison for our partner force, which was not located at Belambai. I did see their leadership at our evening meeting everyday at 1800.
Q: How do you compare the 2/3 IN to the 1/16 IN who was there before them?
A: I didn't see a large distinction. (b)(6) was on their way out, so their focus was on getting home. 2/3 was an incoming, so their level of motivation was a lot higher.
Q: How did you assess 2/3 IN when they arrived? What were your impressions of the soldiers and their leadership?
A: Like most infantry units, they had a large percentage of troops who were young and inexperienced and looking toward the senior squad/platoon leadership for guidance. The NCOs' motivation was high.
Q: What rank were you before you left the infantry?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How would you evaluate SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) as squad leaders?
A: My exposure to both of them was limited. It would be difficult to make an assessment.
Q: How was the relationship between the ODA NCOs and the infantry NCOs?
A: I didn't see any personal or professional issues. Since we were the more senior personnel, they were always asking questions. There wasn't really enough time for any issues to develop.
Q: When 2/3 arrived, was it clear who was in charge of the unit?
A: Yes. It was clear that SSG Bales was in charge. Only the NCOs attended our nightly meeting because of space constraints. At those meetings, SSG Bales identified himself as the platoon sergeant.
Q: How did the ODA leadership interface with the infantry soldiers? Did they always use the IN NCOs as their point of contact?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1821 DATED 16 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Their lower ranking personnel used their NCOs to push information and requests up to us. The soldiers were always busy building their B-hut.
Q: Did you guys ever go right to the soldiers if you needed tasks done?
A: We worked strictly through their NCOs to do any tasks that needed to be done.
Q: Where was your man-can in the housing area?
A: I was right across the way from SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Your door was right across from their door?
A: Correct.
Q: In general, did you feel like the standards and discipline were maintained at Belambai consistent with the tactical situation?
A: Yes. I never saw any issues.
Q: Did you hear or observe and racist or insensitive comments that would give you concern?
A: No.
Q: Were there any inappropriate comments or sentiments expressed toward the Afghans? Any dislike or hatred?
A: No. I worked closely with the ANA, and I would not tolerate anything to that effect.
Q: Did the ODA ever explain to the infantry or any of the other attachments, uplifts, workers or enablers, how to appropriately deal with Afghans so that they didn't make a cultural mistake?
A: We tried to limit their interaction with the locals. That was our responsibility. We did brief them on it. But we also tried to insulate them from that.
Q: Did SSG Bales go out on any of the patrols to the local villages? Would he have engaged with locals through a shura or a KLE or any similar engagement?
A: No. Their specific role was to provide outer security. Our role was to conduct KLEs with our Team leadership and the local elders.
Q: Did you ever see SSG Bales dealing with any of the local workers or the ANA?
A: He never dealt with the ANA. He may have dealt with the local workers in passing. He may have just had a brief conversation at most.
Q: How could somebody leave the compound without being seen?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: We have had sworn testimony that Friday nights were the party nights for alcohol drinking on the boardwalk. Soldiers were apparently told to stay away. Did you know anything about that? Did you ever hear anything about that? Did you hear or see anything related to drinking on the site at all?
A: I didn't hear anything about Friday party nights or anything like that. I didn't see anything to that effect.
Q: Did you ever hear anything about steroid usage or substance abuse at Belambai?
A: Nothing that I saw.
Q: Was the ANCOP located at the blue makhtab across the from the gate?
A: No. They were located one km to the east at the Old School site.
Q: Did SSG Bales have any responsibility for the ANCOP?
A: He did, but it was very rare. They had a radio that they would call us on if they were attacked or needed something. He did liaison with them. We went down there about once per week to maintain contact with them.
Q: Were there any issues with that relationship?
A: I didn't see any issues. I did go down there with him a few times.
Q: When did the first element from the ODA occupy Belambai?
A: It was just before the fighting season.
Q: I want to confirm that the other split location was not at the main FOB at Zangabad. Was it at Sulaiman?
A: It had two separate names: Old School or Suliaman Makhtab.
Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) stay overnight with you guys at Belambai on Christmas?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you guys have a party? Did you shoot off flares?
A: We had a dinner that night that was made up for their arrival. I don't recall anything being shot off.
Q: Can you tell me about the celebration on New Year's Eve?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1521 DATED 16 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Pretty much all bases were shooting flares on New Year's Eve.
Q: We have some statements that some people were acting strange on New Year's Eve on the roof of the OPCEN, as though they may have been drinking. Did you see anything to that effect?
A: I didn't see anything that someone was acting like they were on some sort of substance.
Q: Everyone was acting sober?
A: From what I saw.
Q: Is there any other information that you think would be helpful to this investigation?
A: I did not expect this from SSG Bales based on my interactions. I never saw it coming.
Q: Is there anyone else that we should talk to regarding these issues?
A: No.

\\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITN(b)(3), (b)(6)

Ft Bragg, NC
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Fort Bragg, NC
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 5 day of May, 2012 at Fort Bragg, NC

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) JA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136 UCMJ
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

17 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6) regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(6) on the evening of 14 April 2012 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the incident at VSP Belambai. After being sworn to his testimony, (b)(6) stated that he stayed at VSP Belambai from 2 January 2012 through 1 March 2012 as a (b)(6) (b)(6) employed by (b)(6). His responsibilities included (b)(6) standards at the site. During his tenure at VSP Belambai, he worked with (b)(6) (b)(6) lived in the same containers used by the ODA.

2. (b)(6) characterized the command climate at the VSP to be generally positive and healthy while ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a were there. He also said that the morale on the VSP throughout his tour was "good." With respect to his stress level, (b)(6) reported that it was "pretty low" because the ODA took good care of both contractors. When asked about the relationship between the ODA and the 2-3 IN squad, he said it appeared to be one of mutual respect.

3. (b)(6) said that he believed that standards and discipline were maintained at the VSP, and never had a concern about either. When asked if he had ever seen any indications of drunkenness or drug usage, he responded that he had not; however, he did hear someone make mention of alcohol at one point. When asked whether anyone exhibited inappropriate attitudes towards Afghans, he said "no." He went on to say that everyone on the VSP respected (b)(6) two of the local workers.

4. With respect to the alleged altercation between SSG Bales and a local Afghan truck driver, (b)(6) stated that he had heard about it, but had not witnessed the event and did not have any further details about the incident.

5. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6).

Rick Waddell

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

17 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6) regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(6) the evening of 14 April 2012 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the incident at VSP Belambai. After being sworn to his testimony, (b)(6) stated that he arrived at VSP Belambai on 2 January 2012 and worked as a (b)(6) (b)(6) ensuring (b)(6) standards at the site. During his two months at VSP Belambai, he lived in the same containers used by the ODA.

2. (b)(6) stated that he had a favorable impression of the command climate and discipline standards at the VSP for both ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a which he characterized as positive and healthy. He did confide, however, that the command climate was initially a "little edgy" after ODA (b)(1)1.4a arrived, but this eased up over time. He believed that he and his coworker were well treated by the ODAs and Infantry squad. He also said that he was properly briefed by the ODAs on actions in the event of enemy contact. In general, he focused on his job duties and tried to avoid interfering with ODA operations. His daily pattern of life involved some interaction with everyone on the site, which included the junior enlisted men from 2-3 Infantry. In particular, he found (b)(3), (b)(6) to be really "good guys." He also remembered speaking to SSG Bales on occasion.

3. When questioned about alcohol or substance abuse at VSP Belambai, (b)(6) said that he never saw anything, but recalls hearing a rumor. Specifically, he said he overheard someone talking about getting some alcohol in the mail, but that was the extent of his knowledge.

4. (b)(6) acknowledged hearing rumors about an altercation that occurred between SSG Bales and a local Afghan truck driver; although he did not witness this incident. He remembers being told that SSG Bales had punched and kneed the local Afghan. He also recalls passing SSG Bales on the VSP shortly after the reported incident and hearing SSG Bales mutter something like, "I shouldn't have done that." On another occasion, he

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USFOR-A
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6), regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

overheard an unidentified ODA member, who was talking through an interpreter, use inappropriate language while directing local Afghan workers. (b)(6) also attended several dinners with ODA(b)(1)1.4a and the ANA and characterized the relationship between the two units as being very good. Finally, (b)(6) found the morale on the VSP to be high most of the time.

5. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6), DSN: (b)(6).

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A 18 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6) regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(6) on 11 April 2012 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the incident at VSP Belambai. (b)(6) is a local national interpreter employed by International Management Services (IMS). He worked at VSP Belambai for more than one year with ODA(b)(1)1.4a and ODA(b)(1)1.4a before this interview. The scope of his duties included interpreting Pashtu and Dari language for US personnel communicating with ANSF members and local Afghans. (b)(6) has been employed as a local national interpreter for two years.

2. (b)(6) said that he interacted with ODA(b)(1)1.4a and ODA(b)(1)1.4a on a daily basis while at the VSP. He also said that the ODAs were "very cool" with the local workers and interpreters on the VSP. He remembered attending almost all the shuras held with ODA(b)(1)1.4a and approximately five shuras with ODA(b)(1)1.4a In general, he said that the ODAs treated the local Afghans with dignity and respect. He also perceived the relationship between the ODA and the ANA to be good.

3. When asked whether any local workers had been fired at the VSP, he remembered hearing that a local cook had been fired and then left the VSP. He said that three Afghan workers did live on the VSP and were supposedly from Qalat, Zabul.

4. (b)(6) did know SSG Bales, and thought him to be a "cool guy." He said that he did not know what happened with him later. He stated that he was not at the VSP on 11 March 2012, but he knew that (b)(6) an older interpreter, was there. Finally, he said he was not aware of any alcohol use on VSP Belambai.

5. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6).

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/11	1415	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name.
A: (b)(6)
Q: What is your citizenship?
A: US citizen.
Q: What is your job and which company are you employed with?
(b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How long have you been performing that job?
A: For 7 months now.
Q: How long were you at VSP Belambai?
A: I was there from November to April
Q: How much did you interact with the US personnel there?
A: My job was to interact with them every day. They would ask me to listen to what they were receiving from the (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How did the US personnel at VSP Belambai treat local Afghans and Afghan workers on the VSP?
A: Sometimes it was good and sometimes it wasn't; it would depend on the situation. For instance, we used to bring local workers or contractors that would bring us supplies from Zangabad to the VSP and then we would promise to escort them back, but they would tell the Afghans they could leave and they wouldn't escort them back. It had its days; some days we'd be treating them better than other days.
Q: How would they treat the local Afghans in the villages?
A: Like I said, it would depend on the days. If we were to get shot at from that area, we wouldn't respect them as much as the other areas. But most of the time it wasn't like that.
Q: Did they treat them badly?
A: Well the ones that showed positive for IEDs, we didn't treat them better like the rest. But the elders were treated better than most of them.
Q: When we didn't treat them well, how did we treat them?
A: They would put them in a corner/isolate them. They would feed and bring them water, but they would put them in a section and isolate them from the other. I don't really call it treating them bad...the reason why they would isolate them is because they are considered to be a high threat. The rest of them were free to move around in the boundaries.
Q: When would they do that?
A: When we would do over night missions to the villages to stay in their houses. We would talk to the villagers; ask them where the IEDs are located, or if they've seen the Taliban.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 04/11/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We would scan their fingerprints and if they come up positive for IED materials, then we would isolate them. We still would treat them with respect.
Q: How did the US personnel at VSP Belambai treat you?
A: I was treated pretty well.
Q: Were you aware of an incident involving SSG Bales assaulting an Afghan truck driver?
A: I did hear about that from the laundry guy and I heard that from a couple of the infantry guys.
Q: What do you know about the incident?
A: I heard SSG Bales attacked the guy, even though it was an accident. I was surprised by it; SSG Bales wasn't an aggressive type of person. I've talked to him on many occasions.
Q: Did you see it?
A: No. I didn't see it myself.
Q: Do you remember which infantry guys told you about it?
A: I think it was (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Did you go talk to the truck driver?
A: No. I think they probably brought somebody else to talk to him.
Q: Do you know if the leadership knew about the truck incident?
A: I have a roommate who is a CAT 2 as well and he never talked about it, so I'm sure he didn't know it.
Q: What was his name?
A: (b)(6)
Q: How did US personnel know how to treat Afghans?
A: It would depend on the soldier. Some would treat Afghans better than others; and some would treat them the way they wanted to treat them. Leadership didn't tell how they were supposed to treat them. It depended on the soldier how they treated them.
Q: Did the uplift infantry participate in the shuras?
A: During the shuras, the infantry guys would pull security (b)(1)1.4a It would just be (b)(3), (b)(6) and the (b)(3), (b)(6) the elders and a couple of terps in the shuras.
Q: Did SSG Bales work or supervise or interact with the ANCOP?
A: Yes. When the ANCOP was there, I think he was the main guy who was supposed to ask them how they were doing. So he would hand me the radio and I would try to communicate every morning. I would talk to them to find out how they were doing and if they needed anything. Also, I would call them whenever we needed them to secure the road.
Q: Was he ok with it?
A: Yes. He would say to me, "To call My Boys." He would go through me, to talk to the ANCOP.
Q: Did you ever see SSG Bales participate in the shuras or did he just pull security?
A: I have never witnessed SSG Bales in a shura. I used to be in a small room, so I would never participate in the shura, but most of the time I've seen him pull security.
Q: Are you aware of instances where local nationals were fired on VSP Belambai?
A: Yes, I've heard of one. Our laundry guy supposedly talked to one of the cook's helpers; they were having a casual conversation, just getting to know each other and I think the cook's helper said his brother works for the Taliban. So the laundry guy told the senior bravo, who I think was in charge of the locals and he fired him.
Q: Did you hear (b)(3), (b)(6) make comments about Afghans that were inappropriate?
A: Sometimes when there was a prayer, he would mock the prayer and make fun of it. I told him that if one of the ANA is not in the mood for that, there will be trouble on both sides. A couple of the other guys would join him in making fun of the prayer.
Q: Was he the only one that would make comments like that?
A: Yes. He would call workers, "Monkeys." He would say it to their face but they didn't know what monkey means.
Q: Would (b)(3), (b)(6) do the same thing as well?
(b)(3), (b)(6) was in charge of the workers. He would get mad at the workers if they didn't do what he told them to do, but he would apologize afterwards.
Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) refer to them as "Monkeys" too?
A: Yes.
Q: When (b)(3), (b)(6) would refer to workers as "Monkeys", was anybody else around to hear that?
A: I think there was. Well, we would go talk to the workers as a group; some infantry guys would be there, some of the Special Forces...probably at that time.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT Khandahar DATED 04/11/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did some of the infantry guys see how the ODA acted with locals?
A: Yes.
Q: Did anybody say, "Hey man, maybe you shouldn't do that", or words of that nature?
A: One of the infantry guys did tell me to go talk to (b)(6) because he was kind of treating one the good workers bad. He didn't want to talk to (b)(6) because he was infantry and (b)(6) was ODA. I told (b)(6) he should start being a little nicer to that guy because he is a good worker and a nice guy. But that guy ended up leaving.
Q: After the 5 March IED incident, do you recall a change in how the infantry guys and the ODA dealt with the local nationals?
A: After the incident, I didn't see a big change in the SF guys, but SSG Bales was kind of different after the incident.
Q: Different, how?
A: Well, he would sit at the fire pit and look like he was in deep thought; just thinking. I would ask him what's wrong, but he would say, "Nothing." I did see a difference in him, but the other guys were sad about what happened, of course, but they were normal.
Q: Did you go on any missions between 5 March and 11 March?
A: No, we didn't.
Q: Did you ever see any of the infantry guys breaking any rules like having alcohol or anything like that?
A: With the infantry guys...not really. They would smoke a lot, but that's it. But I never recall seeing them drink or using any drugs.
Q: Have you ever seen them act like they have used alcohol?
A: No, not that I can recall.
Q: What about the ODA guys?
A: People would say when 3rd Group was there, they would have like a gathering and drink.
Q: 3rd Group would drink alcohol?
A: Yes, 3rd Group. They would have little occasions...I think on Friday nights they would have alcohol. But I didn't really see 7th Group have alcohol as a group.
Q: How did you know 3rd Group had alcohol?
A: Well, their conex was next to my conex and I think they were drinking because I saw a couple of bottles.
Q: You sure it was the 3rd Group guys that had alcohol?
A: Yes.
Q: Was it very frequent that they would have alcohol?
A: Probably every week or every 2 weeks. It wasn't an everyday thing, but on occasions.
Q: Do you recall any particular individuals that would have alcohol?
A: Well the (b)(3), (b)(6) would have alcohol.
Q: What was the (b)(3), (b)(6) name?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: So (b)(3), (b)(6) would have alcohol?
A: Yes and the CAT 1 Terp told me to stay away from him when he's having a drink. He asked him why and he said because he's not himself. So I would try to avoid him.
Q: How were you certain that (b)(3), (b)(6) had alcohol?
A: By the way he was walking.
Q: Did you actually see him drinking?
A: Yes. There were many of them in the group, so I'm sure he would be drinking.
Q: So you saw a group of the 3rd Group ODA drinking?
A: Yes.
Q: Did you actually see them physically put the bottles to their mouths?
A: Well, I saw bottles.
Q: How could you tell that the bottles were alcohol?
A: Well the bottles were tall and you could tell it was a vodka bottle by the shape of the bottle. The CAT 1 terp would tell me this night they would drink, avoid them because they are not their selves when they drink and they might treat me different, so I would try to avoid them on their drinking nights.
Q: Did that kind of happen the whole time you were out there?
A: Sometimes. Not an everyday thing, maybe once a week...once a month.
Q: When they were drinking, did you ever smell their breath?
A: No, I tried to avoid them.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(6) TAKEN AT Khandahar DATED 04/11/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How about 7th Group, did they ever do the same thing?
A: No, I didn't see them drinking.
Q: What about on the 5 March IED incident, did you see them drink then?
A: Well o (b)(3), (b)(6) was gone and one the EOD guys were gone (b)(3), (b)(6) wasn't normal because when I talked to him I could tell he suffered a lot.
Q: So there wasn't an incident or you weren't aware of them maybe getting together consoling a buddy and having a drink?
A: I don't recall it.
Q: You said one of the CAT 1 told you to avoid th (b)(3), (b)(6) o you remember which CAT 1 it was?
A: (b)(6) The older interpreter.
Q: Is there anyone else we should talk too?
A: (b)(6) he's our other CAT 1.
Q: Is he still around here?
A: He's at IMS.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Lagman, Afghanistan	2012/03/30	0958	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) Currently assigned to AOB Trident on FOB Lagman, Afghanistan in support of Village Stability Operations.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been working as the company (b)(6) and what are you day-to-day responsibilities?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

Q: Who is your (b)(3), (b)(6) and what are his responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) His resposibilities nest within mine. Bottom line, he is the enforcer of standards & discipline. He is my senior advisor; he helps me enforce and carry out my orders. He ensures the NCO channels understand my intent and operate within it.
Q: What is the mission of your unit in theater?
A: Is to provide infantry support to Combined Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan. Specifically, SOTF-SE and SOTF-S. To provide infantry support to village stability platforms in support of village stability operations.
Q: Where is your HQ located?
A: We are currently located at (b)(1)1.4a It is a camp within FOB Lagman located in Qalat, Afghanistan.
Q: What are your command and control relationships, ADCON, OPCON, TACON?
A: I have ADCON responsibilities over my soldiers. SOF have OPCON responsibility, on-the-ground responsibility. However, we still stay fully engaged as a command team for all leadership development and any other tactical professional development responsibilities. But we allow the daily operations and tasking of forces to be accomplished by VSPs and the SOTFs.
Q: What are your subordinate elements in theater? Where are they located?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with these subordinate units?
A: We handle all administrative matters such as promotions, UCMJ actions, etc. I also speak daily with my platoon leaders and on occasion with the platoon sergeants and squad leaders directly at each site. Usually it's done through email, sometimes through phone and is used to re-enforce my expectations of my platoon leaders. I also use it to provide guidance and direction to them

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB LAGMAN DATED 30 MAR 12

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

on how to interact with the ODA and specific areas I want them to focus on.
Q: What was the mission of SSG Bales uplift unit at VSP Belambai?
A: To provide infantry support to VSP Belambai. To integrate with the ODA. Then to provide the full support as possible within the scope of his responsibilites. On the ground, they take positions in base defense, they pull guard, and they help with camp improvement and expansion. and help train ALP (when established). They also go on combat patrols to support village stability operations. Usually this involves providing a squad or fire team for the ODA and they would also provide tactical ground movement (convoy) and logistical support for the VSP.
Q: What is was your relationship to the ODA unit on VSP Belambai?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself maintain a relationship via email or phone. Our lines of communication were open, but I would try not to interfere with his management of the VSP. The only time I would talk to him is if I needed an assessment of how our soldiers were performing or if there were any leadership issues we needed to correct or reinforce through our channels.
Q: Who was SSG Bales platoon leader?
A: Platoon Leader is (b)(3), (b)(6) and Platoon Sergeant is (b)(3), (b)(6) Both of them were located at VSP Ezabad, which is in Western Kandahar Province.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command at VSP Belambai?
A: He reported directly to the team sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) and they also had a direct line to the team leader, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How well did you know SSG Bales? How long have you served with him?
A: (b)(6) He was the platoon sergeant for 1st platoon. I knew him pretty well. I was able to observe him on a daily basis. We interacted on a daily basis for about 2-3 months while he was the platoon sergeant.
Q: How much are you able to interact with your subordinate units in theater? How do you interact (phone, in-person, VTC?) What limitations or constraints exist on interacting with your subordinate unit?
A: Our physical contact was very limited due to the decentralized nature and geographic dispersion of our forces. And the fact that many of these forces are at sites that are only available by aircraft and some of those aricraft don't fly to those sites on a regular basis. I tried to stay in touch with my platoon leaders on a daily basis, and (b)(3), (b)(6) to stay in touch with the platoon sergeants on a daily basis. Contact is usually done by email. Based on the nature of what we needed to discuss, I would make calls to the platoon leaders and (b)(3), (b)(6) would make calls to the platoon sergeants. We maintain a good line of communication through email or by phone. In addition, I made a plan to do Battle Field Circulation (BFC) for one week per month, to spend several days visiting sites and over nighting at some of the sites. We have been able to visit all the sites, with the exception of VSP Bagh-de-Sreh, Sakari Bagh and Garang. Those sites were inaccessible on our second BFC. Complicating this: however, is my duty as (b)(6) (b)(6) at (b)(1)1.4a
Q: How frequently did you, you (b)(3), (b)(6) a member of your primary staff visit and make meaningful contact with SSG Bales and the element he was a part of? How much did you or you (b)(3), (b)(6) eract with SSG Bales?
A: I (b)(3), (b)(6) direct interaction with SSG Bales through email and by phone. Myself, I went through the platoon leaders. I did not phone or email SSG Bales directly. We conducted a battle field circulation in February, and we spent about 2 days on the ground at VSP Belambai. We had face to face interaction with SSG Bales.
Q: Do you feel that the command relationships (OPCON, TACON, attached) were sufficient for the mission at the VSP?
A: In my point of view, I would like to see more physical interaction with our sites. So from that stand point, I do not feel the ability to get out and provide command level supervision from a conventional side is adequate. Although the contact is less than what I like, it is, however, more than what I expected coming into the deployment.
Q: Who was ultimately responsible for Soldier care of the uplift infantry NCOs and men at VSP Belambai?
A: The ODA detachment is overall responsible for them at the site. Usually the team sergeant and team commander.
Q: How was the command climate at VSP Belambai? How does this compare to the command climate of any other locations your subordinate units are located?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB LAGMAN DATED 30 MAR 12

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What disciplinary standards did you set for personnel located at the VSP? Were those standards enforced? If so, how do you know? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: For squad leaders, I provided personal guidance prior to deployment. I also had a 1 hour meeting with the team leaders and squad leaders prior to deployment, where I reinforced those key principles. Key take aways were serving honorably and enforcing standards and discipline. I provided written and verbal guidance to them. Additionally I reinforced those principles with the platoon leaders in verbal guidance prior to deployment. We talked about taking care of your soldiers and standards and discipline. To the best of my knowledge, those standards were being followed. The only issues we had with the uplift at VSP Belambai were minor issues with property accountability. We had to push a little harder with SSG Bales to get on that issue. We had a hard time getting some administrative reports back from him. He didn't like to write reports and he was very reluctant in doing that. But bottom line, we had no indications of major standards and discipline infractions at VSP Belambai.
Q: How does the discipline at VSP Belambai compare with the discipline of the other VSPs at which your personnel are located in theater?
A: To the best of my knowledge and personal observations, there were no major issues and to be honest with you, they were one of the better sites, if not, the best site. They were the best performers and we put them there for a reason. What we saw was very positive when we were there.
Q: Were you aware of any drinking or substance abuse problems at VSP Belambai? If so, what action did you take?
A: No sir, absolutely not. No indications whatsoever.
Q: What were the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?
A: Everyday they would send up a personnel status report to make sure men, weapons, and equipment are accounted for. The level of accountability on a daily basis is visual inspection. Monthly, we do a 100% inventory of the property book. All items are layed out and accounted for by serial number. The executive officer is in charge and he does this by spreadsheet.
Q: What are the security procedures in place? Are there stand-to procedures? Guard mount procedures?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Do you have an idea of how many days of incoming fire? Enemy initiated attacks since SSG Bales' arrival? Offensive engagements since Bales' arrival?
A: To my understanding of the level of contact they took, it was approximately 1 to 2 times per week that they would receive some form of small arms fire. They did have one Troops In Contact, that occurred within 200 meters of their position, that lasted about 5 hours and was fairly significant. That occurred early on in the deployment.
Q: How many casualities had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? How many were of his unit? Were any close friends of his?
A: No (b)(6) infantry soldiers have been severely wounded. There were two soldiers, (b)(3), (b)(6) (along with 3 ODA) who were involved in a IED blast about 500 meters outside the gate on the road they considered their white space. The blast blew the vehicle over and breached the hull, and those two personnel where evacuated to Role 3 KAF for TBI screening as a precaution. However the screening result was that they were fine. When they launched a QRF to initially respond to the blast, an EOD member stepped on a pressure plate, resulting in a lower leg amputation. He also was evacuated. I can't attest to how close SSG Bales was to that Soldier. Those are the only injures I'm aware of.
Q: What was the battle rhythm? How does this compare with the battle rhythm at the locations of your other subordinate units?
A: The battle rhythm was similiar to other locations. Typical operations would run from 0700 up until around 1900 hours. Then after 1900 hours, there would be some down time and then guard mount, which would start for the hours of darkness. They would run patrols as needed. The priority there was defensive posture, force protection and base defense. On days when they weren't doing mission related tasks, they were performing camp construction on the VSP. Usually around 1400, they would receive enemy contact. So usually around 1400, there would be a heightend sense of awareness and a sense of prepardness for base defense.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did your personnel have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help at VSP Belambai?
A: There were no trained behavioral health specialists on the ground. So the only method for coping with things, was talking to their buddy, talking to their immediate chain of command in the squad. The leaders would then raise any serious issues and talk openly

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB LAGMAN DATED 30 MAR 12

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6) and myself have always made it a point to reinforce the importance of talking to your Soldiers and getting to know what is going on in their personal lives and what they are thinking. Get into their personal living spaces and looking for changes in behavior. Our expectation was that they would raise issues to us and we would coordinate to get the appropriate help out there.

Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, when and how were you first notified?

A: At 0320, I was awoken by the battle captain from SOTF-S, and he told me we were missing a soldier and his whereabouts were unknown. We walked to the Ops Center while he was briefing me.

Q: Are you aware of what type of training SSG Bales' and the rest of the uplift squad at VSP Belambai incurred leading to this deployment?

A: Yes, we had a pre-NTC 20-day company level train up where we focused on COIN-specific training. Specifically on cultural awareness, some basic language, KLE, tactical questioning, media awareness and communications. At NTC, they received their RSO&I training in more detail. We spent time in a large village and on a daily basis we spent practicing those skills. Following NTC, our major training events included basic and advance rifle marksmanship. It included squad STX lane training focused on battle drills, a team leader course, and a machine gunner's course. We also brought in the Secret Service to talk about convoy operations and VSP hardening. (b)(1)1.4a

Q: Are you aware of any warning signs or indicators shown by SSG Bales about his future behavior either in his pre-deployment training or while in theater?

A: No sir, absolutely not. His character and integrity appeared beyond reproach. I never once saw anything behavior-wise or otherwise that would give me concern to his emotional, physical, or mental well-being. No concerns or indicators from my standpoint.

Q: What training or guidance, if any, do you provide your subordinates to recognize/identify warnings signs of potential dangerous behavior?

A: Prior to the deployment, we attended a suicide prevention class, taught by our suicide prevention NCO. Additionally I reinforced it through initial counseling to all my platoon leaders, all my platoon sergeants. I followed that up with verbal counseling. During the deployment, we would reinforce that during our BFCs and through regular emails to our leaders.

Q: What did you do as a (b)(6) to ensure that your personnel could handle the stress they were under?

A: From an operational stand point, we put our soldiers through as demanding training as we could reasonably provide given the amount of resources and time we had available to us. Part of the intent behind that was to make it as tough as possible to identify who was having challenges with that. The bottom line is, through all our training and our daily interaction, we try to put our soldiers in demanding, challenging, tough realistic positions where we could assess them. We try to train our junior leaders to look out for that stuff. Specifically, changes in behavior, patterns that have been altered, depression, things that could be warning signs.

Q: When did you find out the mission for your unit in theater?

A: In June, approximately a week from when (b)(6) that we got the official order and confirmation that our battalion while be supporting the CJSOTF mission and that mission would be village stability operations. So mid June, we got confirmation.

Q: What specific actions did you take to prepare your unit for this mission?

A: I put together a 20 day NTC training plan. My intent was to focus on basic infantry tactics and patrolling, but also to educate them and create awareness for Afghan specific, COIN specific considerations. Specifically, IED recognition was a key concern, cultural awareness was a key concern. And obviously we talked about the rules of engagement as well as how things will be done with respect to our mission set.

Q: What specific actions did you take and guidance did you give to prepare your personnel to conduct Village Stability Operations (VSO)?

A: On the tactical side, I was specifically concerned about marksmanship, primarily with long distance marksmanship. So I wanted to make sure our Soldiers were trained on the implementation of their weapon to a high degree. Precision rifle marksmanship outside 300 meters. Additionally, battle drills and patrolling was a focal area. On the VSO specific training, we had incorporated on our STX lanes a couple aspects, such as, key leader engagements, drop zone security, IED recognition, IED awareness, and a sniper lane. We also put in there the Afghan specific tasks, the COMISAF tasks they would be faced with. Following NTC, I felt the best way to train our squads to operate independently, was give them latitude to conduct their own decentralized, independent training for thier squads. So we did some company directed training, but the primary training focus in the last two months prior to deployment was to support squad level training run by the squads themselves. They would plan and execute thir own training. I would ensure it was coordinated, resourced, and supervised. I didn't want Afghanistan to be the first time they had to operate on their own - I wanted to instill that in them prior to depolyment.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB LAGMAN DATED 30 MAR 12

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Are you aware of any command climate issues that exist within the 2-3 uplift elements, either at VSP Belambai or another VSP? If there are any issues, what, if any, actions have you taken?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: My bottom line take away would be, that this is so shocking and out of character it is almost unimaginable to think of (though we did address this possibility and similar situations; historical vignettes, prior to deployment). We took every precaution we could to address these types of issues prior to and during deployment. But these actions, I never would have believed it would of come from this individual. I don't know how we could have foreseen this, or done anything more to prevent this from my standpoint.
Q: Are there any other witnesses you recommend I interview as part of my investigation?
A: The platoon leader and platoon sergeant. The ODA folks. And possibly (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: During those training evolutions, how much interaction did SSG Bales have with the role players?
A: I personally observed his interactions, and I would say he interacted with them on a daily basis in every single patrol he was on. Typically what we would do is have one platoon on mission, one platoon on base defense and one platoon on QRF. The platoon that was on mission, would conduct patrols in the town. SSG Bales was a platoon sergeant at the time and went on every single mission. SSG Bales was one of the more aggressive, and when I say aggressive, I mean he performed "population engagement" as he was trained. He would talk to the role players on the side in a tactical, courteous, and respectful manner.
Q: Can elaborate on when you said "he was trained to"?
A: We had talked about the importance of our junior soldiers maintaining their security, but at the same time, to engage in respectful, culturally-aware conversation that would develop a good rapport with them and facilitate good information of intelligence value from those folks.
Q: Did you see any indications that SSG Bales held local Afghans or foreigners in low esteem or had a low opinion of them?
A: No sir, absolutely not. He was always courteous, always respectful. I have nothing but positive comments to say about his performance, specifically, the interactions I observed him perform with those role players that I understood to be Afghans.

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ng Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Kandahar Air Field
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 2 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

USAF

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar, Afghanistan	2012/03/30	1211	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) at (b)(3), (b)(6) Infantry.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: A little over 12 years.
Q: How long have you been working as the (b)(3), (b)(6) and what are your day to day responsibilities?
A: Since 15 November 2010. My responsibilities are the health and welfare of the soldiers. I am responsible for individual training and administrative matters.
Q: What is the mission of your unit in theater?
A: Our unit has been chosen to conduct the VSO mission and to help support SOF forces.
Q: Where is your HQ located?
A: In SOTF-SE, in Zabul province. I am currently on FOB Mogensen, which is a FOB within FOB Lagman.
Q: What are your command and control relationships for your unit, ADCON, OPCON, TACON?
A: We have ADCON responsibility.
Q: What are your subordinate elements for (b)(3), (b)(6) in theater? Where are they located?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: What is the command and control relationship of (b)(6), (b)(3) with these subordinate units?
A: Just an administrative role sir. ADCON.
Q: What was the mission of the (b)(6) uplift unit at VSP Belambai?
A: They are to support the ODA as a SOF (Special Operations Force) uplift.
Q: What was your relationship to the ODA unit on VSP Belambai?
A: I try to make a relationship so I can be able to speak to my guys openly, as far as, getting all their administrative things complete. But as far as an operational relationship, there wasn't one.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command at VSP Belambai?
A: At the VSP, it should have been the team sergeant, then it is the team leader and then it should go up to the SOTF.
Q: How well did you know SSG Bales? How long have you served with him?
A: I've known SSG Bales professionally since August 2010, when he came to Bravo Company. I've seen him at different rear companies prior to that, so I knew of him. I knew him very well.
Q: You knew him well personally or professionally?
A: Both. (b)(3), (b)(6). He came into the company in August 2010. (b)(3), (b)(6) platoon and he became the platoon sergeant of first platoon.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT [illegible] DATED [illegible]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Can you tell us a little bit about him personally?
A: SSG Bales struck me as a guy who is a "go getter." He always wanted to do well. He didn't like to fail. He took pride in pretty much everything he did. When it came to getting the troops trained up for combat, he was what an NCO should be. He always put forward the extra step to make shit happen.
Q: How much are you able to interact with (b)(6) subordinate units in theater? How do you interact (phone, in-person, VTC?) What limitations or constraints exist on interacting with your subordinate units?
A: We communicate by NIPR, SIPR and by phone. Sometimes it is difficult to get in contact with some of the sites, either they may be conducting operations or maybe there have been some reporting restrictions for certain sites on how much they can talk to us. But for the most part, I'm able to make contact, via email or phone.
Q: Have you ever been to VSP Belambai? If so, when was the last visit by you to VSP Belambai?
A: Yes, one time in February prior to the incident and we went back there after the incident.
Q: Do you feel that the command relationships (OPCON, TACON, attached) for the 2-3 uplift squad was sufficient for the mission at the VSP?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How was the command climate at VSP Belambai? How does this compare to the command climate of any other locations (b)(3), (b)(6) subordinate units are located?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: So you're saying they didn't like SSG Bales reporting back to you on a daily basis?
A: Correct sir.
Q: What disciplinary standards did you set for personnel located at the VSP? Were those standards enforced? If so, how do you know? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: My guidance to all my NCOs and troops was to account for all of their Soldiers. Uniform standards, all the correct PPE, and being in the correct uniform when being out on patrol or even within the VSP. I wanted all the NCOs in the company to uphold and enforce the standards and discipline policy. As far as what I saw down there, those standards and discipline were being enforced.
Q: How does the discipline at VSP Belambai compare with the discipline of the other VSPs at which your personnel are located in theater?
A: From what I saw in February, Belambai was one of the places that impressed me. When we showed up, all the troops did the right thing. They knew the area well. They knew operationally what they were doing. They knew all the weapons systems. Their living quarters were clean. How they improved the camp and what they did on a daily basis, was an indication of the NCOs actively engaging with Soldiers. For the most part, Belambai, in comparison to the rest the of sites we've been too, impressed us the most at that time.
Q: Were you aware of any drinking or substance abuse problems at VSP Belambai? If so, what action did you take?
A: No sir.
Q: What were the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?
A: Every day SSG Bales did a report (PERSTAT), it would report how many guys they had there. As far as equipment, they would do a monthly accountability. So every day they should be checking their sensitive items and sensitive equipment. Then on a monthly basis they would account for all their squad equipment and send those reports back to us.
Q: Was there any trouble getting those reports?
A: It wasn't an issue getting them.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT [illegible] DATED [illegible]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What are the security procedures in place? Are there stand-to procedures? Guard mount procedures?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Do you have an idea of how many days of incoming fire? Enemy initiated attacks since SSG Bales' arrival? Offensive engagements since SSG Bales' arrival?
A: SSG Bales kind of indicated that every other day they were getting shot at. Whether it was pop shots or a major engagement.
Q: Did that seem to bother SSG Bales or any of the other people?
A: No. Many of the infantry guys were excited. That is what they want to do. At that time, SSG Bales never expressed any concern. He was always the one who wanted to improve his men. Make them better shooters and better train them.
Q: How many casualties had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? How many were of his unit? Were any close friends of his?
A: There was an MRAP at Belambai that got hit with an IED. We had two soldiers that got evacuated from that incident. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) They were evacuated for TBI screening. They were in all the proper PPE, they were seat belted in the vehicle. As a result, both of those Soldiers were ok. They were a little shaken up, but they were fine. Also in that vehicle was the team sergeant. He was rung pretty well and an 18 Delta who had a little more severe TBI signs.
Q: What was the battle rhythm at VSP Belambai? How does this compare with the battle rhythm at the locations of other subordinate (b)(3), (b)(6) units?
A: I know their roll call started at 0700. If they didn't have a patrol, they would do camp improvement throughout the day, probably to about 1700. And they would have team meetings in the afternoon. As far as their schedule on patrolling, we weren't read in on that. I just know on non-patrol days, they did a lot of camp improvement. Continuing to improve their fighting positions. It provided structure in comparison to the other sites. One of the other VSP sites we had concern with and started to put our focus on was VSP Talukon. Belambai was doing all the right things. Talukon needed to improve because the threat level for both of these VSPs were high. The guys at Belambai were pretty motivated about improving their living space and their camp.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did your personnel have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help at VSP Belambai?
A: If Soldiers are stressed out, they should be reached out through leadership. The leadership are trained to identify those things. They would either call back to the SOTF or they can call us and we would coordinate for a chaplain to meet them out there. If we need to, we contact the combat stress team or even bring the soldier back to KAF to kind of decompress. Stress has not been an issue so far, in our company.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, when and how were you first notified?
A: I was located on Camp Brown. I was woken up around 0345 to 0400 by one of the TOC NCOs. He said to me that we have an incident that's pretty serious. On the way to the OPCEN, he briefed me that one of our guys walked off the VSP. The initial report we got was that he was possibly sleep walking. We were told it was SSG Bales.
Q: Are you are aware of what type of training SSG Bales and the rest of the uplift squad at VSP Belambai incurred leading to this deployment?
A: Two members of each squad were trained on the 60mm mortar. One of the things we were focused on as far as for the squads was long range marksmanship. SSG Bales was the guy that ran that training for our company, being that he was qualified. He pretty much trained members of each squad in long range marksmanship. We also focused on team and squad live fires, because the mission was pretty much a squad level mission. In NTC, we focused on Afghan scenarios, but it wasn't VSP oriented. As a company whole, we focused on being at a COP around a city. We focused on interacting with the populous and COIN operations.
Q: Are you aware of any warning signs or indicators shown by SSG Bales about his future behavior either in his pre-deployment training or while in theater?
A: To be completely frank, I know SSG Bales always wanted to do a good job. He loved his kids. (b)(6) I don't know if he was dealing with (b)(6) (b)(6) I always thought he was financially sound, because he had a lot of knowledge on stocks and managing his

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 10 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS [illegible], PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT [illegible] DATED [illegible]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

money. First priority was making sure his kids were taken care of. As far as indicators, he wanted to get promoted really badly. We tried to prepare and get him ready for the E-7 board. We tried to make sure his evaluations were in line, make sure his OMPF was updated and his ERB was updated. That was very important to him. But the E-7 list hadn't come out before the incident.

Q: Anything else on his personal demeanor?

A: He would talk about how he had the resolve. Meaning, he would say, no matter what, he could pull the trigger. If had to pull the trigger, he could pull the trigger. I do recall a conversation when he said that. I talked about, he wouldn't hesitate in the face of the enemy, to pull the trigger. That was something he talked about when we were peers. He used to be in a sniper platoon. He came from a sniper platoon.

Q: Did he ever talk bad about Afghans?

A: I never heard him say anything bad. He might have expressed that to other individuals but he never expressed that to me.

Q: What training or guidance, if any, did you provide your subordinates to recognize/identify warning signs of potential dangerous behavior?

A: Prior to the deployment, we would have classes about ways to identify stress. It was always one of my priorities to make sure the NCOs got involved with their Soldiers. Make sure they got to know them and understand what stresses that Soldier, whether it is finances, relationships, family, health or whatever it could be.

Q: When did you find out about the mission for your unit in theater?

A: Our first indicator when we found out we were about to be deployed was in May. We got information that we may be deployed about late fall, early winter. Right before we went to NTC, we learned about the VSO mission. Specials Forces guys came down and explained what VSO meant and what our mission was going to be.

Q: What specific actions did you take and guidance did you give to prepare your subordinates to conduct Village Stability Operations (VSO)?

A: We read an excerpt from a memo about VSO. We coordinated for some of the SF guys to come down and talk about VSO. We gave classes about VSO, based on the knowledge we had about the operations. We focused on squad level training. The idea was that when we came to Afghanistan, we wanted to structure our squads like an ODA squad. We wanted our guys to pair up with the ODA so they can receive that type of cross training and to help us integrate with the ODA team so we could better facilitate their mission.

Q: How many combat deployments do you have?

A: This is my third combat deployment. This is my fifth deployment.

Q: Did the notification of this unscheduled deployment cause any family problems, stress, etc for SSG Bales?

A: To my knowledge it didn't. SSG Bales seemed ready to go. He didn't indicate any kind of stress or if it bothered him. He was always about the mission.

Q: How did SSG Bales take the move from platoon sergeant down to squad leader?

A: He took it pretty hard. I explained to the SGM that I was happy with SSG Bales as the platoon sergeant. He was a top performer. But at the end I lost that argument and I got a SFC in. SSG Bales took that pretty hard. He thought he was getting fired. I had to sit him down and let him know that was not the case. He understood that when I sat him down and talked to him.

Q: Do you have any counseling statements for SSG Bales?

A: I do not have any here. The counseling statement I had with SSG Bales before we left for deployment. I passed them off to his current platoon sergeant.

Q:Are you aware of any command climate issues that exist within the 2-3 uplift elements, either at VSP Belambai or another VSP? If there are any issues, what, if any, actions have you taken?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?

A: This is a real shock. We considered SSG Bales as one of our best in our company. For this to happen is very unfortunate. Again, the one thing I do know is, (b)(6) I know he had professional stress, that he wanted to make the E-7 list. That was important to him. But other than that, I have no clue why he did what he did.

Q: Did you know his wife?

A: I've met his wife a couple of times.

Q: Are there any other witnesses you recommend I interview as part of my investigation?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) currently the sniper section leader at TF (b)(1)1.4a He served with SSG Bales.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT [illegible] DATED [illegible]

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Were you with the commander monitoring training at the scenario based role playing events at NTC, particularly the ones that had the Afghan role players?
A: We were actually involved. We really didn't observe, we were a part of it. My role was to run CCPs, Med-Evacs, COIST, LOG PACs, and Base Defense.
Q: Did you observe SSG Bales interact with Afghan role players and what was your assessment of these interactions?
A: He conducted KLEs; he conducted himself professionally as we expected from a senior squad leader or junior platoon sergeant. He was a platoon sergeant during that training. So there was no indicator. His platoon was one of our top platoons. He did an outstanding job as platoon sergeant down at NTC. — Nothing follows

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INF (b)(3), (b)(6) DUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of April 2012
at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE [illegible] OF [illegible] PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BRAVO COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION, 3RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
SOTF-SE, FOB LAGMAN
TU TRIDENT, APO AE 09383

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZH-INN-B 04 APR 12

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with BG Waddell

1. After reading my statement I want to make an addition to the following question. Q: How much are you able to interact with (b)(6) subordinate units in theater? How do you interact (phone, in-person, VTC?) What limitations or constraints exist on interacting with your subordinate units?

2. My original answer to the question was not complete and is as follows. "We communicate by NIPR, SIPR and by phone. Sometimes it is difficult to get in contact with some of the sites, either they may be conducting operations or maybe there have been some reporting restrictions for certain sites on how much they can talk to us. But for the most part, I'm able to make contact, via email or phone."

3. I would like to add the following statement. "Other restrictions are put on me from the SOTF-SE and SOTF-SE AOB Commanders. I have been directed that my responsibilities are to support the AOB in which I work for. The SOTF-SE Commander (b)(3), (b)(6) does not support me seeing my guys via BFC in SOTF-South. He stated the SOTF-South is capable of handling any issues that would arise and that they solely are the chain of command for those Soldiers (b)(6) (b)(6) in the south. He told me that my responsibilities are not within SOTF-south and that I will support fully the mission I have in SOTF-SE. I do support and work hard at the mission I have here in SOTF-SE but do not agree with the directive that I will not be involved with my Soldiers in SOTF-S."

4. POC for this memo is the undersign at SVOIP (b)(6) and email (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Lagman, Camp Mogensen	2012/03/31	1759	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Where are you currently located?
A: Sir, I'm currently located in Qalat District in Zabul Province at FOB Lagman, Camp Mogensen.
Q: Please state your full name, rank, and current duty position.
A: My name is (b)(3), (b)(6) I am currently assigned to (b)(3), (b)(6)
My rank is (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Sir, I've been in the military for almost (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Is this your first combat tour?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How long have you been working as the (b)(3), (b)(6) 2-3 and what are your day-to-day responsibilities?
A: Sir, I've been the (b)(3), (b)(6) since October 2011. I guess about 7 months or so. My day to day responsibilities are property accountability and making sure all of our Soldiers have the proper equipment that is needed. Back in garrison, I am in charge of planning and coordinating for any training events.
Q: Do you know what the mission of SSG Bales uplift unit at VSP Belambai was?
A: Sir, I don't have information regarding their mission. I know they were assigned to assist with the ODA that was at VSP Belambai and they were conducting village stability operations, but as far as day to day missions, I don't have any insight.
Q: How long have you known SSG Bales and how long have you served with him?
A: Sir, I've served with SSG Bales since I arrived at (b)(3), (b)(6) in December 2010. At the time, he was the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Bales and I are pretty close. He kind of took me under his wing when I first got to (b)(3), (b)(6) As the (b)(3), (b)(6) kind of showed me the ropes and mentored me since I didn't have a formal Platoon Sergeant at the time.
Q: When did you get to (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: When I first got to (b)(3), (b)(6) I was a (b)(3), (b)(6) for 9 months and then I was taken out of my (b)(3), (b)(6) position in September 2011 and moved to the (b)(3), (b)(6) position in (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: So SSG Bales mentored you even though he was in a different Platoon?
A: Yes, sir. The desks in our office were very close together. We sat face-to-face. He definitely mentored me.
Q: You knew SSG Bales very well. How frequently did you get to visit SSG Bales and the element he was a part of in theater?
A: I never got a chance to go to VSP Belambai and visit him or the ODA counterpart while I was in country.
Q: Do you have an opinion on the command relationship on the command's OPCON, TACON, ect…and were they sufficient from your stand point?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Lagman, Afghanistan DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: As far as reporting requirements, as an (b)(3), (b)(6) I had no issues with SSG Bales or the squad leader he was with out there. I can't really comment as far as the climate that the ODA provided for them, but as far as him reporting to me in regards to property accountability and issues, I had no issues.
Q: Were you aware of any alcohol use or substance abuse at VSP Belambai?
A: No, I was not sir.
Q: In general, any sense of how many days of enemy contact, that your uplift unit at VSP Belambai was taking?
A: I don't know exactly, but it seemed that on a weekly basis, VSP Belambai would take contact 2-3 times a week from reporting.
Q: You knew SSG Bales pretty well. The type of training that he and the rest of the Platoon and Squad got, must have been similar to the training your squad received up until deployment. Can you describe that training?
A: Yes sir. I can go back to May 2011. That was our first major training event since I had come to the unit. We went to the Yakima Training Center in Washington. There we conducted numerous shoot house exercises, close combat marksmanship, basic rifle marksmanship, CREW drills with heavy weapons, Stryker gunnery test with M2 .50 cal, MK-19, and live fire exercise, as well as Platoon STX Lanes. Past Yakima, the next training event we had was the National Training Center in Fort Irwin, California. There we conducted our RSOI Training. We had about a week of classes on key leader engagements and what to expect out at NTC. When we got into field week, we would go to the village, conduct KLEs, assess the security within the village, and depending on if there was enemy in the area or if they came in overnight, help the ALP from NTC capture or kill the enemy in the village. Past NTC, we did long range marksmanship training and more heavy weapons CREW drills. That was a majority of the training that I can recall.
(b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Bales, you were there for nine months and knew him pretty well. Were there any warning signs from his behavior that would indicate he would have an event like this in his future?
A: From my perspective, there were no warning signs. SSG Bales was always the happy-go-lucky type of guy that I knew. He was always passionate about what he did. In reference to our Company training meetings, he always had something to say, something to add great insight. He was very passionate. No warning signs that I saw from SSG Bales to indicate that something like this would happen. He has never said anything negative or showed hatred towards Afghans. He never showed any emotions towards lack of advancement, from my perspective. As far as finances, he always seemed very knowledgeable. He would talk with Squad Leaders within our Platoon about finances and investments. No indication that he was having financial issues.
Q: What about family troubles?
A: There were no indications. He never said anything negative about his family. SSG Bales always spoke positively about his kids and wife. There was no signs of any family related issues that I saw.
Q: You deployed originally as the acting Company commander, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you give me an indication, in that first few weeks there as people were going to the VSPs, whether there were any command climate issues from the people that had been moved to the different locations?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Are you aware of any disciplinary issues among the 2-3 Infantry Elements out there?
A: Sir, while I was the active commander there were no disciplinary issues that were brought to my attention, at all. Once and a while there would be a complaint of a uniform issue. (b)(6) Soldiers would have beards or would be wearing a t-shirt instead of a multi-cam top. As far as disciplinary issues, there were none.
Q: Tell me a little bit about (b)(3), (b)(6) and how you know him.
A: I spent more time with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) when I was a Platoon leader because I worked in the same offices as them. I'm the type of guy who will talk to anyone about anything. So, I would always talk to the squad leaders even if they were not in my Platoon. (b)(3), (b)(6) was always a very respectful and positive person. I don't have anything negative to say ab(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) at all, sir.
Q: Did you know (b)(3), (b)(6) at all?
A: Sir, he came into (b)(3), (b)(6) after I got pulled to be the (b)(3), (b)(6).

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Lagman, Afghanistan DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

So, my interactions with him were minimal. The interactions I did have with him dealt with getting equipment or casual conversation. From the interactions I did have with (b)(3), (b)(6) he was a respectful person.

Q: Were you close with SSG Bales inside and outside of the work place?

A: When I said we were close, I mean work relationship wise. Even with my own Soldiers, I did not socialize with them outside of work, unless it was a Platoon or Company event. However, we were close as far as a work relationship is concerned. He was a mentor to me when I first arrived to the Company.

Q: When you first arrived in country and started working with ODA, what was your interaction with the ODA and their leadership?

A: Most of my interaction was through Camp Brown with (b)(3), (b)(6) who was in charge of the support center. I also interacted with the (b)(3), (b)(6) at Camp Brown, in regards to coordinating for (b)(3), (b)(6) Soldier to move to their VSPs and getting equipment to the VSPs. That was a majority of my interaction with any Special Forces personnel.

Q: You didn't deal with the VSPs really?

A: Yes, sir. As soon as the Company was moved to their VSPs I moved to SOTF South East to FOB Lagman in Qalat District.

Q: In your pre-deployment training or initial time in country, did you and SSG Bales discuss the mission set and his thoughts on the battle space or Afghanistan?

A: Sir, he didn't discuss those types of topics with me. As far as his character and how he reacted to the mission he was placed in, he seemed excited to get out to the VSP, start working and learning. He has a thirst for knowledge and he wanted to get to the VSP, start working with Special Forces and see what Special Forces had to offer and teach him to help progress him as a Soldier. He never elaborated on the mission itself, besides the fact that he was excited to be there and be a part of it.

Q: Did he express any opinion about Afghans or was he interested in learning about the dynamics of the districts?

A: Sir, he never really discussed any views to me about Afghans or the area they would be working in, so I can't really elaborate on that any further.

Q: Do you have any other information that might be helpful to this investigation that we haven't asked you?

A: No, sir.

Q: Are there any other witnesses that you think we should interview to give us a complete picture of SSG Bales or the other personnel at Belambai?

A: I think the Platoon Leader, the Platoon Sergeant, myself, (b)(3), (b)(6) and the Company Commander are great sources. If you're looking to interview anybody else I would recommend the Squad Leaders he worked with in the Platoon.

Q: Do you know who his best friend might have been?

A: I know he was very close to (b)(3), (b)(6) and he was also rather close with (b)(3), (b)(6) Those were two squad leaders within his Platoon.

END STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of April 2012 at NEW KABUL COMPOUND, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Type of Person Administering Oath)

TITLE 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
VSP Belambai, Afghanistan	2012/03/31	1507	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I've been in the military (b)(3), (b)(6).
Q: How long have you been working as (b)(6) What are your day to day responsibilities?

(b)(3), (b)(6)(b)(1)1.4a

Q: What is the mission of your unit in theater?
A: Right now, my platoon is tasked between two different ODAs. Were supposed to be a general purpose force uplift for them. We sort of serve as combat multipliers; bringing more personnel to whatever mission they need and kind of fulfill whatever they need us to do; largely a support role.
Q: What are your unit's command relationships? (ADCON, OPCON, Attached).
A: As far as ADCON and OPCON, my squads technically belong to the ODAs. But in that regard, they let me have some sort of administrative control making sure the soldiers are taken care of, reporting issues are taken care of and that's sort of the relationship for me for most of these squads. While at Ezabad, the ODA did allow me to conduct my own patrol with my squads and serves as sort of their tactical leader when the ODA needed to employ us.
Q: What is your relationship to the ODA unit on VSP Belambai?
A: My relationship with the ODA was partially limited to the commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) I would speak to him via email, approximately once a week and he would send me daily Sit Reps from his site. The Sit Reps kind of showed the daily activities my guys did. Beyond that, that was my only real relation with the ODA here. It was largely administrative with (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What about the prior ODA group(b)(1)1.4a
A: It was largely the same. At the time, I didn't speak with (b)(3), (b)(6) very much, who was the commander for them at that time. I mostly spoke with SSG Bales for all the administrative requirements that I had.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command at VSP Belambai?
A: While at VSP Belambai, as my understanding from speaking with team and my guys since arriving here, he reported to the Team Sergeant and the Team Commander for all VSP Belambai related issues; and I would speak to him once a week during a phone call and approximately 1 to 2 times via email per week, about general patrols, if any issues were arising, promotions, etc..

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6) N MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT VSP BELAMBAE DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

As far as things happening on the ground, I had no control over that, sir. The ODA had operational control over them.
Q: How well did you know SSG Bales? How long have you served with him?
A: I knew SSG Bales fairly well. He was the Platoon Sergeant when I first showed up to the unit, so he was my first Platoon Sergeant. The first day on the job, he and I did our first rotation at NTC together. He was my first Platoon Sergeant, so we had a fairly close relationship, in terms of, learning the day to day operations of the platoon and we worked together with pretty much all issues that we had.
Q: Did you feel that the command relationship for your split platoon was adequate?
A: Yes, sir. I felt as far as administrative problems were being addressed; I understand that there's only so much I can do with this unique sort of deployment, in terms of controlling what my guys are doing on the ground, they largely belong to ODA at that site. But I never felt I had really any issues communicating whatever problems between us. I felt that I was largely kept in what I needed to know about.
Q: Who was ultimately responsible for Soldier care of the uplift infantry NCOs and squads at VSP Belambai?
A: As far as how I saw that fit, I believe we had responsibility to the soldiers' issues and that we were handling it appropriate, but the ODA had sort of the tactical, operational, and day to day control over them.
Q: How did you perceive the command climate at VSP Belambai? How did that compare to the command climate of any other locations your squads are located?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What disciplinary standards did you set for personnel located at the VSP? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: The disciplinary standards we set were the ones the commander gave as guidance to all the squad leaders before we left. It was largely, "We know we are remotely located but we will maintain the same standards we have as a Company at Fort Lewis." And as I understood it, we had no disciplinary issues in my platoon up until this incident. I know some other platoons have had some but up until know, this is the first I've heard anything, sir.
Q: Were you aware of any drinking or substance abuse problems at VSP Belambai? If so, what action did you take?
A: No, sir. I was unaware of anything like that happening.
Q: What were the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?
A: The personnel and weapons accountability was the squad leader task. That was something we gave to the squad leader level. Every day he does daily checks on all of his men weapons and equipment. That's part of our daily battle rhythm, sir. That's what we expected to have happen.
Q: What are the security procedures in place? Are there stand-to procedures? Guard mount procedures?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: How long have you been at Belambai?
A: Going on three weeks.
Q: Do you have an idea of how many days of incoming fire? Enemy initiated attacks since SSG Bales' arrival?
A: My guys have actually been counting and there have been 37 troops in contact incident here at VSP Belambai. I say about six of those happened since I've arrived. So approximately 30 since SSG Bales arrived.
Q: How many causalities had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? How many were of his unit?
A: The only causalities suffered by my guys were the two that suffered the IED attack. Speaking for my men, the only causality they refer to was (b)(3), (b)(6) they all knew him fairly well, and beyond that they haven't really spoken much about it. I haven't really gotten a good feel on how close they were to him, they knew him, and they called him by his first name which was pretty standard for the guys here. But beyond that I'm not sure it's had much of a negative effect on them since then, sir.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, when and how were you first notified?
A: The morning of the incident, I received a phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6), my commander, at about 0630, that's while I was at VSP Ezabad. That's when he informed me that he had left the wire and returned and at that time we didn't know all the details.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT VSP BELAMBAI DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Just wounded Afghan civilians.
Q: What type of training did SSG Bales' and the rest of the uplift squads at VSP Belambai incur leading to this deployment?
A: We had a variety of training. Most of it focused on basic soldier level skills, squad level skills and your basic drill training. That was the most of our tactical training and this was post our NTC deployment. In addition to the tactical training we did a lot of cultural training, we had a lot of classes on Pashtu; we had cultural expert talk to us about Afghan standards, in particular Pashtu's. We also had Special Forces team members from 3rd Group, who had done village stability operations, come in on more than one occasion and speak to us about the nature of the mission here and how we can expect to see ourselves in it. The NTC rotation was Operation Enduring Freedom focus and so it had an Afghanistan theme but it was not by any means village stability operations.
Q: Are you aware of any warning signs or indicators shown by SSG Bales about his future behavior either in his pre-deployment training or while in theater?
A: Negative, sir. I can't say that anything could have predicted something like this. In my personal opinion though, he was excited about the deployment, that's what we talked about most of the time. He was going to get the chance to be a squad leader again but honestly I think he preferred that to being a platoon sergeant, because he would kind of have more of a tactical leadership role rather than as a platoon sergeant. My impression of SSG Bales before we left was that he was excited for the deployment and he couldn't wait to get over here.
Q: Did you ever have any personal counseling with him about his personal finances and his family situation?
A: Sir I conducted an initial counseling with him (b)(3), (b)(6) in which I laid out my expectations of the Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant relationship. I did not include in that counseling a financial discussion. It was limited to what I expected of him as a Platoon Sergeant.
Q: Did you ever shoot the breeze with him?
A: Yes, sir. We did talk about his family from time to time. I never really ever dealt into his personal financial problems and he never actually made it clear to me that he had any financial problems. This is the first I've heard of him having any sort of financial issues. My impression from all our conversations about our families was that he loved his kids, that he's an absolutely dedicated father; he has always made that clear. (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Q: Did you see any warning signs, in general?
A: In retrospect and I have thought about this and in 100% honesty I did not see any signs that indicated he was changing or that he was under any undue stress leading up to deployment. He was just the same old SSG Bales I've always known and there weren't any indications. There weren't any behavioral changes, he wasn't talking differently and there was no indication that he was having any kind of changes like that, sir.
Q: I'm assuming none your other NCOs in your platoon brought up any issues with SSG Bales?
A: No they did not.
Q: Can you give me any impression on (b)(3), (b)(6)?
A: Yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) was my youngest squad leader in the army. But very confident NCO and one of my most trusted squad leaders. He never indicated any problems with SSG Bales or with really anything happening at the camp here.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did your personnel have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help at VSP Belambai?
A: To prepare for stress we emphasized the need for our younger soldiers to lean on their team leaders and squad leaders. Made sure all soldiers understood that we had an open door policy that you can come to anyone and talk about the problems they had. And they also understood that we could get a chaplain if they needed to talk to someone outside of the chain of command, if they were having any sort of problems they didn't want to talk to us about.
Q: Do you have any counseling statements for SSG Bales?
A: They initial counseling statement is actually on a laptop either at VSP Ezabad or at Fort Lewis. I don't know the exact location of that counseling statement at this time right now.
Q: You said you were receiving courtesy copies of the ODA Sit Reps, is that correct?
A: Yes, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) would courtesy copy me on all his daily Sit Reps.
Q: When you first came in, was there a problem with that or did you guys resolve that later on?
A: At first, the Sit Rep situation was a little bit of a problem. The previous ODA (b)(1)1.4a don't know if it there was a miscommunication to my camp on reporting for my commander's intent; but they did not want SSG Bales or (b)(3), (b)(6) reporting to me on a daily basis.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT USP BELAMBAIS DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

And then that sort of continued with ODA (b)(1)1.4a became kind of an issue, and again, I wasn't on the ground to hear discussions that were going on between my squad leaders and the ODA...that there was some sort of embellishment as to what we needed or what the situation was, but there was definitely a push back on the daily reporting from my squad leaders. And what ended up happening was, (b)(3), (b)(6) agreed to cc me on all his Sit Reps and I would call on a weekly basis and sort of just talk to SSG Bales usually but sometimes (b)(3), (b)(6) about anything else that wasn't covered in those Sit Reps.

Q: So they didn't want any sort of parallel reporting, is that correct?

A: Correct, sir. It was made clear that there's to be no parallel reporting and if there ever were any sort of correspondence between us it would be emails and it was usually cc'd to the team commander here.

Q: In regards to your squads being at two different locations, was that decision made above you or was that decided between you and Platoon Sergeant?

A: Before we deployed I saw the dispositions of where our platoon was going to be, and I made the suggestion to my commander, who in turn made the suggestion to the SOTFs that I be placed at VSP Belambai and (b)(3), (b)(6) be at VSP Ezabad. That was turned down; we brought it up multiple times, but the SOTFs made the call and put me and (b)(3), (b)(6) together out at VSP Ezabad.

Q: Did they give you a rationale on why that decision was made?

A: No, sir. They never really explained why they didn't want us there or at the platoon headquarters.

Q: If you had the chance to go back and do it all over again, what would you have done differently?

A: Going back and looking back on it, the biggest issue was not so much our basic infantry skills that were lacking; it was rather how we are going to integrate with the ODA. If I could go back and do it all over again, I would go and seek out more interactions with green berets who have done this mission before. I would reach out to the conventional unit that been here before us, to sort of iron out the issue that we had to kind of learn on the fly. Mainly one issue that has been kind of a problem is exactly how the platoon level leadership can integrate into the VSO mission. Because it's largely a squad leaders based mission, they really just need infantry squads. In some ways out at VSP Ezabad, I have functioned as a (b)(6) to where they let me run my own patrols and be the commander on the ground. And in other times, I'm just sort of like this buffer between them and the guys when they need something done. So really I would just reach out and try to better understand how we would relate to the ODA, because we kind of just knew that they wanted us to be infantry men and they wanted us to be prepared to be flexible, but behind that they're wasn't really a complete clarification on how a platoon leader would function in this mission. In addition to that, I think one of the other things I would focus on is language training and just more cultural exposure. The only problem with that was that we really didn't know exactly where we were going to be in Afghanistan and or we got told immediately before we left, so there wasn't a lot of time to react and try to focus on a specific area in country. But that would be what I would do different, sir.

Q: At any point did you get a thorough deep dive from analysts or Intel people on the districts you platoon would be deployed too?

A: The extent of our, sort of, I guess read ahead on the districts we fell in on, that didn't happen for me or my guys at Ezabad until we actually showed at Ezabad. We had ODA (b)(1)1.4a at us down us and gave us the first thorough O&I brief on the area. I don't know for certain what kind of brief they got here a Belambai, but I do know the ODA sat down with them and gave them the brief about the rules of engagement, escalation of force and things like that once they got on the ground. But before we deployed, we didn't know exactly where we were going and so it was largely once we got to the site that we really got a real good thorough understanding of what operations we're in.

Q: Do you feel your soldiers have a level of understanding of what the tribal and cultural dynamics of their immediate area? Do you think it's important for a squad leader to understand these dynamics?

A: Yes, sir. I do think it's important, that down to the lowest level, they understand the tribal and cultural dynamics that happens around their VSP. I'm pretty confident that our guys can talk the tribal dynamics of the area and down to the individual villages. I've talked with them and they can give me a run down on who is sort of the power broker in whatever village. And they know where people do and do not live; they know the patterns of life. They have a good understanding of the area and that comes from the ODAs and all their operations in the area. I'm confident they understand the cultural dynamics.

Q: Did SSG Bales express to you or showed any actions on being demoted from Platoon Sergeant to Squad Leader? How do you think he handled that situation?

A: Yes, sir. He was angry about it. He felt like the unit had sold him out or something like that. He was just very angry that he had spent a year with the platoon and then he was made a squad leader. He haven't talked to him much about it, it was just one of those things where all I can tell him was kind how this was going to work and this position is for an E-7. We needed four squads and at the time I only had 3 squad leaders, so he was going to have to be squad leader. Beyond him being angry about it, there wasn't

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING ST (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT VSP BELAMBAI DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

so much a change in his behavior. He was the same old SSG Bales and just a squad leader at that point.
Q: Did he ever express to you his concerns deploying to one of the most hostile areas his unit was deploying too?
A: He was excited about that prospect. I know I talked to my commander when we were getting a rundown of the sites and which squad would go where, SSG Bales was chosen to come to Belambai exactly because it was such an active site, and that we needed a strong squad leader who we could trust on the ground and make the right decisions.
Q: How close is your working relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: We didn't really get much of a chance to do training together; we largely had to just sort of take care of administrative thing like SRP, before deploying. Since we've been deployed, I've got to know him better and I know him fairly well now and we have a really good working relationship at this point.
Q: Did you ever have a conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) as to what is considered NCO business?
A: I think we had a good understanding of what we each needed to focus on, but actually I would say we've talked about, I have my lane and he has his.
Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: No, sir. Nothing comes to mind.
Q: Are there any other witnesses you recommend I interview as part of my investigation?
A: No sir.

\\END OF STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of April, 2012 at NEW KABUL COMPOUND, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/03/31	0947	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I'll have been in the military (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Your MOS (Military Occupation Specialty)?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been working as the (b)(6) in the 2-3 Infantry?
A: (b)(6)
Q: What are the day to day responsibilities as the (b)(6)
A: My day-to-day responsibilities include accountability, enforce the standards, make sure that we're prepared for missions, all the PCCs (Pre-Combat Check) and PCIs (Pre-Combat Inspection) also have to be reported. I send SITREPs (Situational Report) to our First Sergeant and also basically support and help out with the VSO (Village Stability Operations) missions as much as possible with the Special Forces.
Q: What is the mission or your unit (b)(3), (b)(6) in this theater at this time?
A: We act as a force multiplier to help the SF (Special Forces) out, so they can have down time; there's just not enough SF team members to continue 24-hour operations. We bring certain things to the table; some of our guys are weapons experts, some of them are better with tactics and planning. Overall, we support and enable them to better perform their VSO mission, which starts with this local security, building up the governments, and helping the Afghans to be able to own their security and to be self supporting -- that's the overall goal.
Q: Where is your platoon headquarters located?
A: At Asadabad.
Q: What is the command and control relationship for your unit and its subordinate squads which are at these VSPs (Village Stability Platforms); what is the ADCON (Administrative Control), OPCON (Operational Control), TACON (Tactical Control)?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Where are your squads located?
A: Two of my squads are with me at Ezabad and two were over at Belambai. I know there has been a little bit of moving around, I just got back from emergency leave, so, I am not a hundred percent yet.
Q: Is your platoon leader at Ezabad with you?
A: Yes, he's there with me. But I believe right now, he's over at VSP Belambai.
Q: When did you go on emergency leave; was it before or after the incident?
A: It was before; I believe it was about 24 February.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) ING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 9 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: The mission of the 2-3 unit from your platoon at VSP Belambai, is that as you previously described?
A: That was my understanding of it; however, going into it, they needed special skill requirements and that is one of the reasons why SSG Bales and the other squad group were actually sent there to begin with was because of his sniper skills and some of the other Soldiers there.
Q: What were some of the other Soldier specials skills? To whom are you referring?
A: Like (b)(3), (b)(6), his squad had the highest PT (physical training) average and they did a lot of dismounted stuff, whereas at Asadabad, we do more mounted movements. So, they wanted to put the highest PT score squad over there with SSG Bales' squad.
Q: Just because of the physical component of what you expected the mission to involve, right?
A: That was kind of the outline. We sat down with our First Sergeant to see what the requirements were; what skills were needed. They later brought on (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales because I think they had worked together before in the sniper section. They had two PFCs (Private First Class) as the team leaders, and the addition of (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales kind of helped fill that mission set that they were looking for. And that is why those two squads were put over there.
Q: What was your daily relationship with the ODA (Operational Detachment A) at VSP Belambai, and with their team sergeants and team leadership?
A: I actually never met them in person. The old SOTF team that RIP'd (Relief in Place) out in January, we had a little bit of trouble with communications; it seemed like there was a barrier there. It really started to cause a little friction between me and the First Sergeant because he felt like I wasn't trying to control them or get the information from them and make sure that they were doing their CIB (Current Intelligence Brief) paperwork and that type of stuff. Once the RIP/TOA (Relief in Place/Transfer of Authority) came, we still had a little bit of a conflict with the new team until the team commander talked to my Lieutenant on the phone and they hashed out what we were looking for. Our First Sergeant came around on battlefield circulation and he sat down with me, we hashed everything out and deconflicted the basis of our relationship. Then he went over to VSP Belambai, and once he spoke with the team commander, everything seemed to be a lot smoother with the communication. The e-mails back and forth became a little better and the information that we were asked to send to higher was also then going along with what everybody else expected.
Q: So, do you think that the First Sergeant did talk to the team sergeant about this?
A: That would be speculation; I know he talked to ours when he came. The First Sergeant and I went off and we had our deal and worked our situation out and made sure everything was clear where maybe it wasn't before. The LT and the Commander went off and they did the same thing, then they all talked to the team sergeant and the team commander.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain of command, while at VSP Belambai, on a daily basis?
A: There was a lot of confusion in the beginning; he wanted to talk straight to the First Sergeant and we had to hash that out. Once we hashed that out, everything seemed to work itself out and everyone understood what we needed to do. Now with the Special Forces team, the first one that was there, the mood I got from talking to him on the phone and through his e-mails was hush-hush. He couldn't say anything, you couldn't tell them anything, and maybe it was just the confusion of what the reporting parts were. Again, those were cleared up, but it just seemed to be a little too hush-hush for me. I wish either LT or I could have been there as a buffer for them; it was hard to go through that. It just felt like they weren't being treated as equal partners in the mission. That was with the first ODA and a little bit with the second until the face-to-face discussions took place. That seemed to me to solve a lot of the problems and a lot of the worries that I was having.
Q: In what would have been the pre-mission briefing to SSG Bales, who was he told that he would report to while he was out at VSP Belambai? In other words, who was his direct leadership out there?
A: It really was not that clear; I wasn't sure, but it was made clear to me, fairly clearly through e-mail and phone conversations. A lot of the stuff pivots off of the First Sergeant's visit where he finally laid it out and made sure we understood. It was a fairly hectic movement from Fort Lewis to here. I had to do all my coordinations of movement to get to my side, so there was not a lot of trust with anybody because I didn't feel like I was getting a lot of information or help to get us to our sites. I just made all the coordinations myself and decided, "I'm leaving on this day," this is what they told me and I got it all worked out. SSG Bales basically had to do the same thing. So, I don't know how clear anything was with everybody so separated; it was something that everybody had to feel out. It was fairly new to all of us as far as upper leadership.
Q: Do you think that SSG Bales understood that, while he was on VSP Belambai, he responded to the team sergeant and the team leader?
A: Yes, I think he knew. Overall, they were in charge of him and that was some of his confusion until it was clarified; he wondered "why do they keep asking me for all this stuff?" I think he got locked into, "I just have to listen to this team, I don't have any other responsibilities".
Q: So, would you say that he adopted a little bit of that "secret squirrel" culture?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I have that feeling definitely, up until the information flow started to move back and forth.
Q: To clarify for us, you had expectations as the (b)(6) that everyone would be reporting back to you, as ADCON, with their personnel, weapons, and sensitive items inventories? And anything going on with the Soldiers?
A: Yes, sir. The minimum, basic reporting requirements.
Q: What you're saying is that, initially, there was tension about that with the first ODA team and at the beginning with the second ODA team rotation? And so, SSG Bales was wondering why he had to do so much reporting back to you at the platoon, when in his mind, he was actually working for the ODA.
A: Yes, I think he had a little trouble with that in the beginning.
Q: But when the battlefield circulation happened in the middle of February, it got better after that?
A: Yes, of course it had only been three weeks, but for the next three weeks the information and communication flow improved.
Q: (b)(6) after they got back from the NTC (National Training Center) rotation. How well do you think you knew SSG Bales?
A: At the beginning, obviously not very well. I think by the time we deployed I had a pretty good feel for him. It was a difficult situation for him because he had been the platoon sergeant for almost a year and a half. So, I didn't want to come in after they did all their training and be that heavy-handed guy and try to change everything; it was too late in the game for that. I commented several times throughout the process about how professionally SSG Bales handled it. He didn't fuss about it; he took the squad leader job and trained his guys and fought to get a more experienced team leader. I really felt he handled it very professionally. He always seemed a little bit tense; I didn't know him for very long, but everybody was a little bit tense, he just expressed it verbally more so than most people. They were receiving a lot of go-home tasks from the ~~SOF~~ (b)(3), (b)(6) company and battalion, and everybody was very frustrated.
Q: Is this the first platoon that you've been a (b)(6) for?
A: Yes, this is the first time I've ever officially been a (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been a SFC?
A: Around two years.
Q: What were you doing before you were (b)(6)?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: So then you PCSd (Permanent Change of Station) to Fort Lewis and assumed this role? This is very important because there are only a few people out there that would have interacted closely with SSG Bales before the incident and you happen to be one of them. But, you had to come in and you had to do a quick assessment of your squad leaders because you were preparing to deploy. What were your impressions of (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales' fitness for duty, their physical fitness, their psychological fitness, and their tactical competency?
A: SSG Bales is an older guy and he's in pretty good shape; he scored high on his PT test. He knew the book material and he was tactically sound. He was upset about getting bumped down to squad leader, but we went out to lunch and we talked about it. He was very mature about it and very professional; he kept saying that he was upset, but it is what it is. My initial impressions of them were that they were never late for duty; every task that I put out was pretty much accomplished. Between the two of them, I thought that they were pretty stud squad leaders. They were both in good shape and neither of them had a bad attitude. SSG Bales was kind of a control freak; he liked to have his hand in everything to see what was going on and make sure everything was just right. He didn't like things to be messed up; he liked to look squared-away.
Q: But that's not necessarily bad, right?
A: No.
Q: What about personally, you have a sense that he was psychologically resilient?
A: I thought he was pretty solid. (b)(6)
Q: House problems meaning what?

(b)(6)

Q: So you, also talked about his family situation?

(b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you ever meet his wife?
A: No.
Q: In those types of conversations, was that anything out of the ordinary? A conversation that you would expect to have during your twelve years of service?
A: You hear all that stuff off and on. (b)(6)
Q: Not a cause for alarm?
A: No, nothing like that. (b)(6) now. That kind of thing ha
Q: Tell me a little bit abou (b)(3), (b)(6) go through the same sequence with him.
A: The same thing with him. I thought maybe he could have been a little bit more assertive, but he was one of the younger squad leaders, a little less experienced than SSG Bales. He was in great physical condition, never any disrespect, always on time, tactically sound, and during training the other platoon sergeants had the same evaluations of him. He was just a little bit green but he would put his opinion in too. I thought he would grow and get to be more confident and assertive.
Q: Any personal issues with him?
A: I just thought that it was strange when they talked about hanging out with the First Sergeant sometimes on the weekends. But as far as family, there were no problems; (b)(6) He never brought up any kind of financial problems.
Q: So your assessment of these two squad leaders was that they were solid, ready to go, tactically and technically proficient, and seemed to be psychologically resilient?
A: Yes, I really believed that they were.
Q: How often or how frequently were you able to have meaningful contact with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) when they were at VSP Belambai? Where you ever able to visit them?
A: No, I was never able to visit, but the LT and I talked about it; we were a little bit worried about the secrecy and the standoffishness. We weren't worried about the guys, but were more worried that they were being shown things and being tainted, that maybe some things were being done and that was why they didn't want to let the information out. As far as meaningful conversation, I think I only talked with SSG Bales twice and (b)(3), (b)(6) once. The LT spoke to them more because the communication piece was more about the SITREP.
Q: Regarding the SITREPs, how was it communicated to you would or would not get the SITREPs?
A: Initially, our company commander wanted a daily SITREP; it went from VSP Belambai to the LT, and from the LT up to the company commander. But the SOTF didn't want two separate reporting chains; it had to be the SOTF's report. They had to be sending up the same message, not two separate reports. It took a long time for everybody to understand that all we wanted was just a picture of the SITREP that the SOTF was sending. Now, we just have a weekly SITREP and the team leader at VSP Belambai cc's (courtesy copies) the LT. It is the SOTF SITREP with the part that pertains to our Soldiers cut out; there's not deviation from the SOTF SITREP that goes up.
Q: Do you feel like the command relationship for your squad was adequate once you got this issues sorted out?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: SSG Bales also functioned as the NCOIC of the detachment out there too, correct?
A: Correct.
Q: How do you think the command climate was at VSP Belambai compared to the command climate at the other location that you were at?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: So you could have been at Ezabad and he could have been at Belambai?
A: Either way, sir. I just think if it's possible to have that one level higher senior rank as a buffer so that the executing squad leaders do not have to take on the role of dealing directly with an E-8 or E-7s and trying to be a squad leader. If it was possible, and in our platoon's case it would have been possible, I think that was a judgment error at the SOTF level or my higher chain of command's level. It's still happening everywhere that this company is deployed. We always talk about why we are together.
Q: What disciplinary standards were set for the people at the VSPs?
A: Well obviously, I think the one that I was on had a lot more white space, so the TICs we were in were minimal comparatively, and I was there. Sometimes I'm a sneaky supervisor where it might look like I'm going to the latrine but really I'm going to go look by the Truck Line and see if you've thrown trash in there. I might get up and go to the latrine since you had KP duty to be done by a certain time and then I'm actually going to really be checking KP duty. So, at my site, there was discipline where I wanted it to be. I didn't have a lot of time to teach and instill that in those guys, but I never saw, in the time that I evaluated their leadership, that there was much deviation in that. They did follow up with the tasks that I had given them. We talked about how we wanted to do things. Basically, it was be professional, follow the ROE (Rules of Engagement), and follow what your SOTF tells you – especially on the tactical side. In the beginning, on my site, I wouldn't let them eat food in their rooms and I did monthly room inspections on them. I expressed that to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales and they said they were doing similar things. We never heard about anything bad in regards to discipline problems from them. Right as we were getting everything cleared up, I talked to the team Sergeant over there, up to the point of the incident occurring, and he told me that the guys were doing great things and there weren't discipline problems at all. Overall, I think the systems that we had in place were working. With regards to the relaxed grooming standards, the LT and I set out a little different standards; for example, if you were a younger guy and you hadn't grown a beard, you weren't going to. If we came up to KAF for a re-supply run and you wanted something from the PX, well it was the clean-shaven guys that could go, not the ones growing beards. We discussed these things with the company commander and the first sergeant and the policy that finally came down was what we had in place. This was explained to SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) also. I would like to say that everybody was pretty disciplined, but again, I wasn't there.
Q: Do you know what the personnel and the weapon's accountability procedure were at VSP Belambai? What would you have told (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales to do?
A: They knew by the 10th of each month they did 100%. The LT had given them a spreadsheet and they sent it to us every month.
Q: At your site, you have two squads. Every morning do they come to you and report in regards to personnel, sensitive items, and weapons?
A: It's not so much that we say, "Hey, we're green on everything." We talk about what we're doing today, and make sure everybody has all of their stuff. Just general conversation and if stuff was missing, they would know to say something.
Q: Were you aware of any drinking or substance abuse problems at VSP Belambai?
A: No, the first I heard of that was on the news when I was home on emergency leave.
Q: Going back to the time before you deployed, did SSG Bales or (b)(3), (b)(6) or any of those guys, except for the last AIT (Advanced Individual Training) Soldiers you got, seem to have drinking problems stateside?
A: Nothing that seemed unusual. They were at work every day. Were they hung over? Yeah, maybe a couple of times, but that kind of thing usually happens more as you get closer to deployment.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We never had anybody show up really drunk where I felt like I would have to breathalyze them. We had one guy come up hot on a urinalysis; I don't think he intentionally did it, I think his drink was spiked. He was hanging around his wife who hangs around a rough crowd. A UCMJ was done on him right before deployment; it was one incident with a junior enlisted. Normal procedure was done to take care of that. He was a squared away Soldier and he took his discipline. He hasn't been in trouble since. That's the only case of anything out of the ordinary that I've experienced.

Q: In regards to security procedures in place, stand-to procedures, and guardmount procedures, did you give them guidance or instructions on that or was that left up to the team sergeant to dictate on the site?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Do you have a sense of how many days of incoming fire or enemy initiated attacks and casualties that VSP Belambai would have experienced?

A: It was pretty close to every day. I know there was a lull and I can't remember exactly when it was, but there was a ten day period when they really didn't get anything. But, other than that, it was pretty close to every day or every other day; they were taking small arms fire or seeing someone put an IED (Improvised Explosive Device) in, or one was being blown up just outside of their area.

Q: In terms of casualties, other than the two Soldiers that were hurt in the 5 March IED incident, were there any other incidents or casualties?

A: No, other than those, I can't recall any other casualties or injuries.

Q: Thinking about combat stress and dealing with stressful events, what did you tell your people at VSP Belambai about dealing with combat stress and who they could turn to for help if they were showing signs of stressful behavior or warning signs of problem behavior?

A: I didn't have direct observation of them. I was a little worried about them until the communication flow was fixed. Once that was fixed, unless they hid it from me, I didn't really sense that anyone was having a huge problem.

Q: In general, what would you have told any of the four NCOs?

A: Of course you're obviously going to sit down and talk to them. There's the chaplain and the stress centers here on KAF (Kandahar Airfield). If someone was having that kind of trouble. It's just difficult for me not being there; maybe I didn't conquer that as a leader?

Q: That's not my question. Given that you inevitably had to rely on SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) and as the platoon sergeant, you were getting ready to deploy and had six weeks to get your NCOs ready, did you talk them about these kinds of things? (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

A: Yes, we did. Everyone knows there are the Soldier Centers and the chaplains, but down there, you don't have that immediately available.

Q: Up at Ezabad, if you were looking at some NCO or Soldier and he seemed depressed or stressed out, what would you do?

A: We did have a soldier that was like that; he had alienated himself. Everyone thought he was a liar because of previous things; he started having panic attacks. This was literally a week before our five day mission and I was home on emergency leave. The system worked perfectly. He didn't feel like he was getting what he needed from his team leader. He didn't feel like he was getting from his squad leader. They came to me and said that he wanted to talk to me, so I brought him in and talked to him and the LT came in to talk with us too. Then we pulled the team leaders and squad leaders in and told them they had to make this guy part of the team; he didn't feel like, so we were failing as leaders. I made them focus counseling on him; make sure he's put in positions to look good. Then I took him to the side and told him that he had to re-establish credibility with the other Soldiers because they thought that he was a malingerer and a liar. I put him on my truck on that mission and he had to help us change a tire. The last four days of the mission, he seemed to be doing fine. The last thing I said to him was that he didn't need to try so damn hard or make stuff up to fit in.

Q: When SSG Bales was determined to be missing, you weren't in the country. When did you find out about it?

A: I found out about it when the very first report came out. (b)(6) (b)(6) So, I was actually sending e-mails to the LNO (Liaison Officer) here to make sure my extension went through and I heard the news that a 38-year old soldier in southern Kandahar did this thing. I thought to myself, I hope it isn't SSG Bales. The little map they showed was in our area and I knew his age and that he was sniper qualified. Two or three days later, his picture came out.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Is there anything else you want to tell us about SSG Bales?
A: It's hindsight, but maybe now you can say if he acted like that, then I should have known. I'm trying not to beat myself up, but I don't know.
Q: Did he ever verbalize anything?
A: Other than him saying, "Around our VSP, they're all Taliban" a couple of times, no.
Q: Did he express to you at any time a general dislike towards Afghans?
A: No, he just thought everybody around him was Taliban. He felt like they didn't have any white space. I know he said to me once or twice that everybody around us is Taliban. This was via telephone.
Q: Why do you think he felt that way?
A: In my opinion, they really didn't have any white space. From my understanding, anytime they went outside, pot shots were taken at them. The local villagers didn't want to help them.
Q: Did he qualify that statement?
A: No, he didn't say why. It was on the telephone and it was before the whole communication clearing happened. He expressed to me that he couldn't send a report to me because SOTF doesn't want two reports going up, we're in contact all the time, we've had this one little break, and basically everybody around us is Taliban. And I told him to just do the best he could and just send me what he could.
Q: Did he ever make statements or comments about how he thought the VSO (Village Stability Operations) would work?
A: No, my impression was that he didn't think it would work at that site because no one would cooperate. Ezabad is a completely different situation. I don't know if they ever saw any successful work there.
Q: When you came into the unit in late September, you knew that you were headed for a VSO mission, correct?
A: By the end of my first week there, I knew for sure. But then there was a time where they said we might not be deploying. I told all my guys that happens every time. Right after that, I was told what we were going to be doing and my integration started then.
Q: You're talking to your site leaders, especially SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6). You knew this site was a fairly kinetic site and you chose them because you know they're qualified and in good shape. What did you tell SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) about interacting with their ODA brethren on that site?
A: I had a good conversation with SSG Bales before he left; he had fallen back to talking about how dangerous everything could be. I had to pull him aside and I told him enough already. We knew he was going to a hot site, but he had good Soldiers. He was going there because we had confidence in him as a good leader. I tried to give him the "you're a good leader" pep talk. I told him that he had to instill confidence in his Soldiers and that he didn't need to talk about things like that in front of them. But as far as giving them advice about how to interact with the team, I didn't know what to tell them. I told them they would find out everything they needed to know when they got there. He just had to be the professional that he is, and take direction. Every team is going to be different and you just have to be professional and prepared and you shouldn't have any problems.
Q: You brought up that SSG Bales was expressing some concern over the danger of VSP Belambai. Was he frequently expressing that type of concern or was it a one-time thing?
A: He was doing it enough that I had to make sure that he stopped talking about that kind of stuff in front of Soldiers because he was going to scare them. It was during a period when I was trying to get all of our travel coordinated to VSP Belambai, while we were here at KAF. I had a couple of meetings with the squad leaders to brief them on their missions and where they were going. In those little bits of times, SSG Bales expressed how hot the site was. The night before we left, I pulled SSG Bales aside and told him he was picked for this because he was tactically sound, he's an older guy, and mature. I told him that he had to believe he was a good Soldier and he needed to dial it back because he had to instill confidence in his Soldiers. I also pulled (b)(3), (b)(6) aside and warned him to not let SSG Bales talk like that.
Q: Did he have a little bit of fatalism towards the mission?
A: I think you could say that.
Q: What specifically was he saying?
A: He would say, "we're going to be getting shot at all the time; they were in this many TICs this last month, I've been talking to the team sergeant and we've got to be ready…" I reassured him that he was trained well and would be alright. I told (b)(3), (b)(6) to steer him back if his confidence goes down this road again. I don't remember my conversation with SSG Bales as much as (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) but I did think this conversation was important. (b)(3), (b)(6) was concerned; once SSG Bales starts in on something, he's relentless. He's like a bloodhound. He wanted all of our automatic weapons out of the weapons tricon but they didn't show up until a month later. He was fixated on it. Once he got fixated on TPE (Theater Provided Equipment) he didn't stop.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 7 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How do you, as the (b)(6) interact with the ODA team sergeant, the Master Sergeant, that's out there and how do you get along with the other E-7s? Was it like dealing with the First Sergeant?
A: It's sort of like that. We get together and we help them plan; they tell me their requirements for their missions. I help them put their 5-Ws together. If they need something, they generally come to me. I get it to the squad leaders and they execute it. That was something that was lacking at VSP Belambai. With the team sergeant right now, we have a pretty good relationship. With the other NCO, I don't interact with them so much because that's how the team wants it. I'm our top dog NCO, and he's their top dog NCO, and we all take care of our own people. We did have one issue that I'll throw out as an anecdote. They only drive the RGs and we have our MP-Vs (Mine-Protected Vehicles). We have definite SOP (Standard Operating Procedure) on vehicle prep and after mission operations. We came up and on the way back, their vehicles were having fuel problems. We were stuck somewhere outside of a bazaar and my guys were on the ground and it ended up being a mechanical problem. When we got back, my guys were put in that situation from what could have been negligence. I pulled their convoy commander, who was their chief, off to the side and asked him when the last time was that they put fuel in their vehicles. Then their bravo leader approached me and he got a little heated for a second about it but he calmed down after a while. They put my guys in danger, and I had a professional obligation to inquire about what happened. Now, they have pre and post-mission refueling SOPs.
Q: You live in a connex by yourself?
A: I don't know how it is right now, but I lived in a tent with the LT that we partitioned off. Essentially it's our company TOC (Tactical Operations Center).
Q: So, you don't interact a lot with the A teams, charlies, bravos, or deltas?
A: Yeah, we sub-organized over there; we told them to work together and cross-train. That's what we did and I try to keep myself back in a way. I want my Soldiers to have a professional relationship with me; I always deal with the squad leaders. If we're sitting in a briefing session and we're all throwing out ideas, then yeah, I'll talk with them. There's no conflicting relationship. Other than that, we've integrated fairly well.
Q: Do you guys have some kind of a gym?
A: We have a cardio room; pretty much everybody PTs. The LT and I make sure everyone is getting in there and we get in there ourselves.
Q: How do you instill sleep-discipline in your people?
A: We have mission squad one week, and whoever isn't mission squad is the duty squad – they're the QRF (Quick Reaction Force), the radio squad, and all that stuff. We do radio watch, but we have Afghan security that mans the towers. On the way to their shifts, they go to each site and make sure everyone is awake; we take them sodas and waters. When we first got there, we had a little bit of trouble with people not taking it seriously, but through corrective training we were able to fix that and everybody realizes the importance of it. At one time, I told the squad leaders that everybody was going to bed at one time. If it's crucial to the mission, I give people bed times.
Q: What's your service history?

(b)(6)

Q: What combat tours do you have?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Do you have any other information that might be helpful to this investigation that I haven't asked you about?
A: No, I think I've pretty much expressed everything, sir.
Q: Are there any other witnesses that you would recommend I interview as part of this investigation?
A: Maybe the LT. And, (b)(3), (b)(6) has known SSG Bales for a long time.

\\END STATEMENT\\\

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 8 OF 9 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 9. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 19 day of APRIL, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath) USAF

TITLE 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	(b)(3), (b)(6)		PAGE 9 OF 9 PAGES

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For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Simmons, Afghanistan	2012/03/29	0956	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state you full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) I am currently the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: For those not familiar with Special Operations, please describe what an AOB is.
A: AOB is the company level in Special Forces once it deploys. We assume the advance operating base upon deployment, but we exercise command and control and sustainment, of deployed detachments, organic to the AOB or to the company. Currently, I (b)(6) There are 6 detachments organic to my AOB or my company. One detachment operates as an attachment for another AOB. Pretty much we're are an extension of command and control of the SOTF while we're here.
Q: How long have you been working as the (b)(6) of the AOB, and what are your day to day responsibilities?
A: (b)(6) of the AOB once we arrived in theater, on 1 February. I've been the (b)(6) for this element since 25 May 2011. (b)(6) As well as plan and execute their sustainment for their operations. That's pretty much our daily duties.
Q: Who is your SGM, and what are his responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) He's the primary enlisted advisor for the company. His responsibilities are to look out for the well being and the readiness of our enlisted force within the company and the AOB.
Q: Where is your HQ located?
A: Camp Simmons, Kandahar.
Q: What are you command and control relationships, ADCON, OPCON, TACON?
A: We're OPCON to the SOTF-S and obviously OPCON to CJSOTF-A. ODAs are OPCON to us for everything prior to the execution of operations. We're kind of an extension of that OPCON relationship. But once ODAs execute operations, or exit the wire as we call it, they fall under direct control of the SOTF.
Q: Do you approve their missions?
A: To an extent. I have limited delegation authority for the execution of their missions or I would say we call the "5 Ws." They are designed to conduct operations within their OP boxes. So routine, daily type of operations, (b)(6) (b)(6)
Q: What are your subordinate elements in theater? Where are they located?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	(b)(3), (b)(6) RSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Simmons DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with these subordinate units?
A: (b)(6). My duties include to extend guidance from the battalion or in this case, the SOTF, down to the ODA.

(b)(6)

Q: What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit?
A: In general terms, our understanding of the role of the infantry uplift is augmenting the SF ODA at those locations. To provide security at the camp and to help conduct our daily VSO tasks. Their participation was of an operational nature and not a support role.
Q: What other units were attached to the VSP and how long had they been there?
A: We have an Air Force attachment, a cook, a tactical control guy and naval EOD. Their lengths of tours vary.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command? How well did you know him? How much interaction did they have with him?
A: Our understanding of his chain-of-command, started at the VSP, through me. So by him being attached to our organization. (b)(6) (b)(6) I didn't know him at all. I can't recall meeting SSG Bales which strikes me to an extent, because he was the senior guy in that element. I didn't get the opportunity to meet everyone at the site.

(b)(6)

A: In this case, very little. Again, I don't recall seeing SSG Bales until I got off the helicopter and someone pointed him out to me.
Q: Were command relationships (TACON, OPCON, attached) sufficient to the mission at the VSP? Who was ultimately responsible for soldier care of the infantry NCOs and men on a VSP?
A: I have to answer yes to the first part of the question. I don't think it's a complicated relationship. The leadership command at that VSP was responsible for the soldier care. Issues or concerns are brought up, through the chain-of-command as necessary. But responsibility of soldier care lies with the VSP leadership.
Q: How was the command climate at VSP Belambai? How does this compare to the command climate at your other (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What disciplinary standards did you set for personnel located at the VSP? Were those standards enforced? If so, how do you know? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: To my knowledge, there weren't any infraction of standards. None were brought to my attention. We held the infantry uplift to the disciplinary standards we held ourselves. The Team Sergeant for the SF detachment oversaw the living conditions. SSG Bales was the most senior guy in his section and the guy in charge. So, the Team Sergeant went to him for the accountability of personnel, the standard of living, discipline, etc...
Q: How does the discipline at VSP Belambai compare with the discipline of your other VSPs in theater?
A: The same in a way. It didn't reflect any different from the other sites. But at Arghistan District, some of the infantry soldiers

INIT (b)(3), (b)(6) AKING STATEMENT PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Simmons DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Were you aware of any drinking or substance abuse problems at VSP Belambai? If so, what action did you take?
A: Absolutely not.
Q: What are the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai?
A: They would be the same procedures we have here. Soldiers maintain possession of their assigned weapon at all times. I'm not aware of any violations of weapons prior to the incident.
Q: What are the security procedures in place? Are there stand-to procedures? Guard mounts procedures?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: Do you have any idea of how many days of incoming fire? Enemy initiated attacks since SSG Bales' arrival? Offensive engagements since Bales' arrival?
A: VSP Talukan and VSP Belambai are what we call, our most kinetic VSPs. Small arms fire and indirect fire impact in or around the VSP very frequently. It has been a routine. I spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) yesterday, either via email or by phone, and I think he encountered 6 Troops in Contact, since 11 March.
Q: How many causalities had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? How many were of his unit?
A: Prior to us arriving there, the most serious causalities I think occurred in Mushan, when our predecessor AOB had responsibility over that site.
Q: But that's not Belambai? Correct?
A: No, it's a little further west. I think it happened prior to SSG Bales' arrival to Belambai. The only causalities we are tracking are the ones that were evacuated after the IED strike that occurred on 5 March. Which included two of his soldiers, and they were evacuated back to Role 3 for TBI screening.
Q: Were any close friends of his?
A: I do not know Sir.
Q: What was the battle rhythm? How does this compare with the battle rhythm of the other VSPs?
A: VSP Belambai and VSP Talukan are the only two sites where we have not been able to stand up Afghan Local Police. I can't say that their battle rhythm relates to the other VSPs that are less kinetic. These guys are going on patrols to engage with the community and on the way back are fighting to get to their home base. That was the case at Belambai on a routine basis, every time they went out. It happened more often than not. So I can't say their battle rhythm is the same as the other VSPs. Having to deal with the intensity of their environment, set them apart from other VSPs. These sites are in what we call the "shaping phase" of our VSO methodology. They're continuously conducting that shaping effort, while most of the other sites enjoy a more permissible environment to engage the community.
Q: Did the NCOs do pre-combat checks?
A: Yes, that was the standard and expected from both the uplift and the ODA.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did the AOB level have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help?
A: We always offer our chaplain. The chaplain is not only the spiritual leader in the SOTF; he's one of the best counselors and advisors I've ever seen in my time. We have always offered that help out there. The detachment always knows that is available. There's also the Group/CJSOTF-A psychologist. Those assets are available should they need it.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, when and how were you first notified?
A: I was woken up on or about 0330 or 0400. I was in my room when they came to wake me up and said we have a soldier missing at Belambai. Immediately went to the ops center and that's when my day started.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, what action, if any did you take to regain accountability of SSG Bales?
A: When we got in touch with the detachment commander, he told us what he had done. Immediately I thought we had another PFC or SPC Bergdhal on our hands. We need to exercise some sort of attempt to recover but the detachment had done it all. They held 100% accountability at the site: they had gotten in touch with their battle space owner and put into motion their (b)(1)1.4a capability. The (b)(1)1.4a the detachment was able to launch and intercept him. I think the detachment had a pretty good grasp of what they needed to do. We didn't direct them to do anything because they were already doing it. At that point, direct communication goes from the detachment to the SOTF and we're just monitoring everything and are ready to render any assistance if necessary.

(b)(3), (b)(6) ON MAKING STATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Simmons DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Are you aware of what type of training SSG Bales' and the rest of the uplift squad at VSP Belambai incurred leading to this deployment?
A: The answer is I am not aware of the specifics of their training. I have become aware of, post incident, their pre-mission training, which is how to handle dilemmas and issues within the local communities. That's pretty much it.
Q: Are you aware of any warning signs or indicators shown by SSG Bales about his future behavior either in his pre-deployment training or while in theater?
A: I'm not aware sir. I asked the question the detachment commander, post incident, and he said most of us here are in "shock" and weren't expecting this out of him. I took that as: no one would have expected it. But at my level, not at all.
Q: What training or guidance, if any, do you provide your team leaders to recognize/identify warning signs of potential dangerous behavior?
A: When we first got here, I recall engaging the detachment commanders and telling them to make sure you train those guys on what you're doing, make sure they understand the purpose behind your actions. I never addressed that in training. We figured that this was already something they were accustomed to be by being on the ground with our predecessors. This was something our predecessors already had in motion, they were comfortable working with us and it was a very fluent process for us to walk in and continue operations with that infantry.
Q: What training or guidance, if any, do you provide your team leaders to recognize/identify potentially stressful events and how to deal with that stress?
A: Prior to deployment, we go through all these briefings. I will recall one given by the chaplain on stress and how to manage stress. I didn't directly drive a point on identifying stress at their level. It was part of our preparation for deployment. So the detachment didn't get it directly from me, they got it from the SOTF or the battalion staff as we were preparing for deployment. We received suicide type training, we received stress training for either here in theater or dealing with our family members back at home.
Q: What did you do as an (b)(6) to ensure that your personnel could handle the stress they were under?
A: On a routine basis, we go ask how the guys are doing. We ask does anyone need help here. The first thing we ask when we shake their hand, is "how's everybody doing?" Usually the detachment commanders tell me everyone is fine, so nothing is brought my attention. I always tell the guys to let me know if there's anything going on and we can help you. We have assets available, like the chaplain and the psychologist at the group level. I express that those guys can come and provide whatever assistance is necessary at their level. But nothing had been brought up to me at that point. All we do at our level is offer what's available to them and leave it up to them to present those cases to us as necessary.
Q: After the shooting incident, what Key Leader Engagement or consequent management actions have you taken or been a part of?
A: With the exception of certain general advisors, Afghan interactions with Americans were virtually zero. Afghans wanted to talk to Afghans to resolve their issues. So initially, there was very little interaction. As it progressed that afternoon, my SOTF commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived on site, and then we began to address some of the Afghan leaders that went in the crowd. But pretty much, Afghan leaders told us, "We got this." That they were going to take care of the crowd outside, we don't want anything to escalate. So we took a step back and the Afghans took control of the situation. Following that, I don't recall whether it was the same day or the day after, a larger delegation from Kabul came to visit. It included the national ANA Chief of Staff, General Wardak, the 205th commander MG Hamid, commanders at the brigade level, General Habibi. We did engage with that delegation and they basically came down to find out information. They just wanted to know what happened. In the middle of that KLE, there was an attack that injured an ANA soldier, so we had to provide medical assistance. I interacted with a delegate from Kabul that claim he came from Pres. Karzai's office and he began asking direct questions about the incident. Questions such as "What's the name of the guy?" and "Where is he right now?" They were so direct that we had to "put the arm out" to protect the integrity of the investigation. I engaged with the detachment commander and told him to get with the key ANA leadership at the VSP, such as the platoon sergeants, platoon leaders. We spoke with them in an effort to try to ensure force protection, and prevent any insider threat that may come from those elements if they didn't understand what exactly happened outside. We needed to explain to them what exactly had happen. That same day the District of Police Chief of Panjwa'i District, Sardar Mohammed came to us and we sat down at a lunch table with an interpreter, and we discussed in greater detail of what was outside of our gates. He discussed what he was collecting from the communities, etc...
Q: Are there any additional KLE or consequent management actions that should be taken in response to the incident?
A: I failed to mention that we also participated in the condolence payments at the governor's palace last week. I was a part of that. For KLE, we need to mend those fractured relationships. To gain trust of the Afghans on many levels, such as the district level and province level. So I believe KLEs are the way to go.

(b)(3), (b)(6) KING STATEMENT PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Simmons DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: For those VSPs, are you aware of any command climate issues that exist within the 2-3 uplift elements? If there are any issues, what, if any, actions have you taken?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Are you aware of any disciplinary issues, adherence to standard issues among 2-3 elements? If there are any issues, what, if any, actions have you taken?

A: Yes, the one I'm aware of at the moment is, I believe 2 or 3 uplift infantry soldiers at VSP Arghistan were found smoking pot. The interpreter found them and notified the ODA leadership and the ODA leadership confronted the guys. I believe one of their soldiers self admitted at the Role 3 facility for suicidal thoughts. He was admitted to the ward and probably redeployed.

Q: For the alleged pot smoking, once removed from the site, were the soldiers turned over at that point, to their 2-3 Company leadership?

A: Yes, that is my understanding sir. At that point, they were no longer on our personnel stats. We weren't tracking them anymore. At that point, they were completely gone from AOB control.

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?

A: The last thing I would say is the actions of SSG Bales were hard to predict. The answer I received for at the VSP level was, "I wish we knew that this was coming." The alleged actions not only became a risk to the personnel at Belambai, but risk to their mission. That was something they strongly wanted to protect. They felt that something like that would damage their efforts of what they were trying to do on the ground. I wish we had those indicators and we would have seen this coming. The fact that we couldn't pin point or identify indicators, is still dumbfounding. Again, it came as a surprise to us. The mission at that site has been called off as of today. We have been directed to redeploy the team and close the site. Turn it over and transition it. I'm pretty sure the ODA would have wanted to identify anything that would let them know this was coming their way.

Q: For personnel accountability, is there a written SOP or TTP you guys follow?

A: If a team has any written SOPs at their level, that cover personnel accountability, formations, etc... I haven't seen them and I'm not aware of those. Other than the verbal routine, detachment involvement, detachment leadership and infantry leadership involvement, that's all I can attest too.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 16

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

(b)(3), (b)(6) MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE – AFGHANISTAN
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-SOUTH
KANDAHAR AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09355

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

SOTF-SOUTH- (b)(1)1.4a

4 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Addendum to Sworn Statement

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to serve as an addendum in record to the Sworn Statement provided to BG Waddell on 29 March 2012, in regards to the 15-6 Investigation for the 11 March 2012 shooting incident near VSP Belambai, Panjwa'i District, Afghanistan.

2. The following are the additions to the answers provided:

a. Question on Page 2 of 5.
Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with the uplift personnel Service members at VSP Belambai?
A: (Addition) UCMJ authority over the uplift infantry personnel resides within their infantry Chain of Command.

b. Question on Page 2 of 5.
Q: What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit?
A: (Addition) When I make reference to the term "not a support role", I'm referring in this case to the role of running the base for the ODA. They are not attached to us to function in that capacity, but rather on an operational and operational support capacity.

c. Question on Page 3 of 5.
Q: What are the security procedures in place? Are there stand-to procedures? Guard mounts procedures?

(b)(1)1.4a

d. Question on Page 3 of 5.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did the AOB level have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help?
A: (Addition) The SOTF-S Chaplain routinely visits our VSPs and remains on site for extended periods of time.

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SOTF-SOUTH- (b)(1)1.4a
SUBJECT: Addendum to Sworn Statement

e. Question on Page 4 of 5.
Q: What training or guidance, if any, do you provide your team leaders to recognize/identify potentially stressful events and how to deal with that stress?
A: (Addition) Although not directly to the team leaders, the AOB SGM engages the Team Sergeants routinely to observe, identify, assist, and report on potential stressful atmospherics. When reported, it is our duty at the AOB to assist the Soldier in coordinating and providing the necessary support.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SDN SVOIP (b)(6)
SDN UNCLASS VOIP (b)(6)
(b)(6) or at
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/03/31	1603	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: For just over (b)(3), (b)(6).
Q: Does that include any enlisted, reserve, or National Guard time?
A: No, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with those subordinate units, considering all of the different enablers that may be working with you?
A: It is an OPCON relationship.
Q: And with the ODA at VSP (Village Stability Platform) Belambai? Is that OPCON, or were they originally organic to you?
A: Yes, sir. They are an organic force; SF ODA (b)(1)1.4a one of our 6 teams under Alpha company, 2d Battalion, 7th Group. They are OPCON to us, as well as their attachments - ranging from all enablers, whether it's the dog teams, the JTAC (Joint Tactical Air Controllers), their SOF uplift, the two infantry squads that are attached to them.
Q: So your command and control relationship with the uplift personnel at Belambai or any of the other VSPs is an OPCON

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 7 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

relationship?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Can you describe the mission of Staff Sergeant Bales' uplift unit at VSP Belambai?
A: They are attached to ODA (b)(1)1.4a to help provide and round out that detachment for security at the VSP site, provide logistics and general operations, as well as augmentation for operations as additional assets.
Q: Given the uplift units at your different VSP sites, including obviously Belambai, the relationship between those uplifted squads and the ODA - how do you see that? How should they normally operate with that ODA?
A: They should be an extension of that ODA. My guidance and the guidance from the chain of command are very clear, from the beginning, that they're augmented; (b)(1)1.4a It's not glorified slave labor; you've got gate guard and you've got only administrative tasks or guard duty. It is supposed to be, generally speaking, a cross train of the infantry and have them augment our operations. So, neither special privileges nor special penalty for being an MOS 11 series versus an 18 series out there. Having said that, we also recognize that they are not 18 series personnel, so we have to make sure that we still have an oversight relationship with them to make sure we're not putting them in a situation that they are not trained for.
Q: And of course they have partnered units to all of your VSP that have ANSF (Afghan National Security Forces) partner units?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: I'm going to ask you a series of questions about command climate. SSG Bales' chain of command on site, what was it?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: But on Belambai itself?
A: It's just the two squad leaders.
Q: Who would they have taken direction from?
A: From the detachment commander.
Q: Did you know SSG Bales at all? Did you have any interaction with him?
A: It was limited to the meet & greet. I was very fortunate that our predecessors and preceding command team in SOTF 3-7 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) did a great job of planning out our RIP. One of those things was that he made sure that we got out to each one of the sites. It was only for a couple of hours, it was not extensive, and it was not living out there with them. We got a face-to-face introduction that was very much limited to a command visit, a quick handshake and a little bit of exchange as far as our appreciation for their support and to take questions and feedback.
Q: How much are you able to interact with your subordinate units in theater given that you've got these 14 different sites? How do you do that interaction, by phone, in person, VTC (video teleconference), e-mail? And, considering that, what are the limitations and constraints on your interactions?
A: I would say we primarily interact using the chain of command, only because with the different sites in the south, I don't think I could adequately do justice by trying to increase the presence on any one site. It would prevent me from getting to all the sites, as well as my day job back here at Kandahar Airfield.
Q: So when you say you're using the chain of command, you mean you're using the two AOBs?
A: Yes, the AOBs, absolutely.
Q: So, that interaction with your AOB commanders - one of them is at Simmons nearby and the other is out at Maholic a little bit further away - do you interact with them by phone, or e-mail?
A: Daily, by e-mail.
Q: How often do you see them face-to-face?
A: I would say, as a rough estimate, on a weekly basis.
Q: You do have a Special Operations Task Force that you're running here, but what are the primary constraints on your ability to conduct battlefield circulation?
A: I would say time, absolutely. I know in the past it was rotary wing air assets to get forward. I've been pretty fortunate so far, but I would say absolutely time, sir.
Q: You mention that you had been out to Belambai in the initial RIP - how frequently did you, your Sergeant Major or one of your

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

primary staff visit and make meaningful contact with SSG Bales or the infantry unit at Belambai? I mean cumulatively from 1 February to 11 March timeframe?
A: I think it was very limited. I would have to go back in records to see. I know our Chaplain is probably our greatest asset; I rely on him heavily. He's got a background of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) so he knows how to get his gun on. Padre saw the higher calling, but he is still really connected and able to get with the Soldiers. Part of that requires a little bit of time, so usually we've blocked him out for 2, 3, 4, 5 days, no more than a week - I think at the longest it's been about 5 days or so at a site. I know he's managed to get to a few sites already, but Belambai was not one of them. I would say, frankly, that I hadn't seen any indicators that would lead me to believe that we had any issues. We were programming him to go down there after we had that IED (improvised explosive device) incident with (b)(6)

(b)(6)

A: It's going to be until the end of September or 1 October.
Q: Normally, what would you try and do to get out there?
A: I would say we try to get out every couple of weeks. During the month of March, our DV (distinguished visitor) schedule has been pretty heavy.
Q: So March was an anomaly?
A: Yes, March Madness sir. When things pop up, we'll readjust just to minimize the impact to the teams.
Q: The command relationships that we talked about were they sufficient to the mission at the VSP, given that fact that this is a fairly unique situation where you've got infantry Soldiers put quite a ways out from their chain of command, and these guys would not have been normally trained for that. Was that command relationship out there with the ODA team leader, team chief, team sergeant clear and sufficient to the task? Any doubts that you had, or that people expressed to you, about this type of uplift mission?
A: Nobody has expressed issues with it, sir. I think it's pretty clear. Specifically, at these sites, the highest ranking person that we've got at a forward site is a first lieutenant. At Belambai, fully sufficient in my mind, we've got a Captain in charge; we've got an E-8 Master Sergeant. It's very clear who's got the lead and who's responsible. The Chief Warrant Officer out there is great; he's someone that is very approachable, that's a great sounding block.
Q: So, the inevitable question is ultimately who is responsible for the Soldier care of the infantry NCOs (noncommissioned officers) and infantry men on Belambai, and how was that command climate, and how did it compare to the other VSPs that you have?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) I would say with (b)(3), (b)(6) right there as his right hand man, the team sergeant. I would say that it's a team effort with (b)(3), (b)(6) If you had to identify one person, of course it would be the detachment commander.
Q: How is the command climate out at Belambai? How would it compare to the other 13 ODA sites?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What were the disciplinary standards set for the personnel at the VSP, and were those standards enforced?
A: I think the standards were very clear. As I mentioned, this isn't the first time that team or the company have deployed, especially with having done the recent tour. Throughout the battalion, there are very clear standards of GO1 (General Order 1). If you need it, I know we can dig into the specific times that we had the collective or the e-mail traffic pushing the standards. There's consolidation of leadership, so that everyone hears it straight (b)(3), (b)(6) On this side, as part of their in-brief procedures, everybody received everything soup-to-nuts on the administrative side; how the camp's running, and where they're going, and all the SOP (Standard Operating Procedures) type stuff, but absolutely the discipline standards while in country.
Q: Do you know of any disciplinary infractions at the VSP, and if so, how were they dealt with?
A: Leading up to 11 March, I'm not tracking any discipline issues whatsoever out there.
Q: Were you aware of any drinking or drug abuse problems at VSP Belambai?
A: No, sir.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)* (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What were the normal weapons and personnel accountability procedures at Belambai or at any of your VSPs?
A: I would say that there was no standard procedure; every site had a different procedure. I think the reason for that is the team character. The team could be a crack-of-dawn, PT first thing in the morning kind of group, or it could be based on the pattern of life within the VSP site, as well as that of the villages around the site.
Q: How would you know or expect the personnel and weapons accountability to function?
A: I know for a fact, as part of our SITREP (Situational Reporting) procedures, that we've got measures in place for daily, 100% accountability and sensitive items check. That includes PERSTAT (personnel status) as well as specific, 24-hour reporting as to where each person is located, whether it is on the camp or out a different site.
Q: When you go out on a mission and come back, what do you do when you come back?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: So, when you get back onto your patrol base are you going to do that again?
A: Yes, sir. Download and get checked for the SITREP – the Captain usually scurries off to start typing up the day's events.
Q: The patrol base security at Belambai, were the normal expectations that there would have been some sort of guard procedures, guard mount procedures, stand to procedures, do you have any kind of feel for that?
A: In this specific case, for Belambai, the perimeter was a combination of the Afghan as well as the U.S. or coalition forces. Each one of the sites has their own base defense plan, but for this time frame specifically, we had reinforced the importance of security due to the ongoing insider threat. There was (b)(1)1.4a
Q: Has it always been (b)(1)1.4a or was that a result of the insider threat?
A: I couldn't tell you definitively. I know for sure when we were talking about insider threat, it was an absolute as a minimum standard. The static piece was really to avoid somebody going out on the night patrol and a guard getting spooked by movements thereabout. That's how we try to keep control of them.
Q: Do you have an idea of how many days of incoming fire they took, enemy initiated attacks, since SSG Bales' arrival? Or how many offensive engagements were there when they went out to engage the enemy? What's your sense of it?
A: I've deliberately kept myself from going through the logs and trying to G2 (intelligence) this course only because I don't want to get myself confused as to what I knew at the time of the actual incident. Specific to Belambai, I know they'd had a couple of incidents for small arms and indirect fire. Not as many as they've had since 11 March; that can obviously be a factor of the incident, but it could also be a factor of the seasons. As part of the CIB report, I'd seen that they had two incidents ~~the night~~ prior to the 11th. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: About casualties, we're aware of 5 March event and the secondary IED event, but other than that, were there any casualties at Belambai during your time here?
A: No, sir.
Q: Do you have a sense of the battle rhythm at Belambai and how it would have compared to others?
A: As far as their daily routine goes, I imagine it would not be significantly different than any other VSP site we've got here in RC -South. I would say the difference comes not in the daily routine, but in the scope of their operations. There is a significant variance between a site like Belambai and another site that is very tranquil. That community is not really an object of the insurgency; they're trying to get around all that and make their way in closer to Kandahar City. In Belambai, I think one of their challenges was that they were not interactive with the local populace.
Q: And that raises a follow-on question, if we take a look at the map over the last year during the handover between the Canadian forces and the battalion that is now at ~~Talalabad~~ Zangabad (b)(3), (b)(6), when you look at that, the footprint of coalition stepped out several kilometers to west down the Horn of Panjwa'i. Subsequently, sites have been moved out and established in what was formerly enemy territory. So, their job is to try to create space around Belambai and look to the north, the south, to the west – is that what drives the ODA team leader's mission planning? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Yes, sir. And it's the big shift in the way that CJSOTF forces have been employed, with the exception of forces that are partnered with the commandos that are still doing the direct action hits – the strike force that those ~~commandos~~ commandos provide. The focus and what we see we bring is to work that engagement with the communities, with the approach being to get them involved in standing up their own security, their own defense. Along with the security aspect, there is a governance and development side to try to give some of that foundation to provide oversight and a little bit of quality control on the security forces that are generated within the communities. So, they're in a tough spot in Belambai in terms of being located along the ratlines and in the hornets' nest; the intimidation factor for the villages is significant.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

And what that does is to put them in a position where they're challenged to get that interaction and develop that autonomous security. The intent is to give them some time to get that developed. One of the phenomenons you see is that it is only after time, when the villagers see that you're staying there, will they get a sense of comfort and be able to come out of their shell. We've seen that in other villages, that is when they start to open up and generate their own security.

Q: For dealing with stressful events, who do those Soldiers turn to when they're out there and they're not getting traction, they are taking relatively frequent TICs, etc. How is stress managed on a place like Belambai?

A: I would say the first line of defense, as with most Army formations, is right there within the ODA, within the squads. The leadership really gets an assessment on the red star cluster type things, such as when you've got individuals that are showing signs, like being detached or having a fatalistic outlook on things, an unwillingness to go out on patrols, or a shellshock type of response.

Q: When SSG Bales was determined to be missing, when and how were you first notified?

A: I believe somewhere around 0400 hours there was someone pounding on my door and I was told that I was needed in the Ops Center. Once in the Ops Center, I was told that one of the guards had seen an American leave the VSP site. The guard raised it up through the night watch chain of command at the time, who immediately brought it up to the detachment chain of command. A 100% inventory of personnel was conducted and SSG Bales was found to be missing. My immediate concern was for his safety. We put the wheels in motion as a PR (Personnel Recovery) event for alerting folks, to alert commanders to get ready to go wheels-up. We informed the RC~~s~~ (b)(3), (b)(6), the JOC (Joint Operations Center), and alerting the site over at ~~(??)~~ VSP Talukan (b)(3), (b)(6) about the circumstances so they could get their personnel up and alerted to maximize our chance of employing assets; they also have (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c assets there that we wanted to get up on the net and get their ears open for any type of radio traffic. And we needed the aviators spun up so if we needed to launch, we had the capability to get forces in there faster. For a specific timeline, I'd have to go back to our MIRC logs, but we had gotten word from the ~~VSO (Village Stability Operations)~~ BSO (Battle Space Owner) (b)(3), (b)(6) at Zangabad that there were some wounded that had shown up there; one of the locals had driven them up there. That was the first sign that we had issues; not necessarily that we had a guy that had done that, but we didn't know where SSG Bales was and we also had casualties. It was obviously cause for concern in that we didn't really know what the situation was. We were still in a PR-type mode.

Q: Are you aware of what type of training SSG Bales and the rest of the uplift squads incurred leading to the deployment?

A: I know they had worked cross-training. Through all the specialties, they had their COMMO training, their medical training, and other standard training.

Q: Are you aware of any warning signs or any indicators shown by SSG Bales about his future behavior, either in pre-deployment training or while in theater?

A: No, sir. I know after the fact, the feedback from the team was that through the training and the interaction with him, it appeared that everything was normal. One of the terms used was that he was a "solid guy" and they were very surprised about the incident.

Q: What training or guidance do you provide your AOB commanders to recognize or identify the warning signs of potentially dangerous behavior or changes in behavior?

A: Specifically, with each of the teams out at remote sites, I would say it's just personal interaction and looking for some of the signs that I had talked about before. More importantly, it's especially about location out at Belambai. I think we're still relatively new to the environment; I knew of two small arms fire and an indirect fire prior to that. So, there was nothing that I thought was something that would trigger somebody to go off the deep end. We were looking at the Chaplain getting out there as preventive measures; there were no warning signs or anything that indicated those guys were in a hurt box. Getting back to your training question, action #1 is to recognize when we don't have the training or to get the Chaplain in or we've got a group a psych, in order to move forward and address those situations.

Q: Is that the same for stress as opposed to other sorts of behavior?

A: Yes, sir.

Q: We're trying to get a sense of Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and event consequence management that have taken place since the 11 March event. What Key Leader Engagements or consequence management activities or actions did you take part in?

A: The first thing we did to was to get our Commandos and emergency security posture out there because we had received indicators of masses of folks migrating toward Belambai. I really think, with the Quran burnings and this shooting, that if there's a success story to be taken away from this tragedy, it would be the level of Afghan participation in maintaining a level of control – consequence management, really. That morning, with the risk of the masses that we saw moving, we took General Habibi, the commanding officer of the 205th Corps, up on his offer for reinforcements. I flew out with the CID (Criminal Investigations Division) and got in touch with some of the key Afghan figures to help with the consequence management. General Razziq is definitely a heavy hitter down here in the south, and we had just had lunch with him a few days prior to the incident.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

He was up in Kabul and came back to meet with the RC; he arrived at a compound nearby and invited us to meet. I had interacted with other key leaders in the past, and I felt very comfortable with them and felt that they were there to help us. There was another gentleman whom I had not met before, but who is also a very big political figure, was a minister who had come in from Kabul. They were all a big help on that first day to get the local populace to stay manageable and stay calm and not erupt into violence or attempt to storm the front gate, which I think was a tremendous asset.

Q: How long did you stay when you went out there?

A: I stayed until Friday. Part of that was just for my own situational awareness. There were no warning signs leading up to this, so with the incident having happened, I wanted to stay out there beyond the adrenaline rush to observe their pattern of life, who was doing what, and really get a sense of the arrangement.

Q: After that first day with the key leaders, did you also engage in any meetings with any high-level Afghans as part of your consequence management?

A: Yes, sir. We were actually kind of on-again, off-again. Two days after the event, a delegation came by; some were from Kabul and I believe some of those personnel were their investigative team. They pulled me off to the side and started asking questions. I was absolutely careful not to release any protected information with regards to his name, his family, where he lives, etc. The delegation went into the village to provide some compensation; they were attacked on their way out. Beyond that, I was trying to set up a Shura either there at the base, or at the school immediately off of the base, to try to have some interaction with the locals. It was very important to me that we knew what they were tracking as far as number of dead and wounded, since the security situation didn't provide us the opportunity to interact with the people. As we went to the compensation table, the GIRoA officials were able to see people and basically rack-and-stack the data, so it was important to me that we had the information about who was affected so that when word got out that condolence payments were being made, we could tell them that was what GIRoA leadership provided, and we could go on a case-by-case basis. That way, it was not a U.S. or coalition force determination about their losses or who deserved or did not deserve payment.

Q: Did you participate in the condolence payment ceremony?

A: Yes, sir. (b)(3), (b)(6) the commander from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a did the heavy lifting in terms of organizing the event. From the brigade staff, they had the 3-person foreign claims commission and all the mechanisms set up. (b)(6) (b)(6) I owed it to the representatives of the families and family members to be there as the person responsible for everything that happens or fails to happen. I also brought the AOB commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) with me for the same purpose. I also brought our interpreter in so that we were able to express our condolences for the horrific incident. I think I did a decent job in communicating our remorse and goal as a nation to see that justice is done to any and all that were responsible for this incident.

Q: What we'd like to get from you, for the record, is a description of the KLEs and consequence management activities and recommendation as to whether they need additional activities at any level from strategic down to tactical. If we can get from your Ops Center, because I'm sure it must be in your SITREP, these activities that you or any of your primary staff attended over this period of time, it would help to complete the record. The other thing that would be good would be a copy of the guard roster.

A: Yes, sir.

Q: What are your impressions of (b)(3), (b)(6) so that we can better understand the climate? You would know those guys better than most people would. What are their qualities as leaders, their preparation for this, any indications from their side regarding leadership failures?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: So, if you've got somebody who's misbehaving out at one of these 14 sites, what do you plan on doing? What's your standard procedure?
A: A lot of that depends on the charge. What's the immediate risk? Is it one-time incident or something that shows a trend? The #1 question: does it incur a risk to our forces out at the site? Depending on the answer to those questions and the rank of the individuals involved, we can either ship them out, if they're junior enlisted, or request backfill if the individuals are in leadership positions.
Q: I just have one general question: as we move towards SFATs and more general purpose force involvement, do you think that the current amount of training that Soldiers receive in the rear is adequate considering the nature and challenges of the environment in which they're expected to operate? Do you think there's room for improvement, or is it alright?
A: I think if this incident doesn't bring that up as a Lessons Learned and how we prevent this type of incident in the future, then what are we doing to ensure the resilience of our Soldiers, especially in the remote sites? Through the selection process, to a certain degree, there may be a level of resiliency, whether it's through selection, or through Phase I and push to get Ranger tabs on our personnel. There are a lot of things built into our process to help build their resiliency.
Q: In addition to resiliency, you have to go through a lot of personality-type screening.
A: We go through the psych testing and those types of formal gates as we move through the selection and the qualification system. But, I think if you're not taking the stress well, you get pushed to a staff or another non-ODA position. There's something for everybody to do.
Q: Are you getting any kind of feedback from your KLEs?
A: Yes, I truly think when you care about the people you're working with, they're going to sense it through your day-to-day contact. Part of that is assuming risk and saying when you've made a mistake. As far as the aftermath, I think what has made this manageable in country and in the region have been the actions of our counterparts. They stepped up and really managed the chaos for us.
Q: Do you have any other information that you think could be helpful to us in this investigation?
A: Not that I can think of, no.
Q: Are there any other witnesses that we should interview other than the staff we've already interviewed or have scheduled?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WIT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 16 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Oath)

USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	(b)(3), (b)(6)		PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/~~04/03~~ 03 31 RC	0807	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I've been in the military nearly (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Do you have prior enlisted or National Guard or reserve time?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Is this your first combat tour in Afghanistan?
A: No, sir. I came over for OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom) 14 with the same battalion.
Q: Can you please describe what a SOTF (Special Operations Task Force) is, the purpose of the ops within the SOTF?
A: The SOTF Ops Center serves as the hub for the two companies that are here; we serve as the hub between the AOBs (Advanced Operations Base) and CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force). We track and ensure that everyone is staying within the operational guidance that's been put out by CJSOTF and we're doing things the right way.
Q: How long have you been working as the (b)(3), (b)(6) for SOTF-South, what are your primary duty responsibilities, and how long is your shift?
A: My shift is 12 hours, sir. As soon as I came off the plane, I rested 7 hours and then began the transition with the (b)(6) night time (b)(6) I believe that started on 20 January. My principal duties when I come onto the floor revolve around ensuring that the (b)(6) process is in place. I also deal with whatever carries over from the daytime shift; those issues are handled between the CO (commanding officer) and me. We also deal with whatever issues are going on throughout the shift. Primarily, we make sure we are tracking the radios for every unit that's out on a mission to make sure we know who's outside the wire to be able to answer questions that come from CJSOTF.
Q: Who is your supervisor and what are his responsibilities?
A: My supervisor is (b)(3), (b)(6) I work for (b)(3), (b)(6) but (b)(3), (b)(6) is my supervisor. Being the (b)(6) (b)(6) however he does have a higher role here at the SOTF, above the AOBs. He makes a lot of decisions, goes to a lot of meetings, and he does a lot of things that are not known to me. He tracks a lot of information for CJSOTF and delegates things to me.
Q: Who are your subordinates and what are their responsibilities?
A: Technically, I only have one NCO (noncommissioned officer) that works for me back in the rear; he is a 74D Sergeant First Class chemical NCO. Primarily, he works in conjunction with the ASTs from each company. We also have a 25-series Specialist in the shop; he manages the CPOF (Command Post of the Future) systems. So we work all things during the night shift, whether it be flights coming in, supply movements, those types of things.
Q: What are your command and control relationships with your higher headquarters and how do you interface with the CJSOTF JOC (Joint Operations Center)?
A: I believe it's been setup since OEF 14; we have an LNO (Liaison Officer) at CJSOTF that has the same rotation as the AST here at the SOTF, and typically all things flow through that LNO to keep everything mainstream. For the most part, when things are hot,

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandarhar Airfield DATED 2012/~~04/03~~ 03 3 (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

I deal directly with the JOC chief. Typically, everything is mitigated through the LNO, but if he's getting peppered with questions about things that he can't answer, then personnel at CJSOTF will call me directly to research and answer questions.
Q: What are the SOTF-South subordinate elements and where are they located?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with these subordinate units?
A: Their primary duties are to make sure they check the respective boxes, with regards to safety, immediately prior to leaving the wire. We do have the authority to keep them inside the wire if they haven't checked all those respective boxes; over this period of time, most of them know what to do. The procedures remain the same for us to ensure that safety is taken care of and the command is best represented.
Q: So every time they leave the wire, does that mean that they have to call your center and run all the traps?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: So, all the ODAs (Operational Detachment A) on site fall under your OPCON (Operational Control) and are calling you to run down that checklist before they go out, and when they come back what do they do?
A: They go outside the wire typically 45 minutes to an hour after pre-game, and depending on how far they travel, sometimes there are checkpoints. Regardless, they always check in when they get to where they're going. As far as movement, and from my vantage point and experience, we're pretty squared away in making sure we know where our guys are.
Q: 100% all the time?
A: That's typically how the process works. They guys will do what they planned on doing throughout the course of the day. If anything happens CCIR-related, they push it back to us and we track that and push it up to CJSOTF to make sure our command team is aware as well.
Q: And so when they come back in, what do they do? What kind of information do they report back to you?
A: They report back as game over. If there's anything that needs to be pushed up or if there's anything that requires a storyboard, a TICSUM (? Summary), or an OPSUM (Operation Summary), we make sure they complete them within the CJSOTF guidelines.
Q: When they call game over, does that mean that they're giving you 100% reporting on weapons, personnel, sensitive items?
A: Although they're not saying that, that's what is assumed.

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: But it still has to be submitted to AOB and it eventually ends up here?
A: Absolutely.
Q: As a knowledge base, you have level-0 through level-2, which a more intensely planned operation that SOTF-South has to approve, right?
A: We have to approve it all, up through CJSOTF as well. The biggest differentiation is whether or not it could result in potential negative, political fallout.
Q: Could you please describe the Ops box around VSP Belambai - like where the limits exist?
A: I looked in that LO specifically, and the way it's drawn out. Coming in, we knew that was the hottest area; the SIGACTs (Significant Activity report) had been hot since we walked in. They continue to be hot with the restrictions currently in place, it's difficult for them to do anything other than play defense. Since the incident, we've had consecutive days of small arms fire, PK, and things of that nature. VSP Belambai is not one of those areas where they're right there in the village.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/03

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/03 (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you have a feel for how many days of incoming fire and enemy initiated attacks that occurred at VSP Belambai in your rotation here and did the ODA at VSP Belambai conduct any offensive engagements?
A: Off the top of my head, no. But I can say that early in our rotation ODA (b)(1)1.4a at Taloqan had a level-0 offensive engagement, and we confirmed 3 KIA, which for about 3 weeks, pretty much mitigated all small arms fire. There was a period of time where we weren't doing any SIGACTs in that particular area and for a while we thought that, going through the S2 (Staff Intelligence) channel, we may have killed a low-level insurgent. So, we think that may have helped deter some of the violence coming in, the guerilla-type warfare tactics.
Q: In the sense of casualties, do you have a sense of how many have been suffered by SOTF-South, SOT (b)(1)1.4a since the time you came into theater?
A: I think, with IED (Improvised Explosive Device) incidents, we're somewhere around a dozen. Nothing major that would take anyone off the battlefield for a long period of time, other than the EOD (Explosive Ordinance Disposal) technician who lost his leg.

Q: When SSG Bales was determined to be missing, where and how were you notified as the (b)(6)
A: That night, we had an incident going on with another unit that we had not been able to bring up on the radio for about 5 hours. We were already planning on spinning up (b)(1)1.4a they were all staged and ready to go. About 0340 hours, I get the call from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) he said he thought they had someone missing. After the initial shock of that statement, he gave me all the specifics; as far as he knew, SSG Bales had been gone for about 30 minutes. They had already conducted 100% accountability, and they were going to do it again just to verify. At that time, neither SSG Bales' NODs (Night Observations Device) or his weapon were accounted for. I immediately sent (b)(3), (b)(6) to go get the S3, who arrived within a matter of minutes. I briefed him immediately. The Ops Center Sergeant Major was already on his way in. A couple of minutes after I briefed (b)(3), (b)(6), the colonel came in and received a brief.
Q: After you were notified that SSG Bales was missing, what was your immediate response, what actions did the Ops Center follow in reaction to this report, who did you notify and when?
A: I notified the S3. Effectively as soon as I got off the phone, I sent a runner to knock on his door, as well as the Ops Center Sergeant Major. So, the order of march was the S3, then the Ops Center SGM. I needed to give the S3 a chance to be able to brief the colonel. I printed out the SITREP to verify the name. I called CJSOTF myself; if I'm not mistaken, I believe I spoke to our LNO. Initially, we thought it was going to be a PR (Personnel Recovery) event, so naturally we woke up our PR personnel, as well as anyone else on the staff, S2, S1, everybody. We kind of assumed that maybe he was just sleepwalking and walked off because who in their right mind would just walk off in that particular area?
Q: Where did you first get the report that he might have been sleepwalking? Was that from (b)(3), (b)(6)?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: Did he say that because he thought that SSG Bales had a history of sleepwalking or was he guessing?
A: I assume that (b)(3), (b)(6) was just befuddled to think that someone had just walked off. I don't know if he had a history, I can't say for certain.
Q: What do you do in the battle drill for personnel recovery?
A: The first thing we do is accountability with regard to personnel, weapons, and equipment. We're going to contact our PR personnel and they open the PR gate as soon as they hit the floor and correspond with RC-South and CJSOTF. At that time, all the command leadership are there, so the PR event is working itself out and we're continuing to battle track.
Q: Do you have units on standby to conduct PR?
A: Yes, sir. Specifically for this event, as soon as everyone was notified, we had anyone and everyone calling us to see what kind of resources they could provide. The commander at Simmons was spun up by (b)(3), (b)(6) he called to make sure the commandos were ready to go. We immediately began working the air through the air OIC (office in charge) and they were ready to go.
Q: As the situation developed on 11 March 2012, can you recall the sequence of events and actions that occurred within the Ops Center from this point where you've already notified CJSOTF-A, you've started the personnel recovery; what were the subsequent events that took place until you went off duty and you notified your relief?
A: At around 0350 hours, even before we started the PR event, we got a call from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a who said that five local nationals were brought to their location. They also said that there were 3-4 people dead, not at that location. So, after I hung up, I called the JOC to attention and let everybody know that information. The person from TF (b)(1)1.4a also said the person who brought the five people to the FOB (Forward Operating Base) said that they'd been in a gunfight with Americans, plural. We continued to battle track to find out what was going on, a missing Soldier…. Roughly 0410 hours, (b)(3), (b)(6) called and said FOB

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/~~04~~ 03/~~03~~ 31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

They said they could see he was wearing night vision goggles and apparently he had a weapon. With that information, we decided to spin up the QRF (Quick Reaction Force) inherent to (b)(1)1.4a and move out. At 0427 hours, they sent their QRF TASKORD and 5-Ws. They were planning and staging to leave at 0445 hours. Around 0430 hours, (b)(3), (b)(6) called and passed us some more information, and at that time he told us what we needed to do with regards to the commandos. At roughly 0450 hours, (b)(3), (b)(6) called back and said that SSG Bales had walked back through the gate and turned himself in. He said SSG Bales had blood on his hands and on his clothes. At that time, when he called in, (b)(3), (b)(6) were on the phone and gave (b)(3), (b)(6) certain directives. The first directive he gave him was to read
SSG Bales his rights. The second directive he gave was that two 18-series personnel had to be watching him at all times. The third, and most important directive, was that everything he had on his person at that particular time needed to be taken and bagged as evidence. Those were the three most pertinent things that I remember.

Q: What role, if any, did the SOTF Ops Center play in the medevac of the injured Afghans?

A: The medevac was handled by Zangabad. So, when we got the information, those three people were already en route to KMRH; that's where they were going initially. I understand that after they realized it potentially involved an American Soldier, that's why they changed them to Role 3. With a CIVCAS (Civilian Casualty) incident, they typically send them to Role 3 because that's where they'll get the best care.

Q: After the shooting incident, what key leader engagements (KLE) with Afghans or other consequence management actions did the Ops Center have a role in, if any?

A: At 0800, at RC-South, they had a consequence management meeting. At approximately, 0820 hours, (b)(3), (b)(6) called back and said he had a guy that lived about 100 meters off of VSP Belambai who said he had four dead bodies in his house, and he said he also heard that in another village, a whole family had been killed. That was the first we heard that information in the Ops Center. That report obviously matched the earlier report we received from Task Force (b)(1)1.4a that said there were three dead bodies that were not at FOB Zangabad. So, this new information effectively confirmed that report. At about 0915 hours, (b)(3), (b)(6) came back from the consequence management meeting and verified a family had been killed and he was able to break down the number of women and children and their relationships. During this time, we were still putting everything together and my replacement was on shift. As far as key leader engagement, the initial reaction from the locals was pretty hostile. As I was leaving shift at about 1100 hours, there was about 150-200 people at VSP Belambai's gate. At that time, we had a team that was ready to go; everything that we needed to support the team was there. They had their riot control gear because of the Quran burning was two weeks prior to this, but there was nothing hostile happening.

Q: In your opinion, are there any additional KLEs or consequence management activities that we should take?

A: This was obviously a very difficult situation. Right now, based on what I've seen, I don't know if we can hold that territory. With the restrictions that we have are dangerous and that comes across in the SITREPs every day. When events happen, our Soldiers, along with their uplift and conventional and special ops forces, need to be able to work. If there are restraints on them because we're afraid of what happened, then that's going to get an American Soldier killed. As much as we care about the people here, losing an American Soldier is a little bit different; for all of us, we all want to go home. I think my best suggestion would be to make the payments. The payments were in excess of what anybody here has seen both here and in Iraq. I'm not sure how the situation can be fixed, other than with time.

Q: Do you have any other information that you think would be helpful to this investigation?

A: I will say, sir, that I've been in the Army six years and I've never lacked good leadership. I can say that the things we need to know coming in, the training that we need to know coming in, we had it. I'm not sure how much we can control the degradation from O-5, to O-4, down to
E-1. I think that everything we need to do when things happen, we react. I think people are sharp when necessary and I think that the skills and the talent, along with the training, perplexes me that something like this could even happen. People are shocked that this happened. I've read the reports and the news and seen the television, and it's still difficult to believe that this thing even happened. The situation is just very tragic.

Q: Is there anyone else that you think we should talk to that can help with this investigation?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) and the S3, but I think you've all identified the key players.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 18 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/03/31	0902	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the Special Forces?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours have you had?
A: This is my third trip to Afghanistan. Zero to Iraq.
Q: Can you describe what a Special Operations Task Force is and the purpose of the OPCEN within the task force?
A: A Special Operations Task Force is a special operations battalion consisting of three companies. In this rotation here, however, (b)(1)1.4a per company. (b)(3), (b)(6) that is tracking the daily battle plus 24 hours.
Q: How long have you been working as the (b)(6) for the SOTF South? What are you duty responsibilities and the length of your shift?
A: I started around January 10 or 12 and our shifts go from 2000 to 0800 in the morning. Most days when we assume duty at 2000 we normally close out that date's activities. We put together the company SITREPS, battalion SITREPS, and prepare for the next day of operations.
Q: What is you MOS?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who is your supervisor and what are his normal responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6), he is the second battalion S3 SGM, the OPCENT SGM. He normally is on duty from 0800 to 2100, but he is on call 24/7 whenever he is needed.
Q: As (b)(3), (b)(6) e you already been a team sergeant?
A: Yes. Until last year, I was in Charlie Company for 36 months.
Q: Who are your subordinates and what are their responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) at the CPOF (Command Post of the Future), he runs the map boards and basically maintains the current situation on the maps. We have the two company ASTs, they are the ones who push stuff out to the companies.
Q: What are you command and control relationship with the higher headquarters? How do you interface with the CJSOTF-A?
A: We normally go through our LNOs.
Q: What is the normal command and control relationship on VSP Belambai?
A: I would expect everything run through the team sergeant, the team chief, and the team leader.
Q: How do you communicate with those subordinate units that are out there? What are the various means of communication?
A: If it is anything operational they use SATCOM, they also have SIPR connection out in the VSPs, but if it is something admin in most cases will be over the phone.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PER NG STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Any limitations coming from these systems?
A: Not too much.
Q: If you have troops in contact and something serious occurs with one of the subordinate units, what battle drills or SOPs do you follow on the OPCEN floor?
A: As soon as we get the information, the night crew goes to (b)(3), (b)(6) and works down the line from there. If it something that is serious in nature, it would go to the Colonel and the Command Sergeant Major.
Q: Do you have battle drills that you guys practice?
A: We did an MRX prior to coming here and we also have all our battle drills posted in our computers where you can review them all the time.
Q: Are the command relationship that you have with your subordinates and units, are they sufficient and effective?
A: It seems to be fine, but it also with the support of the AOBs.
Q: What were the accountability procedures on personnel and weapons on 11 March 2012? Is there any different accountability procedure from VSP Belambai and the other camps?
A: I do not think there would be anything different.
Q: As a former team sergeant, can you describe what the normal SOP would be for informing the AOBs of a missing person?
A: If somebody is missing it will be a direct call to the SOTF.
Q: How do they maintain and report personnel, sensitive items, and weapons?
A: Normally, once a week each person lists their weapon, night vision, and once a week we verify and make a hand receipt check. Also spot checks daily.
Q: How many days of incoming fire and enemy initiated attacks have occurred at VSP Belambai since you guys got here?
A: At VSP Belambai, they would have taken indirect or direct fire on at least five occasions. Maybe 10 or 14 days prior to 11 March they did do a level zero operation in that area.
Q: What about casualties from the SOTF?
A: A little over a week before 11 March, there was the EID that exploded when they were coming back to Belambai; those were the only casualties from Belambai since we have been here.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined to be missing, when and how were you notified?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) notified me over the phone.
Q: What was the immediate response and what SOP did you follow when you were notified that SSG Bales was missing? Who did you notify?
A: We notified the (b)(3), (b)(6) They were all on the floor when the calls were coming in.
Q: What was the sequence of events and actions that occurred within the OPCEN up to the time that you transitioned to your relief and how well that transfer go with your relief?
A: First, we had awakened (b)(3), (b)(6) because of another incident that we had, and he was on the floor when we received the call from (b)(3), (b)(6) came in. At that time, it was immediate wake up for (b)(3), (b)(6) The initial call was from one of the Afghan National Army (ANA) guys had stated that an American had left the post. (b)(3), (b)(6) called us to give us the warning and then he told me that he was going to conduct a head count of personnel and an inventory. 5 to 10 minutes later he called back and said that SSG Bales was missing and provided his battle roster number. Immediately we started going to the ISR channels, trying to get ISR, maybe rotary wings, something with capabilities of night vision to see if somebody was moving around that area. As the process started, (b)(3), (b)(6) notified the CJSOTF. Shortly after, we had the notification that it was SSG Bales, and they stated that they had five peoples MEDEVACed for gunshot wounds. An 8 to 10 year old girl with trauma to the head, another male around 40 years old with wounds to the neck, another smaller male with gunshot wounds to the leg and chest, and they were MEDVACed here to the KAF (Kandahar Air Field). The village north of Belambai, at that time they were claiming two or three deaths. I was trying to put everything together because somebody was missing.
Q: What happened after he showed up?
A: As soon as he showed back up, we were all there and the Colonel said "secure him, secure his weapon, and read him his rights." We notified everyone else that he had come back. We went to get the two daytime ASTs and put them in a UH-60 to fly out on escort duty to bring SSG Bales here.
Q: What roles di the OPCEN play on the MEDVAC of the injured afghan civilians?
A: We had no role. that was RC-South that took care of that.
Q: After the shooting incident, did the OPCEN have any role in managing key leader engagement for the Afghans or other

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Brown DATED 2012/03/31

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: After the shooting incident, did the OPCEN have any role in managing key leader engagement for the Afghans or other management activities?

A: Around 0700, (b)(3), (b)(6) called and told us that one of the local nationals showed up at the front gate and he was talking about what happened. They brought to their attention that several people were killed in the south. At about 1000, about one hundred people were gathered around at the front gate, peaceful for the most part.

END STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, O

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6) SFG (A)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 6 day of April 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

USAF

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Fort Bragg, North Carolina	2012/04/02	1956	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) I am currently assigned to Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 3d Special Forces Group. I'm pending an assignment to the War College.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: It will be (b)(3), (b)(6) I've had 3 combat tours. One tour in Iraq and two tours in Afghanistan.
Q: How long did you work as the [redacted] and what were your day to day responsibilities?
A: [redacted] for approximately 10 months from (b)(6) My day to day duties were to exercise command and control of all SOTF-S elements in the SOTF-S area of operations, which included 2 subordinate AOBs and all special operations subordinate to them in the Kandahar Province.
Q: Who was your SGM, and what were his responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) was the senior enlisted advisor. He provided me advice in regards to all operational, logistical, and administrative enlisted personnel matters for the duration of the deployment.
Q: Please describe the command and control relationship that existed between SOTF (b)(1) 4a and CJSOTF-A (e.g., ADCON, OPCON, TACON).
A: We were OPCON to CJSOTF-A. They were responsible for the oversight of all operational execution of duties and responsibilities as they applied to the mission of SOTF-S in Kandahar Province.
Q: What were your subordinate elements in theater? Where were they located?
A: I had three immediate subordinate elements. My headquarters company at Camp Brown located on Kandahar and two Special Forces AOBs. One AOB was located at Camp Simmons on Kandahar Airfield, our larger complex. The second was AOB Maholic located at Kandahar City adjacent to FOB Gecko.
Q: How many VSP sites did you have under those two AOBs?
A: Throughout the course of the rotation, the number changed over time, but by the end there were 15 VSP sites and one additional team that was responsible for partnering with an Afghan Commando Battalion. That was a Seal Platoon. Another Seal Platoon manned one VSP site, and all the remaining VSP sites were manned by Special Forces.
Q: What was your specific command and control relationship with these subordinate units (e.g., ADCON, OPCON, TACON).
A: They were all OPCON to me as well.
Q: What was your specific command and control relationship with the ODA at VSP Belambai?
A: They were OPCON to the AOB and the AOB was OPCON to me. So as I executed command and control through the AOB down to the ODAs. They would be executing my guidance.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fort Bragg (b)(3), (b)(6) DATED 02 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What was your specific command and control relationship with the uplift personnel (that is, conventional unit) Service members at VSP Belambai?
A: Those personnel were attached to that site, which means they would have been under the OPCON of that location.
Q: What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit?
A: The uplift elements we were augmented with were there to basically provide greater flexibility and reach of the special operations teams at the various VSP sites. What it allowed for was it established more security and the ability to conduct more operations while they were executing operations at any given VSP site.
Q: Who were the previous uplift units before the 2-3 Infantry?
A: That would be the 1st 505th out of Fort Bragg.
Q: What was SSG Bales' chain-of-command at Belambai? How well did you know him? Did you have any interaction with (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: He would have reported to the team sergeant and the team leader at Belambai. Then it would have floated to the ~~ODA and then the~~ Florida SOB SOTF. I did not know SSG Bales. The only interaction I probably would have had with him is in a large group when they arrived in theater. The SGM and I would have met them during inprocessing and gave a welcome speech to the entire company.
Q: How much were you able to interact with your subordinate units in theater? How do you interact (phone, in-person, VTC?) What limitations or constraints impacted interaction between you and your subordinate units?
A: I never really perceived any limitations or a constraint, with the exception of it was sometimes difficult to travel to certain sites, just based on availability of transportation assets. Whether it be ground transportation or air transportation. I could interact with any given site by phone on a daily basis, 24 hours a day if I needed to. I visited sites fairly routinely. I did Battle Field Circulations every week to various sites.
Q: How frequently did you, your SGM, or a member of your primary staff visit VSP Belambai? Did have meaningful contact with SSG Bales and the element he was a part of? How much did you or your SGM interact with SSG Bales? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: We did not go to VSP Belambai after 14 December. We did a Christmas Battle Field Circulation to Panjwa'i and I think that was in conjunction with the CJSOTF command team. We all went to the Panjwa'i District Center. Then I, my SGM, and my Warrant Officer went to VSP Talukan, while the CJSOTF command went on to Belambai. Once the 2-3 units arrived in country and pushed on to Belambai, we wouldn't have seen them. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Were the command relationships (TACON, OPCON, attached) sufficient to the mission at the VSP? Who was ultimately responsible for soldier care of the infantry NCOs and men on VSP Belambai? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: I would have been responsible. In SOTF-S, I was responsible for the care and well being of all the personnel within the SOTF, uniformly at all the sites. Down at that specific level on a day to day basis, in regards to interaction, that would have been the team sergeant and the team leader.
Q: How was the command climate at VSP Belambai during your tour (b)(3), (b)(6) of SOTF-South? How did this compare to the command climate at your other subordinate units?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What disciplinary standards did you set for personnel located at VSP Belambai? Were those standards enforced? If so, how do you know? Was there any infractions of standards at the VSP, and if so, what were the consequences?
A: In regard to the level of discipline, it would be absolutely consistent with anywhere else in theater with adherence to the policies and regulations. And certainly with regards to what was published from the CJSOTF for the execution of ongoing operations and also for standards and conduct. There's no deviation with regard to how to go about their daily business. Now as far as for discipline and tactical discipline, the expectation is going to be an elevated state of security at a place like Belambai, the discipline is very tight. So as far as maintaining equipment, security, and a tight relationship with their partner force, that was absolutely consistent with what anybody would see at any of the VSP sites. That site was an embed site, which is different from some of the village stability sites that are co-located on a larger FOB. (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Were you aware of any drinking and or drug substance abuse problems at VSP Belambai? If so, what action did you take?
A: No, sir I am not.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fort Bragg, NC DATED 2 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you recall the frequency of incoming fire or enemy initiated attacks on VSP Belambai between SSG Bales' arrival on 14 December 2011 and RIP/TOA on 1 February 12? Do you recall any offensive engagements conducted by ODA (b)(1)1.4a and the Infantry uplift personnel between 14 December 2011 and 1 February 2012?
A: Yes, it would have occurred around that time, probably 3 times a week. Belambai saw enemy contact fairly routinely, about 1, 2, 3 times a week during that period of time. I would characterize (b)(1)1.4a operations certainly as engaging the local populous and pursuing any potential insurgents in the area. It's difficult to characterize when you're doing population engagement, that is the root core of what the VSPs do, but doesn't necessarily qualify per se as what we perceive militarily to be an offensive operation.
Q: Do you recall any casualities being suffered at VSP Belambai between 14 December 2011 and your RIP/TOA on 1 February 2012?
A: No, sir I don't.
Q: What was the battle rhythm like at VSP Belambai? How did this compare with the battle rhythm of the other VSPs?
A: The battle rhythm probably for a place like Belambai compared to a place that had a more permissive environment, is that it would just be more deliberate, with regards to synchronization with adjacent units, allocation of external assets and then the means by which they would coordinate the support, internally for any type of operation conducted as well as externally. I didn't see any real difference in the amount of operations they conducted; it's just the level of preparation to execute those operations were higher. More planning and more preparation were required.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did the ODA, AOB and SOTF (b)(1)1.4a have for dealing with stressful events? Is there anyone to whom these personnel could turn to for help?
A: Yes, sir. It really depended on the level of the situation that determined what resources we brought to bear on any given instance. If someone potentially had to be Med-Evac'd, and there was a severe injury, certainly everybody is brought in following any instance in which causalities were taken, whether the guy was returned to duty or Med-Evac'd out. The chain-of-command at that location would then speak to the soldiers, bring everybody together, and they would do a check on everybody to see if anybody has been adversely impacted. And then follow on depending on the proximity with regard to either emotional linkage or physical proximity to an incident. There would be an increased level of awareness by the chain-of-command to keep an eye on specific individuals. Point being, if let's say someone had a very close friend who was wounded or injured, you'd watch that individual on days following to see if there are any concerns. For a particularly bad incident, we would also send out either a doc or a chaplain.
Q: Do you know what type of training SSG Bales' and the rest of the uplift squad at VSP Belambai conducted prior to this deployment?
A: Prior to deployment, it is my understanding they trained at the individual unit level. Familiarization with combat operations, immediate action drills, familiarizations with the weapon systems, familiarizations with the communications and vehicle systems they would be using and also back here they were provided with training as part of an academics week. Getting an overview of the VSP, VSO methodology, familiarization with the mission itself and Afghan tradition and culture.
Q: Are you aware of any warning signs or indicators shown by SSG Bales about his future behavior either in his pre-deployment training or while in theater?
A: No, sir not whatsoever.
Q: What training or guidance, if any, did you provide AOB Commanders to recognize/identify warning signs of potential dangerous behavior?
A: Prior to our deployment and throughout the deployment we discussed what the signs and symptoms were. We had our doc and chaplain discuss at the command level with the Commanders and SGMs the signs and symptoms to watch for such as combat fatigue, etc... That was something we routinely would follow up on with the Commanders. That was something at least in our lane we watched fairly closely. We placed additional emphasis on identification and concerns with regard to combat stress.
Q: Are you aware of any command climate issues that existed within 2-3 uplift elements, or within 2-3? If there are any issues, what, if any actions were taken?
A (b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: Were you aware of any disciplinary issues, adherence to standard issues among the 2-3 elements? If there are any issues, what, if any actions were taken?
A: No, sir. Not that I'm aware of.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fort Bragg, NC DATED 2 April 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: No, sir. I don't believe so.
Q: Are there any additional witnesses you think I should interview concerning this investigation?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) he was the AOB Commander. He would have had frequent interaction with them. But he would be the only one that would have been potentially down there. (b)(3), (b)(6) probably had the same degree of interaction as I did. (b)(3), (b)(6)

Nothing Follows

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan	2012/03/29	1341	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force Afghanistan

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: My basic active service dated is (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been the (b)(3), (b)(6) and what are your day to day responsibilities?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Where is your HQ located?
A: At Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan.
Q: What are your command and control relationships, ADCON, OPCON, TACON?

(b)(1)1.4a

Q: What are your subordinate elements in theater? Where are they located?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with the ODA at VSP Belambai?

(b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What is your specific command and control relationship with the uplift personnel (that is, conventional unit) service members at VSP Belambai?
A: The single ground force commander at VSP Belambai is the SOF team commander. Operational control is exercised through SOTF-South, through (b)(1)1.4a
Q: What do you see as the mission of SSG Bales' uplift unit at VSP Belambai?
A: They are part of the overall SOF team, that is my direction and methodolgy of which we intergrated the infantry for all the units across the CJOA-A that are operating in Village Stability Platforms or Village Stability Staging Areas.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram Airfield DATED 29 1341D MAR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: How much are you able to interact with your subordinate units in theater? How do you interact (phone, in-person, VTC?) What limitations or constraints exist on interacting with your subordinate units?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

A: 99% percent of the time it's together.

(b)(6)

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What disciplinary standards/guidance have you provided your subordinate units in theater?
A: First and foremost, it is the individual Army and Service standards and values. All subordinate units are required to receive briefings on U.S. CENTCOM GO1B, COMUSFOR-A/COMISAF directives, and abide by the UCMJ. I also have operational directives, my operations guidance FRAGO, and Operational Grooming and Uniform standards. Throughout the course of my command tour I have forwarded to my commanders via email and required response/acknowledge to any subsequent command guidance regarding standards of conduct, force protection, measures, OPSEC guidance, insider threat mitigation, etc…
Q: How does the discipline at VSP Belambai compare with the discipline of your other VSPs in theater?
A: I have no reason to believe the discipline there, was a departure from the overall discipline at the other VSPs. During my last visit to Belambai on 24-25 Dec 2011, I was confident in the VSP site hardening, and force protection measures. ODA (b)(1)1.4a that established the VSP took force protection very seriously and I am confident that during the RIP with ODA (b)(1)1.4a force protection and site hardening was taken serious.
Q: What guidance have you provided to your subordinate units on weapons, accountability, and security measures to be carried out at the VSPs?
A: I have outlined operations guidance, in terms what's the minimal number of U.S. personnel on guard (b)(1)1.4a whether they are doing a roving guard, such as checking guard posts, that's minimal of a (b)(1)1.4a as well. I don't allow any of my subordinate elements to rely solely on ANSF or some of the security contracted guards, on their Village Stability Platform. In regards to security and weapons at VSP, and VSSAs, I expect my men to be armed at all times and sleep with their weapons or at least in arms reach. They are not authorized to keep them in central location. Some of the heightened security challenges we've had across the CJOA-A has definitely raised our level of force protection awareness.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram Air Field DATED 29 1341D MAR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: SSG Bales arrived in theater in Dec 2011. Since that time, how does the amount of enemy engagements experienced by the VSP Belambai compare to the amount of enemy activity experienced by your other subordinate?
A: For western Panjwai, the level of contact in December through March is low relative to the rest of the time of the year in Panjwai during the fighting season (April – Late November). Over the course of the year, western Panjwai and specifically VSPs Belambai and Talukan are the most kinetic locations in Kandahar. That said, Panjwai, central Helmand, select districts in Kandahar have high lethal activity. This is also true of multiple locations in RC East; Konar and Paktiya.
Q: Since December 2011, how does the battle rhythm of VSP Belambai compare with the other VSPs?
A: I would say the BR is consistent with respect to the number of dismounted patrols for similar sites in Panjwai and Helmand. Because Belambai does not have the overt support of the population outside of the immediate area, the SOF team conducts an aggressive combat patrol battle rhythm relative to the number of Shuras, to keep the INS off balance.
Q: Are you aware of how many casualities had been suffered at VSP Belambai during SSG Bales' tenure? If so, how does that number compare to your other subordinate units over the same time frame?
A: I am aware, there was an IED attack and (b)(3), (b)(6) lost his leg during that attack. They've also had local nationals brought in for casualities. Also the ANA and ANCOP. I have several areas that are higher, such as central Helmand and North Kandahar.
Q: What processes/procedures, if any, did you establish for your subordinates to deal with stressful events? Who were the personnel at the VSP able to turn to for help?
A: I have one Psychologist assigned to the CJSOTF-A. Each O5 Task force has a unit ministry team that conducts BFC to support the Task Force subordinate units. After a significant event resulting in severe or mass casualties, the SOTFs deploy their command team, AOB command team and unit ministry team to visit with the SMs. In the event of a severe event multiple casualties or deaths, the CJSOTF-A Psychologist will visit with the SOF team and conduct follow up visits or refer the SOF team to the behavior health/combat stress resources at one of the Level III hospitals around the CJOA. The most important resource is command presence and involvement from the AOB through CJSOTF-A. If SMs require behavior health support outside of a catastrophic event, they are referred to BH via the SOTF surgeons.
Q: Were you aware of any problems with any personnel concerning drugs or alcohol at VSP Belambai?
A: I was not aware it until I was provided updates by CID through the course of their investigation.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, when and how were you notified?
A: My phone rang in my quarters at 0406. I was told by the SOTF Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) that we have a missing American at VSP Belambai. I immediately moved to my Joint Operations Center, contacted my higher headquarters. Then I contacted TF (b)(6) to notify them that I might need some resources to help locate a missing American.
Q: When SSG Bales was determined missing, what action, if any did you take to regain accountability of SSG Bales?
A: I woke up my PRCC NCO. I notified my special plans group. I called my J-2. I called TF (b)(1)1.4a We basically have a battle drill for this situation and we went through that battle drill under my direction.
Q: Are you aware of what type of training SSG Bales' and the rest of the uplift squad at VSP Belambai incurred leading to this deployment?
A: Yes, 2-3 infantry conducted a comprehensive PMT focused on combat competencies at the squad and platoon level, members of 3rd SFG(A) conducted a academics POI at JBLM over a 5 day period, select members of the 2-3 command and staff participated in the CFSOCC-A academics week in CONUS, upon arrival to Afghanistan, SSG Bales and all 2-3 in personnel conducted a 5 day RSOI training to include Law of War, ROE, COMISAF/USFOR-A Tactical directives, medical training, commo training, mobility training etc…Upon arrival at the VSP the SOF team conducted SOF team integration training on SOF Team SOPs, battle drills, base defense, site hardening, security responsibilities etc… SSG Bales had an additional duty as the senior NCO from 2-3 at VSP Belambai for site force protection. SSG Bales has extensive combat experience, training and education as a combat arms NCO.
Q: What training or guidance, if any, do you provide your subordinate commanders to recognize/identify warning signs of potential dangerous behavior?
A: In the Army we receive annual training on suicide prevention and signs and symptoms of combat stress. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) identifying signs and symptoms of combat stress are points we drive home with the SOF team leadership and all personnel on the VSPs. The greatest resource we have to help Soldiers is the Chain of command seeking assistance for their Soldiers and taking the stance that they will work their way through it at the lower levels. We have worked very hard to break the stigma that seeking help does not mean weakness and the perception that seeking help will be detrimental to a Soldiers career.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAK (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram AFB DATED 29 Mar 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: After the shooting incident, what Key Leader Engagement or consequence management actions have you taken or been a part of?
A: I've engaged with senior Afghans. I called Minister Asadullah Khalid over the phone. I expressed my sincere condolences to him and to extend the same to the victems family members. I had an engagement with BG Haas where we met the brother of the President for about 4 hours. I expressed to him, our deep regret and this action was a departure from U.S. soldier conduct and what is expected of our service members. RC South, (b)(3), (b)(6), TF (b)(1)1.4a led District and Provincial Key Leader Engagement
Q: Which brother did you meet with?
A: It was Qayum Karzai.
Q: Are there any additional KLE or consequent management actions that should be taken in response to the incident?
A: Yes, just more reinforcing of what we have already done. Express our condolences to the family and explain to them that in no way this is an action condoned, or representative of the U.S. or ISAF
Q: Are you responsible for other subordinate units at which 2-3 provides uplift? If so, what are those subordinate units?
A: Yes, every unit that the 2-3 provides uplift for are under my command. That includes Task Force (b)(1)1.4a SOTF-E, SOTF-S and SOFT-SE.
Q: For those subordinate units, are you aware of any command climate issues that exist within the 2-3 uplift elements? If there are any issues, what, if any, actions have you taken?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram Airfield DATED 29 Mar 2012 (b)(3), (b)(6)

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: What was impressive to me was the counseling that the Company Commander from Bravo company, (b)(3), (b)(6), did as a commander to his company. In terms of what's expected of Soldiers, Non-Commissioned Officers, and Officers, just in general, such as values and ethical conduct. Quite frankly, I wish some of my Detachment commanders were that thorough with their Non Commissioned Officers. I was very impressed with what he laid out. Regarding the (b)(6) Infantry counseling: I would only add the fact that this counseling was done with all his NCOs, Squad Leaders, and Platoon Sergeants for (b)(6) by the Company Commander. SSG Bales received the commander's formal counseling and the information is provided in the sworn statements.

Q: Are there any additional personnel you would recommend I talk to, to carry out the remainder of my investigation?
A: Yes, (b)(3), (b)(6) I think its important you reach back to (b)(1)1.4a also recommend the previous SOTF commander (b)(3), (b)(6) and the previous AOB commander (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

//END OF STATEMENT//

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CJSOTF-A
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 29 day of March, 2012
at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6) JA
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Laghman, Afghanistan	2012/03/30	1359	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: I've been in the military (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: So I'm assuming you've got some enlisted or Reserve or National Guard time?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been (b)(6) SBCT and what are your day-to-day responsibilities?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fob Warhorse DATED 2012/03/10

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Regarding the individual in question, SSG Bales, did you know anything about him or have any interaction with him back at home station before this incident or by chance here in theater?
A: No, sir. I can't say that I haven't met him; I may have met him back at home station, but I don't remember him. I don't know him personally other than that he is a Staff Sergeant in one of my infantry battalions.
Q: Training up for the deployment, when did you first receive notice of your unit's deployment and the subordinate units that would normally go with you as part of the BCT, but their detachment or OPCON outside your BCT?
A: We were notified in June of 2011 when we got back from our brigade FTX (Field Training Exercise). We received a mission to fill 5 FTN missions. Two were scheduled to go against the VSO mission set, two battalions were going against a battlespace owning mission set in RC-South, and then my brigade headquarters was to fill a mission set to replace a National Guard brigade in Zabul Province and as a battlespace owner of Zabul. We had block leave the first two weeks in June, and then we deployed to the National Training Center (NTC); that was initially supposed to be a full spectrum operation and NTC rotation the first time it ran in probably 10 years. Because we received that mission, we didn't change it from full spectrum, but it had a COIN (counterinsurgency) flavor to it. By the time we found out about this rotation, they didn't have time to get the contractors and role players to fill a full COIN rotation. So, we went into that rotation and 2-3 and (b)(6) were still set to be VSOs. So we took them to a place that was remote and we created roles to try to give them the flavor and going through the steps of building ALP in remote areas. Shortly after our NTC rotation, in late September or early October, we found out that our mission had changed again. They wanted a full Stryker brigade in country, not a fragmented Stryker brigade. So, at that point, they were going to pull 2-3 and (b)(6) off that mission, but (b)(3), (b)(6) was a week from deployment, so they kept him on the VSO mission set, which he had been training on ever since we got back from NTC. We shifted (b)(6) to fill a VSO job with a deployment this month, late March or early April.
Q: So you only have the one battalion, 2-3 Infantry as a VSO?
A: That's correct. That's why I have a battalion from (b)(6) - it's basically replacing 2-3.
Q: But that particular battalion, they didn't train with you, they showed up on a different deployment cycle as well?
A: (b)(6) sir? Yes - they're arriving in theater right now. When FORSCOM pegged them to come, which was early January, we got

INITIALS (b)(3), (b)(6) STATEMENT PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Fort Hood DATED 2012 0330

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

on board and they were put into a January/February NTC rotation.
Q: We did hear that, at least in 2-3, they got some of their senior leadership at the company level, Sergeants First Class and so forth, and a backfill of brand new Soldiers right before deployment and after the NTC rotation?
A: We all did because within that cycle, it's designed where you lose people through ARFORGEN (Army Force Generation) 8.1 6 months. ARFORGEN 8.2 starts coming up and you're about 80% - our NTC rotation was at month 13. So, the NTC rotation cycle is scheduled between the 15 and 18 month. Well, ours got scheduled for the 13th month. So, yes, we received the rest of our Soldiers and key leaders after our NTC, after the 13th month. It actually works if you understand the process, unless you get called out earlier, like we did, before the 18th month mark. All of my battalions received new Soldiers and new key leaders after our NTC rotation, prior to deployment. It probably affected the 2-3 most because they went out the door first, end of November or beginning of December.
Q: Looking at 2-3, are you aware of any command climate issues within 2-3 Infantry?
A: Yes, sir, I am.
Q: OK, can you please describe it?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB [illegible] DATED 20120330

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Is there a command climate survey that might bare relevance on this issue or something to that effect?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Just to clarify your understanding of the way the UCMJ authority was working. At the company level, was the understanding that stuff at that level and below would go up only through the SOTF channels, up to CJSOTF, or for the company level, would it still go up through the organic company command?

A: My understanding was that it would still go up through the organic company command to (b)(3), (b)(6) Battalion command and then to CJSOTF, if it turned into an O-6 level action.

Q: These uplifted units are actually kind of new for everybody in figuring out how the ADCON works and the OPCON is a critical lesson learned. You're getting ready to experience your own form of that (b)(1) 1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (Security Force Assistance Teams) coming in.

A: There are 3 separate organizations coming from across the Army. They're coming from (b)(6) (b)(6)

Q: So, they're going to be OPCON to you, but will you have UCMJ authority over them?

A: RC-South did a pretty good job of publishing UCMJ jurisdictions. They have talked about rating schemes and I've spent about 10 hours with my staff going over line-by-line rating schemes. But my understanding right now is that, as a battlespace owner of Combined (b)(1)1.4a I have UCMJ authority over every servicemember, regardless of branch, in that area – other than personnel specifically assigned to Headquarters 82d Airborne Division or some of the loose units on KAF. But, everybody else I have UCMJ authority over.

Q: For these (b)(6) SFATs then, UCMJ authority is clear? You presumably have OPCON over them, even though they're going to be embedded in Kandacks and Brigades. But what about the ratings? Who is doing their ratings, their pay, their personnel actions, all that kind of stuff?

A: (b)(6) SBCT.

Q: So, they are truly OPCON and ADCON to you?

A: I would say attached. They are like an organic unit.

Q: You were a SAMS instructor, so when you add OPCON and ADCON, you get attached; is that right?

A: That's right, sir.

Q: So you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?

A: What happened is probably the most tragic and horrible event that I can possibly imagine as a Commander. In my worst nightmare, you could never convince me that one of my Staff Sergeants would have done what he is alleged to have done. I just can't even fathom. I don't know we could have watched or seen it coming. I don't know how we could have prevented it, because we had no indication whatsoever from any of the lines of communication that we had open - other than the fact that that he did not work for my formation for about three and a half months. I don't know what happened during that three and a half months, so I can't speak to that. People are capable of doing some pretty horrible things and we witnessed it on the 11th March. I don't know how it happened. I know that we are taking care of his family. We've got his wife and kids, and my FRG is taking care of her, just like if he was a combat casualty, and we will continue to do that until we either leave or she moves.

Q: Are there any additional personal that you recommend we talk to, to carry out the remainder of the investigation?

A: You need to talk to SOTF-South, (b)(3), (b)(6) and his group, and then the members that were on Belambai to know what was going on in that particular side.

//END OF STATEMENT//

INITIALS OF PERSON MA (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB LAGMAN DATED 2012 03 30

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

DAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT [redacted] HOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 07 day of APRIL, at FOB LAGMAN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

UCMJ Article 136 / BDE ADJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STAT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Masum Ghar	2012/04/01	1525	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position and unit of assignment.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) currently stationed in Panjwa'i District, Camp Masum Ghar.

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) This is my third combat tour. I have served two tours in Iraq and one in Afghanistan.

Q: I just discussed the Condolence Payment meeting in some detail with (b)(3), (b)(6). Can you please describe the Condolence Payment meeting from your perspective as a senior leader?

A: It was different from any KLE I have ever done before, in that it had so many parties involved in terms of not just the Afghans we were paying money too, but the number of KLEs that were involved leading up to the condolence payments and bringing everybody to the table. It was also different because at the same time we were making the condolence payments we had to try to confirm that we had the right person that we were giving the money to in order to satisfy the requirements out there. It was formal, but at the same time it was a relaxing atmosphere. We had some very powerful senior leaders from both tribes as representation for the injuries and also for those killed. Two of the major players there were General Razziq, the PCoP (Provincial Chief of Police) from Kandahar and one of our Shura members down here who's actually a provincial Shura member, Dastagir, was also present. Both of these men were at the ground level on day one. It evolved into mitigation for all of us, in the beginning. It took a senior leader role in bringing us information as well as helping to calm things down. It provided a lot of good insight. We had a number of other key leaders who were there too. That involved Brigadier General Habibi, the 1st Brigade, 205th Commander, who is my counterpart in the ANA. General Habibi is a very strong leader, who was very instrumental in providing guidance on how we should move on this and was kind of my "go-to guy" with the rest of the KLEs, both above and below. What I mean by this is that if I needed to contact Razziq, I usually contacted him through Habibi or his SFAT (Security Forces Assistance Team) leader. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) But I also used Habibi to reach down to some of the village elders he knew in that area, as well as some of the Shuras members in the Panjwa'i District. The powerful leaders represented the tribe from Alokizai and the tribe from Achekzai.

Q: What feedback, if any, have you received concerning this engagement?

A: I received positive feedback from all the parties. The comments were, "It went as good as you can make one of those events." It was a three-part event. We had a pre-meeting with Governor Wesa, who hosted the event at the provincial headquarters. At that meeting were General Habibi and myself. Razziq was not there because he was hosting the people at his palace (and headquarters) at Mandigak. We had the meeting to make sure we had planned correctly a distinct sequence of events and that we had selected the right rooms to do this and the right areas. We limited the participation of both media and outside persons that wanted to get involved in this and had no business being involved. We did a recon of the different Shura rooms available and we found two that were acceptable. One was the main meeting hall where Wesa hosts the provincial meetings. We had another Shura room where we did the actual payments. In both cases, we were able to identify rooms with a certain amount of privacy.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Mesum Gar DATED 2012/04/01

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The first meeting had to allow for a big audience to attend, so when the SOTF-S Commander makes some public remarks about the condolence payment itself and to express grief and sorrow to all the locals affected, he can express that to a lot of village elders and Shura members from Panjwa'i and Kandahar. So we can have multiple, multiple witnesses present in that room. After we left that room, we had Razziq, Habibi and the P Gov Wesa, we moved to a smaller Shura room where we had the actual money and my lawyers. We conducted the claims commission and paid the money. That process went very well and went very quickly. When the locals had questions, our Afghan partners answered the questions for them. We pre-briefed our Afghan partners what the process was and they explained it to these locals. Those guys were hugely helpful in mitigating what could have been a show stopper. The Senior Afghan partners made the locals comfortable and kept them engaged but at the same time reduced the level of stress in that room just by talking to them. General Razziq helped us get cotton swabs for DNA purposes from the local families for the CID investigation. After the payment concluded, we went into the big shura hall and we had lunch with them. Before lunch ended, I talked individually to all four payees to get their opinion of the process and where we were at. What I left with was that the meeting was a very positive step forward. They were all very appreciative we took that step and paid that money and that we did it in a structure that involved the DGov, the DCoP, and all these senior leaders. One of the things several of them thanked me for at that meeting was how well we treated the wounded how we got them out of there quickly and the great care they were getting at the hospital. So when we left there, I felt like it had gone about as good as it could possibly go. The Shura members also thought it went well. They felt like they played a part in bringing this thing together.

Q: Did your brigade facilitate the movement of the families from the Belambai area over to KAF Role 3 to visit the victims?

A: No, sir. I think what we did, which is kind of traditional for us is that when we do an air evacuation of a family member, we try to fly a family member with them. So some of those folks got on aircraft. Most of the family members that did follow-up visits up there actually did that through DCoP. He facilitated that movement up there and those continued movements after that. I am almost sure Razziq was the guy making that happen.

Q: Are there any other KLE/mitigation actions that you have either participated in or about which you are knowledgeable that you can tell me about?

A: The day of the incident, we had all the major players from the province out at the VSP. The Corps Commander was there, the DGov, the DCoP, Ahsadullah Khalid, the regional ministry was there. The ISAF involvement in the mitigation at that point, from my stand point, was one-on-one engagements. At the VSP, I made it around to the 20 to 30 people I knew and expressed our condolences for the loss. Ahsadullah Khalid's first question to me was, "What do we do next?" I asked him "Well sir, what do you think we ought to do?" He said, "We need to get this crowd to quiet down, before we have another incident right outside the front gate." So he, Razziq, and Hamid went out and talked to the crowd. I asked him if he wanted me to go out there with him, and he said absolutely not. The senior leaders made three trips, back and forth, to the crowd. On the third trip, Ahsadullah Khalid released the bodies to go be buried. Khalid pulled out his SAT phone and he had about 4 different village elders and family members talk to President Karzai. Each one of them had probably a 10 to 15 minute conversation with president Karzai. Then Khalid had a Shura inside the ODA compound, and he took all the ANSF partners in there as well as village elders and family members. He conducted a Shura that lasted about an hour. He did not want any of us in the Shura. When the Shura was done, he said "We've got this under control." "The crowd had dispersed and the bodies were going to be buried. And now it's a matter of some of the Shura members, district leaders to quiet things down." He told us that we all needed to leave. Then in small groups of PSD (Personal Security Details), we departed the area. That was on 11 March. Then the next day, General Karimi flew down along with the Ministry of the Interior, a whole bunch of his CID guys, and two of his investigators. They all landed in Zangabad and went to the site with Major General Hamid, the Corps Commander, Brigadier General Habibi, and the Kandak Commander. The next day we had a meeting with a bunch of the senior folks. Karimi was at the meeting, and he had a bunch of the family members present. He paid some money to at least three family members. I could not tell how much exactly, but I would say 2 to 3 thousand dollars in Afghan currency. Then I was asked to leave the room so they could talk some more. They probably spent about an hour with the family members. That was at FOB Zangabad. About every day after that, we were prepping to conduct the condolence payments. Almost every day I had a conversation with the DCoP, Sadar Mohammed, General Habibi, and Razziq to find out when they thought it would be appropriate to establish the condolence payment time. The timing of this thing was more important than what I would have thought. They all said that if you do it too fast you will look like you are trying to sweep it under the rug; if you are more patient with it you will have better information, which was absolutely true. There was a tremendous amount of talk among the ISAF folks and SFAT chains and there was a tremendous amount of talk with the senior security partners and government's partners. They were trying to do the same thing we were doing in trying to find out the senior leader in the tribes were so that we could pay them. Folks came in on the first two days who were clearly not the ones that needed to be paid and they were identified by our partners immediately.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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APPROVED FOR RELEASE

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Mazar Gor DATED 2012/04/01

8. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Are there any other individuals you think it would be helpful for me to talk with as part of my investigation into this matter?
A: Yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) has lived and worked in that district center this whole year. He has also had multiple tours over here, and he has had multiple tours in Panjwai. He has had special relationships with the D-Gov, before he was killed, the DCoP, and all the potential DGovs out there that are being named on a pretty regular basis. He could provide you with some good insight.
Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: I don't think so. The day I was down there, was really the second time I have been by that site. I really couldn't go into any detail, because those ODA teams were new. But the feedback I was getting from the company commander and (b)(3), (b)(6) was they seemed to be pretty good. When those guys first arrived in theater, (b)(3), (b)(6) sat down with those guys and kind of told those guys how to best to do operations and how to work with us down here. We have a good working relationship with those guys. We do a lot of back and forth in terms of helping each other out on operations as well as logistical stuff.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 7 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

USAF

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
IJC Headquarters, Afghanistan	2012/04/01	1804	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, current duty position, and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) I am currently assigned at the IJC Headquarters.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) This is my 5th combat tour. This is my first combat tour in Afghanistan; the rest of my tours were in Iraq and Kuwait.
Q: Can you please describe the KLEs and consequence management actions taken by LTG Scaparrotti after the incident?
A: Yes, sir. On the morning of, the Command General woke me up and gave me a call and said he'd already received the CCIR and we need to go ahead and start to work. It was a Sunday morning. I went to the office early and assembled the rest of the command group. The CG and I sat down and started identifying those individuals we needed to call. Sadly, I should say, we've got this down to kind of a battle rhythm, an SOP per se, on KLE/consequence management. We had great success previously on notifying our partners, informing them in complete transparency and sharing information with them; so they understood what was going on and could help us mitigate it and communicate to the Afghan people. This is generally the purpose of our KLE and consequence management. This was similar to what we experienced with the Koran burning incident, so we kind of followed suit and executed that same pattern again. This was after some consultation from General Bradshaw, the Deputy Commander of ISAF, and the Embassy. General Scaparrotti and General Bradshaw discussed individuals that needed to be notified. General Bradshaw identified the individuals he was going to contact, and General Scaparrotti indentified the individuals that he was going to contact. The individuals that we contacted were the Minister of Defense; the Deputy Minister of Interior. BK was not available so we contacted the DMoI, General Rachman. We also called General Karim; he is a routine call for us. We gave him the information we had at that time. The other individual we called was the IDLG (Independent Directorate of Local Governance), Minister Farahi. He is another key influential guy who reaches out and touches all the provincial governors and the deputy governors. There were a lot of other calls in between and calls to U.S. military officials like General Huggins and General Haas. We would update them periodically as the day progressed. I'm not 100% sure, but I think General Bradshaw took care of the Embassy and made all those phone calls. But I'm pretty confident about the names I just gave you, that General Scaparrotti contacted those individuals. The specific guidance General Scaparrotti was communicating to General Huggins was that they were already reaching out to Governor Wesa in the south, and also to Brigadier General Razziq. Those were two instrumental individuals that were going to help us mitigate this and being involved.
Q: At what point did the key leaders of IJC engage face to face with senior Afghan leaders?
A: There was none at that point, to my recollection. General Scaparrotti was dealing exclusively with Brigadier General Haas and General Huggins. He was being respectful to the chain of command and he was not bypassing those guys. I am pretty confident he spoke to them several times throughout that day; but that is where he was giving his field input.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT IJC HEADQUARTERS DATED 1 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did General Scaparotti communicate with the Afghan leaders after 11 March?
A: At that point we were communicating directly with General Karimi on the status of the delegation visit. We were trying to coordinate the transportation for them. When the president directed them to conduct a visit, they needed military lift; so we were working feverishly trying to get them air transportation. Unfortunately, the weather at the time was inhospitable, so we were not able to get them out there for a day and a half; but we continued to work and continued to support them. To make a long story short, we were able to fly General Karimi and his delegation out to Kandahar and then they were able to catch a rotary wing from Kandahar to VSP Belambai. They were the able to do their walk-about. I use the word walk-about instead of investigation; they really did not do an investigation, because from the reports and the discussions we have had with General Karimi, they really just talked to a couple of witnesses. The purpose of their visit was to do mitigation for the PoA, and show the Government's face to the people of Belambai and in Panjwa'i. This delegation received aggressive harassing fire and they did lose an ANA member from that delegation. Before the delegation visit was over, General Scaparrotti offered General Karimi to meet with our CID agents; General Karimi accepted that offer. We were able to coordinate that meeting. General Scaparotti told General Karimi that the meeting would be for a restricted audience.
Q: What was the feedback you have received from these engagements?
A: General Scaparrotti has great partnerships and trust with our Afghan partners. When he calls them and talks to them personally, it is a vote of trust and confidence. What I saw and heard in return was sadness and frustration, but support and commitment to General Scaparrotti that we would fight through this and work through this together. They were very grateful for his phone call. They all pretty much accepted that fact that a soldier literally went off the reservation; and that was horrible and they accepted that. But they also were committed that we were going to work through this together and we were going to move on. To that extent, we have. Because of the condolence payments, the families are moving on. This has not had the staying power like that of the Koran burning.
Q: Do you have any recommendations on what future KLE/mitigation actions should occur?
A: One additional thing you may or may not have visibility on, is General Scaparotti has coordinated with General Karimi to establish a combined weekly lawyer huddle for the investigators. The purpose of this is to completely communicate, open and transparent, what we have available to the senior guy communicating to Afghanistan's President on the Belambai incident.
Q: If you have any documentation that provides further detail on the KLE engagements you have discussed, can you please send that documentation to me?
A: Okay, sir.
Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?
A: In summary what I would share with you is the KLE management and consequence management was aggressive and it was based on experience. We've learned from the Koran burning, how to get out in front of it; and I would say we did get out in front of it. We were trying to communicate as much information as we had early on. We've continued to remain engaged and consistent throughout; and we're still engaged. Any time we have something new we provide it to the team; and to the weekly combined lawyer/investigator team, in helping to provide consequence management and mitigation on this case.
Q: Are there any other witnesses you recommend I interview as part of my investigation?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) can give you some atmospherics on what we're doing.

\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\END STATEMENT\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\\

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT IJC HEADQUARTERS DATED 1 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB MASJID GHAR	2012/04/03	1330	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I've been in the military since (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been deployed on this rotation to Afghanistan?
A: Since April, 2011.
Q: Is this your first combat deployment?
A: No, it is not.
Q: How many do you have?
A: I have one previous Afghanistan deployment for OEF (Operation Enduring Freedom). I've also been deployed to the Philippines during OEF Philippines.
Q: I was given your name as the point of contact to receive information on the condolence payments and the meeting during which those occurred with the Afghan families. Can you please describe the condolence payment meeting that occurred?
A: The meeting occurred a week ago, Saturday; that would be March 24th. It started off with a shura with the provincial governor leading the shura; that happened in the shura hall of the provincial governor's palace in Kandahar City. The meeting moved over into the media room in the same center where we conducted a foreign claims settlement meeting with the four claimants. The shura was a bit short, as shuras go. The provincial governor spoke, a couple of the other senior members spoke, and it ended w(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) speaking some words of sympathy. After that, the provincial governor announced that he was anticipating four claimants, who he named, and then everybody moved fairly quickly into the media room where we sat down with the four claimants and the rest of the shura members. There were approximately 50 people in the room, with the provincial governor and Brigadier General Razziq, the PCoP for Kandahar, sitting with (b)(3), (b)(6) nearby. One of the purposes General Razziq provided was to assure us that these were the appropriate claimants, meaning that any wrongful death or personal injury claims were actually being filed by the appropriate claimant for any settlements we were going to make that day. We ended up adjudicating 22 claims with our 3-member FCC (Foreign Claims Commission), that included myself as the president, and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) as members. Also present were (b)(3), (b)(6) who was the foreign claims pay agent, and Master Sergeant (b)(3), (b)(6), who was on standby as the pay agent for any solatia, which we did not end up using that day; we only paid out foreign claims during the settlements. (b)(3), (b)(6) was also at the settlement table along with an ANA (Afghan National Army) cultural advisor, whose name escapes me right now, who was sitting at the table with us as well to ensure that all the cultural norms were observed. We had a concept of operations that we had developed where we would have each family wait in the shura hall with the other members of the shura, and we would meet with them one-on-one. That didn't work out. It was announced that all of the families would go into the settlement hall, so it was a bit more formal than it normally is when you sit down and deal with foreign claims and with the claimants. When we sat down, all four claimants were at the table, and one-by-one we verified the person that they were making their claim on behalf of; all of the claims were paid in Afghani. For wrongful death claims, the foreign claims commission normally observes several categories to come up with a dollar amount; those include the loss of future earnings

10. EXHIBIT | 11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) | PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF ____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB MASUM GHAR DATED 2012/04/03

0 STATEMENT (Continued)

capacity of the deceased family members, burial expenses, loss of consortium, loss of nurturing a child, pain and suffering before death, and hospital and medical expenses. Prior to the shura, we had developed through various source documents a listing of possible claimants. We did that by using several reports; one of the reports was an ANP (Afghan National Police) CID (Criminal Investigations Division) report that we received from the PCoP, General Razziq. Another source was a list of attendees who went to Kabul and visited with President Karzai. We also used several other media documents that we were following at the time about who the people were that were either killed or injured and who their family members were, and what their relationships were to determine who proper claimants would be. As is with Afghan and Pashtu custom, the head of household would receive any payments that were made from injuries, death, or property damage that occurs in their home or in their compound. Here, we actually paid these four claimants because they were the heads of household, not necessarily because they were the next of kin or spouse or the executor for an estate. For all the wrongful deaths, we ended up paying (b)(6) total claims. We ended up not paying any personal damage claims for a few reasons: it was determined by the government officials that we would not be paying personal damage claims; and, during the claims settlements, none of the four claimants made any specific claims for any property damage. I don't know the reason for that, but we put in the settlement documents that that was now waived as part of the settlement agreement. So, we ended up not paying for any, though we were prepared to do so if we received any claims at the time. At the end of each meeting with the individual, we brought out the money and placed it in a box and gave them a few plastic bags. At the end of paying everyone, we sealed each box so that they couldn't be tampered with, ensured that their names were on the boxes, and ensured that they were in the hands of their claimants when they left. My understanding is that General Razziq and his guard force actually escorted them to their next destination. We had spoken about taking them to a local bank in Kandahar, but I don't know what exactly they did after that.

Q: Just to clarify, you have a normal foreign claims meeting every week in the district?

A: We do, in Panjwa'i district. Panjwa'i district is where our task force resides in the southwestern area of Kandahar Province. My foreign claims officer, (b)(3), (b)(6) we are 1-member FCCs and together we were appointed as a 3-member FCC to adjudicate these claims. The 1-memeber FCCs are able to adjudicate up to a maximum pay out (b)(6) but a 3-member can pay out a maximum of $50,000 for each claim or per incident. Here, we actually had to get special permission from the US Army Claims Service at Ft Meade for several things: to recognize these as separate incidents, the reason being because for claims over $100,000 from a single incident, we are not able to adjudicate; also, we were able to adjudicate and pay out more than (b)(6) So, yes, every Saturday morning, (b)(3), (b)(6) goes to the Ministry building at the district center and takes in claims and conducts payouts.; we've conducted around 186 claims brigade-wide, during the past year, so we're fairly familiar with the claims process.

Q: Of the 22 claims you paid to the four claimants in this case, how many were for wrongful death and how many were for injuries?

A: 16 wrongful deaths and 6 for personal injuries.

Q: Who facilitated the meeting? Was that the governor the whole way through?

A: My understanding is that General Razziq had a fairly large interest in this, and he was able to organize this with (b)(3), (b)(6) he is the STT team chief down at Kandahar. We found out on 11 March that this had occurred and we immediately started pulling data because it happened in our battlespace. We pulled the video footage for that day (b)(3), (b)(6) started an incident log, and we also started pulling any information we could get to either confirm or deny the incident, and any other information. Within two or three days, we were tagged to look at providing any condolence payments for the incident. So, my team did a couple of things: first, we tried to coordinate this through the CJSOTF (Combined Joint Special Operations Task Force) and CFSOCC (Combined Forces Special Operations Component Command), and the RC (Regional Command)-South SJA office to find out what they were doing so we could coordinate efforts. We were initially planning on paying out solatia, which are condolence payments of small amounts of money, which we determined here would be approximately (b)(6) for each wrongful death, and about (b)(6) for personal injuries. The decision on payments went much higher than us and it was determined that we would make one settlement and that would be under Foreign Claims. My understanding is one of the reasons for that was that it would basically prevent any further payments from being made, we would ensure that the right people were paid, and the healing process in this area could begin. By that Friday, we were told to stand down because RC-South had decided that CFSOCC would conduct these payments. On Sunday, it came back to us as the battlespace owner because CFSOCC wasn't able to make a 3-member FCC and were not equipped to make the payments. By Monday afternoon, we had conducted a rehearsal of the shura in front of (b)(3), (b)(6) By Tuesday, we had drawn the money and $100,000 for solatia as a "just in case" because we didn't want to get to the event and not be able to pay anyone for foreign claims because of the regulatory and legal restrictions with foreign claims; we had more flexibility with solatia. We also drew $1,000,000 in foreign claims funds, which was authorized by US Army Claims Service. We were on standby until Friday, when we found out that it was going to happen on Saturday.

Q: Do you have a list of names of the people that were killed, wounded, and to whom you paid the money?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB MASUM GHAR DATED 2012/04/23

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

A: Yes, Sir.
Q: Can you provide that, rather than have you repeat all the names?
A: Sure.
Q: When you looked at the 16 deaths and 6 injuries, how did you determine the monetary value? Was it age, number of children? What was the criteria to establish what you pay for one death versus another?
A: The regulatory valuation is as I stated before, and that's the loss of future earnings, capacity of the deceased family members, burial expenses, loss of consortion, loss of nurturing a child, pain and suffering before death, and hospital and medical expenses, and property damage. There's a cultural aspect on that with trying to figure out what the custom is, what the appropriate measures are in the actual local customs of the country that your making the claim. Here, we narrowed it down to not only Afghanistan, but then also to the region. So, here we're dealing with the Pashtu culture and so we went through those iterations. My understanding is that there were some high-level talks between General Razziq and, I don't know if it was the CFSOCC commander, or the RC-South commander, or possibly one of the DCG-Os or DCG-Ss, but some figures were basically going around. It ranged anywhere between $5,000-$50,000, and I may have heard a number above that as well. Those were figures that we were certainly looking at, but we were also looking at whether these would fit within the scope of the regulation and law, and if it was going to be above $50,000, we were not going to be able to adjudicate that without US Army Claims Service authorization; they would have had to receive authorization from someone higher in order to authorize us to payout over $50,000. We can deny any amount, but we cannot pay out more than $50,000.
Q: How much did you finally pay out, total?
A: The total amount was (b)(6) which was about (b)(6) Afghani at 47.45% exchange rate.
Q: So, some of the individual claims were fairly high then?
A: What we ended up doing was standardizing it. In talking with the cultural advisors, and using some of the cultural norms that General Razziq relayed to us through our higher headquarters, we found out that gender and age were a low consideration for the pay outs. So, we ended up going back to how much pain and suffering is worth. That number is fairly flexible, especially with something like this where you have a mass murder and people seeing each other shot, killed and wounded, before they are killed and wounded; and then the survivors seeing this and hearing about this afterwards. So, we capped it at a $50,000 rate for the wrongful deaths, which was not really attainable in Afghani, so we came as close as we could to the $50,000 so it was a round number in Afghani. It turned out to be around (b)(6) Afghani, which was (b)(6)
Q: What feedback, if any, did you receive concerning this engagement? Was it well-received? Did it meet its purpose?
A: The only feedback that we received was at the shura. There was a comment by one of the claimants that he was hoping that the money they were receiving that day wasn't going to be the end of it, but that there was also going to be some justice done. We assured them that the US legal system was working and that this was not the end of it and that the person responsible for this would be prosecuted to the fullest extent of the law after a thorough investigation was complete. That was about the extent of any remarks during the settlement portion of the shura. I haven't heard anything more from the actual claimants or from the people. We just had a normal claims intake day yesterday, and nothing was brought up about the incident from the six people who showed up on that day. I haven't heard anything.
Q: What is a normal claim that someone would present on a normal intake day?
A: We get anything from rotor wash damage from helicopters, to a Stryker damaging crops. Most of the claims are not legitimate for one reason or another, one of which could be damage due to battle damage, and so not appropriate to foreign claims. They are referred to the S9s for possible payment through CERP (Commanders' Emergency Response Program). Some that we see a lot of are battle damage from Task Force Kandahar who was here before us, the Canadians, that happened a couple of years ago; of course, we can't pay that with foreign claims, so they are referred to the remaining points of contact over there. We see some people who are not able to provide any evidence, or repeat people who we have paid or denied before who either want more money or are presenting a claim that has already been denied. One of the things that we have seen within the last 90-100 days are land use claims. We're able to pay land use claims for under 30 days, but if it goes over 30 days, we have to refer those to the US Corps of Engineers.
Q: Do you have any recommendations on what future KLE (Key Leader Engagements) or mitigation actions should occur?
A: In my opinion, I think they need to get out there. I think the US CID needs authorization to get out to the site to look at it. We have a CONOP (concept of operations) for forces and we're prepared to assist with that operation, but it's been hung up for a while. That's something I just remembered: at the shura, one of the comments by one of the claimants was that they hadn't had anyone come and look at their house. No-one had been out to collect any evidence and there was still blood on their floors. That's telling and it sends a message that, under normal circumstances, the first that a criminal investigation agency would do be to go out there.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEME (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB MAJWBHAR DATED 20120403

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

I know there are a number of reasons why they haven't done that, but we're at a point where, every day that we don't go out there, evidence is diminished along with credibility and reliability are just lost. That's one of the things that I would say would be meaningful to the people that this impacted, that the US is actually conducting an appropriate criminal investigation. Plus, it would certainly help the case to collect any evidence for the investigation and subsequent trial, if there is any.

Q: If you have any documents that provide details on the KLEs, like a storyboard, or CONOP, or even an incident summary, can you provide that with the list of people that you paid?

A: Yes, I can. I didn't create a storyboard, but I can certainly find out if our command group did.

Q: What type of payments are foreign claims designed to be used for?

A: Foreign claims are used to compensate claimants where the US government may be liable. The US government is a sovereign, so the government makes itself open to these types of claims, but it's done as a point of credibility for the US. We do this if we're in a foreign country and one of our Soldiers causes damage or death, we compensate those civilians who are affected. That payment is authorized by the Foreign Claims Act and is paid with Title 10 funds. Solatia is more of a condolence that's paid through a unit's O&M (operations and management) funds. That is not necessarily paid in every country; it's part of a cultural norm. So, if it is culturally accepted to pay a small sum of money as a symbol of remorse or sympathy for condolence, then we'll pay that. Here, in this district, we have the Pashtu people and they do recognize this payment and we do use it down here and pay in money, or some type of cattle, or some other form of recompense. We were able to use solatia if we wanted to, but at the end of the day it was decided that we would use foreign claims.

END OF STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT [redacted] ED, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 30 day of April, 2012 at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Type of Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STA (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
	2012/04/03	1833	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, unit and duty position.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Is this your first combat tour?

A: No. This is my fifth: four in Afghanistan; one in Iraq

Q: After the shooting incident on 11 March, what key leader engagements or other consequence management activities did you engage in?

A: On the morning of the shooting, (b)(3), (b)(6), the battalion commander for (b)(6) INF called me at approximately 0630. He informed me about what had happened and asked me to contact my Afghan partner, the District Chief of Police, (b)(6) (b)(6) I immediately went over there and met with (b)(6) He was on the phone with the Provincial Chief of Police, BG Razziq who was informing him of what had happened. We exchanged notes and then made a plan to move to Zangabad to link up with (b)(3), (b)(6) the BDE leadership and also the Afghan leadership. Once we arrived there, (b)(6) spoke to the Afghan leadership and the decision was made to move to FOB Belambai. Once we got to Belambai, (b)(6) and the other Afghan leadership moved to the sites where the actual shootings occurred. I stayed on the COP the entire time. When the individuals returned, they held a press conference and briefed what they had seen. Basically the DCOP and PCOP briefed some of the representatives who had come down from Kabul. My part was to assist the DCOP with secure transportation from Belambai back to Zangabad. When I returned from Belambai, I interacted with some of the local leaders here. We had a shura the day after where this topic came up. We didn't go into details, but I did reassure them that this was the act of one individual and it is being investigated. I passed on our condolences for what had happened, and I thanked them for all of their assistance in providing accurate information to the local population. The next interaction was the actual day when the payments were made to the families. I traveled to the Governor's Palace in Kandahar City. The DCOP was not there, but I went to answer questions for any local leaders. Nobody really had any questions, and there wasn't a lot that I needed to do. My last interaction was yesterday, when we went back to Belambai. We escorted CID agents to the compounds where the shootings occurred. The DCOP was with us that day. He helped guide us to where the shootings occurred. He interacted with the CID agents. We also briefed the PCOP. To summarize: the first day was getting the DCOP onsite and providing the DCOP with information; minimum interaction on the day of the actual payout; some interaction with some of the local leadership conveying condolences and answering any information that I could; and finally yesterday interacting with my counterpart (DCOP) and the CID agents at the scene where the attack happened.

Q: Did you hold your weekly district shura the week of the shootings?

A: We did not hold it the day after the shooting; we held it the day after. The issue didn't come up too much. Two members raised it, and the shura made it clear that they understood that this was the work of a single individual and would spread that word. I thanked them for this, and thanked them for their patience while we investigated.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did you hold your weekly shura the following week?
A: There wasn't a shura that Monday either because of Nowruz or the weather, I can't recall.
Q: Have you been meeting on a regular basis since then?
A: No. Since the District Governor was killed in January, we haven't been holding the shuras on a regular basis. We used to hold two shuras on Mondays. The first was a governance shura at 1000, and the second was a security shura at 1400 with the ANSF leadership from the district and the ISAF leadership. We did hold one security shura, but I don't recall holding a governance shura again until one that we held today. The topics of the shootings did not come up.
Q: Would you say that the Afghan officials and people that you deal with were important in the consequence management until the Nowruz holiday intervened?
A: Absolutely. Our Afghan partners really went above and beyond to deal with the locals and talk to their people to counter any rumors or incorrect information that was circulating or in the press. They also let people know that the Americans are conducting an investigation, are being very straight forward and are not trying to hide anything. When the payments happened, they ensured that the recipients were vetted; they shared all of that information with us. They helped get the people to the Palace. They sat with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) when the payments were made. They traveled with the people to the banks to make sure that they could deposit their money. Yesterday the DCOP was helpful on the scene with the CID agents. He pointed out the specific areas where people had been shot. He helped the CID agents sketch out the compounds and answered any questions that they had. It was a full day. We were out from about 0430 until 1800. The other superstar is the new District Governor, Haji Faisil Mohammed, who was crucial in making people understand that this was the act of one man. He also reminded the people of all of the projects that we had done and of the improved security. Our Afghan partners were definitely crucial to the mitigation of the event.
Q: Were there any Afghans outside of the district level who proved to be particularly important or helpful to the process?
A: One that I would be familiar with is GEN Razziq the PCOP. The day of the event, he went to the scene with the DCOP, he met with the locals and calmed things down a bit, and he reassured people that there would be an investigation and that the truth would come out. I don't have proof of this, but I was told that he issued personal funds to the families on the day of the event to help them. He set up the process of getting the victims' families to the Palace on the day that the payments were made. He was there yesterday to ensure that the CID agents were able to get to the site.
Q: So both the DCOP and PCOP were there yesterday?
A: Yes, the DCOP was there all day. The PCOP was there for about an hour. He drove down and was with us at the first compound. I didn't see them at the second compound. I think they had left by then. He talked to the leadership there and assisted the CID in their investigation.
Q: Did the absence of a permanent district governor have an impact on consequence management? Has the new governor been installed as the permanent district governor?
A: Haji Faisal Mohammed showed up today with a representative from the provincial government. There were probably about 75 people in the shura room and a news crew. The provincial leader recognized him as the new district governor and swore him in. I was talking to (b)(3), (b)(6) (GEN Razziq's mentor) and there is some confusion on whether Haji Faisil Mohammed is actually the new district governor. The leadership of Sardar Mohammed and Haji Faisil Mohammed filled the void left by the death of the former District Governor. Both of them were crucial to the mitigation. Sardar Mohammed was the acting District Governor throughout most of this time.
Q: Can you confirm that neither the shooting nor the investigation came up in the shura today?
A: It did not. We actually had two shuras: a development shura to talk about upcoming projects and a second shura where Haji Faisal Mohammed was installed as district governor.
Q: Do you think that the lack of shuras since the incident was an effort to freeze you out?
A: No. The shuras have been hit or miss for a few reasons. Nowruz is one. We also had some bad weather a month ago. We also did a seed and fertilizer distribution about a month ago that was rampant with corruption. We stepped in and modified how the seeds were distributed and asked the ANSF to help identify farmers. The shura members were not very happy with that and didn't come to the shuras for a few weeks. The shura after the shooting actually gave us the opportunity to come back together and figure out how the seed distribution process could be improved.
Q: Did you see any local nationals out at Alkozai or Naji Bien yesterday?
A: Naji Bien was deserted. It was a ghost town. On the way to Alkozai, we saw a school that was full of children who came out to greet us and were very friendly. We did see a couple of locals at the Alkozai compound. An older gentlemen came up to us and asked how to put in a claim for damages to a building. (b)(3), (b)(6) the battalion commander, briefed him on what he needed to do.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

He was very friendly. In the second compound in Alkozai, a young man in his early twenties came up to us and spoke to Sardar Mohammed. He indicated that he lived in the compound an answered a few questions about what happened that night. Some other local children came out and interacted with our soldiers and ANA.

Q: Are there any additional KLEs or consequence management actions that should be taken in response to this incident?

A: At this point, I think we have pretty much checked all of the boxes. I think the crucial event was that the morning of the event, within six hours, everyone had met at Zangabad. ISAF was sharing its notes with the ANSF. The relationship between the two groups was critical to getting the truth out. Also, ISAF representatives including GEN Huggins, met with Afghan leadership back at Zangabad later. ISAF showed the (b)(1)1.4a footage of the shooter being detained. That helped to make it clear that it was a single individual.

Q: Is there any other information that would be helpful to the investigation?

A: No. Nothing off the top of my head.

Q: Is there anyone else that we should talk to?

A: I think that you have already spoken to (b)(3), (b)(6) may be able to give you some behind the scenes information on what happened with the PCOP.

\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of ______, ____

at ______

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Masum Ghar	2012/03/29	1457	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Division, at FOB Masum Ghar.

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What is your familiarity with the medical response to the shooting incident that resulted in a MASCAL on 11 March?

A: On 11 March, I was down at FOB Zangabad doing Battle Field Circulation checking on the providers. The Battalion surgeon, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself were asleep in the trauma bay, when a medic, (b)(3), (b)(6) came and woke us up around 0330 (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) notified us that we had incoming casualities. We began preparing for the receipt of these casualities. The first patient that arrived was a young girl, estimated age around 6 or 7 years, with a gunshot wound to the head. Then four other casualties arrived. We initially triaged the young girl with the gunshot wound to the head as expectant. We then moved on to the second casuality, he was the older gentlemen, estimated to be in his late 40s early 50s, and he had a gunshot wound to his left neck and jaw. He was awake and alert and had a GCS (Glasgow Coma Scale) of 15 and was communicating with the interpeter. At that point, we performed initial treatment, with combat gauze to his neck to control bleeding and to apply appropriate dressing. We left him with the medic. (b)(3), (b)(6) went on to assist a little boy who was shot in the left anterior thigh and the right hip, who also had a GCS of 15 and was communicating effectively. There was another small boy who had a gun shot wound to the right side of his head. The bullet knicked the pinna, the outer part of the ear, causing a laceration. He was awake, alert, and oriented. He also had a GCS of 15 and didn't appear to have any life threating injures at that point. There was another young female, who looked to be in her late teens. The female didn't allow us to do an evaulation of her until another female was present. We had a female from the CRT join us. We then noticed the young female casualty had a gun shot wound to the chest. We then started to make immediate life threatening treatments, by placing chest seals over the penetrating chest trauma as well as doing chest needle decompression. At that point we had addressed all life threatening injures, so we decided to move back to the first patient which was the little girl. I stablilized her airway, because she had been vomiting and prepared her for evacuation as well. So I started an IV on her left arm and I prepared to secure her airway with a 6-0 ET (endotracheal) tube, which was the smallest tube we had, but a little big for a girl that size. We also didn't have much for pediactric equipment, so I was intubating her with an adult laryngoscope set. (b)(3), (b)(6) came over to assist me while I was intubating the little girl. He pushed the medications while I tried to secure the airway. I was not successful on the first attempt. We had attempted for approximately 30 seconds and her Blood Oxygen Contentration started to drop down to the 80s. So at that point, I stopped, bagged her, and I got her oxygen back up to 100%. On the second attempt I was successful. I secured her airway and then dressed all her wounds. At the time we called for a 9-line Med-Evac, we didn't not know that this was CIVCAS. Once we dropped the 9-line, we planned in accordance with the current MRE (Medical Rules of Eligibility), to move the the three CAT A, who were

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) EN AT Masum Ghar DATED 29 MAR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

the little girl with the head trauma; the older man, who had the penetrating trauma to his left neck; and the teenage female who had the penetrating chest trauma, and move them out on Med-Evac. We went back to the aid station to perform secondary assessments on the two little boys left behind. During that time, we were notified that this was a potential CIVCAS. That information changed the Med-Evac situation. We then dropped a second 9-line for the two little boys who were escorted by an adult male claiming to be the son of the older patient. At that time, the weather unfortunately had deteriorated, so the Air Force Med-Evac picked them up after we did further treatment and classified them as CAT B. We further assessed the head wound of the little boy. We were still unclear if the bullet had penetrated the skull, so we irrigated and closed those wounds temporarily with staples. We also irrigated the wound on his ear and closed that with sutures as we waited for the Med-Evac. Once the Med-Evac arrived, we moved them to the LZ (landing zone) and they were Med-Evaced to KAF. After that, we were mission complete.

Q: What do mean when you say the girl was expectant?

A: In a MASCAL situation, we try to maximize our effectiveness by treating patients we believe we can save and have full return to normal life expectancy. Given her head injury, it was unclear if she had a gunshot wound or blunt force trauma. She had a 2 to 3 centimeter hole in the top of her head where brain matter was exposed. She was showing signs of brain damage. So the likelihood that she would be able to make a full recovery was low. So we didn't want to spend our time treating her when we knew we could save the others.

Q: What does GSC stand for?

A: Glasgow Coma Scale. In the medical world, that's how we gauge their mental status. 15 is the highest you can get and that is normal. When the little girl came in, she had a GCS of 6 and it was deteriorating.

Q: In responding to this MASCAL, were there certain SOPs, TTPs, or other written standards/procedures that the medical responders involved followed?

A: Yes, sir. At each piece of T.I.(Tactical Infrastructure), each aid station has a MASCAL plan that was developed upon our arrival in theater. It is typically rehearsed. I can't vouch that the SOP was rehearsed at FOB Zangabad, however, I can say that they had conducted numerous actual MASCALs on that FOB. The medics had prepared very well and they were good at it. There is a written MASCAL SOP that incorporates the BDOC (Base Defense and Operations Center). Depending on how bad the MASCAL is, certain CLS (Combat Life Saver) personnel may be employed, and FOB Zangabad has a warning system where they blew an air horn to alert all the medical people to come to the aid station. I did not see the FOB Zangabad MASCAL plan, however.

Q: Were these standards met, and if not, why not?

A: Yes, they preformed very well. The medics were very well trained as well as the provider. If they had not been so well trained, we would have not been as successful as we werere that night.

Q: Was the medical response adequate?

A: Yes, Sir.

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?

A: Not to my knowledge, Sir.

Q: Any other witnesses that would be helpful to this investigation that you will recommend we talk too?

A: I would recommend talking to the 3-21 Battalion surgeon, the medics that were there at that time, and anyone who was taking care of the patients at the Role 3 hospital.

Q: What ways, if any, can the medical response be improved?

A: I recommend the Army use the Pavehawk helicopters like the pararescuers do. For this MEDEVAC response, the weather deteriorated and the Army H-60s were grounded. They could not retreive the the last two patients. Nothing against the Army Med-Evac system, but the Pavehawks can fly in low visibility.

Q: Was having the female there by luck or was it designed in their MASCAL plan?

A: I can't comment on what they do for that, because I have not been there for their MASCALs prior to that night. My understanding is that she arrived very quickly so it seemed as if it was something that was coordinated. That if they need a female, she would be the one they would grab. On FOB Masum Ghar, we have female medics on the FOB that help us the with the care of the female patients because we try to remain culturally sensitive. The difference between FOB Masum Ghar and FOB Zangabad is that they are an infantry battallion at FOB Zangabad, so they do not have many females. They are not authorized any females in their medical platoon. Across all of our infantry battallions, however, we have FET (Female Engagement) Teams. We have one female medic as apart of those FET teams, so they have that capability.

////////////////////////////////END OF STATEMENT////////////////////////////////

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKIN (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Classroom - Floor DATED 29 MAR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT (b)(3), (b)(6) WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of April, 2012

at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

28 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Summarized Testimony of (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) gave a sworn testimony to BG Waddell under oath via video teleconference (VTC) from FOB Zangabad on 31 March 2012. (b)(3), (b)(6) testimony was transcribed to a sworn statement form (DA Form 2823), in which his testimony was accurately summarized. (b)(3), (b)(6) was not able to sign his sworn statement due to his redeployment to the States. There is no fault of the witness that his statement could not be signed; tracking down the witness would unduly delay the processing of this investigation.

2. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at DSN: (b)(6) or email at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Zangabad	2012/03/31	1333	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

9.

I, _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, unit and duty position.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: Active Duty since (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: And you are a medical doctor?

A: Yes. I graduated from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) hen subsequently here in Afghanistan since that time.

Q: What is your familiarity with the medical response to the shooting incident that resulted in the mass casualty on 11 March? Can you describe that medical response?

A: At Zangabad we have a medic on duty 24/7. At approximately 0330, that medic came into the trauma bay, where my sleeping quarters are located, and informed me that we had casualties at the front gate. He did not know the extent of injuries or how many, but he was rallying the troops to respond to whatever came through the door. At that point, I got dressed. My BDE Surgeon (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was actually on the ground as well. We made preparations for the trauma room to receive casualties at that time.

Q: In responding to a mass casualty event do you have certain SOPs, TTPs or written standards and procedures that you and your medical responders follow?

A: Yes. We have a "Casualties at the Gate SOP." What that requires is that when we are presented with Afghan civilians who require life, limb or eyesight medical care, we move medics using a Gator or pick up truck to the ECP, do a brief triage, and then use those vehicles to transport any Afghans requiring medical treatment to the aid station. That plan was executed on the morning of 11 March.

Q: Once you got them into the aid station and did your triage, what would be the normal amount of time that you would work on the patient before evacuating them to a higher-level medical facility, like the Role 3 here at KAF?

A: It will depend on the number of casualties and the severity of their injuries. In the scenario on that particular evening, we had five casualties brought through the aid station. Four of them, we determined, ultimately required Category A MEDEVAC. After initial triage, we had three CAT A patients and two CAT Bs. One of the CAT Bs deteriorated, requiring an upgrade to CAT A. Typically for a MASCAL, we will work on them for about twenty minutes per patient, but there is a lot of variability in that scenario.

Q: In a normal scenario where would you typically take Afghan civilian casualties after bringing them in, triaging them and treating them?

A: It would depend on the severity of the injury. We could use the Afghan civilian health care facility in Kandahar City; Camp Hero—the Afghan military hospital; or KAF Role 3.

Q: Do you have a published set of criteria that you use in determining which facility they would be sent to?

A: It is based on the medical rules of eligibility. Additional factors are: the bed space available at those facilities and the status of air MEDEVAC availability.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Before you knew that this was a potential CIVCAS incident, where would you have normally sent the three CAT A patients? Would they have normally gone to Role 3 at KAF?
A: Typically what I would do is to call our BDE MEDOPS and give them a quick run-down of the situation. I would ask them if they can fly or where they can move them to. Based on that response, we would drop our 9-line MEDEVAC request with a MIST. With regard to the authority to launch, that's where my piece of where they go ends. At that point it becomes a MEDOPS decision as to where they will ultimately be taken.
Q: When you determine that you have CIVCAS, civilian casualties caused by coalition operations, does that change the treatment and evacuation protocols?
A: It does in that they are then treated under the same medical evacuation rules as enemy combatants or ISAF forces.
Q: When on the morning of 11 March did you become aware that you were potentially dealing with a CIVCAS incident?
A: About twenty to thirty minutes after they came into the Aid Station, we were starting to piece together that this was possibly a CIVCAS scenario. That was about the time that we were just starting to stabilize the patients, so it did not really come into our decision-making. By the time we were getting ready to prep our 9-line, it was clear that we were dealing with CIVCAS, so we launched a MEDEVAC CAT A, the same as if we had three CAT A soldiers.
Q: Similarly, when you determined that you had two CAT Bs, I think I read that the initial plan was to ground MEDEVAC them by the ANA, but once it was clear that it was CIVCAS, you AIREVACed them as well?
A: Yes. The additional factor was that it was not clear whether it was CIVCAS, and the air availability began to deteriorate. CAT B can stay at Role 1 for four hours, so we had that window. Once it was very clear that this was CIVCAS and one of the CAT B patients began to deteriorate, we dropped the 9-line request, and TF (b)(1)1.4a?check) was wheels up to come pick them up.
Q: The second airlift was actually an Air Force Pave Hawk which can fly in more difficult weather?
A: Yes.
Q: Did the first patients go out on normal Army MEDEVAC?
A: Yes. Based on the amount of stabilization required, we put those three on first. The other two received the basic stabilization, but all of our efforts had been focused on treating the three CAT A patients first. After we put the first three patients on the bird, we reassessed, performed additional stabilization, and that's when the second MEDEVAC request was put up.
Q: Did you meet all of your normal standards as set out in your SOPs and TTPs?
A: Yes. We have done a series of internal AARs. The one thing that was different from previous MASCAL incidents was the severity of the injuries. Typically we deal with IED-related MASCALs where we have maybe one or two critically injured patients and the others have more minor injuries. This case was different in that the number of critically injured patients was greater.
Q: In your estimation as the battalion surgeon, was the medical response adequate to the situation?
A: Yes. Given what we know now and that all five of the patients have survived, we probably more than met the expectations of a medical response.
Q: In what ways, if any, could the medical response have been improved?
A: We could have used an additional set of hands on station. We have actually started to make sure we have an additional group of CLS-type folks available. There were definitely some CLS-qualified soldiers who helped us out a great deal that evening. That is something we should formalize.
Q: It appears that it was somewhere between an hour and a half and two hours from the time of the incident at Alkozai to the arrival of the patients at Zangabad. Could you tell if the patients had bled out a lot during that time?
A: My training is as a family physician, so I am by no means an expert in determining how long someone has been without medical care. Given the amount of time that transpired, I would have expected the patients to have been more seriously injured and in more profound shock from their blood loss. Given the condition of the patients when they arrived, I did not think it had been hours; I thought it had been minutes.
Q: Who made the decision that this was CIVCAS? How was that decision made?
A: When the patient initially arrives at the aid station, our goal is to stabilize and treat. We did not go into figuring out who caused the injuries. What occurred is that we received a report at FOB Zengabad from VSP Belambai that there was a soldier outside of the wire. A 100% accountability check was launched at FOB Zangabad. At that time, our HHC 1SG, OPSSGM, and our LEP started to put together that the casualties may have been caused by the soldier outside of the wire. All of this was ongoing during the initial triage and treatment.
Q: Who made the final determination that you were going to treat this as a CIVCAS?
A: I think it was a collection of everyone involved that evening determining that we should err on the side of CIVCAS.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT | PAGE OF PAGES

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STATEMENT OF ______ TAKEN AT ______ DATED ______

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

These folks needed as high a level of care as possible, so we dropped the 9-line request to get the most critically injured folks out as quickly as possible. It was not one person who said it was CIVCAS, it was more a collective determination that we needed to get these people out the door as quickly as possible.

Q: What things are most responsible for the effectiveness of your response?

A: A lot of it had to do with experience. That was our twentieth MASCAL as a battalion this deployment. That is above average. We have taken care of some pretty terrible situations both here on the FOB and out in sector. I would attribute our success to the excellent crew that I have here-the medics and the NCOs. Our first MASCAL was not as smooth as this one. We trained hard before we deployed, especially at the Ft. Wainright MASCAL Center and at NTC.

Q: How do you share your lessons learned among the medical community here in theater?

A: Mainly internally through the battalion and brigade. I haven't had the opportunity to share it beyond that.

Q: Was there any particular selection or training of your team given that you were going to an especially kinetic district?

A: I am a PROFESDOC and just happened to be from the same installation as the Brigade. That gave me a unique opportunity to spend a lot more time in the train-up and run-up to the deployment. We saw where we were going and how volatile it was going to be, and we didn't allow people to think of themselves as combat medics or aid station medics. Everyone had to be rock solid on combat trauma. Everyone had to be good at everything. My PA was excellent at helping to get that across. Once we got on the ground here, the training didn't stop.

Q: Do you have a MASCAL SOP?

A: Yes. In fact, the week we arrived and were getting ready to take over, we set up training to test the SOP. Before we could even do that, we had our first MASCAL. We've only practiced the MASCAL once or twice because we have been so busy doing the real thing.

Q: Do you have any other information that you think would be helpful to us in this investigation?

A: No.

Q: Are there any other witnesses that we should talk to regarding the investigation?

A: The BDE Surgeon.

\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, ______, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

______
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of ______, ____ at ______

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

______
(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

______
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

______
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE OF PAGES

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Zangabad, Afghanistan	2012/03/29	1901	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank, and current duty position and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I have been in the military (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you (b)(6), and what are your day-to-day responsibilities?
A: Since December of 2009, (b)(3), (b)(6) in Panjwa'i District and to provide stabilization in this region of Afghanistan.
Q: (b)(6), and what are his responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) is my senior enlisted advisor, and he assists with running the command.
Q: What is the relationship of (b)(6), to VSP Belambai?
A: The VSP at Belambai operates within my battle space. They run complementary operationsin support of my overall campaign plan. Specifally, the ODA at Belambai operates in the area known as lower Zangabad.
Q: Do you have any command and control relationship with VSP Belambai?
A: How we basically work togehter is the VSP receives the approval for their operations from SOTF-S. Then they coordinate with us or provide us copies of their CONOPs so we can have situational awareness of what they are trying to do or trying to achieve. We have veto authority, if we think the CONOP is going to interfere with whatever is going on in the battle space.
Q: What is your opinion on whether the ADCON, OPCON, and TACON relationships for the unit at VSP Belambai are adequate?
A: So far the relationships have been adequate. The coordination relationship with the previous ODA and current ODA has been fairly good. As my team develops battalion operations, we would pull the VSP in and make sure they were either a part of it or if they were going to plan something in support of the operation.
Q: What information do you have, if any, concerning the command climate on VSP Belambai?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: How many times have you might have visited the VSP? When was the last time you visited?
A: My last time there was the day of the incident. That was my third trip out there since they relocated that VSP from COP Suleiman to Belambai. That transfer happened prior to the arrival of the current ODA team.
Q: After the shooting incident, what Key Leader Engagement or consequence management actions have you taken or been a part of?
A: I called (b)(3), (b)(6) at the District headquarters. (b)(3), (b)(6) is the partner of our District Chief of Police and acting District Governor, Sardar Mahammed. I asked (b)(3), (b)(6) to ask Sardar Mahammed if he received any reports out of the Belambai area of any activities that had occurred during the night. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I met and discussed the best way ahead regarding who is going to be notified and who should we bring in. Once I got comfirmation from Sardar Mohammed that he received reports, I recommended he contact Haji Fazaluddin Mahammed, who is the Deputy District Governor, and any other Senior Shura members to

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Zangabad DATED 2012/03/29

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

ask them if they've heard anything. (b)(3), (b)(6) notified me that he had been on the phone with General Habibi, and that the Corps Chief of Staff and officers for the 205th Corps and some representatives from General Habibi's brigade staff were enroute to Zangabad. I beleive that groups intent was to assess the situation and determine facts surrounding reports from the area of civilian casualties. Approximately mid morning, Sardar Mahammed and the Afghan Staff contigent arrived at Zangabad. Once the link up was complete, we departed to VSP Belambai. I arrived with (b)(3), (b)(6) the DCoP and the ANA staff members at VSP Belambai and we went to the ANA side of the compound. Shortly after I arrived, Assadullah Khalid arrived at VSP Belambai with some members of the Provincial leadership with whom I am not familiar with. Some of the press also arrived with them. General Razziq arrived with some Panjwa'i ASOP Shura members who we normally meet with at the weekly Monday shuras at the District headquarters. I compared notes with Fazaludin Mohammed about the reports we've received. The decision was made, I believe by Assadulah Khalid, for a group of the Provincial and local leadership to walk to the compound in Naji Bien and the compound in Alikozai to confirm the locations of the events from the prior night. When I started to approach the gate, the locals at the gate began to get agitated and started to approach me. That is when the ANA asked me to stay inside and keep all the Americans within the VSP. We basically consilidated at the VSP and waited for the Afghan contingent to go out to the different villages and do what they had to do. At one point, Assadulah Khalid, made some kind of announcement or some kind of speech to the crowd. After that, part of the crowd started to disperse from the gate. A shura took place on the ANA side of the VSP later on that day with some of the ASOP Shura members, the Corps command, and General Habibi. After the shura, a majority of the delegates left, but General Razziq and Sadar Mohhamed stayed until early evening. He continued to meet with some of the ASOP Shura members and some of the local senior members of the community.

Q: What does ASOP stand for?

A: Afghan Social Outreach Program.

Q: Are there any additional KLE or consequence management actions that should be taken in response to the incident?

A: Right now it is difficult tell until the detachment has an opportunity to make it down to one of the villages. I think the payments we made last week went a long way in taking care of the families. Other than that, I cannot tell until we get a detachment to one of those villages.

Q: Since the incident, have you been attend the Monday shuras with ASOP Shura members?

A: No, I have not been able to get down to the Monday shuras.

Q: Do you have any other information that would be helpful to this investigation?

A: No, not that I can think of. I can add, that the level of support we received received from our Afghan counterparts was great. Their level of support is what got us through this situation.

Q: Are there any additional personnel you would recommend I talk too, to carry out the remainder of my investigation?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

END OF STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT [illegible] DATED 2012/03/29

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE [illegible] D, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAW (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 4 day of April 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

USAF

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

17 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) 3rd Special Forces Group (Airborne) regarding his interaction with SSG Robert Bales during a training event at JBLM

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) held a telephone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) from 2100 - 2120 (Afghan time) on 13 April 2012 from the Nexus building at RC(S). The purpose of the telephone call was to interview (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) about his interaction with SSG Bales during a Mobile Training Team visit to 2-3 IN (3rd SBCT) at JBLM in September, 2011. (b)(3), (b)(6) was speaking from Monterey, California where he is a (b)(3), (b)(6) was previously the (b)(3), (b)(6) for 1st BN, 3rd SFG (A).

2. (b)(3), (b)(6) related that a total of eight Soldiers from 1st BN, 3rd SFG (A) conducted an MTT to JBLM in September, 2011. The training event was aimed at providing 2-3 IN with instruction on Village Stability Operations (VSO). At this point, 2-3 IN had recently been slated to conduct VSO with CJSOTF-A and, having no prior experience with this unique mission, requested assistance from 3rd SFG (A). During this week of training, (b)(3), (b)(6) remembered interacting with SSG Bales and his platoon for approximately 1-2 hours in a classroom setting.

3. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not recall anything unusual or alarming about SSG Bales. In fact, he related that SSG Bales comported himself in a professional manner and appeared to be very receptive to the training. He also reported that SSG Bales encouraged his subordinates to pay attention and learn as much as possible about VSO. According to (b)(3), (b)(6), the classroom training was intended as a primer for 2-3 IN to conduct VSO and seemed to have achieved this purpose. (b)(3), (b)(6) perception was that Soldiers at the line company level and below were very interested and engaged; however, the Battalion Staff for 2-3 IN was preoccupied at that time with the details of the deployment.

4. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6).

Rick Waddell

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Ex QQQ

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
VSP Ezabad Kandhar province	2012/03/31	1959	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, unit, and duty assignment
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Going on (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: Three—two in Iraq, and this is my first in Afghanistan.
Q: How long have you known SSG Bales?
A: I have known him for about three years; I've worked with him for the last two.
Q: How well did you know him professionally?
A: I knew him quite well. He was the acting PL, and I was his PSG for about a year.
Q: How well did you know him personally?
A: Not a whole lot. I knew a little bit about him. I know he's always talking about his kids; he's great with his kids. I only spent a couple of days with him outside of work. He was a caring and compassionate person every time I was with him. Most of the time he was with his family. He's generally a family man.
Q: Were you aware of any negative indicators about his personal life, financial situation, his wife or other people?
A: He didn't discuss any of his financial problems with me. He seemed to be pretty stable. Just a typical married man. No major problem with his wife or his kids.
Q: Did he ever say anything negative about his wife?
A: No, not really.
Q: Had you deployed with SSG Bales before?
A: I started working with him after the deployment. For the last deployment to Iraq, I was in B CO, and he was in HHC.
Q: Where was that deployment?
A: In Mukteadiyah, Iraq.
Q: Can you describe SSG Bales personality' and leadership style?
A: SSG Bales had a high intensity and love for his job. He was very passionate for his soldiers and very knowledgeable. He would do anything he could to help his soldiers in any way possible. He was one of the best leaders and platoon sergeants I have had.
Q: Does anything else stand out in how he prepared his soldiers for deployment?
A: SSG Bales has been there for a while. He used a lot of his training and personal experiences in the training that we actually did. He would give a reason behind all of his training and was always thorough with his assignments.
Q: Do you know whether he was wounded during the deployment to Iraq when he was in HHC?
A: I'm not 100% sure.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT VSP Ezabad Kandahar province DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Was that tour 2008-09?
A: It was 2009-10.
Q: In your tour that year, was it a fairly quiet tour or a lot of combat?
A: It was a quiet tour; not a lot of IED strikes. Really quiet.
Q: Leading up to this deployment, did SSG Bales ever express any concerns to you about the impact of the deployment on his family life?
A: Negative. Since both of us have deployed multiple times, we are always worried about what are kids are going to feel like when we get back, but SSG Bales handled it well.
Q: Was he excited about the deployment or just taking it in stride? How did he handle the pre-deployment stresses?
A: We took it in stride. SSG Bales and I actually tried to go recruiting just before we got our orders to go to Afghanistan. He knew he needed to take a break, but he took it in stride just like he always does.
Q: How much interaction did you have with him before the deployment?
A: He was the platoon sergeant up until the end of September. I had a lot of interaction with SSG Bales. We took on pretty much everything together. I had a lot of interaction with SSG Bales.
Q: When did you and SSG Bales put in for recruiting?
A: Maybe February of last year.
Q: You arrived in sector sometime in the middle of December. Did you and SSG Bales correspond by phone or email during your time on the different VSPs?
A: I only communicated with SSG Bales a few times—maybe three or four—and the same with the other squad leade(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6).
Q: What was the communication about?
A: I am friends with both of them. I was really good friends with (b)(3), (b)(6) before we left. A lot of (b)(3), (b)(6) soldiers were my soldiers when they were growing up. I wanted to see how my old soldiers were doing and how they were doing.
Q: Did either (b)(3), (b)(6) or SSG Bales express any concerns to you about their soldiers, about the conditions at Belambai, about the interaction with the ODA or about anything?
A: Negative. They both seemed like they were normal.
Q: No concerns about the junior enlisted men that you picked up right before deployment?
A: We did pick up a lot of junior enlisted. I wasn't worried about that, because I know that SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) would do the job in training them for combat.
Q: Did SSG Bales ever communicate to you about the 05 March IED incident where a couple of his soldiers were MEDEVACd for a TBI scan and one of the Navy EOD guys lost a part of his leg?
A: Roger. I talked to both of them at that time. One of the soldiers in the blast was one of my old soldiers, so I was very concerned about that. I talked to them right after and then multiple times after that. Obviously they seemed distraught about what happened, but SSG Bales still seemed normal—like he was ready to fight.
Q: Which soldier are you referring to?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What can you tell us about (b)(3), (b)(6)?
A: He is one of the best people I know in the military. He is one of the few people in the military I hung out with after work. He has great compassion. He is one of the greatest people that I know. He would do anything he could for me or my family.
Q: When did you and he start serving together?
A: I became a squad leader in December of 2009, and he was one of my team leaders. Right after our tour, I recommended him to be a squad leader, and then we were squad leaders together.
Q: So he was your team leader on the 2009-10 tour?
A: Roger.
Q: Was he the junior squad leader in the platoon?
A: At that time, yes. Now we have a new squad leader who is junior.
Q: In retrospect, can you point to any warning signs whatsoever shown by SSG Bales that would point to his future behavior?
A: Negative. I know him pretty well. I didn't see anything. When I heard the news, I was in shock. I know the man quite well. I was in disbelief just like everyone else.
Q: As you and SSG Bales were going through training, did you discuss the unique nature of the VSO mission and what your role was going to be in that mission?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT VSP Ezabad Kandhar province DATED 2012/03/31

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: About two months before we deployed, we learned about the VSO mission. We didn't know a lot, but we did a lot of research by ourselves.

Q: Did you collaborate in this? Did you sit and talk about the mission? Did you discuss possible scenarios and challenges?

A: Yes. We discussed and reorganized the platoon. The squad leaders got together with the platoon sergeant. We talked to the ODAs on emails. We definitely put a lot of planning into it.

Q: What was SSG Bales' guidance to his soldiers? How did he view the mission set?

A: With the information that we got from the ODA partners who were over here, we tried to train on exactly what they told us. At NTC, they tried to simulate the VSO mission. We were all in the learning phase. We just did exactly what the ODAs told us to. SSG Bales did it the way he always does it; he wanted to be the best at it.

Q: What kinds of things did SSG Bales do to achieve that status?

A: We did a lot of marksmanship training; extensive IED training; we learned the new TTPs of the enemy from the ODAs; we altered the battle drills to fit the mission. We created a crash course in the TTPs that the ODA gave us.

Q: What was your sense of the populous there? How did SSG Bales view them?

A: I don't know.

Q: Did he ever make any comments about engaging the Afghan population through the three lines of effort of VSO?

A: We definitely did discuss this. He understood it well.

Q: Did you and SSG Bales ever discuss the ROE as potentially being too restrictive?

A: Negative. The ROE is pretty much the same as it was on our last tour. We do discuss it, but we just take it in stride.

Q: In your conversations after the 05 March IED incident, were SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) angry about it?

A: They weren't really angry, just distraught that it happened so close to home. Nothing to show concern, though. Definitely you're going to be angry when one of your soldiers gets hit. That's the only concern that I heard.

Q: Did SSG Bales ever talk to you about (b)(3), (b)(6)?

A: I don't know him, and SSG Bales didn't really talk about him.

Q: During your pre-deployment training, what did the SF mobile training teams tell you about the areas surrounding your VSPs?

A: We knew about our area; about the TTPs; and we were tracking about Belambai. We were tracking how Belambai was a high intensity area. That's why they sent in SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) probably two of the best in the company.

Q: Do you have any other information that might be helpful in this investigation that we haven't asked you about?

A: Negative.

Q: We have interviewed the company and platoon chains of command, and we will interview all of the people at Belambai. Is there anyone else that we should interview to get a complete picture, particularly anyone else who knows SSG Bales well?

A: I wouldn't know that person. I don't think there is anyone else.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
VSP EZABAD

(b)(3), (b)(6)
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of April, 2012 at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT DP

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 131830DDEC11 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a MSO-5W-213; BELAMBAI 141100DDEC11

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 06DEC11 – 13DEC11: ENG IED STRIKES IVO ROUTE VERNON/SERISHEEN/PESHINGAN

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : NONE

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

10xANA

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
141030DDEC11	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
141100DDEC11	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
141200DDEC11	TIME OUT BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
141600DDEC11	GAME ON BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
141700DDEC11	GAME OVER VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

(b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: CRP

WHY: IN ORDER TO DISRUPT INS FOM/CONDUCT LOCAL SHURA

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CONDUCT A CRP IVO BELAMBAI VILLAGE. THE ODA WILL KICK OFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI AND HEAD EAST DOWN ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN. THE ODA WILL TIME OUT IN THE VILLAGE OF BELAMBAI AND PARTICIPATE IN A LOCAL SHURA. THE ODA WILL THEN GO GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE AND GO GAME OVER AT VSP BELAMBAI.

CALLSIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

SIGNAL PACE PLAN

EXTERNAL:

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 151857DDEC11 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a **WSO-SW-215; BELAMBAI 161000DDEC11**

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 09DEC11 – 16DEC11: ENG IED STRIKES IVO ROUTE VERNON/SERISHEEN/PESHINGAN

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : NONE

PERSONNEL: **BATTLE #** **MOS:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10xANA
10xANCOP

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
160930DDEC11	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
161000DDEC11	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
161100DDEC11	TIME OUT BELAMBAI	41R QQ 25 83
161300DDEC11	GAME ON BELAMBAI	41R QQ 25 83
161330DDEC11	GAME OVER VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

(b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: CRP

WHY: IN ORDER TO DISRUPT INS FOM/CONDUCT KLE

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 181740DDEC11 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a ASO-5W-216; BELAMBAI 190700DDEC11

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 12DEC11 – 19DEC11: SMALL CACHE FIND IVO NORTHERN GERANDAI

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : RG 3, MATV 7, MATV 8, RG C, RG W

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

RG 3 WITH TRAILOR/BFT ROLE ID: TM(b)(1)1.4aOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MATV 7/BFT ROLE ID: COM-SEALTMA-NSWC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MATV 8/BFT ROLE ID: ENG-SEALTMA-NSWC

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG C WITH TRAILOR/BFT ROLE ID: TM(b)(1)1.4aOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG /BFT ROLE ID: TM(b)(1)1.4aOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BALES, ROBERT (b)(3), (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
190630DDEC11	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
190700DDEC11	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
190800DDEC11	TIME OUT OCCD-P	41R QQ 35 92
191100DDEC11	GAME ON OCCD-P	41R QQ (b)(1)1.4a
191300DDEC11	TIME OUT KAF	KAF
2011500DDEC11	GAME ON KAF	KAF
201800DDEC11	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

WHAT: TGM

WHY: ATTEND DISTRICT SHURA/CONDUCT VEHICLE MAINTENANCE

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CONDUCT A TGM TO OCCD-P AND KAF IN ORDER TO ATTEND THE DISTRICT SHURA AND CONDUCT MAINTENANCE OF RGs AND MATVs. THE ODA WILL KICK OFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI HEAD EAST DOWN ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN, HEAD

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 271945DDEC11 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a SO-5W-220; BELAMBAI 281530DDEC11

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 21DEC11 – 28DEC11: SAF IVO VSP BELAMBAI

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : RG C, RG M

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

RG C BFT ROLE ID: TM5 (b)(1)1.4a ODD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG M/BFT ROLE ID: TM6 (b)(1)1.4a ODD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DISMOUNTS:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15XANA W/ HMWVV

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
281530DDEC11	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
281600DDEC11	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
281630DDEC11	TIME OUT INTERSECTION A	41R QQ 25 84 (b)(1)1.4a
281730DDEC11	GAME ON INTERSECTION A	41R QQ 25 84
281800DDEC11	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

WHAT: DISMOUNTED/MOUNTED CRP

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL GO GAME ON FROM VSP BELAMBAI HEAD EAST DOWN ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN AND TIME OUT IN VICINITY OF INTERSECTION A. THE ODA WILL REMAIN TIMED OUT FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE HOUR. THE ODA WILL THEN GO GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE AND GO GAME OVER AT THE VSP.

CALLSIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 011720DJAN12 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a ASO-5W-222; BELAMBAI 020630DJAN12

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN, QUEBEC, HYENA

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 25DEC11 – 02JAN11: IED STRIKE VIC NORTHERN BELAMBAI

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : RG C, RG A, RG W

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

RG C BFT ROLE ID: TM5 (b)(1)1.4a ODD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG A BFT ROLE ID: TM5 (b)(1)1.4a ODD

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG W BFT ROLE ID: TM5 (b)(1)1.4a ODD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
020630DJAN12	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
020700DJAN12	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
020715DJAN12	TIME OUT SULAIMAN CP	41R QQ 25 84
020900DJAN12	GAME ON SULAIMAN CP	41R QQ 25 84
020930DJAN12	TIME OUT OCCD-P	41R QQ 35 92
021200DJAN12	GAME ON OCCD-P	41R QQ 35 92
021300DJAN12	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

(b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: MOUNTED CRP TO SULAIMAN CP/OCCD-P

WHY: CONDUCT LINK-UP WITH ANCOP/ATTEND DISTRICT SHURA

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CONDUCT A MOUNTED CRP TO SULAIMAN SCHOOL CP IN ORDER TO LINK-UP WITH THE CURRENT ANCOP AND MAKE PREPARATIONS FOR 06JAN ANCOP RIP. THE ODA WILL GO GAME ON FROM THE SULAIMAN CP AND CONTINUE NORTH ON QUEBEC TO HYENA AND THEN TIME OUT AT THE OCCD-P IN ORDER TO ATTEND THE DISTRICT SHURA. THE ODA WILL GO GAME ON FROM THE DISTRICT CENTER AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE TO VSP BELAMBAI AND GO GAME OVER.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 031402DJAN12 WAK

(b)(1) 1.4a WSO-5W-223; BELAMBAI 040630DJAN12

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME: CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 29DEC11 – 03JAN12: NONE

DEPARTURE VEHICLES: NONE

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

20xANA

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
040630DJAN12	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
040700DJAN12	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
041000DJAN12	TIME OUT BELAMBAI EAST	41R QQ 25 84 (b)(1) 1.4a
041030DJAN12	GAME ON BELAMBAI EAST	41R QQ 25 84
041200DJAN12	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP IVO BELAMBAI NORTH AND SOUTH

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM/VISOBS/CLEAR SOUTHERN/NORTHERN BELAMBAI FIELDS OF SUSPECTED IEDs

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 101835DJAN12 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a ASO-SW-230; BELAMBAI 111000DJAN12

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 04JAN12 – 11JAN12: SAF IVO SULAIMAN CP

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : RG M, RG W, MATV-8

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

RG M/BFT ROLE ID: MOBILE1-3-DOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG W/BFT ROLE ID: TM(b)(1)1.4aOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

MATV-8/BFT ROLE ID: TM(b)(1)1.4aOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10xANA w/VEHICLE

15xANCOP

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
110930DJAN12	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
111000DJAN12	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
111015DJAN12	TIME OUT SULAIMAN CP	41R QQ 25 84
111130DJAN12	GAME ON SULAIMAN CP	41R QQ 25 84
111300DJAN12	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

(b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: MOUNTED/DISMOUNTED CRP TO SULAIMAN CP AND IVO BELAMBAI

WHY: ANCOP TRAINING/DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA(b)(1)1.4a WILL GO GAME ON FROM VSP BELAMBAI HEADING EAST ON ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN AND TIMING OUT AT SULAIMAN CP. THE ODA WILL BE TIMED OUT FOR ANCOP TRAINING AND THEN WILL RETURN DISMOUNTED ALONG THE SAME ROUTE. THE ODA WILL GO GAME OVER AT VSP BELAMBAI.

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 141735DJAN12 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a SO-5W-231; BELAMBAI 150800DJAN12

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 08JAN12 – 15JAN12: SAF IVO SULAIMAN CP/IDF

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : RG M, RG W, MATV-8

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

RG M/BFT ROLE ID: MOBILE1-3-DOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

RG W/BFT ROLE ID: TM6 (b)(1)1.4a DOD

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)

MATV-8/BFT ROLE ID: TM5 (b)(1)1.4a DOD

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10xANCOP

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
150730DJAN12	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
150800DJAN12	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
150815DJAN12	TIME OUT SULAIMAN CP	41R QQ 25 84
151200DJAN12	GAME ON SULAIMAN CP	41R QQ 25 84
151230DJAN12	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

(b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: MOUNTED CRP TO SULAIMAN CP AND IVO BELAMBAI

WHY: ANCOP TRAINING/DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL GO GAME ON FROM VSP BELAMBAI HEADING EAST ON ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN AND TIMING OUT AT SULAIMAN CP. THE ODA WILL CONDUCT ANCOP TRAINING AND THEN WILL RETURN DISMOUNTED ALONG THE SAME ROUTE. THE ODA WILL GO GAME OVER AT VSP BELAMBAI.

CALLSIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 212000DJAN12 WAK

(b)(1)1.4a ASO-5W-235; BELAMBAI 220330DJAN12

GFC MEDIC JTAC

ROUTE NAME : CHARLOTTETOWN, VERNON

LAST 7 DAY SIGACTS: 15JAN11 – 22JAN11: SAF IVO VSP BELAMBAI AND SULAIMAN CP

DEPARTURE VEHICLES : NONE

PERSONNEL: BATTLE # MOS:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

BALES, ROBERT (b)(6) 11B

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10xANA

TIMELINE	LOCATION	GRID
220330DJAN12	PRE-GAME VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
220400DJAN12	KICK-OFF VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
220500DJAN12	TIME OUT NAJA BIEN	41R QQ 24 83
220530DJAN12	GAME ON NAJA BIEN	41R QQ 24 (b)(1)1.4a
220700DJAN12	TIME OUT ALIKOZAI	41R QQ 24 87
220800DJAN12	GAME ON ALIKOZAI	41R QQ 24 87
220900DJAN12	GAME OVER BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP IVO NAJA BIEN AND ALIKOZAI

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANUEVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL GO GAME ON FROM VSP BELAMBAI AND HEAD GENERALLY SOUTH INTO NAJA BIEN VILLAGE. THE ODA WILL TIME OUT IN NAJA BIEN VILLAGE FOR AREA FAMILIARIZATION. THE ODA WILL GO GAME ON FROM NAJA BIEN AND RETURN NORTH TO ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN AND THEN HEAD NORTH ON ROUTE VERNON AND THEN HEAD GENERALLY EAST INTO ALIKOZAI VILLAGE. THE ODA WILL TIME OUT IN ALIKOZAI VILLAGE IN ORDER TO CONDUCT AREA FAMILIARIZATION. THE ODA WILL GO GAME ON FROM ALIKOZAI VILLAGE AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE TO VSP BELAMBAI AND GO GAMEOVER.

CALLSIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

SIGNAL PACE PLAN

EXTERNAL:

(b)(1)1.4a

REMARKS: PRI QRF: 32A, 16W, 10x2/3 PAX, 10xANA OUT OF BELAMBAI
ALT QRF: (b)(6) (APPR 1.5 HOUR RESPONSE TIME)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED, 281250DJAN12

(b)(1)1.4a 5W-002; 29 0915D JAN 12

WHO: ODA (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP; CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHERE: VSP BELAMBAI TO NAJA BIEN

WHEN: 290915DJAN12 – 291200DJAN12

WHY: CONDUCT AREA ASSESSMENT/DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANUVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 0845D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 0915D, ODA WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW NO NAME ROAD GENERALLY SOUTH IN A STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER, THEN CALL TIME OUT AT A ROAD INTERSECTION IN THE VILLAGE OF NAJA BIEN VIC GRID (b)(1)1.4a WHILE TIMED OUT, ODA WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE LOCAL POPULACE AND DETERMINE VILLAGE ATMOSPHERICS. UPON COMPLETION OF ENGAGING, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E.

DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
290845DJAN12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
290915DJAN12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
291000DJAN12	TIME OUT	ROAD INTERSECTION	41R QQ 24 (b)(1)1.4a
291100DJAN12	GAME ON	ROAD INTERSECTION	41R QQ 24 83
291200DJAN12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

TASK ORGANIZATION

PERSONNEL	BR#	MOS	WEAPON
(b)(6)			NA
(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
BALES, ROBERT	(b)(6)	11B	M4
(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
			M4, M9
			M4
			M4
			M4, M9
			M4, M9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

(b)(1)1.4a5W-004; 31 0600D JAN 12

WHO: ODA (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: CRP; CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHERE: VSP BELAMBAI TO WESTERN BELAMBAI

WHEN: 310600DJAN12 – 011900DFEB12

WHY: EMPLACE CHECK POINT/ BIOMETRICALLY ENROLL POPULACE

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 310530DJAN12 AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 0600D, ODA WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN GENERALLY WEST FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER, THEN CALL TIME OUT AT A ROAD INTERSECTION IN WESTERN BELAMBAI VIC GRID (b)(1)1.4a ODA WILL INCORPORATE VEHICLE CHECK POINT AT AN INTERSECTION THAT NATURALLY FORCES VEHICLES TO SLOW DOWN. ADDITIONALLY, ODA WILL EMPLACE CLEAR VISUAL SIGNS AND UTILIZE CLEAR VERBAL COMMANDS EARLY IN ANY ENCOUNTER WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE. WHILE TIMED OUT, ODA WILL BIOMETRICALLY ENROLL PAX ATTEMPTING TO MOVE IN/OUT OF THE AO. AT 011800DFEB12, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E.

DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
310530DJAN12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
310600DJAN12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
310730DJAN12	TIME OUT	ROAD INTERSECTION	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
011800DFEB12	GAME ON	ROAD INTERSECTION	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
011900DFEB12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]

	TASK ORGANIZATION			
	PERSONNEL	BR#	MOS	WEAPON
DISMOUNTED	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				MK17, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
	6X ANA	NA	NA	6X M16
RG-W CROW: 1X M2 EGON	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

FBCB2: TM2 (b)(1)1.4a DOD	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4, M9
DISMOUNTED	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4
				M4, M9
				M4
	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
	6X ANA	NA	NA	6X M16
RG-A CROWS: 1X M2 EGON FBCB2: TM1 (b)(1)1.4a DOD	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
	BALES, ROBERT	(b)(6)	11B	M4
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
GFC, MEDIC, JTAC				

SIGNAL

(b)(1)1.4a

MEDEVAC

(b)(1)1.4a

QRF:

C/S BELAMBAI QRF – 18B, 2X 2/3IN, 6X ANA, 1X RG-31, 1X ANA HMMWV

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED; 041400DFEB12 AMM

(b)(1)1.4a OPS BOX EAGLE CLAW-5W-CRP-002;

WHO: *ODA (b)(1)1.4a CALL SIGN:* (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: *DISMOUNTED CRP;*

WHERE: *VSP BELAMBAI TO NAJA BIEN*

WHEN: *050700DFEB12 – 051100DFEB12*

WHY: *CONDUCT AREA ASSESSMENT/DISRUPT INS FOM*

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: *ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 0630D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 0700D, ODA WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW NO NAME ROAD GENERALLY SOUTH IN A STAGGERED COLUMN FORMATION FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER, THEN CALL TIME OUT AT A ROAD INTERSECTION IN THE VILLAGE OF NAJA BIEN VIC GRID* (b)(1)1.4a *WHILE TIMED OUT, ODA WILL TAKE THE OPPORTUNITY TO ENGAGE LOCAL POPULACE AND DETERMINE VILLAGE ATMOSPHERICS. UPON COMPLETION, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E. ANY CHANGES TO THE TASK ORGANIZATION WILL BE MADE BY THE GFC.*

DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
050630DFEB12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
050700DFEB12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
050900DFEB12	TIME OUT	ROAD INTERSECTION	41R QQ 24 (b)(1)1.4a 83 (b)(1)1.4a
051000DFEB12	GAME ON	ROAD INTERSECTION	41R QQ 24 83
051200DFEB12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

	TASK ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL BR# MOS WEAPON	
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT 1	(b)(3), (b)(6)	M4, M9
* Controls ANA		M4, M9
		M4, M9
		M4, M9

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				NA
	5X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
	MTX: 988,607			
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT 2 * Controls ANA	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
	*BALES, ROBERT	(b)(6)	11B	M4
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M249
				M4, M9
	MTX: 986,264			
	(b)(6)			NA
	5X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16
MATV-7 CROW: 1X M2 EGON FBCB2: TM(7)(1)1.4a DD	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4
				M4, M9
				M4
GFC, MEDIC, JTAC				

SIGNAL
(b)(1)1.4a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 081600DFEB12 AMM

(b)(1)1.4a *OPS BOX EAGLE CLAW-5W-CRP-009*

WHO: ODA (b)(1)1.4a CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: CRP

WHERE: VSP BELAMBAI TO NORTHERN BELAMBAI

WHEN: 090600DFEB12 – 101600DFEB12

WHY: ESTABLISH BLOCKING POSITION ISO TRIDENT/CDO CLEARANCE

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 0530D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 0600D, PATROL WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN GENERALLY EAST FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER UNTIL ROUTE QUEBEC. AT ROUTE QUEBEC, THE PATROL WILL TURN NORTH AND CONTINUE MOVEMENT FOR APPROXIMATELY TWO KILOMETERS UNTIL ROUTE HYENA AND THEN WILL CALL CP1. PATROL WILL THEN TURN WEST ON ROUTE HYENA AND CONTINUE FOR APPROXIMATELY THREE KILOMETERS UNTIL ROUTE VERNON AND THEN WILL CALL CP2. UPON ARRIVAL AT THE INTERSECTION OF ROUTE HYENA AND VERNON, ALL MEMBERS OF THE PATROL CONTINUING TO THE BLOCKING POSITION WILL DISMOUNT. RG-3 AND RG-5 WITH ANA HMMWV AND HILUX WILL RETURN TO VSP BELAMBAI. AT FIRST LIGHT, PATROL WILL BEGIN ROUTE CLEARANCE SOUTH ON ROUTE VERNON UNTIL REACHING THEIR BLOCKING POSITION VIC GRID (b)(1)1.4a AND WILL THEN CALL TIME OUT. UPON REACHING THE BLOCKING POSITION, ANA WILL INCORPORATE A CHECK POINT AT THE INTERSECTION WHICH NATURALLY FORCES VEHICLES TO SLOW DOWN. ADDITIONALLY, ANA WILL EMPLACE CLEAR VISUAL SIGNS, UTILIZE CLEAR VERBAL COMMANDS EARLY IN ANY ENCOUNTER WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE, AND ALWAYS REMAIN IN THE FRONT OF THE CHECK POINT. PATROL WILL REMAIN IN PLACE UNTIL THE FOLLOWING AFTERNOON, AT WHICH POINT THE PATROL WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN SOUTH ALONG ROUTE VERNON, DELIBERATELY CLEARING THE ROUTE UNTIL REACHING VSP BELAMBAI. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE ODA WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E.

DTG	*CODEWORD*	*LOCATION*	*GRID*
090530DFEB12	*PREGAME*	*VSP BELAMBAI*	*41R QQ 24 83*
090600DFEB12	*KICKOFF*	*VSP BELAMBAI*	*41R QQ 24 83*
090610DFEB12	*CP1*	*ACP 17*	*41R QQ 25 86*
090620DFEB12	*CP2*	*INT-X RTE HYENA/VERNON*	*41R QQ 23 85* (b)(1)1.4a
090900DFEB12	*TIME OUT*	*NORTHERN BELAMBAI*	*41R QQ 23 84*
101300DFEB12	*GAME ON*	*NORTHERN BELAMBAI*	*41R QQ 23 84*
101600DFEB12	*GAME OVER*	*VSP BELAMBAI*	*41R QQ 24 83*

	TASK ORGANIZATION FROM VSP BELAMBAI TO INTERSECTION OF RTE HYENA/VERNON (CP2)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

	PERSONNEL	BR#	MOS	WEAPON
RG-1 CROWS: 1X M2 EGON FBCB2: TM1(b)(1)1.4aQOD	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4
				M4
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
RG-2 CROWS: 1X MK19 EGON FBCB2: TM2(b)(1)1.4aQOD				M4
	BALES, ROBERT	(b)(6)	11B	M4
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				NA
ANA HMMWV M240B	6X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16, 1X M249
ANA HILUX	9X ANA	NA	NA	7X M16, 1X M249, 1X RPG
RG-3 CROWS: 1X M2 EGON FBCB2: TM3(b)(1)1.4aQOD	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4
				M4
				M4, M9
				M4
				M4

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

(b)(1)1.4a OPS BOX EAGLE CLAW-5W-CRP-015

WHO: ODA(b)(1)1.4a CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP

WHERE: VSP BELAMBAI TO ALIKOZAI

WHEN: 231300DFEB12 – 231600DFEB12

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: ODA(b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 1230D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 1300D, PATROL WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW ROUTE VERNON NORTH APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER UNTIL REACHING AN INTERSECTION AND THEN CONTINUE EAST APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER UNTIL REACHING LOA. PATROL WILL THEN CALL TIME OUT AND ENGAGE THE LOCAL POPULACE. UPON COMPLETION, PATROL WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION TO VSP BELAMBAI. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE PATROL WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E. ANY CHANGES TO TASKORG WILL BE MADE BY THE GFC.

DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
231230DFEB12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
231300DFEB12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83
231400DFEB12	TIME OUT	ALIKOZAI	41R QQ 24 84
231500DFEB12	GAME ON	ALIKOZAI	41R QQ 24 84
231600DFEB12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 83

(b)(1)1.4a

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

	TASK ORGANIZATION			
	PERSONNEL	BR#	MOS	WEAPON
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #1	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
MTX: 986,264				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				NA
	6X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16, 1X M249
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4
				M4, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #2	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4, M9
MTX: 988,606				M4, M203
				M4
				M4
				M249
				M4
				M4
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
	6X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16, 1X M249
1X LTATV				
M240B	SSG BALES	(b)(6)	11B	M4
GFC, MEDIC, CCT				

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

AOB APPROVED 231142DFEB12 JWL

(b)(1)1.4a OPS BOX EAGLE CLAW-5W-CRP-016

WHO: ODA (b)(1)1.4a CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP

WHERE: VSP BELAMBAI TO NAJA BIEN

WHEN: 240700DFEB12 – 241100DFEB12

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 0630D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 0700D, PATROL WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW "NO NAME ROAD" SOUTH APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER UNTIL REACHING NAJA BIEN VILLAGE. PATROL WILL THEN CALL TIME OUT AND ENGAGE THE LOCAL POPULACE. UPON COMPLETION, PATROL WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION TO VSP BELAMBAI. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE PATROL WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E. ANY CHANGES TO TASKORG WILL BE MADE BY THE GFC.

DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
240630DFEB12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
240700DFEB12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
240900DFEB12	TIME OUT	NAJA BIEN	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 80 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
241030DFEB12	GAME ON	NAJA BIEN	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 82 [redacted]
241100DFEB12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

	TASK ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL	BR#	MOS	WEAPON
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #1	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				NA
	6X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16, 1X M249
	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
RG-1 EGON: MM000391 FBCB2: TMB (b)(1)1.4a DOD M2				M4
				M4
				M4, M203
				M4, M9
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #2				M4, M9
				M4
				MK17, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M249
				M4
				M4
				M4, M203
				M4
				M4

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	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M203
	6X ANA	NA	NA	6X M16
RG-3 EGON: MM000266 FBCB2: TM3 (b)(6) DOD M2	SSG BALES (TC)	(b)(6)	11B	M4
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M249
				M4, M203
GFC, MEDIC, CCT				

SIGNAL
(b)(1)1.4a

QRF:

C/S BELAMBAI QRF – 18E, 2X 2/3IN, 6X ANA, 1X RG-31, 1X ANA HMMWV
FM 37.8/154.7 SC/CT OR SAT VOICE

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(b)(1)1.4a OPS BOX EAGLE CLAW-5W-CRP-019

WHO: ODA(b)(1)1.4a CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP

WHERE: PESHINGAN

WHEN: 021100DMAR12 – 031500DMAR12

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: ODA(b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 1030D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 1100D, PATROL WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW ROUTE VERNON NORTH APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER UNTIL REACHING ROUTE ELIZABETH. AT ROUTE ELIZABETH, PATROL WILL TURN EAST AND CONTINUE FOR APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER UNTIL REACHING RON SITE IN PESHINGAN VILLAGE. ANA WILL INCORPORATE A VEHICLE CHECK POINT AT THE RON SITE WHICH NATURALLY FORCES VEHICLES TO SLOW DOWN. ADDITIONALLY, ANA WILL EMPLACE CLEAR VISUAL SIGNS, UTILIZE CLEAR VERBAL COMMANDS EARLY IN ANY ENCOUNTER WITH THE LOCAL POPULACE, AND ALWAYS REMAIN IN THE FRONT OF THE CHECK POINT. PATROL WILL THEN CALL TIME OUT AND ENGAGE THE LOCAL POPULACE. PATROL WILL REMAIN OVERNIGHT AND CONTINUE ENGAGING THE LOCAL POPULACE THE FOLLOWING DAY. WHILE AT THE RON SITE, THE PATROL WILL CONDUCT SATCOM RADIO CHECKS WITH SOTF-SOUTH EVERY 2 HOURS BEGINNING AT 2000D AND ENDING AT 0800D THE FOLLOWING MORNING. AT 031300DMAR2012, PATROL WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION TO VSP BELAMBAI. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE PATROL WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E. ANY CHANGES TO TASKORG WILL BE MADE BY THE GFC.

DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
021030DMAR12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24[redacted] 83[redacted]
021100DMAR12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24[redacted] 83[redacted]
021500DMAR12	TIME OUT	PESHINGAN	41R QQ 24[redacted] 85[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
031300DMAR12	GAME ON	PESHINGAN	41R QQ 24[redacted] 85[redacted]
031500DMAR12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24[redacted] 83[redacted]

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	TASK ORGANIZATION PERSONNEL WEAPON	BR#	MOS	
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #1	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				MK17, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				NA
	5X ANA	NA	NA	4X M16, 1X M249
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M203
				M4, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
RG-1 EGON: MM000391 FBCB2: TM1 (b)(1)1.4a QD MK19	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4, M203
				M4
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #2				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
	(b)(6)			NA
	5X ANA	NA	NA	5X M16
LTATV M240B	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
RG-3 W/ TRAILER EGON: MM000266 FBCB2: TM3 (b)(1)1.4a QD M2	SSG BALES	(b)(6)	11B	M4
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M249
				M4
GFC, MEDIC, CCT				

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AOB APPROVED

(b)(1)1.4a OPS BOX EAGLE CLAW-5W-CRP-021

WHO: ODA (b)(1)1.4a CALL SIGN: (b)(1)1.4a

WHAT: DISMOUNTED CRP

WHERE: FOB ZANGABAD

WHEN: 080800DMAR12 – 081400DMAR12

WHY: DISRUPT INS FOM

SCHEME OF MANEUVER: ODA (b)(1)1.4a WILL CALL PREGAME AT 0730D AT VSP BELAMBAI. AT 0800D, PATROL WILL CALL KICKOFF FROM VSP BELAMBAI, THEN FOLLOW ROUTE CHARLOTTETOWN APPROXIMATELY ONE KILOMETER TO THE EAST UNTIL REACHING THE SOUTHWEST GATE AT FOB ZANGABAD. UPON ARRIVAL AT FOB ZANGABAD, PATROL WILL CALL TIME OUT. WHILE TIMED OUT, ODA LEADERSHIP WILL MEET WITH BSO LEADERSHIP TO DISCUSS FUTURE OPERATIONS. UPON COMPLETION, PATROL WILL CALL GAME ON AND RETURN ALONG THE SAME ROUTE IN THE SAME MOVEMENT FORMATION TO VSP BELAMBAI. UPON RETURNING TO VSP BELAMBAI, THE PATROL WILL CALL GAME OVER AND ENSURE PATROL IS 100% ON M/W/E. ALL 18 SERIES PERSONNEL ARE TQ QUALIFIED. ANY CHANGES TO TASKORG WILL BE MADE BY THE GFC.

TIMELINE			
DTG	CODEWORD	LOCATION	GRID
080730DMAR12	PREGAME	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
080800DMAR12	KICKOFF	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]
080900DMAR12	TIME OUT	FOB ZANGABAD	41R QQ 26 [redacted] 84 [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a
081300DMAR12	GAME ON	FOB ZANGABAD	41R QQ 26 [redacted] 84 [redacted]
081400DMAR12	GAME OVER	VSP BELAMBAI	41R QQ 24 [redacted] 83 [redacted]

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TASKORG TO FOB ZANGABAD

VEHICLE/DISMOUNTED	PERSONNEL	BR#	MOS	WEAPON
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #1	4X ANA	NA	NA	4xM16
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				MK17, M9
				M4, M9
				NA
	(b)(6)			NA
	4X ANA	NA	NA	1xM249,3xM16
RG#1 W/ TRAILER FBCB2: TM1 (b)(1)1.4 DOD EGON: MM000391 MK19/ M240	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4
				M4, M203
				M4
				M4
DISMOUNTED ELEMENT #2				M4, M9
				M4, M9
				M4, M203
	(b)(6)			NA
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
	5X ANA	NA	NA	5xM16
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M9
RG#5 FBCB2: TM5 (b)(1)1.4 DOD EGON: MM000332 M2/ M240	SSG BALES (TC)	(b)(6)	11B	M4
	(b)(3), (b)(6)			M4, M203
				M249

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BRAVO COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION, 3RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
SOTF-SE, FOB LAGMAN
TU TRIDENT, APO AE 09383

REPLY TO ATTENTION OF

AFZH-INN-B

19 MAR 12

MEMORANDUM FOR: HQ, 2-3IN, 3-2SBCT

SUBJECT: SSG Robert Bales Deployment Timeline

1. Departure from Fort Lewis, Washington. SSG Robert Bales departed for Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan from Fort Lewis, Washington on 03DEC11. SSG Robert Bales arrived at Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan on 04DEC11.

2. Departure from Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan. SSG Robert Bales departed for Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan from Manas Air Base, Kyrgyzstan on 07DEC11. SSG Robert Bales arrived at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan on the evening of 07DEC11 and was escorted to Camp Brown located on Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan that same evening.

3. RSOI. On 09DEC11, SSG Robert Bales in-processed with Special Operations Task Force South S1, (b)(3), (b)(6) SSG Robert Bales received the rules of engagement, law of war, cultural awareness and in-briefing from Special Operations Task Force South leadership. On 10DEC11, SSG Robert Bales participated in a mandatory M4 confirm zero range and received a counter improvised explosive devices class at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan. On 11DEC11 and 12DEC11, SSG Robert Bales received Mine Resistant Ambush Protected vehicle training, Common Remotely Operated Weapon System and navigation communications training at Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan.

4. Departure to VSP Belembai. On 14DEC11, SSG Robert Bales departed from Kandahar Airfield, Afghanistan for VSP Belembai. SSG Robert Bales arrived at VSP Belembai on 14DEC11.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AF 09356

USFOR-A

8 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Excerpts from Witness Statements obtained by Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

1. This memorandum incorporates certain excerpts from statements made by witnesses relevant to the AR 15-6 investigation. The Government counsel assigned to the SSG Robert Bales case requested that this administrative investigation only include excerpts from certain statements made to CID so as not to interfere with the criminal investigation into this matter.

2. The following witness statement excerpts are relevant to the AR 15-6 Investigation.

a. Statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) 13 March 2012.

(1) On the night of the incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) had a bottle of Jack Daniels in a Disani water bottle that he shared with (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Robert Bales.

(2) SSG Bales had an M4 rifle with an ACOG, 9 mm H&K Pistol, an XM-320 grenade launcher, and a 40 mm grenade belt. The H&K pistol was not part of his weapons issue. It was provided to him by (b)(3), (b)(6) after the shooting deaths of the two US Service personnel in Kabul. Personnel on VSP Belambai were ordered to carry a weapon at all times after the shootings, and the SOTF Soldier let SSG Bales use the 9 mm so that SSG Bales did not have to carry his M4 around when on base.

(3) (b)(3), (b)(6) believes SSG Bales was using steroids, and he informed CID where they might be hidden.

b. Statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) 12 March 2012, (b)(6) (b)(6)

c. Statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) 14 March 2012, stating that he had seen SSG Bales drunk twice during the deployment.

d. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 14 March 2012, stating that on the night in question he smelled alcohol on (b)(3), (b)(6) breath and saw him "stumbling." He has seen SSG Bales drunk twice before on the VSP and (b)(3), (b)(6) drunk on the same occasions. He has also seen (b)(3), (b)(6) drunk before at the VSP.

e. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 11 March 2012.

(1) stating that he had a conversation with SSG Bales about the ROE being too restrictive.

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SUBJECT: Excerpts from Witness Statements obtained by Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

(2) stating that he gave SSG Bales his pistol as a force protection measure so that SSG Bales did not have to carry his M4 around. This was in response to the two officers that were assassinated in Kabul.

f. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 13 March 2012.

(1) Stating that he was drinking with SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) on the night in question.

(2) It is clear from (b)(3), (b)(6) statement that individual Service Members maintained their weapons in their rooms.

(3) Stating that SSG Bales had shown (b)(3), (b)(6) steroids several weeks before, and that both (b)(3), (b)(6) were aware of the steroids (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SSG Bales said he had received the steroids from (b)(3), (b)(6).

g. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) Stating that he provided "suspected steroids" to SSG Bales about 20 February 2012.

h. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 12 March 2012. Stating that SSG Bales once got into a fight in the back of a truck with a Class I driver. SSG Bales was unloading boxes with a driver, was hit with a box and told the driver that if he hit him again with a box that he would punch him. The driver did not understand anything that SSG Bales said and accidentally hit him with another box and they started fighting. The driver sustained a bloody nose and a bloody lip. SSG Bales did not have any injuries. (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware if the incident was reported to the chain of command, and he stated that he thought the incident occurred about "a month ago" [from 12 March 2012].

3. The following witness statement excerpts are relevant to the AR 15-6 Investigation concerning when personnel at VSP Belambai first noticed SSG Bales was missing, when the chain of command was first notified, and what procedures the chain of command took to regain accountability of SSG Bales.

a. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), 12 March 2012.

(1) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he started his guard shift on top of the Operations Center (OPCEN) roof at 0300 on 11 March 2012. He was with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(2) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that at 0305, an Afghan National Army (ANA) Soldier and an interpreter notified them that someone was outside the VSP speaking English.

(3) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) went around and conducted a 100% accountability and could not locate SSG Bales.

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SUBJECT: Excerpts from Witness Statements obtained by Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

b. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6), 12 March 2012.

(1) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was in the OPCEN using the phone when he was notified by an interpreter that an American had left the compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he then went and notified (b)(3), (b)(6).

(2) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) told (b)(3), (b)(6) to wake up SSG Bales and get 100% accountability of the infantry personnel. (b)(3), (b)(6) went to SSG Bales' room, but he was not there. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he also checked the restroom, the OPCEN, the MWR room, and the roof.

c. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 11 March 2012.

(1) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that at 0300 he was on guard duty with (b)(3), (b)(6)

(2) After being notified by the ANA that an American had left the gate (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he then immediately told (b)(3), (b)(6) to wake up (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he then got 100% accountability of his squad.

c. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 13 March 2012.

(1) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) woke him about 0310 on the morning of 11 March 2012 and informed him that an American had walked out of the compound.

(2) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he ordered both US and ANA personnel to conduct a 100% accountability of their personnel and other personnel on the VSP site, at which point they discovered that SSG Bales was missing.

(3) After searching the entire compound and determining that SSG Bales was nowhere to be found, (b)(3), (b)(6) called the Battle Space Owner ((b)(6) IN) requesting assistance from the (b)(1)1.4a in searching for SSG Bales around the vicinity of the VSP site.

(4) (b)(3), (b)(6) then notified (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-S night battle Captain, at around 0345.

(5) (b)(3), (b)(6) had a patrol element put together at 0430 to search for SSG Bales.

(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that his initial thought was that the person leaving the compound was sleepwalking, and that was the report he passed up to Forward Operating Base (FOB) Zangabad.

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SUBJECT: Excerpts from Witness Statements obtained by Criminal Investigation Division (CID)

d. Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6) 13 March 2012. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) woke him up at about 0320 to get a head count on base.

4. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6).

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Pages 406 through 417 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(6)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Warrior	2012/04/07	1326	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and unit of assignment.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: I entered the military on (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What are the duties and responsibilities in your current duty assignment?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) all

Q: How long have you been with the battalion?

A: I came to the battalion in December 15, 2009 and have been there for about 28 months. I was originally assigned to the brigade in October 2009, but I came down to the battalion in December. I have known about the battalion since before that time through my (b)(3), (b)(6) He was in the battalion beginning in 2007 and was the platoon leader for SSG Bales when they deployed to Iraq last time.

Q: (b)(6)

A: He is currently with (b)(6) (10th Mountain Division). He redeployed at about the time of the SSG Bales incident.

Q: You have known the current TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership since they arrived in their positions?

A: Yes. I knew (b)(3), (b)(6) fairly well.

Q: What is your frequency of interaction with the current TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?

A: Daily basis. All of the meetings that we held as a battalion (whole) we continue to hold as a battalion (minus). From the three CUBs that we have on a weekly basis to daily interactions, I have daily contact with all of them.

Q: How would you describe the command climate inside of TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 7 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEM (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 7 APR 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: In general, how well did the command prepare soldiers for deployment, how was its receptivity to the VSO mission, and did the staff take the VSO mission seriously?
A: As far as the VSO mission, the only way we could have done a poorer job was by not having visits from the SF guys. Only one platoon at NTC trained on VSO. All of our training was with Strykers. The VSO mission does not include Strykers. There were company level efforts to try to train on the VSO mission, but at the battalion level they were still very much in the Iraq mode. That made training difficult; everyone was stuck in the mindset of Iraq--which is what they knew. Despite numerous efforts at the company level to train the VSO mission, the battalion leadership continued to work against us and issue guidance that was making our relationship with the local village (role players) deteriorate. One example was an effort by SSG Bales to set up a mock Shura with the local village leadership. He set up the DFAC for this purpose and made all of the logistical arrangements. When the battalion commander arrived he did not acknowledge SSG Bales except to have him hold his weapon and helmet. For SSG Bales to not lose his mind at that point, I thought was pretty good. After NTC, we did one squad live fire but no additional VSO training. I feel as though we failed a lot of the soldiers.
Q: When did you leave B Company to go to HHC?
A: September 20. I thought that B CO was the strongest company in the battalion, and without a doubt SSG Bales' platoon was the strongest platoon in the battalion. When we left NTC, the battalion transferred several lieutenants from the company to other positions both inside and outside of the company and brought in one new platoon leader and two new E-7s. The E-7s replaced SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) (?sp) as platoon sergeants, and the two SSGs went back to squad leader positions despite their excellent performance in the platoon sergeant role. September 20, I came to HHC, and we deployed the main body on December 4.
Q: Which company were you a platoon leader in?
A: C Company.
Q: What month in 2010 did you come out of Iraq?
A: Everyone redeployed around June 3. I stayed until 27 July to hand over property.
Q: Can you elaborate on your relationship with SSG Bales prior to your coming into the Army?
A: I knew of him prior to joining the military but never saw him until I joined. (b)(6) (b)(6) I don't know if SSG Bales was in his platoon then, but eventually (b)(6) became the Scout Platoon Leader, and SSG Bales was a sniper in his platoon. (b)(6) was in that position for about two years during the train up for the 2009 Iraq deployment.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 7 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(6) thought the world of his NCOs and in particular thought that SSG Bales was real squared away--he had joined the Army after September 11. After IOBC, I visited (b)(6) off on his deployment; I also knew that I was headed to this brigade. That was my first memory of meeting SSG Bales. When I first saw him, I actually thought he was the platoon sergeant. He was squaring away soldiers and clearly had a good relationship (b)(6) He was clearly going above and beyond his role as a sniper section leader and was a leader for the whole platoon. The platoon had just returned from block leave, and SSG Bales was filling in for the platoon sergeant. I have never had a negative interaction with SSG Bales. (b)(6) had much more of a social and professional interaction than I did. (b)(3), (b)(6) and SSG Bales' family for a social outing at one of the horse races for family day on a Sunday afternoon (around July 15, 2009). (b)(6) wanted to hang out with SSG Bales' family one last time before leaving; they were good friends. Both of them had done investment work before joining the military. I had a much less social relationship with SSG Bales.

Q: When you returned from Iraq and took over as (b)(3), (b)(6) was your commander?

A: Correct. (b)(6) around the end of February 2011. When I redeployed from Iraq, I was with C CO for a few months until going to (b)(6). I stayed with (b)(6) through the whole of the train up for Afghanistan except for the last squad live fire.

Q: Did SSG Bales have a platoon leader during the time you were with the company?

A: Yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) was his platoon leader. (b)(3), (b)(6) now works in the S-6 shop (branch detail-Signal), but he was an extremely weak PL. Sometime in the fall, SSG Bales moved from the Scout Platoon to take over a B CO platoon, and he was very excited for the opportunity. SSG Bales really ran the platoon. Time and time again, through field training exercises, people remarked that SSG Bales was the one who was driving the platoon and was the one who really had the tactical knowledge. Under his leadership, the platoon performed very well in all of the training exercises. Ultimately, after the training exercise at Yakima, (b)(3), (b)(6) was removed from his position as platoon leader. That's when (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the picture. (b)(3), (b)(6) was a good fit. He is a smart guy with a good sense of humor who fit in well with that group of NCOs. On (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived, 1st Platoon became the strongest platoon in the company. (b)(3), (b)(6) was not located with SSG Bales during the deployment. Prior to the deployment SSG Bales was replaced by a new E-7 who came into the unit. I know that he was very disappointed; (b)(3), (b)(6) was pretty upset by this as well. SSG Bales was part of a great NCO team going through NTC.

Q: In retrospect, in the time leading up to deployment, were there any warning signs (e.g., personal, financial issues) about SSG Bales that you wish you had done something about?

A: I've spent the past month trying to think about those. The only thing I can think about is his passion for soldiers. He was both the best and worst PSG for me (b)(3), (b)(6) He was the worst because he didn't let me get away with anything as far as logistics. At NTC, he gave me his Stryker manual, so I knew what fluids were going to be needed in what quantities. But he was passionate to the point of confrontation. At the time I viewed that as a good NCO taking care of soldiers. In retrospect, maybe he was an overly stressed NCO. He never brought up any financial issues. (b)(6) (b)(6). I never saw any sign that would lead me to believe that he would go kill seventeen women and children. Perhaps when he said "fuck this battalion" at the end of NTC, I should have investigated that. I just saw that as venting. Normally he was good at venting and being done. I was that familiar face who he could vent to. I'd like to think that if I had still been (b)(3), (b)(6) he could have called me to vent about the fact that they weren't getting resupplied or any other issues impacting his soldiers. Normally, once he was able to vent he would be good to go. He was the NCO who was most concerned that we were going to war. Maybe it was paranoia. He was concerned that we were going to go get shot at and maybe get killed, and that people weren't taking that seriously enough. My only concern was that his passion for soldiers may have become paranoia. I have no idea how he could have done what he is said to have done.

Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) embrace the VSO mission or did he see it as a change in the game or an inconvenience?

A: He had a hard time grasping it. When the ODA teams were here talking to us, (b)(3), (b)(6) kept bringing things back to Iraq and his experience as a PRT XO, which didn't seem to fit. I had some background in this work from my time before the Army working with an international development NGO. At no time, though, was I able to offer input or expertise. He never understood the importance of the personal relationships in VSO work--he didn't have a good idea of how to do personal relationships. It was hard for him to "take off his rank" and go listen.

Q: What was his relationship with the SOF teams? Was there a culture clash?

A: The SOF teams tended to feel like he did not really understand the mission. (b)(3), (b)(6) seemed to be intimidated by the ODA guys. The ODA guys tended to be deferential, but they had a hard time respecting and interacting with him. He had a notable lack of interaction with the ODAs and did not seem to understand what they were doing. When he needed to sign paperwork for them, there was often friction.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEM (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 7 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Was there anything in your interactions with SSG Bales that led you to think that he had a low opinion or lack of respect toward foreigners, especially in the developing world?
A: It was common in the infantry to hear de-humanizing terms like haj, muj, and muz. As far as those who were trying to kill us, there was no love lost. SSG Bales had no problem saying "fuck these people who are trying to kill me; they're all dirty people who are trying to blow us up; they're terrorists who hate America and hate freedom." He was able to distinguish the fight from the outreach effort. He was good at the KLE and intel collection--building relationships that would protect his soldiers. He managed this balance well, but I could see that if that line became blurry, you might have a problem. I don't believe that it came from a hatred of little brown people or Muslims, but that came from a hatred of people who were trying to kill him or his buddies.
Q: Did the negative command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a extend down to the company commanders or are they isolated from it?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: I understand the living conditions at Camp Patriot were tough, especially during the cold weather, which caused consternation among the soldiers. As infantrymen, you might expect these kinds of conditions. Was it the living conditions that caused that consternation or was it the fact that the senior leadership was claiming special privileges for themselves?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Are there other people that we should talk to regarding this investigation?
A: Yes. I can get you a list. (b)(3), (b)(6) was a battle captain. He knew the command climate well and knew SSG Bales well given his length of service in the battalion. (b)(3), (b)(6) is our S-4, he has been in the battalion for a long time and is a former B CO platoon leader and C CO XO. (b)(3), (b)(6) has a good perspective on the NTC and VSO aspects of the command climate. (b)(3), (b)(6), the Bn S-2 would also be a good contact. (b)(3), (b)(6) is with D CO (b)(6) 10th MTN, he would be able to provide background on SSG Bales.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 7 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY [redacted] REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE[redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted]king Statement)

[redacted] person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB WARRIOR, CAMP PATRICT	2012/04/08	0935	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: Three combat tours plus three other operational deployments. Two to Iraq plus this one.
Q: What is your current duty assignment and daily responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
because of OD (b)(1)1.4a being reassigned up north. My daily duties are taking care of my platoon and getting packed and ready for either Fiazabad or the district center, whichever one they want me to go to.
Q: How long have you been associated with the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?
A: I have been here for (b)(3), (b)(6) years and have been around this leadership for ~~two~~ DONE to (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~two and a half~~ years.
Q: You have been in HHC for (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~three~~ years as the Scout Platoon Sergeant?
A: Yes.
Q: How often do you interact with TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership—the Top Three?
A: Very rarely. I was expecting to interact with them a lot more, but I hardly ever talk to them.
Q: Can you describe the command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a dating back to the period of pre-deployment?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6), TAKEN AT Camp PATRIOT FOB WARRIOR DATED 8 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What set of tasks and TTPs did you train your people on?
A: I trained them on TTPs that I knew from other VSPs, and I made sure they were trained on their basic skills and battle drills.
Q: Do you have any issues with the living conditions at FOB Warrior, and how have they been addressed?
A: I have no issues with them. I think they have dramatically gotten better over the past month. When we first arrived, there was no heat in tents and other issues. Once we started getting the heat, it is really nice around here in my opinion. We have showers, we have laundry, we have heated tents.
Q: Do you participate as a member of the battle staff?
A: No.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Patriot For Warrior DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you see the command climate issues at TF (b)(1)1.4a bleeding over to the subordinate companies?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Are there any other people that we should talk to concerning this investigation?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) ; my platoon leader (b)(3), (b)(6) he was previously with B CO until right before we deployed, and he has a lot more interaction with the staff.
Q: Were you on the 2009-2010 deployment?
A: No. I arrived right when they got home.
Q: Did you have much interaction with SSG Bales who was in the sniper section when you first arrived?
A: Yes. When I first took over, SSG Bales was the sniper section leader. The CSM at the time, (b)(3), (b)(6) gave me free charge to change the scouts any way that I wanted. I interviewed all of the team leaders, and I did not like SSG Bales and his leadership style. The only other interaction I had with him was at the redeployment ball where he was a little drunk. I didn't like being around him; he was an angry drunk.
Q: Can you elaborate on that?
A: SSG Bales was sitting at my table at the ball. In my opinion, he drank a little too quickly. The more alcohol that he drank, the more he got loud and wanted to be heard and seen.
Q: And that was at the Redeployment Ball in mid-2010?
A: Yes.
Q: Why did you not like his leadership style?
A: He was more of a yeller and a punisher than a teacher. I would rather pull someone aside and make them learn. He would rather yell at people and smoke them if they got things wrong. I think that during the day you should be outside training, but he would rather sit inside and teach power point classes.
Q: You made this recommendation to the CSM at the time?
A: At that time, I made the recommendation to the first sergeant that I wanted another sniper section leader. He was in agreement because SSG Bales had been there for a while and they moved him down to the line.
Q: They moved him to B CO at that time?
A: Yes.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) 26 Apr 12
ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27 day of April, 2012 at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Patriot, Afghanistan	2010/04/10	1608	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: State your full name, rank, unit, and duty assignment

A: (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: Is this your first combat deployment?

A: No. This is my second. I was deployed in Muktaediyah, Iraq from 2009-10 as part of 2/3 IN. I was a member of the S-3 shop and the battalion commander's PSD platoon leader for the first half of the tour, and I was a platoon leader in B CO, 3rd Platoon for the second half of the tour.

Q: What are your duties and responsibilities as the TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been associated with the current TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?

A: I have been a member of the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership since it came on board in September or October of 2010.

Q: How much do you interact with the current leadership (the Top Three)?

A: As a member of the primary staff, I interact with the Top Three and the S-3 on a daily basis.

Q: Can you describe the overall command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 17 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WALLACE DATED 10 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: What about the Battalion XO?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 10 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Would you say that the command is not really open and approachable on these types of issues?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB Warrior DATED 10 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: For the record, what is an ANCD and an SKL?
A: They are communication devices. An SKL is a single key loader, and an ANCD is an older version, though I'm not sure what it stands for. They are used to load COMSEC into communications equipment.
Q: What was missing on this side? Are these items that were sent and got lost, or did people leave them behind?
A: I would say 75% were items that were actually loaded and either lost in the shuffle of containers or people moving to sites. Another 25% were items that were located in the rear. The items that were lost forward were things like tripods or CCOs, nothing sensitive—minor items that were loaded onto TRICONs and when people went through the TRICONs to get the equipment for their unit, there were a lot of different hands on different equipment and things came up missing. When the TRICONs arrived on ground, there was an inventory conducted, but there was not a whole lot of oversight. The command directed that people continue to go into the TRICONs to retrieve equipment like badge makers and other non-essential things, and this created a real vulnerability both in our camp and when the TRICONs were not secured on other camps. There have probably been about five FLIPLs to this point that were presumed to have been loaded, were shipped over and are now unaccounted for.
Q: Did the command take the VSO mission seriously? Did the staff take it seriously?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: It is my understanding that most of the improvements to the camp that were requested out of the PDSS (chow hall, gym, MWR facility, etc.) were not completed when you arrived on camp. Can you walk me through that?
A: When I was here on PDSS, I worked with (b)(3), (b)(6) to develop the camp plan. We vetted it though the S-3. We walked through the whole plan with the CJSOTF J-4 who was here on the ground and with the COR, (b)(3), (b)(6) We gave him a full plan for how the camp needed to be when we arrived in order to be able to support the VSO mission. Those things did not happen. If some of those things did not happen because of time, things like the gym or the MWR tent, that would be understandable. There were some B-huts established; the OPCEN and SUPCEN were about 80% complete when we arrived, and some of that might have been due to Class IV shortages across the CJOA. But at the end of the day, there was only one COR here to oversee and contract all of these requirements. I wasn't here so I don't know what his work ethic was like, but he seemed to be a competent individual. He just did not get everything done. This shifted our focus when we got on the ground. Instead of focusing on VSO right away, we had to establish a camp in order to sustain ourselves.
Q: Other than the OPCEN and SUPCEN, what else was not complete?
A: The latrines were not winterized—when the winter hit, the pipes froze or burst or just did not work. There were very few port-a-potties. Preventative Medicine would have had their heads spinning with the sanitary conditions. There was no gym. The CRSP yard concrete pad was only about 25% complete. The RGs and most of our mobility package was not present on the ground. Electrical wiring was not complete. The OPCEN and SUPCEN were close but not complete. The biggest issue was not having the latrines and work spaces completed. Living in tents would not have been a huge issue if not for the other things. At the end of the day, there were some clear requirements for the TF that were not met, and that became the focus of the task force headquarters.
Q: Was there a mess hall?
A: The tenting system that we had comes along with a DFAC-type system. It is extremely small. We used it as living space for the first month or so because we didn't have enough space. Once we did move people out of the DFAC, it became a very high priority for the command to get that DFAC established. This consumed a lot of time, especially for my shop. There was another DFAC on FOB Warrior that was on the Polish side and was run by Flor. They were increasing the LOGCAP for that to account for our personnel. So we had a DFAC, and it was just a five or ten minute walk to get to it. I only have two cooks at Camp Patriot, and they can't support a 150-man DFAC by themselves. We spent a lot of time trying to stand up this DFAC, make it a three meal a day DFAC, increase storage and contract local workers. Ultimately this idea has been pulled back, but we do have a DFAC here on FOB Warrior.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 10 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

At one point during the winter, we did have about a two-week period where we had a food shortage because of the weather, and we did get some food dropped from CJSOTF to supplement that. At the end of the day, the DFAC was one of those things where people were saying that it is not feasible, it will require a lot of manpower, a lot of effort and a lot of money, and we already have a DFAC on the FOB that is accounting for us. Then when the 82nd hit the ground, they established another DFAC about 600m from our gate to augment the current one. At that point, the Camp Patriot Progress Working Group determined that there was no reason to have a DFAC on Camp Patriot when there are already two on FOB Warrior that can support you.

Q: Have most of these issues been addressed by now?

A: Once (b)(3), (b)(6) got on the ground, he blessed off on the plan that we had established. CJSOTF staff had begun to push down as many resources as they could—assessment teams, staff assistants, etc. When he arrived on the ground about two or three weeks ago, that sparked some change. That has really helped. Some of that was cutting out projects that were not feasible or did not need to be done and shifting the focus to how do we improve living conditions for soldiers, how do we get them more showers and hygiene units and how do we reorient the camp so that they can become as self-supporting as possible so that they can start supporting the VSPs. Over the past three weeks, it has been an unbelievable shift. I just arrived back here and a See Bee team is either on the ground or enroute to fix some of the issues surrounding the living conditions.

Q: Do you think the battle staff was prepared for the task of tracking the OPCON ODA teams?

A: We did the best that we could to prepare. When we got on the ground, there was some initial friction about whose job it was to do mission analysis. In the SOF world, it is a very bottom-up approach. Typically the teams will do their mission analysis and then tell the staff what they need to support their mission. For a while we tried to do a top-down approach, especially because we only had a few teams. Fortunately we have an SF LNO who told us to let the teams feed us the information and then it is our job to support them. I think we got that fixed. That just comes from joining a new element of the Army. In terms of logistics, once the movement package arrived on ground, we were definitely able to logistically support the VSPs that were nearby. That required us to increase our fuel storage capacity. I have received very positive feedback from the team regarding support. I think that we have gotten past all of our tactical and logistical friction points. The remaining issue is the VSP at Fiazabad, which is just in an extremely tough location both logistically and operationally. It is 47km away, and we are supporting them with air drops and FLETACs. By the time we were FMC, I think we understood what it would take to support these guys. The command seems to be doing fine with operational control and approving CONOPS.

Q: Do you think that any of these command climate issues bled over and have effected any of the line companies out with the other SOTFs?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Going back to 11 March, do you recall being notified about the issue out at Belambai.

A: I couldn't give you the specific date or time when I found out about this. I know that it was officially addressed to the staff on a Sunday morning when we were all brought into the chapel. As the days went on more information came out. There was very focused talk to leadership and soldiers telling them not to talk to the media. As the officer who has been in the battalion the longest, it is one of those events that I would never forget. When I found out, it was very disappointing and disheartening.

Q: Why was it so disheartening to you in particular?

A: I was on the prior deployment with this unit, and SSG Bales was an NCO that I had looked up to ever since the day I joined this unit. Before I was a PL in Iraq, I had been on a few patrols with the scouts and had been in his truck. He was a mentor to me, passionate, well-versed in his profession, and just cared a ton about soldiers and the mission. He taught me a lot. I got to know him very well, especially when I was in B CO as a platoon leader. When we redeployed, he got moved over to B CO from the scouts. I got to know him well. I knew that he had two kids and a wife. I got to interact with him on a daily basis and see the inspiration and the passion that he brought to work with him every day. Next to my platoon sergeant and my squad leaders, he was the go-to NCO for me whenever I had an issue or a question. He was always extremely helpful and respectful and wanted to do whatever he could to make me better. Hearing that news was kind of like a kick in the chest to me. It was not the man that I knew or looked up to. I knew that there was something else that had to have triggered that. The Bobby Bales that I knew was not that man.

Q: Do you recall on the day of 11 March when the B CO Commander informed the TOC about the incident?

A: I don't. If it happened while I was in there, it was not brought to an open forum. My guess is that I was probably not in the TOC. I was probably in the SUPCEN at the time.

Q: At any time do you remember being with (b)(3), (b)(6) when that news came in?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WALKER DATED 16 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I don't if it was at that particular time. I do remember sitting down with (b)(3), (b)(6) or maybe all three of us. We started to war game what was going on once we heard, so we pulled out a map to see who was at that location. Could it be one of our guys? If so, who is at that location?
Q: Do you recall anyone stating "that had to be SSG Bales?"
A: When we were looking at the map, and like I said I came from B CO and probably knew better than anyone in that room, and we saw who was at that location—the two E-6s—I said "that has to be Bales, that just has to be Bales."
Q: So you stated that?
A: Yes. Either I echoed it or I stated it first. I honestly can't remember, but like I said, as soon as I saw that name at that location, a wave of emotion came over me. Whether I echoed it or stated it initially, I do know that that came from my lips.
Q: Why did his name come to your mind first?
A: When I looked at the sheet, I saw that there were two E-6s, SSG Bales and (b)(3), (b)(6) was an E-5 when I first met him and in one of my best friends' platoons in B CO, and I had gotten to know him quite well. (b)(3), (b)(6) was a very passionate guy but he was very controlled and very ambitious. He had a wife who I know he was very happy with. He had a good life and a lot of friends. He had hobbies outside of work. He was the kind of guy who was easy going and was good at his job, but he was definitely not a Type-A person. When faced with that versus Bales—SSG Bales is an extremely passionate NCO. He has been through things that I don't even want to imagine in his lifetime in the Army. He was one of those people who kind of commanded your presence when he walked into a room. People stopped and looked and listened to what he had to say. He was very authoritative with his words. He said exactly what he meant. Being in the infantry, he had a temper, which is not uncommon. He would get loud at times. I knew that there were some issues with SSG Bales personally. What I had gathered from conversations with him, (b)(6) (b)(6) I knew that he had joined the Army after a stint in the financial markets. I knew that there were some underlying issues with him. When faced with those two, knowing the passion that SSG Bales had, and knowing that when you care about something that much, all it takes is the flip of a switch or a trigger for that passion to go from being used for good to being used toward something not so good. I know that he was the kind of person who had the personality and the drive to be emotional and to just let it all out. Over the years with this unit and in prior wars, I know he was a guy who didn't like to talk about what he had done or what he had been through. It was just one of those things where I thought if he has a bunch of those things piled up and nobody knows about, it only takes one trigger for that stuff to come out. When faced with those two and their types of personalities, I didn't want to believe that either one of them was capable of it, but faced with a choice if someone put me on the hot seat and said "who did it" I would have definitely said SSG Bales just because of who he was as a person.
Q: When you say he had a temper what do you mean? Was his a violent temper?
A: For example, his platoon was out on a range doing a live fire back at home station, and there was a piece of equipment that was signed out from another organization, maybe a smoke machine. It was damaged by rifle fire. The equipment was destroyed and they brought it up to the chain of command and explained what happened. After a couple days somebody came back and said that there needed to be a statement of charges because the equipment was destroyed, and SPC so-and-so is going to be charged because they shot it. SSG Bales would just get loud and say that this is outrageous and that he couldn't believe that a soldier was going to get charged for preparing for battle. He would be saying this in a very loud manner and using some profanity and he would go on a rant. He would get loud and passionate. However, after that five minute rant getting mad at nobody in particular, he would come back, calm down and say that he would pay for it. He would say "I'm not going to let the soldier pay for it," and he would have a rational solution and move on. He was never angry at anyone in particular or violent with anyone, but he would get very loud and passionate, particularly when it had to do with this soldiers.
Q: Did you ever observe him under the influence of alcohol.
A: I had a fantasy football league, and a lot of us who were in that league typically went to a restaurant called Wingers on Sundays to watch the games. Every once in a while I would see SSG Bales there. He wasn't there directly with our group because he was not in our league. He'd be watching football and talking to buddies while having a few beers. But while he was there drinking, I never saw him get loud with the patrons or his buddies or even get loud and passionate about the game. He would be there drinking for a few hours and I might have a short conversation with him. He would be loud, because some people get loud when they drink, but he would be very jovial. I never saw him get angry. I wasn't with him the whole time, and I couldn't tell you how much he was drinking.
Q: Do you have any other information that I have not covered in my questions that may be important to our investigation?
A: I want to go on the record as saying that I don't think that there is anything that the command did to either assist or allow the events that transpired in Belambai to happen. I believe that it was solely an incident where an individual who did not seek help for things he probably needed help for. I don't think it would have mattered whether he was co-located with the current command team or if he was where he was.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 7 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT FOB WARRIOR DATED 10 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 7. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 7 OF 7 PAGES

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

8 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Summary of Site Visit to Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai

1. On 27 March 2012, my investigation team and I conducted a site survey to VSP Belambai, Afghanistan. The following is a summary of the information I obtained on this visit. Enclosure 1 to this memorandum is a diagram of VSP Belambai with numerals indicating significant positions on the VSP. Enclosure 2 is an overhead image depicting VSP Belambai in relation to the villages of Alikozai and Naja Bien. Enclosure 3 is an overhead of VSP Belamabi, indicating relevant distances on the VSP (e.g., the distance between SSG Bales' Connex and the gate to the VSP. Enclosure 4 is an index of photos taken on the site visit.

2. At the site, we were received by the ODA (b)(1)1.4a leadership team, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) escorted my team and me throughout the VSP, to include the operations center (OPCEN), roof of the OPCEN (encl 1, #5), the Entry Control Point (ECP) to the VSP (identified as "gate" on encl 1, the single ECP on the VSP), and the Afghan National Army (ANA) guard towers (encl 1, #8 and #9). We were also shown the locations of other relevant structures on the VSP, to include the medical Connex (encl 1, #13) and the respective living areas of the senior (encl 1, #1) and junior US personnel (encl 1, #3) on the VSP.

3. While on the OPCEN roof and the ANA guard towers, I was able to observe the relative line of sight that those on guard would have from these positions. I was able to discuss with the VSP personnel what the fields of view were from the guard positions, the relative directions upon which the guards focused based on the location of the perceived threat, and the equipment available to the guards that enhanced the ability to perform their duties (e.g., thermal imaging devices, night vision goggles, lights, etc).

4. While at the VSP, I (along with (b)(3), (b)(6)) took photographs from the relevant guard positions in support of my investigation. Enclosed to this memorandum are those photos with an index that lists the photos with a brief description.

5. Relevant to my findings in this investigative report are the following observations from the site visit:

a. VSP Belambai is a relative small VSP, with a scale as indicated on Enclosure 3 of this memorandum. VSP personnel perform guard duty from three vantage points: the roof of the OPCEN (encl 1, #5), the main ANA guard tower (encl 1, # 8), and the smaller ANA guard tower closest to the gate (encl 1, #9).

(b)(1)1.4a

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(b)(1)1.4a

e. The gate itself at the ECP is a wooden beam, wrapped in barbed wire. According to (b)(3), (b)(6), on the night of the incident a person could have walked around the beam on either the east or west side. If the person chose to stick closely to the west wall of the gate, and exited on the west side of the beam, that person would be difficult to see from either the OPCEN roof or the ANA tower, particularly in the dark [See Photo 10].

f. The Hescoes on the north wall, facing the village of Alikozai, are only one high in two locations, and did not have concertina wire on top of these locations. An athletically fit individual might scale these walls, but would be in full view of the OPCEN guards at night using their Night Observation Devices (NODs) and thermals. [See Photo 1].

g. The living conditions for the NCOs are very close quarters. SSG Bales' Connex door was directly across from (b)(3), (b)(6) Connex door, with about four feet of separation.

h. Views from the ANA towers to the south toward Naja Bien are restricted by the blue school/clinic building across from the VSP gate, and by trees lining the road on the south side. [See Photo 9].

(b)(1)1.4a

j. The interior of the OPCEN was well used for all operations and intelligence functions. However, the "Cerberus" system was down on 11 March 2012 as the camera could not be maneuvered by the joystick on the control panel. This system had been awaiting parts, according to (b)(3), (b)(6) since before the 11 March incident.

4. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6), DSN: (b)(6)

4 Encls
as

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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Pages 436 through 438 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c

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Enclosure 4: Index of Photos Taken During Site Survey Visit to VSP Belambai

1. Photo 1: View north from the roof of the OPCEN (position #5 on Enclosure 1) towards the village of Alikozai.

2. Photo 2: View southwest from the roof of the OPCEN towards the Entry Control Point (ECP – referred to as "gate" on Enclosure 1) at VSP Belambai with the local school in the background.

3. Photo 3: View west from the roof of the OPCEN towards the cemetery – historically, a likely direction for enemy contact.

4. Photo 4: View east from roof of the OPCEN overlooking the Village of Belambai proper.

5. Photo 5: View northwest frm the OPCEN roof overlooking Officer/NCO quarters.

6. Photo 6: View of the Aid Station/Casualty Collection Point (position #13) looking west from the OPCEN roof.

7. Photo 7: Southwest view of the Entry Control Point (ECP) from the roof of the OPCEN.

8. Photo 8: View west from the ANA guard tower closest to the ECP (ANA Tower #2 on enclosure 1) overlooking Route Charlottestown and the ECP into VSP Belambai.

9. Photo 9: View southwest from the main ANA guard tower (ANA Tower #1 on enclosure 1) overlooking the smaller ANA tower, the main gate, and the southern wall of the VSP.

10. Photo 10: Southerly view exting the gate/ECP.

11. Photo 11: Northeast view of the ECP entrance. Note daytime surveillance camera.

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Photo 1: (View north from the roof of the Operations Center towards the village of Alikozai)

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Photo 2: (View southwest from the roof of the OPCEN towards the Entry Control Point (ECP) at VSP Balambai with the local school in the background)

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Photo 3: (View west from the roof of the OPCEN towards the cemetery -- historically, a likely direction for enemy contact)

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Photo 4: (View east from the roof of the OPCEN overlooking the Village of Belambai proper)

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Photo 5: (View northwest from the OPCEN roof overlooking Officer/NCO quarters)



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Photo 6: (View of the Aid Station/Casualty Collection Point looking west from OPCEN roof)

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Photo 7: (Southwest view of the Entry Control Point (ECP) from the roof of the OPCEN)



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Photo 8: (View west from the ANA guard tower closest to the ECP overlooking Route Charlottestown and the ECP into VSP Belmabai)



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Photo 9: (View southwest from the main ANA guard tower overlooking the smaller ANA tower, the main gate and the southern wall of the VSP)

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Photo 10: (Southerly view exiting the gate / ECP)

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Photo 11: (Northeast view of the ECP entrance. Note daytime surveillance camera)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
BRAVO COMPANY, 2ND BATTALION, 3RD INFANTRY REGIMENT
BUILDING 3655, LT WOODFILL STREET
JOINT BASE LEWIS-MCCHORD, WASHINGTON 97433

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

AFZH-INN-B 27 November 2011

MEMORANDUM FOR: Squad Leaders and Team Leaders

SUBJECT: Village Stability Operations Enduring Guidance – OEF 2012

1. INTRODUCTION. Our soldiers stand, as they have stood for over two centuries, as guardians against those who would deny us the freedoms we enjoy. They guard against those who would take our lives, either by the chains of oppression or with weapons. They guard and insure us against those who would tear down the sometimes frayed fabric of democracy under which we, and other peoples of the world, live and pursue our individual beliefs and desires.[i] It is upon this legacy that we march forward on our next deployment. Our unit is no stranger to this type of warfare. Our Regiment was born out of revolution and has fought un-conventionally in the Philippine Insurrection, Indian Wars, Vietnam, and more recently in Iraq. However, this deployment will be tougher and culturally different than any other our unit; and each of you personally, may have experienced before. As I said previously, never before in the history of warfare has so much responsibility been placed on our junior leaders. You have an awesome task ahead of you. One that will require the very best you can offer up. There is no stopping, no resting, and no quitting. I have the utmost confidence in you.

2. DUTY/HONOR/COUNTRY – THE IMPORTANCE OF SERVING HONORABLY. As has been the case from the time of General George Washington and the formation of our Constitution, men of honor who have abided by the highest ethical standards of conduct and selfless service have been the ones who have successfully wielded the moral authority.[ii] Our profession involves deep moral values because we are dealing with matters of life and death- for ourselves, for those who serve shoulder to shoulder with us, for our nation, for our families, and for adversaries and noncombatants.[iii] To a true military professional, loyalty to the ideals of the nation means a deep belief in serving and defending the ideals of freedom, justice, truth, and equality found in the Declaration of Independence and the Constitution. It is the sworn duty of military leaders to defend these ideals; numerous wars in the past two centuries have been fought to preserve them.[iv] Those of us in the Total Army who take an oath of service have sworn to 'support and defend the Constitution of the United States.' By doing so, we stand shoulder to shoulder with the framers of the Constitution who mutually pledged their lives, their fortunes, and their sacred honor. We do this freely because it is the Constitution which guarantees all citizens the rights and obligations which are the essence of being an American. And it is the Constitution that our comrades have, in other times and in other

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places, sacrificed to preserve.[v] Many times during this deployment you will find yourself in complex situations where the right ethical choice is unclear. You will face difficult dilemmas of conscience; experience strong and often conflicting feelings, and be forced to make tough choices.[vi] When you find yourself in an ethical dilemma, you must search for the morally RIGHT thing to do. Let me remind you of your ethical responsibilities as a leader. First, you must be a good role model. Second, you must develop your subordinates ethically. Finally, you must lead in such a way that you avoid putting your subordinates into ethical dilemmas.[vii] You must teach your Soldiers how to think through ethical issues and have the moral strength to do what they believe is right. While you may not always be rewarded for integrity and candor, I will hold you accountable as leaders if your Squad/Team fails to behave ethically. All soldiers have the responsibility to behave ethically- to do what is right. As we order our soldiers into battle, we must know in our hearts that they understand what's right.[viii] If you are ethical and set an ethical environment within your Squad, I assure you that you will be better and more successful overall. I can't foresee every situation you will be faced with, nor give guidance for every possible dilemma. But generally speaking, I would tell you that the right thing to do is the moral action that best serves the ideals of United States, GiROA, the people of Afghanistan, your Soldiers, [ix] our mission, and which results in the greatest moral good.[x] Further, I would tell you not to violate any laws, regulations, policies, or standing orders as you seek the best possible solution. However, if you ever decide to violate a regulation or law, you must be able to show that your actions were not motivated by self-gain, but by the highest moral good. You must be able to show that the situation was so unique that you had to violate a regulation, law, or ethical rule to do the most moral thing in terms of the ideals of this nation.[xi] You must keep in mind that as Soldiers we represent our nation's values[xii]and that any unethical act done by one of us diminishes all of us.[xiii] Soldiers take pride in successfully accomplishing their missions with honor. Violating the basic principles of American life and the rules of warfare while defending them leads to tainted victory.[xiv] When all else fails, "follow your gut" – instinctively you usually know in your heart the right thing to do. The point is that you have to live with yourself, the decisions you make, and the actions of your men. What legacy do you wish to leave behind? You cannot fail in your duty to serve honorably. To quote General Douglas MacArthur, "were you to do so, a million ghosts in olive drab, in brown khaki, in blue and gray, would rise from their white crosses, thundering those magic words: Duty, Honor, Country." Remember that you carry Company B's legacy and over 200 years of honorable service with you – arguably, B/2-3 IN is the first and oldest unit in the entire U.S. Army, originally manned by our forefathers who fought in the American Revolution (refer to Appendix 1 for our history). You cannot tarnish that history. In case I've been unclear in my expectations of you or the men under your charge, let me speak more bluntly – do not embarrass, discredit, or otherwise bring dishonor to Bravo Company, the Patriot Battalion, or the U.S. Army in your actions, words, or deeds. To do so will result in your immediate removal and re-assignment, maximum punishment under the UCMJ, and assignment to the most remedial of tasks for the duration of the deployment.

3. LEADERSHIP. The Soldiers do not want or need another buddy; what they must have is a leader. And as a leader you must set the example; "Be, Know, Do." You must strive to be the most experienced, seasoned, and professional Soldier in your Squad/Team. As

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such, every Soldier will look up to you as the example. They will model their behavior after you. They will observe everything – how you lead, how you impart instructions, how you treat Soldiers, how you carry/present yourself, and your conduct both on and off duty. As such, everything you do will have a lasting impact on them. Your personal example affects the Soldiers in your Squad/Team more than any amount of instruction or form of discipline. Soldiers will instinctively look to you for patterns of conduct which they may either emulate, or use as an excuse for their own shortcomings. They will do what they see you do. As such, you must be a leader of character. What you are (your beliefs, values, ethics, and character) is the most important part of your leadership.[xv] Character grows out of the steady application of moral values and ethical behavior in one's life.[xvi] Character is what will enable you to withstand the rigors of combat and the daily challenges that might otherwise tempt you to compromise your principles.[xvii] Make no mistake; the crucible of combat will test your integrity and character like never before.[xviii] Therefore, I expect you to:

a. Ensure all Soldiers within your Squad/Team maintain the highest ethical, legal, and moral standards of conduct– they must not violate the basic principles of the American way-of-life and fundamental ideals laid forth in the U.S. Constitution; nor sacrifice their honor – they must embody the Army values at all times. Likewise, I expect your character and integrity to be beyond reproach at all times. I expect you to maintain the highest legal, moral, and ethical behavior. I expect you to be grounded in the Army Values and the basic ideals this nation was founded upon.

b. Set and enforce high standards for your men (personal appearance, customs and courtesies, PT, etc.).

c. Counsel your subordinates regularly.

d. Ensure your Soldiers understand and use the chain-of-command.

e. Show initiative – do not wait to be told what to do. No one is going to hold your hand or teach you how to do something. You are on your own – you must learn things for yourself; teach yourself and your men what you don't know; and figure it out for yourself.

f. Be decisive – but be fair, firm, and impartial in your decisions.

g. Check, supervise, and inspect everything. Leaders can never stop inspecting and teaching. It is our way of life, and it will save the lives of your Soldiers.[xix] "You need to have a routine system for checking and double-checking the things that are important to cohesion, discipline, morale, unit effectiveness, and mission accomplishment as well as weapons and equipment.[xx]

h. Ensure all Soldiers in your Squad/Team maintain the highest standards of military appearance, bearing, courtesy, and discipline.

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i. Enforce all orders of your Chain-of-Command (both conventional and SOF). It is your Squad/Team, its standards reflect your standards - be the best.

j. Avoid "They said" or "the PL said". Once an order is issued, you must issue it to your subordinates as if it were your own - regardless of what your think or feel. All debate is over once an order is issued. Unity and support of the chain of command works up and down.

k. Form strong, positive working relationships with your ODA, and when possible, across the VSP site and your assigned area of responsibility and all encompassing villages. I expect you to work in close harmony with the ODA and your Afghan partners to enhance your Squad/Team's training, readiness, discipline, morale, and overall combat effectiveness. We must be team players.

l. Keep your Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant aware of conditions, climate, and potential problems within your Squad/Team – bring these matters to their attention immediately.

m. Anticipate, identify, and resolve problems early; and when possible, prevent them all together. Ensure for every problem you identify, you have a recommended solution.

n. Advise, coach, teach, and mentor your Soldiers – they can learn a great deal from you. Encourage a "can do" attitude in them.

o. Develop your Soldiers. Help them to sharpen their skills. Do not let them accept substandard performance. Teach them what "right" is. Be hard on them. Push them. Make it your mission to make your Soldiers the most knowledgeable, capable, and proficient you can. Constantly challenge them to learn. Test their knowledge. Pull them aside and explain things. Support them and ensure they have the confidence to make decisions in your absence. Be exacting in your standards of them. Teach them what right is. Make sure you give them tasks that develop a sense of responsibility and accountability in them, and allow them to perform roles that help them practice their leadership skills (e.g., teach a class, serve as Primary or Alternate Instructor for PT, place more experienced Soldiers in charge of junior Soldiers during details, etc.).

4. PROFESSIONALISM. I expect you to be a *mature*, competent professional at all times. Nothing will cause you or your Soldiers to lose credibility faster in the eyes of your ODA than immaturity and incompetence. Immaturity will not be tolerated. It leads to carelessness, recklessness, and negligence. It presents a poor professional image and tarnishes the reputation of the Company. You must remember that the average age of an ODA is 30 years old and all are either NCOs or Officers – you must think and act like they do or you will not be accepted by them. Above all, I expect you to know your job and perform it to the very best of your ability. As stated in my Command Philosophy, you should be continuously working to hone the knowledge and skills of your trade. You are constantly studying your profession; thinking, learning, and always working to better

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yourself and your performance. You must take your job seriously. As such, I expect you to:

a. Act "strategically" – think and act above the scope of your age, rank, and experience/skill level. Focus on performing and modeling your behavior two (2) levels up. Identify a mentor or role model, and strive to behave, act, and think like this person. Identify those traits and characteristics you admire in this person and attempt to emulate them. Model your behavior after this person. Attempt to understand their job, how they operate, how they convey and impart instructions, how they interact with others, how they command respect, how they communicate, and what makes them successful. Learn as much as you can about what is expected in future positions and higher ranks.

b. Be aware of your words, actions, and deeds and how others may interpret, view, perceive, or be affected by them and always strive to set the example.

c. Always exhibit initiative, discipline and enthusiasm - with those traits you will never fail your men. Display a positive mental attitude. Love soldiering.

d. Be proactive, seek out and assume additional responsibility, and make things happen; it's contagious.

e. Maintain unimpeachable integrity. I expect your word to be your bond.

f. Do the hard right over the easy wrong.

g. Accept every task as a mission and accomplish all missions in an aggressive manner. When you make errors, err on the side of audacity. As General George S. Patton, Jr. once said, "In war nothing is impossible, providing you use audacity."

5. DISCIPLINE & STANDARDS. I believe discipline has a direct relationship with morale and combat effectiveness. As Non-Commissioned Officers in Bravo Company, your job is to know the standard, and enforce it. More importantly, it is to teach our Soldiers how to maintain the same exacting, uncompromising standards that you have. Disciplined Soldiers and leaders do their duties promptly and effectively in response to orders and in the absence of orders. I expect you to be disciplined, train discipline, and enforce discipline, everyday in every task. Discipline must be your hallmark and must be a part of your normal daily business while deployed. Soldiers and leaders with self-discipline do what they ought to do regardless of supervision, stress, exhaustion, or other conditions - they do the right thing ALWAYS. You set the example and tone for discipline in your Squad/Team. If something looks wrong it probably is. Do not accept "that's the way we've always done it" as a standard. Hold your subordinates to uncompromising exacting standards, as that is what I will hold you to. As General Bruce Clark put it, "You owe it to your men to require standards which are for their benefit even though they may not be popular at the moment." As such, I expect you to find the standard, meet the standard, exceed the standard, and enforce the standard in all missions and tasks. Maintaining high standards means constant attention-to-detail, and constant

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on-the-spot corrections. If you walk by a deficiency and say nothing, it becomes the new standard. Maintaining high standards is how you take care of your Soldiers. They may complain about high standards of appearance, training, discipline, and duty; but once attained they will take pride in them and look with a patronizing attitude on individuals and units not up to their standard. Cohesion, morale, and Esprit de Corps will improve. Remember, your Squad/Team's standards are a reflection of your personal standards. I will always have your back in maintaining standards. Additionally, greater than 50% of your time will be spent on the VSP site – essentially, in a "garrison"-like environment. Therefore, you must be equally disciplined in "garrison" as you are out on patrol. You cannot perform well on patrol, if you fail to be disciplined in accomplishing your garrison and administrative tasks – discipline will not "magically" appear in the field if you fail to practice it in your normal daily routines. As General Patton put it, "administrative discipline is the index of combat discipline. Any commander who is unwilling or unable to enforce administrative discipline will be incapable of enforcing combat discipline." The neatness of your Soldier's living quarters, the CP, common areas; orderly accountability of our equipment; and timeliness and completeness of personnel actions are just as important as how well you execute your battle drills in combat. They are indicators of just how disciplined you are as a Squad/Team and they contribute to neat, orderly, and efficient operations and the prevention of security violations and lost paperwork. Your Squad/Team's discipline will be measured by your Soldiers attitude, confidence, appearance, unit pride, well-maintained weapons and equipment, and ability to accomplish any mission asked of them. More importantly, it will be measured by what they do when you and your fellow NCOs are not around (self-discipline). As such, I expect you to enforce the following (not inclusive):

a. I expect you to set and enforce the highest standards of military customs and courtesies, professional/personal conduct, wear and appearance of the uniform, drill and ceremony, field and living quarter sanitation, weapons and equipment maintenance, and overall military bearing within your Squad/Team. Ensure strict adherence to the appearance standards for on and off duty and ensure your Soldiers maintain the highest standards of good order and discipline whether in the field or on the VSP site. Immediately correct any deviations from the established standards, no matter how small. Keep in mind that uniform and grooming standards will be different at each site. My guidance is this: whatever standards the senior ODA NCO at that site has – are the standards you adopt and ruthlessly enforce with your men.

b. I expect you to ensure that every member of your Squad/Team knows, understands, and maintains strict adherence to established laws, policies, regulations, and SOPs.

c. I expect you to work with your ODA, and with your PL/PSG, to ensure 100% accountability, serviceability, and maintenance of all equipment assigned to your Squad/Team and each individual Soldier.

6. TRAINING. Training doesn't stop just because you are deployed – in fact, more than ever, it is imperative that you find time to do quality training throughout the deployment.

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If there is down time, you must evaluate whether to rest your men or to use that time to do training. While resting may be the "easy" answer, your job as an NCO means you are duty-bound to take care of your Soldiers by making the hard decisions and pushing them to train at every opportunity to build proficiency in their warfighting skills. Focus on the basics: shoot, move, and communicate. Don't accept low standards – your Soldiers lives are on the line! I'm counting on you to train them to the maximum extent possible to ensure they are the very best trained and are prepared for the rigors of combat. Ensure you properly plan ahead, coordinate, and prepare to conduct training. Have an objective. Know the Task, Conditions, and Standards. Ensure you know the material and have rehearsed it prior to execution – otherwise you will lose credibility in the eyes of your men. Ensure the area has been reconnoitered and prepared prior to the Soldiers arriving for training. Ensure you have planned for all resources in a timely manner. Maintain security at all times. Keep your PL/PSG informed of training conducted. What they should be told is: what was trained, how many were trained, any problems found, any retraining conducted, etc. I can't stress enough – TRAIN, TRAIN, TRAIN!

a. Focus on combat skills: marksmanship (close-quarters, long-distance, high angle, target discrimination, magazine changes, weapon transitions, alternate firing positions, stress shoots, etc.); battle drills (react to contact, squad attack, convoy live fire, enter and clear a room, 5-25m drills, vehicle egress, etc.); communications (load, operate, and trouble shoot every radio, field expedient antennas, hand and arm signals, etc.); first aid (treat for shock, apply dressing to open wound, use of tourniquet, 9-line Medevac, etc.) and Squad/Team SOPs (marking, IEDs, breaching, room clearing, Karzai 12, ROE/EOF, etc.). Ask for assistance from the ODAs to enhance your training at every opportunity.

b. Cross train and develop your Soldiers. You must train your Soldiers to function two levels above their current duty position. Naturally, the first priority is to ensure they are totally proficient at their current duty position. Make sure they know *everything* about their assigned weapon and job before teaching them yours. Cross train your Soldiers in other combat skills/specialities: mortar employment, Call-for-Fire, sniper employment, anti-armor weapon employment, crew-served weapons, RTO duties, etc.).

c. Ensure that every member of your Squad/Team knows and understands unit SOPs and policies (including those of your ODA/SEAL Team).

d. You are your Squad/Team's safety officer at all times. Ensure that a risk assessment has been done for all tasks. Ensure that each training event passes the "common sense" test.

e. Ensure that your Soldiers are in the proper uniform at all times. Enforce the established standards for field battle dress.

f. Ensure that your mounted crews are conducting Gunnery Skills Training with assigned crewmembers or are cross-training Soldiers on the CROWS. Machine gun teams

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should be practicing crew drills over and over until they are all trained on all positions and can rapidly execute drills in any configuration.

7. TAKING CARE OF SOLDIERS. General Abrams once said, "People are not in the Army, they are the Army." The 'health of the enlisted force' means ensuring that Soldiers are trained to standard and that their needs are taken care of. Sometimes people tend to separate mission accomplishment from taking care of Soldiers. You should understand that the two are inseparable. By focusing on both you will accomplish your mission.[xxi] Know your Soldiers. Deal with problems before they grow too large. Listen to your Soldiers. If you sense any psychological or behavioral health issues, don't ignore it. Get to the bottom of it. Being aware is the first step to getting Soldiers the treatment they need. Fully use all available resources/agencies to assist Soldiers in solving problems (i.e., chaplains, psychologist, medics, etc.). Keep your Soldiers informed. Constantly communicate with them and tell them "why" they are doing things so they understand their role and how it fits in to the bigger picture. Ensure every new Soldier receives an orientation to your Squad/Team (standards and expectations, SOPs, duties and responsibilities, etc.). Ensure every new Soldier is sponsored within your Squad/Team by a "like" Soldier; single for single/married for married. Ensure every Soldier is taken care of from the time he gets here until the time he departs; pay special attention to in-processing and out-processing (clearing). Work with your PSG to improve the quality of life and living conditions for your Soldiers.

8. READINESS. The price of unpreparedness is always paid, again and again, in lives and in blood...The less prepared we are, the more wishful our thinking, and the greater the costs of war when it comes.[xxii] Bravo Company exists solely to deploy worldwide and defeat any enemy on any battlefield no matter the circumstances. Our Soldiers must be physically and mentally prepared for the rigors of combat. It will take a disciplined and fully prepared Soldier to properly fight, win, and return home safely.

a. Prepare yourself for the first 100 days. Prepare yourself for your first patrol. Prepare yourself for your first mounted convoy. Prepare yourself for your first contact. Prepare yourself for your first IED. Prepare yourself for your first interaction with Afghan villagers. You must mentally talk yourself through these actions and visualize what you will do in every situation. Know what you would do at this very moment if you took contact – Where will you move to? What is your next step? What commands will you give your Soldiers? Don't get lazy – your life and that of your Soldiers depend upon it.

b. Ensure your Soldiers don't become complacent in conducting "every day" operations; keep and instill in your Soldiers a sense of alertness and urgency. Complacency kills. This will require your constant attention.

c. Do your honesty traces – each and every day, in all aspects of VSP life – to make sure you are not establishing patterns either inside or outside the wire. Assign a Soldier the job of leading an honesty trace each day. This creates responsibility and gives you a "backup" so you don't forget. Make it part of your routine.

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d. Ensure all Soldiers are ready to pick-up and move at a moment's notice. Do not let their living areas become so messy that they can't pack their gear and move out when needed. Constantly inspect these areas.

e. Know the Patrol "Lifecycle" and follow it. Do your pre-briefs and de-briefs. Gather the intelligence reports prior to your patrol and study them. Coordinate with the ODA and find out what resources are available and request them in a timely manner. Study the terrain and do a map recon – plan your routes and alternate routes. Once you have studied the intel, terrain, target, routes, etc. – then make your men study them over and over until you can recite the details from memory. You can't cut corners – you must push yourself and your men to know everything and rehearse the mission.

f. Prepare yourself and your Soldiers mentally for the loss or injury of a Soldier. Know what to do. Talk with your Soldiers. Understand what happens to the Soldier; where they go and who takes custody of them and their equipment, should they be wounded or killed. Know how you are going to handle that situation – how you will address your men; how you will re-focus them; and how you will get them to carry on despite the loss.

g. Continue to gain an understanding of the enemy you would face. Read every SITREP, every GRINTSUM, and participate in every Intel Update/Brief that you can. Request additional information on the enemy (rat lines, link diagrams, pattern analysis charts, target packets/dossiers, etc.). Read any books on the Taliban, Al-Qaida, Mujahedeen, and combat in Afghanistan that you can get your hands on. Force yourself to read them over other books. You must become a subject matter expert on your enemy. He's certainly studying you!

h. Family Readiness. We recruit Soldiers, but we retain families![xxiii] The Family Readiness Group is an integral part of this organization. Take an active interest in the married and single Soldier's unique problems. Encourage Soldiers to have their wives participate in the Family Readiness Group. Spouses and children are a top priority wherever they are. A family problem is PIR to me. Ensure I know about family problems ASAP through your CoC. Specifically, I want to know if any immediate family member is hospitalized or a death in the immediate family; any baby being born; financial problems; marital issues/relationship problems (such as a divorce or separation); or any other significant information that in your judgment you think I would want to know. I will work through the FRG Leader to get information to our families and to resolve problems back at JBLM. This does not excuse you of the responsibility to keep in touch with your Soldier's families to handle "Soldier issues" as they arise.

9. COMPREHENSIVE SOLDIER FITNESS. It's been proven in over 200 years of combat that units whose men are physically and mentally fit have fewer battle casualties than troops who are not in condition. Troops with good leadership, high morale, and good physical condition are more alert and take the extra precautions which save their lives and reduce their casualties.[xxiv] Ensure PT is mentally as well as physically challenging. An

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M240B gunner who can't complete a footmarch means one less gun in the fight. Lead from the front. Your physical example is central to your credibility as a leader.

a. Focus on "functional fitness." Work on building lower body strength (such as lunges for your legs to help with going up and down mountains). Consider following the "Cross Fit Workout of the Day." This may be as simple as assigning a Soldier to download the WOD from the Crossfit website. Get creative and use the resources you have on hand to perform battle-focused PT (gather MRAP tires, sandbags, .50 Cal barrels, etc.). Develop a "Prison Yard" PT area where Soldiers can rotate stations. Assign various Soldiers the responsibility of leading PT in accordance with the PT Manual. This develops them as leaders and prepares them to lead PT. Get creative and incorporate your battle drills and SOPs into PT (such as litter carries, ammo can runs, fire and movement with buddy teams). Conduct competitions to create a sense of esprit de corps.

b. Weight Control Program. I expect your assistance in the oversight of the Army Weight Control Program. Your goal is to get every Soldier off the program.

c. Evaluate your Soldiers mental, emotional, and behavioral health daily. If you "sense" a problem – get to the bottom of it. Get your Soldiers help if they need it. Everybody deals with combat experiences differently. Don't neglect your Soldiers.

10. MAINTENANCE. Just because we are in combat, doesn't mean maintenance stops. In fact, it is more important than ever that you are highly disciplined in maintaining your weapons and equipment – you MUST stay on top of it! You will never have all the equipment, supplies, facilities, and funds you require. You will always be short due to combat losses, accidents, interruptions in the supply system, or just insufficient resources to fill all needs. Therefore, you must teach your Soldiers how to maintain and conserve what they have.[xxv] You are responsible for all aspects of your Squad/Team's maintenance program. You are responsible for ensuring all vehicles, weapons, and equipment are maintained at a high level of operational readiness. You are responsible for identifying, tracking, and resolving any maintenance issues. Know your Squad/Team's equipment and its present condition intimately. If any vehicles, weapons, or equipment are down you should get personally involved to immediately fix it. If your vehicles or equipment are not FMC, you are NOT prepared for combat. Keep your eyes open during maintenance; ensure all equipment is inspected by the operator, then spot check for yourself. Your equipment must be maintained at -10/-20 standards. I expect you to know the status of parts that are due in. Build a good relationship with your maintainers/mechanic(s). They don't have to like your way of doing things, but they must get things done and it's your job to ensure they do. Ensure your maintenance team and/or mechanic(s) are communicating with you daily; and you with them. If there is a lack of action, get involved. Your physical presence may make the difference in speeding things along. Make the maintenance team at your site work for you. Personally talk to the VSP site armorer, commo sergeant, mechanic(s), and others to speed the repair of downed equipment and get feedback on how your Squad/Team is maintaining its equipment. Your personal equipment needs to be the cleanest and best maintained in your Squad/Team. Your Soldiers will look at you to set the standard for maintenance. They

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will be inspecting your gear on a daily basis, in both "garrison" and in the field. Check the maintenance of weapons, night vision devices, commo equipment, individuals and vehicles daily. Ensure you record all maintenance on 5988-Es and keep these on file.

a. Ensure the accountability, serviceability and maintenance of all equipment assigned to your Squad/Team and each individual Soldier. All deficiencies will be corrected and reported to your ODA OIC/NCOIC. Vehicle deadlines, crew-served weapons, and pacing items (such as the Javelin CLU) are reported immediately.

b. Ensure your Squad/Team equipment is accounted for at all times. Have a by-name/serial number status card on your person at all times and update it daily.

c. Inspect your Soldier's weapons and equipment daily as part of your battle rhythm. The minimum standard is no dirt, rust, or carbon and a light coat of oil for weapons.

d. Know the status of your equipment. What the deficiencies are and the status of inbound parts. Be proactive in maintaining the serviceability of your equipment.

e. Ensure all maintenance and services are supervised. Hold your Soldiers accountable and responsible for poorly maintained weapons and equipment.

11. LOGISTICS. You are responsible for everything that your Squad/Team needs to train and to fight. You must be resourceful. Learn to be a "scrounger." Think of everything that you need, or might need. Have backups for everything that you can. Then work through all the formal and informal channels to get what you need. Don't take "no" for an answer. At a minimum, constantly ask yourself, "Where else can I get some?" "Who else might have some?" "What can I use as a substitute?" "What other options are available to me?" and "Who can grant an exception to policy?" Never give up trying to obtain it – keep looking. But never violate any regulations or do anything immoral, illegal, or unethical in your search. Developing relationships with key personnel internal and external to your ODA, VSP site, and Platoon will aid you in getting what you need – never burn a bridge.

a. Build "stockpiles" at your VSP site when possible. There should be a stockpile for Class I, V, and VIII. Make these into ready-to-load "packages" so they can be loaded on a vehicle at a moment's notice. For instance, a Class V package may consist of a Pelican case with pre-loaded magazines, SAW drums, 100-rnd belts for crew-served weapons, extra frags, extra 60mm mortar rounds, and some pyro. Make sure that stockpiles are not pilfered – they are intended for emergency re-supply only. When possible, create them in a manner that allows for a "drive thru" of the convoy (i.e., convoy enters and files past each "station" and vehicles are loaded with package before moving to next "station" [for instance, Station 1 is Class V; Station 2 is Class I, and Station 3 is Class VIII]). Develop a marking system for each – for instance, yellow triangle indicates Class V package; blue square indicates Class I package; and red cross

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indicates Class VIII package (be sure to include luminous tape and IR chem lights for night marking).

b. Constantly work to refine your defensive positions and force protection posture. Request all the Class IV that you can and be smart about hardening your living areas. Continuously improve your positions. Remember to examine your positions using OAKOC and CARVER to identify vulnerabilities. Then work to increase security.

12. ADMINISTRATION. Unfortunately, paperwork doesn't go away just because you are deployed. We will still have to do awards, leave forms, NCOERs, counseling, SIRs, SITREPs, CONOPs, inventories, UCMJ actions, and a host of other administrivia. You will be given a suspense from your PL/PSG and/or ODA and I expect you to meet it or identify early that you will be unable to meet it and ask for an extension. I will not tolerate late administrative paperwork. Further, your administrative work needs to be of the highest standard. Review your own work; then have another NCO or Soldier review your work for spelling errors, punctuation, grammar, consistency, etc. Do it right the first time so you don't have to do it again or put others through the ass-pain of correcting your work.

a. General. Know the details of all administrative matters pertaining to the men in your Squad/Team. Recommend and track promotions, awards, evaluation reports, and punitive actions. Know the status of every one. Ensure you have a system that works no matter your OPTEMPO. Maintain direct visibility on in & out processing, leave, pay actions (including overdrawn accounts), awards, counseling, and NCOER's. Ensure that admin actions are submitted and completed in a timely manner. Make sure you know and track all your Soldiers' admin actions, problems, etc. and ensure you submit all daily, weekly, monthly report inputs for your ODA in a timely manner (i.e., SITREPs, etc.).

b. NCOERs. No late NCOERs will be tolerated and you must ensure that they are error free, just like you want yours to be. Ensure that your PL/PSG are tracking all Annual and Change of Rater evaluations. Let them know ahead of time when yours is due.

c. Keep Personnel Record Files/Soldier Readiness Packets (PRFs/SRPs) current. Monitor weapons qualifications, shots, wills, powers of attorney, dental readiness, family care plans, vehicle readiness packets and all other "readiness issues". Ensure that the Squad/Team is staying current on all deployment criteria.

d. Indebtedness: Ensure that your Squad/Team has as few delinquent Soldiers as possible. Be proactive in identifying financial problems and keep your Soldiers out of debt. Get your Soldiers into a payment plan if they owe money and supervise the payment of their debts if necessary. Counsel all instances of indebtedness and deposit waiver program failures in writing.

e. Living Areas. Work to improve the living conditions and quality of life in your Soldiers living areas. Assign an NCO or Soldier to oversee the living quarters (i.e.,

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"Barracks"). Inspect daily to ensure that individual Soldier rooms, common areas, offices, CPs, and other areas are not dirty or unorganized. I expect each Soldier to clean his own workspace at the end of each duty day and I expect an NCO to be responsible for each common area – hold them accountable. NCOs should conduct morning an end-of-day walk throughs to inspect. I expect all Soldiers to maintain sanitary conditions and an impeccable appearance in their living areas– help me enforce this. It's not just a matter of "neatness" – it is crucial to preventing the spread of disease and the introduction of rodents, snakes, arthropods, and vectors (flies, fleas, ticks, lice, mosquitoes, camel spiders, etc.).

f. Health and Welfare Inspections. Conduct daily (or weekly at a minimum) Health and Welfare inspections to monitor your Soldiers living conditions and assess morale, discipline, sanitation, and standards. These inspections may be a simple walk-thru or as complex as a search with Military Working Dogs. Absolutely NO DRUGS, ALCHOHOL, UN-PRESECRIBED MEDICATIONS, or OTHER BANNED SUBSTANCES or CONTRABAND – no exceptions!

g. Equal Opportunity and Consideration of Others. Our diversity is the strength of our team. I expect you to enforce EO and COO in all aspects of your Squad/Team. Teach your Soldiers to do the same. I have no patience for disrespect, ignorance, racism, intolerance, or any form of discrimination – and neither should you. You must promote a healthy Command Climate based on mutual respect and understanding among all Soldiers in your Squad/Team regardless of background, race, religion, ethnicity, individual beliefs, or orientation. If you see or hear anything contrary to this – I expect you to squash it immediately. Alert your ODA and Platoon CoC of any potential indicators of something more serious (e.g., gang, extremist, or discriminatory group affiliations [posters, tattoos, clothing, etc.]).

h. Quality of Life/BOSS/MWR. Don't forget to improve morale and quality of life for your Soldiers throughout the deployment. Periodically plan, coordinate, and execute activities throughout the deployment year that allow your Soldiers to relax, have fun, and let go of the daily stress of being a Soldier. Try to plan two activities per month. This may be a PT challenge, squad competition, sporting event with your Afghan partner, or some other safe, respectful, and fun activity.

i. Leaves/Passes. Leaves and passes are your responsibility to manage – with guidance given from the 1SG and your PL/PSG. Make sure Soldiers going on Pass/Leave receive a proper Safety Brief prior to departure and that the contents of their stay-behind gear is properly inventoried for loss prevention. Ensure leave forms are maintained on file.

j. Adverse Administrative Actions/UCMJ. I expect you to provide your expert input and recommendations on any UCMJ actions that may arise. Make sure you speak with your PL/PSG prior to any preliminary action being taken. It's important that the entire CoC is on the same sheet of music.

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k. Counseling. Counsel your Soldiers monthly in writing. Ensure counseling is conducted properly; Soldiers need to know how they are doing (good as well as bad). Perform a monthly review of counseling packets to ensure it is being done properly.

l. Awards. Ensure that every deserving Soldier is appropriately recognized. Recognize your good Soldiers at every possible opportunity. I will support any award submitted for a deserving Soldier. No late awards! Review them for completeness. Ensure awards contain all necessary supporting documents, such as hometown news release or personal data verification sheets. Enforce the following award turn-in standards (unless told otherwise):

(1) 10 days for an ARCOM/PURPLE HEART

(2) 20 days for an BRONZE STAR

(3) 30 days for an SILVER STAR or higher

m. Promotions/Re-enlistments. Make sure your PL/PSG and the Training Room NCO are tracking these. Coordinate with your PL/PSG to make sure the ceremony is prepared and resourced. Make a big deal of it – these Soldiers deserve to be recognized.

n. PCIs/PCCs. Ruthlessly enforce proper PCIs/PCCs in your Squad. Make sure your Soldiers are doing them to your standard. You cannot afford to be outside the wire without the proper equipment! You must put YOUR EYES and YOUR HANDS on every Soldier to make sure. Don't let them tell you they have it – make them SHOW YOU they have it. Make sure you know what you need across the squad. Follow the SOP as a checklist. Go line by line. Don't try to recall it all from memory – use the checklist. You will be too tired and focusing on too many other things to recall it all from memory. Inspecting doesn't just mean checking to make sure the piece of equipment is there – it means making sure it is fully operational (i.e., don't just have them hold up the NODs – turn them on and put your eyes through it to make sure they work properly).

o. CASEVAC. Always have a CCP. Ensure your PL/PSG and the ODA have accurate and timely casualty information, all reporting has been completed, and casualty tracking is updated. Ensure that our casualties receive expedient care and evacuation -- there must always be a CASEVAC plan. Make sure all Soldiers have casualty feeder cards on them, extra pressure bandages and tourniquets for self aid, and a laminated 9-line MEDEVAC request. Every time you leave the wire you should rehearse the 9-line with appropriate call signs and freqs as part of your PCIs/PCCs and rehearsals.

p. Re-Supply. Maintain a laminated LOGSTAT on your person so facilitate quick re-supply reporting to your ODA. Use the "stockpiles" to expedite re-supply when practical.

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q. Vehicle Recovery. Make sure you maintain security. Make sure that all vehicles have the ability to self-recover. Make sure you plan for this in every movement – what will you do?

r. Movements. Never miss an SP time - ever. Utilize REDCON status to ensure your Soldiers are at the same readiness level at the same time. Enforce proper short counts and shut down procedures with vehicles – that is how you maintain OPSEC and prevent the enemy from knowing your exact composition and strength. Believe me when I tell you that they are listening!

s. Recovery. Make recovery procedures and maintenance a part of your routine. As you come back from a mounted/dismounted patrol ensure you follow a checklist of items (i.e., priorities of work) to ensure all personnel, weapons, and equipment are accounted for; all reports are submitted; and all vehicles, weapons, and equipment are maintained and restocked as necessary.

13. SAFETY. This is a critical part of taking care of Soldiers. Some people think safety takes a break when in a combat environment. On the contrary, it's just as important to enforce safety in combat as it is in training. Make sure you conduct Risk Assessments prior to execution (when feasible). If your inner voice is telling you that something doesn't feel right, it probably isn't. If you make the call and stop something that doesn't appear to be within the safety parameters, I will back you 100%. Our jobs are inherently dangerous and we accept risk as part of our daily operations. In combat, audacity, boldness, surprise, and violence of action sometimes require certain risks to be taken. Just understand that calculated risks are acceptable; careless and un-necessary risks are not. Think through it before you act. Be careful when pushing the envelope. Take care of each other.

14. PROPERTY ACCOUNTABILITY & INVENTORIES. You will ensure that all monthly 100% Sensitive Items and 10% Cyclic inventories are completed in a timely manner. Account for your Soldiers and equipment at all times. Understand property accountability and learn the Company Command Supply Discipline program. The goal is for every piece of equipment within your platoon to be accounted for physically and on paper. Work with your PSG and the XO to ensure everything you own is hand-receipted, maintained in PBUSE, and/or reflected on a shortage annex. No piece of equipment should be un-documented.

a. Personnel Accountability. I expect you to maintain accurate accountability of our Soldiers, both on and off duty – I expect you to have 100% accountability each and every day. There is nothing more important than soldier accountability. Squad Leaders should provide a detailed accountability report to your ODA NCOIC and PSG each morning – by the numbers (# assigned, # present for duty, # on leave, # on profile, # on duty, etc.). Don't just report "all accounted for." That's a cop out. Know your Soldiers whereabouts by the numbers and report it as such. I don't want to hear a report of "all accounted for" and come to find out later that we really didn't know where a Soldier was.

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You must report where each Soldier is. Also maintain visibility of any Soldiers on TDY, on leave, or attached/detached.

15. TEAMWORK AND LOYALTY. Loyalty is one of the most important qualities in a man. Do not talk behind the backs of fellow NCOs and Soldiers. Do not allow your men to bad mouth ANY ONE or ANY UNIT. The Soldiers in Bravo Company are a team and you need to always work on building the team. The Soldier you work with every day may be the man you pulls your Squad/Team out of tight spot in combat. I will not tolerate the " I've been here longer, we - they " attitudes. Bond with your Soldiers and become a team focused on mission accomplishment. Seek your Platoon Sergeant's experience to make smart, well thought out decisions. Keep your Platoon Leader and Platoon Sergeant informed. Do not let them find out about something after the fact that they should have been briefed on by you. When you go to critical meetings I expect that you come back and let them know what went on (time and situation permitting).

16. INFORMATION SHARING & HISTORICAL RECORD KEEPING. When Soldiers write what they have seen and learned in training and in battle, they contribute to the knowledge of other Soldiers. Without a journal, many valuable lessons will be forgotten that will have to be relearned next time. This costs valuable time in training and lives in combat. When Soldiers do not systematically write lessons learned, they doom those who follow them to make the same mistakes.[xxvi] We must ensure that ideas to improve our unit and our mission are shared and distributed at large. Many times the lessons learned that are gained at the Squad/Team level can be realized across the Company (and even Battalion). We need to 'cross-fertilize' so that the Company/Battalion will be enriched from the 'bottom up,' not necessarily from the 'top down.[xxvii]

a. Keep a Squad/Team history file. Designate a Soldier as the Squad/Team historian and have him collect all photos, journals, and other memorabilia. These will be consolidated later at the Platoon and Company level. We owe it to our Soldiers to keep a record of their achievements, to tell our unit's story and pass on our lineage to posterity, and to ensure we can refer back to previous events for official inquires when required.

b. You should never go a day without talking with your ODA counterpart (and if possible, your PL/PSG) – you need to keep information constantly flowing between your leadership. I expect you to provide your candid advice on all matters and ask only that you keep them informed at all times.

17. PERSONAL. Live the Non-Commissioned Officer and Ranger Creeds. Maintain uncompromising standards of conduct, both on and off duty. It goes without saying - don't lie, cheat, steal, or encourage / permit it in any of your men. Remember that you are a non-commissioned officer and your conduct should be exemplary. You live in a glass house. Don't place yourself in a situation with your Soldiers that would compromise your position of authority. Keep your integrity standards at the highest level. Be honest without exception, up and down the chain of command. Get and know all SOPs and Policies. Not knowing the SOP or policy is no excuse. If there is not a written SOP that everyone knows, and adheres to - write one. Unless everyone knows and adheres by it, it

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is not an SOP. Suffer all the hardships your Soldiers are suffering, and revel in their successes. Don't forget to keep a good sense of humor and have fun in your job. This is the most exciting, challenging, and rewarding job in your career!

18. PROFESSIONAL SELF DEVELOPMENT. Leaders are made, not born. They are made by a life-long study of history, of the influence of leaders on it, and by absorbing the real-life teaching of role model leaders. Leaders are made by the day-to-day practice and fine tuning of leadership talents, because leading is an art as well as a science and best developed by application. Leaders are made by the steady acquisition of professional knowledge and by the development of 24-karat character during the course of a career. These traits foster inner strength, self-confidence, and the capacity to inspire by examples of professional, as well as personal, excellence.[xxviii] Make time beyond the normal duty day to advance yourself personally and professionally. Engross yourself in professional reading. Seek to attain greater knowledge and mastery of your trade. Look outside your traditional "comfort zone." Explore FMs outside the scope of your normal duties. Review other service doctrine, and civilian publications. Broaden your perspective. And use this knowledge to continuously improve your job performance and things within your Squad/Team. Fifteen minutes of professional reading in the evening adds up to a lot of knowledge over time. This reading needs to include technical reading and field manuals, cultural appreciation, mission-related updates and SITREPs, and leadership insights. Taking this time leads to success, to more interest, and to more success. Good, better, best – don't ever rest until your good becomes better, and your better becomes best.[xxix]

19. CLOSING REMARKS. On the battlefield, the difference between victory and defeat very likely will be the leadership of NCOs.[xxx] The effective noncommissioned officer is one who is looked upon by his Soldiers with professional respect, because he provides them with sound information on how to do the job, how to handle the equipment, how to perform tactically, how to cope with 'the system,' because he teaches them. Building on that confidence, those Soldiers will seek their Sergeant's counsel on matters more stressful and more personal. The resulting Soldier/Sergeant relationships are essential elements in building cohesive units- units that will hang together and perform aggressively and successfully on the battlefield.[xxxi] It is difficult to be a good Noncommissioned Officer, but your Soldiers will fight for you if they believe that the best chance for survival for themselves and their buddies is to do their job as part of a team.[xxxii] Your responsibility is to prepare your Soldiers for combat, lead them to victory, and bring them all home. Your job is never finished as long as there is one more technique to be learned or one more Soldier to be trained. Be hard, be demanding, and LEAD THE WAY.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Commanding

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AFZH-INN-B
SUBJECT: Village Stability Operations Enduring Guidance – OEF 2012

APPENDIX 1: The NCO Creed

No one is more professional than I. I am a Noncommissioned Officer, a leader of soldiers. As a Noncommissioned Officer, I realize that I am a member of a time honored corps, which is known as "The Backbone of the Army". I am proud of the Corps of Noncommissioned Officers and will at all times conduct myself so as to bring credit upon the Corps, the Military Service and my country regardless of the situation in which I find myself. I will not use my grade or position to attain pleasure, profit, or personal safety.

Competence is my watchword. My two basic responsibilities will always be uppermost in my mind—accomplishment of my mission and the welfare of my soldiers. I will strive to remain technically and tactically proficient. I am aware of my role as a Noncommissioned Officer. I will fulfill my responsibilities inherent in that role. All soldiers are entitled to outstanding leadership; I will provide that leadership. I know my soldiers and I will always place their needs above my own. I will communicate consistently with my soldiers and never leave them uninformed. I will be fair and impartial when recommending both rewards and punishment.

Officers of my unit will have maximum time to accomplish their duties; they will not have to accomplish mine. I will earn their respect and confidence as well as that of my soldiers. I will be loyal to those with whom I serve; seniors, peers, and subordinates alike. I will exercise initiative by taking appropriate action in the absence of orders. I will not compromise my integrity, nor my moral courage. I will not forget, nor will I allow my comrades to forget that we are professionals, Noncommissioned Officers, leaders!

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SUBJECT: Village Stability Operations Enduring Guidance – OEF 2012

APPENDIX 2: The Ranger Creed

Recognizing that I volunteered as a ranger, fully knowing the hazards of my chosen profession, I will always endeavor to uphold the prestige, honor, and high esprit de corps of my ranger regiment.

Acknowledging the fact that a ranger is a more elite soldier, who arrives at the cutting edge of battle by land, sea, or air, I accept the fact that as a ranger, my country expects me to move further, faster, and fight harder than any other soldier.

Never shall I fail my comrades. I will always keep myself mentally alert, physically strong, and morally straight, and I will shoulder more than my share of the task, whatever it may be, one hundred percent and then some.

Gallantly will I show the world that I am a specially selected and well trained soldier. My courtesy to superior officers, neatness of dress, and care of equipment shall set the example for others to follow.

Energetically will I meet the enemies of my country. I shall defeat them on the field of battle for I am better trained and will fight with all my might. Surrender is not a ranger word. I will never leave a fallen comrade to fall into the hands of the enemy and under no circumstances will I ever embarrass my country.

Readily will I display the intestinal fortitude required to fight on to the ranger objective and complete the mission, though I be the lone survivor.

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APPENDIX 3: 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regimental History

The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment traces its lineage to when it was first constituted in June 1784 as a company of the First American Regiment. The unit was re-designated in September 1789 as a company of the Regiment of Infantry, and again in March 1791 as a company of the 1st Infantry. The unit first participated in the War of 1812 at the battles of Lundy Lane and Chippewa. The consolidation of companies, in May 1816, from the 1st, 5th, 17th, 19th, and 28th Infantry Regiments formed Company B, 3rd Infantry.

Company B fought with the Regiment during the Mexican War, and distinguished itself in the battles of Palo Alto, Churubusco, and Chapultepec. Their gallantry during these battles was exemplified when Army commander, major General Scott, in what is perhaps the greatest praise he could have given, is said to have turned to his staff as the 3rd Infantry passed in a victory parade in Mexico City and said, "Gentleman take off your hats to The Old Guard of the Army." His remark gave the Regiment its modern and now official name. The Regiment next campaigned in the American West during the Indian Wars, where Company B saw action against the Seminoles, Comanche and the Nez Perce.

When the American Civil War began, the 3rd Regiment was again called into action. As a member of Syke's Regulars, the Regiment fought at the First Battle of Bull Run as a part of 1st Brigade, 2nd Division. After distinguishing itself in the first conflict of the war, the 3rd Regiment went on to fight in eleven other major conflicts until the end of the war in 1865.

During the war with Spain, the 3rd Regiment distinguished itself during the Battle of Santiago. At the turn of the century, the 3rd Regiment found itself fighting in the Philippine insurrection. The men of the 3rd Regiment were cited for their valorous actions in the Battles of Malolos, San Isidro, and Luzon.

After multiple reassignments at Fort Snelling, Minnesota between the 6th and 7th Divisions between 1923 and 1939 the unit was inactivated in June 1941 at Fort Leonard Wood, Missouri. In July 1957 B Company was activated and re-designated as Headquarters and Headquarters Company, 2nd Battle Group, 3rd Infantry.

On 1 June 1966, 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry Regiment was activated again at Fort Benning, Georgia. In June 1966, 2-3 Infantry was assigned to the 199th Light Infantry Brigade and deployed to Vietnam. 2nd Battalion operated in the Bein Hoa Province from 1967 to 1968 and throughout he Long Binh province until 1969. The battalion was sited for valor for its actions in Saigon-Long Binh and through their actions in both the Tet and Sanctuary counter offensives. The 2nd Battalion, 3rd Infantry was inactivated on 15 October 1970 at Fort Benning, Georgia.

The Battalion was reactivated on 16 March 2001, at Fort Lewis, WA and deployed in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom I and II. The Regiment served in Balad, Iraq from 7 December 2003 to 22 January 2004. It then moved to eastern Mosul, Iraq on 23 January 2004, as part of 3rd Brigade, 2 IN DIV which replaced the 101st ABN DIV. The Regiment participated in numerous raids and patrols which captured or killed numerous terrorists and provided a much safer Area of Operation while facilitating the rebuilding of Mosul. The Regiment also participated in operations in Samarra, Najaf, Baghdad, and Tall Afar; it was the choice of force in theater.

The Regiment was relieved in October 2004 and sent back to Fort Lewis, WA where a new group of Patriots consolidated, reorganized and began the difficult road to prepare for future combat operations. The Battalion was trained and certified for combat in February 2006 after completing a tour at the National Training Center at Fort Irwin, California. 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division was ordered to deploy in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom in June 2006. The Patriots deployed in June 2006 and were assigned to Multinational Division North, 25th Infantry Division in the city of Mosul with the Headquarters based at Forward Operating Base Marez. In December 2006 the Patriots were assigned to Multinational Division Baghdad, 1st Cavalry Division in the capital city of Baghdad. The Battalion conducted combat operations throughout Iraq , with a focus on Baghdad and a home station at Camp Striker which is part of the Victory

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Base Complex at the Baghdad International Airport (BIAP). The Battalion's one year tour was extended to 15 months in April 2007 as part of the "Iraq Surge Plan"

In 2009 the Battalion was once again called on by the nation for a third deployment in support of Operation Iraqi Freedom. 3rd Brigade, 2nd Infantry Division was ordered to deploy in August 2009. The Patriots deployed to Iraq and were assigned to Multinational Division North, 25th Infantry Division in Diyala Province. The Patriots were officially called Task Force Patriots and were based at Forward Operating Base Normandy. Its main area of operation was in the Muqdadiyah Qa'daa and surrounding cities. Throughout the 10 month tour of duty, the Patriots refurbished the predominant market in Eastern Iraq, continued to combat insurgents, and trained Iraqi Policemen and Soldiers. Fittingly, the Patriots, who were called to battle enemy hotspots throughout the first two Iraq tours, closed out their third by transferring complete responsibility of security for the last former Al Qaeda stronghold over to Iraqi authorities on 25 May 2010. The Patriots were extremely successful in their mission, bringing security and stability to a volatile region. Their efforts will forever have a lasting impact on the sovereignty of Iraq and on America's partnership with them for years to come.

Famous Old Guardsmen

William H. Harrison - Major General-War of 1812; 9th President of the US (1841)
Zachary Taylor - Major General-War with Mexico; 12th President of the United States (1849-50)
GEN Matthew Ridgeway - Supreme Allied Commander, Europe (1952-1953); Army Chief of Staff (1953-55)
GEN Harold K. Johnson- Commandant-Command & General Staff College (1960-63); Army Chief of Staff (1964-68)
GEN James Van Fleet-Commander UN Forces-Korean and Eighth Army Commander (1951-53)
GEN Walter Krueger-Commander-Third Army (1941-43); Commander-Sixth Army (1943-46)
GEN Hap Arnold-only person to served as General of the Army (1944-46) & General of the Air Force (1949)
Patrick J. Hurley-Secretary of War (1929-33); US Ambassador to China (1944-45)
MG George Sykes– Commander-V Corps (1863-64)
Bvt BG Benjamin Bonneville-Explorer of Oregon Trail (1832-35)
BG Henry Leavenworth-Explorer and founder of Ft. Leavenworth, KS (1814-34)
CPT Merriweather Lewis-Lewis & Clark Expedition of Louisiana Territory (1804-06)
BG Zebulon Pike-Explorer of American Southwest (1806-07)

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SUBJECT: Village Stability Operations Enduring Guidance – OEF 2012

APPENDIX 4: Endnotes

The following citations apply where annotated.

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[i] Gen Wickham, p. 27
[ii] FM 22-103, 1987, p. 17
[iii] Gen Wickham, p. 279
[iv] FM 22-100, 1983, p. 87
[v] Gen Wickham, p. 304
[vi] Gen Wickham, p. 280
[vii] FM 22-100, 1990, p. 30
[viii] Gen Wickham, pp. 150,190
[ix] FM 22-100, 1983, p. 91
[x] FM 22-100, 1990, p. 31
[xi] FM 22-100, 1983, p. 105
[xii] (b)(3), (b)(6), Jan 27, 1994
[xiii] (b)(3), (b)(6) NCO Journal, Winter 1995, p. 7
[xiv] FM 22-102, 1987, p. 7
[xv] Gen Wickham.
[xvi] Gen. Wickham, p.286.
[xvii] Gen. Wickham, p.303.
[xviii] Gen. Wickham, p.144.
[xix] Gen Wickham, p. 47
[xx] FM 22-100, 1983, p. 206
[xxi] (b)(3), (b)(6)
[xxii] Gen Abrams, quoted by Gen Wickham, p. 193
[xxiii] Gen Meyer, p. 123
[xxiv] FM 101-1, 1951, p. 35
[xxv] Gen Wickham, p. 284
[xxvi] FM 22-100, 1983, pp. 266,267
[xxvii] Gen Wickham, p. 65
[xxviii] Gen Wickham, p. 285
[xxix] (b)(3), (b)(6) 8th Postal Detachment
[xxx] Gen Wickham, p. 75
[xxxi] Gen Wickham, p. 75
[xxxii] FM 22-100, 1983, p. 78

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CJSOTF-(b)(6) CMD DCO

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, March 20, 2012 00:01
To: CJSOTF-(b)(6) CMD DCO
Cc: CJSOTF-(b)(6) CMD DCO; (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: SOTF-S RSOI schedule for 2-3 IN ~~(CONFIDENTIAL)~~

Importance: High

Follow Up Flag: Follow up
Flag Status: Flagged

Sir-

Below is the RSOI schedule/training provided to 2-3 IN by SOTF-S (courtesy of (b)(3), (b)(6)).

Day 1 (Academics Training):
S1- in-processing
JAG- tactical directives, night raids, ROE, EOF
S3- VSO Methodology
MID- Intel overview
S4- Contracting classes

Day 2 (Round-robin):
MATV Training
RG Training
Commo Training
CROWS/Weapons Training

Day 3 (Round-robin continued):
MATV Training
RG Training
Commo Training
CROWS/Weapons Training

Day 4
Confirmed zero's on all assigned weapons systems

Day 5
Paladin IED training

Additional SOF-specific training was conducted on-site at VSO locations, to include:
- Mortar, crew-served weapons, medical, detailed commo, VSO methodology (site-specific), detailed intel brief (site-specific)

Let me know if you need anything else.

v/r
(b)(3), (b)(6)

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PRE-NTC (20 Day Train-up)

- CIED Training with WTA (Awareness/Recognition/TTPs) - 2 days
- COIST MTT (40 Hrs, 17 B Co pax) - provided by Ft. Huachuca Instructors
- Joint Expeditionary Team (3 days) - Cultural Awareness, CIED, Patrolling, Pashtunwali
- Former 1st Group CSM - Population Engagement (2hrs)
- Round Robin Company Training (Cultural Awareness, Communications, KLEs, Tactical Questioning
- Media Awareness Training - Reporter from "The Ranger"

POST-NTC (Pre-Deployment Train up)

- Team Leader Course (5 days) - Classroom and Hands On
- Machine Gunners Course (3 days)- Classroom and Range time
- PMI/BRM (zero, qual, fam fire - alt firing positions) - (2 days - day/night)
- ARM (long range, alt fire positions, stress shoot) (2 days - day/night)
- Convoy Operations and VSP Hardening - Taught by US Secret Service
- Squad STX Lanes (4 days) - 6 lanes focused on Battle Drills
- CFF/CAS Training - Key Ldrs

PRE-DEPLOYMENT SQUAD/TM LDR COUNSELING FOCUS

- Written Counseling/60 minute brief with all SLs/TLs - Duties and Expectations of a Leader (Serving Honorably, Standards & Discipline, Tng, Maint, Admin, etc.)
- Verbal Counseling with PLs, XO, 1SG - Building Rapport with an ODA, Leader Checks, Reporting, Combat Leadership
- Enduring focus - taking care of our men, checking on their behavioral/emotional/mental health

RSOI schedule when we arrived at KAF:

1. MATV Rollover training (Completed at Manas)
2. Day 1- SOTF-South In-brief, in-processing, escalation of force, ROE, Law of War and cultural awareness briefings (0800-1300)
3. Day 2-Zero Range (1000-1300)/ CIED Training (1400-1600)
4. Day 3, 4, 5- RG31, RG33, MATV drivers training (0800-1200). Night drivers training (1800-2000)
5. Day 3,4,5- Crows class (0800-1200). NAV Comm Class (1300-1600)

On days 3,4, and 5 B Co Soldiers were split into groups. **Group #1** would attend Drivers training on Day 3 and CROWS and NAV Comm class on Day 4. **Group #2** would attend CROWS and Nav Comms class on Day 3, have the day off on Day 4 and conduct drivers training on Day 5. **Group #3** would have Day 3 off, attend drivers training on Day 4 and attend CROWS and Nav Comm class on Day 5.

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A 18 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6), CAT I Interpreter, regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) on 11 April 2012 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the incident at VSP Belambai. (b)(6) (b)(6) is a local national interpreter employed by International Management Services (IMS). He worked at VSP Belambai for one year with ODA (b)(1)1.4a and ODA (b)(1)1.4a before this interview. The scope of his duties included interpreting Pashtu and Dari language for US personnel communicating with ANSF members and local Afghans. (b)(6) has been employed as a local national interpreter for ten years.

2. He said that he interacted with ODA members on a daily basis, and that he and the local Afghans were treated very well. (b)(6) said that he attended most of the shuras that ODA (b)(1)1.4a held at VSP Talukan, VSP Belambai and the weekly security shura at the Panjwa'i District Center. He also remembered numerous representatives from the surrounding villages attending the Belambai shuras. He said that he was on leave during the month of January, 2012.

3. When asked about SSG Bales, (b)(6) stated that he did not meet him until later in December because he had been working at the Panjwa'i District Center issuing I.D. cards. Once he returned to VSP Belambai, he said that he interacted regularly with SSG Bales. (b)(6) (b)(6) recalled helping SSG Bales coordinate with the ANCOP unit that was previously located at the Belambai Makhtab, which is directly across Route Charlottestown from the VSP gate. He also recalled that ODA (b)(1)1.4a had "some issues' with the ANCOP at the Makhtab. He said that ODA (b)(1)1.4a did not like the ANCOP troops, who he claimed were living in very bad conditions. He said that the ANCOP team constantly asked the ODA for supplies of food and water.

4. The last interaction he had with Bales was on 10 March 2012, the day before the killings in Alikozai and Naji Bien occurred. During his tenure, he does not remember SSG Bales

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USFOR-A
SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6) CAT I Interpreter, regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

attending shuras with the locals. He said that he was not aware of the reported altercation between SSG Bales and a local national truck driver.

5. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

18 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with (b)(6), CAT I Interpreter, regarding his observations and experience while working on VSP Belambai.

1. BG Rick Waddell, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(6) on 11 April 2012 as part of the AR 15-6 Investigation into the incident at VSP Belambai. (b)(6) stated that he arrived at VSP Belmabai O/A 1 March 2012 where he worked as a local national interpreter employed by International Management Services (IMS). His responsibilities included interpreting the Pashtu and Dari languages for ODA personnel at VSP Belambai. The scope of his duties included interpreting dialogue between the US personnel, ANA Soldiers and local Afghans. (b)(6) has been employed by IMS since 2 March, 2009.

2. (b)(6) stated that he worked at VSP Belambai for approximately one month before this interview. He remembered meeting SSG Bales shortly after he arrived at the VSP. He said that he interacted with ODA members on a daily basis, but never left the VSP on missions. With one exception, he reported being treated well by the US personnel on the base, and believed that the ODA treated the ANA well also. The only negative interaction he reported involved (b)(3), (b)(6) one of the (b)(3), (b)(6) on ODA (b)(1)1.4a In this case, he said that (b)(3), (b)(6) pulled out his pistol and, gesturing with the pistol, told him that he was going to use it to kill Afghans. Although (b)(6) believed that (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was joking at the time, this rhetoric bothered him. He said that (b)(3), (b)(6) would make comments to him like, "I hate Afghans … I will kill them one-by-one." He did not recall (b)(3), (b)(6) making these comments to other Afghans, however.

3. (b)(6) said that the ODA always had a plan for interacting with local Afghans which focused on building support for the Afghan Local Police (ALP) program. Immediately following the IED incident on 5 March, (b)(6) accompanied the Quick Reaction Force (QRF) to the site to interpret for the ODA. During this incident, he witnessed the ODA Team Leader, (b)(3), (b)(6) speaking to the local villagers about supporting the government. When asked about the use of alcohol or controlled substances on the VSP, he stated that he did not see anything like that.

4. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

13 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Conversation with BG Marty Schweitzer (RC-S DCG-O) regarding KLE/Consequence Management following the incident in Belambai, Panjwai on 11 March 2012

1. BG Rick Waddell met with BG Marty Schweitzer on 3 April 2012 to discuss the role of RC-S in Key Leader Engagements (KLE) and consequence management following the 11 March incident at Belambai. A summary of talking points from this meeting follows.

2. Key Leader Engagements.

a. The RC-S command team worked in conjunction with the command team of IJC to reach out to their habitual partners. The Commander of RC-S contacted Asadullah Khalid and Qayoom Karzai. The DCO of RC-S spoke with the commander of 205th ANA Corps, and other ANSF leaders. The message communicated to their Afghan counterparts was that the US would conduct a full investigation and take action to hold people accountable. The main focus of the effort resided at the brigade and battalion level, including extensive involvement by the SOTF-S commander.

3. Use of Conventional Infantry Units in the VSO Mission.

a. BG Schweitzer was involved in the preparation and deployment of the first conventional infantry battalion employed in support of the VSO mission. According to him, the command-and-control relationships are clearly spelled out in the orders from FORSCOM to the deploying unit, and in the orders from ISF and/or CFSOCC-S for employment of the units.

b. BG Schweitzer made contact with the G3/5/7 officer at FORSCOM to request a copy of the FORSCOM order, and provided his recollection of the other orders and training requirements. On the latter, his recollection was that the orders specified that the units down to squad level were to train on basic infantry combat tasks, since those were the tasks to be executed down to squad level at VSP sites.

c. In general, the infantry units were to be OPCON to CJSOTF-A. Additionally, UCMJ authority over these OPCON infantry battalion units is specified in the orders. The CJSOTF-A units have no command-and-control relationship with the local Battle Space Owners; however, the CJSOTF-A units are specified as having a supporting-to-supported relationship with the RCs, which means that the SOTFs must coordinate targeting to support the RC commander's priorities. In practice, the RCs and subordinate units work with the SOTFs in their respective battle space to deconflict missions.

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4. The POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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Pages 480 through 482 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(6)

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UNITED STATES CENTRAL COMMAND
OFFICE OF THE COMMANDER
7115 SOUTH BOUNDARY BOULEVARD
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5101

MAR 13 2006

CCJA

GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1B (GO-1B)*

TITLE: Prohibited Activities for U.S. Department of Defense Personnel Present within the United States Central Command (USCENTCOM) Area of Responsibility (AOR).

PURPOSE: To identify and regulate conduct that is prejudicial to the maintenance of good order and discipline of forces in the USCENTCOM AOR.

AUTHORITY: Title 10, United States Code, Section 164(c) and the Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), Title 10, United States Code, Sections 801-940.

APPLICABILITY: This General Order is applicable to all United States military personnel, and to all civilians, including contingency contractor personnel (as defined in DOD Instruction 3020.41, dated October 3, 2005), serving with, employed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States, while present in the USCENTCOM AOR *except for* personnel assigned to: Defense Attaché Offices; United States Marine Corps Security Detachments; sensitive intelligence and counterintelligence activities that are conducted under the direction and control of the Chief of Mission/Chief of Station; or other United States Government agencies and departments.

1. **STATEMENT OF MILITARY PURPOSE AND NECESSITY:** Current operations and deployments place United States Armed Forces within USCENTCOM AOR countries whose local laws and customs may prohibit or restrict various activities which are generally permissible in western societies. Adhering to restrictions upon such activities is essential to preserving U.S./host nation relations and ensuring the success of combined operations between U.S. and friendly forces. In addition, the high operational tempo combined with often-hazardous duty faced by U.S. forces in the region make it prudent to restrict certain activities in order to maintain good order and discipline and ensure optimum force readiness.

* This General Order supersedes General Order Number 1A, dated 19 December 2000 (See Paragraph 7)

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GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1B (GO-1B)

2. **PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES:**

a. Purchase, possession, use, or sale of privately owned firearms, ammunition, explosives, or the introduction of these items into the USCENTCOM AOR.

b. Entrance into a Mosque or other site of Islamic religious significance by non-Moslems unless directed to do so by military authorities, required by military necessity, or as part of an official tour conducted with the approval of military authorities and the host nation. This provision may be made more restrictive by Commanders when the local security situation warrants.

c. Introduction, purchase, possession, sale, transfer, manufacture or consumption of any alcoholic beverage within the countries of Kuwait, Saudi Arabia, Afghanistan, Pakistan, and Iraq. In all other countries of the USCENTCOM AOR, U.S. military and civilian personnel will conform to their respective component restrictions on alcohol, and maintain appropriate deportment by respecting host-nation laws and customs. In order to maintain good order and discipline and ensure optimum readiness, in all locations where alcohol is not prohibited by this General Order, Commanders and unit chiefs are directed to exercise discretion and good judgment in promulgating and enforcing appropriate guidelines and restrictions. Guidelines should recognize that in some countries although alcohol consumption may be legal within certain facilities such as hotels, personnel, upon any consumption, may be presumed to be under the influence upon leaving the facility or upon operating a motor vehicle (e.g., Qatar, UAE),. Alcohol consumption guidelines and restrictions should be regularly reviewed to ensure that they are commensurate with current or foreseen operations, threats and host country actions.

d. Introduction, purchase, possession, use, sale, transfer, manufacture, or consumption of any controlled substances. Prescription drugs must be accompanied by the original prescription label which identifies the prescribing medical facility or authority.

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GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1B (GO-1B)

PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES (Continued)

e. Introduction, purchase, possession, transfer, sale, creation, or display of any pornographic or sexually explicit photograph, video tapes or CDs, movie, drawing, book, magazine, or similar representation. The prohibitions contained in this subparagraph shall not apply to AFRTS broadcasts and commercial videotapes distributed and/or displayed through AAFES or MWR outlets located within the USCENTCOM AOR. This prohibition also shall not apply within the areas exclusively under the jurisdiction of the United States, such as aboard United States Government vessels and aircraft, which shall remain subject to service rules.

f. Photographing or filming detainees or human casualties, as well as the possession, distribution, transfer, or posting, whether electronically or physically, of visual images depicting detainees or human casualties, except as required for official duties. "Human Casualties" are defined as dead, wounded or injured human beings, to include separated body parts, organs and biological material, resulting from either combat or non-combat activities. This prohibition does not apply to the possession of such visual images acquired from open media sources (e.g., magazines and newspapers), nor is the distribution of these unaltered images, subject to copyright markings or notices. Additionally, possession and distribution of open media source images is not prohibited if required for official duties. Finally, with their express consent, the photographing and possession of images of wounded personnel while within medical facilities and during periods of recovery is also not prohibited.

g. Gambling of any kind, including sports pools, lotteries and raffles, unless permitted by host-nation laws and applicable service component regulations.

h. Removing, possessing, selling, defacing or destroying archeological artifacts or national treasures. (See also 2.m.(3) below).

i. Selling, bartering or exchanging any currency other than at the official host-nation exchange rate.

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GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1B (GO-1B)

PROHIBITED ACTIVITIES (Continued)

j. Adopting as pets or mascots, caring for, or feeding any type of domestic or wild animal.

k. Proselytizing of any religion, faith or practice.

l. Taking or retaining of public or private property of an enemy or former enemy, except as granted by applicable USCENTCOM waivers and as noted below:

(1) Individual War Souvenirs may only be acquired if specifically authorized by USCENTCOM. Absent such express authorization, no weapon, munitions, or military article of equipment obtained or acquired by any means other than official issue may be retained for personal use or shipped out of the USCENTCOM AOR for personal retention.

(2) Private or public property may be seized during exercises or operations only on order of the Commander, when based on military necessity.

(a) Private property will be collected, processed, secured and stored for later return to the lawful owner. The wrongful taking of private property, even temporarily, is a violation of Article 121, Uniform Code of Military Justice.

(b) Public property lawfully seized by U.S. Armed Forces is the property of the United States. The wrongful retention of such property is a violation of Article 108, Uniform Code of Military Justice. Unit retention of historical artifacts must be specifically approved by USCENTCOM.

(3) This prohibition on acquiring the property of an enemy or former enemy applies to enemy war materiel even if such materiel could be lawfully purchased through commercial or private means. Such items can only be acquired as Individual War Souvenirs and then only to the extent specifically authorized. This prohibition does not preclude the lawful acquisition of other items as tourist souvenirs if such items can be legally imported into the United States.

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GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1B (GO-1B)

3. **PUNITIVE ORDER:** Paragraph 2 of this General Order is punitive. Persons subject to the UCMJ may be punished thereunder. Civilians serving with, employed by, or accompanying the Armed Forces of the United States in the USCENTCOM AOR may face criminal prosecution or adverse administrative action for violation of this General Order. In the case of contingency contractors, DOD Instruction 3020.41, dated October 3, 2005, provides guidance on administrative actions.

4. **INDIVIDUAL DUTY:** All persons to whom this General Order is applicable are charged with the individual responsibility to know and understand the prohibitions contained herein. All such persons are further charged with the responsibility to become familiar with and respect the laws, regulations, and customs of their host nation insofar as they do not interfere with the execution of their official duties. Acts of disrespect or violations of host nation laws, regulations and customs may be punished under applicable criminal statutes and administrative regulations.

5. **UNIT COMMANDER RESPONSIBILITY:** Commanders, Security Assistance Office Chiefs, and military and civilian supervisors are charged with ensuring that ALL PERSONNEL are briefed on the prohibitions and requirements of this General Order. Commanders may further restrict their forces as they deem necessary.

6. **CONFISCATION OF OFFENDING ARTICLES:** Items determined to violate this General Order may be considered contraband by command or law enforcement authorities if found in the USCENTCOM AOR. Before destruction of contraband, Commanders or law enforcement personnel will coordinate with their servicing judge advocate. Military customs and other pre-clearance officials will enforce this General Order in their inspections of personnel prior to departure from the AOR and return to CONUS.

7. **EFFECTIVE DATE:** This General Order is effective immediately. GO-1A, dated 19 Dec 00, as amended on 30 Nov 01 and 9 Aug 03, and all waivers granted pursuant to GO-1A, are hereby rescinded and superseded. USCENTCOM Policy Memo

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GENERAL ORDER NUMBER 1B (GO-1B)

Prohibiting Photographing or Filming Detainees or Human Casualties or Possessing, Distributing, or Posting Visual Images Depicting Human Casualties, dated 21 Oct 2005, is hereby rescinded and superseded.

8. **EXPIRATION:** This General Order will expire when rescinded by the Commander, USCENTCOM, or higher authority.

9. **WAIVER AUTHORITY:** Authority to waive or modify the prohibitions of Paragraph 2 of this General Order is hereby delegated to the Deputy Commander, USCENTCOM and to the Chief of Staff, USCENTCOM. No further delegation is authorized.

JOHN P. ABIZAID
General, USA

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A-SJA (12-008)

22 MAR 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Ricky L. Waddell

SUBJECT: AR 15-6 Investigating Officer Appointment Order – Alleged Shooting of Afghan Civilians Outside VSP Belambai, Afghanistan

1. You are hereby appointed per Army Regulation (AR) 15-6, Chapter 2, *Procedures for Investigating Officers and Boards of Officers*, to conduct an informal investigation into the facts and circumstances surrounding the allegations that SSG Robert Bales shot Afghan civilians outside Village Stability Platform (VSP) Belambai, Afghanistan, on 11 March 2012. This investigation is your primary mission until you tender your completed findings and recommendations to me. Complete your report NLT 30 days from your date of appointment. If you need an extension, submit requests to me through the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate, USFOR-A. Unless I release you sooner, your appointment remains in effect until you complete the investigation and I determine that no further investigation is required.

a. CFSOCC-A will identify a Deputy Investigating Officer to assist you with your investigation. You will also have a dedicated paralegal to assist you with your investigation. You may request the appointment of additional personnel to assist you in your investigation. You should coordinate their appointment through your legal advisor.

b. (b)(3), (b)(6) is hereby appointed as your legal advisor and a member of the investigative team. You will consult with (b)(3), (b)(6) before making any substantive efforts regarding your investigation. Advisor's e-mail address is (b)(3), (b)(6) and he can be reached at DSN (b)(6)

2. The scope of your investigation is as broad as necessary. However, you will at a minimum determine the following:

a. What was the command climate at VSP Belambai at the time of the incident? What was SSG Bales' chain of command? How well did they know him? How much interaction did they have with him? For chain of command located off of VSP Belambai, how frequently did the chain of command visit and make meaningful contact with SSG Bales and the element he was part of?

b. How long had SSG Bales been in Afghanistan? Had he been at any other locations? How long had SSG Bales been at VSP Belambai? What unit was he a part of? What was the mission of SSG Bales' unit? What was SSG Bales' relationship to the Special Operations unit operating out of VSP Belambai? How long had the ODA been at the location? What other units were attached to the VSP and how long had they been there?

c. Were there any warning signs that SSG Bales might engage in this behavior and, if so, what action was taken? Specifically, were there any recent incidents in SSG Bales' personal or professional life that may have triggered his violent behavior? If so, what were those

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incidents, who knew about them, and what action was taken in response to awareness of these incidents?

d. Did SSG Bales have any previous interaction/familiarity with the local nationals in the area? Had he attended any Shuras in the villages? What types of missions did SSG Bales participate in and how many missions had he been on?

e. How was SSG Bales able to leave VSP Belambai by himself? What access did SSG Bales have to the weapons he used? How did he get them? What were the security procedures and battle rhythm at the VSP? How could a Soldier depart and return without notice? Were guard mount and stand-to procedures sufficient?

f. What are the personnel and weapons accountability procedures at VSP Belambai? When did personnel at VSP Belambai first notice that SSG Bales was missing? When was the chain of command first notified? What procedures did the chain of command take to regain accountability of SSG Bales?

g. What was his duty position? What were his responsibilities at the VSP? What type of training did SSG Bales incur leading to this deployment? Did he deploy as a member of a unit or as an individual augmentee? At the time of the incident, was he serving with personnel with whom he deployed? In the train-up for deployment, did SSG Bales show any warnings about his future behavior? Did he exhibit any concerns about his upcoming deployment?

h. After the incident, what Key Leader Engagements have occurred with the local leadership concerning the incident? What other consequence management activities have been taken with the local leadership/population concerning the incident? Your recommendations shall include any additional consequence management activities you determine appropriate concerning this incident.

i. What was the medical response provided by US and/or NATO personnel concerning the victims of this incident? Was the medical response adequate? If not, what improvements should be made?

j. Any other matters pertaining to this incident you deem relevant.

3. There is an ongoing criminal investigation into this incident. The criminal investigation takes priority and your investigation will not interfere with the criminal investigation in any way. If you have any questions about potentially interfering with the ongoing criminal investigation, you will consult with your legal advisor. You and your legal advisor will consult with Criminal Investigation Division (CID) before conducting any investigative activity to ensure your investigation does not interfere with CID.

4. This incident is a matter of significant unrest and concern for the Afghan population. You will ensure that your investigation is conducted with great care toward respecting Afghan culture. Further, you will ensure that you conduct your investigation with appropriate security. To that end, you will consult with the Battle Space Owner through the RC-S legal office to ensure that conditions are safe for investigative activity in the region. Your

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CFSOCC-A Deputy IO will assist you with coordinating with the VSP personnel to ensure that you have adequate security to conduct your investigation.

5. You are to conduct this investigation using the procedures outlined in Chapter 3, AR 15-6. No individual has been named as a respondent at this time. All witnesses will be sworn before their interview. You are to document thoroughly all witness interviews in writing on a DA Form 2823 (Sworn Statement). You will interview all witnesses in person, if practical. Reduce any oral statements to memorandums for record.

6. If, in the course of your investigation, you come to reasonably suspect that a person committed criminal conduct, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ (right against self-incrimination, outlined in DA Form 3881 warnings), or the Fifth Amendment, as appropriate. Witness waivers of their Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights will be documented on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate). In addition, you may need to provide a witness with a Privacy Act statement before you solicit any personal information. You are strongly encouraged to consult your legal advisor in the event you suspect someone of an offense or if you have questions regarding these procedures. Additionally, should you determine in the context of your investigation that a Soldiers' status has changed from favorable to unfavorable, as defined in AR 600-8-2, Suspension of Favorable Actions (FLAGS), coordinate with the appropriate officials to initiate a FLAG.

7. You may interview and examine documents of personnel senior to you. If, in the course of your investigation, you determine that the investigation will require you to examine the conduct or performance of duty of a service member senior to you, or to which you have a moral or ethical conflict, then you shall report that fact to your legal advisor immediately.

8. From the evidence, and in concert with your legal advisor, you will make findings and recommendations.

a. Findings will be as thorough as necessary to fully capture the facts and circumstances surrounding the scope of this investigation. You have the discretion to use any of the following methods: examination of relevant documents; visiting relevant locations; evaluating procedures; conducting inventories; taking pictures; and interviewing witnesses, documenting all in writing or otherwise. You are not limited to these means of investigation, and your legal advisor may provide you with additional guidance.

b. In developing your recommendations, ensure that your findings support your recommendations. Develop in your recommendations any courses of action that seem appropriate to resolve any issues or problems raised by your findings, and recommend whether judicial or non-judicial proceedings under the Uniform Code of Military Justice, or further investigations are warranted.

9. Your final report will include a table of contents, and all exhibits will be tabbed. Submit the completed report, along with the completed DA Form 1574, to the Office of the Staff Judge Advocate (OSJA), USFOR-A, for a legal review immediately following completion of your investigation. Submit any request for delay or modification of the scope of your investigation to the OSJA, USFOR-A, through your legal advisor. In assembling your report, ensure that you also include the following:

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a. This memorandum of appointment.

b. An executive summary (classified and unclassified versions).

c. An index of exhibits and all exhibits labeled in successive order.

d. A chronology of your investigation.

e. A list of all people interviewed.

f. Proper classification markings for each paragraph, page, and exhibit.

10. To the extent practical, use unclassified materials in your report.

11. This appointment authorizes the investigating officer and his team priority 1 travel status throughout the AOR to conduct the investigation.

12. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6) USFOR-A, Deputy Staff Judge Advocate at SVOIP (b)(6)

JOHN R. ALLEN
General, United States Marine Corps
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces - Afghanistan

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/12	1832	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I. (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank, unit, and duty assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Since (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Please detail your prior combat tours.
A: Nov 2003-Oct 2004, Iraq- 3rd BDE / 2ID (Assistant S-3 / Commander, B Troop 1/14 CAV)
Q: Please generally describe your duties as TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(6)

Q: How would you describe your Commander's leadership style?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: In your case, where do you put the welfare of soldiers in your priorities?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 15 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Let me very specific about this. Over the last four months since we have been at FOB Warrior, the welfare of soldiers has been my foremost concern in the construction and the development of the camp. Specifically to get stuff like billeting, dining facilities, gym facilities, latrine facilities, shower facilities, all of those things. That has been my primary thing, almost to the detriment of other things.

Q: Do you believe that senior leaders have a sense of entitlement over junior soldiers?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you think the E-8 and above latrine issue impacted the perception of the command climate from the Private on up?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 15 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Was the issue the way the XO made the point to the Commander? Was it his attitude?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 15 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: So your team had to install all of the communications wiring?
A: Yes. They also installed the heaters. The only shelter they had at that time was the OPCEN itself. The slept in those buildings.
Q: In the meantime, the SEAL team is still in the B-huts?
A: Correct.
Q: So when you went out on the 26th did you deploy by ground or air?
A: We went by fixed wing from BAF to Sharana and rotary wing from Sharana to Ghazni. Let me add a bit more. CJSOTF had provided a 150-man Bare Base system, which included the force provider latrines, the DFAC, and lodging. They're all very basic. However, the tent system for the Bare Base was incomplete. We only had five of the eight tents that are authorized for that system. We didn't have all of the required heaters. We did have the dining facility, which became our sixth housing tent. Early in January, we requested additional heaters. Even the ECUs that we had were limited.
Q: Were the tents in the TRICON containers but just not set up?
A: Correct.
Q: The SEAL Team was in the B-huts for about three weeks after you arrived?
A: Yes.
Q: Where were the E-8s and above living at that time?
A: We turned some of the rooms in the BDOC building into billeting. The SEALS gave up two B-huts for lodging as well. The field grades and above moved into those buildings.
Q: How many B-huts are there?
A: There are six for lodging; two for latrines; one for storage; and one for the Aid Station. There's also one other B-hut for females.
Q: Where did you put the females before that?
A: I think they moved straight into that B-hut.
Q: Did you know SSG Bales?
A: Only through observing him during training. (b)(3), (b)(6) I saw him briefly during squad live fires. I saw him briefly during platoon lanes, live fires and gunnery. Several times, he stopped by the S-3 shop, and I saw him there.
Q: What were your impressions of him as an NCO and a leader?
A: He seemed very friendly. He seemed to be an outgoing and hard-charging NCO. My impression of him during training– at that time he had one of the weaker platoon leaders, and he basically carried that platoon through platoon EXEVALS and the platoon live fire.
Q: And then he continued on all the way through NTC?
A: Yes.
Q: Are you aware of any concerns that any of the battalion's leaders had about SSG Bales behavior, personal troubles or attitude toward this deployment?
A: No. The only thing that I saw at all was that as (b)(3), (b)(6) and I were going through the officer and platoon sergeant slate, we had several E-7s come in, and since SSG Bales was only an E-6, we moved him from his platoon sergeant position to squad leader. (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he brought SSG Bales in to talk to him about it. SSG Bales was obviously disappointed, but that was the extent of it.
Q: In retrospect, knowing what we know today, was there anything that should have set off a red light?
A: Nothing that I know about.
Q: Are there any other incidents that you are aware about involving 2/3 personnel that relate to alcohol or substance abuse at any of the other VSPs or at Camp Patriot? Is there a widespread issue?
A: I am aware of the disciplinary issues that we had related to drugs. I don't think we have had an alcohol incident per se. I think we had four guys who were huffing. We had one soldier in A CO, a huffer, who was also found with hash. He claimed that he didn't know what it was. The soldier claimed that an Afghan guy had just given it to him. We had three soldiers on one VSP from B CO who were suspected of smoking marijuana. The ODA had apparently done a urinalysis on them. They indicated positive. Unfortunately, I don't think they did the testing correctly in order to create evidence that could be used in a disciplinary action. Then we had another guy get caught with steroids in C CO.
Q: So just a handful of guys across the 48 squads?
A: Yes. We actually created a slide to show what we were tracking.
Q: In August 2011 did you go to NTC as part of the whole brigade or as a battalion?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 15 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: We went as part of the whole brigade. About ten days before we went to NTC, we learned that we were going to have a VSO mission. We started researching it in the short time we had available. We read 1/16 IN's and 1/505 IN's 90-day AAR comments. We read the ALP and VSO methodology books. We asked NTC if we could do the VSO mission at NTC. Obviously they can't turn on a dime in terms of the mission set. They had trouble turning on what they did. Originally it was supposed to be a full-spectrum rotation. OPFOR was excited. They had done a big combined arms rehearsal in December. But then we learned about the deployment at the end of May, and NTC did what they could to give us an Afghanistan-focused mission. It was at the end of July, about ten days out from flying to NTC when we learned that it would be VSO specifically, and NTC couldn't do much to adapt the scenario to provide that training. We did get one company that was able to do a little bit of VSO-style/ALP-style security in one of the very far outlying villages. Other than one platoon in that company, nobody else got a chance to do that stuff. Everything else that we did was part of the larger brigade mission.
Q: My understanding is that B CO was bivouacked in a COP outside of an Afghan village for the typical Afghan scenario?
A: Yes.
Q: But not for a VSO mission?
A: Correct.
Q: Do you think the NTC rotation adequately prepared your unit for deployment?
A: Yes from the standpoint of the SF input that we got— focus on FM 7-8-style infantry battle drills and tasks. So from the standpoint that we did some of that at NTC, we were prepared. From the perspective of being able to exercise with SF units and work with their SOPs and mission set, we were not. I don't know how NTC would have replicated it.
Q: So you didn't have a lot of interaction with SF Groups at all?
A: Prior to the rotation we had zero.
Q: And after the rotation, you had an MTT and you talked to some of the guys in 1st SFG over at North Ft. Lewis?
A: Right. We had a few team leaders from 1st Group come over and talk to us about ALP and VSO methodology. They gave us some of their standard package. We had a few folks come out from the SEAL Team that is currently down there as SOTF-SE and do some staff cooperation and training observation. We had a little bit of that from 3rd Group as well. But really the window for that was very limited, and the number of folks involved was very limited.
Q: What did you do to prepare yourself for the VSO mission-set?
A: We read everything we could about ALP and VSO. I read a couple of the books on Afghanistan. I focused on making sure that the training was focused on infantry and squad level things. I also worked on making sure that everything at the squad level was ready to go. I instituted a service program for the weapons, NVGs, radios and that kind of stuff. We had to service vehicles a little bit, but that is kind of low impact. I wanted to make sure that each of the platoons took a day or two to actually go through their weapons, NVGs and radios.
Q: How would you rate 2/3 line companies' readiness for the assigned mission?
A: On a scale of 1 to 10 with 10 being the highest, I would probably rate them as a 6. Which is better than the middle but not where we should have been for a couple of reasons. We were under strength by about 100 soldiers until we got back from NTC, so we didn't have full squads. Up to that point, all of our training had been scheduled, planned and executed prior to learning that we were going to Afghanistan at all. So we focused on FM 7-8-style tasks but in a combined arms, maneuver-type environment. At NTC we were able to get some exposure to the Afghanistan-type scenario but not the VSO mission. During October as well, we did some small arms ranges to try to get new soldiers qualified and proficient on their weapons, and then we did some team and squad training and live fires to try to integrate new soldiers into their squads and to adjust to the new task organization. We had to completely reorganize from 27 squads, a scout platoon and MGS elements into 44 squads and 4 FLETACs.
Q: And your company HQs were organized as separate units? Three company HQs deployed out to sites plus the HHC?
A: Yes.
Q: How was the HQ's readiness? You had two VSPs assigned. Were you trained well enough to track that?
A: I think we were trained well enough to track that. I don't think that we were trained well enough in the environment that CJSOTF operates in and the environment that we found ourselves in in Afghanistan. With the benefit of hindsight, I would do some of the things that my S-3 and I are doing now to realign our support structure and realign our command and control stuff. For example, I am completely familiar with command and control in a cavalry squadron or in infantry companies. I was not familiar with the command and control in the ODA teams and the role of the AOB. I had taught at the Captains' Career Course at Fort Benning. We were able to train on that stuff at the staff level through the fielding of our TOC and a series of three CPXs and through the command and control of the field training exercises that we did in the winter and spring of last year. Can we control two subordinate elements that are teams? Probably. But it is quite another thing to transition to the way that ODA or SEAL teams are supported

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 7 OF 15 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

If there is a worse place than FOB Warrior to try to sustain stuff, I'm having trouble thinking of it right now. It is not very conducive. We do not have a major airfield. It's not a major hub. It's actually the turn-around point for convoys coming from BAF or KAF. So it is the place that is least likely to get convoy support. We are at the end of the line. The number of rotary missions that were denied by RC-E is pretty significant, especially at Faizabad. I'd estimate that we've gotten about a 15-20% support rate on the missions that we have requested there. With the benefit of hindsight, I would have put the headquarters at some place like Sharana where there is a major airfield and a major hub for logistics. One of the things that held us up at first was that we didn't even get our FLETAC vehicles until the beginning of February. When BG Haas came, he asked us why we didn't just go get supplies from Sharana. It was because we didn't have any vehicles. He dug into it and helped to push that along so that we started getting vehicles within two weeks. They staged a bunch of our lumber for example at Sharana. Probably enough for six B-huts— five or six forty foot trailer loads. When we showed up on 07 DEC, and I talked to the SPO about the plan, he told me about all of the lumber staged at Sharana and he told me that as soon as we got the lumber, he would send the See-Bees back down to get the rest of the buildings built. I kept asking about it and didn't get an answer for it. Through brute force and continuing to push the Movement Control Team at Sharana, I managed to get it pushed to us after a month of trying. I got a hold of one of the LTs in the MCT at Sharana, and he retasked trucks for me. I sent a guy there who helped to get it forklifted onto trucks, and we finally got it shipped to Ghazni. It took ten more days to get it here. The support piece wasn't that good. In February, we only had 5 or 6 days of flyable weather, so it is a tough place to go. Understanding how the support stuff was going to work and managing the terrain is the part that we weren't quite prepared for.

Q: What was the process to prepare the unit's equipment for deployment, particularly that equipment that you were leaving behind? What issues did the Company's XOs encounter in splitting their property books? How about the process of distributing equipment once you got to Afghanistan?

A: There are two parts to that. First let me talk about what we did to get ready. The return from NTC also coincided with the year -end fiscal close-out, so I was prohibited from ordering parts basically from the return from NTC until 05 October. What we did during that time was set up a services program and demanded disposition instructions for the Strykers. In the past, the Brigade has turned them over to GD and had contractors do maintenance on them. At the end of September we found out that they were just going to be low usage. We were to perform maintenance on them and then store them. So we set up a service schedule. We were the first battalion to set that up, which was good—we were able to get our line companies, HHC, and the attached 18th Engineer Company. Most of the Stryker service is done by contractors. We did the other vehicle service ourselves, but it did not take that much time. My primary focus was to get the weapons, NODs and radios in good order. I worked with our maintenance tech to set up a service bay with all of the necessary technicians on hand so that we could do PMCS and then get deficiencies corrected right there. In hindsight that was good. We identified more than 40 M-4s, a dozen M-249s, a dozen M240s, and a number of .50 Cals that were not serviceable. In terms of the property book split, our first issue was determining through CJSOTF and our Brigade what we needed to bring. Ultimately we were allocated 6 TRICONs for the line companies (total) and 11 TRICONs for the HHC. Our initial request was for double that. Brigade came back and said that number was not doable. There was also some back and forth between CJSOTF and SOCOM about who was resourcing our movement. When my S-3 went out for the CPX and for the Academic Week with 7th Group, he ran into the movement tech for 3rd Group who told him to run everything through them. The S-3 of 3rd Group said the same thing. I had a little bit of working out to do with my brigade to see who was actually planning the movement. The bottom line was that First Corps said that we belonged to them and that they were going to control our movement over there. It took us a while to figure out just how much we could bring. We were also waiting for the full task organization to go into effect, including the cut of the BSB that we were going to get. At first the BSB provided about 80 names, but this changed to 68 as they came up non-deployable or with disciplinary issues that prevented deployment. Our parent Brigade did not let the task organization go into effect until 18 October. So we had less than a month and a half to get the soldiers into our formation and then distribute them down to the companies, platoons and squads that they were actually going to work with. For example, cooks were in high demand. It also took the BSB some time to figure out what property to send with us. In fact, I am still trying to correct property issues with my BSB. I am still waiting for the A CO and B CO commanders of the BSB to sign a hand receipt for equipment that the BSB Commander thought he was going to need but didn't and then ultimately gave back to the BSB before he left. And then I had 14 soldiers from the Engineer Battalion that were attached to us. Based on feedback from the CJSOTF, we spent a lot of time and money getting those guys EOCA and R2C2 trained through Ft. Leonard Wood. In fact, that is the only money that I was able to spend in September. I sent twenty Engineers to EOCA (demolition in place) and R2C2 (route clearance) schools. Engineer branch actually agreed to fund those schools.

Q: Why didn't you go on the PDSS visit?

A: The Commander, the S-3 and the S-4 went. The Commander wanted to leave one field grade officer behind to be in charge. We

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 8 OF 15 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: It sounds like you were pretty busy back in the rear?
A: Yes.
Q: Following the PDSS and the development of the build-out plan for the camp, who was responsible for monitoring the progress of the build-out during your last 6 or 7 weeks at JBLM?
A: CJSOTF SPO was in charge of it, and we monitored it through weekly or semi-weekly VTC.
Q: At what point did you learn that the build-out wasn't going to be complete before you arrived?
A: Shortly before we arrived. I didn't realize how incomplete it was until after we arrived. The way a lot of the slides read, it looked like most of the structures were complete. Even where the structures were complete, the wiring and other essentials were not.
Q: When you arrived on 06 DEC and sat down with CJSOTF, were you able to determine why the construction was so far from completion?
A: No. I don't know why. Part of it was a Class IV issue. One of the galling parts was that we had a plan from October that was approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) First it wasn't ready, and second we couldn't get the materials. Once we started to build it (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) changed the plan and told us that we couldn't have a gym or additional B-huts. He told us that we were good enough with tents. In one of those first meetings as well I met with the GSB Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) He asked the CJSOTF-A SPO and J4 directly why these contracts (furniture, septic system, gravel, etc.) were not in place. When my S-3 and S-4 were here for the PDSS, they met with the JLOC, gave them signature card authority for us so that they could start ordering parts. We also had a contracting rep here that we were borrowing. He was here to work contracts for us. We gave him all the legal and signature authority to start working contracts on our behalf. But he had a few contracts completed but we were nowhere near what we needed.
Q: So, you came in on 06 DEC and met with the JLOC and CJSOTF and found out that things weren't going to be ready. When did you sit down with (b)(3), (b)(6) and find out that he wanted the camp plan to be changed?
A: We got the Class IV delivered to Camp Warrior about late-January. In the interim, CJSOTF created the FAM-C Board (facilities, access and maintenance) to help prioritize their See-Bees. The situation at the time was that whoever asked last was getting support rather than it being a command-driven thing. We put our proposal in to the FAM-C Board, and it got rejected. The FAM-C Board said that it had been denied by the CJSOTF Commander. He rejected the use of hard structures for the additional housing, DFAC, gym, etc. This is all in mid to late January after we were already on-site.
Q: When did you find out that you weren't going to have a wooden structure for everything and that you were actually going to have to move into tents?
A: We found out as soon as we arrived in country. We learned that there was a Bare Base System, but that we had to set it up. Even at that time, the CJSOTF staff was telling us that this was a temporary system until the B-huts got built. After we got the lumber and proposed to build out the camp plan that was approved by the JLOC staff back in October during PDSS, the FAM-C Board denied it.
Q: Who in particular communicated this to you?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) the SPO, communicated it to us over VTC.
Q: Was there any follow-up over email?
A: There may be, I don't recall. My S-4 probably has a bunch of that. The FAM-C Board meets every Thursday at 1500. That was how we learned about it. I would also like to add one other thing on the property split. We didn't finish all of the training on weapons systems until the end of October. We basically then had a four-day week prior to going on block leave. During that week, the Brigade S-3 told (b)(3), (b)(6) that the VSO mission was off and that we were deploying with the rest of the Brigade in April. 1/504 IN had been designated to take our place, and we were to dispatch the S-3 to go coordinate with them to help them prepare for their mission. The S-3 went to Ft. Bragg during the first week of block leave. He called me at home and teld me that he received a call from (b)(3), (b)(6) the 3-2 SBCT brigade S3, who asked (b)(3), (b)(6) what he was doing there, and told him that he hadn't told him to go. The S-3 was upset because he just got sent out there during block leave. So he turned around and returned to JBLM. Somewhere between 04 and 06 NOV, we found out that the mission was back on. Everyone was on block leave at that point, we had delayed some of our pack out, and we didn't have some of the equipment that we needed for the Engineers or the FLETAC. As soon as we got back, we continued to work through SRP, RFI and the pack out. There was a lot going on that made the pack out less than perfect.
Q: When did you get word about the timeline change?
A: 27 October.
Q: When did you go on block leave?
A: 29 October.
Q: So you had about 48 hours, and a lot of people just shut down?
A: Yes.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: You said that you were 100 people understrength when you went to NTC, but you also lost and replaced some of your existing personnel. Is that correct?
A: We lost a few. I can't tell you exactly how many. Some of the PCSd or ETSd. If I had to estimate, I would say that it was about twenty to thirty.
Q: So you ended up taking in about 120-130 people in the last two months?
A: Correct.
Q: How would you characterize the relationship today between TF(b)(1)1.4aHQs, the ODA teams and the CJSOTF HQs?
A: I have done a lot of reflection on that. With the ODAs, I think sometimes it is tenuous, and usually it is pretty good. In a lot of ways we're still trying to figure out the system that we are working within. The team at Latif that is close to us gets great support. They're only three miles away, so it is easy to push them stuff. With Fiaz Abad, it is a completely different story. The terrain between here and there is too high risk to travel with a FLETAC. Based on the number of IEDs that the SEAL Team found and the level of threat with(b)(1)1.4ae're not driving down there. We think the safest way is to drive into Zabul, though Qalat and through Nabahar and then come in from the southwest.
Q: Wouldn't that take a really long time?
A: Yes.
Q: So they're mostly supported by air?
A: They're entirely supported by air. My S-4 has been good. He has set up a system of supply air drops. They get a drop every three to four days. We have finally cracked the code with some of the contract air craft (Mule Air) in the last three weeks or so. The weather has also improved, which has helped. We worked through that, and I know that they guys down there have been grateful. However, because we don't have an AOB and because they have an ADCON relationship with their AOB, I've run into situations where they've been requesting support directly from the AOB. That has been frustrating. I have contacted the team leadership a number of times about it. I can see why the teams do it. I'm at FOB Warrior, where it takes me 2-3 weeks to get anything from BAF or KAF. If I'm trying to get something out to Faizabad, it is going to be another 2-3 weeks to get out there. The most reliable way has been air. But I can't air drop everything. LTATVs are one example. At the same time, a team can call up to their supply guy at BAF for something, and that guy at BAF appears as though he can get it right away because he's got it right there, even though it would still need to go through the same 4-6 week movement process, under our control to get to the team. From his perspective, he has called TF(b)(1)1.4aand hasn't gotten the response he wants but he calls SOTF-E and gets an immediate response.
Q: How would you assess the level of communication and the operational effectiveness up and down this chain? What can improve? What would you sustain?
A: I don't think that we are doing a good job giving feedback to the teams. We have put in place a new SITREP feedback system for my staff to send back down to the teams. Any issue that comes up in their SITREPs that requires our action gets a response from us about the status of that action. Along with my S-4, S-3, and HHC Commander, we talk to the teams frequently every day. I could also use some help from them sometimes to bring issues up before taking them to their parent AOB.
Q: Where are their ADCON AOBs?
A: At FOB Shank.
Q: What is TF(b)(1)1.4aHQ's responsibility with regard to the 2/3 Companies that are OPCON to the other SOTFs?
A: We are ADCON. That is the extent of it. We don't have any control. I track the awards, evaluations and personnel actions.
Q: It is my understanding that evaluations are being done by the ADCON chain of command, which may be situated across several different locations. Is that correct?
A: Yes.
Q: How about awards?
A: Awards are different. For the companies out there, the SOTFs do the awards. We continue to monitor the awards, and I try to make sure that my S-1 is tracking them. What we saw was that a lot of the awards that were in process when the SOTFs started to RIP out last time were lost by the time the RIP was finished. I'm talking about CIBs, Purple Hearts and that sort of award.
Q: Who designated the awards procedure?
A: I don't know if there was a formal directive. As far as I am concerned, it has been informally worked out between us and the SOTFs. That was based on lessons learned with 1/16 and 1/505.
Q: So the OPCON guys don't have input into the OERs, NCOERs, etc.?
A: Correct. We are also doing the disciplinary issues. That includes company grade Article 15s.
Q: Who is delivering the company grade Article 15s? The ADCON chain of command?
A: Correct.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 10 OF 15 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: So it could be three VSPs away, but the Company Commander would still have to do it, presumably by VTC?
A: Correct. That's exactly how we do it.
Q: But there is some UCMJ authority that resides with CJSOTF?
A: Yes. Let me clarify as I understand it. If it is a field grade Article 15, it comes up to my Commander. (b)(3), (b)(6) has withheld authority to adjudicate field grades associated with huffing and the one field grade for (b)(3), (b)(6) that was related to the EO complaint.
Q: And those are the only exceptions that you know of? Are those articulated in a policy?
A: I am reasonably sure that (b)(3), (b)(6) had a policy specifically to reserve field grades on huffing. Apparently it is a sensitive issue for him. He lost a soldier about 18 months ago to huffing at Ft. Bragg.
Q: How do you view your relationship with the captains and lieutenants in your battalion? Do you consider yourself approachable? There were some reports that you were considered to be stand-offish to the point where you wouldn't shake new lieutenants' hands. Is that true, and what is your philosophy with regard to junior officers?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Have you talked to these guys on the phone at all?
A: I've addressed this issue through the SOTF-E XO.
Q: Telephonically?
A: I've addressed him telephonically, over email and in person.
Q: How did that go?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I'm not sure what you mean.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Do you feel as a leadership team that you performed your duties to the best of your ability given the situation that you were faced with?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 12 APR 12 / KAF DATED

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Nothing Follows

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 15. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY [redacted] ITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ent)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of April, 2012 at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ath)

USAF

Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE (b)(1)1.4a (CAMP PATRIOT)
FOB WARRIOR, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09311

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

TF- (b)(1)1.4a

25 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Additional information to support sworn statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) taken 12 APR 12

1. The purpose of this memorandum is to clarify and add information for a question that I could not recall fully at the time of questioning.

2. The original question and response:

Q: An issue that appears to be impacting the perception of the command climate is a

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

3. Additional information. The NTC LTP was broken into two phases. Phase I occured 4-5 May 2011 and took place at Fort Lewis within the brigade footprint. Phase II occured in late June 2011 at NTC and was about 7 days in length. (b)(3), (b)(6) and the other officer went to

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weddings that occurred the day after LTP II at NTC ended and missed the last day (our pack up and return travel day) to attend. (b)(3), (b)(6) the brigade commander, made it very clear both in guidance to the battalion commanders and to the staffs that LTP was their primary duty and exemptions from attending would only be approved on a case by case basis. (b)(3), (b)(6) both scheduled the event and brought it to the command after the brigade and battalion established and published the restriction. While I know (b)(3), (b)(6) raised (b)(3), (b)(6) issue with the brigade commander, I do not know the brigade commander's response. We did however, let (b)(3), (b)(6) go on 5 May after the fire support portion of the LTP was complete.

4. The Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SIPR: (b)(6) or NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP PATRIOT	2012/04/06	1703	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC 2-3IN 3/2 SBCT (TF (b)(1)1.4a)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank, and unit of assignment:
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: I joined (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours have you had?
A: This is my fourth one; three in Iraq and this tour in Afghanistan. All as an officer.
Q: What are your current duty assignment and responsibilities?
A: (b)(6) for TF (b)(1)1.4a with two assigned ODA Teams, a FLE and associated logistics elements across three SOTFs.
Q: How long have you been associated with (b)(6) INF or TF (b)(1)1.4a
A: Since July 2011.
Q: How much do you interact with the leadership--the commander, the CSM and the XO?
A: Daily.
Q: Describe the command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a since your arrival up until now.

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIAL (b)(3), (b)(6) ON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 6 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5), (b)(1)1.4a

Q: Do you have any issues with the living conditions at Camp Patriot?
A: We had significant issues upon our arrival. We had been doing weekly VTCs with CJSOTF regarding the build-out of the camp.

INITIALS OF PER (b)(3), (b)(6) ATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 6 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We had initial plans to build Bee-huts, but the construction effort fell behind, and we had to use tents instead. What we fell in on was some Bee-huts that had been built by the SEAL platoon who were here before us. We built our OPCEN, SUPCEN and BDOC; our soldiers were spread out among the Bee-huts and tents. Our challenges through the winter were logistical: keeping heaters running, keeping our LSS buildings from freezing, and bringing in more pipes. Several times we went black on fuel as a camp, and the fuel had to be restricted. We also had issues getting enough workers to keep the porta-a-johns cleaned out. Our location and the weather were major obstacles. The winter set in before we could finish our build-out. Our soldiers needed more space, and the command and staff was making every effort to provide that.

Q: When did you do your PDSS?

A: First two weeks in October.

Q: When you got back from the PDSS, did you send in your facilities plan?

A: Yes. We also did an outbrief with CJSOTF before we left, where we laid out our plan for what we needed. We followed up with a weekly VTC with CJSOTF where we continued to monitor the progress.

Q: Do you know why the facilities weren't done in time?

A: I understand that the teams on the ground built everything they could with the material they had available, but there were issues getting the rest of the needed materials into FOB Warrior. A significant amount of our Class IV was frustrated at FOB Serana. Tents were used to compensate for this challenge.

Q: It was primarily a winter-derived Class IV issue?

A: Yes.

Q: How many people are at Camp Patriot?

A: About 150 military and civilian combined.

Q: What is the extent of the command climate problems at TF (b)(1)1.4a if they exist? Do they extend down to the line companies?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

Q: Are there any additional people that we should talk to concerning this aspect of the investigation?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) —my operations SGM; I can't think of anyone else.

Q: You mentioned the difficulties of accessing the headquarters. Did you request a different location or was the headquarters location chosen for you?

A: It was chosen for us. In retrospect, I would have highly recommended that we move to a location with an airfield and larger logistics hub. This was a very difficult spot to establish given our mission.

Q: Can you describe your relationship with your subordinate elements?

A: I think it is healthy. We only have two units, so we have good daily interaction with the units. During the winter, however, we were not able to deliver on all of the things that they needed.

Q: How many command visits from CJSOTF have you received?

A: One command visit in March. I was on R&R. The CJSOTF Commander and CSM came down. Additionally, in early March we had a visit from BG Haas, CFSOCC-A Commander.

Q: How did that visit go?

A: The CFSOCC visit was positive. We were able to get him out to VSP Latif, get him a brief from ODA (b)(1)1.4a and do a staff brief. I didn't receive any negative feedback from the staff or commander based on that visit.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 6 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Can you describe during your NTC train-up, did B CO receive any VSO training?
A: No. Only C CO, and it was only one platoon from that company. We had three problem sets as a battalion, but only one was a VSO mission. B CO was doing a traditional partnership in a village, and A CO was doing a Kandak partnership. The only training for the battalion was the training for C CO and the lessons that they were able to share.
Q: Was it clear at that point what B CO's mission would be?
A: We asked for more VSO training, but we got this mission as we were loading trains to go to NTC, and the folks at NTC were not able to resource a VSO or VSP mission on short notice. We were a victim of being a brigade Stryker team going through a normal Stryker rotation.
Q: It sounds like you tried to play catch up with Mobile Training Teams and other approaches.
A: Yes. We did everything we could to try to pull in knowledge.
Q: To clarify, was the problem of lack of time for preparation attributable to the 2/3 leadership?
A: The primary issue was the time of notification of the unit relative to the deployment date.
Q: You mentioned the eight FLE elements, are those platoon size elements?
A: No. They are squad sized elements. Two squads would make a FLE platoon element. We had to build four of those. One for HHC, and one for each of the line companies.
Q: And these guys came out of your brigade support battalion?
A: Some of them; some of them were infantry. In the end we had a mix of infantry and other MOSs in the FLE elements.
Q: So you had to have some guys in the FLEs with tactical training?
A: Yes. That is right.
Q: Your battalion mission statement says that you should be capable of deploying in 96-hours, yet when you arrived, the HQs had been short one Major for some time and at least two of your E-7s and many of your 11Bs did not arrive until shortly before deployment. You would not have been capable of deploying in 96 hours in July or even in late September. Why was that the case?
A: That is correct. I was notified of my unit of assignment in May, at which time, the unit was not slated for deployment. I think there was some ARFORGEN issues at that time since it was not set to be a deploying unit. This meant that personnel assignment and equipment regeneration was not prioritized as it would have been if we designated for deployment. By late May, when the unit did show up on the patch chart, we began to try to correct the issue, but personnel problems were not resolved until September. Additionally, the equipment handover prior to deployment was very time consuming.
Q: Do you remember what month in 2010 the unit came out of Iraq?
A: June 2010 for this battalion, and the remainder of the brigade came out in August.
Q: Based on that timing, it sounds like you were deployed at the very front end of your train/ready ARFORGEN stage, which is why you didn't have your personnel.
A: I think that is accurate. The battalion had begun a collective training phase in May, however, the normal reset of the equipment and personnel did not occur based on what the unit looked like when I arrived.
Q: Are you adequately utilized as a battalion headquarters, since you are only managing a FLE and two ODAs?
A: No.

\\END STATEMENT\\

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 6 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

HHC 2/3 DAX

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/12	1604	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What date did you assume that position?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many other combat tours do you have?
A: In addition to the current tour--Iraq: 2004-05 (1SG); Afghanistan 2009-10 (Bn CSM); 2 Kosovo tours; Iraq right after the initial war for a few months.
Q: How would you describe your duties (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a
A: The mission we got is a different mission than I've ever had before. It is very challenging due to the fact that my (b)(1)1.4a people are everywhere and spread apart. We have (b)(1)1.4a and I only control 2.
Q: Were you (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Yes (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How would you articulate your leadership philosophy as the (b)(1)1.4a of TF (b)(1)1.4a?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 12 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: I was struck by the high number of soldiers who had a negative or very negative perception of the command climate. Why do you think that was?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Did any of your NCOs bring that issue to you, and did you take it to the commander?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you think he does a good job prioritizing the task force needs and support to the VSP sites and to the line companies?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: What is your impression of Soldiers' overall attitudes towards the people of Afghanistan?
A: I don't think it is negative. The SSG Bales thing came out of nowhere. I know SSG Bales from the rear. At first he was the acting Platoon Sergeant. He has two kids; he plays a lot of football with them. He's very knowledgeable. He knows what he is doing. How this could have happened, I have no idea. It is absolutely baffling.
Q: How many visits did you receive from CJSOTF-A and from your parent brigade?
A: From CJSOTF-A, nobody. From the original brigade, nobody. The first phone call that I received was from (b)(3), (b)(6) he is with BG Haas. He was the first guy to call me and ask me how the soldiers were doing. That was maybe a week after we arrived. BG Haas came out with (b)(3), (b)(6) We took them out to Latif. We took the LMTVs out there. He was surprised when I told him that they were the first ones out there to see us. Once he saw the state of the camp, he said I that he needed to send forces down here to get us what we need.
Q: Do you remember when BG Haas and (b)(3), (b)(6) made their visit?
A: On 30 January.
Q: How well did you know SSG Bales?
A: Did I personally know him? No. I saw his actions on the range and on training events. He ran a tight ship. He did everything right. We were expecting and hoping that he would come out on the SFC List, because he had already been a platoon sergeant.
Q: When did that list come out?
A: Before the deployment. Way before. The new one just came out three or four weeks ago. So the list would have come out a year prior to that. We had a big influx of Sergeants First Class come in just before the deployment. That's also when we got our HHC 1SG. He actually didn't deploy with us until February because of some issues with his wife and his high blood pressure.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 18 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: So you knew SSG Bales professionally and had an impression that he was squared away and ran a tight ship. Did you ever see him get angry or particularly animated about any issue?
A: When he corrected soldiers, but not in a physical way. He corrected soldiers and enforced the standards, but always in a normal way.
Q: Did you ever see SSG Bales drinking alcohol?
A: Negative.
Q: Are you aware of any concerns by any of the battalion's leaders about SSG Bales' behavior, personal troubles or attitude toward the deployment?
A: Negative. His wife was at the FRG meetings. His kids were there. I actually kind of thought that he'd been looking forward to it. He got the guys ready; he got them motivated. Nothing. The SRP for us lasted three months, and you never knew at the end of the day who got orders and who didn't. That process was much lengthier than any of my prior deployments. We actually have the least number of soldiers in the Brigade of soldiers on Rear-D. We actually gave up about 40 soldiers to other units because they couldn't get their numbers.
Q: So you think that SSG Bales was actually looking forward to the deployment?
A: Yes. There was no feeling sorry for himself, trying to get out of it, or anything like that.
Q: In retrospect, is there anything that, when you look back at it now, would have been a warning sign?
A: No. I read the newspapers like everybody, and I know that he had 3 or 4 combat tours. That was pretty standard for an infantry guy with 10-12 years in.
Q: Can you talk me through any other incidents involving alcohol or drugs at any other VSP sites or Camp Patriot?
A: Yes. I just found out about one not too long ago. I guess there was a (b)(3), (b)(6) who was out in Indian Country for 2 or 3 years. They brought him back and are doing an investigation on him. I guess he was serving alcohol to a few guys on Christmas.
Q: But that was not one of your VSP sites?
A: No.
Q: How about on the 2/3 IN sites or the TF (b)(1)1.4a sites?
A: That site did have 2/3 IN soldiers out there. I don't remember the name of the site, but (b)(3), (b)(6) was one of the special operators out there. I believe that it was one of our LTs who brought it to people's attention. We had four GOMARs out of that. As far as steroids, we had one guy who I don't think was taking them but he had them. He told people that the old ODA left it out there, but I don't know anything more about that. We did have some guys huffing Dust-Off. I had one of those guys on one of my sites—Fiazabad.
Q: Do you have guys out at VSP Argestan (?sp)?
A: I'd have to look. Where is that?
Q: It is in the western part of Kandahar Province? I believe there was an issue out there with marijuana or hashish.
A: Yes. There are three people out there that supposedly smoked it. What happened is they did a urinalysis but did not read them their rights. So when they brought them back here, they couldn't use anything they said. They then had to do another urinalysis here, which they had to FEDEX back to the States. The results are not back yet. One of those guys, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) went to Role 3 and said something to the effect of "I don't like Afghanis, and I want to kill Afghanis." Automatically when he said that, he went back to the rear.
Q: Are any of these ongoing investigations?
A: Yes. For the three people, we don't really know if they smoked it. We don't have the results yet. They said they smoked it, but we don't have the results yet. The other two soldiers are on Camp Patriot with me.
Q: In general, what trainings or briefings on the use of alcohol or on mental health issues did the soldiers receive before deployment or during the deployment?
A: Back in the rear, we did 100% urinalysis almost every month, and a lot of 10% tests every long weekend. Before every weekend, the commanders have to call in to verify that they did a safety brief. We talk about stress, boating accidents, driving accidents. The colonel talked to the guys several times before coming down here. Everybody was fired up because of the Special Forces standards. We had the relaxed grooming standards. I brought it up that that was probably not good, but other people thought it was a good idea so that the guys fit in with the Special Forces teams. I still think it's not a good idea. 17, 18, and 19 year old soldiers can't handle that. What happens is that the relaxed grooming and uniform standards is a magnet for every CSM, every colonel, everybody else when they walk off of the camp. And 60-70% of the issues that I have is because of relaxed grooming standards. I am not pushing any responsibility out to anybody but me. When I look at these sites, I see SSGs and Soldiers.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

There is a CPT, there is a Chief Warrant Officer, there is a Master Sergeant, but everybody else is probably a Sergeant First Class, and they're not helping me out too much.

Q: When you learned about 2/3's deployment to Afghanistan, did you think that the unit was appropriately trained for the VSO mission by the time you got on the plane?

A: No. The reason for that is timing. Was everybody mentally ready? Yes. Was everybody qualified on their assigned weapon system? Yes. We needed 48 different teams. The squads got picked. Those were not the squads who were working together back in the rear. We don't have 48 squads. There is not a platoon sergeant or a platoon leader out at the sites. They are at certain sites and they have to go out there. We had to put squads together. There are 11Cs, medics, and cooks in those squads that are not normally there. I lost at least 30-35 NCOs from July until the time that we left that HRC put on orders. We still have people back in the rear that are PCSing. I received 4-5 E-7s in the weeks just prior to deploying. In no VSO did the team come together and develop SOPs for how to do ALP and the other missions.

Q: How did you prepare yourself for the VSO mission?

A: I came out on the alternate for Brigade CSM last year. When you come out on the alternate list, you automatically come out on primary for a Battalion. I was on orders to go to Korea for two years. Then the deployment came up, and I called HRC. They basically said "do you want to deploy with the unit?" and I volunteered to come down here instead of taking that position. This VSO really ~~was~~ nothing ~~to do~~ with me. They call it VSO, but it is really no different than what we have been doing for the past 8-9 years. I did it the last time that I was in ~~Afghanistan~~ NEW FOB (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) AFGANIDAD. You were the battlespace owner; you took over some local villages; you trained the local police. It's a different word for the same thing. In the ~~Afghanistan~~ AFGANIDAD (b)(3), (b)(6), we came up with training plans, we ran weapons ranges and we actually developed a three-week course. It might not have been this extensive, but it is basic combat fundamentals and basic squad tactics.

Q: What steps did you take to ensure that Soldiers had adequate time to spend with their families prior to deployment?

A: They got the block leave. We gave them weekends off. There were some mandatory four day weekends. It was crunch time, but I didn't see anybody work on the weekends. When I went home at 1800 or 1900, there weren't too many soldiers left. Were there long days in there during packing? Yes. But our Rear-D handled all of the taskings that came up after October. If we had weekend work, the Brigade had to sign off on it. We did not request any. On Fridays, soldiers were released by 1500.

Q: How well do you think the squad leaders out at the VSPs are integrating in with the ODAs?

A: We had a couple of issues at the beginning. Originally, the guys were just going to be doing guard duty, but I was briefed before I came down here that they would become members of the team. Mostly it works that way. Some don't. Usually when I go out there, I ask them to give me the guard roster, and I see how many 2/3 soldiers are on there as compared to how many SF soldiers are on there. That's how I get my first impression.

Q: Did you get to provide any input into the decision to put SSG Bales' and (b)(3), (b)(6) squads out at Belambai?

A: No. When we did the PDSS, the company commanders all went to their sites and determined how many soldiers and squads went to the different locations. I still don't have any input into how SOTF-S or SOTF-SE uses the squads.

Q: Were you a part of the decision to take the platoon leaders and platoon sergeant of First Platoon and place them at locations away from their squads?

A: No. For example SSG Bales' CO and 1SG work for SOTF-SE, even though they are located in SOTF-S. As a result, they are not always given the opportunity to go down and check on them.

Q: Since the changeover of CJSOTF command have things changed?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: In your estimation, did the companies have sufficient time and resources to follow appropriate property accountability procedures during the deployment process?

A: No. Due to the timeline and only having 17 CONNEXs.

Q: Was that 17 for the headquarters?

A: No. That was for the whole battalion, including B bags and A bags. Did they have enough time? I don't think so. Could it be accomplished? Yes. Was it ideal? No.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 7 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Following the PDSS and the development of the build-out plan, who was responsible for monitoring the progress of the build -out plan?
A: Once we first got down there, the colonel put some LTs in charge—our engineer, the HHC XO, Chief and I kind of oversaw everything.
Q: What about before you deployed? Was it the Bn XO who was tracking that progress?
A: Everybody was busy, and I don't think we got too much information about what was happening. I think we got pictures one time, but that was about it. There was a (b)(3), (b)(6) down here that was working it. He was a little overwhelmed. This is not my first time building a FOB. I built another FOB not too far away from here. My recommendation was that we should have taken the officers in the battalion who were not going to deploy with us (some of them were heading off to school), had them come on the PDSS and had them stay. You need to get the money flow going, the FOO money going, and the contracts in place. This is not Iraq. It takes us 60-90 days to get the money flowing for a contract. We could have been way better prepared if those officers and NCOs had been on the ground so that when we came down here at the end of December we wouldn't have had to start the contracting processing then.
Q: When did you learn that the build out was not going to be complete?
A: Beginning of December.
Q: Why was the construction so far from completion?
A: Lack of oversight from CJSOTF. They had one guy out there. The See-Bees had no Class IV. There was no internet, gym, tents, heaters, etc. Everybody who comes to Patriot is surprised by what we don't have, especially when they see the VSPs.
Q: When you got there, what did you assess as the priority of the critical needs in order to finish building out the camp?
A: We got pressure to leave Montron early. They wanted to get us out early; they wanted us gone. But we couldn't really control it. Nothing was really set. If we had gone down there earlier, there really would have been nothing. There was a push for us to get out. My first priority was communications. After that, the living is not that bad. We had some kind of heat, and we had tents. But everybody was in the mindset of what they had at BAF or what they had at any of the other sites that they went to. It didn't surprise me. It's like the early days when we first got here.
Q: When you tried to make progress on these deficiencies, what obstacles did you run into?
A: As far as support from anybody else—there was none. We had to go do it ourselves. (b)(6) me and the Supply Sergeant drove a pick-up truck around to go pick up supplies. I really don't see many other (b)(6) doing that. But I thought it was necessary. We went out and got heaters, tents, water blivets and other things. We didn't go through any channels, it was me talking to a bunch of other retired guys trying to figure out what we needed to do to get stuff. I have a supply sergeant, (b)(3), (b)(6) I hope you'll talk to him if you haven't already. For example, I tried to get him a truck so that he could do his job, and I couldn't get him one. He finally got one that is about 50 years old, and I think he had to fix it himself.
Q: Does he work with the CJSOTF JLOC?
A: Yes. With the new guys here, there is no issue. With the old ones, you would get the answer you want on the phone, but not too much action after that. It's just a hard pill to swallow when I see 40 vehicles sitting here, and I'm asking for one, and they tell me that they'll look into it.
Q: What do you think the living conditions were like out on the VSPs and at Camp Woods?
A: Camp Woods is pretty nice. They have the man ~~camps~~ CANS (b)(3), (b)(6). It's been there probably ten years. Latif has tents, and it's okay. Fiazabad is pretty rough, in part because of the weather. For example, I wanted to send showers out to Latif, but they said that they didn't want showers because it is a bigger pain to get guys out there to suck the black water. Instead, they'll drive back to us every three to four days to take showers. It's only 5km. But we sent the refer vans out there so that they could freeze their stuff. At one point, we didn't get any chow at Warrior because of the weather, so we put our own DFAC up, but you could only heat stuff up. Chow is not an issue. We got a new DFAC here when the 82nd came in, but there may be an issue again if those guys pull out in October and we're still here. That's why the DFAC was really not a top priority at this time, because we can walk over there in five minutes. But there is other stuff. Living space was more important.
Q: How often do you go visit Camp Woods, Latif or the other VSPs?
A: On December 18 during RSOI, I went up to see the 82nd who were out doing a different mission. After that I went to KAF on 05 JAN and then went to visit B CO at Camp Logansan. I went to Camp Vance on 15-17 JAN. I went to Camp Woods 18-21 JAN. Then BG Haas came on 30 JAN. In February we were snowed in; we couldn't go anywhere. I went to BAF 23-25 FEB and went to Camp Woods from 27 FEB through 02 MAR. Once again, we were snowed in and then when the incident happened, we were getting a regular stream of phone calls that we needed to deal with. On 25-29 MAR, I returned to Latif.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Aside from battlefield circulation, how did you monitor the welfare of the soldiers out at the remote sites?
A: I called the 1SGs. I don't like using email too much. I also talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) my BDE CSM a few times to see what he was seeing. Most everyone was connected by telephone or email. I talked to each of them once a week.
Q: So you rely on your 1SGs for communication about the soldiers?
A: Yes, but now under the new command group, I have a good relationship with the CSMs at SOTF-S and SOTF-E.
Q: When did the tension with CJSOTF-A start? Was it a single event or was it something that evolved over time? Was this tension there right at the beginning?
A: It started as soon as FORSCOM told them that they needed to take the 2/3 HQs along with the soldiers.
Q: What did you get back from them that led to that perception? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: I didn't get any emails whatsoever before coming here, and (b)(3), (b)(6) talked to me for one or two minutes before I got here.
Q: Did they say anything specific?
A: They didn't say anything specific. I just know what their initial request was before all of this took place.
Q: If their request was just for the maneuver elements, whose decision was it to deploy the entire battalion?
A: I don't know. I assume it was FORSCOM.
Q: I know that the CJSOTF Commander and CSM had command-only meetings at the end of the O&I meetings. Did you ever sit in on those?
A: No.
Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) have the opportunity to bring these issues up to the CJSOTF command? Did that conversation ever happen?
A: I think the XO had that conversation with the J-4. I also had the opportunity to talk to the J-4. I think that's where the XO got his bad reputation. When we first came down, we asked for everything. We wanted everything right away. Could we have operated with less? Yes. We can do the same thing with fewer gadgets, and I think the XO kept pushing for us to get all of those gadgets right away. I think he pushed with the J-4 and maybe with the XO as well.
Q: Did it ever rise through the command channels?
A: No. What triggered this was when BG Haas came down and actually saw what was happening on the ground. He said that he needed to help us out, and that's when things really started moving. I don't know if the CJSOTF command ever had the intention of coming down to visit us, but ten days before the TOA, somebody must have told them that they needed to come down. Normally I would have gotten an email four or five days out before a battlefield circulation visit. I didn't get anything like that. I just got a note that said "I'll be there tomorrow morning at 0930. Make sure you are there."
Q: How is the relationship with the JLOC now?
A: It is great. I was miserable the last five weeks. But the new guys came in and stayed overnight the first day. They talked to the guys. They did PT. There was no stress. It feels normal.
Q: Did the segregated latrine thing start at NTC?
A: At NTC, when we were in the box, there were about four shower points. There were some bigger trailers with several showers in them and then there were two smaller trailers with two showers in each one. We took the two smaller trailers and reserved one for the females and one for the command group. But there were only two showers in each of those.
Q: When you arrived at Camp Patriot, did you talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) about the philosophy behind the segregated showers? Did you find that to be a potential problem?
A: I thought that it could have been a problem. There were three shower points—two B-huts and one big one by the tents. Yes, I did bring this up as an issue that people were talking about.
Q: What was the response? (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: That there are 58-60 people ~~showing~~ SHOWERING in this building, which is more than are showering in the other building. It was driven by numbers. If that stupid piece of paper had come down and instead he put down: "S-1, S-2, S-3, S-4" the perception would have been different. But I do have to say that every VSP I go to, they also have it in different groups. It was not favorable to write it that way. I would have written it differently or not at all. I don't care where I shower. It doesn't make a difference to me.
Q: You're saying the E-8 and above latrine was solely due to numbers?
A: That is what I was told.
Q: It doesn't have anything to do with a sense of entitlemen—" rank has its privileges?"
A: No.
Q: Do you specifically remember bringing this issue up with (b)(3), (b)(6)?
A: I know that it was brought up. I don't know the exact time. I just said "Sir, do you think that it is smart to do things this way?" He just replied with the explanation about the numbers.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 9 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Are you aware that he gave an OPD on this very topic?
A: No. I don't go to OPDs. I don't know if it was an OPD, but I know that he talked to officers about it—what his thinking on the whole issue was.
Q: At NTC, was it a numbers based issue there as well?
A: I don't know. I really didn't pay attention; I don't even know that that was an issue.
Q: You can see how there would be a perception that if the division was made by rank then the decision is based on rank?
A: It was not just Army guys; it was civilians as well.
Q: But you can see how a soldier on the ground could see that it was mean to create a caste system?
A: Yes. I could see that happening.
Q: When did the command explain to the soldiers at FOB Ghazni about the rationale for the decision to separate out the latrines by rank?
A: I think it happened over a series of events. When the issue came up, it was addressed to "x" amount of people. When it came up again, it was addressed again, and the commander said that if anyone still had a concern that they could come to see him in his office at 1700 that day.
Q: How long had the policy been in place before somebody raised it as an issue that got to the Commander?
A: Officially, I don't know. A lot of this stuff was talked about in little groups, but it probably didn't make it back up as being an issue.
Q: This is a problem across the board in the command climate survey, and I'm wondering why it took so long to get it to the Commander's attention.
A: I don't think the XO and Commander really knew the magnitude of the problem.
Q: Why not?
A: Because nobody explained it to them that way.
Q: But you said that they were approachable.
A: They are approachable if you deal with them a lot. So the door's always open. But do people really take that opportunity to go to them? Not always. Probably not enough. But he won't send anybody away.
Q: Does that mean that he's approachable? Having an open door is one thing, but having someone listen to your issues and thinking that they are going to do something about it are two different things. Wouldn't you agree?
A: Yes. It was put out: "if you have a problem, come see me." Are they coming to see him or not? I can't answer. If I had a problem, I'd go see the guy. If you are an officer and you have a problem, you go see your boss. Some of the NCOs brought it up to me, and I brought it up to the Commander. I told him that there were things going on with the shower issue and that I didn't think it was a good idea. Am I approachable? I think so. I hope so. My door is always open. The thing I always get is that when people get to know me they say that I've changed. I don't change; I'm always this way. (b)(6) I look out for the guys. I put them in the right positions. For example, (b)(3), (b)(6) Did I have the opportunity to get in some E-8s to take that position? Probably. But I know what I have in (b)(3), (b)(6) My commo guy is (b)(3), (b)(6) He's the best commo guy I've ever worked with. Did they want to give me a SFC? Yes. I asked them if I would lose (b)(3), (b)(6) They said yes. I told them that if they had somewhere else to put the SFC, I was good. Do I give them career counseling? I made (b)(6) I must have done something right somewhere. I tell them what I did.
Q: When you tell me that the command climate results came back and they weren't a surprise, why was that?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 10 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT KAF DATED 2012/04/12

8. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you think that you would have identified the issues that were identified in the survey if the survey hadn't been conducted?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: When did the 0800 meetings start?
A: Almost when we got here.
Q: And the command group routinely attends that meeting?
A: I am in there; the S-3 is in there; mostly the XO is in there; everyone who works in the TOC is in there. The battalion commander is not always there, but he usually stays in his office to 0100 or 0200 every night. But he makes every CUB, and he gets updates after the fact. He usually knows everything anyway since he's typically in his office so late. It is more than a shift change; all of the key players brief.
Q: What was the purpose of the SPAWare computer in your tent?
A: When we first got there, in order to be able to talk to the MWR guys, the CRSP Yard guys, and the force provider guys, it all had to be done over AKO. We don't have CENTRIX, and the AKO that we had down there worked really bad. I said, let me put this in here, and two days later it caused a big stir.
Q: So it was simply for NIPR email communications?
A: Yes. I have a phone in my office if I want to call anybody.
Q: The perception was that you also brought a Skype camera back into your room.
A: No. No Skype camera.
Q: Do you know anything about the staff trying to get a command climate survey started right after NTC?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: In light of the results from the command climate survey, do you think that you did your job to the best of your ability?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

Q: Is there any other information that can be helpful in our investigation that we haven't covered?
A: Maybe not so much for us, but for the next unit that does this mission, I would have a lot to say to Big Army. The Special Forces soldiers and the conventional infantry units should come from the same post for this mission so that they can train together before deployment. We should have more VSO training. Relaxed grooming standards need to go away right away. That 18 year old soldier isn't doing any KLEs, he's not talking to any elders, and when we all come back together in the same unit, it is going to make for a big headache. The next thing that happens is disrespect.
Q: Who made the decision on the relaxed grooming standards?
A: I think we had the choice to say no to it, but 1/16 did it, and people thought it was going to be great. But we lack the maturity to do it. On the sites, the SF guys will not correct soldiers, so it's up to that SSG to do it. The other thing is that we are here for a year. The SF guys are here for 6-8 months. We will see three different SF elements during our deployment. We are talking about 17, 18, and 19 year old kids who probably didn't want to be on this mission in the first place. We have issues like this back in the rear.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	(b)(3), (b)(6)		PAGE 11 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

END OF STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of April, 2012 at New Kabul Compound Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

th)

USAF

ath)

Title 16

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERS (b)(3), (b)(6) IENT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE (b)(1)1.4a
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE - AFGHANISTAN
CAMP PATRIOT - FOB WARRIOR, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09311

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

TF- (b)(1)1.4a

25 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Clarification of Sworn Statement for Interview on 12 April 2012

1. Added additional sentence to page nine of sworn statement DA Form 2823 for clarification:

"I rely heavily on the 1SGs and PLT SGTs to gather information about the Soldier's needs and well being. Due to the fact that we have Soldiers at 48 remote sites throughout Afghanistan, and the limited nature of air and ground transportation, especially from Camp Patriot, I rely on my NCO's for atmospherics about the troops. I use this information to prioritize the Battle Field Circulations that I conduct."

2. Paragraph in context with clarifying sentence:

"Q: So you rely on your 1SGs for communication about the soldiers?

A: Yes, I rely heavily on the 1SGs and PLT SGTs to gather information about the Soldier's needs and well being. Due to the fact that we have Soldiers at 48 remote sites throughout Afghanistan, and the limited nature of air and ground transportation, especially from Camp Patriot, I rely on my NCO's for atmospherics about the troops. I use this information to prioritize the Battle Field Circulations that I conduct. But now under the new command group, I have a good relationship with the CSMs at SOTF-S and SOTF-E.

3. Point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SIPR: (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan	2012/04/12 (b)(6)	2134	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

TF (b)(1)1.4a

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank, unit and duty position.

A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: How long have you been in the military?

A: Just over (b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: What are your previous combat tours?

A: 2003-04 Iraq, Camp Victory; 2007-09, Iraq, 2nd BDE/25th Infantry Division

Q: Describe your general duties as TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Q: Have you seen the results of the command climate survey?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 12 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) KEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKI (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Gardabo DATED 2012/04/17

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you think that the personnel in your command consider you to be approachable?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Does he do a good job prioritizing task force needs and supporting the line companies when he can, even before he came over here?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5)

Q: From the time you arrived on Camp Patriot around 26 DEC, how many visits did you get from your higher HQs, whether it be CJSOTF-A, your SBCT command, USFOR-A, CFSOCC-A, ISAF, etc.?
A: BG Haas came at the end of January. About ten days after the Belambai incident, (b)(3), (b)(6) came out. After that (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) came out about five days later.
Q: How well did you know SSG Bales?
A: I did know him. I probably talked to him several times during our main training before NTC. I interacted with him through the AAR process. I did have breakfast with him one time in our chow hall; that was probably well over a year ago. He was actually a platoon sergeant for a while, though he got bumped back down to squad leader when we got some new E-7s in. I did not know him well, but I would say that I knew him well enough that he seemed like a solid NCO.
Q: What was the occasion for the breakfast?
A: We just ran into each other. He was sitting by himself, so I sat to talk with him about the platoon. He was a platoon sergeant at the time. We talked about integrating mounted and dismounted Stryker operations. What I got out of him was a guy who was really trying to help out his platoon and do the right things.
Q: Where you aware of any concerns by any of the battalion leaders about his behavior, his personal troubles or his attitude toward the deployment?
A: No. It is very shocking that the event occurred at all. I think he truly was a good soldier and did all of the right things for his platoon.
Q: In retrospect, is there anything that could have been a warning sign or an indicator of his future actions?
A: No. I found out more in the newspapers about his other troubles. I was actually kind of concerned that the process for his security clearance didn't uncover this. Again, that was all after the fact.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Can you tell me about other incidents involving alcohol or controlled substances at other VSPs, on Camp Patriot or with your soldiers elsewhere, whether ADCON or OPCON?
A: Across the whole task force, we have had several huffing incidents. We had one in HHC at Faizabad. That soldier is on his way home. The others were at the other SOTFs. There is an allegation of either some hash or marijuana smoking in B CO. We still don't have a test back on that yet. The ODA did some kind of a test that would not hold up for UCMJ action. They had to be retested. Through extension, my lawyers shared with me an incident that happened in SOTF-E with a (b)(3), (b)(6) There were two NCOs and two privates who drank beer with him on Christmas Day at his guidance. There is another one at SOTF-E where a soldier was caught with steroids from another ODA. The JAG has told me that there was some issue with either his rights or the evidence, and that will end up being a company level letter of reprimand.
Q: What trainings, briefings, etc. on mental health issues and the use of alcohol and controlled substances did the battalion's soldiers undergo prior to deployment or when you got here?
A: There were several in the GO1(b) RSOI training that we did around NTC time and at Manas. Personally I saw what we did at SOTF-E at Camp Montran, where there were also additional briefings. I told the Company Commanders that they needed to make sure that their E-1s through E-4s needed to understand that this mission required a high level of maturity. That includes how you wear your uniform, basic standards and even security. I know that with SEALs and ODAs, sometimes the standards are good, and sometimes they are a little bit uneven. Each team does their own thing. I said that regardless of what the team does, they need to make sure that they are adhering to the basics. I verbalized that to everybody and the commanders, especially after we started getting some trouble with beards.
Q: Can you describe the circumstances under which you first learned of 2/3's deployment to Afghanistan?
A: At Yakima, we received a Warning Order at the end of May from our Brigade Commander that we were going to Afghanistan, but we didn't know the mission. By July it started to solidify that it was going to be with SF guys. Initially, we were going to replace TF (b)(1)1.4a Originally our sister battalion, 1/23, was going to go to where I am right now but with 1/16 IN, but they didn't have a task force. (b)(3), (b)(6) my Brigade Commander, said that since (b)(3), (b)(6) is an old 82nd guy, he needs to go to the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a area and that I could replace the 1/16 guys. That pushed our deployment ahead, so instead of going in the spring, we were going to go in the winter. So we started to pull all of the information that we could through the SIPR contacts that we had with 1/16. And then we went to NTC for the month of August. We were trying to figure out how we were going to be organized and what we were going to do . The information that we got was very vague. We were trying to figure out how the units were split up and how the C2 arrangement was going to work. It was very difficult to get a straight answer. Things were in flux. This thing was less than a year old at the time. I think things were even still being reorganized at CJSOTF. What we found out is that they had mixed 82nd guys and 1st ID guys across the battle space. They were trying to re-align that so it was just 82nd guys in RC(N) and the rest of the guys down here. That stopped at NTC while we were out training. As soon as we came out of the dust bowl, we started emailing again to find out a few things that we could go to. That's why the S-3 and I went to the Eglin AFB Academic Week during the first or second week of September. Then we had a TB (b)(1)1.4a meeting at Ft. Benning. I sent my Assistant S-3. I sent my S-3 and Assistant S-3 to an MRX with the SEALs. I did all of this through September to try to get any kind of input that we could. The final thing was the October PDSS where we took a small staff slice and the Commanders. My biggest thing was finding out where all of the units are and how they were arranged. So even in October after we had left the PDSS, we were probably in the 80-90% range in terms of the certainty that this is the mission that we were going to do. But there was still some uncertainty. In October we tried to focus just on small unit training and 7-8 stuff. We had gotten some indication from the SF guys that it was important for us to focus on our small unit battle drills. After NTC, which had been focused on a battle-space-owner mission, we tried to get our ranges done and our small unit training done. It wasn't a long time, but we tried to do what we could. We also read the VSO Handbook that they published.
Q: You didn't have much time to do that. You had part of September, October and November.
A: Yes, and November was our block leave.
Q: What steps did you take, given all of that, to ensure that the soldiers had adequate time to spend with their families prior to deployment?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) had a couple of things that I agreed with. We tried to avoid any weekend training, and we took the block leave. Those were the main things. We had to manage all of the pack out and turn in our Strykers. It was very challenging to get all of the administrative and SRP things done. SRP had to be done by the "eaches." Instead of an Alpha Roster, orders had to be cut on an individual basis.
Q: Why did they do that?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I don't know. I assume Corps needed to validate that everyone makes it through instead of taking the unit's word for it. It is very tedious.

Q: I heard that about 48-hours before block leave, they cancelled your deployment.

A: Yes. I was actually supposed to give my TF (b)(1)1.4a brief to (b)(3), (b)(6) We had the staff and commanders assembled to brief what we were going to do. The S-3 and the Commander came into my office. I pulled some senior leaders in, and they shared the news. I asked them at that time "is this 100% shut off?" They said "yes." We went into the meeting, but (b)(3), (b)(6) didn't want the brief. He talked to the leaders and we talked about what we could do to mitigate this and what to do if it got turned back on. Apparently they still had to really, really verify it. We had some guys who had questions about housing. We told guys that we would call them on leave by November 5 to tell them if it is a go or no-go. Some of these guys had a short time line to effect some of the financial or housing issues or other administrative things that you need to do for deployment. The Brigade was going to call back to get the real deal, because it would have resulted in an RFF change and some other real hard paperwork to be done. I reached out to (b)(3), (b)(6) from the 82nd Airborne was going to be the guy who replaced me to share all of the information that we had put together from our preparation and the PDSS. I sent my S-3 and my Company Commander out to Ft. Bragg on the 3rd or 4th of November to go brief them on what we knew. Literally when (b)(3), (b)(6) was at the airport, we got the phone call that said the mission was still on. He literally got on a plane from Fayettville and came back home.

Q: He didn't get much block leave either?

A: I had him traveling. I pulled him out of CGSC to go to LTP1 because we were on such a short string. Of course as soon as he got to the unit, we did an LTP, NTC, Eglin AFB, and an MRX. Not only was it a new mission, but the mission was SOF. (b)(3), (b)(6) was quite a hero.

Q: Can you tell me what TF (b)(1)1.4a mission statement?

A: Our mission is to conduct VSO for the districts of Gelan, Muqer and Nawan. Muqer has now since dropped off. We originally had a FID mission, but BG Haas reduced it down to just the VSO mission.

Q: How do you see your relationship with your subordinate ODAs and with CJSOTF now?

A: Now, pretty good.

Q: Was it rocky at the start?

A: No. I had some conversations with (b)(3), (b)(6) Of every report that I sent, I'd get some feedback on them occasionally. There were some issues with, for example, officer moves. LTs can't stay in a job for two years if they are a PL. We had a plan to move one of our officers out of SOTF-E with about a four-week overlap. We wanted to do this toward the end of March/early April to beat the fighting season. Once that was discovered, it was negated, which puts us in a bind as far as officer moves. LTs start stacking up.

Q: Who negated it?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) We talked about it over the phone. I told him that I would have to redo the slate and come back to him on it. I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) about it subsequently and he kind of had the opposite idea, and I am going to show him my plan here shortly. With the ODAs, the one issue that I can think of specifically is with ODA (b)(1)1.4a Gelan. (b)(3), (b)(6) actually approached me directly and said that his AOB thought that we weren't getting along very well, and he wanted to make sure that we were. I said that we absolutely are. He said that they thought we were giving us too much detail in the SITREPs. I think that the one at Faizabad was a little more remote, it was a tough one. They just got their commander here. He had a baby and didn't deploy until a couple of months later. We talk to them on the phone and by VTC. They had a rough time in terms of getting supplied, but I think the relationship is OK.

Q: How would you rate your level of communication and operational effectiveness up and down the chain? What would you do to improve it?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Until they get more combat power, they can't really push south, even though I would prefer that.
Q: Do you think that your battle staff can do the battle tracking and support that is required for the two VSP sites or any new ones that might appear?
A: As a matter of fact, my S-3 just sent up some information to (b)(3), (b)(6) on an issue that we have discussed about expanding out to Paktika so that we can have fixed and rotary wing support. We have also talked to him about taking on an AOB and a few more ODAs plus an ODA that was partnered with a Commando Kandak. One of our big frustrations is that of all of the SOTFs, we didn't have a shaping force because the ODAs at the VSP don't have any teeth. The Commandos can be that teeth and then you can use (b)(1)1.4a or (b)(1)1.4a, which are out of the Polish side. Now that we have a new battlespace owner, we are trying to incorporate them. We are obviously in direct support to the battlespace owner, but we've been on the ground for a while and can give at least some guidance and recommendations about where to do shaping operations. We believe that with a larger footprint, we can better do that.
Q: How do you see your role and responsibilities with the companies that are OPCON to the other SOTFs?
A: First is to maintain a positive relationship because they are pretty frustrated. I won't say that it is all bad. As a matter of fact, I got a note today from my B CO Commander about a SEAL Platoon that gave some kudos to one of my LTs and an NCO who work with one of the FLETACs. I've gotten a couple of notes like that giving kudos to our guys and generally I get notes saying that the guys are doing pretty well. Of course I get all of the bad news too. And we try to temper that with the conversations that I have with the commanders. A couple days ago I got some feedback. I had asked them about PT and the standards and discipline, and they came back with the fact that they wanted to be more inclusive of their lowest level leadership when they do either BFCs or VTCs. What was occurring is that something bad would happen; I would call them on it and they would pass the word down to the platoon leadership. What they were finding was that the word wasn't getting down to the individual soldier level. They were looking for ways to address whole VSPs at one time so that the information got out but also so that it didn't feel like a beating about the head and shoulders every time something happened. They came back with some other PT plans in places where you can't run.
Q: It's pretty tough to do this through VTCs and phone calls?
A: Yes. I call it "remote control."
Q: You actually don't have any operational control over them at all.
A: Correct. Zero.
Q: All that you can do is to encourage them to do these things.
A: Right. But they are taking my guidance just as if I was their real life commander, which I am.
Q: And you will rate them when this is done?
A: Yes.
Q: And they will have the same problems because at the end of the day when they have squads out on other sites they can only exhort them to do certain things.
A: Yes. Sometimes only teams. With the SEAL platoons, because they are larger, they will often split the squads, and you will have very junior guys out there.
Q: Did you have any input into how the platoon leadership was split up? In the case of B CO, which we know about because of Belambai, the platoon leader and platoon sergeant are actually both located at the same site rather than splitting them up to cover two different sites.
A: That was not a decision that I made.
Q: Total operational control by the SOTF?
A: Right. That is one of the things that I want to talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) about as well. These kinds of things all relate back to standards and discipline, officer professional development, and managing soldiers that may lack some of the maturity necessary. It all comes together in me wanting to make sure that this is something that we get ahead of. Based on my brief conversation with him, I think he will be supportive. For future units coming into this mission, it must be addressed. It's not that the SOF leadership wakes up in the morning and wants to do a bad job. But I think that they are very team-centric. They have E-8s, E-7s and E-6s in their teams that are very mature guys. They treat the lower enlisted infantry guys like that, but they're not quite ready for it in some cases. Sometimes there are, but there can be some friction. That's what we've seen in the several instances that we have had out there.
Q: I assume that you will try to capture that in your 90-day AAR?
A: I have a draft on my desk already.
Q: Following the return from NTC, what direction did you or your staff give to the companies to prepare the unit's equipment for re-task organization and deployment?
A: There were two parts. The first was splitting property books. The XO, the S-3 and I all had input. The XO was probably most directly involved. He actually reviewed the lists of what equipment was going to go.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEM (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 8 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Some of it was pretty standard, the Strykers for example. Getting things inventoried and loaded, though, was a challenge. Several times I said that this was a high-friction area—the transition point between a Rear-D and the forward elements (b)(1)1.4a with serial numbers needed to be counted and recounted. For the mission-set, it was going to be small unit patrolling, so my general guidance was that anything that had to do with a dismounted infantry squad had to go. We specified a few other things—a lighting kit, motion detectors, those types of things. It was kind of our best guess about what does light infantry look like with an SF unit. That's the guidance that we gave.

Q: I heard that your entire battalion was only authorized 17 CONNEXs. Is that correct?

A: Roger. I don't know what the final count was, but that was the number at the first cut.

Q: And that was for all of your gear?

A: Right. (b)(3), (b)(6) actually wanted to bring some tents, but I don't think they made it on. They probably would have helped us out.

Q: In your estimation, did the commanders have sufficient time and resources to follow appropriate property accountability measures before deployment?

A: On the surface, there was a lot of guidance to do that, and I would say "yes." But on the backside, I told them that if we have to burn the midnight oil, then we're going to have to do it. I told them that they had to come back to me and tell me if they needed to go into the weekend or something like that. But nobody ever came back to me to say that they just absolutely could not do it. There was a realization that things were pretty tight.

Q: You just didn't have a lot of time, but your guys got it done without working weekends? People still go their block leave?

A: Yes. Again, I'm sure that there were XOs or Supply Sergeants working certain areas. On balance, though, it was done in the time allotted.

Q: JBLM has seen a lot of units deploy, so I presume that they were helpful to you.

A: Yes.

Q: Following the PDSS visit and the development of the build-out plan for the camp, who was responsible for monitoring the progress of that construction?

A: Under the SPO shop at CJSOTF, (b)(3), (b)(6) a Navy guy out at the site.

Q: So this was under CJSOTF's control?

A: Yes. There was nobody there from our unit.

Q: They were communicating back with your staff via VTC?

A: Yes. Primarily through the XO. When we were there in October, I went to the Polish Commander and I asked him if we could have a certain portion of the camp. We then built a plan based on the SOTF HQs that we had seen. We took it to CJSOTF, and they signed off on it. I confirmed with them that this needed to be done by December in a couple of months.

Q: At what point did you learn that this build out was not going to be complete by the time you arrived?

A: When we were at Camp Montran.

Q: So after you arrived at BAF?

A: They had built a few of the buildings—the OPCEN and SUBCEN. The B-huts, the gym and the DFAC were not completed. It was later that we found out that those buildings were getting killed anyway under the FAM-C Board process.

Q: So the condition of the camp when you got there was pretty austere. Why do you think that they didn't make any more progress than they did?

A: It was probably because of the ad-hoc team that they had in place. It was a Navy Chief Petty Officer who was in charge. He was rotating out in January, so it was his last project. There probably wasn't someone down there being the ramrod. Again, I assume that's all they had, and that's what we got so we decided to work with it.

Q: I understand that even when you arrived down there, you still had to put up the tents, so people were sleeping in the OPCEN and SUBCEN buildings.

A: Correct. Some people were also able to sleep in B-huts and in the DFAC tent. We weren't using it as a DFAC then.

Q: What did you assess in priority order of the critical things that needed to be done in terms of build out once you got there?

A: Before we got there, I said that the OPCEN needed to be up with all of the commo infrastructure. The gym and life support areas could be done when we got there. Once we arrived, the OPCEN was pretty well complete. They were just working out bugs. There were still some things, but I felt like if we could get the OPCEN and SUBCEN operating, we could do our mission.

Q: What obstacles did you encounter in making progress on the deficiencies in the build-out?

A: Once we tried to re-address the living quarters, we found out that because o budgetary cuts CJSOTF was going to kill that.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 9 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Once we got another tent and cleared out the DFAC, we tried to establish one hot meal a day in there so people didn't have to walk all the way to the Polish side. Since then the 82nd has built another facility right outside of our camp, so we can go there.
Q: So you could make do with MREs and the Polish DFAC?
A: Yes, but at one point during the winter, the Polish DFAC went black on both food and fuel.
Q: Do you think CJSOTF-A provided adequate support for you to get Camp Patriot established both before and after your arrival?
A: For us to be operational, yes. We could do our job. I addressed that with BG Haas also. I told him that it was austere but that we could handle it and were working to improve it every day. I think we got the level of support that they could afford. I don't want to be too negative on it, but it was a challenge.
Q: You did have an expectation, though, after the PDSS that you would arrive, go through RSOI and arrive at a camp that was complete?
A: Relatively finished. Again, that may not have been realistic on my part. They only had two months to do it. It wasn't like we were going into an austere location in BAF. We were at a location with nothing going into austere conditions.
Q: How often were you able to get out Camp Woods, Latif or other locations?
A: In early January and during the tail end of December I was able to get out. The weather wasn't too bad. We actually went and frocked a 1SG out at FOB Laghman. In mid-January we got out to BAF to do a conference with the CJSOTF commander. In February I did get out to FOB Ghazni to meet with the PCOP, PGOV and some of the leaders up there. After about mid-February, it was pretty rough. I remember on the 13th I got the PCOP to agree to give us some rifles for our ALP. By the 17th he drove down to give us those weapons but couldn't go any further because a blizzard came in.
Q: Was the decision on the E-8 and above latrines based solely on numbers or was it an effort to separate the ranks in some way?
A: I didn't have any philosophy initially when I saw it. A lot of people had access to the other side, Trident (b)(1)1.4a had been there for some months, and it didn't really bother me at all. But then when the maintenance issues started to come up, I tried to determine whether this was a function of usage and how we could divide up the usage. Since we had the separate latrine for (b)(1)1.4a and then someone put a sign up that said "Officers" (I did not direct this), I said let's just put down DoD civilians and E-8s and above. We just added the civilians to what was there because (b)(1)1.4a had departed by that time. I did a rough estimate on the numbers and then I got real numbers on it, and it turned out to be a little bit higher on the DoD civilian and officer side. I figured out that it was about balanced and that we were going to have equal usage. I think there were some initial concerns about what we were going to do if one side broke down. I told them to put on the sign that if one side breaks down, you can use either side. That was not rank specific. To answer your question, yes—this was driven by the numbers. It was mainly a takeoff on what had occurred with the (b)(1)1.4a and the officer only thing. I just extended it to make it not rank specific segregation but numerical segregation.
Q: When it became apparent that this was unpopular with some people, did (b)(3), (b)(6) or the XO bring that up with you? Did it come to you prior to the command climate survey?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: What are you taking forward from the command climate survey? What changes are you making now?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 10 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/17

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: I understand that there may have been some tension between your XO and the AOBs and the JLOC. Did he come to you and tell you that he was running into a brick wall?
A: I told him that was where I needed to come in. He'd never come to me and say that he was at a brick wall, but he would address some things with me. I would essentially give him some guidance on how to push it in a different direction and figure out how to articulate it in a better way because maybe we're not giving the message in the right way. He never told me that he had an absolute failure and needed me to call the boss.
Q: So 1/16's HQs became a VSCC and 1/505 had some teams under its control in the north?
A: Yes. I think they had about 7 teams and an AOB. They were located about five feet from an airfield as well.
Q: Who is the other battalion here doing the mission?
A: 1/30 out of 3rd ID. They replaced One Panther up north. They are a combined arms battalion.
Q: Is there any other information that we haven't asked you about that you'd like to provide that could be helpful in any aspect of this investigation?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 11 OF 12 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Kandahar DATED 2012/04/12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: We dealt with a lot of command climate survey issues here, and I know that the overarching issue is SSG Bales. I know that there are connections to be made. SSG Bales seemed to be a very solid NCO. I know that there were obvious issues, and I'll take full responsibility for those whether there was an austere situation or not. I won't say that we can blame everything on the snow. We have personalities also, and we'll take full responsibility for that. But as far as any connections between the two, I think it would be a pretty big stretch. It's not that there is not a question to ask, but the horrific event that occurred is just that. No one that I've talked to has indicated that he was the weird kid in the third row that everyone thought was going to do something strange. Not in a million years.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

(b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH [redacted] . I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND H[redacted] CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOU[redacted] THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR [redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

Subscribe[redacted] administer oaths, this 25 day of April, 2012

at New Kabul Compound, Afghanistan

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HEADQUARTERS, TASK FORCE (b)(3), (b)(6)
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN
CAMP PATRIOT - FOB WARRIOR, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09311

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF

TF- (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

25 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Clarification of Sworn Statement for Interview on 12 April 2012

1. Added sentence to ninth sworn statement DA FORM 2823 for clarification:

"In no way was it to separate the DOD Civilians or ranks as a sign of entitlement or privilege but as a method of capacity management."

2. Paragraph in context with clarifying sentence:

"Q: Was the decision on the E-8 and above latrines based solely on numbers or was it an effort to separate the ranks in some way?

A: I didn't have any philosophy initially when I saw it. In no way was it to separate the DOD Civilians or ranks as a sign of entitlement or privilege but as a method of capacity management. A lot of people had access to the other side, Triden(b)(1)1.4a had been there for some months, and it didn't really bother me at all. But then when the maintenance issues started to come up, I tried to determine whether this was a function of usage and how we could divide up the usage. Since we had the separate latrine fo(b)(1)1.4a and then someone put a sign up that said "Officers" (I did not direct this), I said let's just put down DoD civilians and E-8s and above. We just added the civilians to what was there becaus(b)(1)1.4a had departed by that time. I did a rough estimate on the numbers and then I got real numbers on it, and it turned out to be a little bit higher on the DoD civilian and officer side. I figured out that it was about balanced and that we were going to have equal usage. I think there were some initial concerns about what we were going to do if one side broke down. I told them to put on the sign that if one side breaks down, you can use either side. That was not rank specific. To answer your question, yes—this was driven by the numbers. It was mainly a takeoff on what had occurred with the(b)(1)1.4a and the officer only thing. I just extended it to make it not rank specific segregation but numerical segregation.

3. Point of contact is the undersigned, SVOIP (b)(6).

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A 21April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 19 April 2012 Phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The purpose of the phone call was to explore some of the command climate issues raised in the TF (b)(1)1.4a interviews touching on their interaction with their OPCON headquarters. The following is a summary of the questions and answers during this phone conversation.

2. The establishment of the 2-3 IN Headquarters as TF (b)(1)1.4a

   a. Question: Some in TF (b)(1)1.4a headquarters felt that they "were not wanted as a headquarters."

   b. Answer: CJSOTF-A absolutely did not set a tone of not wanting them. Did everything possible to make them feel wanted - multiple SVTCs, the PDSS, and the right seat/left seat training, for example.

2. CJSOTF-A perception of TF (b)(1)1.4a

   a. Question: TF (b)(1)1.4a members recount that they were seen as needy because they kept asking for things to fix their living conditions. Also, the J3 asked one of the Top 3 why they hadn't deployed yet from Camp Montrond, when they were still in their train-up period. (b)(3), (b)(6) also puts the responsibility for a two-week delay in leaving Camp Montrond on (b)(6) staff failures, even though 2-3 is still in their train-up period. Some TF (b)(1)1.4a personnel also report the impression that they just were not seen as a real SOTF. Comments?

   b. Answer: (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware of these perceptions among his staff officers toward TF (b)(1)1.4a

3. Logistical support of ODAs that were OPCON to TF (b)(1)1.4a

   a. Question: Was he aware that the ODAs placed OPCON to TF (b)(1)1.4a were still going to their ADCON AOBs without coordinating with TF (b)(1)1.4a That TF (b)(1)1.4a at least wanted the chance to try to arrange the support?

   b. Answer: He was under the impression that this was happening because TF (b)(1)1.4a could not or would not support the ODAs. He was not aware that this was being worked around TF (b)(1)1.4a He did note that (b)(3), (b)(6) did not bring any of these points up in the frequent VTCs he had with (b)(3), (b)(6)

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4. Infrastructure and life support at Camp Patriot.

a. Question: Why wasn't Camp Patriot completed by the time of 2-3's arrival, as 2-3 was led to believe from their PDSS? Why was their additional construction in mid-January denied by the FAM-C?

b. Answer: CJSTOF-A only had a contingent of (b)(1)1.4a Seabees to cover all of their (b)(1)1.4a VSP sites. He had to prioritize their work, which included the OPCEN and SUPCEN first, with life support to follow later. They decided to give them a Bare Base set because that is what they had provided to TF (b)(1)1.4a in RC-North, plus they were going to have some existing B-huts to use. In mid-January, when the lumber ordered during the PDSS finally arrived, he did veto the use of the lumber via the FAM-C because they had the B-huts and a sufficient Bare Base set, and he had higher priorities elsewhere for his Seabees on new VSP sites.

c. Question: Was he aware that the Bare Base set arrived three man-tents short? That the Bare Base Force Provider Latrine/Shower set arrived minus the plumbing fittings and some key electrical components? That the Life Support System latrine trailers also arrived without plumbing hook-ups and with a European-standard electrical system incompatible with the power supply available?

d. Answer: No, he was not aware, and this was not brought to his attention by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) When BG Haas visited TF (b)(1)1.4a at the end of January, he did suggest to (b)(3), (b)(6) that he should talk to (b)(3), (b)(6) about life support issues, which did. However, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not bring up these issues.

e. Question: Was he aware that the SEALs still at Camp Patriot kept most of the B-huts for themselves and kept one of the two working latrines locked just for their own use?

f. Answer: No, but the SEALs would have been OPCON to (b)(3), (b)(6) at that point, so he should have simply used his rank to rectify the situation.

5. NOTE: THE ONLY CJSOTF-A VISIT TO TF (b)(1)1.4a WAS ON 21 MARCH AFTER THE WORST WAS WELL OVER. THEY HAD TRIED TO GET THERE BUT WEATHER CANCELLATIONS AND AIRCRAFT AVAILABILITY HAD PRECLUDED EARLIER VISITS.

6. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6) DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell

RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

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Command Climate Survey Comments Overview (Results)

TF (b)(1)1.4a

(Good) Sustainments –

1. NCOs taking care of SMs
2. Maintain MWR standards for Troops
3. Cohesion amongst lower enlisted is high
4. Staff remains operationally effective for SOTF
5. Good relationship between Junior officers, Junior and Senior Enlisted NCOs
6. Morale is high maintained at section/company level due to cohesiveness and ability to work together as a collective team
7. MWR i.e. Spaware, internet
8. Chaplain services
9. The organization has not lost any SMs

(Bad) Needs Improvements –

1. 42% of SMs feel that the BC, CSM and XO are not concerned with the welfare and morale of their subordinate. The comments are supported by timelines and significant events described in the Command Climate survey questionnaire and additional questions added to the survey.
2. Manpower and Personnel management i.e. guard roster and convoy ops. SMs feel that they are being improperly managed with workloads. The 1SG detail to improve Camp Patriot Ops was mentioned often throughout the needs improvement blocks and the additional 5 questions added to the survey
3. Communication breakdown from higher i.e. BC, CSM, and XO to the subordinate staff elements (Subordinates feel that they do not have a voice or input to decisions made within their organization besides their influence on their sections/platoons)
4. Inadequate berthing and latrines was brought up a significant number of times (The rank separation of latrines has an immense affect on morale)
5. Lack of training prior to the deployment - this is reflected by 53% responding that they were not well prepared for current operations from the Command Climate Survey Scoring sheet
6. Force Protection inadequate
7. Communication from top to the lowest level to include between the staff and command leadership
8. Support from the CJSOTF i.e. resources for MHE, Funding approval for contracts for hard billets

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HHC 2-3IN Command Climate Survey AAR

What was supposed to happen:
(b)(3), (b)(6) (GSB, 7th SFG EO/SHARP Rep) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (2-3IN EOL) are to conduct a Command Climate Survey IOT provide the Commander a review of the unit with assessment upon his/her command. Assess leadership, cohesion, morale and human relations within the environment which can have a direct impact on the effectiveness of the Commanders unit.

What did happen: starting on 221900LMAR12 SMs from HHC 2-3IN were briefed on the intent and purpose of the Command Climate survey administered by (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (2-3IN EOL). Immediately after the survey SHARP (Sexual Harassment/Assault Response Program) Training was conducted. An additional class was given after at 2020. The next morning training continued at 231000LMAR12 and the remaining SMs were surveyed and briefed. 96/137 SMs from HHC 2-3IN were issued the survey and provided SHARP.

What went well:
96 SMs from HHC 2-3IN were trained and issued the Command Climate survey. 60% percent of the unit had not been introduced to the SHARP program or brief so this portion proved to be a very effective block of instruction to junior Officers/NCOs and lower enlisted SMs within the unit. The Battalion CO and BN CSM were eager to view the results of the CCS and adamant toward making adjustments to address the significant issues and attempt to raise the morale within the Company. The BN CO and CSM were also given the SHARP brief and given feedback of the Soldiers responses and views from the briefs. A copy of the SHARP brief was given to them for guidance and as a training aid.

What went did not go well:
-Due to detachments at multiple outstations conducting various missions i.e. Latif, Fiaz Abab and Camp Woods, all 137 SMs assigned to HHC 2-3IN were not available for the Command Climate survey.
-Provide adequate space to conduct survey i.e. classroom environment. 2% of the surveys were not taken seriously.
-It was obvious by the responses that few of the SMs have very cavalier attitudes and did not adhere to the intent of the survey.

What could be done better:
-As an alternate approach for the survey conduct focus groups at junior NCO/Officer and lower enlisted level. Ensure units facilitate EOL training at Battalion and Company level prior to deployment.

-Commanders/1SGs provide Command Climate surveys upon 30-60 days of taking command to capture or highlight issues within section/company/battalion. Once these issues are captured as a way ahead provide guidance to Key Leaders to mitigate the effects from impacting SMs at all levels.

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SCORING WORKSHEET

QUESTION NUMBER	Strongly agree/Agree		Neither agree nor disagree		Strongly disagree/Disagree		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Q1: Officers care	32	33	24	25	40	42	96
Q2: NCOs care	65	68	22	23	9	9	96
Q3: Junior enlisted care	73	76	15	16	8	8	96
Q4: Easy to see CO	29	31	34	36	32	34	95
Q5: Easy to see 1SG	63	66	19	20	14	15	96
Q6: Work well together	68	71	21	22	7	7	96
Q7 Supervisor example	75	78	10	10	11	11	96
Q8: Counseling/coaching	48	51	17	18	30	32	95
Q9: Get training needed	65	68	14	15	16	17	95
	No		Yes, once in a while		Yes, frequently, very frequently		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Q10: Racist materials	81	85	12	13	2	2	95
Q11: Sexist materials	79	83	15	16	1	1	95
	None/Slight		Moderate		High-Extremely High		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Q12: Level of stress	20	21	21	22	55	57	96
	14 or more days		8-10 days, 11-13 days		1-3 days, 4-7 days		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Q13: Days training schedule posted in advance	6	6	6	6	84	88	96
	Extremely, Very, Moderately		Slighty, Not at all helpful				Total
	#	%	#	%			
Q14: Unit assistance	36	40	55	60			91
	Very great, Great, Moderate		Slight extent, Not at all				Total
	#	%	#	%			
Q15: Treated with respect	59	63	35	37			94
Q16: Interest in families	55	57	41	43			96
Q17: Interest in single Soldiers	49	52	45	48			94
Q18: Dealing with adversity	43	49	45	51			88
	Very well, Well, Moderately		Not well, Not at all prepared				Total
	#	%	#	%			
Q19: Perform wartime mission	45	47	50	53			95
	Very high, High, Moderate		Low, Very low				Total
	#	%	#	%			
Q20: Own morale	39	41	57	59			96
	Marked		Not marked				Total
	#	%	#	%			
Q21: 1 No, Not discriminated	81	88	11	12			92
Q21: 2 Yes, Racial	7	8	85	92			92
Q21: 3 Yes, Religious	2	2	90	98			92
Q21: 4 Yes, Gender (sex)	3	3	89	97			92
Q21: 5 Yes, National Origin	2	2	90	98			92
	No		Yes, Not affected		Yes, Affected		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Q22: Sexually harassed	93	98	0	0	2	2	95
	No		Yes, On installation		Yes, Off installation		Total
	#	%	#	%	#	%	
Q23: Sexually assaulted	96	100	0	0	0	0	96
	Very likely, Likely		Unlikely, Very unlikely				Total
	#	%	#	%			
Q24: Report incident	60	63	36	38			96

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY:	Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).
PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:	To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.
ROUTINE USES:	Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.
DISCLOSURE:	Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
FOB Ghazni, Afghanistan	2012/04/08	1635	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
TF (b)(1)1.4a

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name and rank.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your duty position?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What is your unit of assignment?
A: 2/3 INF
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Approximately (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat deployments do you have?
A: Two-the other one was in Iraq.
Q: What is your MOS?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What are your normal responsibilities?
A: Normally, I would just be the (b)(3), (b)(6) Here I am also the NCOIC of the VSCC, and for Camp Woods. I am the senior enlisted soldier and the Camp Mayor.
Q: Who asked you to provide the command climate survey and why?
A: First, I got a message from (b)(3), (b)(6) When I returned the call, I spoke to him about doing an EO and command climate survey for TF (b)(1)1.4a
Q: About how long ago was that?
A: Approximately 20 March.
Q: Were the questions on the survey standard, or were they drafted to address the issues that were specific to this unit?
A: The first two pages looked like the standard questionnaire. The third page had five questions that were more specific to the command group and command climate.
Q: Can you describe the results of the command climate survey?
A: In my opinion, they were negative.
Q: How does that survey compare to other surveys that you have performed?
A: The worst one I have ever seen.
Q: Do you think that the survey represented a good cross-section of the people in TF (b)(1)1.4a
A: Yes.
Q: Did anything in particular stand out to you concerning the results?

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) KING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Woods DATED 2012 04 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

A: Pretty much everyone had the same issues. Usually different people have different issues. In this case everyone identified pretty much the same issues.
Q: Before you conducted the survey, did you make TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership aware that a survey would be performed?
A: After I contacted (b)(3), (b)(6) I received several phone calls about my ETA to FOB Warrior to conduct that survey. I was called by (b)(3), (b)(6) the S-3 SGM, and the HHC Commander. So they were well aware.
Q: What was the nature of their contact?
A: To see if I was tracking the information on the survey.
Q: So it was just coordination?
A: Yes.
Q: What did you tell the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership, if anything, about what to tell their subordinates about the upcoming command climate survey?
A: I did not advise them of anything due to the fact that I really didn't know the nature of it at the time. (b)(3), (b)(6) said that he was going to brief me when I arrived.
Q: So you didn't talk in advance to the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership in advance about the nature or the content of the survey?
A: Correct. That was handled by (b)(3), (b)(6) but I'm not sure if he actually contacted them.
Q: Is there anything else that you would like to tell us about the survey or the survey results?
A: No. I think it was pretty much clear.
Q: As I looked through the survey results, I noticed maybe five people who had some level of discomfort based on perceived discrimination or sexual harassment issues, one of them seriously. Is that average, above average or below average for a command climate survey?
A: It is about average, based on my experience. The two who had a sexual assault issue, their issue was handled shortly prior to the command climate survey. One soldier received an Article 15 that dealt with both issues.
Q: How many command climate surveys have you done in the past?
A: At least three.
Q: Did anyone from your chain of command contact you once they found out about the survey?
A: Many people contacted me to find out how many people had completed the survey.
Q: Did anyone contact you to ask you details about what the questions would be or anything like that?
A: Once the CSM contacted me to get an update, but I didn't give him any information like that.
Q: What did he ask?
A: He basically asked me, "does it look good or does it look bad?"
Q: You said that you have done three command climate surveys?
A: Yes. At least.
Q: Were all of those done in theater?
A: Negative: this was my first one in theater.
Q: How long have you been involved in Equal Opportunity?
A: I went to the class in 2006.
Q: Have you been serving in that capacity ever since?
A: Off and on. I was never officially appointed the EO officer of TF (b)(1)1.4a for 2/3.
Q: When you are asked to do a command climate survey, is it typical for the person doing the survey to talk to the leadership about what is going to be done?
A: The ones I have done before were company level. For those the company commander is the one who had requested me to do the survey, so he would be totally in the loop.
Q: What if it is not the commander who is requesting the survey?
A: I have never done one like that before.
Q: How is the survey administered?
A: Normally there is a form, and you give them a briefing with basic administrative notes. You give everyone enough space so they can write and nobody is looking over their shoulder.
Q: So you do it as a group?
A: Yes. It can be done either/or, but we prefer to do it as a group because if you do it individually it is easier to track who said what.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP WOODS DATED 2012 04 08

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Are you able to get a sense of whether people are really forthcoming or whether there is a chilling effect when people fill these surveys out?
A: About 80% of the soldiers took it seriously; about 20% did not feel that anything would be done about the issues.
Q: How do you know? Did some soldiers talk to you about it?
A: Yes. In fact one soldier didn't even write anything. He thought that either nothing would be done or that there would be repercussions. This was a senior NCO.
Q: In the other surveys that you conducted, did you ever have a similar issue?
A: Never this much of an issue; the morale wasn't as bad in the other units.

END STATEMENT

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREE THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INF (b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

TITLE 10
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIAL (b)(3), (b)(6) MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Woods/FOB Ghazni, Afghanistan	2012/04/09	1035	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
HHC 2/3 INF, Commander

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH.

Q: Please state your full name.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How many combat tours have you had?
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What are your current duties and responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Are you normally based at Camp Patriot or at Camp Woods?
A: Camp Patriot. Right now we are doing a resupply operation.
Q: How long have you been associated with the current TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?
A: Since (b)(3), (b)(6) took command of the battalion (August 2010) until present. Since right after we returned from Iraq.
Q: How often do you interact with the battalion leadership?
A: Daily.
Q: Please describe the overall command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: Have you seen or been a part of specific issues with the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership which would reflect negatively on the command?
(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 6 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Loop DATED 9 APR 12

9 STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: Did the TF (b)(1)1.4a command set a tone where it was clear that the command cared for the welfare of the soldiers in the unit?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Q: As HHC Commander, you had two combat-oriented platoons, the scouts and the mortars. How were you training them for the VSO-specific mission?
A: After the PDSS in September 2011, I decided that the mortar platoon would be the FLE TAC, and the scout platoon would be divided into three teams for VSO. As far as training, we focused on the squad live fires and a lot of classes about the VSO mission based on information provided by the SOTF-E personnel during the PDSS. The VSO training was all classroom based. We did have a group of Special Forces and SEALS who came to give classes on VSO.
Q: Tactically, what did you have your squads focused on in terms of training over the two months prior to deployment?
A: Basic squad live fires and maneuvers. Good infantry squad fundamentals.
Q: You were part of the PDSS. Walk me through the issues with the living conditions on Camp Patriot and how they were addressed.
A: During the PDSS we met with the (b)(1)1.4a SEAL Platoon, who had just enough B-huts to house that one platoon. We were briefed by the CJSTOF team about how they would begin building and increase the living footprint on Camp Patriot. We gave them our input, and all of the structures were supposed to be built prior to our arrival. In actuality, that did not happen. Due to the winter weather and lack of oversight, the living conditions were not established prior to our occupation of Camp Patriot.
Q: In addition to the issue of housing, what else was missing?
A: The latrines were not operational. They were in place but not operating. There were only two port-a-johns for the whole TF. There were two B-hut latrines, but they were not fully operational. Food was sporadic during the winter. This impacted the Polish Battalion next to us as well. At one point, we had to eat MREs for lunch.
Q: How were those living conditions eventually addressed?
A: Through our SUPCEN Director, S-4 (b)(3), (b)(6) as well as through our XO and CSM up to CJSOTF. (b)(3), (b)(6) kept addressing the issues through our GSV Support Commander.
Q: How would you have done things differently given the condition in which you received Camp Patriot?
A: We did build burn latrines as a contingency. We used some of the latrines on the Polish side as well. We never had to use the burn latrines.
Q: Did you build field expedient showers?
A: We used the showers on the Polish side, which required us to exit our camp.
Q: Do you think that any of the command climate issues bled over to subordinate companies that are out on the VSO mission?
A: No.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Woods DATED 8 APR 12

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Q: SSG Bales was one of your platoon sergeants when you were (b)(3), (b)(6)
A: Yes.
Q: What is your general impression of him and his capabilities?
(b)(3), (b)(6) A: I had a very good impression. He was motivated and enforced discipline and standards. He mentored an elite platoon leader. He was a very disciplined and competent platoon sergeant.
Q: In hindsight, were there any warnings or indicators that might have led you to think that he could do something like this?
A: He did express that the reason why he is in the infantry is to kill the enemy. Whenever we did live fires and battle drills, he emphasized to his soldiers how important it was to be vigilant and to engage the enemy. He was very offensive minded. That would be the only thing that came to mind as possible indicators.
Q: Did he ever express a dislike, a disdain or a hatred for Iraqis or Afghans in general?
A: No. Not to my recollection.
Q: You mentioned that there was one NCO who went to the commander to discuss the latrine issue. Do you ever wonder why only one guy presented himself on this issue? Was that a good sign or a bad sign?
A: I think it was a bad sign. My deduction would be that most other soldiers or NCOs thought that the opportunity to discuss would not really be a discussion. It would just be an opportunity for them to voice their opinion, and (b)(3), (b)(6) would not really change his mind.
Q: Do you think there was any concern on their part that their questions or concerns would be viewed in a negative light and that there would be repercussions from that?
A: No. I don't think that would be the reason why.
Q: You just think that they thought it would be a waste of time?
A: Roger, but I don't think anyone thought there would be negative repercussions.
Q: Please describe the circumstances of the sensing session that you described earlier.
A: I held one for HHC prior to deploying, and then this session was at the 100-day mark. We had just gone through the winter, and I wanted to get some feedback from the soldiers in a non-threatening sensing session-type climate in order to make some more improvements to the quality of life for soldiers now that we could get more rotary support with the better weather. Also, this was right after the Belambai incident. It was just a good time to do a sensing session.
Q: Was the session focused on actions within the company, or did you discuss battalion leadership?
(b)(3), (b)(6) A: No. At the beginning of the session, I made it clear that the purpose of the session was to discuss company issues that myself or the first sergeant could address. I told them that if there were any battalion-related issues, they could bring them up or write them up on a 3x5 card, but that was not supposed to be the focus. I said I would address those issues to the battalion, but the primary focus was the company level.
Q: Were you aware that there was a command climate survey done of the battalion?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: To clarify, is your staff at Camp Patriot or Camp Woods?
A: The vast majority is at Camp Patriot, there is a small VSSC unit at Camp Woods.
Q: What was the target audience for the command climate survey that was just conducted?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: So it did include some of the same people who were at your sensing session?
A: Yes.
Q: Do you have any indication of the results of the command climate survey?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Bondsteel DATED 9 APR 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: I talked to (b)(3), (b)(6) and CSM.
Q: How did they respond?
A: We had an OPD and one of the aspects of the OPD was the commander's justification for the separation of the latrines.
Q: How did that sit with you as a leader? Did that make sense to you?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) thought that it was important to make a distinction between the ranks because of the close proximity of the living situation-- to be sure that familiarity did not interfere with the professional rank structure. That was why he made the decision to separate the latrines.
Q: Did you bring up the fact that soldiers were complaining about the issue and that this was having a negative impact within your company?
A: Yes. At that point, he only made that distinction when there were two B-hut latrines operating. When one broke down, he dissolved that policy to mitigate the perception that the E-8 and above personnel were hoarding the latrines.
Q: When you had issues in your company and you brought issues to the commander, was he receptive to those issues, or did he simply tell you how it was going to be?
A: He did listen to the input that I gave. But, he did not change his decision.
Q: What was your interaction with (b)(3), (b)(6)? What was his leadership style?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Were you responsible for the MWR facilities on the camp?
A: Yes.
Q: Were you responsible for their location on the camp?
A: I did not direct the location.
Q: We have heard that the MWR location was located close to the command group for their personal convenience. Do you know anything about that?
A: I never asked the CSM. He took lead on the MWR. I am responsible for the property—the computers, the telephone and the tent. CSM took lead on the location.
Q: Did your soldiers ever bring that to you as an issue?
A: No.
Q: Did they ever bring that issue to your First Sergeant?
A: Not that I am aware of.
Q: Have you ever had any complaints brought to your attention about inconsistencies in the standards for soldiers and how the command acts? For example, (b)(3), (b)(6) walking around smoking a pipe while yelling at soldiers for smoking.
A: Yes. The Scout Platoon Sergeant brought that issue to me.
Q: What did you do with that information?
A: I brought that up to (b)(3), (b)(6) as part of my brief on the results of the sensing session. He said he would fix it with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Has it been fixed?
A: To my knowledge, yes. He no longer walks around with his pipe as far as I know.
Q: Did you follow up with your soldiers to let them know what action had been taken to address their concerns?
A: I did not communicate it directly. I thought the actions were sufficient since (b)(3), (b)(6) was no longer walking around smoking and out of uniform.
Q: Do you know anything about (b)(3), (b)(6) trying to hold on to an LTATV even though it was designated to go down to the VSP?
A: Yes. When we first arrived at Camp Patriot, there were six LTATVs. Because they were on my property book, I had my XO manage the process of distributing the LTATVs to the VSPs. At the time, I was not aware and (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware of the strict allocation of the LTATVs to the VSP sites and the COMCJSOTF directive that they be used strictly for VSP operations.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Woods DATED 9 APR 12

9 STATEMENT *(Continued)*

It is clear now that the LTATVs are for operational uses and not to be used as FOB runners.
Q: Can you confirm that (b)(3), (b)(6) is your XO?
A: Yes. When we arrived at Camp Patriot, I saw the SEALS and one of their junior officers using the LTATVs as FOB runners. (b)(3), (b)(6) did express his initial desire to allocate two LTATVs for use on the FOB. Because my XO was on ADVON and in close contact with (b)(3), (b)(6), they were tracking the strict usage requirements for VSO operations only. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) got that guidance, that is what we did.
Q: Did (b)(3), (b)(6) follow that policy when he was advised of it by (b)(3), (b)(6) or did it take (b)(3), (b)(6) to get involved?
A: There was a verbal conversation when (b)(3), (b)(6) did address that to (b)(3), (b)(6) and I don't think at that time that (b)(3), (b)(6) realized that the guidance was coming from (b)(3), (b)(6) probably thought that (b)(3), (b)(6) was blowing smoke up his butt. I don't think he thought that (b)(3), (b)(6) would have guidance from (b)(3), (b)(6) that he (b)(3), (b)(6) had not received directly.
Q: So when (b)(3), (b)(6) told him that guidance, what was (b)(3), (b)(6) reaction?
A: I think the initial reaction was a disbelief that (b)(3), (b)(6) had any direct guidance from (b)(3), (b)(6). That got clarified the next day through the CJSOTF staff.
Q: Were you present for that interaction?
A: No.
Q: Did you consider that a good example of how a senior leader would interact with a junior leader under your command? How did you assess that interaction?
A: I wasn't there, but it seemed like my XO was not tactful in how he presented that information. Had my XO been more tactful with that information, I don't think the commander would have gotten so defensive.
Q: Were you present during an Article 15 hearing for an EO issue at which (b)(3), (b)(6) presided?
A: Yes.
Q: Were there instances when (b)(3), (b)(6) had to make corrections to anyone in the room based on their behavior?
A: No. I was not aware of anything like that. I was present during the entire hearing. (b)(3), (b)(6) did make a correction to (b)(3), (b)(6) because he lost his composure when (b)(3), (b)(6) issued his punishment. That was the only thing that I noticed.
Q: Were there any corrections to the leadership regarding an explanation of what the EO policy was?
A: No.
Q: When you saw the command using LTATVs with machine gun mounts to make the 100 or 200 meter trip to the mess hall, how did that make you feel?
A: At no time did any personnel use the LTATVs on the FOB. That issue only came up when there was a verbal request to (b)(3), (b)(6) to allocate the two LTATVs to the FOB. All of the usage of the LTATVs on the FOB was done by the SEALS and other CJSOTF staff assigned to deal with the property.
Q: Do you get together with your fellow company grade officers and talk about issues on the FOB?
A: Yes.
Q: Who do you talk to? What do you talk about?
A: I mainly speak to all of the company commanders. They are all my good friends. On a regular basis, I talk to the C CO Commander. We vent to each other and talk about what is going on.
Q: Do you interact much with the T(b)(3), (b)(6) staff—the S-2, the S-4? Do you talk about leadership issues?
A: Yes. With the S-4, I do not. (b)(3), (b)(6) (the S-4) was one of my platoon leaders in B CO. With (b)(3), (b)(6) or other OICs, we do not discuss leadership issues. I am a sounding board for (b)(3), (b)(6) (S-2) sometimes. He vents some of his frustrations, but nothing in particular. That is the extent of my discussions with the staff.
Q: Are there additional people that we should talk to?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (on R&R now)—he is currently a battle captain. The AS-3 is (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who is the S-1?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)

END STATEMENT

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 5 OF 6 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp woods DATED 9 Apr 12

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 6. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) SFOR-A/SJA

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 27th day of April, 2012 at New Kabul Compound, AF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

TITLE 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 6 OF 6 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
HHC, TASK FORCE (b)(1)1.4a
COMBINED JOINT SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE - AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09311

REPLY TO
ATTENTION OF:

TF (b)(1)1.4a

26 April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Character Statement of (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6), (b)(5), (b)(3)

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Lacey, Washington	2012/04/09	2101	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: What is your full name, rank, duty position, and unit of assignment?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2/3 INF.
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: About ten years.
Q: How many combat deployments do you have?
A: This is my fourth: Bosnia, two in Iraq, and the current one.
Q: What are your current duties and responsibilities at TF (b)(1)1.4a
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been associated with the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?
A: I have known the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership since the inception of TF (b)(1)1.4a Also, I was with 2/3 INF prior to the deployment, served under the prior command group and was part of the battalion when the current leadership took command. I have been in the unit since early 2010.
Q: How do much do you interact with the commander, XO and CSM?
A: Daily I have at least a little bit of interaction.
Q: Please describe the command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: What are the leadership styles of the Top Three?
A: I would say they were directive and closed. Nobody goes in there to talk to them about anything. That is for the commander. For (b)(3), (b)(6) less so, but nobody wants to go in there and talk to him either. The CSM is usually not around.
Q: Where do you think the CSM is?
A: I think he's in his room.
Q: What incidents have you seen or participated in with respect to this climate and the leadership?
(b)(5), (b)(6)
Q: Do you get treated better, worse or differently?

(b)(6), (b)(5)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INI	(b)(3), (b)(6)	STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) Lacey WA DATED 9 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Can you tell me more about your effort to get a command climate survey before deployment?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Given that you had a small number of units under the battalion's command, do you think that you were adequately trained as a day battle captain to track those units based on what you saw at SOTF-E?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp [illegible] DATED 9 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(5), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

(b)(6), (b)(5)

A: The one guy that the staff goes to, even though it is not often successful, is (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: Who would the NCOs go to?
A: My NCOs come to me, and I think you see a lot of that.
Q: What is the role of the HHC command? Does the HHC advocate on behalf of soldiers?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(5)

Q: Are there any other matters that we haven't covered that you believe may be helpful to my investigation?
A: I do have one bit of information about SSG Bales. The reason I say this is that I'm not sure why he was deployed. I didn't know him well, but I did know him. When we were in the TOC and we first heard about the shooting and knew that it was B CO based on the region that it was in, there were people who already knew his name; everybody already knew who it was; this was SSG Bales. I remember somebody saying "hey man, this is SSG Bales" even before the name was released. It was widely known that this guy had some problems. I don't know how widely known it was, because, like I said, I did not know him well myself. I knew who he was through my limited interactions with the platoon leader and the fire support officer, which is not a lot.
Q: Did you have any personal knowledge or interactions with him before deployment that would have led you to anticipate an incident like this?
A: This is not based on my personal knowledge. This is based on the reactions of people in the TOC. Like "hey, this is B Company, it must be SSG Bales; he's the only one crazy enough to do it." That was an exact quote.
Q: Who said that?
A: That came from two people (b)(3), (b)(6) both said similar statements. (b)(3), (b)(6) was his platoon leader a year ago or so. And (b)(3), (b)(6) was the guy's old company commander.
Q: Any other issues?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT [illegible] DATED 9 Apr 2012

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: No. That is the only thing pertaining to the Bales situation. I thought it was important that people knew that this guy had issues, and I don't know what was done to address them.
Q: Other than (b)(3), (b)(6), is there anyone else that you think could provide additional information concerning these issues?
A: I can't think of anyone else off the top of my head.
Q: Did they think it was SSG Bales before his name was even announced?
A: Roger. They thought it was SSG Bales when we found out that it happened and that it was in B Company. The only information that we had at that time was that it was a B CO soldier. The only reason we had that information is because the B CO Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6) called us. This is before any name was put out.
Q: So all you knew at that point was that civilians had been shot, and it was a B CO soldier?
A: Yes.

\\END STATEMENT\\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WIT (b)(3), (b)(6) D, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENC

Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of ________, ____ at ________

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

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SWORN STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP PATRIOT/ FOB WARRIOR , AFG	(b)(3), (b)(6) 2011/04/08	1103	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your name, rank, and unit of assignment
A: (b)(3), (b)(6) 2/3IN
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: Since 15 May 2004
Q: How many combat tours do you have?
A: This is my third—two tours in Iraq before this one in Afghanistan
Q: What is your current duty position and responsibilities?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been associated with the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?
A: I arrived in the unit in October 2010. (b)(3), (b)(6) was already in command. (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived about a month and a half later. I believe that the XO, (b)(3), (b)(6), arrived in late November. (b)(3), (b)(6) (S-3) arrived shortly before NTC, in Summer 2011.
Q: How much do you interact with the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?
A: I have daily access to one if not more of the top leaders.
Q: Can you describe the overall command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(3)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Can you provide some detail about the TF (b)(1)1.4a battle rhythm?

(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a

Q: You guys have a pretty robust command and staff schedule. So you are passing information to each other, to higher and to the Top Three?
A: Speaking for the S-2, yes. We have a substantial responsibility to make sure that IJC, SOTF-E, the battlespace owner and others have a good idea of what we are doing.
Q: Where were you prior to coming to this unit?
A: I was assigned to a MTT team that was out of Ft. Riley; we deployed in August 2009 and redeployed in July 2010.
Q: And you worked with 2/3 IN during that time?
A: Yes.
Q: How well did the command prepare its soldiers for this VSO deployment?
A: I don't think the command had any impact on the training. There was a robust effort by the company commanders, 1SGs and NCOs in the companies to ensure that their soldiers got adequate training. We first learned about the VSO mission just prior to NTC, and only one company participated in the VSO-style mission.
Q: Did the staff take the VSO mission seriously?
A: Yes. The staff sections were relieved to be working with Special Forces. We were all eager to work at the level of professionalism that the ODAs and CJSOTF-A bring to the table.
Q: Were there any issues with the living conditions at Camp Patriot? Have they been addressed?
A: We fell in on several B-huts owned by the SEALS and then we put up several tents. I have lived in some of the worst places in the world, and I was happy just to have a clean place to sleep. Some of the newer guys found it to be unsatisfactory. There was, however, a separation. Officers and NCOs were living in the B-huts. The enlisted and some lieutenants at the time (who were later ordered to move) lived in the tents. The tents are brand new Bare Base tents and are some of the best that I have ever seen.

INITIALS OF PERSON (b)(3), (b)(6) ENT

PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

We have brand new bunks. Everything is very clean. As a leader, I didn't like the concept of the separation, but I also didn't complain that I got a B-hut.
Q: Was the staff prepared to battle track the three original OPCON SOF teams?
A: Yes. We had ample time at BAF and Camp Montrond upon arrival to figure out who does what. Once we got down here, there were some issues with connectivity and technology, but after a few growing pains we were more than ready to take everything over.
Q: Why were you stuck at BAF?
A: It was all due to weather. Not a lot of military aircraft were flying, and the weather was very bad.
Q: Is the battalion staff capable of tracking a normal Stryker battalion in more traditional operations, like the ones you trained at NTC?
A: Led by (b)(3), (b)(6) I think that the TOC could effectively lead a Stryker battalion.
Q: Do you think that the command climate issue at 2/3 and TF (b)(1)1.4a extended beyond the headquarters and impacted the subordinate 2/3 elements that are OPCON to other SOTFs?

(b)(5), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)

Q: Who is in charge of FOB Warrior?
A: FOB Warrior was originally owned by TF (b)(1)1.4a, a Polish element. Yesterday was the RIP-TOA, and now 1st BDE / 82nd Airborne owns FOB Warrior.
Q: Did the poor living conditions on Camp Patriot mirror the conditions on FOB Warrior as a whole?
A: The Poles did not work to do many improvements in their part of the FOB. The improvements that were being made were in anticipation of the arrival of the brigade from 82nd Airborne. The 82nd is currently all living in tents. I don't think there is a plan during their six months here to live in any kind of a hardened structure. As far as improvements to Camp Patriot, I have seen the paperwork from the S-4 where most of our proposed improvements have been denied by CJSOTF.
Q: One witness talked about a lack of T-walls or protected areas at Patriot. Do you have any comments about that?
A: About a week and a half ago 60 T-walls arrived courtesy of the S-4. The contracts were put in prior to our deployment. They are around living tents but nowhere else on the FOB. Every place else is exposed. This is a difficult place to resupply, however.
Q: Is this just another example of one of those things that you identified in PDSS but took a while to come to fruition?
A: Yes. I think one of the biggest issues is that we need to be in the bridge-building business but the Top Three seems to be in the bridge-burning business. Since PDSS, they have made us look terrible. Instead of talking about the mission upon the return from PDSS, everyone was talking about the embarrassment that the Colonel brought to the unit.
Q: What was the source of embarrassment?
A: The entitlement that the Commander insisted on. He wanted vehicles. He wanted VIP living. He expected everything to be done right away. It established a very poor relationship with CJSOTF right off the bat.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEME (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Do you think that had an impact on the ability of CJSOTF to carry through on some of the things they were going to do at the site?
A: Yes. I think CJSOTF had a bias about us based on PDSS and future contact that we have had with them. It is a daily fight for us at the staff level to maintain good contacts at CJSOTF.
Q: Do you know (b)(3), (b)(6) at B CO? What impact does TF (b)(1)1.4a have on B CO now that you are in theater?
A: We have zero impact. It was a hard pill to swallow for the Commander. We have bi-weekly contact with the companies. That is where we discuss UCMJ actions, NCOERs and officer moves.
Q: Does the battalion commander interact with the company commanders on these admin issues or is it delegated?
A: The battalion commander is there. He is concerned about awards, NCOERs and other personnel issues.
Q: So there is an ADCON relationship down to the line companies?
A: Yes. ADCON and property.
Q: Do you and your fellow officers often discuss the issue of leadership issues in the battalion and how to mitigate the impact on your subordinates?
A: Yes. That is one of the big things that we get together to try to figure out. The issue that we have is that it is so apparent now, I cannot hide it from my soldiers. Even when they say something now that is derogatory toward the Top Three, I have to remind them that these are my issues to deal with. The soldiers continue to bring very specific instances to me that I have a hard time responding to.
Q: Do you have a relationship with the company commanders?
A: We try to pass information to them to keep them informed. I haven't had any issues with any of them specifically. It is important for me to have a good working relationship with the commanders. I have a very good working relationship with (b)(3), (b)(6) the HHC Commander here.
Q: Have people been getting out of the Army because of the command climate issue?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Can you tell me about any knowledge you have about attempts to steer responses to the command climate survey?

(b)(3), (b)(5), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP PATRIOT DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Is there anything else?

A: I do not feel that the battalion command could have impacted the events that led up to this investigation. It is unfortunate what happened with SSG Bales. It is unfortunate what happened with the sexual harassment complaint. I do not think that the poor command climate and the poor leadership had anything to do with the events that happened in RC(S). However, the poor leadership in the battalion is toxic, and the morale is pathetic.

\\END STATEMENT\\

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6) , HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ___. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY W... THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUEN...

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

S... to administer oaths, this 14 day of APRIL, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

TITLE 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKI... (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Patriot	2012/04/08	0804	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		(b)(3), (b)(6)

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Q: Please state your full name, rank and unit of assignment.
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been in the military?
A: 14 years.
Q: How many combat tours have you had?
A: This is number four; Baghdad twice; Ghozni/Paktika once.
Q: What is your current duty assignment?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: What are your duties and responsibilities as night battle NCO?
A: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Q: How long have you been associated with the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership there at the battalion level?
A: Since I arrived last year in April.
Q: Where were you coming from?
A: From an AC/RC unit.
Q: How much do you interact with the leadership—The Top Three?
A: Since being deployed, almost daily.
Q: When is your shift?
A: From 2000-0800.
Q: So you see them at the end of the day and the beginning of the day?
A: Roger.
Q: Can you describe the overall command climate at TF (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(5), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CP Patriot DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q: Can you describe the leadership style of your XO?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Do you have some specific issues you have seen with respect to the TF (b)(1)1.4a leadership?

(b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(5)

Q: Have you seen anyone in the command engage in race or gender inappropriate activities?

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMEN (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) N AT CP Patriot DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

A: Nothing blatant. There was one time, when the platoon voted to change its call sign to "El Guapo." The commander immediately squashed that, saying we can't have that going over the radio. But nothing that was outright racist.

Q: How well did the command prepare its soldiers for the deployment?

A: Nobody really had specifics on the mission. As the specifics came down, we tried to shift our focus to it, but the issues that we had with property accountability and Stryker turn-in ate up a majority of the time.

Q: How receptive do you think the battalion command was to the VSO mission as a whole? How seriously did the staff take the mission?

A: As far as the Top Three—I can't tell if the commander does or doesn't; with the XO, I'm not sure that he understands the mission; and I don't think the CSM takes it seriously. As far as the HHC staff, it would be pretty hit or miss. I would say that the S-4 is doing the best they can; S-6 does the best they can; S-2 is another reliable section. Outside of that, I don't think that people really understand that there are people going three weeks without a shower, that sometimes we have to eat two MREs a day because there isn't enough food, and that you might get shot at from one day to the next.

Q: What about the OPSCENTER that you are in; does that work at a pretty good rhythm?

A: I think the night shift is the better shift. Right now (b)(3), (b)(6) is the acting battle captain. He is the FSNCO. He does a pretty good job. We went through a CJSOTF battle drill once, and I thought he did pretty well. I was a battle captain in Iraq for fifteen months, so I have some experience with this. We had a TIC a couple days ago, and I thought he was on it. When I was in the FLETAC and we had problems with the OPCEN battle tracking us, it was usually the day shift.

Q: What is the FLETAC?

A: The forward logistics element.

Q: And you guys are out running the supplies to the other units?

A: Correct.

Q: In your estimation, was the battle staff prepared for the battle tracking? The battle drills and the reaction to TICs have been going okay?

A: As far as the night shift, I think we're doing pretty well. I think if we had to battle track a whole battalion tomorrow, I think we would have to take a step back. I think guys have gotten a little too comfortable with where they are at. At TF (b)(1)1.4a here is the FLETAC, one VSP team that doesn't have a home and the sniper section. That's 33 guys plus the two VSPs in our task force. It isn't hard.

Q: Do you think any of the command climate issues bled over into the other 2/3 companies in preparing them for deployment?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

Q: Did you know SSG Bales?

A: Negative. I did not. He was already down in B CO when I got to HHC.

Q: Are there any other people that we should talk to regarding this investigation?

A: (b)(3), (b)(6) (sniper section leader), he replaced SSG Bales; SSG Bales was his mentor.

Q: How does the command climate compare to the command climate of the previous units you have been at?

(b)(5), (b)(6)

\\END STATEMENT\\\

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CP Patriot DATED 2012/04/08

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 20 day of April, 2012 at Kandahar Air Field, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) USAF

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Title 10

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1.01ES

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Pages 569 through 576 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A 21April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 19 April 2012 Phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) of CJSOTF-A.

1. The purpose of the phone call was to explore some of the command climate issues raised in the TF (b)(1)1.4a interviews touching on their interaction with their OPCON headquarters. The following is a summary of the questions and answers during this phone conversation.

2. The relationship between (b)(3), (b)(6) (CJSOTF-A) and (b)(3), (b)(6) (TF (b)(1)1.4a.

a. Question: Did you really only have a brief two-sentence conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and then made no phone calls or emails with him subsequently?

b. Answer: Had a 30-45 minute in-call with (b)(3), (b)(6) when he arrived, jointly with (b)(3), (b)(6). Tried calling (b)(3), (b)(6) but couldn't get him. (b)(1)1.4a only called back, in the middle of the night, when he had issues like uniform and grooming challenges with young 2-3 soldiers getting in trouble with FOB Sergeants Major. He also invited (b)(3), (b)(6) to come to Kabul for (b)(3), (b)(6) farewell and (b)(3), (b)(6) change-of-responsibility. Said that (b)(3), (b)(6) did not make the effort to come [and then noted that he himself had been weathered out for the second event]. (b)(3), (b)(6) did come to Camp Montrond for a CSM conference with (b)(3), (b)(6) on 26 January. Also noted that on the few times that (b)(1)1.4a made it to BAF, he did not stop by to see (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

c. Question: Did you not call him by his first name, but did call others by their first name, or did you refer to him simply as TF (b)(1)1.4a on email chains?

d. Answer: When writing blanket emails, used the title, "Gentlemen," and would sign his name (b)(3), (b)(6) Would only use first names with other CSMs in his chain after getting to know them personally.

3. NOTE: (b)(3), (b)(6) MADE SOME HARSH OBSERVATIONS ABOUT THE (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) BASED ON FEEDBACK FROM (b)(3), (b)(6) AND

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USFOR-A
SUBJECT: 19 April 2012 Phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) former Command Sergeants Major of CJSOTF-A.

FROM SEEING (b)(3), (b)(6) AT BAF IN HIS MESS HALLS AND JUST HANGING AROUND RATHER THAN OUT HELPING HIS SOLDIERS.

6. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES – AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A 21April 2012

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: 19 April 2012 Phone call with (b)(3), (b)(6) Commander for Support.

1. The purpose of the phone call was to explore some of the command climate issues raised in the TF (b)(1)1.4a interviews touching on their interaction with their OPCON headquarters. The following is a summary of the questions and answers during this phone conversation with (b)(3), (b)(6).

2. Build-up at Camp Patriot prior to and after the arrival of 2-3 IN Headquarters.

   a. Question: Why wasn't Camp Patriot completed by the time of 2-3's arrival, as 2-3 was led to believe from their PDSS? Why was their addition construction in mid-January denied by the FAM-C?

   b. Answer: A lot had to do with weather, distance, and lack of a good airfield. He recollects that the plan was always to put them into a Bare Base, using a 250-man set, plus eight existing B-huts. In the FAM-C, he remembers what was vetoed was mainly a gym, and given other needs across CJSOTF-A, they "just couldn't invest in B-huts for quality of life."

3. Status of the Bare Base tent set used by TF (b)(1)1.4a at Camp Patriot.

   a. Question: Was he aware that the Bare Base set arrived three man-tents short? That the Bare Base Force Provider Latrine/Shower set arrived minus the plumbing fittings and some key electrical components? That the Life Support System latrine trailers also arrived without plumbing hook-ups and with a European-standard electrical system incompatible with the power supply available?

   b. Answer: He was unaware of these issues. TF (b)(1)1.4a did not bring these issues up in the daily SITREPs or in the Log Sync meetings. In fact, he had a contract for engineering services and he was looking for jobs to utilize the contract. [When reminded of the weather, though, he thought this might be why the additional help might not have been sent]. He also remembered that they were only two tents short, but two extra tents were found in RC-E and shipped out to them. He thought since they had a Bare Base for 250-men, plus eight B-huts, that they would have had plenty of room. He was surprised to hear that they were still seen as crammed into tents as late as the 21 March visit.

4. Status of Vehicles at TF (b)(1)1.4a

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a. Question: Why did they not have vehicles when they arrived at Camp Patriot?
b. Answer: He thought they did, because he had made an advanced visit to Patriot, and was picked up by a rental vehicle. He was surprised to hear and will check the contract to see what should have been there when 2-3 arrived at Patriot. He does remember that when 2-3 arrived at Montrond, the CSM did not have a vehicle and he arranged one for him.

5. Perception of TF (b)(1)1.4a by CJSOTF-A leadership.

a. Question: Was TF (b)(1)1.4a seen as "needy?"

b. Answer: No. In fact, he had a very good working relationship with the XO. However, SOTF-E did express feelings that 2-3 was delaying their departure; this was probably because Camp Montrond was bursting with so many people on it. He was not aware that the plan for 2-3 was for 4 days of RSOI and then 2 weeks or more of right seat/left seat. Delayed arrival of 2-3's conexes meant that 2-3 could not have left early anyway, even if the OPCEN and SUPCEN had been ready.

6. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at (b)(6)
DSN: (b)(6)

Rick Waddell
RICK WADDELL
Brigadier General, U.S. Army
Investigating Officer

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

RFF 12-001 CJSOTF-A IN BN RFF REWRITE

Issue Generated By: CJSOTF **LOCATIONS:** CJSOTF-A AOR

POC: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Email (b)(6)

Received by ISAF: **Type of Force:** PR **FY:** 12

LAD: 5 & 11 NOV 12 **EAD:** 16 & 22 OCT 12 **BOG:** 16 & 22 NOV 12

PAX: (b)(1)1.4a **Compensating Offset:** N/A **Offset Source:** N/A

FML Impact	Offsets
0	0

Command	Name	Action	Date	Remarks
CJSOTF-A	(b)(3), (b)(6)			
CFSOCC-A				
AOWG				
FGRB				
DCOS OPS				

Concept of the Operation:

(b)(1)1.4a

Risk to campaign if not filled: RISK to VSO Mission if not filled

High — Low

Pros/Cons:

PROs:
- Increased support for VSO teams across CJSOTF-A AOR.
- Increased IN BN enablers to SOF throughout the CJOA.

CONs:
- No JMD offsets to support increased manning.

ISAF Campaign LOO

Ranking

Geographic Locations



ISAF Recommendation:

Comments:

Proposed C2 Diagram

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 10:47 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) MIL USA USFOR-A SJA
Cc: MIL USA USFOR-A SJA; Waddell, Ricky L BG USA Commander CJIATF-Shafafiyat; (b)(3), (b)(6) Shafafiyat HQ ISAF
Subject: FW: 5W: Monkey Bite ~~(SECRET)~~
Attachments: Approved_Disapproved_CIBs_CABS_16JAN_IDF(1).xlsx; CJSOTF-A_IN_BN_RFF_Rewrite_20Jan12.pptx

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

Sir,

I am forwarding some supporting information sent by (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----
From: TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD (b)(3), (b)(6) [mailto: (b)(3), (b)(6)]
Sent: Wednesday, April 18, 2012 10:11 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: 5W: Monkey Bite ~~(SECRET)~~

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ Caveats: NONE Sir, (b)(3), (b)(6) said that you might have not gotten this e-mail.

Take care and stay safe.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a

CAMP PATRIOT-FOB WARRIOR

Ghazni Province

SIPR VOIP (b)(6)

NIPR VOIP

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Sunday, April 15, 2012 9:03 PM

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To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: 5W: Monkey Bite ~~(SECRET)~~

Sir, this is one of the e-mails I was talking about. It did not come from CJSOTF but it kind of paints a picture of the atmosphere in the area. I also attached the JAN. RFF, this request was also asked for in Sep. before we came.(6 infantry companies and 1 HQ) we talked about.

I attached the award tracker for the event that happened on the 16th of Jan. All awards were written up the same way. All the Soldiers were in the same area. Some got awarded and some did not. I am checking up on the date they got submitted and I will send that info to you. This did not help us during the survey. Soldiers were asking about this for some time.

Thanks for all the help.

From: TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, April 13, 2012 6:35 PM
To: TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD CDR; TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: 5W: Monkey Bite ~~(SECRET)~~
e the awards were submitted

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a

CAMP PATRIOT-FOB WARRIOR

Ghazni Province

SIPR VOIP
NIPR VOIP (b)(6)

NIPR: (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD XO
Sent: Thursday, March 22, 2012 12:35 AM
To: TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD CDR; TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: 5W: Monkey Bite ~~(SECRET)~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

Sir,

Not sure if you have seen this.

From: SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 9:41 PM
To: SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ MED OIC - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ XO - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S3 DIR - (b)(3), (b)(6) CJSOTF-A MEDICAL; (b)(3), (b)(6) 7thSFG; TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD XO; TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ J35 SGM; SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S3 SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6); TF (b)(1)1.4a HHC MED OIC; SOTF-EAST ABAD VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST AHMEDKHEL VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) 'SOTF-EAST CHAMKANI VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST CHAMKANI VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DAND PATAN VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DAND-PATAN CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST DYER AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST GHAZNI VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST GOSHTA VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST GOSHTA VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST HERRERA VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST HERRERA VSO MED2 (b)(3), (b)(6) MED; SOTF-EAST KHAYER KHOT CAT MED (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST KKC VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) 'SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING ANA MED - SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING ANA MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING CCO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LILLEY CAT MED (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LILLEY VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LILLEY VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MANGWEL VSO MED (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MOREHEAD CDO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) Mark; SOTF-EAST MOREHEAD CDO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MOREHEAD VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST ORGUN-E VSO INF MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST CHOWKAY/NARANG VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST CHOWKAY/NARANG VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SBAD VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SBAD VSO MED1 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SPARTA CDO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SPARTA CDO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST TALAWKA CAT MED- (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST WARDAK VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST WARDAK VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST GOSHTA CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); CJSOTF-A Vance HQ MED Deputy Surgeon; (b)(3), (b)(6) MEDICAL SURGEON; (b)(3), (b)(6) 3rdSFG; (b)(3), (b)(6) CJSOTF-A MEDICAL NCO; SOTF-EAST DYER AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DYER AOB SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING CCO CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING CCO SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ CHAP - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S1 NCOIC - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S1 OIC - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ MED BN Surgeon; TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ PA
Cc: CJSOTF-A Montrond HQ MED PM
Subject: RE: 5W: Monkey Bite

Guys,

APPROVED FOR RELEASE

Is this CCIR? There have to be some 2-3 guys not doing something stupid, aren't there?

DOC, DOWNREP some wildlife / medical considerations stuff tonight in this edition.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ MED OIC - (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, March 21, 2012 8:44 PM
To: SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ XO - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S3 DIR - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) CJSOTF-A MEDICAL; (b)(3), (b)(6) 7thSFG; TF (b)(1)1.4a CMD XO; TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ J35 SGM; SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S3 SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) TF HHC MED OIC; SOTF-EAST ABAD VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST AHMEDKHEL VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) 'SOTF-EAST CHAMKANI VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST CHAMKANI VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DAND PATAN VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DAND-PATAN CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DYER AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST GHAZNI VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST GOSHTA VSO MED - SFC (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST GOSHTA VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST HERRERA VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST HERRERA VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) MED; SOTF-EAST KHAYER KHOT CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST KKC VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) 'SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING ANA MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING ANA MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING CCO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LILLEY CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LILLEY VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LILLEY VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MANGWEL VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MOREHEAD CDO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MOREHEAD CDO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MOREHEAD VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST ORGUN-E VSO INF MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST CHOWKAY/NARANG VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST CHOWKAY/NARANG VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB MED SOTF-EAST SBAD VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SBAD VSO MED1 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SPARTA CDO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SPARTA CDO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST TALAWKA CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST WARDAK VSO MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST WARDAK VSO MED2 - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST GOSHTA CAT MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); CJSOTF-A Vance HQ MED Deputy Surgeon; (b)(3), (b)(6) MEDICAL SURGEON; (b)(3), (b)(6) 3rdSFG; (b)(3), (b)(6) CJSOTF-A MEDICAL NCO; SOTF-EAST DYER AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DYER AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST DYER AOB SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING CCO CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST LIGHTNING CCO SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MCCLOSKEY AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ CHAP - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S1 NCOIC - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ S1 OIC - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST MONTROND HQ SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SALERNO AOB SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB CDR - (b)(3), (b)(6); SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST SHARANA AOB SEA - (b)(3), (b)(6); TF Ghazni HHC MED OIC; TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ MED BN Surgeon; TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ PA
Cc: TF (b)(1)1.4a HQ MED BN Surgeon; SOTF-EAST DYER AOB MED - (b)(3), (b)(6); CJSOTF-A Montrond HQ MED PM
Subject: 5W: Monkey Bite

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WHO: (b)(3), (b)(6)

WHAT: bite in face by pet monkey

WHERE: ALP Kewar Checkpoint
WHEN: 1630hrs on 3/20/12

HOW: soldier is being medevac'd to JAF for initial treatment by (b)(3), (b)(6) at approximately 0100hrs tomorrow morning; from there he will be medevac'd to BAF where we can observe and complete followup treatment

Sir / CSM,

(b)(3), (b)(6) is a 2-3 Infantry soldier augmentee at COP Penich who was bitten in the face (left cheek) by a pet monkey at ALP Kewar Checkpoint this afternoon at 1630hrs. The risks of a monkey bite include rabies, simian herpes (a version of herpes from monkeys), tetanus, and bacterial infection; we are ensuring he gets the appropriate postexposure prophylaxis. He was not immunized against rabies prior to this deployment, so he will require 4 doses of rabies vaccine and rabies immunoglobulin. He will also receive valcyclovir (administered under direct observation) to help prevent simian herpes. DD Form 2341 (Report of Animal Bite) has been documented by (b)(3), (b)(6) our 68W10 Medic at COP Penich.

Very respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SOTF-EAST MED STAFF

MED SHED (b)(6) VOSIP
MED SHED VOIP/DSN BLK SCAMPI
MED SHED DSN

E-Mail: (b)(6) <mailto: (b)(6)
(b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-EAST MED Surgeon
, SOTF-EAST MED PA

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

SOTF-EAST MED NCOIC

SOTF-EAST MED PM NCOIC

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Caveats: NONE

Classification: ~~SECRET~~ Caveats: NONE

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET~~ Attachment Caveats: NONE Classification: ~~SECRET~~ Caveats: NONE

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

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(b)(1)1.4a

SPECIFIC TRAINING AT SOTF-E (7 - 45 DAYS)

This phase begins upon completion of (b)(1)1.4a common training and ends upon the successful completion of (b)(1)1.4a specific training tasks.

- Identified Integrators will move to CP Warrior prior this phase
- During this phase primary 2-3 IN staff personnel will move to SOTF-E and/or CJSOTF-A IOT train with the their counterpart staff.
- During this phase select SOTF-E and/or CJSOTF-A staff personnel will move to CP Warrior IOT assist their counterpart staff with integration/training.
- Select SOTF-E/CJSOTF-A/2-3 IN staff personnel will conduct left/right seat rides
- Items for consideration:
  - Staff swaps are tentatively planned for a window of 7-45 days (At the determination of the 2-3 IN staff)
  - L/R Seat Rides are tentatively planned for a 14-day timeline
- The following slides are Staff Training Tasks for consideration

Working Draft 31 Aug 2011

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status	LAST NAME	FIRST NAME	RANK	TASK FORCE	AWARD APPROVED	DATE APPROVED
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CIB	12-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	24-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE						
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CIB	24-Feb-12
COMPLETE						
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE						
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CIB	24-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	08-Feb-12
COMPLETE					CAB	24-Feb-12
DISAPPROVED					NONE	
DISAPPROVED		(b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(1)1.4a			NONE	
DISAPPROVED					NONE	
DISAPPROVED					NONE	
DISAPPROVED					NONE	
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DISAPPROVED					NONE	
DISAPPROVED					NONE	
DISAPPROVED					NONE	

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ORDER #	LOCATION	DISTRO METHOD	DATE OF LAST ACTION	ROTATION
039-021	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-011	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
043-005	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	12-Feb-12	OEF XVII
055-001	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-020	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
	DISTRO		04-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-012	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
055-004	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
	DISTRO		04-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-014	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	05-Feb-12	OEF XVII
	DISTRO		05-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-015	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-016	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-013	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-017	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
055-003	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-018	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
039-019	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	08-Feb-12	OEF XVII
055-002	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	22-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
	RETURNED		04-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	22-Feb-12	OEF XVII
	J1 - READY		21-Mar-12	
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	22-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	22-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII
000-000	DISTRO	EMAIL (SCANNED)	24-Feb-12	OEF XVII

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Pages 591 through 768 redacted for the following reasons:
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(b)(5)(b)(6)

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