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COMMAND HISTORY 1980

CLASSIFIED BY : COMRDJTF
REVIEW ON : 15 MAY 1987

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PREFACE

(U) This first time supplement to the 1980 USREDCOM Command History is a record of the activities and accomplishments of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF). It is therefore appropriate for the Commander to preface our first year of existence.

(U) The following excerpt was extracted from Lieutenant General P.X. Kelley's statement made before the Senate Armed Services Committee Subcommittee on Seapower and Force Projection, 9 March 1981. It reflects not only the status of the command, but his own personal views and philosophy about the many important issues that affect the RDJTF.

(U) "On 1 March 1980, Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF, was activated as a subordinate command of the U.S. Readiness Command at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida.

(U) Roughly a year ago, if you had visited our headquarters you would have been greeted by a constant stream of carpenters, electricians, telephone installation men, and Air Force construction personnel. To add to this confusion, you would have also met our uniformed men and women, who were individually selected by their parent service, as they reported for duty. You might say, then, that one year ago headquarters, RDJTF, started with a "clean piece of paper", and undertook one of the most difficult, demanding, and complex military tasks ever addressed in peacetime.

(U) Today, 56 officers and 42 enlisted from the Army, 42 officers and 42 enlisted from the Air Force, 29 officers and 15 enlisted from the Navy, and 18 officers and 17 enlisted from the Marine Corps, all of whom are assigned to the RDJTF Headquarters, are a National asset. This group, which represents a carefully orchestrated and in-depth balance of combat, combat support, and combat service support skills from all four services, is, to the best of my knowledge, the only group in this country whose current, fulltime activities focus on joint and combined combat operations. At last, we have recognized the essentiality of such a peacetime organization, and obviated the confusion and risks associated with pulling together an "AD HOC" headquarters at the "11th Hour" when a crisis erupts. Teamwork, cooperation, and daily interface between all four services are absolute requirements to successfully accomplish the missions assigned to the RDJTF. Anything less is courting defeat. The RDJTF Headquarters is the amalgam which accomplished this!

(U) In my view, one of the most significant decisions ever made by the National Command Authorities relative to effective crisis management was the establishment of a functional Washington Liaison Officer for the RDJTF. The Director, RDJTF/WLO is Army Brigadier General Dale A. Vesser, and he has 15 officers and three enlisted from the four services. In their one year of existence, the RDJTF/WLO has become the focal point for the myriad of activities in Washington associated with the RDJTF, not to mention the critical political-military interface they have provided for the RDJTF with all agencies of government. I can state, unequivocally, that the success of the RDJTF thus far is directly related to the superb efforts of General Vesser and our WLO. Without the WLO, the RDJTF's ability to accomplish assigned missions would be highly speculative. It is my right arm!

(U) I should emphasize that what I say today is fully supported by each and every member of our Headquarters: Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine. I do not stand alone in my opinions. I am backed-up by 261 of the most talented and dedicated individuals I have ever known, and no group can speak with more authority on the RDJTF. We have worked daily, weekly, and monthly, with only one purpose: the successful accomplishment of the RDJTF's many and complex tasks. If we don't do it, I'm in a quandary as to who will! I have yet to hear a reasonable alternative.

(U) It is important to note that the RDJTF Headquarters is charged with the primary responsibility for the planning associated with contingency operations in Southwest Asia. In terms of land mass, Southwest Asia encompasses an area which approximates the size of the United States. This includes a wide diversity

of terrain and climatic conditions, ranging from the formidable mountain ranges of Iran to the barren desert wastelands of the Arabian Peninsula; from sub-zero temperatures to +140F in the shade. Moreover, it should come as no surprise to note that the Persian Gulf is some 7,000 air miles from the east coast of the United States. To the best of my knowledge, we have never, in 205 years of our history, attempted to rapidly project and sustain a force as sizable as the RDJTF over such vast distances. In contrast, Vietnam involved a relatively slow, incremental build-up over years --- not days or weeks.

(U) Since the United States imports roughly 13% of its oil requirements from the Persian Gulf States, there is little doubt that if forced to do so we could find alternatives. It is highly unlikely, however, that Germany, which imports some 45% of its oil requirements from the gulf, or Japan and France, who import approximately 75% of theirs, could find reasonable alternatives should this source be denied. In my personal opinion, then, without Persian Gulf oil, western Europe and Japan could be in economic chaos in a matter of months. I need not remind you of the potential consequences to the United States and the rest of the Free World.

(U) When deployed, the RDJTF would start with zero combat power and support structure on the land masses of Southwest Asia. Our difficult task is to deploy combat power --- and I describe combat power as personnel, equipment, and necessary logistics support --- in an orderly, balanced, and sequential manner --- as rapidly as strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and amphibious shipping will permit.

(U) Let me now tell you about the RDJTF itself --- particularly its uniqueness.

(U) First, I would emphasize that in peacetime, or prior to deployment, I do not command forces of the RDJTF. My day-to-day command is limited to the 261 officers and enlisted of our headquarters. Our headquarters, in turn, is under the operational command of the Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Readiness Command.

(U) RDJTF forces from the four services are assigned on a daily basis to a unified or specified commander, and there is no intent to assign these forces to the RDJTF until directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff; such assignment is to be determined by requirements existing at the time.

(U) When the RDJTF deploys to Southwest Asia, it would normally report to the National Command Authorities in Washington through the Joint Chiefs of Staff, or as otherwise directed by the JCS.

(U) It should be noted that no new forces have been added to the overall military force structure specifically for the RDJTF. The RDJTF's job is to amalgamate the broad range of diverse combat capabilities currently extant in all four services into an effective combat force.

(U) Among the Army organizations designated for planning, we have many of the finest available, and, when these deploy as part of the RDJTF, they will be commanded by Lieutenant General Thomas H. Tackaberry, the Commanding General, XVIII Airborne Corps.

(U) The Air Force has made an extraordinary effort to provide the RDJTF with their best units from Tactical Air Command, Strategic Air Command, and the Military Airlift Command. Our Air Force Commander is Lieutenant General Arnold W. Braswell, Commander, 9th Air Force.

(U) Our planning interface with the Navy is CINCPACFLT, Admiral Donald C. Davis, who, of course, is the ultimate Navy senior of Naval Forces in the Indian Ocean. When we deploy to Southwest Asia, naval force in the Indian Ocean will be significantly augmented to conduct maritime operations in support of the RDJTF.

(U) Regarding the Marine Corps, we plan on a daily basis with Major General Kenneth L. Robinson, the Commanding General, I Marine Amphibious Force, Camp Pendleton, California. In his planning, General Robinson can draw on forces from the entire Marine Corps, including I Marine Amphibious Force; the II Marine Amphibious Force on the east coast; and the III Marine Amphibious Force on Okinawa.

(U) Our final planning component is the Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force, commanded by Brigadier General Joseph C. Lutz, USA, who also commands the J.F.K. Center, Fort Bragg, North Carolina. I consider unconventional warfare to be a significant force multiplier, --- and General Lutz has specialized units available to him for planning from the Army, Navy and Air Force.

(U) My main reason for mentioning these individuals and organizations is to provide a counter-point to those who have criticized the RDJTF from positions of ignorance. As evidenced, no responsible person could logically call the RDJTF a "paper tiger". The RDJTF Headquarters plans, on a daily basis, with a force which exceeds 200,000 young, hard-charging, professional Soldiers, Sailors, Airmen and Marines. In terms of deterrent capability and combat power, the forces available to the RDJTF represent some of the best our nation can currently muster ---and, as it matures, the RDJTF gains increased recognition and respect from friends and foes, alike.

(U) I have consistently maintained, the permanent establishment of a four-service headquarters to plan, train, jointly exercise, deploy and employ a joint force is one of the most important decisions I have known. Never before, to the best of my knowledge, has this been done on such a scale in peacetime.

(U) Perhaps it is appropriate to discuss why our nation requires such a force. To do this, it may be best to first highlight the RDJTF's role in the security of Southwest Asia.

(U) While there are a number of threats to the security of Southwest Asia, the most serious is the military power of the Soviet Union ---and the will the Soviets have shown to use it.

(U) During the last decade and a half, we have seen the Russians developing a more global perspective to their military capabilities, especially in Africa and Southwest Asia.

(U) Soviet intervention through proxies in Angola and Ethiopia, or directly as we have seen in Afghanistan, has become a real and disturbing threat. We can no longer ignore new Soviet overseas bases, or the proximity of their forces to Turkey, Iran and Pakistan.

(U) The best counter to Soviet adventurism in Southwest Asia is a network of strong, independent, and stable nations --- in simple words --- collective security. While this must be at the initiative of the nations in the region, the United States must be prepared to assist diplomatically, economically, and, if necessary, militarily.

(U) It should be obvious that the RDJTF is currently the only meaningful counterbalance to Soviet adventurism in Southwest Asia. It is a deterrent force, designed to promote stability in this region. If deterrence fails, however, it must have the capability to counter Soviet aggression with military force. Aside from the RDJTF, I know of no reasonable alternative for responsive and effective military action in Southwest Asia. I must emphasize that the RDJTF is not an invasion force to intrude on the sovereign rights of any nation. Quite to the contrary, our purpose is to insure that these fundamental rights are protected.

(U) Two key words basic to the RDJTF's ability to establish a credible deterrence in Southwest Asia are "rapid" and "deployment". Not only do these encourage questions such as, "How rapid is rapid?" and "How do you deploy?" --- but they mean different things to different people. I do not have simple answers -- for specifics are scenario dependent. If we merely had to deploy people, and didn't have to worry about equipment and supplies, we have enough seats on our strategic airlift ---together with the highest number of aircraft in our civil reserve airlift fleet --- to move the entire RDJTF in several days. But people alone do not constitute combat power. It takes equipment and logistics to build an effective combat team.

(U) The challenge facing the RDJTF is to ensure that we optimize and fully integrate the capabilities of airlift, sealift, and amphibious lift. And, in our planning, we must deal with today's numbers of aircraft and ships to perform this task. We cannot make non-real-world assumptions --- nor can we conjecture as to what will or will not be available in 1985 or 1990. Our mission is here and our mission is now! Parenthetically, I must be the first to emphasize that without sufficient strategic airlift, strategic sealift, and amphibious lift, there is no way to put a capital "R" in rapid, and all of the finest trained troops and most sophisticated weapons systems in the world are totally useless sitting at Fort Campbell, Kentucky: Camp Lejeune, North Carolina; or Myrtle Beach Air Force Base, South Carolina.

(U) We are undertaking incredibly detailed planning to insure we optimize the use of these limited resources. We are demanding, through command channels, that every item of supply or equipment which goes aboard an aircraft in the early days of deployment will be something which is an essential enhancement to RDJTF combat capabilities --- we will not tolerate creature comforts at the expense of combat power!

(U) Also, we are undertaking increased efforts to preposition supplies and equipment in the region --- either aboard ship or on land. The airlift savings associated with prepositioning are significant. As an example, one ammunition ship at Diego Garcia, as part of the NTPS, carries as much ammunition as could be lifted by roughly 500 C-141 sorties from the east coast to the Middle East. This, obviously, would allow us to reduce force closure times and simultaneously enhance staying power.

(U) On the strategic sealift side, we are looking for faster ways to get ships on-berth and loaded in U.S. ports, on their way to the Middle East, and off-loaded in Persian Gulf ports or over the beach. Our ultimate objective is to get a specific item of supply or equipment from where it is today in the U.S. --- to the actual user in Southwest Asia --- in the shortest period of time.

(U) Concerning readiness of RDJTF units, it is important to note that the Army has undertaken extraordinary efforts to upgrade those organizations which are available to the RDJTF for planning.

(U) The Air Force has filled all of the key billets in RDJTF wings, and re-allocated war reserve spare kits to these units to insure that they are ready to deploy and fight --- now!

(U) The Marine Corps, with traditional readiness emphasis, is relatively sound across the board. In fact, the 7th MAB's equipment aboard the NTPS ships is in an exceptionally high state of readiness.

(U) Since the bulk of the Navy forces which will support the RDJTF will be those which are forward deployed on a daily basis in the Indian Ocean, and forward deployed forces are normally given priority for readiness, I have every confidence that our partners on the sea will be ready when the circumstances so dictate.

(U) To enhance operational readiness, we have established a realistic training and exercise program. In one year we have participated in eight separate exercises --- two of which were conducted overseas ---Exercise BRIGHT STAR in Egypt last November --- and Exercise ACCURATE TEST, a communications exercise, in Oman during February. Both of these far exceeded our initial expectations.

(U) One of our most important tasks is to constantly look for more and better ways to exploit Soviet vulnerabilities --- and there are many. Press reports from Moscow highlight the fact that the RDJTF has added a new dimension to Soviet concerns over U.S. combat capabilities.

(U) If you give us the same amount of time to deploy the RDJTF as it would take the Soviets to mobilize category II and III divisions and move them into position, we can deploy a credible force --- one which, at the very least, changes the fundamental calculus of Soviet decision-making.

(U) While I am quick to recognize the RDJTF's shortcomings, I am impatient with those "gloom and doom" experts who picture every Soviet soldier leaning forward in the attack position --- and who portray every U.S. serviceman or woman

sitting back wringing their hands in desperation. This is an unwarranted indictment of the hundreds of thousands of superb young Americans in uniform today who still have the patriotism, guts, determination and professionalism to do the job. As the RDJTF, I can't afford the luxury of spending the bulk of my time discussing what we need for the future --- even though I applaud those who do. I have been given a specific mission, and must do with what we have available --- here and now!

(U) We cannot afford to put our head in the sand, and, as long as I am associated with the RDJTF, I will continue to move forward in providing this country with something it requires --- a fully combat capable and deployable force. Don't think me naive in this regard, for I doubt if there is anyone who has a better understanding of RDJTF capabilities and limitations --- but we must make this concept work. I have neither heard of nor do I know a reasonable or responsible alternative which takes into consideration the enormity and complexity of our missions --- particularly as they relate to peace and stability in Southwest Asia.

(U) In closing, let me say that as the Commander I see the RDJTF as an essential element of a viable national military strategy.

(U) I see it as a strong and powerful signal of our commitment to our friends in Southwest Asia and elsewhere in this troubled world.

(U) To the Soviets, it says that we will not tolerate military adventurism. It says that threats to our friends and allies could constitute an assault on our vital interests, and, when they do, we have a credible military capability to respond.

(U) To our friends and allies, it says that we are a nation to be reckoned with. We are not a "Paper Tiger".

(U) And, to the American public, it says that we, as a nation, have not forgotten our obligations to friends and allies --- and that we recognize the importance of the developing regions to the free world."

I. (U) GENERAL

U ~~(S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force concept grew out of a study conducted in 1977 which highlighted the need for a four service force which could deploy for contingencies outside NATO and Korea. Presidential Review Memorandum 10 culminated in Presidential Decision 18 (PD-18) which discussed the establishment of a force to project U.S. power rapidly. The Iranian revolution, the seizure of the American hostages in Tehran, and the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan hastened the formation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

(U) Public interest in the Rapid Deployment Force predated establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force by nearly a year. Among the first senior government officials to mention publicly what eventually would become the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was the outgoing Army Chief of Staff in the summer of 1979, General Bernard W. Rogers. He held a farewell news conference at the Pentagon on June 21, 1979, and, in response to questions, told reporters, "We are designing what will be known as the unilateral corps", a force which could be deployed for "a non-NATO contingency such as the Persian Gulf or the Middle East or Northeast Asia".[1]

(U) After the Rogers news conference, news media carried a variety of reports on the proposed force. Press releases by the White House and OSD provided an additional catalyst for the creation of an RDJTF.

(U) On 29 November 1979, the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) approved the establishment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Headquarters, Located at MacDill AFB, Florida. The HQ RDJTF was to be a moderately sized, full-time military staff with a balanced service representation and sized to enable the Commander, RDJTF to exercise operational control of the identified forces of the RDJTF or a force of comparable size using rapid deployment forces.

(U) On December 5, 1979, Major General Paul X. Kelley stepped forward for the U.S. Marine Corps to talk with the Pentagon press corps about the Corps' new maritime prepositioning concept. Under this concept, the Marine Corps would preposition heavy equipment and supplies aboard "maritime prepositioning ships", which could then be placed in strategically located ports around the world. When trouble flared, he said, a force of up to 45,000 Marines could be flown to the area by Air Force transports and civilian aircraft from the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF). Once there, they would meet the prepositioning ships, draw their equipment and up to 30 days supplies from the ships, and proceed to the objective area. General Kelley, then responsible for requirements and programs at Marine Corps Headquarters, pointed out that while the maritime prepositioning ships did not have a forcible entry capability, they would, nonetheless, enhance the Marine Corps' role in the proposed Rapid Deployment Force. At the time, Kelley was not aware that he would be named the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force's first commander.

(U) The Kelley briefing received considerable coverage in national news media. Official Washington took note, and a background briefing for Pentagon reporters was scheduled late the following afternoon. Under the ground rules for the briefing the "senior Defense official" who conducted the briefing could not be identified, nor could the "senior Marine Corps officer" who joined him.

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1. Transcript of news conference by General Bernard W. Rogers, Chief of Staff, U.S. Army, June 21, 1979, Washington D.C.

The senior Defense official told those present that the Carter Administration was prepared to spend $9 billion over the next five years to create a Rapid Deployment Force which could send Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps units into areas such as the Persian Gulf. He said that the plans included purchase of at least 50 new CX transport aircraft and 15 new multi-purpose prepositioning ships. Although the plan did not have White House approval, it had been proposed by the Secretary of Defense because it would fill a major gap in the nation's defense readiness, i.e., insufficient airlift and sealift. The division of labor within the proposed Rapid Deployment Force, he told reporters, would have the Army using the new CX aircraft while the Marine Corps would use chiefly the Civil Reserve Air Fleet and the new maritime prepositioning ships. The senior Defense official also discussed at some length the kind of force which could be projected into the Southwest Asia region.

(U) National news media reported what the senior Defense official had said at the background briefing, and the idea of a Rapid Deployment Force began to gather additional steam. However, there was an information vacuum on the Rapid Deployment Force, and speculation began to fill the vacuum.

(U) Secretary of Defense Harold Brown scheduled a news conference on Friday afternoon, December 14, 1979, to lay to rest some of the speculation about the RDF. As he put it in his opening statement, "I understand there have been some questions about the organization of Rapid Deployment Forces and what the command organization might be. I should soon be establishing that organization formally, but I can tell you what is planned". He went on to tell reporters:

-- A joint task force will be established to do the planning for various contingency uses of the Rapid Deployment Forces, and these forces could range from a battalion to an Army corps in size.

-- The force could involve elements from all the services.

-- The Joint Task Force will be headed by a lieutenant general and will be part of the Readiness Command.

-- The Joint Task Force will do the planning for deployment and operation of whatever parts of the rapid deployment forces are to be used for a given contingency and will examine various contingencies.

-- If these contingencies actually occurred and an operation had to be mounted, the commander of the Joint Task Force would become the operational commander. His headquarters would be subordinate to the unified commander in the area or would report directly to the National Command Authorities.

-- The establishment of the joint task force will take place very soon, within weeks or months.

-- The Rapid Deployment Force will be composed of essentially all units not already committed to NATO or Korea. Forces will be selected from a very broad spectrum of units, including the 82nd Airborne, the 101st Airborne, a number of other Army units, the bulk of the Marine Corps, and Air Force and Navy units.

-- Over the next five years, we would expect to be able to cut the deployment time for the first substantial elements to be deployed to distant places by at least a factor of two.

-- Something on the order of $10 billion will be spent to improve our ability to deploy rapidly.[2]

(U) Less than two weeks later, on December 27, 1979, Dr. Brown flew to Tampa's MacDill Air Force Base where he held a news conference about the Rapid Deployment Force. He reiterated much of what he had said on December 14th, but he added:

-- The new organization will be called the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

-- The task force headquarters will be part of the Readiness Command and will be subordinate to the Readiness Command.

-- Major General Paul X. Kelley will be assigned as the commander of the new unit. General Kelley will be given a third star and will take command very soon.

-- The RDJTF Headquarters will become operational in early March 1980 and will have a staff of about 250 personnel.[3]

(U) Although no one had been specific about the size of the new force since General Rogers' news conference the previous summer, the consensus was that the force would number around 100,000 to 110,000 and those were the most frequently mentioned figures.

(U) Senior Defense officials who discussed the Rapid Deployment Force always talked in terms of employing it in the Southwest Asia region. It was clear that the focus of the new force was to be Southwest Asia. This was underscored by President Carter, in his State of the Union address, of January 23, 1980, which set forth what came to be known as the Carter Doctrine:

(U) "Any attempt by outside forces to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and such an assault will be repelled by any means necessary, including military force."

President Carter went on in the same address to say:

"We are systematically enhancing our ability to respond rapidly to non-NATO contingencies wherever required by our commitments or when our vital interests are threatened. The Rapid Deployment Forces we are assembling will be extraordinarily flexible: They could range in size from a few ships or air squadrons to formations as large as 100,000 men, together with their support. Our forces will be prepared for rapid deployment to any region of strategic significance. Among the specific initiatives we are taking to help us respond to crises outside of Europe are: -- the cargo aircraft with inter continental range; (and) -- the design and procurement of a force of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry heavy equipment and supplies for three Marine Corps brigades."

2. Transcript of news conference by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, December 14, 1979, Washington, D.C.

3. Transcript of news conference by Secretary of Defense Harold Brown, December 27, 1979, MacDill AFB, Florida

(U) When the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was formally established on March 1, 1980, there was little fanfare. As other sections of this history will show, few of the new command's 258 authorized personnel were actually at MacDill Air Force Base, the headquarters building was still under renovation, guidance to the new headquarters from the Joint Chiefs of Staff and the U.S. Readiness command was still being formulated, and the commander of the new force was still needed in Washington.

II. (U) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

U ~~(S)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was not developed as an "invasion force". Rather, it was structured chiefly as a force to deter aggression from outside the Persian Gulf region and to assist nations in the region in resisting aggression from outside the region. Upon invitation from a friendly nation (or nations) in the region and when directed by the National Command Authorities, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force would have the capacity to rapidly deploy a significant force to the Middle East/Persian Gulf region. The presence of such a force would be intended as a signal to potential adversaries that movement of their armed forces into the area could result in direct confrontation with the United States. If deterrence failed, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force would be prepared to conduct sustained combat operations in the region. To prepare for any contingencies, COMRDJTF was assigned the responsibilities for all aspects of employment planning for RDJTF operations; to be capable of deploying on a no-notice basis and in a bare-base environment to meet Southwest Asia (SWA) contingencies; and to be prepared to conduct combat operations on order. Under the operational command of USCINCRED, COMRDJTF was to undertake predeployment planning for Southwest Asia (SWA) region contingencies and related CONUS training and exercises. Through USCINCRED, COMRDJTF would coordinate outside OCONUS exercises with commanders of appropriate unified commands and employ forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

U ~~(S)~~ JCSM-318-79 dated 15 Nov 79 delineated the force composition for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and identified notional forces which were regularly assigned to a unified command and capable of rapid deployment to meet the requirements of global contingencies. In this reference, certain of those forces were also tentatively identified for designation as joint task force rapid deployment forces and were also tentatively identified for use in initial contingencies/planning for the Middle East and Africa. As a result of lessons learned in RDJTF exercises and continuing coordinated action between HQ USREDCOM, USREDCOM Service Component Headquarters, the RDJTF HQ, the services, and the headquarters of the unified and specified commands, specific forces were identified to better define the notional structure provided in JCSM-318-79. Action to further identify specific units continues.

U ~~(S)~~ With regard to deployments, the RDJTF is directed to be capable of deploying forces that were varied in their size and composition. In all cases the force selection was to be predicated on mission requirements and could be structured through modified existing OPLANs, pre-identified packages, or in some cases a no-plan situation. The deployment concept is based on the following factors:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Except for small contingencies, forces will utilize both air and sealift.

U b. ~~(S)~~ Intermediate Staging Bases (ISBs) may or may not be available.

U c. ~~(S)~~ Forces would normally be deployed by air and land, however, they must be capable of airdrop operations.

d. U ~~(S)~~ Naval forces would normally begin closure during the crisis buildup.

U ~~(S)~~ Force deployment packages would provide a balanced capability to command and control forces from all services at various levels of conflict. If the actual force deployed for the operation was not balanced, command, control and communications (C3) would be adjusted or tailored to reflect the composition of the force.

(U) The following force packages were structured based on the above guidance:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Reinforced battalion/squadron(s)/MAU/naval combatant(s) force(s) are introduced primarily for "presence" operations and would rely heavily on local subsistence, security, billeting and transportation support. C3 would be established with the appropriate CINC and COMRDJTF via secure TTY by entry into the AUTOSEVOCOM System, and communications would be established with any other US combat forces located in or near the operational area.

U b. ~~(S)~~ A brigade/wing/MAB/CVBG force capable of short-term medium intensity combat operations and requiring subsistence, security, billeting and transportation support. C3 would be established with the supporting NCA, CINC, and RDJTF.

U c. ~~(S)~~ A division/multi-wing/MAF/multi-CVBG force capable of medium intensity combat operations for an indefinite period or capable of conducting high intensity operations until approximately C+15. Operations may be from a bare base and full subsistence, security, billeting, communications and transportation support would be required.

U d. ~~(S)~~ The entire RDJTF force list capable of sustained operations and requiring maximum logistical and communications support. In any given scenario, the deployment of the RDJTF headquarters should be viewed as a buildup by increments rather than as separate packages. These increments build from a small liaison staff to a full capability for command and control of the entire force list. Augmentation would be required as the force size and conflict intensity increases.

U ~~(S)~~ In most situations the RDJTF would attempt to deploy a headquarters liaison increment to the objective area prior to deploying forces, or possibly, even prior to a decision by the National Command Authority.

(U) An incremental buildup was planned as follows:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d

(b)(1)1.4a

a. (U) Phase I. Crisis Development.

(b)(1)1.4a

(2) (U) Priority for strategic airlift would be established by COMRDJTF.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ Specific instruction for command, control and communications countermeasures (C3CM) operations (to include electronic warfare (EW) operations); psychological operations (PSYOPS); unconventional warfare (UW) operations; search and rescue (SAR) operations; deception; rules of engagement (ROE); and reconnaissance are being developed and will be contained in appropriate annexes to specific operations orders and SOPs.

(U) In the logistics area, the following concept applies:

a. (U) COMRDJTF exercises overall directive authority within the area of operation in order to insure effectiveness and economy in operations to prevent or eliminate unnecessary duplication of facilities and overlapping of functions among the service components.

b. (u) The respective services would continue to have responsibility, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense, for the logistics support of their own forces, except where such support is otherwise provided for by agreements or assignments as to common-servicing, joint-servicing, or cross-servicing at force, area or Department of Defense (DOD) level. Component commanders would deal directly through their service channels on logistics matters.

c. (U) Commanders of component forces and the naval force command would comply with the instructions of their respective department regarding the internal management of logistics within their respective commands. Additionally, they will be responsible for logistics support to their respective forces deployed in support of operations set forth in supporting plans, using established service methods, except where the logistics support is otherwise provided for by prearranged agreements or predirected assignments.

U d. ~~(S)~~ Deploying forces would be fully equipped and provided with sufficient accompanying supplies to sustain themselves until resupply can be effected. The initial resupply lines of communication (LOC) will be programmed to be established to the area of operations not later (b)(1)1.4a by sealift. While resupply will ultimately be from CONUS, resupply prior to closure of the RDJTF elements will be subject to strategic movement tradeoffs. Prior to closure of Sea Lines of Communications (SLOC), some resupply may be from Unified Command (e.g. EUCOM) stocks with automatic replenishment established from CONUS.

e. (U) Initial units, supplies and equipment are scheduled to be deployed by airlift to the area of operations except for Naval/Marine forces afloat. Maximum use would be made of existing facilities at each staging base/operating base, both in CONUS and overseas and every effort will be made to keep combat service support requirements to a minimum commensurate with the tactical situation. In preparing logistics and movement plans, service component commanders would evaluate and consider throughput capabilities, adjusting required stockage levels to meet mission requirements.

U f. ~~(C)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) Commander plans to coordinate common-user logistics facilities in the area of operations, and to control and coordinate the establishment of interior LOCs as will be required to accomplish the mission. Maximum utilization will be made of local logistics support resources.

g. (U) The services, in coordination with appropriate component commanders, would compare logistics requirements in support of various sized force packages against assets available. Supporting plans would be developed; logistical shortfalls would be identified, and alternative support methods would be determined. The services would also identify specific host nation support requirements as a potential alternative logistics source.

III. (U) MISSION AND ORGANIZATION

(U) MISSION

(U) The mission of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is to plan, jointly train, exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ designated forces in response to contingencies threatening U.S. vital interests. More precisely and as defined by the Terms of Reference (TOR) for the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, the mission includes:

U a. ~~(S)~~ Being under the operational command (OPCOM) of USCINCRED to undertake predeployment planning for Southwest Asia (SWA) region contingencies and related CONUS training and exercises. The SWA region is defined as all states on the Arabian Peninsula south of the northern borders of Saudi Arabia and Kuwait; the countries of Iraq, Iran, Afghanistan, and Pakistan on the Middle East landmass; Ethiopia, Djibouti, Somalia, and Kenya on the Horn of Africa; and the Red Sea and the Persian Gulf and adjacent waters.

U b. ~~(S)~~ Coordinating through USCINCRED, all outside CONUS exercises with commanders of appropriate unified commands.

U c. ~~(S)~~ Employing forces as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

(U) COMMAND RELATIONSHIPS

U ~~(C)~~ The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters is a subordinate command of the U.S. Readiness Command. As such, the Commander, RDJTF is under the OPCON of USCINCRED for planning, joint training and exercising, and during all preparation phases for the employment of assigned forces.

U ~~(S)~~ For the employment/deployment of assigned force, the RDJTF will be employed under the direction of the National Command Authority (NCA) through the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS) or as otherwise directed by the JCS. Furthermore, all command arrangements, agreements and memorandums of understanding between USCINCRED and commanders of other unified and specified commands will be submitted to the JCS for approval.

U ~~(C)~~ USREDCOM components (i.e., United States Army Forces, Readiness Command (USARRED) and United States Air Force Forces Readiness Command (USAFRED) will designate Army and Air Force headquarters to support RDJTF requirements for planning in exercises and contingencies. USARRED, USAFRED, and CINCPAC will further designate deployable headquarters to conduct detailed execution planning with HQ RDJTF. Once the deployable headquarters are identified for a specific exercise or contingency, they will serve as HQ RDJTF's component headquarters through which the specific contingency response will be planned in detail and executed.

U ~~(S)~~ When deployed in an exercise or contingency response, operational control (OPCON) of Army and Air Force forces will pass to COMRDJTF, Naval forces will operate in support of COMRDJTF, and Marine forces will pass OPCON to COMRDJTF upon termination of amphibious operations.

(U) ORGANIZATION

(U) The RDJTF was slated to have an initial fill of 117 officers and 114 enlisted (total 231) to be responsible for all aspects of planning in coordination with appropriate unified commanders for rapid deployment force operations in the Middle East and for planning and conducting rapid deployment force operations in other regions of the world as directed by the JCS. Duties and responsibilities include:

a. (U) Maintain a permanent in-place, ready, trained, and exercised joint staff.

b. (U) When deployed, exercise operational control, or maintain operational relationship, as directed, over the designated forces of the RDJTF.

c. (U) Conduct mission analysis and develop staff estimates to include force tailoring.

d. (U) Review and develop OPLANs, CONPLANS and coordinate joint deployment requirements with USREDCOM and JDA.

e. (U) Monitor, through USCINCRED, RDF readiness to include unit readiness, force deployability, force sustainability, and joint procedures and systems effectiveness.

f. (U) Coordinate, in conjunction with USREDCOM, inter-service logistics requirements.

(U) The following flag officers are assigned to the RDJTF:

(U) The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was officially established on 1 March 1980. Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, USMC, was the first commander. General Kelley, native of Boston, Massachusetts, was born 11 November 1928 and commissioned in 1950. He has served at least one tour with each of the four services, including service as commanding officer of the Marine Detachment of a navy ship, a tour as the senior Marine Corps officer at the U.S. Army Infantry School at Fort Benning, GA., and graduated with distinction from the U.S. Air Force's Air War College at Maxwell AFB, AL. As the commander, General Kelley commands a joint task force capable of responding to strategic deployments world-wide. He is directly responsible to the Commander in Chief of United States Readiness Command (USCINCRED) for the daily performance of the prescribed command mission and functions, and to a Unified CINC or the NCA upon employment of the RDJTF.

a. (U) The Deputy Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is Major General Robert C. Taylor, USAF. General Taylor, a native of Danforth, Illinois, was born on July 2, 1932 and commissioned in 1953. He is a command pilot and has flown over 4,300 hours, primarily in fighter aircraft such as the F-4. General Taylor has served as military assistant to three Secretaries of Defense (Melvin Laird, Elliott Richardson and James Schlesinger). In addition, he has served as commander of the 314th Air Division and U.S. Air Forces in Korea. The Deputy Commander is the principal advisor and assistant to the Commander, RDJTF discharging the mission and functional responsibilities of the Commander in his absence.

b. (U) The Chief of Staff of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is Brigadier General Carl W. Stiner, USA, a native of LaFollette, Tennessee. General Stiner was born in 1936 and commissioned in 1958. An airborne officer, General Stiner has spent most of his career in airborne and infantry positions, including command of the 1st Infantry Training Brigade at Fort Benning, GA. For two years in the mid-seventies, General Stiner served as assistant project manager of the Saudi Arabian National Guard Modernization Program, with headquarters in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia. The Chief of Staff directs and coordinates the activities of the RDJTF Staff in accomplishing its mission and functional responsibilities, and the policies and instructions of the Commander.

c. (U) Concurrent with establishment of the Headquarters at MacDill AFB, was a 19 man Washington based liaison office (WLO). The Director of the Washington D.C. Liaison Office is Brigadier General Dale A. Vesser, USA, a native of Pocatello, Idaho. General Vesser was born in 1932 and graduated from the United States Military Academy in 1954. An Airborne/Ranger qualified officer, General Vesser commanded the 2nd Battalion 7th Cavalry in Vietnam, 1970-71, and the 1st Brigade 3d Armored Division, Europe, 1976-77. Before assuming his current assignment, General Vesser was the Deputy Director (J5) for Force Development and Strategic Plans, Officer of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. This unique extension of the RDJTF is located in the Pentagon and provides the RDJTF Headquarters with the requisite politico-military/contingency planning interface and serves as a sounding board for ideas/plans and concepts with the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the Office of the Secretary of Defense, individual service headquarters and other Washington-based agencies. The WLO also maintains cognizance of ongoing actions that may effect the RDJTF planning for contingencies anywhere in the world.

UNCLASSIFIED



RDJTF KEY STAFF PERSONNEL

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IV. (U) GENERAL AND SPECIAL ACTIVITIES

A. (U) HEADQUARTERS COMMANDANT (RDHC)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The RDJTF Headquarters Joint Manpower Program[1] (JMP) dated 1 March 1980 as authorized by JCS on 23 January 1980[2] provided a single support element for support of USREDCOM and RDJTF. As shown in paragraph 11, page 40 of the JTD[1], the combined support element in support of HQ RDJTF was made up of 5 officers and 54 enlisted. Two officers and 20 enlisted are RDJTF billets and the MOS's required by the USREDCOM support element to support the additional requirements created by HQ RDJTF. The other billets (3 officers, 34 enlisted) are shown on the JTD as USREDCOM augmentees to support HQ RDJTF upon deployment.

(U) The garrison support arrangements that evolved from the original JTD was that 3 officers and 2 enlisted would work full time for HQ RDJTF and the remainder of the combined support element would be utilized as required through RCJ1-H.

(U) Upon activation, HQ RDJTF shared facilities in Bldg 501 with USREDCOM. On 24 March 1980 the HQ RDJTF moved to Bldg 1105 which was being remodeled by USAF "RED HORSE" units. Small elements of some directorates remained in Bldg 501. Construction on the RDJTF Headquarters began on 9 February 1980 with a $300k approval for the renovation of building 1105, the former Strategic Air Command (SAC) alert facility bunker at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. Paperwork to designate Bldg. 1105 as a restricted area had been submitted to the base on 5 Feb 80.

(U) On 15 August 1981 six rental trailor units were leased for use by HQ RDJTF to allow for the expanded administrative space requirements of the headquarters.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

U ~~(C)~~ Field Support for HQ RDJTF. The current arrangements for providing field support to HQ RDJTF would require, upon notification of deployment, USREDCOM and RDJTF components to provide pre-planned individual, unit and equipment augmentation as required to Headquarters Commandant, RDJTF (RDHC).

(U) RDHC personnel augmentation, as tasked, below:

(a)	(U)	RDHC (JMP)	22
(b)	(U)	USREDCOM AUGMENTEES (JMP)	37
(c)	(U)	Component Individual Augmentees	38
(d)	(U)	Unit augmentees	

1. RDJTF JMP FY80/81 DTD 1 Mar 80
2. JCS MSG 2968, DTG 231754Z Jan 80.

1	(U)	MP/SP (Army/AF)	180
2	(U)	Water Purification TM (Army)	3
3	(U)	Water Transportation TM (Army)	5
4	(U)	Bath Det (Army)	3
5	(U)	POL Storage/Issue TM (Army)	9
6	(U)	POL Bulk Dist Tm (Army)	18
7	(U)	Medical Det (AF)	10
8	(U)	Laundry SVC TM (Army)	7
9	(U)	Combat Engr Plat (USMC)	37
		TOTAL	369

U ~~(S)~~ On 20 November 1980[3], CJCS designated CSAF as executive agent for the JCS for coordinating field support of the HQ RDJTF. On 26 Jan 81[4] HQ USAF requested HQ RDJTF to provide the envisioned concept for field support[5], current/proposed arrangements with all services, and requirements to support the field support concept.

(U) On 24 March 1981 equipment requirements which would provide the capability for "standing alone" as a separate headquarters, were[6] submitted to USREDCOM.

(U) On 28 January 1981[7] a personnel requirements package was submitted to USREDCOM which would provide COMRDJTF with a Headquarters Commandant stand alone capability.

B. (U) DATA AUTOMATION

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) During 1980, the data automation effort was directed toward establishment of the foundation for a viable, deployed automatic data processing (ADP) system, the first such computer system in the Worldwide Military Command and Control System community. Initial tasks centered around procurement of data processing equipment as a prerequisite to development of system applications.

3. JCSM 675-80, 20 Nov 80.4. HQ USAF MSG DTG 262215Z Jan 81.
5. COMRDJTF MSG DTG 092021Z Apr 81.
6. RDHC FORM 14, SUBJ: RDJTF EQUIPMENT, DTD 24 March 1981.
7. RDHC LTR SUBJ: MANPOWER STUDY DOCUMENT, DTD 28 Jan 1981.

(U) Prior to the creation of the RDJTF, USREDCOM organized an RDJTF ad hoc Working Group to study the projected requirements of the new organization. The Working Group concluded, among other things, that the RDJTF required a deployable ADP system to support staff decision-making and command and control functions. This led to submission by USREDCOM in February 1980, of a Worldwide Military Command and Control System (WWMCCS) System Development Notification (SDN) for a commercial test-bed as well as a deployable system.[8]

(U) Although the RDJTF was officially established on 1 March 1980, the Office of Data Automation did not reach full staffing until 26 March 1980. One week later, the new office learned that OJCS had validated the USREDCOM SDN, but had returned it to the Air Staff without action because the desired deployable ADP equipment was not available on the current WWMCCS ADP contract. OJCS recommended that the requirement for a deployable ADP system be present in the form of a Required Operational Capability (ROC). In addition, OJCS recommended submission of a restructured SDN for acquisition of the test-bed (a Honeywell Level 6 Minicomputer).[9]

(U) The ROC and revised SDN were completed and placed in channels in early June.[10/11] OJCS validated the SDN on 9 September 1980,[12] and personnel training and site preparation were completed in anticipation of delivery of the test-bed computer system in January 1981. The ROC is still undergoing staffing at the OJCS/Service level.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Data automation support was provided to the RDJTF for the first time under field conditions during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81 at Fort Bragg, North Carolina in October 1980. Visual Information Projection (VIP) terminals and printers were tactically deployed in support of the RJDTF, AFFOR, MARFOR and JUWTF. This exposure provided the staff a greater appreciation of how ADP might support the accomplishment of their functional responsibilities.

(U) As the staff continued to gain experience with ADP, more potential applications emerged. The coming year should see the marriage of deployable equipment obtained through the ROC with a growing inventory of application systems which will enhance the productivity and effectiveness of the RDJTF.

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8. Letter, HQ USREDCOM (RDCA), 20 Feb 80, Subject; WWMCCS System Development Notification (SDN) RED-057.
9. Memorandum, JCS (SC3S), ADP-030-80, 2 Apr 80, Subject: WWMCCS System Development Notification (SDN) RED-057.
10. Letter, HQ USREDCOM (RCCS), 4 Jun 80, Subject: WWMCCS ADP Required Operational Capability.
11. Letter, HQ USREDCOM (RCCS), 6 Jun 80, Subject: Revised WWMCCS System Development Notification (SDN) RED-057.
12. Memorandum, JCS (SC3S), ADP-M-100-80, 9 Sep 80, Subject: Acknowledgment Memorandum (SDN F80032).

C. (U) LEGAL ADVISOR

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The COMRDJTF Legal Advisor, an Army Lieutenant Colonel, reports directly to the Chief of Staff. Duties include developing a system that would permit the RDJTF to take care of its own military justice matters. Under the system, COMRDJTF has Article 15, UCMJ punishment authority for all Navy and Marine Corps officer personnel. With respect to enlisted naval service personnel, a Naval Service Detachment Enlisted (NSDE) was activated and a Marine Corps officer was designated as its commander. The senior Air Force officer, Deputy Commander, RDJTF was delegated Article 15, UCMJ punishment authority for all USAF officer and enlisted members. The senior Army officer, Chief of Staff, RDJTF was given the same authority over assigned Army personnel. Also, the Legal Advisor was instrumental in obtaining the authority for the COMRDTJF to convene General Courts-Martial. This gives him the authority to prefer for trial by courts-martial the cases of any armed forces members who are assigned or attached to RDJTF. This authority is published in DOD Directive 5510.3.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) This office published RDJTF Directive 27-1, Reporting Violations of the Law of War, in July 1980. The purpose is to implement DOD Directive 5100.77 and insure that the law of war and the obligations of the United States Government under the law are met and that a program is designed to prevent any violations of the law of war by US personnel. This directive applies to all RDJTF personnel, component commands, subordinate elements and all personnel assigned, attached or serving as a part of the RDJTF upon deployment of the RDJTF as the supported Joint Commander.

(U) Claims responsibility for the RDJTF rests with the Department of the Air Force. The Legal Advisor was responsible for assisting in the formulation of the claims procedure that will be used. All claims involving or generated by the RDJTF or units assigned or attached thereto except when they arise in countries for which single service responsibility is already assigned in accordance with DOD Directive 5515.8, will be handled in accordance with the procedure proposed by the Legal Advisor, RDJTF and approved by the Dept. of the Air Force.

(U) All OPLANS and OPORDS issued by RDJTF have been reviewed to assure their compliance with the law of war.

(U) Lastly, in the area of administrative law, the Office of the Legal Advisor has assisted the Commander and Staff with answers to a myriad of thorny legal questions.

D. (U) PROVOST MARSHAL

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Provost Marshal, an Army Lieutenant Colonel, has staff responsibility for discipline and law and order aspects of the RDJTF.

(U) In a deployed status, suspected criminal activity of HQ RDJTF members will be investigated by qualified personnel of the supporting MP unit under supervision of the RDJTF Provost Marshal. Criminal investigative support will be requested from the appropriate component as required. Confinement of US personnel will be done in accordance with service directives with the confinement facility operated by the ARFOR Commander.

(U) Enemy Prisoners of War (EPW) and Civilian Internees (CI) are transferred as soon as possible to the ARFOR operated facility.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) During exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81 a "Task Force Pistol" was formed to assist the RDJ3 ground operations section by developing a plan to provide Rear Area Security (RAS) for the area of RDJTF and other facilities located in the littoral of Saudi Arabia.

U ~~(S)~~ This task force, made up of members of the HHD 519th MP BN produced by ENDEX a viable RAS plan briefing the Chief of Ground Operations. The plan determined force requirements, logistical and other shortfalls of the 19-76 MP BN HHD. This data was provided to the PM FORSCOM in Nov 1980 for use by that office in further coordinations with TRADOC.

(U) Investigative support for a deployed HQ RDJTF continues to require specific resolution. Visits to HQ OSI and NIS in Oct 80 by PM RDJTF, resulted in commitments of support from the nearest permanent location OSI Turkey, NIS from the nearest ship or direct from the Washington area. During Nov 80, a representative of the USACIDC visited the RDJTF Provost Marshal to discuss the viability of collocating a CID detachment with HQ RDJTF to provide direct support to HQ RDJTF. This represents the best solution to the requirement and does not create a support problem. USACIDC held a conference in Dec 80 to determine the best configuration for this support element. This issue continues with resolution expected by the middle of next year.

E. (U) COMPTROLLER

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The current organization of the Comptroller, RDJTF, consists of two Army officers, a Lieutenant Colonel and First Lieutenant.

(U) The mission of the Comptroller, RDJTF is to advise the commander and the staff on resource management, fiscal and budgetary matters and resource structure; the creation and maintenance of a financial management system; and administering the execution of the approved Operations Operating Budget (OOB) and Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX) Budget. He is also responsible for maintaining liaison and coordination with component forces and higher headquarters regarding budget and fiscal matters. Other duties and responsibilities include:

a. (U) Providing comptroller support planning for the headquarters, to include financial planning for joint training and JRX's;

b. (U) Performing staff supervision of command TDY travel policies and procedures;

c. (U) Preparing the financial management section of the Personnel Annex of all headquarters OPLANS/CONPLANS to include: budget, accounting and reports, financial services, logistics (interface with the finance system), local procurement of foreign currency, and use of military payment certificates (MPC);

d. (U) Evaluating contract administration for the RDJTF;

e. (U) Controlling local contract funding procurement actions made by the imprest fund cashier.

(U) When deployed the Comptroller will, in addition to the duties noted above, provide staff supervision and act as advisor to the commander regarding finance services in the area of operations to include: disbursing operations, related cash requirements and banking services and military accounting.

STATUS OF FY80 OPERATING PROGRAM

AS OF 30 SEPTEMBER 1980 (U)

(U) PROGRAM BY DIRECTORATE/OFFICE:

	FY80 PROGRAM	FY80 OBLIGATIONS
Command Section	$ 46,100	$ 63,366
Comptroller	8,800	365
Legal Advisor	2,600	3,279
Public Affairs	3,000	1,806
Adjutant General	65,400	59,821
Data Automation	5,000	3,523
J-1	5,600	7,952
Headquarters Commandant	588,872	614,276
J-2	54,000	47,800
J-3	47,500	23,997
J-4	17,300	18,972
Surgeon	1,500	313
J-5	25,300	30,650
J-6	14,400	9,252
TOTAL	$885,372	$885,372

(U) FINANCIAL MANAGEMENT

(U) Since the year 1980 was the first year of existence for the RDJTF, one time set-up costs were incurred by the JCS designated executive agent, the United States Air Force. Significant among these costs are those associated with the minor construction project necessary to refurbish the headquarters building and the dollars required to procure the items of supply and equipment necessary to make the RDJTF headquarters operational. The obligations incurred in these areas as of 31 December 1980 were as follows:

Minor Construction (AF EEIC 529)	$282,000
Supplies (AF EEIC 605,609,618 & 619)	$554,365
Equipment (AF EEIC 628)	$208,055

(1) (U) FY80 OOB. Depicted below is the final status of the FY80 OOB as of 30 September 1980 (end of fiscal year):

(U) PROGRAM BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE:

	FY80 PROGRAM	FY80 OBLIGATIONS
Transportation Costs	$ 96,600	$100,756
Per Diem	83,400	46,697
Equipment Rental	27,800	19,455
Other Commo Svcs	1,000	1,002
Other Purchased Services	11,200	3,996
Supplies - SSD	2,600	2,537
Supplies - GSD	448,172	503,936
Other Supplies	7,800	8,501
Equipment	206,800	198,492
TOTAL	$885,372	$885,372

(2) (U) FY81 OOB: The FY81 OOB is shown below as of 31 Dec 1980 (end of calendar year):

STATUS OF FY81 OPERATING PROGRAM

AS OF 31 DECEMBER 1980 (U)

(U) PROGRAM BY DIRECTORATE/OFFICE:

	FY81 PROGRAM	OBLIGATIONS TO DATE
Command Section	$ 93,600	$ 27,209
Comptroller	154,200	0
Legal Advisor	4,500	0
Washington Liaison Office	69,000	13,562
Public Affairs	23,400	7,063
Adjutant General	209,300	150,320
Data Automation	50,000	522
CCAG	10,900	6,023
J-1 & PM	42,500	2,637
Headquarters Commandant	189,200	37,766
J-2	126,200	35,567
J-3	186,500	24,344
J-4 & Med Svcs	73,900	16,755
J-5	110,300	8,589
J-6	139,500	5,840
TOTAL	$1,483,000	$336,197

(U) PROGRAM BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE:

Transportation Costs	$489,400	$ 86,219
Per Diem	245,400	40,482
Equipment Rental	153,550	154,702
Other Commo Support	5,650	5,650
Printing & Reproduction	4,000	0
Facilities Projects	58,000	0
Other Purchased Services	51,600	190
Medical Supplies	1,000	0
Supplies - GSD	218,400	37,656
Other Supplies	6,000	1,735
Equipment	250,000	9,563
TOTAL	$1,483,000	$336,197

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) In addition to the OOB, the Comptroller, RDJTF also administers a Joint Readiness Exercise (JRX) budget for the RDJTF. In 1980, the RDJTF prepared for and/or participated in seven exercises. Listed below are the exercises with the associated costs by fiscal year and total obligations as of 31 December 1980:

EXERCISE	FY80	FY81	TOTAL 1980
POSITIVE LEAP	$ 4,467	$ 2,964	$ 7,431
BRAVE SHIELD	338	-	338
GALLANT KNIGHT	4,548	-	4,548
ACCURATE TEST	20,391	13,083	33,474
BRIGHT STAR	17,563	51,216	68,779
BORDER STAR	-	1,324	1,324
BOLD STAR	-	900	900
TOTAL	$47,307	$69,487	$116,794

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) FY82 OOB: The FY 82 OOB was submitted to HQ USAF in February 1980 and reflected a projected requirement of $10,590,000. A significant portion of this estimate was programmed to cover military airlift cost associated with the developing RDJTF exercise program -$6,717,000. HQ USAF was advised that as the RDJTF exercise program was approved and integrated into the JCS directed or coordinated exercise program, the $6,717,000 should likewise be removed from the OOB and redistributed in the exercise budget. Final funding for FY82 anticipates such redistribution. Set forth below is the FY82 OOB as submitted:

FY82 OPERATIONS OPERATING BUDGET (U)

(U) PROGRAM BY ELEMENT OF EXPENSE:

EEIC	FY82 ESTIMATE
Travel	$ 803,000
Transportation	6,717,000
Rental	102,000
Communications	34,000
Printing	3,000
Purchased Maintenance	27,000
Misc Contracts	2,757,000
Supplies	134,000
Equipment	13,000
TOTAL	$10,590,000

F. (U) PUBLIC AFFAIRS

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) COMRDJTF is responsible for public affairs matters within the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force and will serve as the principal public spokesman for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. His principal assistant in such matters is the RDJTF Public Affairs Officer (PAO).

(U) During normal in-CONUS exercises, significant RDJTF public affairs activities shall be coordinated with USCINCRED, normally through the USREDCOM Public Affairs Officer.

(U) During normal OCONUS exercises, significant RDJTF public affairs activities shall be coordinated with the Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense (Public Affairs), unless COMRDJTF is under the operational command of another commander in which case the coordination shall be with that commander. Significant public affairs activities overseas shall also be coordinated with the country team PAO.

(U) Public Affairs Officer, RDJTF:

a. (U) Serves as Joint Public Affairs Officer for RDJTF exercises and operations.

b. (U) Serves as RDJTF command spokesman.

c. (U) Conducts public affairs/liaison with OASD/PA, CINCs, and commands assigned/designated for assignment to COMRDJTF.

d. (U) As required, establishes Press Center and Joint Public Affairs Office (JPAO) in connection with RDJTF exercises and operations and is responsible for operation of press center/JPAO.

e. (U) Obtains feedback on news coverage of RDJTF operations and exercises.

f. (U) As feasible (depending upon news sources), publishes a daily news sheet during RDJTF exercises and operations.

g. (U) As appropriate and as feasible, initiates action to commence delivery of Stars and Stripes newspapers and obtain American Forces Radio and Television Service (AFRTS) during RDJTF operations.

h. (U) Is releasing authority for RDJTF news and photographs during exercises and operations.

(U) National news media took notice in early April when the fledgling RDJTF began its first exercise. The exercise came only five weeks after the force was formally established. It was called Positive Leap, and media reports noted that it was a command post exercise conducted entirely on paper and that it had a Middle East scenario. Other than local news media in the area where the exercise

was held (Ft Bragg, N.C.), there was no interest on the part of news media representatives in actually visiting the exercise site. Because the exercise was classified throughout, no effort was made to generate news media interest.

(U) When the initial planning for creation of the RDJTF was being done, Readiness Command public affairs personnel correctly fore saw great news media interest in the new command. Early REDCOM drafts of the proposed RDJTF Joint Table of Distribution (JTD) allocated 13 of the original 258 manpower spaces to public affairs. These included a public affairs officer and an enlisted public affairs specialist from each of the four services plus two photojournalists and a broadcast journalist. The public affairs section of the proposed JTD was cut by 10 billets to provide additional manning for the operations directorate and other RDJTF staff sections, leaving billets for two public affairs officers and an administrative assistant. When it became necessary to create the Washington Liaison Office, however, one more billet was taken, leaving RDJTF with two public affairs billets: a Navy Lieutenant Commander (0-4) public affairs officer and an Air Force Staff Sergeant (E-5) administrative specialist. The public affairs officer billet was filled by Commander (b)(6) who reported to the new command on March 31, 1980. For a command sometimes accused of being nothing more than a public relations gimmick, the new force began its life with a very small public affairs staff. The staff was not enlarged during the first year.

(U) When Lt. Gen. Kelley reported to MacDill, he and his deputy commander, Air Force Major General Taylor, sat down with Commander Baker on 30 April 1980 to discuss public affairs for the new command. Basically, the following emerged from that meeting:

a. (U) The first priority in public affairs would be devoted to explaining what the RDJTF was, what it needed, and, in general terms, what its capabilities were.

b. (U) The principal target audience for RDJTF public affairs initiatives would be the Washington arena.

c. (U) General Kelley said "he felt that the RDJTF should have a moderately aggressive" public affairs program and that sustaining the momentum was important.

d. (U) It should be emphasized that the RDJTF was a joint service enterprise and was highly dependent for success on the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and the Marine Corps.

e. (U) Because General Kelley was already perceived by news media as the personification of the Rapid Deployment Force, he would serve as the principle spokesman for the RDJTF. He noted that he wanted his deputy and chief of staff also to meet with news media representatives from time to time and for his PAO to take care of day-to-day dealings with news media representatives as required, keeping the Readiness Command PAO informed.

(U) News media reports about the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force during the force's first few months were numerous, but most of the coverage simply re-hashed previously available information. But the demand for new information grew, and arrangements were made for General Kelley to meet with a small group of Pentagon reporters on one of his regular trips to Washington.

(U) When word got out that General Kelley would meet with reporters, the list began to grow rapidly. What was originally intended as a briefing for a handful of Pentagon reporters became a full-blown Pentagon news conference on June 18, 1980, with reporters from all major media present. Television cameras were not permitted.

(U) In his meeting with the press, General Kelley provided an update on the RDJTF's progress during its first three and a half months. He noted that his staff was a good one, that he had done a great deal of traveling since the first of March, that the RDJTF was making significant progress, but that the force also had some significant problems, mainly interoperability and a shortage of sealift and airlift.[13]

(U) Media coverage of the briefing focused on two points, however: plans to increase from 50,000 to 100,000 the number of reservists the President could call up without declaring a national emergency, and a concept General Kelley called "pre-emptive strategy", the idea that the RDJTF would get forces, irrespective of size, into an area rapidly because, as he pointed out, "once you get a force into an area that is not occupied by the other guy, then you have changed the whole calculus of the crisis and he must react to you, not you to him."

(U) Because of the particularly painful connotation of the word "pre-emptive" in the Persian Gulf region (based on Israel's "pre-emptive strikes" against Arab targets), General Kelley changed the name of his concept. The concept, he felt, remained a viable cornerstone of the RDJTF's capabilities.

(U) The month of June also brought the first of a steady stream of news media representatives who wanted to visit the home of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Between June 2nd and the end of October, the RDJTF played host to news media representatives on 15 separate occasions, not counting eight additional interviews or other meetings with the press by General Kelley. Between early June and late October, the command told its story to representatives from the New York Times (on several occasions), the Washington Post, Time magazine, U.S. News and World Report, Newsweek, Newhouse News Service, Fortune magazine, the New York Daily News, the London Observer, and many other news organizations.

(U) General Kelley also spent a great deal of his time on the road giving speeches. In all, he spoke to 21 different audiences ranging from the prestigious Council on Foreign Relations in New York City (December 2, 1980) to the Sarasota Council of the Navy League of the United States (December 4, 1980) to the National Security Council of the American Legion during the Legion's annual convention at Boston (August 16th). Among the groups he spoke to were the Joint Civilian Orientation Committee, the Armed Forces Staff College, the National War College, the Industrial College of the Armed Forces, the Chicago Committee of the Chicago Council on Foreign Relations, the Reserve Officer Association, the Iron Gate Chapter of the Air Force Association in New York, the Naval War College, the Air War College, and the Marine Corps Reserve Officers Association.

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13. Transcript of news briefing by Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, USMC, Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, June 18, 1980, Washington, D.C.

(U) In addition, other members of the RDJTF staff spoke to local community groups as well. Particularly active in speaking were the deputy commander, Maj Gen Taylor, and the director of plans (RDJ5), Navy Captain (b)(6) both of whom spoke to community groups on numerous occasions.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) As the operations portion of this history covers in considerable detail, the RDJTF Headquarters had a particularly heavy exercise schedule during its first year. The majority of the exercises were classified, and news media representatives were unable to cover them. One exercise, however, was essentially unclassified and received a great deal of news coverage. It was the first overseas deployment of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

(U) Exercise Bright Star 81 was a combined field training exercise conducted at Cairo West Airfield, Egypt, November 7 through 27, 1980, involving approximately 1,400 U.S. military personnel and a number of Egyptian personnel. Americans on the exercise came from RDJTF Headquarters, the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault), and the 150th Tactical Fighter Group, Air National Guard, with a smaller number of personnel from other commands.

(U) In spite of some last-minute surprises, public affairs activities for the exercise were straightforward and there were no significant public affairs problems which had an effect on coverage. Initial public affairs guidance, based on consultations between U.S. Government and Egyptian Government, provided for keeping news media involvement at a low level throughout the exercise. No media visits were anticipated, but U.S. public affairs personnel associated with the exercise would be accessible to news media representatives, and selected print, still photo and video tape releases on exercise activities were planned.

(U) The crash of a C-141 transport (with the loss of all 13 U.S. military personnel aboard) heightened media interest near the beginning of the exercise.

(U) Midway through the exercise, the Government of Egypt decided unilaterally and without warning to invite news media representatives to cover a portion of the exercise which was especially photogenic: a combined live fire exercise and a combined air assault exercise. Approximately 35 news media representatives from major U.S. media based in Cairo and a small contingent of Egyptian media covered the exercise, with significant coverage resulting on U.S. television networks, in major U.S. newspapers, and on wire services around the world. Interest in the exercise by the resident U.S. press corps in Cairo remained high throughout, peaking with the on-scene coverage. The ready accessibility of Bright Star public affairs personnel and the frequent release of photography and video tape coverage throughout the exercise contributed significantly to the straightforward media coverage of the exercise.

(U) If the public affairs goal for Bright Star 81 was to demonstrate the capability of the RDJTF to deploy a small joint force to the Middle East, the goal was achieved. Given that the exercise was a first, however, there were many lessons learned not the least of which was that more than three full time public affairs officers should be on hand for similar exercises in the future. The three--Commander Baker of the RDJTF Headquarters, LTCOL (b)(6) from the RDJTF Washington Liaison Office, and MAJ (b)(6) PAO for the 101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)--had their hands full throughout the exercise.

(U) Because the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force began its life as a high visibility organization, it was imperative that the commander and his key staff have quick access to newspapers and other media accounts of activities in Southwest Asia and Washington.

(U) After a number of false starts in trying to obtain subscriptions to The New York Times, the Washington Post and other national newspapers for delivery on the day of publication, it was learned that Tampa, Florida, just could not provide such service unless the papers were flown in especially for RDJTF at tremendous cost. The best alternatives were:

a. (U) Subscribe to the newspapers by mail and receive them two to four days after the date of publication.

b. (U) Make arrangements to receive Current News, a press clipping service published by the Department of Defense, in a timely fashion; and,

c. (U) Install wire service printers at the RDJTF Headquarters.

(U) In the end, all three alternatives were used. RDJTF Headquarters subscribed to a number of national newspapers by mail; arrangements were made to receive the Early Bird edition of Current News each morning by facsimile, with the main edition arriving a few days later by mail; and teletype printers for the Associated Press "A" Wire and the Reuters International "RNA" (Reuters North America) wire were installed. The Early Bird was reproduced for distribution to the staff each morning, and an afternoon news summary called "Todays News" was taken from the wire services and other clippings for distribution each weekday to the staff. It was one of the best informed staffs outside the Washington area, at least if access to news media reporting is used as yardstick.

(U) As with any new concept, the Rapid Deployment Force received criticism from many sources. Among the most notable criticism appearing in the media were:

a. (U) A Washington Post column which appeared on March 3, 1980, a mere two days after the force was established officially. The piece was written by Martin Binkin and Jeffrey Record and it told readers that a rapid deployment force should be based on a restructured and reequipped Marine Corps. (General Kelley responded by saying he felt the success of the Rapid Deployment Force would depend on the integration of all four service components of the RDF into an effective war-fighting machine.)

b. (U) Various articles quoting (b)(6) a retired Army Colonel who was senior national defense specialist for the Library of Congress. In a sentence, (b)(6) said there were only two things wrong with the Rapid Deployment Force; it was not rapid and it had little to deploy.

c. (U) An article which appeared in the Baltimore Sun (and other media) on July 6, 1980. This one was written by (b)(6) a freelance writer, who summarized many of the arguments advanced against a Rapid Deployment Force: no bases in the Southwest Asia area, a confused chain of command, no troops permanently assigned to the RDF, etc.

d. (U) Former Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger, in an article by the Washington Post on September 14, 1980, told readers that like the Holy Roman Empire--which was said to be neither holy, nor Roman, nor an empire--in his opinion the Rapid Deployment Force was not rapid, it was not much of a force, and its potential for deployment remained to be demonstrated.

(U) General Kelley responded to the criticism in typical fashion. He took an upbeat, positive approach, emphasizing what was right about the new force. And he used many platforms to carry his message: speeches to private groups, public speeches, classified speeched to military audiences, interviews, and Congressional testimony. One of his principal points was this:

(U) The only alternative I see to a positive, yet realistic approach is for me to hunker down and say that the job is impossible. Well, the job isn't impossible -- not when you've got well over 200,000 people behind you who are willing, eager and capable.

(U) Those words came from his speech to the American Legion's National Security Council on August 16, 1980. But they were echoed over and over again.[14]

(U) Testifying before the House Budget Committee on October 1, 1980, General Kelley told those present that the Rapid Deployment Force "contrary to some speculation, is not a paper tiger." He added: "But that is not to say that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is without problems." Among the problems he listed:

a. (U) No new combat troops were created for the RDF, though he could call on more than 200,000 troops from all branches of the service.

b. (U) The bulk of the heavy equipment needed in Southwest Asia would have to go by ship, which might take three or four weeks.

c. (U) The United States was deficient in strategic airlift, with only 70 C-5s and 234 C-141s.

d. (U) Staff for the RDJTF Headquarters was "woefully inadequate in terms of our planning," according to Kelley.

(U) After Ronald Reagan defeated President Jimmy Carter in November, attention was focused on what the Reagan team would do with the Rapid Deployment Force. During the campaign, the RDF had not been an issue which led many observers to believe that the new Administration would leave the force substantially as it was.

(U) As the end of 1980 approached, the "command relationships" of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force began to receive increasing visibility in the press. News media also reported the Army and Marine Corps to be locked in a bitter dispute over which would command the Rapid Deployment Force. Another dimension

14. Remarks prepared for delivery by Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, Commander Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, before the National Security Commission, the American Legion, August 16, 1980, Boston, Massachusetts.

was added to the reports with indications in the media of a rift between Lieutenant General Kelley and his boss, Army General Volney F. Warner, Commander in Chief of the U.S. Readiness Command.

(U) General Kelley cut back on the number of interviews being granted as the year ended. He reasoned that the question of command relationships was "above my paygrade" for resolution, and he had no desire to comment on the matter in public.

(U) When the year ended, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force's profile was slightly lower than it was the year before. That notwithstanding, it probably still was the highest profile military organization the United States had at the time.

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G. (U) COMBAT CAPABILITIES ANALYSIS GROUP (CCAG)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Combat Capabilities Analysis Group (RD/CCAG) was not included in the original organization of the Headquarters RDJTF. It was established by the commander effective July 1, 1980, at the request of the chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff. Its purpose was to provide COMRDJTF and subordinate component commanders with an inherent, deployable research and analytical resource.

(U) The CCAG was constituted as a special staff section administratively subordinate to the Chief of Staff. It was staffed by excess and overage personnel with combat, intelligence, foreign area, analytical, war-gaming and administrative skills.

(U) With a small complement of 4 officers and 1 enlisted, directed by an Air Force Colonel, the CCAG set out to respond to a number of specific tasks already levied by the Commander, the Deputy Commander, the Chief of Staff, and the Staff Directorate. It was CCAG's mission to directly support these senior officials with studies, briefings, discussions and other product forms.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) ~~(C)~~ The dominant focus and major CCAG effort during 1980 centered on two over-riding postulates:

(U) a. ~~(S)~~ Conceptualization and articulation of RDJTF interdiction operations, and

(b)(1)1.4a

(U) The bulk of this concentrated, specialized research and analytical effort materially assisted the Intelligence, Operations and the Plans and Policy directorates in support of the production, exercise and potential execution of COMRDJTF OPORD 1003. In this initial period, a modus operandi was developed to the effect that any armed force performs only four functions, attack, defense, withdrawal and reinforcement. All armed forces function during wartime in accordance with their peacetime training, organization and equipment, plans, and precedents. Military analysis is not a magical process; an understanding of the foregoing principals permits the analyst to project backward or forward in time, starting at any point. Throughout CCAG's first half-year, the emphasis was always on joint plans and operations imbued by a strong sense of immediacy.

U ~~(C)~~ Products produced by CCAG during the last half of 1980 included the following printed (hard copy) studies, by title:

- Soviet Logistics: A Concept for Interdiction
- Three Hundred Years of Strategic Warning: An Overview of Soviet Interests in Iran

- Soviet Policy for the Middle East

- The Problem of Water in a Soviet Invasion of Iran

U ~~(S)~~ Other products included:

(b)(1)1.4a

- RDJTF Basing Options in the Middle East and Southwest Asia—a briefing

- U.S. defense strategy for military operations in Southwest Asia—written commentary and verbal discussion

- Analysis of RDJTF simulated combat operations during JCS-sponsored CPX GALLANT KNIGHT-81 (October 1980) deployed to Fort Bragg, N.C.—comments and discussion

- Interdiction in Southwest Asia—conference coordination of and participation in a Pentagon conference in January 1981.

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) The CCAG also was tasked to establish contact and to maintain liaison with selected research and analysis agencies throughout the U.S. Department of Defense, including contract companies. Several temporary additional duty (TDY) trips were made in this connection, buttressed by written and electrical communications.

(U) Agencies contacted and visited included:

- Defense Mapping Agency (DMA), St. Louis, MO

- Center for Naval Analysis (CNA), Washington, DC

- Center for Advanced Research of the Naval War College (CAR/NWC), Newport, RI

- Combined Arms Combat Development Activity (CACDA), Fort Leavenworth, KS

- Rand Corporation, Santa Monica, CA

- Institute for Defense Analysis (IDA), Washington, DC

- PROJECT CHECKMATE (The Air Staff, Pentagon)

- Strategic Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA), JCS, Pentagon

(U) The purpose of this liaison was to consult on projects of mutual interest and utility with a view to expanding CCAG's effectiveness through access to pertinent and complementary research and analysis.

(U) Several other tasked or initiated projects could not be completed or undertaken because of limited manpower, lack of specific expertise and demands of competing priorities. Staff-wide administrative requirements also had a negative impact on the Group's effectiveness because of limited staffing against a building workload. The most critical limitation was noted as one of an insufficient number of appropriately skilled personnel. This shortage was most evident in CCAG's lack of a ground warfare specialist within the joint section and in the insufficiency of administrative skills and man-hours.

H. (U) LIAISON

1. (U) Washington Liaison Office

a. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The WLO was established at the direction of Secretary of Defense Harold Brown to improve contingency planning. The Memorandum from Secretary Brown on 26 January 1980 stated,

(U) "Establish a JTF liaison office in Washington (headed by a general or flag officer) to support JTF responsibilities, especially those for contingency planning. There will need to be adequate politico-military interface with the JCS/Joint Staff and OSD on these matters, especially in the light of the early RDF focus on the Middle East/Persian Gulf area. The liaison office will therefore have to be appropriately staffed, and in my judgment this will require on the order of 15-20 people."

(U) When Major General P.X. Kelley was designated to be the first Commander, RDJTF, the CJCS requested that General Kelley operate initially from the Pentagon. While his new Headquarters was being established, General Kelley was provided direct access to two OJCS ad hoc planning groups. Two groups, Crisis Planning and Assessment Group (CPAG/J5) and the Contingency Review Group (CRG/J3) served as his initial planning staff. These groups worked previously under the overall direction of the Director, Joint Staff to develop options for the JCS to use in politically sensitive contingencies, and were redesignated the Contingency Planning Group (CPG). Brigadier General Vesser visited CINCPAC, DCINCEUR and CINCRED to establish contact, develop support and identify issues. General Kelley provided guidance concerning future working relationships and substantive matters until his departure for MacDill AFB to join the RDJTF Headquarters in late April 1980.

(U) General Vesser organized the CPG to serve as the initial WLO. In March 1980 the JCS approved manning for the WLO at 16 officers and three enlisted. The CPG, which totalled 15 officers and two enlisted, was designated to serve as the WLO until the Services provided permanent manning. The CPG had a nearly complete personnel turnover before permanently assigned personnel began to arrive between May and August 1980.

(U) The WLO moved its offices four times through the period May to August 1980 before arriving at permanent quarters in Room 1B737, Pentagon. Initially, the WLO shared these new offices with the Southwest Asia Planning Center in J5 which was created to disseminate information about planning to interested parties. The WLO also maintained a vault within the NMCC. The disestablishment by J5 of the Southwest Asia Planning Center in April 1981 has permitted consolidation of all members of the WLO within the same office.

b. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) The WLO conducted business continuously while making transition from TDY personnel and temporary quarters to permanent arrangements. It influenced studies under way concerning the Southwest Asia region, combat attrition in Southwest Asia, and tactics appropriate for fighting in the mountains and deserts. The WLO also provided strategic intelligence while HQ RDJTF developed its own capability, made political-military assessments concerning developments expected in Middle East countries and participated, with the Joint Staff, in the development of a strategy for Southwest Asia. The strategy included approaches to deterrence and options for delay, denial and defense. In addition, the WLO participated in ongoing contingency planning, had major responsibilities in connection with executable OPLAN development and worked with HQ RDJTF to facilitate the transfer of planning responsibilities from the area CINCs to HQ RDJTF.

(U) Individuals within the WLO also pursued a variety of political-military and contingency related support projects and emphasis was on developing a viable capability to deploy substantial four Service cmbat forces to Southwest Asia which would provide a credible deterrence and could be sustained in combat. The most significant contributions involved communication support, map and chart support, use of regional and extra-regional forces, interdiction measures, military construction, perception management and participation in air and sea-lift enhancement efforts. The WLO further performed representational and liaison functions. It reflected COMRDJTF's position in the Joint Action process at conferences and coordination meetings, and in Congressional hearings where appropriate.

(U) Members of the WLO participated in the REDCOM Command Post exercises "POSITIVE LEAP" and "GALLANT KNIGHT". A major initiative by the WLO involved development of an overseas exercise program. The WLO facilitated coordination with OSD and the State Department on exercises "BRIGHT STAR" and "ACCURATE TEST" in Egypt and Oman respectively. Working participation in these exercises by WLO members contributed significantly to the development of an enhanced Southwest Asia area appreciation within the WLO. This experience was applied in the ongoing efforts described earlier and in political-military assessments to facilitate future actions and exercises.

(U) The WLO worked carefully within the Joint Staff system and through the Joint Staff whenever possible. It participated with the Joint Staff and OSD in preparation of materials for use by the Chairman, JCS or others within the NSC system. It also influenced the development of papers concerning RDJTF by the Joint Staff and Services. These inputs from the WLO have often changed the outlook of national level decision makers by giving them realistic expectations from the perspective of the Commander, RDJTF. The WLO has worked closely with the Joint Staff and Services concerning military requirements in Southwest Asia. It has participated in studies with the Defense Science Board, Programs Analysis and Evaluation and Manpower Reserve Affairs and Logistics to identify programs necessary to support present and projected force structures should they be deployed in Southwest Asia. During the Defense Resources Board addressal of

programs for the RDJTF, the WLO provided coherent, clear proposals which influenced the addition of some 2 1/2 billion dollars to the FY 81 supplemental and FY 82 amendment. If enacted by the Congress, these monies would provide the minimum essential needs for COMRDJTF to fight in Southwest Asia. Further, they would reduce substantially the time necessary to deploy forces in a contingency.

(U) In the event of a crisis in Southwest Asia, the WLO has been designated to assist and support COMRDJTF through direct liaison among Washington organizations relevant to supporting CINCs and HQ RDJTF deployed in the field. The members of the office are POR qualified to facilitate rapid movement to Southwest Asia if required.

(U) Through the year under review, working relationships between HQ RDJTF and the WLO have evolved to improve effectiveness. WLO officer personnel visit MacDill for orientations, staff interface, briefings, and participation in planning activities. Exchange of personnel in both directions has markedly expedited contingency planning. Recently, closer functional coordination has been established between WLO and HQ RDJTF.

(U) The WLO has provided a structure within the Washington environment for Southwest Asia where none existed. Previously the military staff in the Washington area addressed primarily the political aspects in detail of the Middle East and Persian Gulf areas. Further, as the United States has not had forces stationed in the Middle East except for personnel assigned to the security assistance tasks, few personnel are available who have served in Southwest Asia. The creation of the WLO provided a focus for all ongoing military planning efforts which had previously been ad hoc.

2. (U) SAC Liaison Office

a. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) Strategic Air Command Operating Location MacDill (SAC OL-MD) was activated on 4 August 1980 . The mission of OL-MD is to provide support to the RDJTF for the inclusion of SAC capabilities into the concept of operations for the Rapid Deployment Force. Also OL-MD provides liaison and continuity between HQ SAC and RDJTF.

(U) SAC OL-MD manning consists of a director (0036) who also performs duties as a bomber planning officer, one logistics planning officer (6616), one tanker planning officer (1435C), one reconnaissance officer (2265), and one administrative technician (70270B). The SAC liaison office is an extension of HQ SAC/XO (Deputy Chief of Staff/Operations Plans) .

b. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) SAC OL-MD became fully manned and operational on 11 Aug 1980. Adequate office space and equipment was obtained and administrative policies and procedures were integrated with those of USREDCOM, RDJTF and pertinent USAF and SAC requirements. As a matter of policy, OL-MD will comply with USREDCOM and RDJTF administrative regulations for MacDill operations. Applicable USAF and SAC regulations are complied with for external communications.

(U) During the month of October 1980 supply accounts were designated and funded for OL-MD. Mobility equipment was placed on order and personal mobility equipment was issued to all OL-MD personnel IAW TA-50. Also during October all personnel obtained passports and shot records were updated. RDJTF J-1 then declared the OL-MD as ready for world wide deployment as necessary.

U ~~(S)~~ From 21 October to 29 October 1980 three personnel from the liaison office supported exercise GALLANT KNIGHT at Fort Bragg, NC. Coordination with the RDJTF staff was provided on a 24 hour basis. The OL-MD field office was established in the Joint Operations Center which allowed effective interface with J3 (air, ground and sea), and J2 (intelligence). Two of the members maintained a 24 hour desk with J3 air operations interfacing SAC bomber and tanker activity as reflected by the SAC Frag orders, and the third member assisted in J2 in the proper tasking of SAC Recon platforms in coordination with the AFFOR and SAC ADVON.

U ~~(S)~~ On 25 October 1980 SAC OL-MD worked with HQ SAC/DOC and the RDJTF J3 and J6 developing the deployment concept for BRIGHT STAR. SAC OL-MD also coordinated the battlestaff efforts with J3 and J6. After approval by the Deputy Commander, General Kelley was briefed on the EC-135 with the RDJTF Battlestaff which deployed on 10 Nov 80 with Lt Col (b)(6) (Director SAC OL-MD) aboard. OL-MD personnel provided liaison between RJDTF, 56 TFW, and the SAC 55SRW EC-135 flight crew during the MacDill stop. OL-MD funds were used to bring two SAC communications personnel to MacDill to ensure communications capability between JCSE equipment and the EC-135.

U ~~(C)~~ On 9 December 1980 OL-MD personnel researched, at Major General Taylor's request, the possible RDJTF usage of Boeing 707's. Information was provided for staff use.

U ~~(S)~~ OLMD provided extensive guidance and B-52 capability information to the Combat Capabilities Assessment Group (CCAG) when the initial concept was developed for an air interdiction campaign in Southwest Asia.

U ~~(S)~~ On 22 December 1980 a Battlestaff Concept paper was initiated and delivered to the command section for ACCURATE TEST 81-2.

U ~~(S)~~ SAC OL-MD was actively engaged in planning for ACCURATE TEST 81-2 scheduled for 14-26 Feb 1981. A SAC EC-135 was requested to deploy the RDJTF battlestaff to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1) where the communications exercise took place. Enroute join up with two C-141's was envisioned with emphasis placed on establishing electronic signatures throughout the Middle East and testing deployed communications with other forces in the area.

~~S~~ U OL-MD was actively involved in developing USREDCOM/COMRDJTF message
:0Z Dec 81, Subj: Prepositioned Support for SAC's Strategic Projection
: (SPF), to JCS. Reference message again surfaced the requirement for pre-
:ioned support equipment at (b)1.4 a, b, d for B-52 operations.

:. (U) MAC LIAISON OFFICE

:U) In November 1980, the Military Airlift Command assigned a permanent
:on officer to the RDJTF. The RDJTF dependence on airlift makes the MAC
:on an essential function in this headquarters. Since his arrival, the MAC
:as helped develop new airlift request procedures, participated in exercise
:ATE TEST as part of the battlestaff and helped plan new exercises as well
:oviding assistance to the staff for OPLAN 1003. The MAC LNO to the RDJTF
:ts to the HQ MAC DO through the REDCOM MAC LNO.

:U) USEUCOM LIAISON OFFICE.

:U) The United States European Command assigned a permanent liaison officer
:e RDJTF in July 1980. Through participation in several exercises, the
: LNO has determined the following responsibilities to the RDJTF:

a. (U) Remain an integral unit while in the field providing expertise
:JTF on USEUCOM command relationships, plans and operations.

b. (U) Be responsive to information requests from all RDJTF
:torates, components and other liaison elements and responsible to COMRDJTF.

c. (U) Insure continuity of operations between HQ USEUCOM and HQ RDJTF
:yed.

d. (U) Coordinate RDJTF requirements for USEUCOM support and
:tance.

V. (U) JOINT PLANNING, OPERATIONS AND TRAINING

A. (U) PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Director for Personnel has staff responsibility for the personnel, manpower, morale and welfare aspects of the RDJTF. The Director, an Air Force Colonel, is responsible for the preparation of all supporting personnel annexes for RDJTF contingency plans and exercises.

(U) The Personnel Plans Division prepares supporting personnel annexes for all RDJTF contingency plans and exercises. Coordinates force replacement policies and procedures with all service military personnel centers. Monitors the component forces personnel status and provides technical advice in all personnel areas of interest.

(U) The Personnel Services Division provides all personnel services to the RDJTF Staff in garrison and when deployed. Services include; records maintenance, promotion, selection, OER/EER processing, and other individual personnel actions.

2. Plans and Exercises

(U) Prior to the activation of the RDJTF on 1 March 80, RCJ1 had completed the Personnel Annex (Annex E) to COMRDJTF OPORD 3-80 (U), POSITIVE LEAP. Resulting from POSITIVE LEAP, the following observations were made:

a. (U) Personnel Replacements. Replacement forecasting, requisitioning, and distribution was not played in sufficient depth to evaluate the effectiveness of the replacement system.

b. (U) Casualty Reporting. Although casualties were being assessed, in some cases, components did not report them.

c. (U) Enemy Prisoner of War (EPW) Reporting. EPW reporting was not properly and accurately accomplished.

d. (U) EPW Processing Shortfall. There was no EPW processing capability within Military Police (MP) units currently assigned to the RDJ-A.

e. (U) Host Nation EPW Support. Current plans called for transfer of custody of EPW to host nation. National policy precludes transfer of EPWs without prior approval of ASD (JSA) and an executed Host Nation agreement.

f. (U) Personnel Status Report (PERSTATREP). The PERSTATREP, as structured in Annex E, OPORD 3-80, was not understood by all services and did not reflect all necessary information.

(U) Annex E to COMRDJTF OPLAN 0001-81, was developed during the period April 80 thru July 80. The draft was forwarded to RDJ5 on 31 July 80. RDJ1 continued to provide responses/input to guidance issued thru December 80.

(U) Annex E to Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81, was developed from August 80 thru October 80.

(U) From lessons learned at GALLANT KNIGHT, the following areas were identified as significant problem areas:

a. (U) Personnel Replacements. Need to examine personnel replacement policies and procedures of all component forces.

b. (U) Casualty Reporting. Emphasis to be placed on accuracy of reporting.

c. (U) Replacement Reporting. Emphasis to be placed on accuracy of reporting.

d. (U) PERSTAT. Following POSITIVE LEAP, the PERSTAT was modified. Additional instructions were provided to the components.

e. (U) Reserve Call-up. Requirement exists for components to establish a policy/plan for Reserve/National Guard call-up.

(U) Annex E to COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81 and Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81 were developed during the October and November 80 timeframe.

(U) Personnel statistics for POSITIVE LEAP, GALLANT KNIGHT, and BRIGHT STAR were as follows:.

PERSONNEL STATISTICS

EMPLOYMENT CPX POSITIVE LEAP (U)

TOTAL PARTICIPATION	ACTUAL	SIMULATED
JECG	1,352	N/A
RDJTF	318	318
ARFOR	5,162	116,235
AFFOR	882	21,873
MARFOR	320	41,896
NAVFOR	91	56,173
JUWTF	196	2,020
JCSE/SIGNAL	1,916	1,916
OTHER	18	N/A
	10,255	240,431

PERSONNEL STATISTICS

EMPLOYMENT CPX GALLANT KNIGHT (U)

TOTAL PARTICIPATION	ACTUAL		SIMULATED	
	23 Oct 80	29 Oct 80	23 Oct 80	29 Oct 80
RDJTF	278	299	647	647
ARFOR	5,144	5,582	106,907	149,299
AFFOR	1,482	1,458	25,650	44,662
NAV	5	5	45,215	40,272
MC	417	415	58,411	80,459
JUWTF	210	210	2,769	3,112
TOTAL	7,536	7,969	239,599	318,451

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PERSONNEL STATISTICS

EXERCISE BRIGHT STAR (U)

TOTAL PARTICIPATION	5 NOV 80	22 NOV 80
RDJTF	3	103*
ARFOR	5	896
AFFOR	3	260
Comm		93
MAC		34
TOTAL	11	1386

*Includes 42d MP Customs Detachment.

(U) Manpower Review

(U) Due to the revised Terms of Reference (TOR) dated 13 August 1980, a study was conducted by the RDJ1 which addressed potential changes to the Joint Manpower Program (JMP) as a result of the mission change. RCJ1, in conjunction with RDJ1, held an action officers meeting to discuss the results of the study. Subsequently the RDJTF staff reviewed their manning requirements to determine whether sufficient personnel existed to perform the missions as outlined. Personnel requirements, due to the new TOR, were submitted to USREDCOM on 10 September 1980. The total increase required to the RDJTF JMP to adequately perform the new TOR mission was seventy military and four civilian personnel. This increase provided for a staff increase of fifty personnel (O-39, E-11), staff support increase of twenty enlisted personnel and four civilian personnel.

(U) USREDCOM dispatched a message to JCS on 17 September 80 requesting the aforementioned increase. On 3 October 80, JCS requested a detailed review of requirements and alternatives for realignment of existing assets and concurrent consideration of all known near and long term requirements. A joint USREDCOM/RDJTF committee was established to address the issues.

(U) The RDJTF continues to assess manpower needs, internal realignment, dual-hatting, etc. Justification is based on/around operational requirements, particularly those requirements resulting from experience gained on POSITIVE LEAP, GALLANT KNIGHT, BRIGHT STAR, as well as those generated by the revised TOR.

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) Foreign Language Training

(U) RDJ1 in coordination with the Base Education Office, negotiated arrangements for instruction in the basic Arabic language course for RDJTF personnel. The 10-week course was conducted by Mrs. (b)(6) during the period 26 August 1980 thru 30 October 1980. Attendees were presented with an introductory level of conversational phrases and discussions of the various Arabic cultures.

(U) RDJTF Awards and Decoration Board

(U) RDCS letter dated 28 August 1980 to RCJ1 requested approval authority for COMRDJTF for decorations, awards, and honors for personnel assigned to Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, to include joint service decorations and awards not preempting respective service authority.

(U) Reference RCJ1 Form 14 dated 19 Septmber 1980, USCINCRED deemed it inappropriate to delegate approval authority to the COMRDJTF for the joint service decorations. However, delegation of authority to convene an Awards and Decorations Board and make appropriate recommendations to HQ USREDCOM was granted to the COMRDJTF. The delegation included authority to approve certificates of commendation or appreciation for RDJTF personnel. The RDJTF Awards and Decoration Board members were designated on 26 October 1980.

(U) Dedicated Housing

(U) The RDJTF is required to constantly be prepared for no-notice deployments to respond to contingencies threatening U.S. interests. The place of residence of key staff personnel is directly related to the command's ability to accomplish its mission. Therefore, it was deemed imperative that certain key personnel be provided on-base housing. A thorough analysis of key personnel requirements associated with crisis action planning and no-notice deployments revealed that a minimum of 42 housing units were needed at MacDill AFB for RDJTF personnel. The requirement for future dedicated housing was identified and articulated in a staff paper which was forwarded to RCCS for review and signature for dispatch to 56CSG/DEN on 3 September 1980.

(U) 1980 Combined Federal Campaign

(U) The USREDCOM 1980 Combined Federal Campaign (CFC) fund drive was announced by a USREDCOM, Chief of Staff memorandum dated 21 October 1980. Included in the USREDCOM campaign were RDJTF, JSOSE and the Deployment Cell. Specific guidance provided for insuring a successful 1980 campaign included a reminder that a careful selection of highly motivated key workers was necessary in obtaining the goal of seeking maximum voluntary participation.

(U) The total dollar pledge/donation: $6,118.25. As a result of a large number of personnel being assigned TDY and in anticipation of meeting the 1980 CFC established goals, an extension to the campaign was authorized extending the closing date from 27 November 1980 to 5 December 1980.

(U) Processing for Overseas Replacement

(U) Based upon the requirement, as established in the mission of the RDJTF, to prepare the Headquarters RDJTF personnel for no-notice deployments, a POR Qualification SOP (completed 14 April 81) and a POR Deployment Processing SOP (completed 8 May for incorporation into the Readiness SOP) were developed.

(U) The following actions were identified as requirements for deployment and a package was designed for personnel assigned to the headquarters as well as designated augmentees.

a. (U) Be qualified in specialty code for position assigned.

b. (U) Be available for immediate deployment.

c. (U) Be physically qualified to perform field duties for extended periods of time.

d. (U) Possess required security clearance.

e. (U) Maintain worldwide immunization standards in accordance with current service directives.

f. (U) Possess official passport, identification tags, and ID card.

g. (U) Be familiarized with individual weapon.

(U) POR processing was implemented on 17 March 1980, and a system was designed to control and maintain the current status of personnel deployability.

(U) During July 80, in an effort to streamline the POR management and administrative time, a software computer program was developed to track and suspense recurring POR requirements. The program was finalized 14 August 1980 and includes major requirements such as immunization, passport expiration dates, and medical and dental examination data.

(U) Additional requirements and information will be incorporated into the program as the requirement occurs. To expedite the processing of passports/visas and provide a capability to quickly respond to no-notice deployments/trips while retaining positive security RCJ1-PM letter dated 18 August 1980 to the State Department requested authorization for the designation of a passport agent within the RDJ1. The authorization was received on 6 October 80.

(U) On 30 December 1980, 231 of 254 personnel met the POR requirements, equating to 91%. The remaining 9% mainly represent newly assigned RDJTF personnel and/or personnel awaiting passports.

(U) Validation of Augmentee Positions

(U) Based on POSITIVE LEAP experience, the RDJTF staff reviewed its requirements for augmentation from USREDCOM and supporting component forces. The results of the review were:

a. (U) USREDCOM Augmentees:

Additions - 6 officers, 5 enlisted

Deletions - None

b. (U) Component Augmentees:

Additions - 14 officers, 11 enlisted

Deletions - 2 enlisted

(U) If approved, the total augmentee support for HQ RDJTF would be:

USREDCOM Augmentees	72
Component Augmentees (Individual)	103
Component Augmentees (Team)	249
Total	424

(See Appendix J)

(U) The results were forwarded to RCJ1 on 7 July 80. Requirements were briefed to the USREDCOM Commander's Conference 10-11 July 80. During the 24 July 80 In-Progress Review, the RDJTF staff was tasked to (1) review augmentation requirements of the headquarters to determine if previously submitted lists were valid and (2) review the augmentee package with an aim of decreasing Army requirements and redistribute those requirements among the other services. Results of the review were:

a. (U) USREDCOM Augmentees	70	(-2)
Component Augmentees (Individual)	86*	(-14)
Component Augmentees (Team)	290*	(+41)
Total	446**	(+41)

*Indicates a deletion of Army Engineer augmentation support (-24) with addition of a MC Combat Engineer Platoon (+37).

**Represents an increase of 22 to the augmentation package submitted 1 July 80.

(See Appendix K)

b. (U) Decreased 3 officers and 15 enlisted previously requested Army augmentees and redistributed among the other services.

(U) Approval was also received to task components and forces designated in support of the RDJTF for pre-identification, pre-processing for deployment, and training and equipping individual augmentees. This included training with the RDJTF on an at least once a year basis.

(U) The results of the augmentee requirement review were briefed to the COMRDJTF on 21 August 80. The completed report was forwarded to RDCS for signature on 22 August and forwarded to USREDCOM on 29 August 80.

(U) Service Member of the Quarter

(U) Senior Airman (b)(6) , USAF, was named as the United States Readiness Command Service Member of the Quarter 1 April to 30 June 1980.

(U) Sergeant (b)(6) USMC, was named as the United States Readiness Command Service Member of the Quarter 1 October to 31 December 1980.

(U) Service Member of the Year

(U) Sergeant (b)(6) USMC, was also named as the United States Readiness Command Service Member for the Year 1980.

B. (U) INTELLIGENCE DIRECTORATE

1. (U) Mission and Organization

U ~~(C)~~ The Intelligence Directorate (J-2) was initially organized under a JTD[1] developed by HQ USREDCOM.

U ~~(C)~~ Shortly after the RDJTF was activated on 1 March 1980, adjustments were made to the organization structure to establish a Targets Branch and a Systems Development Branch. The revised organizational structure is shown on page V-19.

(U) The mission of the J-2 was stated as:[2]

"The Director of Intelligence has staff responsibility for all intelligence and counterintelligence (CI) matters pertinent to missions assigned the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Has overall responsibility for the collection, production and dissemination of intelligence necessary to support the Command's mission. Represents the Commander with all appropriate national intelligence agencies and services to insure intelligence support of collection objectives. Coordinates with senior military intelligence officials of cooperating foreign governments and forces. Prepares intelligence planning inputs for concept and operations plans and develops appropriate intelligence recommendations regarding joint tactics, techniques and procedures for the joint employment of forces."

U ~~(C)~~ In August 1980[3], the RDJTF Terms of Reference (TOR) were revised by the JCS, altering the Command's mission from a worldwide responsiblity to emphasis on Southwest Asia (SWA). This required a further realignment of functions within the Analysis Branch to focus analysis on the SWA region.

(U) Because of the increased planning requirements placed on the directorate through this new TOR[4], the J-2 formally requested a change in the JTD. This change not only functionally realigned current billet structure, but also asked for an increase of 18 J-2 manpower authorizations.

(U) Operations Division (OPS)

(U) The Operations Division is responsible to the Director of Intelligence, J-2 for all intelligence and intelligence products to support the mission assigned to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The division manning consists of personnel from all service branches, organized into four branches: Targeting; Collection Management; Current Intelligence; Analysis. This division handles all substantive intelligence matters. Additionally, all of the branches are tasked to provide coordination, support and guidance to the component/supporting forces to insure a timely exchange of intelligence information. The Division Chief also serves as the Deputy Director of Intelligence, J-2.

1. Document, RDJTF Headquarters Joint Manpower Program FY80/81, 1 Mar 80.
2. IBID
3. Memorandum, JCS SM480-80, Terms of Reference for the RDJTF, 13 Aug 80.
4. Letter, USREDCOM, RDJTF Manpower Requirements, 10 Sep 80.

(U) Plans, Programs & Security Division (PP&S)

(U) The Plans, Programs and Security Division is responsible to the Director of Intelligence, J-2 for all aspects of intelligence planning required to support the various command OPLANS/OPORDS, the intelligence architecture and systems necessary to support intelligence requirements and for Special Security and Counterintelligence functions. The division has personnel assigned from all four military services. They are tasked to develop the intelligence planning inputs for the command concept and operations plans, support the planning requirements of the HQ staff and to coordinate and support the planning effort of the component/supporting forces, develop an intelligence architecture and determine the intelligence support requirements necessary to adequately support the mission assigned to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, to provide secure communications for the Commander and the HQ Staff and to insure an effective counterintelligence program.

(U) Cryptologic Support Group (CSG)

(U) The CSG is tasked to provide SIGINT support to Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force during contingencies, exercises and the deployment of the Joint Task Force (JTF), and will extend such support to the JTF Commander during periods of deployment and employment. The CSG is staffed by two officers and one enlisted and is augmented as required by personnel from the National Security Agency (NSA).

(U) Weather Detachment

(U) The Weather Detachment is tasked to provide environmental services to Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. In addition, they provide or coordinate weather forecasts and advisories to the component/supporting forces. In garrison the RDJTF Weather Detachment consists of one officer and one enlisted. When deployed for exercise or contingency operations, the Weather Detachment is augmented as required from the First Weather Squadron and the Air Weather Service.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

U ~~(S)~~ Immediately after the command was formed, all branches of the directorate became heavily involved in the task of providing the intelligence input to (b)1.4 a In September the command was tasked to (b)1.4 a (b)1.4a The intelligence input to these OPLANS required a concentrated and coordinated effort to develop the threat, develop target lists, provide a comprehensive collection plan, order of battle (OB) information and a myriad of intelligence support details required in these documents.

U ~~(S)~~ On 23 May 1980, J2 personnel participated in communications exercise RAPID DELTA ALPHA. J2 personnel were involved in all phases of the exercise from the development of scenario intelligence to the actual parachute assault. Throughout the planning and execution sequence, intelligence information was developed, analyzed, transmitted and acted upon by commanders and principal staff, at the fixed headquarters, in the airborne command post, and on the drop zone with the lead elements. The intelligence objective of providing timely, accurate, secure information to the Commander was met. Lessons learned contributed significantly to our knowledge and expertise and greatly facilitated future planning efforts for actual deployment and employment of component and in-support of forces.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT-81 Intelligence Workshop

U ~~(C)~~ On 21-22 July 1980 HQ USREDCOM hosted an intelligence workshop in preparation for Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81. The conference was attended by representatives from USREDCOM, RDJTF and RDJTF component forces. The objective of the conference was to discuss lessons learned in Exercise POSITIVE LEAP and to work out an operational framework for Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81. At this conference, the fusion center concept of intelligence analysis was worked out and the exercise scenario, ground rules and message traffic procedures were developed.

(U) GALLANT KNIGHT-81 21-30 OCT 80

U ~~(C)~~ GALLANT KNIGHT-81, conducted 21-30 Oct 80 at Ft Bragg, NC gave the J2 directorate the opportunity to exercise its fusion center concept of intelligence support to COMRDJTF. In addition, secure communications to the RDF component forces were established. A number of problems were encountered but the concept was proved valid. The intelligence flow within the Joint Operations Center (JOC) was very much improved over that experienced during Exercise POSITIVE LEAP. Shortfalls in personnel were identified in the areas of collection management and Electronic Order of Battle (EOB) analysis and additional augmentee requirements in these areas were documented in an augmentee requirements package submitted to J-1.

(U) BRIGHT STAR-81

(U) In November 1980 elements of the HQ RDJTF deployed to Cairo West Air Force Base, Egypt to participate in Exercise BRIGHT STAR. The J-2 participation included preparation of the intelligence scenario and supporting documents,

controlling/directing the aggressor forces and establishing secure communications connectivity during the deployment and employment phases with the National Security Agency (NSA), the National Military Command Center (NMCC)/National Military Intelligence Center (NMIC), HQ USREDCOM and other commands. The deployed J-2 simulated FTX play by generating message traffic and direct coordination with the aggressor force commander/controllers.

U ~~(C)~~ During Exercise POSITIVE LEAP (9-16 April 1980) the SSO facility deployed with a UGC-129 "table top" circuit with point to point connectivity to the USREDCOM SSO facility. During Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81 the deployed RDJTF SSO facility operated four point to point circuits, employing the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility (MCSF). This RDJTF SSO facility provided connectivity to component forces and provided the RDJTF director of intelligence with all-source intelligence information to exercise his fusion center concept.

U ~~(S)~~ In November 1980, SSO personnel deployed to Cairo West Airfield in Egypt to participate in Exercise BRIGHT STAR. Non-SCI circuit connectivity was established between the deployed HQ and HQ USREDCOM, NSA and the NMCC utilizing a TCG-27 van with four circuit positions. Sanitized real world intelligence was provided to the deployment commander and deployed J-2 throughout the exercise.

3. (U) Significant Activities

(U) Operations Division Activities

(U) The OPS Division was tasked by the J-2 to develop and refine a fusion center concept of intelligence support as a result of lessons learned in Exercise POSITIVE LEAP. This concept of deployed operations was successfully tested during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT and formed the basis for a requested increase in manpower authorizations and for additional augmentee support when deployed. Coordination and liaison were effected with national agencies, HQ PACOM, and HQ EUCOM to enhance the intelligence support these HQ can provide to the Headquarters RDJTF and its component forces. Particular attention was paid to collection management, indications and warning (I&W), targeting and mapping, charting and geodesy (MC&G) support.

(U) The Collection Management Branch, working closely with the HQ staff, component/supporting forces and other joint planning headquarters, established the command collection management policy/procedures. From this coordination and lessons learned in Exercises POSITIVE LEAP and GALLANT KNIGHT procedures for all collection requirements to be validated by the RDJ2 were developed. The concentrated effort in this area has resulted in a centralized collection management program to determine optimum utilization of collection resources, and to ensure all intelligence requirements are satisfied in a timely manner.

(U) The capabilities of the Collection Management Branch were greatly enhanced through the acquisition of the Advanced Imagery Requirements Exploitation System (AIRES), that provides access to the national imagery data base. Participation in national level conferences on strategic and tactical collection systems, DIA schooling and experience gained in exercises POSITIVE

LEAP, GALLANT KNIGHT and BLUE FLAG proved invaluable in developing the expertise required by branch personnel to manage an effective collection management office.

U ~~(C)~~ The initial organization did not provide for an I&W element on the J-2 staff. In June 1980 in an internal reorganization, this element was added from existing assets with the mission of developing I&W indicators for the RDJTF area of interest. Since June 1980, liaison has been conducted at the national level and with HQ EUCOM and HQ PACOM to focus attention on RDJTF requirements for I&W support in SWA.

(U) As a result of Exercise POSITIVE LEAP problems with administrative functions associated with targeting and weapons applications procedures required during the planning and employment phases of contingency operations surfaced. As a result, a Joint Targeting Coordination Board was developed and promulgated as a RDJTF Target procedure. The concept was proven valid in Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT and greatly enhanced the targeting coordination effort between HQ RDJTF and the component forces.

U ~~(C)~~ The Targeting Branch also has responsibility for the command's Mapping, Charting and Geodesy (MC&G) requirements. Few new maps/charts have been produced on SWA in recent years and a vigorous program has been instituted by Defense Mapping Agency (DMA) to support the very large requirements of the RDJTF. RDJ2 personnel have continually coordinated with DMA throughout the year and as a result of this and other actions, DMA has received increased budget and manning authorizations over the next five years to support the RDJTF requirements in SWA.

U ~~(C)~~ During this initial year the Analysis Branch was very heavily tasked to support not only the requirements of the J-2 but in addition provided installation and other types of data to all major staff elements. One of the more important products was the preparation of the "Command Threat" brief, which depicts probable adversary situations in the Southwest Asia region. This brief includes overviews of enemy orders of battle (OB), weather and terrain , and general geo-political factors affecting the RDJTF area of interest. In addition the Analysis Branch prepared briefs on Soviet forces mobilization/capability and SWA country briefs. Major intelligence products included a SWA biographic handbook, SWA interdiction study, capability and vulnerability assessments on SWA countries and assessments of probable Soviet courses of action in SWA.

(U) Plans, Programs and Security Division

U ~~(C)~~ The RDJTF SSO/Communications Center was activated on 1 Mar 1980 concurrently with HQ RDJTF. This RDJTF SSO initially shared facilities with the USREDCOM SSO pending facilities completion and equipment installation in Building 1105. Action was taken by SSO, USREDCOM to obtain approval from DIA for 119 Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) billets for the RDJTF.[5]

5. Message, SSO USREDCOM DTG 141300Z Feb 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
Message, DIA DTG 122006Z Mar 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.

These billets were not sufficient, however, to fulfill the requirements of the HQ at MacDill and the Washington Liaison Office and over the course of the year the billets steadily increased to a current total of 169.[6]

U ~~(C)~~ In June 1980, DIA designated the Commander RDJTF as "proper authority" for routine sanitization of special intelligence (SCI) material.[7] Concurrently the SSO received authority from USREDCOM for the RDJTF senior intelligence officer to sanitize, decontrol and downgrade SAO materials.

(U) On 26 Sep 80 the SSO facility was relocated to the RDJTF HQ (Bldg 1105) and accredited by DIA to provide Commander RDJTF and the Director of Intelligence with daily SCI intelligence service.[8] In addition it provides the Commander and his key staff members with privacy "back channel" message service. The facility operates eight hours a day, five days per week in garrison and with augmentation, 24 hours a day, seven days a week when deployed.

(U) The Counterintelligence (CI) section was created under the JTD with the mission of planning, implementing and supervising the RDJTF CI program through the detection and neutralization of sabotage, espionage, treason, sedition and subversion; and to insure that CI and security measures are adequate to protect the headquarters. The CI section is also responsible for coordinating the counterintelligence program with the component forces and with higher headquarters. Liaison is conducted with other elements of the CI community to include the services, U & S commands, CIA, FBI and State Department. Upon direction by COMRDJTF, the CI section must be prepared to establish and maintain liaison with friendly foreign CI and law enforcement agencies when deployed. The CI section has established and maintains a CI data base for use by the Director of Intelligence and other staff elements. Throughout the reporting period the CI section carried out a continuing program of enhancing the command security consciousness through films, pamphlets and security awareness bulletins.

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6. Message, SSO USREDCOM, DTG 221330Z Apr 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
   Message, DIA DTG 232216Z Apr 80 Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
   Message, SSO USREDCOM DTG 141558Z Aug 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
   Message, DIA DTG 092203Z Sep 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
   Message, SSO USREDCOM DTG 221600Z Oct 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
   Message, DIA DTG 302146Z Oct 80, Subj: Request for SI/SAO Billets.
7. Message, DIA DTG 030031Z Jun 80, Subj: Designation of COMRDJTF as Proper Authority for SI.
   Message, DIA DTG 071454Z Aug 80, Subj: Routine SI Sanitization Authority for COMRDJTF.
8. Message, DIA DTG 272229Z Feb 80, Subj: Interim Facility Accreditation, RDJTF, USREDCOM, Rooms 30,32,33, and 35, Bldg 1105, MacDill AFB, Florida.
   Message, DIA DTG 171916Z Oct 80, Subj: Facility Accreditation, RDJTF, USREDCOM, Rooms 30,32,33, and 35, Bldg 1105, MacDill AFB, Florida.

(U) On 24 April 1980 the CI section prepared a letter requesting that the Commander, RDJTF be granted authority to originate and classify top secret material.[9] Authority was granted to USREDCOM by SECDEF ltr dated 5 Jun 1980,[10] and subsequently by memo from USREDCOM to COMRDJTF.[11] In August, authority was requested for directorate/special staff heads to classify secret and confidential material.[12] That authority was granted by HQ USREDCOM in Sep 1980.[13]

(U) In Dec 1980 the CI section published a RDJTF information security standard operating procedure (SOP). Distribution throughout the command was accomplished in Dec 80. Also, on 10 Dec 80, the CI section established a program of monthly meetings for directorate/special staff security control officers for the purpose of promoting security awareness within the headquarters.

(U) On 9 Dec 80 a request was forwarded through HQ USREDCOM to the office of the Under Secretary of Defense, Director of Information Security for a waiver of requirements for administrative control of secret material within HQ RDJTF.[14] A response is expected in early 1981.

(U) As the principal staff officer tasked to provide the essential intelligence required to support the COMRDJTF the J-2 must have available an extensive data base as well as the capability to rapidly task national level intelligence assets and to communicate with component forces in a timely manner. To accomplish this when deployed it is necessary for the J-2 and his staff to have a computer based, automated intelligence support system. Shortly after the RDJTF was activated it became apparent that the systems to provide timely support during deployment and the early stages of employment did not exist. A program was launched to define the concept of operations, the intelligence requirements and develop a functional description of intelligence support systems for enroute and employment intelligence support. Since activation of the RDJTF, J-2 personnel worked closely with USREDCOM, DIA, JCS and the component headquarters to identify requirements for a full intelligence capability during deployment/employment. The following conferences/visits were in direct support of this still unresolved problem:

a. (U) Advanced Imagery Requirements and Exploitation System (AIRES) In June 1980 discussions were held between the J-2 and DIA concerning the problem of collection management. The AIRES systems was offered by the DIA to help solve this problem. The system was delivered to USREDCOM in Sep 1980 and is expected to be installed and on line to DIA early in 1981.

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9. Form 14, COMRDJTF, Designation of Original Classification Authority, 24 Apr 80.
10. Memorandum, Secretary of Defense Memo For USCINCRED, Designation of Official to Exercise Original TOP SECRET Classification Authority under Executive Order 12065, 5 Jun 80.
11. Memorandum, USREDCOM Designation of Original Classification, 18 Jun 80.
12. Form 14, COMRDJTF, Delegation of Original SECRET and CONFIDENTIAL Classification Authority, 29 Aug 80.
13. Memorandum, USREDCOM, Delegation of Original Classification Authority, 23 Sep 80.
14. Letter, COMRDJTF, Accountability/Control Procedures for SECRET material, 9 Dec 80.

b. (U) Aerospace Corporation, Los Angeles CA. In July 1980, the Commander, RDJTF was briefed by representatives from the Aerospace Corp who visited the RDJTF to discuss the functional design of an automated intelligence support system for the RDJTF. Topics discussed included a practical architecture of intelligence systems for RDJTF and "straw man" requirements for such a system, which included a review of various sensors, exploitation systems, communications systems and collection management systems/approaches.

U c. ~~(C)~~ HQ SAC - In August 1980 J-2 personnel visited HQ SAC to discuss the feasibility of utilizing existing SAC software to build an intelligence data base for use with the Rolm 1666 computer which is installed on SAC EC-135 aircraft. These aircraft would be used to deploy the RDJTF battlestaff upon direction by the National Command Authority (NCA). SAC has agreed to assist RDJTF and funding for this program has been identified in the FY1981 supplemental defense appropriations bill. The data base problems are expected to be overcome in the first half of 1981.

d. (U) RCA Auto Systems, Burlington, Mass - in August 1980, J-2 personnel visited RCA to discuss on-going RCA programs and contracts for automated intelligence support system which could be used to support the RDJTF and to receive briefings on SIGINT systems they currently produce for the US Army.

e. (U) DIA, Wash DC - In Sep 1980 DIA/DI-2 hosted a conference for RDJTF to assist in the identification of intelligence requirements and to establish an intelligence architecture upon which appropriate automated support systems could be designated and proved. The efforts begun here continued throughout the remainder of the year resulting in the RDJTF intelligence requirements and concept of operations being documented.

f. (U) HQ FMFLANT - In November 1980 J-2 personnel attended a briefing and demonstration of the Marine Air Ground Intelligence System (MAGIS) at FMFLANT in Norfolk, Va. The purpose of this visit was to determine if the MAGIS could fulfill the RDJTF requirement for a deployable automated intelligence support system.

U ~~(C)~~ The first RDJTF hosted intelligence conference was held 16-18 Sep 80. Participating were representatives from RDJTF, USREDCOM, DIA, designated RDF Planning HQs and service intelligence representatives. The conference focused on major areas of mutual intelligence concern including the refinement of the RDJTF intelligence architecture concept and a comprehensive review of near term RDJTF intelligence enhancements. The status of RDJTF OPLAN 1001-81 and Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81 was briefed and discussed. The conference served as a forum to voice and resolve the various concerns of the subordinate/supporting commands and contributed significantly to the intercommand flow of intelligence information/ideas and improved the RDJTF's ability to provide intelligence support to the components/supporting commands.

(U) The following national level intelligence conferences were attended by representatives from the intelligence directorate:

a. (U) DIA Intelligence Requirements Review - May 1980.

b. (U) Department of Defense Intelligence Information System (DODIIS) Manager's Conference - Sep 1980.

c. (U) JCS Interdiction Seminar - Sep 1980.

d. (U) Target Intelligence/Tactical Target Materials (TI/TTM) Conference - Oct 1980.

e. (U) Air Defense Systems Program Review Conference - Oct 1980.

f. (U) Indications and Warning (I&W) Seminar and Policy Council -Oct 80.

g. (U) Reconnaissance Operations Conference - Oct 1980.

h. (U) DOD Plan for Intelligence Support to Operational Commanders Conference - Nov 1980.

i. (U) Air Defense Systems Program Review Conference - Nov 1980.

j. (U) Tactical Exploitation of National Collection Capabilities (TENCAP) Conference - Dec 1980.

k. (U) Defense Steering Group (DSG) Conference - Dec 1980.

(U) RDJTF participation in these conferences not only insured that the commands intelligence requirements were made known community wide but also provided the vehicle to inform the intelligence community of the mission and problems confronting HQ RDJTF and solicit their support and assisitance in solving the unique problems associated with this "one of a kind" command.

(U) Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) Activities

U ~~(C)~~ Since its establishment on 1 Mar 1980 the RDJTF has received cryptologic support from the Cryptologic Support Group (CSG) USREDCOM. As planning progressed it became apparent that additional personnel would be required to adequately support the cryptologic requirements of both USREDCOM and the RDJTF. In a letter dated 7 Aug 80,[15] to the Director, NSA, USCINCRED requested additional NSA personnel to fully support the mission of the RDJTF. On 29-30 Sep 80 a two man team from NSA, led by the Chief of NSA's Office of Support to military operations visited HQ USREDCOM for the purpose of validating the request for additional support personnel. As a result of this visit a recommendation was made to the Director, NSA that CSG billets be increased by four (two officer/two NCO). This action was approved and the additional personnel are expected to arrive during 1981.

U ~~(C)~~ In addition to an increase in cryptologic support personnel, USREDCOM CSG advised NSA via message[16] that to fully support COMRDJTF potential deployment/employment options in Southwest Asia (SWA) the Mobile Cryptologic Support Facility (MCSF) would require the following upgrades:

15. Letter, USREDCOM, No Subject (Personal For), 7 Aug 80.
16. Message, USREDCOM (USF-784) DTG 161430Z Dec 80, Subj: MCSF Improvements .

U a. ~~(C)~~ An increase of two secure teletype terminals. The current configuration of the MCSF permits communications to only four components. With the addition of Navy/Marine forces and the SAC Strategic Projection Force (SAC/SPF) there is a requirement for a total of six in-theater OPSCOM circuits to the RDJTF CSG.

b. (U) Back-up communications terminals which are non-computer dependent to provide a fail safe, minimum-communications mode of operations.

U c. ~~(C)~~ A secure voice capability to permit direct voice communications between the MCSF and the National Sigint Operations Center or Component Cryptologic Support Elements (CSE) as required.

(U) NSA approved the upgrades to the MCSF and advised CSG USREDCOM that it would be accomplished by 5 December 1980. However, as of the end of CY 80 the upgrading of the MCSF was not complete.

U ~~(C)~~ During Exercise POSITIVE LEAP at Ft Bragg, NC (10-15 April 1980) the MCSF formed part of the national intelligence display for tactical commanders. The purpose of this display was to familiarize combat commanders and key staff elements with the capabilities of national intelligence assets to support tactical planning and operations. The CSG also provided SIGINT support to COMRDJTF and the component forces during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT-81 at Ft Bragg, NC.

(U) Weather Detachment Activities

(U) Since the activation of the RDJTF, weather support to the RDJTF HQ has been provided by the 1st Weather Squadron (MAC), MacDill AFB, Florida, under authority of the Joint Chiefs of Staff J3M-1882'80, subject: "Designation of Mission Meterological Support Responsibility for the Joint Deployment Agency (JDA) and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF)", 29 October 1980. A Weather Division (RDJ2-W), manned from 1 WS resources, was formed under the Intelligence Directorate to fully integrate RDJTF weather support.

(U) A Weather Support Element (WSE) supported each exercise during 1980 in which the RDJTF participated. Support began with Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 in which four RDJ2-W personnel participated. During Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT 81, RDJ2-W deployed with the RDJTF HQ to form a WSE at Fort Bragg, NC. The WSE consisted of seven persons from RDJ2-W, augmented by 47 other Air Force and Navy weather personnel. Support was provided to the RDJTF HQ and all components down to division/brigade and wing level. Joint weather support to the RDJTF became a reality during GALLANT KNIGHT 81 when the Naval Oceanographic Command (NOC) deployed a Navy weather officer to augment the WSE. During Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81, RDJ2-W deployed two weather forecasters with the JTF HQ to provide around-the-clock weather support.

C. (U) OPERATIONS DIRECTORATE (J3)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Director of Operations, An Army Colonel, has the staff responsibility for coordinating and directing all operational and joint training aspects for missions assigned to the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The Director's duties include but are not limited to:

a. (U) Advising the commander on all matters that pertain to joint operations joint training, combat readiness of assigned forces and other requirements as directed.

b. (U) Supervising the staff to ensure adequacy of training and operational preparedness of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to deploy and to conduct joint exercises and contingency operations.

c. (U) Monitoring component task organizations and the operational procedures to assign forces to insure the maximum operational effectiveness and optimum utilization of available resources.

d. (U) Translating approved plans into contingency actions and orders to include the planning for supervision of and the conduct of component "no notice" unit alert exercises; exercising staff supervision over, planning for, the conduct of directed joint readiness exercises and the monitoring of joint training of assigned forces. To assist the director with his assigned tasks, he has cognizance over three divisions - Current Operations, Special Operations and the Exercise and Readiness Division.

(U) Current Operations Division

(U) The Current Operations Division is directly responsible to the Director of Operations, J3 for all Operational aspects of missions assigned the Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. The Division consists of 34 personnel from all services:

	OFFICER	ENLISTED
a. Army	7	7
b. Air Force	5	4
c. Marine Corps	5	2
d. Navy	4	1

(U) They are organized into 6 branches: Air Defense Operations; Air Operations; Command, Control and Communications Countermeasures; Emergency Actions; Ground Operations and Naval Operations. These branches are tasked to provide, in each of their areas of expertise, advice on all matters concerning joint operations and combat readiness of assigned forces. Additionally, each branch monitors component task organization and operational procedures of assigned forces to insure maximum operational effectiveness and optimum utilization of available resources as well as translating approved plans into contingency actions and orders. The division chief also serves as the Deputy Director, Operations Directorate, J3.

(U) The initial nucleus of the Current Operations Division reported for duty prior to 1 March 1980 and began to organize the framework of a viable organization. A rapid influx of personnel from all four services quickly built up the strength and operational capability of the division during March through May. Full operational strength was essentially achieved by the end of July.

(U) Exercise and Readiness Division

(U) As in the case of the Current Operations Division, the Exercise and Readiness Division was formed concurrently with the activation of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force on 1 March 1980.

(U) The Exercise and Readiness Division is responsible to the Director of Operations, J3 for pre-joint exercise planning, exercise control, and monitoring the operational readiness of assigned forces. The division also develops joint exercise control organizations and prepares detailed exercise scenarios and exercise control plans. Additionally, it establishes procedures for and monitors the readiness of assigned RDJTF forces. To accomplish these tasks this division has six assigned personnel. Distribution is as follows:

	OFFICER	ENLISTED
a. Army	1	0
b. Navy	1	0
c. Air Force	2	1
d. USMC	1	0

(U) Special Operations Division

(U) The Special Operations Division is directly responsible to the Director of Operations, J3 for all matters pertaining to unconventional warfare, political/military operations, civil affairs, special planning and escape and evasion as pertains to missions assigned the Commander, RDJTF. The division also conducts unconventional warfare planning for joint readiness exercises and contingencies, serves as a technical adviser to the Commander on special/unconventional warfare matters and, in coordination with the Chief of the Current Operations Division, translates approved plans into contingency plans and orders. The division is comprised of 11 individuals with distribution as follows:

	OFFICER	ENLISTED
a. Army	4	1
b. Navy	3	1
c. Air Force	2	0

The division chief supervises branches with responsibilities that include unconventional warfare, political/military/civil affairs, special plans and an administrative cell.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Forces

U ~~(S)~~ RDJTF forces are regularly assigned to unified or specified commands and, in some instances, are committed in the event of a NATO-Warsaw Pact conflict. It is not intended to assign these forces to HQ, RDJTF on a routine basis. When required, and as directed by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, forces will be assigned to, or operate in support of HQ RDJTF as determined by individual requirements. Tentative RDJTF forces with the capability to respond to non-NATO combat contingencies were originally identified in Appendix B to JCSM-318-79, 15 November 1979. In coordination with the services and the unified commands, the Joint Chiefs of Staff would designate specific forces to satisfy requirements identified by Commander, RDJTF, and Service component planning headquarters. Additional forces could be tasked in OPLANs and OPORDs if approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Identified RDJTF forces were so recorded in applicble Joint Strategic Planning System documents. The size of the RDJTF force was derived from a planning requirement for a swift response to a demanding non-NATO contingency in which there may or may not be (b)1.4 a, c Should there be direct Soviet involvement, the RDJTF would be reinforced by additional units assigned or earmarked for NATO.

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FORCES (U)

US ARMY FORCES[1*]	US AIR FORCES[2*]
XVIII Airborne Corps, HQ	Air Force Forces HQ
4th Infantry Division (Mech)	4 Tactical Fighter Wings[3*]
194th Armored Brigade	2 Tactical Reconnaissance Squadrons[4*]
82d Airborne Division	2 Tactical Airlift Wings[5*]
101st Airborne Division (Air Assault)	
1st/75th Infantry Battalion (Ranger)	
2d/75th Infantry Battalion (Ranger)	

*Notes to Above.

1. U ~~(S)~~ Unit shortfalls or reduced equipment/personnel levels will occur in support forces if simultaneous employment of RDF-Army exceeds 2-1/3 divisions.

(b)(1)1.4a

3 U ~~(S)~~ These USREDCOM forces would be augmented with appropriate USAF support units, including 6 E-3A AWACS aircraft, 24 F-4G WILD WEASEL aircraft and air rescue helicopters.

4. U ~~(S)~~ Air National Guard units requiring mobilization. (Since 3 active tactical reconnaissance squadrons located in CONUS are dual-based under operational command of USCINCEUR.)

5. U ~~(S)~~ CONUS-based MAC units with airdrop capability.

US NAVAL FORCES[6*]	Supporting FORCES AVAILABLE FOR PLANNING FOR RDJTF
1 Surface Action Group	Strategic Refueling[8*]
3 Carrier Battle Groups	Strategic Airlift[9/10*]
1 Marine Amphibious Force (MAF)[7*]	Strategic Sealift[11*]
5 Patrol Squadrons P-3	

*Notes to Above.

6. U ~~(S)~~ Consists of forward-deployed and CONUS-ready forces assigned to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, or CINCPAC. RDJTF forces may be drawn from the appropriate unified or specified command, depending upon the location of the contingency.

7. U ~~(S)~~ Made available from 3 MAFs currently under operational command of CINCLANT and CINCPAC. All three, or elements thereof, possess rapid deployment capability. Amphibious lift is available for 1 MAF assault echelon. MAFs are capable of rapid deployment via sealift and/or airlift.

8. U ~~(S)~~ Strategic refueling resources for the execution of a specific OPLAN will be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as required, at the time execution planning is directed.

9 U ~~(S)~~ Strategic movement resources for the execution of a specific OPLAN will be allocated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff, as required, at the time execution planning is directed.

10. U ~~(S)~~ Planning for any single non-NATO contingency may assume use of up to (b)1.4a of mobility assets that are available at the assumed level of mobilization.

11. U ~~(S)~~ Sealift forces available for planning include:

a. U ~~(S)~~ Nonmobilization--Military Sealift Command (MSC)-controlled fleet, US-flag ships in the Sealift Readiness Program (SRP), and the Ready Reserve Force (RRF).

b. U ~~(S)~~ Partial Mobilization--MSC-controlled fleet, US-flag ships in the SRP, and the National Defense Reserve Fleet, including RRF ships.

(b)(1)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ The force list above modified the specific type of Army units available and noted that shortfalls or reduced equipment/personnel levels would occur in support forces if more than 2 1/3 Army Divisions were simultaneously employed. It also provided more specific guidance on the

number and type of Air Force squadrons and added 5 Bomber Squadrons (Heavy) to the list of available forces. No changes occurred in the list of Naval Forces available.

(U) Readiness

(U) In accordance with the FY81 JCSP and the Terms of Reference (TOR), Readiness data for all service forces assigned as part of, or in support of, RDJTF was provided HQ RDJTF through the established chain of command as required by JCS Pub 6, Vol II, Part 2, Chap 1 (UNITREP).

a. U ~~(S)~~ US Army and US Air Force RDJTF units provided their UNITREP status to US Readiness Command, and in turn, USREDCOM provided the information to HQ RDJTF. Identification and status of assigned units as of 1 Mar 1980, the date Headquarters RDTJF was activated, and on 31 December 1980, the end of this first command history reporting period, are shown below:

		STATUS AS OF 1 Mar 80	STATUS AS OF 31 Dec 80
Army			
4th	Infantry Division	C3	
9th	Infantry Division	not assigned	C3
24th	Infantry Division (Mech)	not assigned	C2
82d	Airborne Division	C2	C2
101st	Air Assault Division	C4	C3
6th	Cavalry Brigade (Air Combat)	not assigned	C3
194th	Armored Brigade	C2	
Air Force			
563	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4G)	C5	C2
390	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-11A)	C2	C2
522	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-111D)	C2	C1
353	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10A)	C2	C1
355	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10A)	C1	C1
336	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10)	C3	not assigned
356	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10A)	not assigned	C2
68	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4E)	C1	C1

70	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4E)	C1	C1
339	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-4E)	C1	C1
7	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-15)	C1	C1
8	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-15)	C2	C1
9	TAC Fighter Sqdn (F-15)	C1	C1
76	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-7)	C1	C1
16	Spec Operations Sqdn (AC-130)	C2	C2
552	Abn Wing Control Wg (E-3A)	C2	C1
7	Abn Command/Control Sqdn (C-130E)	C2	C2
188	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-7)	C1	not assigned
106	TAC Reconnaissance Sqdn (RF-4C)	C1	C1
165	TAC Reconnaissance Sqdn (RF-4C)	C1	C1
118	TAC Fighter Sqdn (A-10)	C3	C3
193	TAC Electonic Warfare Sq (EC-135)	C5	C4

The readiness of Army units was degraded primarily by a shortage of Senior NCO's. Air Force forces were experiencing a degradation of readiness due to shortages of War Reserve Spare Kits (WRSK).

U ~~(C)~~ The Naval forces available for RDJTF planning consisted of forward-deployed and CONUS-ready Naval Forces assigned to CINCLANT, USCINCEUR or CINCPAC. RDJTF Naval Force could be drawn from appropriate unified or specified commands, depending on contingency location. Since the RDJTF's planning throughout the year was focused on SWA, the RDJTF concentrated on monitoring, through JCS, the location and status of Naval forces forward-deployed in the Indian Ocean and Persian Gulf. During the majority of the year, two Carrier Battle Groups were forward-deployed in the Indian Ocean. These were in addition to the Naval Forces attached to COMIDEASTFOR which were forward-deployed in the Persian Gulf. The Navy's major factor degrading readiness was a shortage of personnel.

U ~~(S)~~ RDJTF Marine Forces were available from elements of the three Marine Amphibious forces under the operational command of CINCLANT and CINCPAC. The three Marine Divisions remained C-2 throughout the year. The Marine Corps major readiness deficiency was shortage of personel. Further, during this period a Marine Amphibious Unit was periodically forward-deployed to the Indian Ocean aboard amphibious shipping.

(U) Training and Exercise Program

(U) The RDJTF Training and Exercise Program was an essential element of efforts to establish and maintain the required state of operational Readiness for the RDJTF and its component headquarters. As of 31 Dec 81, HQ RDJTF had participated in eight exercises. These included four Command Post Exercises (CPX's), on OCONUS Field Training Exercise (FTX), Two Rapid Deployment Readiness Exercises (RDRE) and a Communications Exercise (COMMEX) conducted at home base.

(U) Command and Control of Small Rapid Response Forces

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(U) The RDJTF command and control element to support this concept consisted of 116 Headquarters staff and support personnel. The package provided for an Airborne battle staff and an airdrop as well as an airland element. The development of this command and control package was significant since it was the first such requirement placed on the Headquarters RDJTF and since then has served as the basis for subsequent similar Command and Control requirements.

(U) Operations Standing Operating Procedure (SOP)

(U) During the period of 1 Mar - 1 July 1980, this Headquarters developed the organization/format and basic contents and philosophy for the Operations SOP. The purpose of the SOP is to provide command policy, procedures, guidance, and taskings to the Headquarters, RDJTF, commands and units designated as component forces, and to commands/units designated as forces in support of. It was decided that the organization would, to the extent possible, follow the Joint Operational Planning System (JOPS) format. The SOP includes the voluminous amount of routine unclassified material that is normally found in operation plans/orders and also prescribes the methods by which COMRDTJF will conduct combat operations and exercises. In general, the information and procedures contained in the SOP are designed to promote understanding and unity of effort for this Headquarters and all participating forces.

(U) The first draft COMRDJTF Operations SOP was published on 1 Aug 1980. It was closely reviewed by all HQ RDJTF Directorates for the next sixty-day period to ensure that all policy, procedures and requirements contained therein were consistent with current direction on such areas as command relationship being formulated and refined by higher headquarters. On 1 October 1980, the first approved COMRDJTF Operations SOP was published and distribution was made so this document could be used/referenced for CPX GALLANT KNIGHT (conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C. 23-30 Oct 1980).

(U) All commands and forces participating in CPX GALLANT KNIGHT were given an opportunity to provide comments/recommendations on this SOP. All input was reviewed, staffed, and incorporated into a draft revision dated 31 Dec 1980. Distribution was made with COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81. All addressees were requested to identify additional changes and submit comments/recommendations as a result of reviewing this manual in support of COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81.

(U) As a result of this tasking, numerous issues were forwarded to this Headquarters requiring staff coordination and resolution with components and supporting forces prior to the next approved publications of this manual. All issues have been resolved at this time. Those issues considered to be significant were: airspace management, common-air tasking procedures, reporting requirements by forces in support of, and standardization of joint operational procedures encompassing most functional areas throughout the SOP.

(U) A second COMRDJTF Operations SOP is scheduled for publication during the first half of calender year 1981. The publication/distribution of this SOP to all components, forces in support of and other selected headquarters/organizations will serve as a major contribution toward the preparedness and readiness of the RDJTF to execute short notice missions. By referencing this document the requirement to prepare large voluminous OPLANs/OPORDs will be virtually eliminated.

(U) Command Post Field SOP

(U) During May of 1980 the decision was made to prepare a Command Post (CP) Field Standing Operating Procedure (SOP). The SOP would provide command policy, procedures, guidance and tasking for the conduct of HQ RDJTF CP operations in the field. Additionally, this SOP would include that information needed by HQ staff elements to promote a clear understanding of the organization and functions of the RDJTF Headquarters while operating in the field. General subject areas included in the SOP are:

a. Personnel

b. Intelligence

c. Operations

d. Logistics

e. Plans

f. Communications

g. Special Staff Activities

(U) The initial draft of this SOP was prepared during the period 13 Jun - 10 Oct 80. The first field check of the information contained in the SOP was conducted during Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT, 21-31 Oct 80, at Ft Bragg, NC. Changes based on Exercise GALLANT KNIGHT were incorporated into the SOP during the period 1 Nov 80 - 30 Jan 81.

(U) Readiness SOP

(U) The activities chronicled in this Command History provided many invaluable insights especially in the deployment of the Headquarters, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. These insights were of such significance that COMRDJTF desired to incorporate them into the permanent institutional memory. Therefore on 10 March 1980, the Current Operations Division, Operations Directorate, J3 was directed to take the lead in developing a Readiness SOP. Mobilizing the efforts of the entire staff, the Readiness SOP evolved from merely recording lessons learned to that of serving as a Headquarters deployment guide.

(U) The basic rationale behind the development of the Readiness SOP is that the Headquarters deployment process will be incremental in nature and keyed to the size of the total deployed force. The Headquarters will optimally perform its functions if each deployment increment provides a balanced capability to command and control forces from all four services. If the actual force deployed is skewed toward a particular service capability the deployment increment would be tailored to reflect force composition using the deployment increment in the Readiness SOP as a baseline. Within the incremental deployment concept is an additional option for the commander: the provisions of an inherent airdrop capability. Airdrop entry of the operational area, however, is not the most likely deployment option, therefore the provision of this capability has not driven the composition of the increments. Command and control deployment increments are being developed for three different force packages:

a. (U) A reinforced battalion/squadron(s).

b. (U) A division/multi-wing force.

c. (U) The entire force list.

(U) In addition to the three command and control increments, a liaison increment was developed to act as an advance party and to assist the commander in planning force deployment. Consistent with the incremental deployment process, the liaison element will be deployed into objective areas prior to force deployment or, with appropriate permission, prior to a decision by the NCA to deploy all or part of the RDF. It relies on local subsistence, security, billeting, and transportion support. This increment was designed to perform the following functions:

a. (U) Establish liaison with local national security forces.

b. (U) Prepare for introduction of US combat forces.

c. (U) Establish liaison with US government agencies already in the area, (embassy, military assistance team, etc).

d. (U) Establish communication with the appropriate CINC and COMRDJTF.

(U) The Initial Increment provides a minimum capability to command and control a major buildup of a multiservice force during the first several days of low intensity combat operations. This increment is designed principally for an airland mode of insertion but possesses an inherent airdrop capability. Additionally this increment provides the battle/staff expertise for use in an airborne command post. This package will include the liaison increment if it had not originally deployed. It has an organic capability for a minimum level of subsistence, security, billeting and transportation selfsupport. The initial increment was designed to perform the following functions:

a. (U) Provide a minimum capability to command and control a multi-service force.

b. (U) Control a small show of force (battalion/squadron(s)/MAU) for 30 days.

c. (U) Command and control the force during the buildup of the RDJTF prior to the arrival of the second increment.

d. (U) Control a low intensity combat operation.

e. (U) Coordinate the arrival of units into the operational area.

f. (U) Establish communications with the supporting CINCs, NCA, REDCOM/JDA and RDJTF(rear).

g. (U) Establish communications required to command and control forces in the operational area.

h. (U) Assume operational control of all assignment forces and coordinate naval forces in support of the RDJTF.

(U) The Second Increment, in conjunction with the previous increments, provides the capability to command and control a division/MAB/multi-wing/CVBG (in support) force in medium intensity combat operations. This increment, designed solely with an airland capability, has the following functions:

a. (U) Control forces engaged in medium intensity operations for an indefinite period.

b. (U) Control high intensity operations until the arrival of the entire headquarters.

c. (U) Operate from a bare base environment.

d. (U) Provide full communications connectivity necessary to support combat operations.

(U) The Final Increment, in concert with all preceeding increments, provides the capability to command and control all deployed forces in sustained combat operations.

(U) The Readiness SOP, incorporating the deployment rationale discussed in the preceeding paragraphs, will include other readiness enhancing topics. Alert notification procedures, personnel readiness requirements, deployment checklists and crisis action procedures are topics slated for inclusion in the Readiness SOP with a scheduled publication date of late June 1981.

(U) HQ RDJTF Hurricane Relocation Plan

U ~~(FOUO)~~ RDJ3 was tasked in July 1980 to develop a HQ RDJTF Hurricane Relocation Plan. The plan gives COMRDJTF the option of relocating, with USCINCRED and JCS approval, HQ RDJTF operations away from hurricane conditions at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida to maintain a deplopyment capability for HQ RDJTF. It provides for relocating up to 125 personnel with required equipment (Small Rapid Response Force -- SRRF) to one of three relocation bases: Ft Bragg, North Carolina or Ft Cambell, Kentucky by airlift; or Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida by convoy. The plan was coordinated with United States Readiness Command; Commander, Forces Command; Commander, Naval Training Center, Orlando, Florida; and 56 Tactical Fighter Wing, MacDill Air Force Base Florida. Plan development was completed in December 1980 with a publication date of 1 January 1981. It will be reviewed and updated annually in the month of January.

(U) Employment CPX POSITIVE LEAP 80

U ~~(S)~~ Employment Command Post Exercise (CPX) POSITIVE LEAP was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina, during the period of 10-15 April 1980. The purpose of the exercise was to provide a simulated combat environment to train the commander and staff of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (RDJTF) and its Army, Air Force, Navy, Marine, and Joint Unconventional Warfare components/supporting commands in planning and conducting large scale military operations. The exercise objectives achieved included exercising the RDJTF in contingency operations based on real-world contingency plans; exercising RDJTF command, control, communications procedures; validating RDJTF force structure; developing RDJTF force closure data, refining airlift requirements; and identifying logistics issues. A total of 10,255 personnel from all services participated in the CPX.

(FOUO) Participating Headquarters and key commanders/players are listed below:

U ~~(S)~~ Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Headquarters

COMRDJTF	Lt Gen P. X. Kelley
Deputy COMRDJTF	Maj Gen R. C. Taylor
Chief of Staff	BG C. W. Stiner

(U) Army Forces (ARFOR).

U ~~(S)~~ COMARFOR/Commander, XVIII Abn Corps	LTG T. Tackaberry
HQ, 82nd Abn Div	MG G. S. Meloy III
HQ, 101st Abn Div (AASLT)	MG J. N. Brandenburg
HQ, 24th Inf Div (M)	MG J. F. Cochran III
HQ, 194th Armd Bde	COL
HQ, 197th Inf Bde (M)	COL
HQ, 1-75 Inf Bn (RGR)	LTC
HQ, 2-75 Inf Bn (RGR)	LTC
HQ, 96th CA Bn	LTC
HQ, 8th PSYOP Bn	LTC

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(U) Air Force Forces (AFFOR), POSITIVE LEAP.

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ COMAFFOR/Commander Ninth Air Force — Lt Gen A. S. Braswell
4 Tactical Fighter Wings
2 Tactical Recon Squadrons
6 E-3A (AWACS)

U ~~(S)~~ SAC ADVON — Maj Gen P. J. Halloran
5 Squadrons B-52

(U) JOINT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (JRCC)
Air Rescue Helos

(U) COMALF — Brig Gen D. D. Brown
2 Tactical Airlift Wings

(U) Naval Forces (NAVFOR).

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ COMNAVFOR — RADM R. F. Dunn
1 Surface Action Gp
3 Carrier Battle Gp
1 Amphibious Task Force
5 Patrol Squadrons (P-3)

(U) Marine Forces (MARFOR).

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ MARFOR HQ — Brig Gen E. C. Cheatham, Jr
MAF

(U) Joint Unconventional Warfare Task Force (JUWTF).

UNIT

U ~~(S)~~ JUWTF HQ — COL (b)(6)
Special Forces Operational Base

Special Forces Group (A)

Op Det 8th PSYOP Bn (+)

Air Force Special Operations Base

1 SOW

5 MC-130E
6 UH-1N/4 CH-3
4 AC-130H
SOCCT/WT

Navy Special Warfare Group HQ

3 SEAL Plt
2 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Det
1 Special Boat Unit

(b)1.4a

advance. US ground "Show of Force" forces located in Saudi Arabia and Kuwait were redeployed to Iran and the remaining RDJTF forces in CONUS commenced deployment. Near Term Prepositioning Shipping (NTPS) was moved from Diego Garcia to the United Arab Emirates and joined by airlifted elements of a Marine Amphibious Brigade (MAB).

(b)(1)1.4a,b,d

U ~~(S)~~ CPX POSITIVE LEAP was a significant milestone in the evolution of the RDJTF concept. It represented the first time Commanders and staffs of all RDJTF earmarked forces were able to exercise together. The CPX proved to be a timely and valuable training vehicle for getting planners involved with RDJTF activities. Significant insights were gained as result of CPX POSITIVE LEAP which were documented in the United States Readiness Command's After Action report and forwarded to components and appropriate agencies.

(U) Deployment CPX POSITIVE LEAP 80

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(b)(1)1.4a

(U) The following commands and agencies participated in Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80:

a. U ~~(C)~~ The Joint Chiefs of Staff implemented the Emergency Operating Procedures at STARTEX. The Joint Staff, Services, and Defense Intelligence Agency personnel participated as members of the Operations Planners Group or appropriate response cells.

b. U ~~(C)~~ Personnel from the Department of State, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Military Services, and Coast Guard participated in their expected roles for a crisis situation.

c U ~~(C)~~ LANTCOM, USEUCOM, MAC, PACOM, USREDCOM, SAC, and the RDJTF participated in the exercise with normal battle staffs. The TOAs participated with crisis action teams.

d. U ~~(C)~~ The JECG functioned in its accustomed role and controlled the exercise play. The representatives of the Department of State and the Office of the Secretary of Defense on the JECG functioned as both players and controllers. The representatives were several grades junior to the principals they represented. Thus, representatives' actions during Exercise POSITIVE LEAP 80 did not necessarily depict the same actions that would have been taken by their respective principals.

(b)1.4 a, b, d

(U) The Planning Exercise Phase (12-17 May) covered CAS Phases III and IV; Course of Action Development and Decision.

(U) The Joint Chiefs of Staff provided a WARNING ORDER to the exercise participants at STARTEX. The JCS WARNING ORDER commenced CAS Phase III. The Joint Chiefs of Staff, in the WARNING ORDER, designated COMRDJTF as the supported commander and CINCLANT, USCINCEUR, CINCMAC, CINCPAC, USCINCRED, and CINCSAC as supporting commanders. The WARNING ORDER contained a list of forces available for planning. The JCS WARNING ORDER contained a requirement for the RDJTF to submit a COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE with his COAs and forces by 151800Z May.

U ~~(S)~~ In accordance with CAS procedures, the RDJTF, issued an Evaluation Request message which amplified the information contained in the WARNING ORDER to applicable organizations supporting the RDJTF. The Evaluation Request message contained two COAs and a request for an evaluation of the COAs. USEUCOM, PACOM, SAC, FORSCOM and TAC submitted Evaluation Response messages to RDJTF. The FORSCOM Evaluation Response message contained two additonal COAs, one of which was adopted by the RDJTF. The RDJTF sent (150800Z May) its COMMANDER'S ESTIMATE to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, recommending FORSCOM's proposed COA.

U ~~(S)~~ Other actions taken during the Planning Exercise included preparation of closure estimates by the TOAs and the RDJTF, development of the JDS data base, and determination of JOA boundaries.

U ~~(S)~~ On 17 May the OJCS presented a decision briefing to the acting Secretary of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the three RDJTF COAs. The OJCS prepared an ALERT ORDER reflecting the COA decision. The last action ended the Planning Exercise.

(U) The OJCS scheduled no exercise activities during the period 17 May - 2 June. RDJTF, JDA, and supporting commands continued to work on the force list, logistical support, and the JDA data base.

U ~~(C)~~ The Deployment Exercise Phase was conducted during the period 2-6 June. The RDJTF and supporting commands started this phase by initiating actions to implement the guidance and tasking contained in the ALERT ORDER.

U ~~(S)~~ The OJCS sent the EXECUTE ORDER on 4 June to the exercise participants with L-hour set for 042100Z June. The TOA's Services, RDJTF and its component commands and the JDA continued implementation actions. By ENDEX, the RDJTF had deployed the first 2 days of airlifted forces.

U ~~(S)~~ This exercise was the first JCS sponsored CPX involving the RDJTF. The RDJTF and other commands made substantial progress in developing initial planning for a RDJTF deployment, and the following significant problem areas

requiring review and corrective action by the Secretary of Defense, Joint Chiefs of Staff and Services were identified.

a. U ~~(C)~~ Command and Control arrangements for the RDJTF as the supported CINC.

b. U ~~(C)~~ Logistic supportability of a large deployed force in the Arabian Gulf area.

c. U ~~(C)~~ ADP and WIN support to the deployment community.

(U) BRAVE SHIELD 80 Rapid Deployment Readiness Exercise (RDRE)

U ~~(S)~~ BRAVE SHIELD 80 RDRE was conducted at Fort Bragg, N.C. and at Polk AFB, Louisiana during the period of 13-21 Aug 1980. The purpose of the exercise was for HQ RDJTF to monitor the operational readiness of an RDF unit. This responsibility is contained in the JCS Terms of Reference for the RDJTF dated 13 August 1980. The major objectives of the exercise included: developing staff functioning procedures required for planning and deploying a small response force; exercising airborne battle staff procedures in an EC-135 aircraft; and to exercise chop procedures of the airborne assault deploying force from the RDJTF to an employing force on the ground.

(U) Participating player headquarters and key commanders/players are as listed below:

U ~~(C)~~ RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS BATTLESTAFF

COMMANDER	BG STINER
J3	COL (b)(6)
J3 GROUND	LTCOL (b)(6)
J3 AIR	LT COL (b)(6)
J2	COL (b)(6)
J6	CAPT (b)(6)
MAC LNO	LTCOL (b)(6)
BN LNO	MAJ (b)(6)

U ~~(C)~~ RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS STAFF MONITORING TEAM

J3 (TEAM CHIEF)	LTC (b)(6)
J1	LTC (b)(6)
J2	MAJ (b)(6)
J4	MAJ (b)(6)
J6	SSGT (b)(6)
USREDCOM J4	LTC (b)(6)
USREDCOM J3	LTC (b)(6)

U ~~(C)~~ RAPID DEPLOYMENT AIR FORCE FORCES (RDAFFOR)

1/EC-135

1/C-5

7/C-141

1/C-130

U ~~(C)~~ ARMY FORCES (ARFOR)

502nd Engr Airborne Bn, 82nd Abn Div

U ~~(S)~~ The setting for the exercise was that a RDJTF ARFOR unit needed to be reinforced at a designated area within a 24 hour time frame. The selected organization was given the mission of planning and conducting an airborne assault and follow-on air land operation. This exercise originated at Fort Bragg, N.C. and the exercise area was at Fort Polk La. The HQ RDJTF Battle Staff and Monitor Team were present when the Engr Bn was given the mission. The Engr Bn then briefed on their concept for conducting this operation. The RDJTF Monitor Team then accompanied respective functional counterparts throughout the exercise to include the parachute assault. The RDJTF Battle Staff relocated to Seymour Johnson AFB, boarded an EC-135 and then rendezvoused with the airborne battalion near the exercise area. The Battle Staff exercised command and control over the airborne battalion during the parachute assault. After the battalion was on the ground and had linked up with the ground forces commander, the chop was effected. The Battle Staff then returned to MacDill AFB. The RDJTF Monitor Team stayed on the ground with the airborne battalion until the exercise secured.

(U) Overall the RDRE was conducted in a timely and professional manner. The Engr Airborne Battalion demonstrated that although this type of an operation was their secondary mission, they possessed the skills, proper attitude and the degree of readiness to complete this assignment in an outstanding manner. The RDJTF Battlestaff and Monitor Team were fully utilized and achieved the objectives as described above.

(U) Employment CPX GALLANT KNIGHT 81

U ~~(S)~~ Employment Command Post Exercise (CPX) GALLANT KNIGHT 81 was conducted at Fort Bragg, North Carolina during the period 23-30 October 1980. The purpose of the exercise was to provide a simulated combat environment in which to train the commanders and staffs of the RDJTF and its Army, Air Force, Marine and Joint Unconventional Warfare Components as well as the Navy supporting Command in planning and conducting large scale military operations. A major objective of the exercise was the examination of strategic concepts for employment of the RDJTF in Southwest Asia. Other objectives included exercising the RDJTF in employing reinforcements; exercising the conduct of an interdiction campaign; validating interservice logistics requirements/procedures; exercising an integrated air defense data; analyzing the sustainability and adequacy of the RDJTF in Southwest Asia; and exercising/evaluating all-source intelligence support of the RDJTF. A total of more than 8000 players from all services representing as many as 300,000 personnel participated in the CPX.

U ~~(C)~~ Participating player headquarters and key commanders/players are listed below:

U ~~(C)~~ RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE HEADQUARTERS

COMRDJTF	LtGen P.X. KELLEY
DEPUTY COMRDJTF	Maj Gen R.C. TAYLOR
Chief of Staff	BG C.W. STINER

U ~~(C)~~ ARMY FORCES (ARFOR)

COMARFOR/COMMANDER, XVIII ABN CORPS	LTG T.H. TACKABERRY
HQ, 82d ABN DIV	MG G.S. MELOY III
HQ, 101st ABN DIV (AASLT)	MG J.A. MACMULL
HQ, 24th INF DIV (M)	MG J.F. COCHRAN III
HQ, 194th ARM BDE	COL (b)(6) JR
HQ, 2-75 INF BN (RGR)	LTC (b)(6)
HQ, 96th CA BN	LTC (b)(6) JR
HQ, 8th PSYOP BN	LTC (b)(6)

U ~~(C)~~ RAPID DEPLOYMENT AIR FORCE FORCES (RDAFFOR)

COMRDAFFOR/Commander 9th AF	Lt Gen A.S. BRASWELL
4 Tactical Fighter Wings	
2 Tactical Recon Squadrons	

6 E-3A (AWACS)

SAC ADVON — Brig Gen J.A. SHAUD

5 Squadrons B-52

JOINT RESCUE COORDINATION CENTER (JRCC)

Air Rescue Helos

U ~~(C)~~ COMALF — Brig Gen D.H. CASSIDY

2 Tactical Airlift Wings

U ~~(C)~~ NAVAL FORCES (NAVFOR)

COMNAVFOR — CAPT (b)(6)

1 Surface Action Gp

3 Carrier Battle Gp

1 Amphibious Task Force

5 Patrol Squadrons (P-3)

U ~~(C)~~ MARINE FORCES (MARFOR)

MARFOR HQ — MajGen K.L. ROBINSON JR

I MAF

U ~~(C)~~ JOINT UNCONVENTIONAL WARFARE TASK FORCE (JUWTF)

JUWTF HQ — BG J.C. LUTZ

Special Forces Operational Base

Special Forces Group (A)

Op Det 8th PSYOP BN (+)

Air Force Special Operations Base

1 SOW

5 MC-130E

6 UH-1N/4 CH-3

4 AC-130H

SOCCT/WT

Navy Special Warfare Group HQ

3 SEAL Plt

2 Swimmer Delivery Vehicle Det

1 Special Boat Unit

(b)1.4 a, b, d

U ~~(S)~~ Each phase of the exercise involved attacks by Soviet Forces far outnumbering the defending U.S. units. This high level of intensity required the development and utilization of innovative tactics on the part of U.S. forces and provided the RDJTF staff with opportunities to resolve complex issues of joint command and control. The exercise was terminated prior to any decisive breakthrough by the Soviets and without any significant offensive action on the part of the RDJTF.

U ~~(C)~~ CPX GALLANT KNIGHT provided opportunities to examine several newly formed U.S. strategic concepts. The exercise was a success and substantiated the requirement for such exercises for commanders and staffs of the RDJTF to develop the joint operational expertise essential for success on a Southwestern Asia Battlefield. Significant insights, problems and solutions were as a result of CPX GALLANT KNIGHT 81 which were documented in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force After Action Report and forwarded to the components and appropriate agencies.

(U) BRIGHT STAR 81

(U) During the period 7-27 November 1980, the RDJTF conducted its first OCONUS exercise - "BRIGHT STAR 81" - in Cairo Egypt. During the deployment and employment phases of this exercise, USCINCEUR was the supported commander. USCINCRED, CINCMAC and CINCSAC were supporting commanders. Operational command of deploying forces passed to USCINCRED upon their departure from home station(s) and passed to USCINCEUR at 10 degrees west longitude. Commander of BRIGHT STAR 81 assumed operational control of deployed forces upon their arrival at Cairo West Air Base.

(U) The purpose of this exercise was "to participate in a combined Egyptian/United States exercise which was mutually beneficial to the Armed Forces of both nations. Additionally, for U.S. Forces, to exercise the RDJTF HQ and demonstrate the rapid deloyability, mobility and combat readiness of a selected Army/Air Force Task Force."

(U) The exercise objectives were to:

a. (U) Conduct combined training with Egyptian Armed Forces.

b. (U) Familiarize selected personnel and RDJTF units with environmental and operatioal characteristics of SWA.

c. (U) Demonstrate RDJTF capability to establish and operate from an austere location.

d. (U) Establish command and control communications during deployment, employment, and redeployment in SWA, to include validating RDJTF SOP.

e. (U) Validate logistical requirements for operating in SWA.

(U) The planning for Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81 began in late July after a decision by the National Command Authority (NCA) to consider one RDJTF Outside Continental United States (OCONUS) exercise per year, as a part of the RDJTF's five year training program. NCA planning guidance indicated that Egypt would be the site of the first RDJTF OCONUS exercise in SWA.

(U) After detailed staff planning/study, it was decided that a Battalion sized Army/Air Force Task Force comprised of an air assault battalion and an Air Force element of approximately eight (8) aircraft would be the optimum size/mix force to participate. The name chosen for the exercise was "BRIGHT STAR 81".

(U) The major exercise participants were notified in late July and early August and the first planning conference was conducted at HQ RDJTF, Tampa Florida, on the 21st and 22nd of August t1980. The final planning conference was conducted at Ft Bragg, NC, during the period 24-25 October 1980.

(U) A predeployment team of 15 members visited Cairo Egypt during the period 20 September through 8 October and conducted detailed coordination with Egyptian Defense Officials (GOE), on all aspects of the exercise. The GOE

agreed to provide US forces an austere air base from which to operate; a desert area for the conduct of the FTX; permission to enter the country using military ID cards and certified unit rosters (instead of passports and visas) and logistical support in the form of water, ice and fuel. The team was headed by the RDJTF.

(U) As a result of US/GOE coordination it was agreed that BRIGHT STAR 81 would be a six-phased exercise conducted in the desert, west of the Nile River. It was further agreed that all US forces would be based at Cairo-West Airbase.

(U) The JCS Terms of Reference (TOR) for BRIGHT STAR 81 restricted the number of exercise participants to approximately 1400. Major exercise participants were HQ RDJTF; Bn Task Force, 101st Abn Div (AASLT); 150th TFG (ANG); 226th/240th/3rd Combat Communications Groups (ANG), and Combat Service Support Elements of the XVIII Abn Corps.

(U) The Strategic Air Command provided on EC-135 Airborne Command and Communications Platform for use as an enroute command and control vehicle. The EC-135 allowed the Commander, RJDTF to maintain communications with Army Forces (ARFOR) Commander and the Exercise HQ at Cairo-West while deploying from the Intermediate Staging Base (ISB) at Rhein Mein to the exercise site at Cairo-West Airbase.

(U) Military Airlift Command (MAC) provided deployment and redeployment airlift for BRIGHT STAR 81. During the deployment phase seventy-seven (77) C-141 and twelve (12) C-5A missions were flown. A total of eighty-two aircraft missions were required to redeploy all BRIGHT STAR participants to CONUS.

(U) The exercise phases were:

*PHASE 1 (7-11 Nov)

- Deploy ADVON

*PHASE II (12-13 Nov)

- Deployment

*PHASE III (14-15 Nov)

- Establish Bivouac Site

- Individual Training

- Equipment Preparation and Maintenance

*PHASE IV (16-18 Nov)

- Combined Training with Egyptian Armed Forces

*PHASE V (19-22 Nov)

- Combined Field Training Exercise

*PHASE VI (22-27 Nov)

- Redeployment

a. (U) During Phase III of the exercise, US Army and Egyptian Air Force pilots conducted combined helicopter training. Egyptian pilots provided orientations on desert flying operations and US pilots provided classes on US air assault doctrine and tactics.

b. (U) The soldiers of the Egyptian Armed Forces (EAF) received orientations on and fired several US small arms (M-16 Rifle, M60 Machine Gun, M203 Grenade Launchers); and US soldiers received orientations on and fired some EAF small arms (AK-47 Rifle, Lt Machine Gun, RPG-7). The 101st Abn Div (AA) provided interpreters for the training. This combined individual training took place on a range north of the airbase and was conducted in a most professional manner by forces of both nations.

c. (U) Phase IV was highlighted by the conduct of a Combined Arms Live Fire Exercise (CALFEX) conducted at WADI NATRUN Air force Range (50 KM NW of Cairo West) on 18 Nov 80. During this exercise, US and Egyptian Armed Forces conducted live fire exercises against an advancing armored force (notional). US Army forces conducted an air assault, and fired TOWS and rockets from the COBRA Helicopter (AH-1). US Jet Fighters (A-7D's) dropped live ordnance (MK 82's - all on target) during the CALFEX. The EAF conducted an air assault, fired missiles from the Gazelle helicopter, and fired Sagger missiles.

U ~~(C)~~ During Phase V of BRIGHT STAR US/EAF units conducted combined maneuvers in a desert area located southwest of Cairo-West Airbase. The combined Army task force, commanded by the US Battalion Commander, consisted of 1st BN, 502 Inf (-), and one Egyptian airborne rifle company (REINF). A US rifle company equipped with Russian vehicles (BTR-50 PK) provided the BLUE (enemy) forces for the exercise. BLUE forces were commanded by a US captain and the BTR-50's were driven by Egyptian drivers.

(U) The Field Training Exercise was conducted in six phases:

FIELD TRAINING EXERCISE (U)

PHASE V

PHASE	DTG	ACTIVITY
I	190600-101300	Occupy assembly area
	(7 hrs)	Prepare for air Assault
II	191300-191600	Conduct daylight attack
	(3 hrs)	Secure objectives

III	191600-202200	Defend objectives
	(30 hrs)	
IV	202200-210400	Conduct 10KM MVT to contact
	(6 hrs)	Conduct night attack to secure
		A 2d objective
V	210400-220800	Defend objective
	(28 hrs)	Plan and conduct a simulated
		Relief in place
VI	220800-221030	Conduct air assault to secure
	(2½ hrs)	Abandoned airfield
		Secure airfield and repel attack
		ENDEX

U a. ~~(C)~~ The FTX began at 0800 on the 19th of November with the Battalion TF conducting an air assault from Cairo West to an assembly area, an abandoned airfield, approximately 12 KM northwest of Cairo West. There the TF linked up with the Egyptian airborne company.

U b. ~~(C)~~ At 1300 hours on the 19th of November, the TF conducted a combined US/Egyptian air assault from ABUI SIMBOL to seize three company size objectives in the vicinity of ASWAN HILLS. Seizure of these objectives was preceded by tactical air strikes (no live ordnance) from Egyptian MIG-17s and US A-7 fighters.

c. (U) On the evening of the 20th, the TF conducted a night movement to contact, over a distance of 10km, and then successfully conducted a night attack (Objective LUXOR HILLS) beginning at 0200 hours on the 21st of November.

d. (U) On the morning of 22 November, the TF conducted an air assault to secure an airfield and then defended the airfield (objective ABUI SIMBOL) from attacks by the opposing (BLUE) force. The FTX exercise ended at approximately 1030 hours on 22 November 1980.

(U) The 150th TFG (ANG) was scheduled to deploy from Albuquerque, New Mexico to the Azores and then to Cairo West. Due to high wind conditions in the Azores, the eight (8) A-7D jet aircraft flew non-stop from Pease AFB, NH to Cairo Egypt. The trip took 11½ hours and required seven refuelings enroute. The planes were back in the air (with fresh pilots) for six training sorties within two hours of the time they touched down at Cairo West. The unit was operationally ready 97% of the time. The following are highlights of the 150th TFGs other activities during BRIGHT STAR 81:

- Sustained a 1.5 sortie rate throughout the exercise

- Expended 71 (live) Mark-82 bombs and 5,000 rounds of 20mm HEI

- Participated in a live firepower exercise

- Operated effectively in an austere environment

Conducted information displays/ground training with Egyptian Armed Forces.

U ~~(C)~~ Exercise Overview: Exercise BRIGHT STAR 81 provided an excellent vehicle to demonstrate the United States capability to project a Joint Task Force in SWA. The exercise tested the RDJTF's capability to plan for deployments OCONUS. It improved/tested staff procedures between the staffs of RDJTF, MAC, SAC, TAC, and the joint staffs of USCINCRED, USCINCEUR and JCS. This highly successful exercise stands as testimony of our capability for deploying selected Army and Air Forces to SWA.

(U) Although the exercise was successful in every way, there were many significant lessons learned; the most important lessons are as follows:

U a. ~~(C)~~ Enroute Staging Bases - There were insufficient enroute staging bases available. The entire deployment (except one fighter support

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b. (U) Refueling for MAC Aircraft - No fuel was available at Cairo-West for MAC missions. The constraint of having to land at Cairo West with sufficient fuel to recover at a stage location created most of the deployment routing problems. This severely limited our operating range and degraded allowable cargo loads. Recommend negotiation for refueling MAC aircraft have high priority in future deployments.

U c. ~~(C)~~ Deployment Planning - Exercise deployment planning was accomplished late. This exercise was an add-on to the annual schedule and was not formally approved until late in the JCS established planning cycle. Finite planning did not take place until host nation approval and return of the RDJTF predeployment team. Determination and sourcing of participating

forces and, subsequently, their airlift deployment requirements were all accomplished in a compressed time frame. This led to late development of the airlift flow and all associated MAC actions regarding ALCE sourcing, sizing and logistics support, aircrew/airframe management, diplomatic clearance requests for overflight/landing rights, and customs support. Accomplishment of milestones established in JCSM 437-79, the JCS-directed and JCS-coordinated exercise program, should be followed, when possible, in order to effectively plan and execute future deployments.

U d. ~~(C)~~ RDJTF FM Communications - Due to the nature, composition and size of the exercise force, a need existed for the establishment of an RDJTF FM Command/Safety Net and an OPFOR Control Net. Communications equipment limitations provided only for a combined Command/OPFOR Net. Participating units did not possess sufficient communications equipment for establishing these nets. The arrangement was less than satisfactory. Recommend that the requirement for RDJTF FM communications capability be realistically considered in future exercise planning.

U e. ~~(C)~~ Desert Uniform - The present camouflage uniform does not provide sufficient concealment in the desert. Consideration should be given to developing a reversible camouflage uniform. Recommend that efforts to produce/procure a suitable desert uniform be continued.

U f. ~~(C)~~ Identification of Communications Support Units for HQ RDJTF - Late identification of communications support units caused some difficulties during initial stages of the exercise. Although SHF Satcom reliability was generally outstanding, problems were encountered on the Narrowband Secure Terminal (NBST) in setting correct levels and alignment of echo suppressors. For the HF DCS entry, it was determined that Nea Makri Autovon switchboard was not compatible with our equipment. As adjustments were made, the HF trunk improved to 100 percent reliability. A frequency system (AN/TRQ/35) would probably have reduced the initial outages on the HF trunk. Had comm support units been identified earlier, TSR/TSO's could have been issued in a timely manner thus surfacing problems prior to STARTEX. Recommend that communications support units for HQ RDJTF be identified at least thirty days prior to STARTEX and a frequency management system (AN/TRQ-35) be utilized whenever HF DCS entry is being operated.

U g. ~~(C)~~ Desert Environment Impact on Communications Equipment - While relatively ideal (temperatures range mid-fifties to low-eighties) desert conditions existed during the exercise, equipment malfunctions, which can be attributable to sand, did occur. Teletype machines were particularly susceptible to blowing sand and dust and should not be operated except in shelters with environmental control units and extra external air filters. Recommend that expando shelters or regular comm center vans be used for teletype equipment operations to minimize malfunctions.

U h. ~~(C)~~ Effect of Desert Operations on Helicopters - extensive wear on the main/tail rotor blade tip caps was a significant problem during the exercise. This was particularly true for the UH-60 Blackhawks as loose desert sand blasted the blades and blade tips during hovering, takeoff/landing, and

slingload operations. Additionally, the UH-60 experienced an above average failure rate in APU's due to sand ingestion and a higher than expected tire failure rate from landing on lava rocks which were imbedded in the sand. The particle separator on the OH-58 functioned very effectively in preventing excessive engine turbine blade wear; a similar modification should be considered for the AH-1's. Sand also caused increased stoppage of the Cobra's .20mm weapon system. Recommend that appropriate project managers assist in determining corrective/preventative measures for the problem areas identified above.

D. (U) LOGISTICS DIRECTORATE (J4)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The Director for Logistics (J4) is an Army Colonel, with an Air Force Colonel as Deputy. The Staff is organized into Logistics and Transportation Support Divisions, the Civil Engineering Office, and a central administrative support section. Personnel began reporting for duty 15 February 1980, and the Directorate was fully manned by September 1980.

(U) The Directorate is composed of 14 officers and four enlisted persons representing all four Military Services. One Army Medical Services Officer and one HQ Military Airlift Command Liaison Officer (MACLO) are attached. Service representation is:

Army -	7 officers	1 enlisted
USAF -	5 officers	2 enlisted
Navy -	3 officers	
USMC -	1 officer	1 enlisted

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

U ~~(C)~~ During 1980 the main pursuits of the J4 Directorate were exercises and the development of two OPLANS, 1001-81 and 1003-81. Efforts expended on these plans surfaced many logistics and transportation deficiencies that needed considerable work if the RDJTF was to be capable of rapidly projecting a credible fighting force seven or eight thousand air miles from the CONUS supply base.

(U) In recognition of the extremely limited numbers of personnel on the staff as a whole, and the J-4 in particular, COMRDJTF provided his basic logistics philosophy early:

a. (U) Go with minimum essential

b. (U) Get all the help we can

c. (U) Leave nothing in the "too hard" box

d. (U) Keep problems visible and working

e. (U) Delegate to maximum extent feasible (while retaining directive authority)

f. (U) Help components to maximum extent possible

(U) These tenets have influenced all concepts development and planning activities during our first year of effort.

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(U) Development of the Logistics Annex (Annex D) to OPLAN 1001-81 (initially OPORD 0001) began in April 1980 and continued through the end of the year. The Phase I TPFDD Refinement Conference was held in early September. This plan was the headquarters' first major planning effort and its first exposure to the Joint Operations Planning System (JOPS). New ground was broken (or forgotten lessons relearned) at every step, particularly in joint logistics doctrine, Service responsibilities, and inter-Service coordination. Two officers devoted full time to this effort, frequently augmented by the entire Directorate Staff. Many problems were met during this initial effort at using the JOPS in detailed logistics planning, but after close staff coordination and many iterations, difficulties in this planning process were overcome. These planning efforts provided valuable experience in development of time-sensitive and highly classified contingency plans, and highlighted the handicaps generated by using compartmented planning cells (and thus precluding full coordination).

(U) Planning for OPLAN 1003-81 began in September 1980 and continued through the end of the year. Although larger and more complex than 1001, the 1003 effort was greatly facilitated by the lessons learned and the personal contacts made during the earlier effort. An expanded account of planning accomplishments (both 1001 and 1003) can be found in the J-5 section of this history.

(U) Logistics Concept

(U) Much Logistics Support Division effort was focused during the year on development and publication of a "Logistics Concept in Support of RDJTF". (This has been a joint effort by RDJTF and logisticians from the HQ USREDCOM Staff.)

U

~~(C)~~ The purpose of the Log Support Concept document is to provide a basis and guideline for joint planning relative to the rapid deployment and sustainment of the RDJTF in the exceedingly austere environment of SW Asia. The concept is intended to be flexible and readily adaptable to any plan and any force mix that might be called upon to respond in such an environment. Throughout the document, emphasis has been placed on initiatives to enhance rapid deployment, sustainability, effectiveness, efficiency, and economy (in a force sense as well as in a financial sense).

(U) The document is a broad, omnibus concept with utility at all planning levels. It has assisted planners in developing more detailed logistical plans and procedures and has aided in a smoother implementation and execution of current and evolving logistical options.

(U) Five sequential drafts of the document were developed and published during 1980 with the last version dated 30 September. To reflect the dynamic nature of the joint planning world, there are provisions for another update during the next 6 months, based upon inputs from all interested headquarters and activities. The Log Concept provides a joint forum through which logistics planners can develop innovative and creative concepts outside the constraints of formal OPLAN preparation, JCS publications changes, etc.

(U) JSCP Planning Factors

U ~~(C)~~ Early in the planning effort our logisticians recognized wide and unexplained variations in Military Service resupply planning factors. Also noted was the absence of factors specifically tailored to the SW Asia theater. The variations and lack of a theater multiplier have influenced RDJTF planning efforts and caused the validity of some resupply tonnages to be questioned. (Inaccurate estimates of tonnages to be moved could have drastic impact on strategic and intra-theater lift requirements.) At RDJTF request, JCS has tasked the Services to review and refine their planning factors (by class of supply) for SW Asia and to undertake a reassessment of logistics and operational concepts for this area of the world. A proposal has been made to hold a Joint planning conference to resolve concept and procedural differences among the Services; some real, substantive, and tangible results of this focus are already in evidence.

(U) Supply Committee

(U) The RDJTF Supply Committee, a problem-solving outgrowth of the July 1980 Logistics Conference and the resultant Log Concept document, is chaired by the Director for Logistics and consists of members from components, Services, supporting CINCS/commands and other agencies. It meets as required and provides a forum for coordination and problem identification/resolution, as well as updating the Log Concept document. Issues addressed include logistics communication and ADP support, Initial Preplanned Supply Support (IPSS), OPLAN supply planning problems, graves registration, Inter-Service/Cross-Service (IS/CS) support, theater stockage objectives, emergency resupply from supporting CINCs, and prepositioning.

(U) Petroleum Support Requirements

(U) RDJ4 identified, compiled and disseminated OPLAN 1003-81 petroleum requirements (in JOA) during the initial phases of the planning cycle to enable the supporting agencies and activities to gage support requirements, including the force structure required to meet IS/CS needs, and assess overall supportability. The overall concept for POL support of the RDJTF in SWA has also been developed and promulgated for further refinement.

(U) Desert Camouflage Fatigue Uniform

(U) RDJ4 has identified a critical need for expedited procurement of desert camouflage fatigues for all land-based Rapid Deployment Forces. This office has initiated action with USAF, USMC, and the USN to follow the Army's lead in identifying requirements and getting them on order.

(U) Logistics Communication/Automatic Data Processing (LC/ADP) Concept

(U) The LC/ADP Concept was initiated in recognition of potential equipment shortfalls and coordination problems between logisticians and communicators. It has been incorporated into the Log Concept document, after much confusion arose in our first year of planning and exercising. The concept was developed under the purview of the RDJTF Supply Committee and in coordination

with the USREDCOM Logistics and Communications staffs. The purpose of this concept is to provide a Joint LC/ADP blueprint that provides a common ground, a general guide, and a point of departure for logisticians and communicators to identify and understand mutual requirements for SWA-Region planning purposes. LC/ADP requirements were clearly stated in the Joint Logistics Review Board Report on the Vietnam War (1971), Communications monograph.

(U) Transportation

(U) Force sustainment via all modes of transportation (both strategic and intra-theater lift) has been and is still a prime concern. Considerable strides have been made to enhance the strategic movement of forces vital to the success of RDJTF plans, and intra-theater distribution unknowns have largely become working problems areas.

(U) Strategic Airlift Enhancement

U ~~(C)~~ RDJTF planning efforts have helped to quantify requirements and strengthen justification for strategic airlift enhancement programs. Progress is currently underway with the improved C-5A wing, the C-141B stretch program the KC-10 tanker, and the development of requirements for a new CX Transport. Efforts of this Division have supported each of these valuable programs.

(U) Intra-theater Airlift

U ~~(C)~~ RDJ4 planning efforts have further reinforced Service needs for the SL-7 Rapid/Surge Force Program (T-AKRX) which involves the purchase and subsequent conversion to a RO/RO configuration of eight existing 33-knot civilian containerships. These ships, once converted, could be selectively prepositioned at CONUS SPOE's and partially crewed to provide a rapid response capability. They will provide a considerable enhancement in speed alone, averaging up to 25 knots to the SWA-Region.

(U) Intra-theater Sealift

U ~~(S)~~ In the course of more detailed planning and exercising, considerable effort has been directed toward identification of intra-theater sealift capabilities and requirements. This is a soft area in logistics supportability within the Arabian Gulf scenario to date. To provide a single point of focus for this essential factor, the Military Sealift Command was tasked to provide intra-theater sealift within the JOA. MSC has undertaken this responsibility and is in process of identifying assets, in conjunction with on-going efforts by planners to refine requirements.

(U) Near Term Prepositioning Ships (NTPS)

U ~~(S)~~ In August 1979 The Secretary of Defense (SECDEF) directed the Navy to establish a Maritime Prepositioning Ship Program (MPS) and to acquire sufficient commercial type ships to preposition three specially organized Marine Amphibious Brigades (MAB) with specified schedules and funding guidelines. To provide an interim (Real World...NOW) prepositioning response capability which could be on station in the Indian Ocean in the near term, the

1980. This was accomplished, on schedule, representing a tangible and quite credible U.S. commitment to any interested party.

U ~~(C)~~ Upon direction from JCS, CINCPAC, in conjunction with its component and supporting forces, and the RDJTF developed an NTPS concept of operations and maintenance. By late summer the NTPS fleet was prepositioned at Diego Garcia (three RO/RO and two breakbulk ships, one water tanker, and one POL tanker), thereby significantly enhancing RDJTF flexibility and sustainability until Sea LOC establishment.

(U) Water

U ~~(C)~~ The RDJTF J4 has developed a concept of operations for water support of RDJTF in SWA-Region and identified a need to further refine water doctrine and concepts for RDJTF employment in SWA. The Army has been designated DOD Executive Agent for land based water resources, and working groups have been established to develop plans for equipment procurement and a concept of operations for water support of RDJTF in SW Asia. Given current programs, water as a limiting factor in sustainment planning should not be a issue by March 1982.

(U) Host Nation Support

U ~~(C)~~ Identifing locations and functional areas for Host Nation Support of the RDJTF resulted in the establishment of a DOD working group to analyze RDJTF HNS requirements in preparation for negotiating agreements with countries in SWA. J4E participated in OJCS-J4 sponsored conferences to identify and refine Southwest Asia military construction programs in support of the RDJTF, and coordinated development of procedures for the preparation of civil engineer support plans for RDJTF OPLANs 1001-81 and 1003-81.

(U) During 1980, J4 participated in two OCONUS Exercises during 1980, a combined FTX with the Egyptians at Cairo West (Bright Star), and a joint communications exercise in Oman (Accurate Test). The exercise schedule has been fully discussed in the J3 section of this history.

(U) Commander Mideast Forces (COMIDEASTFOR)

U ~~(S)~~ Since August 1980, the Logistics Directorate has maintained an officer on continuous temporary duty (90-day rotation) in the Arabian Gulf area aboard the COMIDEASTFOR flagship. This officer has constituted the Logistics element of the forward-deployed RDJTF Staff. The mission of the team of which this individual is a part has been to obtain logistics intelligence and area familiarization, establish an interface and develop working procedures with the COMIDEASTFOR Staff, and provide a nucleus for the forward RDJTF HQ in event of contingency. (Restricted travel in the theater has somewhat limited the opportunity for intelligence-gathering and familiarization.)

(U) Manpower/Joint Manning Plan

(U) Staff Participation in exercise Positive Leap identified the requirement for augmentation positions to provide adequate manning for the headquarters and support components.

(U) Refinement of permanent and augmentation positions continued as an on-going project during the year. Exercise Gallant Knight, combined with an In-Progress Review, provided further refinement of additional personnel positions required to properly execute all task assignments and responsibilities.

(U) Further review of the HQ RDJTF manning posture was directed due to a change of emphasis from potential world-wide employment to primarily focusing on planning responsibility for the SWA-Region.

(U) Special augmentation was requested and provided from USREDCOM for Exercise Gallant Knight 81 to ensure planning continued for real-world OPLANs 1001 and 1003 while most of the staff was deployed to the exercise location at Ft. Bragg, N.C.

(U) During late December, a USREDCOM/JDA/HQ RDJTF organization and manpower study group conducted preliminary meetings to establish parameters for the working groups and chairmen during January 1981. More details on these actions are provided in the J-1 section of this history.

(U) Environmental Problems Associated with SWA Operations

(U) To determine specific medical problems associated with operations in the SWA area, the Host Research Division, U.S. Army Research Institute of Environmental Medicine was requested to provide results of tests conducted on personnel under hot weather conditions. The Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency was requested to provide current health data on the Southwest Asia region. From information received, a report was prepared and distributed to RDJTF Staff and Component Commanders that discussed effects of heat, acclimatization to heat, water replacement requirements, clothing and equipment, mosquito and flyborne diseases, and patient evacuation.

(U) Current Medical Information

(U) To ensure information on health and environmental factors relative to the designated area of operations was available to the RDJTF Staff and Component Commanders, five separate reports were prepared and distributed. The source documents for each report were provided by the U.S. Army Medical Intelligence and Information Agency.

(U) Medical Support

(U) Through the efforts of OJCS J4 and USREDCOM Command Surgeon the health services required to support the RDJTF were identified. These efforts resulted in a series of meetings with Service Medical Departments and culminated with a Medical Plans Conference convened at HQ USREDCOM. From the

meetings and the conference, near-term and long-term actions were identified that could be taken to improve the medical support structure for the RDJTF.

(U) Distinguished Visitors

(U) During the period, visits were made by Lt Gen Paul W. Meyers, USAF, MC Surgeon General, U.S. Air Force and the Honorable John H. Moxley III, M.D., Assistant Secretary of Defense, Health Affairs.

(U) Major Exercise Participation

(U) Gallant Knight was the first exercise that afforded the RDJTF Office of the Surgeon the opportunity to participate. During the exercise, scenario problems were introduced that required the efforts of the Joint Medical Regulating Office (JMRO), Joint Military Blood Program Office (JMBPO) and the Surgeon Staff in coordinating and directing medical support activities for the component Services. As a result of this exercise, additional detailed guidance will be provided the JMRO, JMBPO, and component Services during future exercises. JRX Bright Star 81, a combined exercise with Egyptian Armed Forces and a selected U.S. Army and U.S. Air Force Task Force, was conducted at Cairo West Airbase, Egypt during November. Medically, the exercise was supported by a U.S. Air Transportable Clinic (ATC) and a U.S. Army (Unit Medical Support) Medical platoon. There were no serious health problems encountered during the exercise and the medical support available was adequate. Medically, the exercise reinforced the requirement for command emphasis on field sanitation and preventive medicine functions in a hot, dry environment.

(U) Personnel Augmentation Requirements

(U) The personnel requirements to adequately staff the RDJTF Office of the Surgeon, establish the Joint Medical Regulating Office, and the Joint Military Blood Program Office have been identified and documented.

E. (U) PLANS DIRECTORATE (J5)

1. (U) Mission and Organiation

(U) The J5, a Navy Captain, has staff responsibility for the preparation and maintenance of operations orders, plans and concept plans for Southwest Asia. Advises the Commander on matters relating to command policy, missions, functions responsibilities for the joint deployment, employment and redeployment of RDF forces. Provides the staff focal point to review, analyze and provide recommendations for development and/or tasking documents pertaining to policy, command relationships, requirements and doctrine development to include techniques for joint deployment, employment and redeployment of RDF forces.

(U) The Plans Division is responsible for preparing, coordinating and maintaining operations orders, plans and concept plans for the Southwest Asia region. It monitors events and conducts studies of the area to identify trends and other factors which affect current plans and requirements for new initiatives. Monitor the Joint Exercise Program to insure RDF exercises are consistent with OPORD/OPLANS. Establish techniques for joint deployment, employments and redeployment of RDF forces. Review component supporting plans for employment with RDF and provide personnel for the forward deployed element.

(U) The Policy Branch is responsible for matters relating to command policy, missions, functions, responsibilities, requirements and doctrine development to include crises planning and assessment of National Security Council/Joint Chiefs of Staff actions, (thru the Washington Liaison Office) pertaining to Southwest Asia. Service component liaison when committed, and automated data systems support. Provides the Commander with political assessments, trip preparation, policy review and all other matters relating to J5 functions. The branch maintains and presents the RDJTF command brief.

(U) The Administrative Branch provides administrative support to the J5 Directorate to include filing, correspondence preparation, graphic support and personnel administration. The J5 Administrative/Executive Officer acts as a special assistant to the J5 and performs special projects as directed by the Director J5.

(U) The original Plans and Policy Directorate, established on 1 Mar 80, was reorganized on 11 Aug 80. The reorganization was accomplished to meet the functional responsibilities of the Plans and Policy Directorate as evolved during the first five months of operation and to adhere to the terms of reference approved by SECDEF on 4 Aug 80. The reorganization deleted the Middle East/Europe Branch, the American/Caribbean/Atlantic Branch and the Southeast/Northeast/Pacific Branch. A Current Plans Branch, a Plans/Exercise Branch and an Administrative Branch were established in Lieu of the branches listed in the JMP dated 1 March 1980.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Deployment planning in support of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (JCS).

U a. ~~(C)~~ OPLAN 1001-81 - (b)1.4 a

U ~~(S)~~ On 18 March 1980, a Planning Group was formed and directed to review and/or rewrite JCS OPORD 001 and to proceed in developing an Operation Concept Order in order to preclude Soviets easy access to the Persian Gulf. The JCS was provided an initial brief on 6 April and selected component personnel were briefed 10-11 April. Draft OPORD 0001 was forwarded to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, components and planning elements in support of RDJTF on 2 May for informal review. Informal comments on the draft OPORD were received during the latter part of May and early June and were incorporated as appropriate.

U ~~(S)~~ On 1 August the JCS OPDEP's were briefed on OPORD 0001 and draft OPORD dated 31 July 80 was distributed to the CINC's, Services, Components, and forces in support of RDJTF. OPORD 0001 was briefed the Joint Chiefs of Staff on 20 August, PACOM on 22 August, and USEUCOM on 25 August. During briefings of OPORD 0001 to the Unified/Specified Commands and the JCS, the following deficiencies were identified:

(b)1.4 a

(U) These deficiencies were not included in OPORD 0001 but would be addressed in subsequent OPORD's. Completion of OPORD 0001 without those major changes was recommended because it would serve as a base for analysis of a balanced force in determining logistical supportability and sustainability for follow-on OPORD's in the critical areas of communications, water, POL, and ammunition; established airlift/sealift requirements for the size force and highlighted the need for enhanced lift capabilities to support other OPORD's; and would complete the JOPS planning cycle culminating in an executable OPORD. Comments from all commands were forwarded with recommended action to the JCS on 22 September. JCS message of 22 October[15] stated that OPORD 0001 formal comments by the JCS would be completed no later than 1 December. During the review process at the JCS, all four services and the J4 recommended that OPORD 0001 not be processed in accordance with JOPS. As a result, 340 comments from the Services, agencies, and JCS/J4 were informally provided to this Headquarters by the JCS for consideration and incorporation in the OPORD as appropriate. It was determined at this time that the OPORD would be published and submitted to the JCS

15. JCS Message 221916Z October 1980.

as COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81 by 15 February 1981 with the completed TPFDL. The OPLAN provides for the deployment of a balanced, joint US military force to

(b)1.4 a

(U) If accepted by the JCS for review IAW JOPS, it is expected that the results of the review by the Services will be forwarded to the JCS in April 1981.

U b. ~~(C)~~ OPLAN 1002-81 - (b)1.4 a

(b)1.4 a

U ~~(C)~~ During the review of OPORD 0001 in April/May 1980 and in view of the rapidly changing international situation the need to develop at least two more options to OPORD 0001 was identified. These were OPORD 0001A, (b)1.4 a basing, and OPORD 0001B, (b)1.4 a Planning for OPORD's 0001A and 0001B was interrupted during the time frame May through August pending completion of OPORD 0001.

U ~~(S)~~ In September, OPORD 0001A was re-designated OPORD 0002 and the Headquarters commenced drafting planning guidance and the concept of Operation/Mission was defined. JCS message of 26 September [16] as revised by JCS message 25 October [17] shifted the planning focus to JCS Options 1 and 2. Consequently, this higher priority and shortage of planners and ADP software support suspended efforts on OPORD 0002. Upon receipt of the JCS comments on OPLAN 1001-81 planning will resume on development of OPLAN 1002-81. This effort when completed will satisfy the intra-regional planning requirement of JSCP FY 81. OPLAN 1002-81 will include a revised mission statement, an interdiction capability, the 7th MAB and NTPS shipping, and basing exclusive of KUWAIT.

c. U ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1003-81 - (b)1.4a

U ~~(S)~~ In response to RDJTF message of 10 September, [18] JCS responded with a message on 26 September [19] which provided planning guidance and planning factors with two options. RDJTF hosted an action officer planning conference on 9 October and briefed component AO's concerning the JCS options. After comprehensive study, COMRDJTF briefed the OPDEPs on 15 October concerning planning guidance and Options 1 and 2 and recommended consolidation of JCS Options 1 and 2 to form an alternative option subsequently designated OPLAN 1003-81 and tabled 25 recommended changes to the planning guidance. On 25 October [17] JCS approved 18 recommendations, 14 of which concerned planning factors and deferred decision on seven of the twenty-one planning factor changes proposed by COMRDJTF for OPLAN 1003-81. Deferred planning factors were:

16. JCS Message 262336Z September 1980
17. JCS Message 251727Z October 1980
18. COMRDJTF Message 102200Z September 1980
19. JCS Message 262336Z September 1980

- Responsibility of support for RDJTF Forces outside of JOA
- Medical Evacuation Policy
- Priority to RDJTF for Strategic Lift
- Host Nation Support
-
-
-

(b)1.4 b

RDJTF called a planner's conference at Ft Bragg NC, 27-29 October and published COMRDJTF Planning Guidance/Component Tasking and milestones in a message on 4 November [20] with inputs from Component Commanders due to COMRDJTF not later than 21 November. To augment the planning effort the Chief of Staff, U.S. Army provided nine TDY personnel; seven officers were provided for up to sixty days, and two officers were provided until 7 November. Additionally, five officers, one TACAIR and four communications officers, were provided by USREDCOM.

U ~~(S)~~ In response to COMRDJTF tasking, XVIII Airborne Corps planners provided a concept briefing to COMRDJTF on OPLAN 1003-81 19 November. COMRDJTF approved the concept, provided that the sustainability and communications capability of the force could be accomplished. Concepts of Operations for the remaining component/supporting commands were scheduled to be received by message at RDJTF HQ on 21 November. Due to Exercise "PROUD SPIRIT," the Component/Supporting commanders had difficulty in obtaining adequate computer support and COMRDAFFOR on 8 November [21] stated that all milestones, especially TPFDL submission, could not be met by 21 November. COMRDJTF emphasized the essentiality of providing a concept of operation by 21 November and requested that component/supporting commands advise COMRDJTF of any inability to meet milestones. The COMRDJTF Concept brief was presented to USREDCOM on 24 November and to the OPSDEPs on 26 November. In addition, revised milestones were briefed and approved by the OPSDEPs. Component/supporting commands' concepts were received and the Headquarters commenced study to determine adequacy and feasibility of the proposed concepts.

U ~~(S)~~ OPLAN 1003-81 concept of Operations was briefed to the JCS on 12 December. Inferred guidance from the JCS was to proceed with the development of the OPLAN. CJCS requested COMRDJTF assessment statements for denial of

(b)1.4 a, b, d

to the CJCS on 16 December. The Chairman requested that an assessment of our assumptions regarding Saudi Arabian facilities and Host Nation Support be obtained from CHUSMTM during his visit to the RDJTF on 17 December. CHUSMTM was supportive of the planning effort and suggested that planning continue so that a "baseline" case could be developed that would offer a means by which excursions can better be judged and evaluated. A personal message [22] was sent to CJCS forwarding CHUSMTM's assessment with appropriate comments by USCINCRED and COMRDJTF.

20. COMRJDTF Message 042200Z November 1980
21. COMRDAFFOR Message 081700Z November 1980
22. COMRDJTF Message 182225Z December 1980

U ~~(S)~~ On 29 December[23] the JCS provided additional guidance to COMRDJTF and clarified the seven planning factors which had been deferred by the JCS. In order to address a more constrained basing option, JCS directed that a concurrent planning cell be established with augmentation from component/supporting commands. A draft of OPLAN 1003-81 will be forwarded to the JCS on 6 April 81 which provides for the deployment of a joint US military force to the Southwest Asia region to conduct military operations to (b)1.4 a

(b)1.4 a

(U) JOPS Volume I, dated 7 October 1980, provided Plan Identification Number block of 1000-1999 for COMRDJTF, and on 19 December all OPORDs were redesignated OPLANS to conform with JSCP FY 81 guidance and were redesignated with corresponding numbers.

(U) Deployment Planning in Support of USCINCEUR, USCINCSO, CINCLANT, and CINCPAC.

a. (U) In addition to responding to JCS tasking, various OPLANs and CONPLANs were reviewed in order to determine RDJTF tasking and requirements for supporting plans. The following plans were reviewed: USCINCEUR OPLANs 4221, 4224, 4274, CONPLAN 4338, USCINCSO OPLAN 6501, CONPLAN 6100, CINCLANT CONPLANs 2348, 2360, 2362, 2371, 2373, CINCPAC OPLAN 5027 and CONPLANs 5020 and 5092.

b. (U) The out-of-cycle change to JSCP FY 81 Vol I tasked RDJTF for the following plans:

(b)1.4 a

23. JCS Message 292152Z December 1980

F. (U) COMMUNICATIONS-ELECTRONICS (C-E) DIRECTORATE (J6)

1. (U) Mission and Organization

(U) The directorate has overall staff responsibility for C-E aspects of the command. The Director, an Army Colonel, advises the COMRDJTF and staff on all C-E matters, prepares and reviews C-E policies, programs, and plans, and coordinates and directs the employment of all C-E facilities to support HQ RDJTF. The RDJ6 operates a C-E management facility on a 24 hour basis for the deployed RDJTF and exercises staff supervision of all communications support elements assigned or attached. The Director conducts and coordinates radio frequency engineering and management within the RDJTF and is responsible for the development of policies and procedures for communications security (COMSEC), the use of codes and authentication systems, and keying materials. Communications support of HQ RDJTF is provided on a day-to-day basis and communications plans and activities are coordinated with the JCS, USREDCOM, the NCA assigned subordinate forces and other joint and national force commanders.

a. (U) Plans and Operations Division (RDJ6-O).

(U) RDJ6-O is responsible for the preparation and review of C-E annexes, operating instructions, and procedures to support exercises and contingency operations of the command. The Chief develops policy and establishes priorities for the employment of C-E facilities, provides the operational direction to assigned and attached communications support elements, and manages the communications operations status center on a 24-hour basis when the RDJTF is deployed. The division also keeps the COMRDJTF and staff advised on the status of communications throughout the command. Manning within this division consists of four officers and five enlisted personnel.

b. (U) Systems Engineering Division (RDJ6-E).

(U) RDJ6-E is responsible for the development of detailed system engineering specifications and facility layouts required to support the command. The division determines radio and wire systems requirements, develops the tactical automatic switching scheme and teletype network requirements, and manages the radio frequency spectrum for the command. The Chief, RDJ6-E develops COMSEC policy, monitors COMSEC practices, and provides technical expertise on communications center terminals and relay operations for the command. Manning within this division consists of four officers and two enlisted personnel.

(U) The J-6 Directorate was formed and originally manned to support an operational headquarters in the field. The Joint Manpower Program of 8 officers and 7 enlisted (3 of the enlisted are administrative specialists) in inadequate to fully support an operational headquarters and totally unsatisfactorily to conduct the extensive communications planning for the RDJTF HQs, four component force HQs and the JUWTF HQs. Several manpower packages have been submitted to RDJ1 requesting relief in the communications planning, automatic switch network engineering, frequency management and communications operations areas in order to provide adequate personnel

requirements to satisfactorily conduct the extensive overall communications planning efforts which cover the entire spectrum of communications systems, i.e. wideband terrestrial systems, HF radio, automatic telephone switching, UHF and SHF satellites, and high speed data systems. The requested manning increases range from 10 personnel increase for day-to-day planning, to 60 additional personnel to support a unified command in the ME/SWA area.

2. (U) Plans and Exercises

(U) Plans

a. (U) COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81

(U) Annex K to COMRDJTF OPLAN 1001-81 was completed on schedule. The plan was developed with the guidance that communications equipment for the plan was in the DOD inventory or would be available within six months of when the plan was being developed. Coordination is continuing with USCINCEUR and CINCPAC for radio frequency assignments in the joint objective area. RDJTF and RDAFFOR wideband circuit requirements are being coordinated with the Electromagnetic Compatibility Analysis Center (ECAC) for proper circuit analysis and frequency engineering.

b. (U) COMRDJTF OPLAN 1003-81

(U) JCS Msg 262336Z Sep 80 initiated C-E planning for Annex K to OPLAN 1003-81. All JCS planning factors were evaluated as they relate to C-E requirements. On 15 October 1980, COMRDJTF briefed the OPSDEPS and recommended changes to the JCS planning guidance. The JCS responded with a 251722Z Oct 80 message which approved eighteen of the RDJTF recommended changes. This JCS message approving the RDJTF concept for 1003 planning marked the beginning of the development of Annex K to 1003-81.

(U) To assist in the development of Annex K, the RDJTF J6 staff was augmented with four Lieutenant Colonel communication staff officers from USREDCOM and two from Fort Gordon, GA.

(U) A joint 1003-81 C-E planning conference was conducted with the component C-E elements during the Gallant Knight Exercise at Fort Bragg, NC during 27-29 Oct 80. During this conference, the joint C-E concept, planning factors and considerations impacting on the total C-E planning were discussed. The components' informal inputs to the C-E planning milestones were considered. The results of this conference were refined and considered in the RDJTF milestones and component and supporting command taskings published in COMRDJTF message 042200Z Nov 80.

(U) In mid-November 1980, planners from XVIII Abn Corps (ARFOR), the RDAFFOR and supporting commands briefed their concept of operations and milestones. These component concepts were incorporated into a refined RDJTF concept and milestones which were briefed to the OPSDEPS on 26 Nov 80. The OPSDEPS approved the concept and milestones as briefed and refinement of OPLAN 1003-81 continued.

(U) JCSE Enhancement

(U) The Joint Communications Support Element (JCSE) has been designated to provide communications support for the deployed RDJTF and JUWTF HQs. The JCSE is inadequately manned and equipped to presently carry out this tasking. In Jan 1980, USREDCOM submitted the first proposal to the JCS for enhancement of the JCSE to support the RDJTF and JUWTF HQs. In June 1980, the JCS approved a modified concept of the JCSE Enhancement (JCS Msg 242110Z Jun 80). This 24 June 1980 concept tasks the JCSE to provide both ends of satellite communication links between RDJTF, JUWTF, the component HQs (less Navy) and subordinate JUWTF HQs (less NSWTG); one end of HF radio links to the 4 component HQs and the DCS; both ends of HF radio and terrestrial system between RDJTF and JUWTF HQs, and any additional communications support at the RDJTF and JUWTF HQs. The JCSE will not provide support to component HQS other than that stated; the components will install both ends of terrestrial wideband multichannel systems to the RDJTF HQ, and provide all other communications support at the component HQs. Actions are ongoing to provide the required equipment and personnel to support this concept.

(U) Exercises

a. (U) POSITIVE LEAP 80

(U) Exercise POSTIVE LEAP 80 was a three-phase exercise conducted at Ft Bragg, NC during April, May and June 1980. RDJTF J6 personnel were involved in all three phases and received invaluable experience for future operations. Planners worked with RCJ6 communicators to prepare a detailed Annex K to support the exercise. RDJ6 personnel were involved in the day-to-day operational activities of the Systems Control Facility (SYSCON) which controlled support communications as well as realtime planning in reaction to JECG scenario-related actions.

(U) Numerous communications-related areas were identified as requiring increased command attention. Shortfalls were highlighted for resolution in future OPLAN/CONPLAN(S).

b. (U) RAPID DELTA ALPHA

(U) On 23 May 1980 a communications exercise, Rapid Delta Alpha, was conducted to select an airborne platform suitable to meet COMRDJTF command aircraft requirements. Candidate aircrafts consisted of the Airborne Battlefield Command and Control Center (ABCCC), the E-3A Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS), and the SAC Airborne Command Post (EC-135C). Each aircraft was evaluated and the EC-135C was recommended as the aircraft which could best support the COMRDJTF. Significant findings which arose during the evaluation process are identified below:

(1) (U) The EC-135C met most of the deployment needs of the RDJTF. There was sufficient space to accommodate the Battle Staff and communications connectivity to all desired terminals was achieved.

(2) (U) A secure enroute communications package (SECOMP) consisting of UHF radio with NESTOR security device was installed for the test and worked satisfactorily. As a result of this test, a SECOMP was placed on the EC-135C for all subsequent RDJTF exercises for air-air and air-ground secure communications.

(3) (U) It was determined the aircraft required UHF satellite voice capability to provide long range secure voice aboard the aircraft. As a result, the AN/WSC-3 with Parkhill (KY-65) device was later tested and approved for use on the EC-135C for satellite secure voice communications.

(4) (U) The E-3A would require extensive modifications to provide the necessary communications connectivity for command and control (C3) by the RDJTF Battle Staff during deployment operations. The aircraft does, however, complement the RDJTF by executing its normal missions and integrating into the overall C2 structure of the deploying RDJTF.

(5) (U) The ABCCC is an ideal C2 platform once in the objective area due to its communications capability. The aircraft, however, is not optimized for the deployment role due to its lack of speed and staff

accommodations. To accomplish the RDJTF C2 mission, more positions would be required, and this would have a major impact on normal ABCCC Battle Staff operations during actual employment.

c. (U) GALLANT KNIGHT 81

(U) RDJ6's participation in JRX Gallant Knight 81 at Ft Bragg, NC, from 21 - 30 Oct 80 was extensive. RDJTF J6 personnel assisted USREDCOM J6 in planning and establishing C-E systems and procedures supporting the CPX, prepared a 131 page Annex K to support CPX scenario operations and an FTX operation at Ft Stewart, GA and Hunter AAF, GA. The CPX provided a further insight into C-E problem areas disclosed during CPX Positive Leap 80 and enabled better refinement and definition of C-E shortfalls. Although the FTX portion of the exercise was cancelled before C-E support plans were completely developed, valuable experience in exercise planning was gained from the effort. After action items aided RDJ6 in the planning for other exercises and contingencies and are contained in the Gallant Knight 81 After Action Report.

d. (U) BRIGHT STAR 81

(U) Exercise Bright Star 81, a combined exercise with elements of US and Egyptian Forces, was conducted 8-27 Nov 1980, at Cairo West, Egypt. The total U.S. force committment numbered nearly 1,400 and included both air and ground units. For the period of the exercise, communications support was provided by the 3rd Combat Communications Group (CmbtCGp), Tinker AFB, OK and the 226th CmbtCGp, Alabama Air National Guard, Gadsden, AL. The 3rd CmbtCGp provided the SHF satellite communications terminal (TSC-94), the Technical Control Facility (TSC-62) and the required personnel. The 226th CmbtCGp provided two communications center vans, a message preparation facility, two weather vans, an HF radio facility (TSC-60(V)2/3), and the required personnel. The 11th Signal Brigade, Ft Huachuca, AZ, provided an HY-2 (Narrowband Subscriber Terminal) secure voice unit and two operators/technicians. The HF DCS entry was terminated by NAVCOMMSTA, Nea Makri, GR and the link operated as a 4 channel (12A9B emission) system carrying 3 AUTOVON and one teletype multiplex channels. The SHF satellite system carried 12 channels and utilized the DCS gateway station at RAF Croughton, UK.

3. (U) <u>Significant Activities</u>

(U) Word Processors

(U) In the June/July 1980 timeframe this HQ ordered several WANG word processors in an effort to upgrade administrative support within the command. The WANG processors were ordered by the staff without regard or knowledge of the TEMPEST implications associated with using electrical processors for classified material. The WANG processors were never placed into operation since they did not meet TEMPEST requirements nor did they appear on the quarterly Preferred Products List (PPL) issued by the Subcommittee on Compromising Emanations (SCOCE).

(U) VYDEC 1200-15T (10 each) were ordered and placed into operation in the September 1980 timeframe. This processor was TEMPEST approved and

appeared on the PPL. In late December 1980, the VYDEC 1200-15T processor was removed from the PPL for technical reasons which resulted in it not being approved to process nationally classified material.

(U) Intertheater Command and Control Communiations COMSEC Package

(U) In Feb 80, OJCS hosted a meeting of representatives from all unified and specified commands, service HQs and service cryptologic depots to find out the feasibility of fielding a COMSEC package that would meet contingency or crisis secure communications interoperability needs. Heretofore, each area CINC specified keymats to be used in each promulgated OPORD/OPLAN.

(U) USREDCOM was selected to be the COMSEC controlling authority for the initial seven short titles that eventually became known as the Inter-theater Command and Control Communications (C3) COMSEC Package. This package contains keylists for the KW-7 ORESTES (SI and Non-SI), KY-65/75 PARKHILL, KY-8/28/38 NESTOR, and KY57/58 VINSON security devices as well as an Operations Code and DRYAD Cipher/Authentication System.

(U) Users/holders for the Intertheater C3 Package are nominated by area CINCs and validated by USREDCOM/RDJTF to service cryptologic depots for distribution. There are approximately 400 crypto accounts involved in the Intertheater C3 Package. Copy count for the seven crypto keymats range from 500 to 1200 copies per short title.

(U) In-Garrison Communications Upgrade

(U) With the activation of HQ RDJTF in Mar 80 and the location of the staff within Bldg 1105, it became apparent that a total communications upgrade was necessary to properly support the envisioned operation.

(U) Initially, the staff was provided over-the-counter service for record telecommunications actions (both GENSER and SI) via existing USREDCOM 1928CG operated assets. In late May 80, a USAF Automatic Message Processing Equipment (AMPE) remote AUTODIN terminal was installed within the Adjutant Generals spaces of the HQ. This installation allowed for the automatic receipt of any GENSER traffic addressed to this HQ. Outgoing messages could be prepared locally on the AMPE input device but due to shortage of personnel all outgoing messages are carried to USREDCOM for processing.

(U) A five-hundered pair telephone cable expansion project was initiated by the 1928CG to satisfy HQ RDJTF and other subscribers located at the southern end of MacDill AFB. This will substantially upgrade telephone access and eliminate the overload of staff personnel using a single assigned line. This project is scheduled for completion in early 1981.

(U) Initially, the HQ was serviced by one AUTOSEVOCOM drop tied to the USREDCOM switch. Planning and acquisition were expedited and resulted in the installation of nine KY-3 secured AUTOSEVOCOM drops in the RDJTF Headquarters area.

(U) Planning and initiation of a Statement of Requirement (SOR) was begun to acquire a CY-104 installation to interconnect the RDJ2 personnel located in Bldg 1105 with RDJ2 personnel located in Bldg 501. USAF Southern Communications Area engineers tested the existing base interconnect cable to ascertain if the system would support a T1 carrier (1.554 MB) CY-104 system. Initial determination was that it would not.

(U) USREDCOM J6 then looked into acquiring a GFE microwave system to support the required interconnect; no system was currently in the AF system. GTE was contacted as to what services could be provided to accommodate the interconnect. It was determined that the existing cable did not meet commercial standards for a T1 carrier system and that replacement would cost $126K. GTE did not propose use of a microwave system due to routing over an active runway and possible interference with navigational aids already installed. At years end, this project was completely engineered and was awaiting acquisition of the bill of materials and installation scheduling.

(U) A Statement of Requirement (SOR) was initiated for the upgrade of a secure facsimile capability in the J3 Operations Center. This project will result in the installation of two KG-36/4 security devices and associated red patch panel providing the capability to use a single DACOM-412 in either exercise or real world mode without having to rekey the crypto device and manually switch circuit paths. At years end this project was engineered and awaiting an out-of-cycle CEP submission to validate the added KG-36 requirement.

(U) Closed Loop Secure Telephone Configuration for Exercises

(U) In the February/March 1980 timeframe it was determined that a specially designed secure telephone loop would be required to support Exercise Positive Leap 80 due in part to the newly formed RDJTF, the planned location of the exercise at Fort Bragg, NC, and the real-world related scenario to be used.

(U) Basically, Exercise Positive Leap was designed to test the RDJTF capability to command service components in a Southwest Asia (SWA) employment scenario with emphasis on field emplacements and tactics. As such, the exercise was conducted in the old 82nd ABN Div area and in one field location occupied by XVIII ABN Corps and the MARFOR contingent. To facilitate the interplay of the RDJTF with participating service components, the closed loop secure voice telephone system was designed.

(U) The closed loop system used KG-27 secured PCM radio links to interconnect the components and the Joint Exercise Control Group (JECG). This configuration was approved by the National COMSEC Authority (NSA) for use at the TOP SECRET level. In order to accomplish the installation of the loop and meet the MILHNBK-232 requirements for protected wireline distribution systems (PWDS), rigid standards were written and promulgated. These instructions met with much resistance since components were unaccustomed to applying the red/black criteria associated with PWDS. Moderate success was achieved with meeting established criteria during the exercise.

(U) The closed loop configuration was used again during exercise Gallant Knight 81 held at Fort Bragg, NC. The success and understanding of the installation parameters was greatly improved and well received by the components and user subscribers.

APPENDIX A

NEWS CONFERENCE BY
GENERAL BERNARD W. ROGERS
CHIEF OF STAFF, U.S. ARMY
AT THE PENTAGON
THURSDAY, JUNE 21, 1979
11:30 AM

General Rogers: This is my last day as the Chief of the Army. I have always enjoyed my association with the members of the Pentagon press corps over the past -- well, during the 13 -- almost 14 years that I've served in the Pentagon. Some of you I know better than others, and have seen more often than others. So I'm prepared today to answer what questions I can.

Before we throw it open to questions, though, just let me make one comment about a subject in which I know you are very interested, and that's the position of the Joint Chiefs of Staff relative to SALT.

I just want to underscore the statement that was made yesterday by General Jones, the Chairman of the Joint chiefs, when he pointed out that the Chiefs have, and will continue to give their advice to the President on SALT, and we will provide our advice to the Congress during the time of the ratification hearings. And that we, as Chiefs, do not intend to make any public comment on the subject prior to our testimony. That testimony will be commencing, I believe, the second week in July before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee.

Now, with that, I'm prepared.

Q: As long as you brought that up -- (Laughter)
A: George?

Q: Does that mean that you have not reached a consensus of the Chiefs for or against SALT? Or that you have reached such a consensus, but you are holding your position close to the vest until you go up to the Hill?
A: Well, it means two things: one, that the Chiefs are making a final evaluation of the final language of the Treaty, and we have all along given our advice as the language was being developed. We did that right up until the time of the Summit.

Q: But have you decided a position for or against?
A: I'm just not going to comment on that, George, until the testimony before the Committees.

Q: But isn't it true, General, that there would not be a treaty unless the Chiefs had agreed, in principle, to the provisions of the treaty? We were told by General Jones, we were assured that there would be no Treaty, there would be no signing unless there was concurrence by the Chiefs. So it's implied that the Chiefs agree.

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A: Well, Ike, you're just going to have to read it whichever way you wish to. The Chiefs offered their advice to the Secretary of Defense and to the President. The advice of the Chiefs, of course, is important to the President. He has to consider a number of other factors just besides the Chiefs' advice, as he makes his decision.

Q: General Rogers, were you quoted correctly in recent days when you were supposed to have said that the United States will go through a period of strategic inferiority in the early eighties, into the late 1980s, before we gain that superiority or that equality, rather?

A: It depends upon which column you read with respect to the accuracy of my quote. What I did say is that it is my opinion that this country is approaching a time when we will no longer have the essential equivalents which is one of the basic requirements of our U.S. strategic policy, and that time frame, in my opinion, is in the early eighties.

Q: This is the same, isn't it, General, of saying "inferiority?"

A: Well, to me if we are unable to maintain essential equivalents, it certainly, to put it another way, does not place us in a position of superiority. But there are, of course, two basic requirements for our U.S. strategic policy. Essential equivalents is one, and credible deterrents is another, and I am speaking in terms of essential equivalents.

Q: Sir, if you had your way, which would you send to the conventional forces in Europe; troops or equipment?

A: Well, Sarah, we have been taking steps with respect to the numbers of troops in our forces in Europe over the past several years. It really didn't make any sense to me that we had the authorized level of organization for our units in Europe set at two, and those here in the States at one. One being, of course, a higher level of authorization for organization with respect to the numbers of soldiers that are in the units. So we've changed that with most of our units in Europe, and as a consequence, we have placed additional soldiers in those units, to bring them up to the proper level of organization.

With respect to the numbers that we have there, under current conditions, I am fairly well satisfied that we have about the right numbers of divisions and brigades and supporting units. Supporting units, I'm talking about combat support units, not combat service support units. I am very interested in providing the soldiers with the kinds of equipment that they need on the modern battlefield.

Those equipments, those combat vehicles, are just coming into our inventory. The XM-1 tank, the first 110 will be starting to roll off the production line next February. We need that infantry fighting vehicle to accompany them. The advanced attack helicopter is necessary on the modern battlefield. The new Patriot Air Defense System. Those kinds of equipments are just now coming into our inventory. I'll be much happier when they are in the hands of the troops, particularly in Europe.

Q: General, I'd like to ask you to share your thoughts with us on manpower requirements of the All-Volunteer Force and the future of the draft.

A: Well, with respect to manpower requirements, I need to address that, both quantity and quality. And I need to break that down into Active components and Reserve components, and the Individual Ready Reserve, which is the manpower base for mobilization. There is some confusion, perhaps not among you ladies and gentlemen, but there is some confusion as to what we're talking about, because we have three packages of personnel.

First, the Active component. I am satisfied, from the standpoint of quality, that we're getting the kind of a soldier that we need in the volunteer environment to man and to maintain the equipment that we have and will have.

We have been successful on the quantity side, in the Active component, in meeting within a percentage point or two each year in the volunteer environment, our objectives from a standpoint of recruiting. We are not being as successful this year. In fact, we're running just about 90 percent of our objective. We've taken some steps to try to improve that, that take, recruiting take between now and the end of the fiscal year. I'm not too optimistic that we will meet our objective.

Now, with respect to the Reserve components. First let me go back with the Active component and just add a footnote. And that is that so long as our end strength remains around -- somewhere between 770 and 780,000, I am convinced that we can recruit the quality of the soldier that we need in those conditions.

Now, with respect to the Reserve components. Reserve component units is what I want to talk about, the divisions and the brigades and the regiments, the companies. Right now we are about 20 percent under-strength across the board in the U.S. Army Reserves and the National Guard. That's about 128,000 less than we would like to have in peacetime, grouping both the Guard and the Reserve together. That doesn't mean that we don't have some units out there that are over-strength, but it also means we have some that are under-strength.

We have taken some steps in the past few months to increase our capability to recruit for the Reserves. I won't tick those steps off now, and we are seeing slight gains being made in both the Guard and Reserves of the numbers that they're bringing in, versus the losses.

The major challenge that the Army faces, and it becomes a national challenge, is with respect to the Individual Ready Reserve. That's that pool of trained soldiers that still have a commitment for service. As you recall, when a soldier comes in he signs up for six years of service. If he enliests for two years in the Active force and he gets out, that means four years yet in the Reserves, either in the Selective Reserve in a unit or in the Individual Ready Reserve.

That's a pool from which we would draw, come mobilization, to fill the vacancies within our Reserve component units, and our Active units, because we do not man it at wartime levels, even in the Active force. But also to provide the replacements for the combat casualties in the first months of a war until a draft can take over and start providing us with the trained skills that we need as combat replacements.

There is a major shortfall in the numbers of personnel that we have in the Individual Ready Reserve pool today. You can pick several numbers; it depends on what time frame you're talking about. By 1985 it's estimated, if we make progress in several areas, which project a gain of about 230, 240,000 in the pool in that time frame, that the shortfall will be something like about 170, 180,000. Another figure that you hear from time to time is by the end of 1984, agreed with OSD, somewhere between 200 and 250,000. And then the question is, what's the figure today.

I mentioned that those figures of 1984 and 1985 projected that we would have some improvements, and among those things that we will do will be to identify at least 80,000 retirees who will be told that, "Come mobilization, you will report to this station for this kind of an assignment." And we anticipate we can find those 80,000 who can do that. But that's one of the improvements I'm talking about to be included in that 230,000 projected improvements. If we went to war today, obviously, the shortfall is going to be greater than the figures I gave you, because we haven't had time to make those projected improvements and there's a debate as to just what that number may be. It certainly falls within the realm of somewhere from 200 to 500,000.

The point is this: even if we had registration today, and registration would give us our first draftees in about 120 days coming out of the training command and going to units as replacements. Even if we had registration today, we would run out of infantrymen, tankers, artillerymen and medics before that 120-day period is up and the draft could take over. That's the major challenge that I see in the volunteer environment as far as the Army is concerned, and as far as the country is concerned. What that really means is that we do not have, in this country today, the trained manpower to provide the manpower base for mobilization. We need to solve that problem, and solve it in a time frame that should be relatively soon. There are a number of options on how to solve that. You mentioned the draft.

One option, of course, is to provide sufficient incentives to attract individuals to enlist in the Individual Ready Reserve, be trained in one of the critical skills, and then we keep a string on him for a certain period of time, providing bonuses for them as long as they stay in the Individual Reserves. Another is to provide incentives to have him extend in the Reserve component units, because that would reduce the requirement. Another would be to draft for the Individual Ready Reserve. It lends itself to bulk draft. You would draft by skills, train them for the necessary amount of time in those skills, send them back home and keep a string on them, knowing where they are during this time so that they can be called in on very short notice come mobilization.

General Marshall, in his report to the Secretary of War on the 30th of June, 1945, recognized even in those days that the luxury of a long time frame for mobilization would no longer exist for this country. He recommended as an option universal military training. Not service, but universal military training, so we would have that pool of trained manpower ready to go. My point is, it's a major challenge. It's one for this country — we've got to find a solution. We cannot continue to wring our hands about it and ignor it. In my opinion something must be done.

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Q: You've discussed your options, but could I just follow it by asking you what your preference is. If you had your way, what would you do?

A: It really does not matter to me, so long as it can be resolved, on a timely basis. I am hopeful that the steps that I see being taken — I am hopeful but not optimistic that they will lead to a resolution of this problem.

Another spin-off of this is, of course, that there will be those who would tell you that we do have a source of trained manpower in this country, and those are the veterans who have already served their country.

There is a school of thought that says that we should have an Emergency Reserve, which would draft the veterans come mobilization for service. To me that does not seem equitable, that we would draft a veteran to serve when there are so many others who have not yet served their country.

Q: General, do you think that without resorting to the use of tactical nuclear weapons that NATO could resist a direct attack from the Soviet Union or from the Warsaw Pact today? Could they win in Europe right now?

A: You know, the scenarios that you could create for that, Ike, are so varied. Just let me say that we are attempting, within the Alliance, with the near-term and long-term defense programs, to enhance the conventional capability of the Alliance, so that we can meet the initial thrust of the Warsaw Pact forces, should it come.

As I say, depending upon the scenario, it depends upon how long that force might be able to hold. But we must continue to maintain within the Alliance, in my opinion, the continuum of forces of the conventional and modernized theater nuclear forces, with the strategic nuclear capability as the overall umbrella.

Q: General, I'm going to ask you a three-part question — all at the same time. Number 1, you did not repeat what you have said in testimony on the Hill, that you favor a draft for the IRR. Have you changed your position on that?

A: I have not changed my position. You see, Fred, the first thing we would have to have is registration. It's going to take some time to get that organized. Secondly, we have to then have a capability to classify, and of the 17 categories of classification for a draftee, five are determined by the local board. So local boards would have to be established. That, again, would take time. Now, meantime, I believe that there will be steps at least proposed and, hopefully, supported financially, to try to overcome the shortfall.

If it is not overcome, or the solution doesn't seem on the horizon by the time we would have registration and classification established, then we would have to resort, in my opinion, to the draft of the IRR. Not the draft for the Active Force, and I didn't make that point with you before. Not the draft for the Reserve component units, because it's very difficult, because of the geographical locus of the Reserve components to draft for them. But the draft for the IRR. And if you draft for the IRR, I personally am convinced that the salutary effect, one, will be easing the strain on our recruiters, both for the Active components and the Reserve components. Because this younger generation of potential soldiers are no different from those we've always had. They are interested in selecting

the time and the place and the type of unit in which they wish to serve. So that I personally am convinced that there would be a number of them who would make their way to both Active and Reserve component recruiters.

Q: The second part of my question. On the retirees. Would there be an upper age limit? And how would you break that out, as approximately between enlisted and officer retirees?

A: Fred, I don't have the details on the plan. The plan is being devised, but you could, for example, foresee a colonel who had retired in the Engineers being recalled to be a facility engineer at an installation. You could also see a number of non-commissioned officers and officers who might be utilized in the training bases as retirees, assisting us in training the additional troops, come mobilization. I don't have the details of that plan at the present time, Fred.

Q: The last one, on Korea. What is your present position on the question of continuing the withdrawal, slowing it down or changing direction entirely?

A: I understand your question, yes. Well, the Chiefs have taken a position on our evaluation of the new assessment of the threat from North Korea, based upon a better analysis of the intelligence information that had been available over almost the past decade. We have made our recommendation to the Secretary of Defense, and that recommendation will be among those recommendations considered by the interagency group that is currently assessing the entire situation on the Korean Peninsula, leading to a recommendation to the President as to what to do. At this juncture, I am not prepared to tell you, Fred, what the recommendation of the Joint Chiefs is.

Q: Not even as a farewell present?

A: Not even as a what?

Q: A farewell present?

A: Not even as a farewell present. But one cannot ignore the fact that the most recent assessment does provide sufficient indicators of a greater capability on the part of the North Koreans than we had originally thought.

Q: Your remarks on the draft, could you just walk it through so we can get it clear? You would draft a young man and send him to a training school to be a medic, say, and then he would go home and resume his civilian life unless we had mobilization? How do you envision that working?

A: What I would envision, George, is just about that. The critical skills I've outlined to you, and it would be that the individual would be drafted under a random sequence lottery, similar to what we had at the end of — just before the draft expired in 1973. It should be a draft that is as equitable as possible, namely, with the fewest number of exemptions as possible. The individual would be drafted for a particular skill, and would be trained the number of months necessary, paid while he is being trained, and then sent home, and remain vulnerable for recall on mobilization, immediately upon mobilization, for the length of time that the legislation provides.

If the legislation were to say that the individual is vulnerable for six years, it would mean we would need to bring him back in for some refresher training at least once, probably twice during that period. If it were for two years, then I don't think we would need to bring him back for refresher training. And the individual would have the option, after he's finished his training, to become a member of a Reserve component unit, or he could enlist in the Active forces, if he wished.

Q: When you talk about that 120 days, well, 120 days plus how many months of training?
A: Well, that includes the training.

Q: I see.
A: You see, today, Sarah, our estimate is that if we had to mobilize and got authority to draft, it would take us about 110 days to get the first group of draftees into the Training Command, train them for 100 days, that's 210 days before the individual is ready to go.

If we have registration we can reduce that 110 days to at least 30 days and maybe short of that, but at least 30 days. We train them for another 100 days, so you've got about 130 days before the indivisual would be ready to go to a unit as a replacement.

Q: General, you mentioned tactical nuclear force modernization to include strategic capability. Could you be more specific about what needs to be improved in NATO in terms of tactical nuclear forces, what kind of weapons systems, cooperation with the Allies?
A: Your question was not quite accurate of what I said. I did not associate a strategic capability for the theater nuclear forces. I indicated that there should be that continuum in NATO as we've had in the past.

With respect to the modernization, in my opinion, and I certainly will be involved in this to a much greater extent after today than I am right now, in my opinion, we need to have new and modern warheads on the theater nuclear weap that we currently have and we're taking steps to modernize in those areas. I also think that a very careful consideration must be given to extending the range of those theater nuclear forces if, in fact, our deterrent is going to cover the spectrum of the threat that we face.

Q: General, should those warheads include the neutron warheads?
A: In my opinion, they should include the neutron warhead. It's a much more effective weapon, and I look at it, perhaps, in a different light than some. If we have to resort to the use of theater nuclear weapons, tactical nuclear weapons, the kind of weapons in which we would have the enhanced radiation reduced blast warhead, it will be at a time when our soldiers, NATO soldiers, are in very close proximity to the Warsaw Pact soldiers.

We can get the same effects of blast and thermal and nuclear effects, radiation effects, with our current inventory of warheads. But with the so-called

neutron warhead, we can reduce the thermal damage and the blast damage radius by at least ten times, which means we can use that warhead much closer to our own troops than we can with the current inventory. That's why I believe that we have the capability, we should, in my opinion, make those warheads as we modernize into the enhanced radiation reduced blast capability.

I was very pleased that the President left that option open, because when he approved our modernizing some of our warheads, he also approved leaving the capability there so that within a very short time we could make the proper insertion and make them into the enhanced radiation reduced blast weapons.

Q: General, on this subject, should the Pershing II be approved for production and deployment be deployed in several NATO countries, or should they continue to be deployed only in Germany?

A: Well, that's really not for me to answer. That's for the Alliance itself to determine. As you know, that is being discussed within the Alliance, and shortly I will become a party to that discussion.

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Q: What is your opinion, at this point on the deployment of the cruise missile?

A: I do not wish to comment until I have been over there and become further enmeshed in the overall discussion.

Q: What about the medium-range ballistic missile? Is that also a consideration in your view? Is this what you have in mind in extending the range?

A: It is a consideration; medium-range ballistic missiles.

Q: As the Supreme Allied Commander of Europe, as I understand it, you do have control or have assigned to you certain strategic weapons that could be used to support NATO. Do you have anything that you can say on the kinds of weapons or the numbers of weapons that you will see a need for as part of that capability?

A: Not at this juncture, Lloyd; talk to you in six months.

Q: Kind of a home-run pitch, I'm afraid, but I think we ought to give you that inning. There has been some talk that the new modern volunteer Army won't fight. It's a nine-to-five Army, it's not ready, it's a bad idea, it hasn't worked. You've heard all the criticisms from the Hill and elsewhere. In your last day as Commander of the Army, what is your fitness report on the U.S. Army today? Will it fight? Is it good? Is it ready? Is it worse than it used to be; is it better than it used to be?

A: One can only judge an Army when it is put to the supreme test, which is on the battlefield. So it would be unfair for me to attempt to compare today's Army, which hasn't been tested on the battlefield, with those in Vietnam and Korea and World War II.

But I also was a soldier in all of those three wars, and I just tell you, George, that in my opinion these are among the finest soldiers with whom I've served in 36 years of service. They will fight. They wish to succeed. For some, when they finish basic training that's a major success for them. The challenge for the leaders of the Army is to ensure that we have the same decisiveness of action, the same good judgment as to how those soldiers should be trained and employed that would equate to the aggressiveness, initiative, desire to succeed that you find on the part of a soldier. My fitness report of the soldier today would be very high.

If you are talking about the whole Army, you see, the total Army, I mentioned we have the difficulties with the manning and particularly in the Reserve components. We have a need and a major challenge that faces us is the capability to procure the weapon systems and the equipment that we must have if we're going to fight successfully on the modern battlefield. Those have not yet come into our inventory, but we are making progress in that area.

Q: I just wanted to clarify one of your earlier answers. The President, you mentioned that he left open the option to deploy the neutron bomb. The President -- one of the provisions involved is that the Russians show restraint on their side, too, in the deployment of nuclear weapons. Are you advocating

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not going with that, possibility of that option, but are you advocating the immediate or as soon as possible deployment of neutron weapons in Europe?

A: Well, Ike, I have always been in favor of having the enhanced radiation reduced blast warhead on our weapons. As I indicated, I was encouraged that the President left that option open, and he did caveat his option by saying that it depended upon the reaction of the Soviets. But I, personally, have always recommended having that warhead.

Q: Sir, when you get through all these questions, there's one I wanted to ask you before you go.

A: All right.

Q: Somebody else?

Q: The General on the —

(Laughter)

Gen. Rogers: I can hardly wait, Sarah.

Voice: Sarah, you tell him.

Gen. Rogers: She has, hasn't she?

Q: You mentioned the need for sufficient incentives to enlist, and this is one of the categories that — I wonder if retirement is that and what you would see as needed in terms of an improvement to the Army retirement system?

A: Well, when a soldier comes into the Army, I suspect that retirement benefits is very low on his checklist. We find that it becomes a little higher on his priority list after he's served two or three tours, reenlisted two or three times. So that I, personally, don't believe that from the standpoint of the soldier that retirement benefits means too much to him. It does, though, for the career force.

My position has always been, after I studied the various options, in projecting out the costs in constant dollars, not in inflated dollars, that we should retain what we have today, which is the option to retire at the end of 20 years with 50 percent of base pay at that time. And I would change our procedures just slightly by paying some kind of an allowance to a soldier who is discharged, through no fault of his own, such as we do to officers today when we — a severance pay of $15,000 to officers, I would make that more equitable for our soldiers, too.

Q: General Rogers, there has been talk in the last couple of years about the creation of a quick reaction force or Persian Gulf force, something like that. Where does that stand? In particular, how does it relate to the recent review of our posture in the Middle East.

A: Well, the Army has always had, Ken, what we call the heavy/light corps, which was a spectrum of forces from a platoon of rangers all the way up to a three-division corps, with supporting forces, of about 100,000. We are designing what will be known as the unilateral corps, and it will be a spin-off from that

heavy/light corps. When finally designed it will not include forces which are earmarked for initial deployment from this country to NATO. So that we could deploy that force of up to about 100,000, or any part thereof, to a non-NATO contingency, such as the Persian Gulf or the Middle East or Northeast Asia, and have it fight in that contingency and not have to reach in and pull out forces from it, if we go, shortly thereafter, into a NATO contingency.

The Army is designing that now. I have to leave to my successor just what the time frame is that we are going to have ours prepared. And what we're working towards, Ken, is a self-contained corps, one that will have sufficient combat service support units in it that it can maintain itself for X number of days, X being classified. So that we will not have to depend upon host nations support, because it may not be available in some of the areas in which we go. So that we will not have to mobilize, even under the option of the President to call up 50,000, we wouldn't have to mobilize initially even at 50,000 in order to be successful in maintaining ourselves for X number of days.

Q: This will have its own indigenous equipment so it won't have to borrow from other units in NATO or elsewhere?

A: It will have its own equipment and it will be fenced. What I mean by that, it will be protected with respect to its equipment. The reason I say that, Ken, is you know as we pre-position more division sets of equipment in Europe, so that we can pick up our soldiers by aircraft and fly them over to marry up with that equipment, we have to pull that equipment from someplace. We don't get a double issue of equipment. So it comes from our Reserve components and it comes from our Active components.

We are anticipating, under the current plan for POMCUSing that we will have a drawdown on the Active component units that are not protected, down to about 70 percent of their issue of equipment, and in our Reserve components about 50 percent. With the 70 percent will not be the forces in the unilateral corps, they will be protected. Now I say that just as if I can predict what the future holds with respect to budgets and our procurement accounts and all of those kinds of things. But that's what we're looking towards.

Q: Can you explain why that's different? I mean I would suspect if you went down to the 82nd Airborne they's say, "Well, that's what we can do now." I'm not too clear on how the unilateral corps would be, (a) different from what you've got today; and, (b) whether there's any features of it which lend itself particularly to the Persian Gulf.

A: Well, (a) different, is that it will not include the units that are earmarked for early deployment to NATO. (b) as far as its composition is concerned, it will be dependent upon, one, where the contingency occurs; and, two, what the Commander-in-Chief of the unified command, who has cognizance of that area, wishes in his force to meet that contingency. So there will be some differences.

Q: Will it be a force of X how many people?

A: I would estimate when finally designed it will be up 100, 110,000. About the size of what we would have with a heavy/light corps. Remember in

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the heavy/light corps you had light divisions and you had heavy divisions, which could be mixed. Well, you'd have a similar situation in this one, and about the same strength, in the final analysis.

Q: If all and well, it would be ready when?
A: I can't give you that answer.

Q: Fiscal '80?
A: I mentioned I'd have to leave that answer to my successor.

Q: It's well along, but it's still on paper; is that right?
A: Well, the forces exist out there. It's a question of our getting them in the proper status and ready to do, and depends somewhat upon what occurs with respect to the Second Division, for example.

Q: But it's decided to do this or it's under consideration?
A: It is decided to do this. Now the Army intends to do this, and the Defense Department, or Office of the Secretary of Defense also will ensure that the other Services have a capability along the same lines.

Q: One further question on this. How does it differ from the light/heavy corps arrangement you have now? Is it slightly different — is it much more than an organizational change?
A: Primarily, the units that will be designated within that corps will not be those that are earmarked for early deployment to Europe. Today, in the heavy/light corps —

Q: Are you taking troops that are — where are you going to find these troops? What are they designated to do now, if they're not going to —
A: Well, obviously, the 82nd Airborne would be one, you know, obviously. And there will be others. Now another difference will be, as I mentioned, we want to make this a self-sustaining force from the standpoint of support. We have, in our budget, a wedge — in our program a wedge of spaces to go to combat service support units in the Active force, so we won't have to depend upon Reserve component units, you see. So there's another difference.

Q: Just to be clear again. Would we be accurate in describing this as a force particularly suited for combat in the third-world, Persian Gulf, Number 1, and, secondly, has that old idea of having two Army Divisions plus the Marine wing, is that still alive? Or is this independent of that concept?
A: There will be other forces in it, besides Army forces. You could expect it to be used to meet contingencies anyplace, George, not in any specific area.

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Q: The figure of 110,000 includes the Marines?
A: That's the Army.

Q: As SACEUR, will you continue to be responsible for the Middle East area, or is that going to be broken off into a separate command or a subsidiary command?
A: That still is the responsibility of CINCEUR, the European Command, and I know of no movement afoot to change that, Lloyd.

Q: General Rogers, will you continue General Haig's efforts to get Greece back into the integrated NATO command on the southern flank, and on the northern flank will you be working on the concern of the Scandinavian countries about gaps up there, particularly manpower, U.S. manpower assignment on the northern flank?
A: Well, needless to say, I'll have an interest in both flanks of NATO. Specifically, whether or not I will be charged by the North Atlantic Council and Secretary General to carry on the discussions that General Haig has been having, I don't know. I won't know until I get aboard. But he has been working very diligently in that area, as you indicated.

Q: General, could you explain one thing, the unilateral corps. What is behind that designation of "unilateral"?
A: Well, maybe it's for want of a better name, you know--

Q: Unilateral in the sense of what?
A: Well, it means that it can be used anyplace in the world, and would be intended to be other than in the early deployment phasing of NATO. Now, why the word "unilateral" was selected, I'm not sure. But it certainly differentiate for us in own mind the difference between that corps and the heavy/light corps organization that we have had for some years, as a quick reaction force.

Q: In other words, it's not interdependent or not dependent upon any other --
A: We would hope it would be self-contained, you see, and our heavy/light corps today, one, we would have to call on units that are early deploying to NATO; and, two, we would have to call in combat service support units that also should be early deployed to NATO. We're hopeful of changing both of those, you see.

Q: So those are your half war outfit. In other words, the other one being (inaudible) and this would be the half?
A: I suppose, Lloyd, that's as good a way to look at it as any. For a soldier any contingency is a major one.

Q: But there would be other elements to this force; is that correct?
A: Yes.

Q: Air and naval?
A: There would have to be.

Q: Can you estimate how large that would be?
A: No.

Q: But it would be considerably more than the figure you gave us for exclusively Army?
A: Yes. We would expect the Army to run somewhere between 100 to 110,000 at the maximum including the support forces.

Q: Along this line of words, would you give us a little help translating from the Army talk. Suppose you were talking to Mom and Pop Jones, and you wanted to tell them that we don't have the strength in this country today to provide the manpower base for mobilization. Now what would you mean? What would you be telling them about their country's defenses?

A: What I'm saying is that today, in my opinion, we do not have the manpower base from which to mobilize to go to war and to continue to fight. As indicated, that even with the registration, we would run out of the critical skills today before the draft could take over. If that is a fact, which I believe it is, my judgment tells me that that's not the posture that this country wants to be in, so the country faces a challenge, and something must be done. I've ticked off a series of alternatives to solve that, Sarah, any one of which would be agreeable to me with the exception of this Emergency Reserve of recalling veterans, which I do not think is proper.

I should also point out that even if we were to take the late-deploying Reserve component units, deploying late in our mobilization schedule, and broke those units up and brought those skills forward into our IRR, come mobilization, we still would run out of the critical skills before the draft could take over. That is another source of trained manpower to go back and break up those late-deploying Reserve component units. But even doing that we still would run out of the critical skills before the draft could take over, even with registration in existence.

Press: Thank you, General.

General Rogers: Thank you. Good luck to you. Nice to be with you.

END

APPENDIX B

PRESS CONFERENCE
BY
SECRETARY OF DEFENSE HAROLD BROWN
THE PENTAGON
FRIDAY, DECEMBER 14, 1979
1:45 PM (EST)

Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen.

I have one item on which I want to comment and then I will take questions. I understand that there have been some questions about the organization of rapid deployment forces and what the command organization might be. I should soon be establishing that organization formally, but I can tell you what is planned.

The arrangement that we plan is to have a joint task force to do the planning for various contingency uses of the rapid deployment forces and the rapid deployment forces, as you heard, could comprise anywhere from battalion to an Army corps in size, and would involve the elements from all of the Services, or could involve elements from all of the Services.

The Joint Task Force would be headed by a three-star officer, lieutenant general. It would be assigned as part of the Readiness Command, the Unified Command whose headquarters is located at MacDill Air Force Base, Florida. This joint task force would contain elements from all of the Services. It would do the planning for deployment and operation of whatever parts of the rapid deployment forces were to be used in a given contingency. It would examine the various contingencies. It would look at the deployment lists to see what would be shipped first and in what kind of a lift. And then in case any of these contingencies, which are not limited to any one part of the world, they would cover not only the Middle East, they would cover various other parts of the world.

If these contingencies actually occurred and an operation had to be mounted, the Commander of the Joint Task Force would become the operational commander. He would either be -- that headquarters would either be subordinate to the Unified and Specified Commander in the area, whatever the area happened to be, or could report directly back to the national command authorities here in Washington.

I should note that the establishment of this Joint Task Force will probably take place soon. I don't want to say whether it's within weeks, but it certainly won't take very many months. We have not been idle over the past months in working on this question. Following the Nifty Nugget Exercise that took place last year, a Joint Deployment Agency, responsible directly to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, was established to start on the job of looking at how deployments would take place; that is, prioriticizing for each contingency plan, what would load first, what would load second, and so on, and also examining conflicts between different contingency plans for different areas of the world since there is always a tendency in establishing those contingency plans to assume that that's the only contingency and to assume also, therefore, that all of the airlift and sealift capability of the United States would be available to handle that contingency.

The so-called JDA has been active for a number of months. Moreover, the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff has established a small element reporting

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directly to him to look at the issue of the Rapid Deployment Force and how to operate it. It's out of those activities and further considerations by the Joint Chiefs and myself that this plan I have just described to you has been evolved.

Questions?

Q: Dr. Brown, could I ask you an essay question for a little bit more on the Rapid Deployment Force? What units --

A: Can I have a multiple choice?

(laughter)

A: Go ahead.

Q: What units would generally be assigned to it? We hear talk of the 82nd Airborne and the 101st, for instance --how its performance in terms of speed and ability to move large units and endurance would compare to what we can do now and what its costs would be?

A: The Rapid Deployment Force would comprise essentially all the units that are not already committed to NATO or the 2nd Division, which is in Korea. In other words, the rapid deployment force would be selected from that very broad spectrum of units which includes, of course, the 82nd, the 101st, and a number of other Army units. Includes the great bulk of the Marine Corps. And also includes Air Force units, some of which are committed to NATO but can be moved back and forth easily, and also includes Naval units.

Therefore, a very large fraction of U.S. forces are available for use as rapid deployment forces. They would be tailored to the situation and contingency plans would be made up that would identify which ones would go to which places under which circumstances.

We are talking about deployment, as I said, of anywhere from a battalion to an Army corps, plus -- or, alternatively, plus or instead, naval units and plus air units. I think that really needs to be understood and perhaps the best way to do it is to tell an anecdote of the town in Texas that wired Texas Ranger Headquarters for help because there was a severe riot and within a couple of hours the train stopped and a Texas Ranger got off and the Mayor came up to him and said, "Are you the only Ranger they've sent?" And he said, "Yes, they only sent one Ranger, you ain't got but one riot, have you?"

(laughter)

Q: Can you confirm whether Iraq has invaded Iran?

A: I am aware of the Tehran radio reports alleging an invasion of Iran by Iraqi forces. As you know, there has been tension between those two countries and occasionally accusation of incursions. I have no information that would suggest that there has been an invasion.

Q: Would an invasion prompt the U.S. to do anything?

A: I am certainly not going to respond as to what the U.S. might do in such a case, because, as I say, we don't have any information that confirms this.

Q: Mr. Secretary, did you testify that the Pentagon has decided to drop plans for a separate new cruise missile aircraft carrier; and if so, would you elaborate on that?

A: No, we continue to include in our five-year program the possibility of a cruise missile carrier aircraft beyond the B-52 which will be the first cruise

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missile carrier. As you know, the B-52s will start to carry cruise missiles operationally late in '82 and early in '83. And we plan to equip our B-52G's all with cruise missiles. We may go beyond that.

We continue to carry in the five-year program tests and designs for other aircraft as cruise missile carriers but we are not committing to the full scale development of another cruise missile carrier. The Air Force has concluded that the B-52 will serve well as a cruise missile carrier through the '80's. I want to keep some insurance in case the B-52 proves vulnerable to a barrage attack, but insurance is all we've got, is all we need. We don't need a full scale development program now, for a new cruise missile carrier.

Q: Mr. Secretary, on the budget, I wonder if you could tell us where the funds will come from to cover the increases that you are calling for. Will they come from other social programs? Will they come from making the deficit increase? How would you cover the increase that you're budgeting?

A: That, of course, depends upon additional economic decisions. If one is asking about the year 1984 or 1985, there can be predictions about what the tax revenues will be and about what other non-defense expenditures will be and therefore, what the deficit will be. But they're only predictions.

The rest of the government does not detail its programs over the next five years to the same degree that the Defense Department does and so it is difficult to make an overall estimate four or five years ahead. To the extent that other programs or it could be attributed to a smaller deficit. These numbers all add together to give you a net deficit or surplus, and to the extent that one believes they are interchangeable, you still can't identify a single one as the cause of the other numbers.

I believe, and indeed, I think it is coming generally to be understood, that the country needs to be militarily strong and that the funds that are being programmed for that purpose over the next five years are to serve that end. The United States can afford that. The United States can also afford to do what it needs to do for genuine non-defense, social needs. I would point out that the non-defense expenditures are now roughly three times the defense expenditures. For that reason, I think it's a mistake to infer, I don't think you implied, but some people do infer, that the size of the Defense budget determines whether there is a deficit or not. It certainly has an effect. It has one-third the effect of the non-defense programs.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you agree with other senior government officials who say that your new Defense plan represents sort of a final purging of our Vietnam hangups?

A: Well, it is tempting to see current events as some sort of great watershed or hinge of history and I must admit I, to a degree, succumb to the temptation. Whether it is or not, we don't really know until some years have passed. I will say this, the attitudes, both on the part of the public, on the part of the Congress, as I read it, and on the part of the Executive Branch, are very different in this regard than they were five years ago. The American people, I think, are convinced now that U.S. military capability is not the principal source of unhappiness in the world or instability in the world and that we need to be militarily strong. We need, in fact, I think, to be somewhat cautious to see that the pendulum doesn't swing too far back the other way to the point where we begin to believe that military strength can solve all of our international, let alone our domestic problems, because there continues to be a major and in most cases preponderant influence by diplomatic, by economic, by political factors in what goes on in the world. It's also true, and this is what we have come to realize, that in the absence of sufficient military strength, the others cannot do what we need to do.

Q: Mr. Secretary, to what degree do you attribute these changes in attitudes to what has happend in Iran?

A: I think that the trend had set in well before then. The polls, which five years ago showed that 40 percent of the American people wanted to reduce defense spending and only 9 percent wanted to increase it, had already changed quite a lot six months ago or a year ago to the point where the numbers were that, perhaps, 30 percent of the people or 40 percent of the people thought there should be more defense spending, and 20 percent or so felt there should be less.

Iran — the events in Iran clearly have accentuated that trend to the point where now 60 percent think there should be more defense spending and only 10 or 11 think there should be less. That, I think, is a rather sharp temporary thing which, however, I think, will also leave considerable residue. So, I think it's a peak perhaps, but on a continuing trend.

Q: Mr. Secretary, you called recruiting and retention problems yesterday your most difficult problems and so forth. There is a new Pentagon pay study that identified over $5 billion worth problems in the pay area. And yet not much of that money, I understand, is showing up in this budget. And you mentioned travel yesterday. And it's over $1 billion that you are having trouble with, that the military people are paying for out of their pockets.

A: I didn't say 1 billion, but —

Q: No, the pay study did that. And I wondered if the Administration is committed enough to solve some of these recruiting-retention problems?

A: We are committed to solve the recruiting and retention problems. And it clearly will take more money. However, like many other problems, it can't be solved solely by throwing money at them and we'll have to take that — we will have to try to solve it gradually. We do feel that our military people, as is shown by the recruitment and retention rates deserve to be compensated better. They deserve to get some special compensation that goes with their special burdens, and they also deserve to have some general increases. We'll try to do some of both of those in the fiscal '81 budget and we will try to keep doing it in subsequent years. The President's Personnel Reform Acts, I think, will help. I also believe that the retirement changes that have been proposed but have not yet begun to be acted on in the Congress would also over an extended period have a beneficial effect.

Q: Mr. Secretary, there's been reports of possible conflict between Vietnam and Thailand, if and when Vietnam resumes its offensive in Cambodia. What role might the U.S. have if they do — those two countries do come into conflict?

A: Well, as you know, the U.S. has increased lately, in the last year or two, our military sales to Thailand. We've transferred some munitions to Thailand. We continue to have a close relationship and obligation to Thailand. I don't want to predict what would happen in case of some hypothetical action. But there's no doubt that the Vietnamese movement toward hegemonism over Indochina has already had a very serious negative effect on the relations throughout the area and if that were to extend to action into Thailand, that would make it still worse.

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Q: Do we have any treaty obligation?

A: We have a treaty with Thailand that requires consultation in the case such actions. We would then have to decide what we would do.

Q: In your testimony yesterday, you said the Navy would be coming up with a new smaller nuclear attack submarine.

A: Yes.

Q: Could you tell us some more about that submarine? Approximately when do you expect it to be coming out and will it be replacing the Los Angeles class sub? The last question: You made no reference to the TRIDENT. That was also the subject of the Mann Study. Is it the Defense Department's position that you are going to go with the TRIDENT and that you are not considering re-designing that?

A: The 688 will continue to be procured at the rate of -- well, at a roughly steady rate; one, some years; two, some years, for the next several years. A smaller, less expensive submarine, of somewhat different shape, is under design and we would plan, and this will be detailed in the budget and five-year program that gets sent up in detail in January, we would plan to introduce the lead ship of that class, if I remember correctly, in 1983. And then gradually would increase their number so that they would replace the production of the 688s.

In the case of the TRIDENT submarine, as I read the Mann Study, as I understood the results of that study, the savings from going to a new design may be somewhat less. We'll continue our design work but we do not -- I have not decided as of this moment that we will have new -- an SSBNX; that is, a new class. I don't rule it out but it's not in the same state of decision as the 688 follow on.

Q: In September, as was recalled to you yesterday, the President stood fairly flatly on a 3 percent increase, and it's now over 5. Would you --

A: It's 5 for 1981.

Q: 4.57638. (laughter) Would you say that in the interim that your studies and conclusions on what to do were responsive to Congressional examinations of Defense which concluded that it was inadequate or under financed?

A: Well, I think that there is -- I'm perfectly willing to spread the credit around. Certainly Congressional interest and inputs had an effect but it is part of the regular process of Defense and Administration, Defense Department and Administration, formulation of Defense policy, Defense programs, Defense budgets, for us every summer and fall, to go through and update of the 5-year program and to prepare the following year's budget.

During the course of that, there were Subcommittee meetings with the National Security Council, chaired in the case, in the particular case of the Defense Program, by myself with the Secretary of State and National Security Adviser and others, going over these issues of what does the United States need in the 1980s and 1990 in the way of military capability to back-up or to underlie, its foreign policy.

How much does it cost? What are the most effective programs? How shall we phase the acquisition of that capability in terms of hardware, in terms of new technology, in terms of the people to operate it? By comparison with many other areas of the new government or outside, it's a relatively orderly process no matter how disorderly it sometimes may seem to me. And it was on that basis, followed by a National Security meeting, chaired by the President, followed by detailed budget and program discussions within this department, with the participation of Office of Management and Budget and other people, that we arrived at this program, these numbers.

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Q: But you arrived at a program which is about $3 billion lower in budget authority than in September you expected to do?

A: Yes. Some of it is cost and some of it is additional programs. Some of it is a more accurate estimate of the cost in constant dollars and some of it is additional program. The rapid deployment force part, forces part, for example, is additional program.

Q: Did you not conclude that the country was ready to spend more on defense? — Congress, showed you the way?

A: That's certainly — I am willing to spread the credit around. The fact that the country was ready for more defense is not completely independent of the fact that the country needs more defense.

One more.

Q: Did that poll that you took have anything to do with it?

A: No, the poll I referred to wasn't taken by us and it appeared well after these decisions were made.

Q: Does that mean that the number of the percentage of American people favoring defense spending has doubled since the Iranian crisis?

A: No. Probably doubled in the last year and a half or so. But, you know, that depends on whether you believe the polls.

Q: On the Hill you talked about the — the conception — the view that the United States is weak, maybe unnecessarily, a wrong view that we're too weak —

A: Yes.

Q: — has corruded our influence in the world.

A: Yes.

Q: Do you think that merely building up our forces will restore that influence or do you personally feel that we'll have to use force in order to fully restore an image of the strong, assertive country?

A: Let me make two comments on that. First of all, I think part of the problem of perceptions has to do with the confusion of present balance with the balance you can expect in the future if the trend stays the way it is. It's easier to see what the trends are than it is to make an absolute comparison of capabilities, especially in two sets of forces, geographical conditions, and so on, as different as those of the U.S. and the Soviet Union. And so when I say people have misperceived the situation, I'm saying they sometimes confuse the future situation if the trends don't change and they take that to be the present situation. It's not, but it's a very important balance to weigh anyway and I have always tried to make the distinction. I don't know that I have been all that successful. But I am going to keep making it.

I believe, also, and this is a second point, that the stronger our military capability is, the stronger it's perceived as being and that will be a function of how strong it is and what the trends are. That is, what we are seen as doing that will make us more capable five years from now. The stronger that capability, the stronger that impression, the less necessary it is to use military force to, either to affect a political situation or a world situation, or to cause people to believe that you're strong. You don't have to exercise it if it's visibly strong enough.

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Q: I have been told that there were contingency plans. I am sure they were to take out the hostages and do other things. And the difficulty they ran into was shortage of equipment and particularly of vehicles. Is that a fact?

A: I am not going to talk about any potential or planned or conceived military operations. I just don't think that that's useful.

Q: Mr. Secretary, can you tell us what the comparative cost of this new smaller sub would be as against the 688?

A: Advertised as about two-thirds and I think that's probably a reasonable estimate.

Q: How many do you expect to build?

A: Oh, I, myself, have never been convinced that the 90 SSN figure that has somehow become enshrined as a requirement is the only possible number. But I would expect that we would go to something like two a year for some years; maybe we could build more than that in some years.

Q: Do you see any need for the AV-8B in FY 81?

A: I don't want to talk about specific budget decisions on individual aircraft programs. I think that the AV-8B is a good thing to have and the question is, is it worth paying the extra price and the price in reduced total numbers of aircraft and there's a difference of view between various components of the DoD on that, in order to get the VTOL capability. It certainly is a less capable aircraft than the F-18 except for one thing, it's capable of operating vertically and a F-18 is not.

Q: I have one questions on the hostages. Actually, it's two parts. There seems to be a new air of optimism --

A: How are the credits divided? (laughter)

Q: -- Well, I'll outline that. First, it's the White House gets the first credit and then it's the State Department. Anyway, there seems to be a new feeling of optimism that perhaps these hostages might be released soon and that there is something in the work, some arrangement in the works. That feeling, I believe, exists at the White House and at the State Department. Do you share that feeling? And if so, what has happened? Has there been a message, has there been a --

A: I think that some of the words coming out of Tehran in the last couple of days have been less negative than some of those that have gone before. That is naturally a hopeful sign. I don't place all that much weight on words and we'll just have to see what the actions are. I don't want to express either optimism or pessimism. I only want to say that the existence of -- or the enunciation of some less negative words is -- I am happy to see that.

Q: Dr. Brown, before we lose you, could I -- get back to the last two parts of my last question.

A: Okay, you'll get the last two words.

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Q: The cost and the comparative performance of the new Rapid Deployment Force to what we have now.

A: Well, it's different on every different contingency. But I would expect that over the next five years we would be able to cut the deployment time for the first substantial elements to be deployed in distant places, at least by a factor of two and perhaps more than that. The subsequent build-up also would be completed much more rapidly. So I'm giving you a comparison. It's at least a factor of two in time and as I remember it, more than a factor of two in many cases. The relative cost, the cost mostly is going to go into the lift and the maritime prepositioning, including the extra equipment that you buy to deploy on the maritime prepositioning ships. And we're talking, perhaps, in the order or $10 billion or so over the next five years. That, you know, that's a very large amount of money. It is however only a modest increase to the total amount of money that we spend on the Rapid Deployment Forces defined as I have defined them, which is all the non-NATO forces. So, that is, I think, as best I can answer the question.

Thank you.

END

News Conference by
Secretary of Defense Harold Brown
At Readiness Command Headquarters
MacDill AFB, Florida
Thursday, December 27, 1979 - 1:30 p.m.

I came here today to the Headquarters of Readiness Command to be brought up to date on the activities of the Command, its exercise program, and also to see how it, Joint Deployment Agency, and the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force will fit together and work together.

Inherent in the structure and training of existing U.S. military forces is the ability to deploy across the seas, or over them, to where they may be required to deter or if need be to resist aggression. Indeed the military capability of the United States to project power to distant areas is greater than that of any other nation as has been demonstrated in innumerable exercises, and in several crises with which I'm sure you're familiar.

But the world of the 1980s will be in many ways even more demanding than the decade that we're about to conclude. Therefore, President Carter and I have concluded that we must improve further our ability to deal with crises that are at a long geographical distance from us. To focus this resolve and to improve our capabilities along these lines we have designated as our Rapid Deployment Forces, those forces of all the Services that are not assigned to or earmarked for early deployment to NATO or not now presently deployed to the Republic of Korea.

The Rapid Deployment Forces include, right now, the greater part of the Marine Corps, a number of Army units including but not limited to the 82nd Airborne and 101st Air Assault Divisions, and various air and naval units. Our needs in responding to non-NATO crises center on our ability to move available combat forces over vast distances quickly enough, either to deter conflict or if that's not successful to prevail in conflict.

To assure that we can deploy decisive force swiftly enough we're undertaking two major airlift and sealift enhancement initiatives. First, a force of maritime prepositioning ships that will carry in storage the heavy equipment and supplies, including supplies to sustain them in combat, of three Marine Brigades. The Marines themselves and that portion of their equipment that's not well suited to such prepositioning, in particular, helicopters for example, and fixed-wing air, would then be airlifted to marry-up with their gear and would be ready for combat on short notice. By 1983 we'll have built enough maritime prepositioning ships to carry new heavy equipment for the first of an eventual three Marine Brigade to be so equipped.

The second initiative to make the movement of our Rapid Deployment Forces swifter yet, is a new fleet of large cargo aircraft able to carry heavy, so-called outsized equipment over inter-continental distances. Our objective is pursuing these and related initatives is to cut the deployment time for the first substantial combat units by at least a factor of two and perhaps by a factor of three from what it now is. The subsequent buildup would also be completed much more rapidly than we can now do it.

The initiatives that I've mentioned will cost about $10 billion over the next five years mostly for the lift and maritime prepositioning aircraft and ships. But some of it also for the extra equipment that would be deployed on the prepositioning ships. A joint task force headquarters to be located here at MacDill will do the planning for various contingency uses of the Rapid Deployment Forces. The Joint Task Force Headquarters will be subordinate to Readiness Command. For any given event, the particular force assembled for the purpose could include anything from a single battalion up to a force of the size of an Army Corps.

The Joint Task Force's responsibilities also would include operation of the Rapid Deployment Forces. The commander of the Joint Task Force would become the deployed force's operational commander if a deployment is mounted. In that case he would report either to the Unified and Specified Commander of all U.S. forces in the area or else he could report, under certain circumstances directly to headquarters in Washington.

In view of the unique and demanding responsibilities of this new Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force Commander, his selection has been a most careful process in which the Joint Chiefs and I have considered very carefully. I'm happy to announce that the President has approved my recommendation that Major General Paul X. Kelley, USMC, be assigned as Commander. He's sitting right over there.

Coincident with this assignment, General Kelley who is now currently the Deputy Chief of Staff for Requirements and Programs at Marine Headquarters, has been nominated for promotion to lieutenant general.

That is my prepared statement. I'll be glad to take some questions.

Q: Is this a little bit of an extension of the Readiness Command?

A: The task force headquarters itself will be part of the Readiness Command, it will be subordinate to the Readiness Command. It clearly is in line with the kinds of things that the Readiness Command now does. Readiness Command has responsibility for the readiness of forces in the United States, some of which of course are committed to reinforce our units in Europe, in NATO. The rapid deployment forces are not in that category but the category that they are in, that is forces that would deploy elsewhere in the world to a crisis, is also already within the responsibility of the Readiness Command.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force headquarters will be concentrating on these other areas. It will, for example, be preparing alternate contingency plans for events that might take place in those parts of the world that would require the deployment of U.S. forces. It would, that is the joint task force headquarters will come up with alternate force packages. It will select units that might be deployed to a particular part of the world in case of such a contingency. It will examine the various deployment routes and working with the Military Airlift and Sealift Commands and the Joint Deployment Agency, will work out ways for the equipment and the people to move very quickly in a contingency. Now it always is the case that a contingency turns out not to be exactly what you've planned for so that the work will not all have been done when the contingency begins but

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the Joint Task Force headquarters will be able to use the work that its already done on these plans, these force packages, these deployment routes and adapt them to a contingency as it arises.

One more thing that will happen with the Joint Task Force headquarters here, it will design and conduct training and joint exercises. The Readiness Command already does that, it does it primarily with two Services — Army and Air Force. Clearly, the rapid deployment force concept envisages the use of all four Services and indeed the selection of a Marine officer as its first commander highlights that fact.

Q: Not trying to run somebody out of a job, but is the Readiness Command still necessary then?

A: The Readiness Command as I said includes a good many duties that have to do with deployments to NATO or to Korea, neither of which is a prime area for the in fact its not an area for the rapid deployment forces.

Q: Mr. Secretary, do you know how soon this task force will be operational here at MacDill and how many individuals will be stationed here just for that purpose?

A: Well, we're working on the details of the table of organization. We're talking about the order of 250 people, maybe somewhat less, for the headquarters itself. We are aiming at a completion of and activation, early in March. We may not quite make that date but there will be pieces of it down here before then.

Q: Mr. Secretary, one of the obvious questions would probably be, has the Iranian situation given any impetus to this type of task force even though it may not have been the reason that this was developed?

A: Well, we've been working on mobility enhancement programs for several years — on Defense Department organic airlift enhancement, on the enhancement of the civilian reserve air fleet, on sealift enhancement — and we've actually been spending on the order of several hundred million dollars a year on this. In fiscal 1980, the budget for which was prepared before the Iranian crisis, it was prepared more than a year ago, we included about a half billion dollars in the budget for this kind of thing. In fiscal 1981, it will be more like a billion dollars.

So that there's no doubt what we've seen happening in Iran and in the Middle East, but not only in those areas, there have after all been considerable activity that impacts on the United States and other parts of the world, too, in the Caribbean and Africa. All of these things, I think, remind us that we need to be able to move forces quickly, when and if we decide that military action is needed. Now, in most cases, it won't be. In fact we hope it never will be but there are times when rapid movement of military forces can prevent a war and if it fails to prevent a war there are times when rapid movement of military forces are needed to prevail in a conflict. The Iranian situation is one of a number but a particularly visible one of a number of events that remind us that we need to be able to move forces quickly.

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Q: Now, Mr. Secretary, is this going to be covered under the current Defense budget or do you need more money to deploy these forces?

A: It is included in the fiscal year 1981 budget and the five year Defense program of which I gave a preview to Congress last month, so that it is included in that. It is one reason but by no means the only reason for the President's decision to increase the size of the Defense budget in real terms over the next five years at a rate of about 4 1/2 percent more in real terms each year. So, it's included in what I previewed to Congress last month and it is indeed a substantial portion of that increase.

Q: Mr. Secretary, how much problem are you having getting a volunteer force as far as the Army is concerned and the other Services?

A: We are able to meet the numbers and quality required for the active duty forces so far as accessions are concerned. Our active duty strength is about . 1/4 percent below the authorized levels. We have very severe problems in retaining experienced and skilled people, people who've been in anywhere from six years to twelve years or more. Our shift to an all volunteer force is not directly responsible for our shortages or our deficiencies among those skilled and experienced people since the draft never did run to 10 or 12 years service. But we do need therefore to make military service more rewarding. We need to improve compensation. We need to improve working conditions. We need the best people in the country for this purpose.

Q: There are unconfirmed reports today of a coup in Afghanistan with former Prime Minister Babrek Karmel taking over the pro-Soviet backed Government of Amin. Can you confirm whether there has been a coup and if so how it would affect the tension in the Middle East right now?

A: I can't confirm it. There's just been one report from the PARS Radio which is the Iranian Radio Service and if you've watched what happens in Iran, almost every statement is followed by a contradiction or denial. It's clear that there is a great deal of unrest in Afghanistan. It is clear that the Soviets have in recent days greatly expanded their military presence in Afghanistan. It now runs perhaps 10,000 military people including a number of combat units. The Soviets are, by this military intervention, clearly engaged in helping to suppress national and Islamic feelings that have expressed themselves in Afghanistan in terms of instability and conflict. What the details are of what is happening at the top of the Afghan Government, we don't yet know. As you may recall, there was an overthrow of a pro-Soviet Government there by another pro-Soviet Government not very long ago. The so called Taraki regime was overthrown by the Amin regime and in the course of that Taraki died. I think we can expect more of this kind of instability and it's very unfortunate and I think deserving of world condemnation that the Soviets are engaged in fomenting it and in suppressing national feelings.

One more question.

Q: Is the United States contemplating taking counter measures, militarily or otherwise?

A: We do not contemplate military action in an area where we are very unhappy about military intervention by another country, but we certainly protest and we think that international condemnation is in order.

Thank you.

END C-4

News Briefing by
Lieutenant General P. X. Kelley, USMC
Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
at the Pentagon
Wednesday, June 18, 1980

Spokesman: The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force has been going now for about three and a half months, and we thought we'd come in, bring you up to date and let you have a go at us. General Kelley.

Q: On the record?
A: You know I always speak on the record.

As Milt said, I, of course, as many of you know, have moved to Tampa. I get up here about once every week or two. I thought it might be an opportunity to sort of run over, just for your edification, what we are doing in the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. I am well aware of the fact that there have been and possibly still are and always will continue to be many skeptics of the whole concept. Little did I think when I briefed you all on the maritime prepositioning ships last year and we got into a rather lengthly discussion on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, that I would become it. But here I am, trying to answer all of those good questions.

I think, first of all, and I mean this very sincerely, and those of you who know me know that I am sincere when I say these kinds of things, that I think that the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force now, after having some five months of personal association, is unquestionably the most innovative military venture that I have personally seen in 30 years of active service. That it's the first time that I know of that we have ever attempted to establish, in peacetime, a full four-Service, joint Headquarters that has the responsibility not only to plan but to jointly train, to exercise, to prepare to deploy, and finally, actually employ, as the combat command, in combat. So I think in that respect it certainly is unique.

Since the first of March, we have organized the headquarters down in Tampa. We're almost 90 percent filled and I can say, without equivocation, that the personnel that we have from all four Services represent, I think, some of the best talent that these Services have to offer. Each one of them was chosen for his or her personal expertise in a particular functional area. So we have resident at Tampa experts in almost any functional area that you want to consider. And that's Military Airlift Command, Strategic Airlift Command, C^3 electronic warfare, Navy, Marine Corps, almost any area that you want to talk about, we have expertise in that.

We've done a lot since the first of March, in fact, sometimes I have to look around to see where my shirttail is and see if it's catching up with me. As an example, in April we conducted a major employment command post exercise at Fort Bragg. This was a very large exercise. It included all of the component elements of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and these came from all four Services. So we had an Army component, a Marine component, an Air Force component and a Navy component.

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In May, we conducted what people tell me in the Pentagon was the most extensive Joint Chiefs of Staff-directed crisis action exercise in recent history. We were the ones who did all of the planning, all the field planning, all of the field organization and all of the activities to come up with a final plan, which was then ultimately approved by the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

In May, we conducted a very extensive communication exercise, using primarily airborne command and control, at MacDill. And again, this proved to be a very successful exercise, which has led me to the conclusion that today we have the capability of deploying an advanced echelon, which is not only organized, it is now trained and it has the command and control facilities to make it operational.

In June, we conducted a major worldwide JCS-directed deployment exercise, which on paper we deployed the entire Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force to the MIddle East, and I may say again, while we had some difficulties, which we anticipated, that the results in terms of the procedures and the way we have interfaced with all of the members and all of the units of RDJTF, were very encouraging.

In March, I personally visited EUCOM in Germany and had extensive discussions with General Allen on the situation in the Middle East/Persian Gulf.

In April, I was fortunate enough to visit with Admiral Long in PACOM where again, we had extensive discussions on military operations in the Indian Ocean.

I've been fortunate in visiting LANTCOM where we have discussed the use of their forces.

We have visited, or I have visited, the XVIII Airborne Corps at Fort Bragg to look at their readiness; the 82nd Airborne Division, and the 5th Special Forces Group, and I must tell you that I was immensely impressed.

Last week I spent several days with the Strategic Air Command and the 57th Air Division at Minot, North Dakota. This division, incidentally, has been designated as the RDJTF Strategic Projection Force, and this will consist of a number of B-52 H's. My visit included a six-hour B-52 H flight, and when you take one of those, believe me, at low level, you have to be impressed.

Tomorrow, I'm to visit the 101st Air Assault Division at Campbell. As you well know, this is one of the RDJTF units also. They are in the process of converting to the Black Hawk helicopter, which again will improve their capabilities, I think, immensely.

Friday and Saturday, I'm to visit the Red Flag Exercise out in Nellis. Monday, TAC. Tuesday, a Blue Flag Exercise down in Eglin. Next month out with the Marines at Twenty Palms with their 7th MAB. That's the MAB which has been designated as their Near-Term Maritime Prepositioning MAB. And then next month, we'll visit the 24th Division at Fort Steward, Georgia, which has been now designated in lieu of the Fourth MEC Division, and will be the MEC division that will be assigned to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, effective later this summer.

So, frankly, when I weigh all of the pluses and minuses that I have seen, I have to say, in all honesty, that my reaction thus far to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force is not skeptical. In fact, it's on the upbeat side. I think any of you who have gone out and visited the young troops, the young officers, and

the people who are part of these units, will share my view that morale, generally speaking, is very high.

Even though I think we all recognize that there are some significant problems, we are taking some major steps. I think one of the advantages, the great advantages of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, aside from the fact that it did give us a headquarters to command and control the elements of four Services, is the fact that it's allowed one headquarters to focus on the problems of deployment. So we focus not only on the problems inherent in strategic airlift but also strategic sealift and prepositioning, which is sort of the triad of any successful future venture toward rapid deployment.

I think sometimes we are guilty of self-flagellation in that we do not look at the current assets we have. And the current assets are many, as I mentioned to many of you before -- the 70 C-5's, the 234 C-141's and the 490 C-130's. If you add that into the 213 cargo aircraft and 248 passenger aircraft that we have in CRAF Stage 3, which we could get available to us if the President and the Congress so agreed, in 48 hours, you've got a pretty significant capability.

But we have recognized the problems and we are taking steps to improve them. It's not just equipment, however, it's a state of mind. One of the things that the Army, Air Force and Marine Corps units are doing is taking a hard look at their tables of equipment, their equipment lists. We're pruning those down dramatically, taking only those things into combat that we actually require to move, shoot or communicate. There will be no luxury items that will be taken aboard the first several weeks of precious strategic airlift.

We are very encouraged by the action of the Senate Armed Services Committee in the SL-7's. That's not to say we don't think we have a fairly decent capability today. But this will certainly help us if we can get them converted. They can be stationed in someplace like Savannah, Georgia, could help us move the 24th MEC Division. And eight of those ships converted could move a mechanized division, plus an armored brigade, to include 87 percent of their combat service support into the Persian Gulf in some 15 to 18 days. And this includes load and offload.

You all have read about the Near-Term Maritime Prepositioning Ships, and I've discussed with you before, a lot of you, the more mature maritime prepositioning concept. We're also encouraged that the CX did not die in Congress, that it's still alive, possibly not as well as we would like to see it. But it's alive. Also, it appears that the PD-214, now known as the C-8 Sealifter, which is the more mature ship for the Marines, will be in pretty good shape.

We've got problems. Over the years, you've heard the buzz words of the tooth to tail ratio. This was kind of the catchword of the 1970's and I'm the first to admit that I think in our overzealous movement we probably cut out too much of our tail. We've got sharp teeth, but now we need to take a look at the tail once more, and build that up to a level where it can support all of the combat units that we have in the RDJTF. Right now that would be difficult if we did not call up significant numbers of reserve forces.

We believe that for a large-scale conflict, involving the RDJTF, a 50,000-man reserve callup is not sufficient and that we need at least double that to support our operations, if you're going to employ the entire RDJTF.

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We believe our weakest link right now is interoperability and connectivity in command and control between all of the four Services. We will have a joint headquarters with four Services under us. We will be required to communicate not only to them, but also to the next higher echelon, which could be a Commander-in-Chief of a Unified Command or, in all likelihood, would be the National Command Authority here in Washington.

We have discovered, not that we didn't know it, but we've discovered that we've got to move ahead now, and very rapidly, in improving our capability to produce potable water, that we are focused on the Middle East/Persian Gulf and water can be one of our most critical shortfalls. So the Services have identified and are now moving out in their programs, which will overcome this shortfall.

On balance, with all of that said, I still think we have come an awfully long way. We still have a long way to go. But I think we are guilty of underestimating our current capabilities. We've got a lot of reasons to think on the positive side. The trouble with the negative thinkers is all too often they never give me a real-time solution to the problem.

So, speaking as one individual, I think that we in the military have to think in a positive vein. We hope that other people think positively with us. If our friends don't think we're positive, they won't be our friends very long. If our enemies don't think we're positive, they'll be even more formidable enemies. If our neutrals don't think we're positive, then they probably won't be our neutrals much longer. And last of all, and most insiduously, if our own troops don't think we're positive, then we might as well give up.

I think that one of my jobs is to put together this force, with an attitude that we can do the job and I am convinced that we can. I'm convinced also with the utility of a pre-emptive strategy — and a pre-emptive strategy to me means that we get forces into an area rapidly, irrespective of the size, because once you get a force into an area that is not occupied by the other guy, then you have changed the whole calculus of the crisis, and he must react to you, and you not to him. And that is a significantly different problem, particularly for the Soviets.

If he has to react to you and your presence in the area, he's got a problem of a different magnitude. If you've got to react to his presence, then, of course, the big problems are on your side.

So with that said, I'm very happy now to — I probably spoke a little longer than I had anticipated — but I'm very happy to answer any questions.

Q: Do you draw on any lessons at all from the attempted rescue mission? Does that have any bearing on the sort of thing you're trying to do?

A: Don, as you know, we were not at all involved in the attempted rescue mission. That's not our job. So we weren't involved in any of the planning. We have learned a lot of lessons from the communication aspects. The rescue team built up an extensive and extremely capable command and control network. We are looking into that. Other than that, that was strictly a covert operation that was at a much lower order of magnitude, and a different thrust and meaning and mission than we would be involved in. So there will be some peripheral benefits that will come out of it, but there are no direct benefits of any meaningful size.

Q: How large of a pre-emptive force do you think, from a practical standpoint, would represent the kind of a problem that you outlined for the Russians? I mean, putting a brigade in there in four to five days, which is what General Warner has testified, and I assume you agree with, would that constitute enough of a deterrent?

A: Well, that's kind of a question of, I'm not being flippant about it, but how high is up. If you, as an example, put an 82nd Airborne Division batallion, or say a brigade, we could get the lead elements incidentally of a battalion there in something on the magnitude of the order of 48 hours. If you put them in an airfield, we'll say in the vicinity of Abadan in Iran, if you had some indications that the Soviets were going to conduct an airborne assault in that area, it's not the question of the force ratios or the force balance or the force asymmetries, those are all things we get hung up on. It's a question then, and if you can do it in sufficient time so the Soviet commander can bow out gracefully, then you've caused a significant problem for him. It's just not a simple air-landed movement into an airfield. It then involves a direct military confrontation with the United States, irrespective of the size.

Q: Where were those places, Abadan?
A: Abadan, Charlie, which is up, you know, at the head of the Persian Gulf.

Q: I thought you mentioned another one. Was that the only one you mentioned?
A: Abadan is what I'm talking about. In view of the vital Khuzestan oil fields. That's a theoretical —

Q: Your view is that this would be enough to give the Soviets pause and make them think twice. What would prevent them from isolating and — I think these are real questions, these are not theoretical questions. I've heard this theory expressed before by Mr. Komer and others on the Hill, that the presence of any size U.S. force would serve its purpose. I wonder whether or not the Russians couldn't get around that by simply putting a large force in elsewhere, say in Iran, and in fact making the position of that small force of yours untenable, so that you, in fact, would have to pull out, rather than they having to — (inaudible) second thoughts.

A: Without getting into specific numbers and scenarioes, let me say that if you were to give me — and this is sort of a pet peeve of mine — for some reason, and I'm not sure exactly what it is, but for one reason or another, everyone always seems to have the U.S. serviceman sitting at the edge of his foxhole, smoking marijuana or eating Big Macs or doing something like that, while the Soviet is leaning forward in his and he's ready to go to war. I don't subscribe to that thesis. If you give me the same amount of time to deploy my force, as you give the Soviets to build up his Category 2 and Category 3 divisions to mobilize and move his force in that geographical area, then I'll say I can give you a very significant force in that area, in that period of time. And that will give him pause to reflect.

Q: That's a big if, though, isn't it?
A: No, I don't think it's a big if at all.

Q: Given the geography?
A: Given the geography —

Q: He has an Airborne Division doesn't he up there in the Trans Caucuses? He also has tactical air that could presumably come in and ...
A: At the limits of that range. He has an airborne division.

Q: How about the limits of our range?
A: He has an airborne division, which is the only Category I division he has in the whole area. He's got 1400 miles of some of the most tortuous terrian in the world to traverse, through the Zagros Mountains. He's got inhospitable local population. He would have the Kurds on his flank. His problems are not simple, as compared to ours. In a geographic asymmetry, he certainly has an advantage, and there's no question about that. We have to go 7,000 miles and he has to move 1400 kilometers.

Q: Kilometers or miles?
A: Translate that into about — what's 1400 kilometers?

Q: About 1,000 miles.
A: Yes, about 1,000 miles. From Joppa to Abadan would be about 1,000 miles —1400 kilometers.

Q: There's been various figures given of the size of the force you're talking about. When you talk about the rapid deployment forces, how big is it? Can you put a number out?
A: This is kind of a misunderstanding — there is not an upward number, upper limit on the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. Just like NATO has, we have certain forces that are designated priority to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force. As you are well aware, that includes over three Army divisions. It includes a Marine amphibious force. It includes a number of carrier battle groups, a number of P-3 squadrons. It includes a number of Air Force tactical fighter wings. That's sort of the baseline designated force. That's the force that we will be working with on a day-to-day basis. But for those contingencies that require a larger force, that will be then at the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff or the National Command Authority on how large that force would be. There's no upper limit to the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force capability.

Q: How big is this force that you've just described?
A: In terms of numbers? We're talking several hundred thousand people.

Q: And, of those, how many are people who actually would be on the scene, say, if you're talking about putting a force into someplace in the other part of the world, how many of these would actually arrive there?
A: Well, if you're talking about the whole Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, and you give me time to deploy the force, we're talking about the whole force. These are not rear echelon people who are sitting back in the States. These are deployable people.

Q: Some will be on ships and so on?
A: Oh, yes.

Q: I'm talking about troops (inaudible)—
A: Troops on the ground, again, we're getting into — I almost wouldn't rather — I'd rather not speculate. You can probably add up yourself, you've got roughly 20,000 people in an Army division and you've got 50,000 Marines in a MAF, so you can sort of add that up yourself, plus all the tactical fighter wings. We're talking about a very sizeable force.

Q: General, I'm going to (inaudible) on this baseline force. The Marine element of that is —
A: Marine Amphibious Force.

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Q: Which is a division size?

A: It's roughly a 50,000-man division-wing team. It's an air-ground task force. So it's a Marine division and a wing.

Q: General, on this pre-emptive strategy, I've been trying to run quickly through my mind, and I can't remember anytime in modern American history where the Americans have taken ground forces into a potential area of conflict first. We have always been the reactors to things. Has the President signed off on this strategy? And secondly, how do you square this with going to Congress, the War Powers Act, and things like that, where speed is going to be of the essence to you, but you have a political constraint behind you?

A: I think what you're asking are some rather, almost hypothetical questions, in a sense, but let try to --

Q: I don't think they're hypothetical. You think of what happened after the Iranian rescue mission. The first thing that ran up the flagpole was the War Powers Act.

A: I don't think right now, in my opinion, there is an area in the world that is as critical to Western civilization as the Middle East/Persian Gulf. It represents, as you know, 13 percent of our oil, 45 percent of the Germans and 75 percent of the French and Japanese. I do not personally see how, if we lost that, we could not have absolutely catastrophic results in NATO and with the Alliance. And I think to draw lessons or parallels from history really are not totally germane in this case, because I think that the importance of the Persian Gulf to the future well-being of our Nation and future generations is so significant that I do believe it will be recognized, not only by the National Commandy Authority -- it already has been by him -- but also by the Congress.

Q: The President has signed off on this then? This is established policy of the --

A: The President has said he will do everything, everything necessary to keep Middle East/Persian Gulf oil flowing. That's what he said. To say that he personally has endorsed this would not be a true statement. He has not ruled it out. I don't know whether he's endorsed it. He and I have never discussed it.

Q: Well, the Administration support of the whole idea or concept seems to me to carry with it the implicit support of such (inaudible) what I --

Q: It doesn't, that's just the thing that bothers me.

A: What you're saying is, and when I said, hypothetical, probably emotional would be a better -- you're asking for a decision now that will have to be made based on some very, very tight circumstances at the time and --

Q: You are raising the possibility, General, of pre-emptive strike or pre-emptive strategy on the ground is to revolutionize the history of American ground warfare. Can you recall a time that we have ever put ground troops in first, even when we've been warned?

A: Oh, I would say if you probably went back to the early stages of our country on the Barbary Coast and other places you would find some incidents where we have done this, yes. If you're talking about recent times, no. I can't think of any offhand.

(Break in tape.)

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Q: I think you've raised something here that I hadn't heard before and I think it's got enormous consequences, given the immediate past history, say, of Vietnam and the politics of Vietnam in this country, and Congress and so forth. I'm not quarreling with the military strategy of it. I'm talking about the political military aspects of it.

Q: Except for the terminology, wasn't this very scenario laid out by Komer and to some extent Brown, in their testimony?
A: Secretary Brown? I don't recall his. I know Ambassador Komer has laid out that same type of strategy.

Q: Brown has done it in posture statements and in a very long speech on getting there first with the least.

Q: General, could I ask a meat-and-potatoes type question which may not seem important to some of the big thinkers, but it is to me. The President has authority under the law to call up 50,000 reserves, without going to Congress, in an emergency. And you say you would need to double that?
A: We feel now after our experience and what we would need in terms of reserve forces from all four Services, these include Military Airlift Command crews, communications support elements from the National Guard, Reserve, that we feel that the number more closely approximates 100,000.

Q: Are you recommending that Congress be asked to grant this type of legislative authority?

A: (Procedural comments deleted) I believe there is some legislation that's pending right now in the White House, but I'm not sure of the status of it, that does make such a recommendation. (Procedural comments deleted)

Q: That 100,000 would go together with deploying 200,000 RDF troops?
A: That 100,000, George, is additive. That's over and above the force list that we have for the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

Q: Well, would they stay here for reserve or would they go over to Country X?
A: It would depend on their mission. There would be MAC crews. There would be -- what do they call those guys that do all the material handling from MAC --

Voice: LC's.

General Kelley: LC's that would be deployed to other countries.

Q: So 100,000 on top of 200,000?
A: Not necessarily all of those would deploy, George.

Q: Who are the 200,000?
A: When you add it all up, Charlie, you are going to come to a figure that sort of starts pushing around 200,000. That's an approximation.

Q: I thought you said several hundred thousand.
A: Well, several hundred thousand.

Q: Could you just give that arithmetic again?
A: No, ma'am.

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Q: Why not?

A: You're getting down into very specifics on that. I've already given you about as much as we can give you. You've got over three divisions in the Army. You've got a 50,000-man Marine Amphibious Force. You've got several carrier battle groups. You've got a number of tactical fighter wings, plus a host of all sorts of support personnel. But figures start pushing around 200,000. I think we're getting hung up on specific numbers, and I don't think that's germane to the issue.

Q: Let's say the President wanted you for whatever reason to establish a presence at the head of the Persian Gulf, let's say Abadan, just for purposes of illustration. What advantages and disadvantages in comparison do the Russians have? And at what point in time do the lines cross, where you could see yourself having advantages over them?

A: Oh, boy, George, I wouldn't even attempt to answer that question without sitting down with you for about eight hours. That would depend on the world situation, the focus of their attention, whether they felt some kind of a threat in Eastern Europe, whether or not we felt some kind of a threat in Eastern Europe —

Q: Let's put it this way. What advantages and disadvantages do you have and the Russians have in getting 50,000 men to Abadan in two weeks? They obviously have TAC air. They have a border. You've got some things they don't have. Can you give us any kind of feel for (inaudible)?

A: I'm not sure, George, I understand the question. I think we're getting down into a specific scenario and I'm one that doesn't really get hung up on force balances and force asymmetries, like some people do.

Q: Let me put it this way. The object of the question is to find out when we're going to start approaching the Soviet's capability of establishing a presence in the Middle East.

A: George, let me put it this way. If the Soviets wanted to upgrade, say, 40 or 50 Category 2 and 3 divisions, and move them down through Iran, and draw down forces in other parts of the world to do that, then there's no way in God's world that we're going to have the kind of force to cope with that.

Q: Well, what I'm getting at is, there's been talk in this building and on the Hill, come 1983 we'll have a significant capability for the RDF.

A: Well, I think what happened on that — I take a little heat for that one. I think that if anybody is to blame, it came almost from the press conference that I had in December when I was talking about the first MAB being ready to go with new ships in 1983. And that's where the misnomer came. That was talking about a specific program, which was the Maritime Prepositioning Program, with a specific number of ships, and really, at that time, had nothing to do with the RDJTF as such. To say we don't have a capability today just ignores all of the aircraft and all of the ships and all of the things that we have to move a combat force into a particular geographical area.

Q: General, you don't mention the heavy lift shortfall, which no matter how optimistic spin you may put on it, is a continuing problem which will bear on the effectiveness of the kind of force you put in there against the kind of force the Russians put in.

A: The more we can improve upon our strategic airlift and improve upon our strategic sealift, the more basing rights we could get in the Middle East/Persian Gulf area to preposition equipment, all of those things have a profound impact on your ability to move forces rapidly. As an example, one C-4 break bulk ship, loaded with ammunition, equates to 500 C-141 sorties. That's a large number of sorties if you could preposition one break bulk ammunition ship.

So there are a lot of things that you can do in the interim between now and the time we get the full-blown maritime prepositioning ships, between now and the time we hopefully get the CX, and between now and the time we enhance our strategic sealift with ships like the SL-7.

Q: What kind of shape are you in for overflight rights and refueling rights and all the sorts of things you're going to need to get your ammunition and people from here to there?

A: That's almost a day to day problem, Don. A number of countries don't want to give you long-standing overflight rights that are sort of in perpetuity. They like to hold the string out for the particular crisis. But let me say this, that I think at that stage of the game, when we're required to move massive forces into the Middle East/Persian Gulf, I just cannot personally anticipate that any country there will not see the threat to their security as clearly as we see it, and I just can't see that we would be denied the overflight rights.

Q: Is this something that you or State or somebody is working on?

A: It's a constant process, Don. It's not one that you go out to a particular country and you get a blanket clearance in perpetuity for overflight or basing rights. It's one of those things that happens on a case by case basis. And sovereign countries like to keep it that way.

Q: How does this outfit of yours fit into the Readiness Command?

A: Right now, Charlie, we're under the operational command of USCINCRED.

Q: Well, is there any difference? I was just reading the Atlantic Command's assigned forces, I was just reading the Readiness Command's assigned forces, and I just heard yours. It seems to me they're all the same, except for the Atlantic Fleet. You haven't quite got that yet but I dare say you will.

A: We'll get a pretty healthy fan club. (laughter)

No, they're not. Readiness Command has some very distinct missions. It, of course, has the defense of North America, which is quite a large mission. It's got the reinforcement of NATO. It's got the Joint Deployment Agency, which is the new agency it picked up last year, and USCINCRED wears two hats. He's now the Director of the Joint Deployment Agency. And that's the Agency that pulls together all of the transportation operating authorities and their capabilities — that's MAC, MTMC — the Military Transportation Management Command, and MSC, the Military Sealift Command. He works with those in developing the flow — and this is extremely important to us — in developing the flow that's necessary to get your forces in the area as rapidly as possible.

For instance, there's a cutoff line somewhere where it's more, when you can go more rapidly by going by ship, for instance, in a mechanized infantry division, right now. That by the time you could flow that in aircraft, your time would be extremely long and it might be easier to get the whole unit there at once by ship, by leaving early in the game and embarking aboard ship and disembarking in a port of debarkation.

Q: You work for the Readiness Commander, or is he the one you report to?

A: It's an interesting command arrangement. Yes, in terms of peacetime, we are a major subordinate command under the operational command of Readiness Command.

Q: General, Readiness Command is son of Strike Command. Strike Command was created in the early 1960's, partially, I think, for international political impact, and its charter included, it seemed to me, almost the identical things that you're supposed to be doing. You said yours was the first command set up to do these various

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things as well as to lead command forces in the field. Strike also had some command functions in the field. We used to call them MEAFSA.

A: No, that was a geographical area, Middle East South of the Sahara.

Q: Didn't they also have, in broad form and in specific area, all the functions that your task force —

A: First of all, Strike COM was always two Services — Army and Air Force. It never really had the Navy and the Marine Corps. That was LANTCOM. Now we've got four Services tied up under one headquarters. So that's a significant difference. Strike COM as Strike COM was not a deployable headquarters that was meant to actually deploy and employ forces in the field.

Q: General, you referred a couple of minutes ago to going in with the invitation of the host country. Would this always and invariably be the case, or might there be circumstances, for example, protecting the Iranian oil fields, where there wouldn't be an explicit invitation, in fact, there might not even be any desire on the part of the host country?

A: Well, the only answer, you know, you're getting into some military political questions. The only answer one can give to that is that we will go into any country under circumstances when it's at the direction of the President, by and with the consent of the Congress. I can't give you any better answer than that.

Q: How soon are your ships going to be ready, the ones that are at Wilmington?

A: They're sailing next month. July, They should be in the Indian Ocean, I think, by mid-July.

Q: Are you going to bring some Marines over to test out how quickly they could marry up?

A: We're working that problem right now, Don, in working a flow sequence, for the Marines. They're working it right now at Twenty-Nine Palms, to work up some training exercises where we can actually work the Marines with their ships.

Q: I wonder how you would get permission for a realistic scenario for them to do this in the Indian Ocean (inaudible)

A: It would depend on the port, obviously. If it's in a friendly port, where we ca just use it as a routine training exercise, there's no problem. Did you have a specific question on it?

Q: Yes. Actually what I had in mind all along is the next step beyond placing seven prepositioned ships somewhere near Diego Garcia with the equipment for 12,000 Marines, and then the question in my mind, looking at the seemingly obvious reluctance of Oman and Somalis, and maybe even Kenya, to allowing anything more than quote "access," I was wondering how you would then in a practical sense, marry up your Marines flown from say the United States with that equipment in the near term? And I'm talking about (inaudible)

A: For a training exercise? Are you talking about for an operational? For operational you still have to have the invitation of that host nation to do that. For a training exercise, I can do it in any number of places. I can do it in Northern Australia. I can do it in Subic Bay. I can do it anywhere. But for an actual operation, this would have to be with the invitation of a host nation.

Q: And that seems to me an element that has not yet been addressed, at least as far as I'm aware, that we would at this point be assured that there's some place along that critical area where we could do that actual marrying up. You've got an island 2300 miles from the Straits of Hormuz.

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A: Again, it's funny how attitudes do change when people are put under tremendous duress, that they would more than welcome the opportunity to have a 12,000-Marine brigade.

Q: Can I get very straight, just before we leave it on this reserves? You figure you need 100,000 reserves to back up a sizable deployment of the RDF. Now, would those 100,000 be drill units of the Army, Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, be active Reserves, or are these going to be the IRR, so every guy in America doesn't call up the newspapers and say am I going to be called up? In other words, what units are you talking about and how long would they be kept on active duty? The current limitation is 90 days, I believe, isn't it?

A: George, the list is as long as your arm. Right. It's 90 days. And to say how long they would be called up, I can't even give you a decent answer on that one. We feel that we have identified a requirement for — this is primarily Reserve units, it's not IRR, primarily Reserve and National Guard Units that could approach a number approximating the 50,000 — i.e., it could approach roughly 100,000 people.

Q: And not any IRR? These will all be ready Reserve guys attached to drill units, right?

A: Well, as you well know, with the IRR, some people pulled out of the IRR to go into units. But primarily we're talking at the unit level and not at the individual level.

Q: In all four Services?

A: In all four Services.

Q: General, you've been talking here about the progress you've made since January or whatever. I remember an unnamed senior official standing where you are now, I think it was along about December or January, and you were sitting over where Milt is and gave us a rundown of what could be done then. Would you compare that with what you think you can do now, rather specifically, in areas of progress?

A: I'd rather not, to be very candid about it. I think we've come a significantly long way and I think that was his privilege in saying that. That would be much like you asking my Soviet counterpart if he was standing here, how long would it take to move his rapid deployment force, and you were a member of TASS, and I think you'd probably be locked up, but that's beside the point. The simple point is that I think now, to get into those kinds of numbers where we have come to this point, and to make them part of the public record, I think is manifestly wrong to our national strategy. I don't even think it's germane to the issue, frankly. You can speculate all you want, but I don't think it's germane.

Q: What then, is your biggest problem? I mean, you talk about hardware and communications, so forth. What is your biggest priority to fix? You talk about morale, too.

A: Our biggest problem comes in the mobility side. In other words, to make us more rapid, hopefully, you don't think we're not rapid. To make us more rapid, we do need all of those enhancements in the strategic mobility side, to include the prepositioning. That's the biggest problem. Morale, in the sense of —

Q: Well, you said it. Take my word for it. You said that morale was generally very good, but although you have some significant problems.

A: Well, no. I'm sorry. I'm glad you brought that up. Morale is very good. And then I had a period and I closed out that sentence and paragraph. Then I said, now we have some significant problems, which I went into.

Q: I don't understand how — you talk about a strategic projection force. How does that fit in with what you're doing?

A: You mean the SAC Strategic Projection Force?

Q: Yes. You talked about the B-52 H's. Wouldn't they go in first and clear -- how does it work?

A: You could use the B-52 H's in a conventional mode, with iron bombs, and they can go in and attack any number of troops. They can attack billeting areas, they can attack runways, they can attack taxiways, airfields, any good area target. They can attack with devastating effectiveness.

Q: But then, if they do do this, and you're 48 hours behind, there seems to me there's a lag in there.

A: Well, what you're trying to do is to wrap into one scenario. I didn't mean to infer that we would be 48 hours behind. That would be part of the force that would be in the area. Certainly SAC can deploy very rapidly. So we would be in the area, and the Strategic Projection Force, which is a part of SAC, but a part that's designated now to support the RDJTF, would be in support.

Q: How many B-52's do you have?

A: That's classified.

Q: But why are they using H's rather than D's for this kind of job?

A: The H has a much better capability for low-level penetration, and what we hope to do is ultimately modify the bird to carry the large numbers of iron bombs.

Q: Do tactical nukes look attractive for deployment?

A: I wouldn't touch that with a ten-foot pole.

Q: Aren't those B-52's cruise missile-carrying airplanes, the B-52 H's? What happens if there's a big nuclear crisis going on and we need these airplanes for that job?

A: Then the priority of effort goes as the National Command Authority dictates. You know, that may sound like a flippant answer, but that's the way it goes.

Q: Are you looking at other parts of the world in drawing your plans, besides the Middle East now, are you drawing plans for --

A: While our primary focus, Don, is on the Middle East/Persian Gulf, we consider that to be probably the critical area, but that does not rule out the fact that we should and must look at other areas that we see as potential trouble spots or crisis areas.

Q: Have you done it yet or are you still (inaudible)?

A: Yes, we have.

Q: On your May Airborne Command and Control exercise, can you give us some more details on that and tell us how it related to the lessons you learned from the Iranian rescue thing? You said the communications, there were some good things to learn from that.

A: There was no relationship to that. I said the thing that we learned from the Iranian rescue operation is the availability of some very fine items of command and control hardware, particularly communications equipment. That had nothing to do with the communication exercise that we conducted in May, which was a communication exercise involving our advanced echelon of the RDJTF, which is that echelon that would go in initially to provide the command and control facilities for the RDJTF. That was an extensive exercise, using all types of aerial platforms that we know that are available, and was immensely successful.

Q: You've talked about how large the Rapid Deployment Force might be. How small might it be before it drops back into a commando-type raid operation which you people wouldn't be involved in?

A: It can go anywhere from a battalion to a multi-corps. And an example of that is, if you have a battalion that is moving into a sensitive area, a crisis area, and you want to have follow-on or you think you may have requirement for follow-on forces, then I've got to have an advanced echelon in there to determine the requirements. So, therefore, it wouldn't be the full-blown RDJTF Headquarters but it would be sufficient people to give me a command and control element.

Q: Is the Marine Division an assigned one or could it be any one of the three?

A: The Marine Amphibious Force, Charlie, can be any one of the three.

Q: These other areas that you're looking at, do they include — can you tell us what they are? Do they include the Caribbean, or Northeast Asia, or —

A: Don, they're worldwide.

Q: Why did you switch from the 4th Division to the 24th?

A: Geographical location, primarily. The 24th is going to be near a port.

Q: You just ran an exercise with them.

A: 24th? Yes. Ship-loading exercise.

Q: How did that go?

A: Very successful. Lots of problems. You know, we lose our expertise over the years just in loading ships — chalking and tie downs and all those things, but the problems are identified and I think it was an immense success.

Q: You called the 24th a mechanized division. Is it?

A: Yes. It is now.

Q: How long has that been —

A: It's just converting, Charlie. And it won't be converted until 1 October. Fully converted.

Q: I want to pursue this Marine Amphibious Force, because if it's any one of the Marine Divisions — if you don't mind putting your Marine Corps hat on for a moment — the Marine Corps has got Scandinavian missions or would like to think it has Central European missions, it's got Southern Flank missions. And I don't see how you could have a MAF assigned or earkmarked for your operation, unless you know which one it is. Suppose you wind up with one that's got all the cold weather gear?

A: But you know, they're not standing in the barracks with their cold weather gear on. What we're saying is that for each contingency plan, Charlie, that we will have forces, Marine forces assigned to support that contingency plan. Now, example, the Marine amphibious unit that deploys periodically into the Indian Ocean, that may in one time come from the East Coast, another time come from Okinawa, and another time even come from the West Coast. That's what we are saying. We won't know until the time of actual commitment, the actual flag that will be a part of the RDJTF.

Q: But any given time there will be an assigned MAF?

A: Yes. Absolutely. There's one MAF available to me for planning purposes.

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Q: General, did I understand you to say that you would have a problem in what you would need in the way of Reserves for any rapid deployment?
A: Well, the problem is we would like to up the ante in the Reserve callup and go from 50,000 to roughly 100,000.

Q: You don't anticipate a problem in raising them, since there is a shortfall of Reservists?
A: There will be obvious shortfalls of capabilities that each unit will have, but I don't anticipate a major shortfall.

Q: Is the Reserve where the correction of the tooth to tail imbalance comes in, is that what you're thinking of?
A: The Reserves can provide us with a tremendous capability to help us correct that.

Q: General, is the concept of having a kind of a grab-bag of forces that could be assigned to the unified and specified commanders in various parts of the world where they have something, some need to use them, has that been changed so that instead your headquarters would actually employ these forces, and not the, say the Commander in the Pacific or the Commander in Europe?
A: That would almost certainly depend upon the situation. Needless to say, there are areas in the world that we will operate that belong to another unified comander. Has to be. Now, whether or not that will be carved out and given directly to the Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force or whether or not that will be still part of that unified commander's responsibility, remains to be seen, depending upon the particular circumstances in the geographical location. It's a fuzzy answer, but that's the answer.

Q: What are you all doing about the water situation? One of the seven ships is loaded with nine million gallons of it, and you said the Services were moving ahead on curing this problem. What is it desalinization?
A: They're working on every aspect that you can conceivably think of. They have now a Water Action Group. Not a study group. A water Action Group.

Q: A WAG?
A: A WAG, thank you. (Laughter)

Q: That used to have another meaning.
A: Thank you, Charlie. They're looking at desalinization. They're looking at well digging. They're looking at the reverse osmosis machine, which is —

Q: I don't even want to know what that is. (Laughter.)
A: It's probably the most revolutionary of all.

Q: Oh, really?
A: And they're looking at every conceivable way that we can provide that essential water to the troops.

Q: You save yourself one freighter then, is what it amounts to, if you do get the (inaudible).
A: Well, we're making presumption that there's no water — first of all, how much water do you have, you have to tell me where we are, and you're making a presumption that's not available.

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Q: Well, let's say for the 1800-man Marine Amphibious Group. How long can they last on the water that you have?

A: For the 12,000-man MAB, take roughly 10 gallons per man, per day and 12,000, you get nine million gallons aboard ships, and you can do the arithmetic.

Press: Thank you very much.

General Kelley: Thanks.

—END—

Remarks Prepared for Delivery by
Lieutenant General Paul X. Kelley, USMC
Commander, Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force
Before National Security Commission
The American Legion,
Boston, Massachusetts
August 16, 1980

On the edge of the Stony Brook Reservation, not too many miles from where we are right now, sits a magnificent playing field--football, baseball, track, soccer--day or night--it has it all. This field is named in honor of a great American, a man who had been a very active and well known legionnaire in this area until he died in the service of his country during World War II.

This great legionnaire had a profound impact on the lives of everyone with whom he came in contact. Personally, I would not be standing here today were it not for him! The field is named in the honor of Major (b)(6) Major (b)(6) a proud legionnaire, was my father.

So you see, my ties with the American Legion are deep and remain solid. For this reason, and the fact that I have unswerving respect for the basic ideals you represent, I was deeply honored at your invitation to be with you today.

When I was nominated last December to be the first Commander of the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, I had very mixed emotions. On the one hand, I have spent an abnormal number of years in assignments away from the Marine Corps--two tours with the Navy, one of which was with a Marine detachment aboard a heavy cruiser; a tour with the Army as the Senior Marine Corps Representative at the U.S. Army Infantry School; a tour with the Air Force as a student at the Air War College; a tour with the Royal Marines; and a tour with the Joint Chiefs of Staff just prior to my selection to Brigadier General. On the other hand, the challenge of organizing such a force for the first time in the history of our country was overwhelming. I can say, in all honesty, I have not experienced a dull moment since the 14th of January.

The Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force, or RDJTF as we call it, provides a new and vital dimension to the capabilities of our general purpose forces.

In my view, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force transmits a strong and powerful signal:

--To the Soviets it says that we will not tolerate military adventurism. Such threats to our friends and allies may constitute an assault on the vital interests of the United States, and when they do, we have a military capability to respond.

--To our friends and allies, it says we are indeed a nation to be reckoned with. We are not a "paper tiger."

--To our young men and women in our Armed Forces, it says that we have confidence in your ability under any and all circumstances to do the job.

--And, finally, to the American public it says that we, as a nation, have not forgotten our friends and allies, and that we have recognized the importance to the United States of the developing regions of the world.

As you well know, since the end of World War II the United States has undertaken extraordinary measures to bolster the European alliance. In my judgment, this has been the proper course, even though we might argue and debate on "how much is enough."

During the last decade and a half, however, we have seen the Soviets developing a more global perspective in their military capabilities, especially in Africa and Southwest Asia. In simple language, then, the RDJTF is intended to counterbalance these capabilities--in other words, to deter Soviet aggression and to promote stability in these developing regions of the world.

As you well know, Soviet intervention, through proxies in Angola and Ethiopia, or directly in the case of Afghanistan, has emerged as a new and disturbing threat. We, as a nation, cannot ignore the new Soviet overseas military capabilities, or the string of Soviet bases and forces to the north of Turkey, Iran and (now) Pakistan. They call for new and effective U.S. responses, and the Rapid Deployment Force is one such response.

I should pause here for a moment, however, to emphasize that the concept of a Rapid Deployment Force is not so new. It had, as its genesis, a study conducted in 1977. This study highlighted the need for a four-Service force which could deploy rapidly for contingencies outside NATO and Korea. With the emphasis at the time being focused primarily on bolstering NATO, the creation of such a force was placed logically on the "back burner." There is no doubt that events last year in the Middle East "energized the system," and, consequently, the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force was activated on March first of this year.

There are many misconceptions of the RDJTF, so let me, as the Commander, put some of it in proper perspective.

First, basically we are a global force designed to cope with contingencies outside NATO and Korea. Due to events in the Middle East and the critical importance of the Persian Gulf, however, it is quite natural that this region captures much of our attention.

The President in his State of the Union speech made clear the United States' determination to respond to threats on our vital interests in the Persian Gulf region. He said that any attempt by outside force to gain control of the Persian Gulf region will be regarded as an assault on the vital interests of the United States and that any such assault will be repelled by any means necessary--including military force.

The United States is heavily dependent on oil from the Persian Gulf area. 13 percent of the oil consumed in the United States comes from the Persian Gulf.

Our allies depend even more heavily on it. Germany, for example, gets 45 percent of its oil from the Persian Gulf. Japan and France both import three-fourths of their oil from the region.

If that oil were not available, the effect on the economies of Western Nations and Japan would be catastrophic.

Even if we could find a way to eliminate our dependence on oil from the Persian Gulf, our security problems wouldn't be solved. Our security is tied directly and irrevocably to that of our allies and friends. As long as they are dependent, so are we.

Furthermore, we are strongly concerned with the security of our friends in the region regardless of oil. We are vitally interested in the independence of sovereign states and their freedom from Soviet domination. They are principally responsible for stability and security in the region. But they cannot singularly or together stand up to a Soviet threat. Only the United States can play this role.

There are a number of threats to the security of the Persian Gulf. But the most serious of them is the Soviet Union's military power--and the will the Soviet Union has shown to use that power as an aggressive instrument of national power.

The best defense against Soviet aggression in the Persian Gulf is a network of strong, independent and stable nations. Collective security, in other words. That is the responsibility of the nations of the region, but it is one the United States is prepared to assist in--diplomatically, economically, and, if necessary, militarily.

The RDJTF can buttress collective security, although I want you to know that our military effort is but a part of a broader effort which includes a range of important diplomatic and economic initiatives. In the aggregate, these are designed to protect the

vital interests of the United States, its friends and its allies in the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

With that said, it becomes obvious that the RDJTF is uniquely dependent on strategic mobility means, both airlift and sealift, and the cooperation of our friends in the region--both for facilities and diplomatic support.

Unlike the Soviets, we do not have--nor do we seek--a permanent base structure near the Middle East. Navy and Marine forces can be forward deployed in time of crisis without a requirement for en route basing, overflight rights, or forward operating bases. But all other forces, together with their supplies and equipment, must now move by air or ship. And I need not remind you that the distance from the United States to the Persian Gulf is 7000 air miles, or that it takes 3-4 weeks for a ship to move from the East Coast to the region.

But let me not give you the wrong impression. The task is difficult but not impossible. The only alternative to the Rapid Deployment Force is nothing--and nothing is a "gilt-edged" invitation to the Soviet Union for further excursions like Afghanistan. Frankly, I don't like that alternative!

We have available to the RDJTF right now a balanced force which can, in a relative sense, deploy quite rapidly.

--We have carrier battle groups, two of which are deployed right now in the Indian Ocean.

--We have a Marine Amphibious Force--together with the necessary amphibious shipping to move this 50,000 man integrated air-ground team--which could commence movement when early warnings are received...and could be positioned off-shore independent of bases--to act as a strong deterrent or to move ashore when and where needed.

--We have seven maritime prepositioning ships already on station in the Indian Ocean. These ships are loaded with the heavy equipment and supplies needed to support a 12,000-man Marine Amphibious Brigade during an initial period of operations.

--We have 70 C-5, 234 C-141, and 490 C-130 aircraft for both inter- and intra-theater movement of a multi-division force from the U.S. Army. This includes a combination of airborne, air-assault, mechanized, armor, ranger, and special forces capabilities. These same aircraft will assist in the movement of an extensive U.S. Air Force Tactical Air Force--to include F-111's, A-7's, A-10's, F-15's, F-4's, F-16's--not to mention a conventional strategic projection force of B-52's from the Strategic Air Command.

My bottom line is never underestimate the capabilities of our military. That's not to say, however, that I believe we have enough. To do the job better we need more, particularly amphibious shipping and strategic airlift and sealift.

Now that I've told you how we would get there, it may be proper to tell you what we do after we arrive.

The Rapid Deployment Force is designed for flexibility. In other words, we organize around the building block principle, which means we could respond to minor as well as major contingencies.

Basically, however, we are preeminently a force to deter... and, if deterrence fails, to repel overt Soviet military aggression. We are not a force designed to intrude on the sovereign rights of any nation! Quite to the contrary, we are designed to insure that these same sovereign rights are maintained and protected.

Let me give you an example. Suppose the Soviets, or any other aggressor for that matter, seriously threatens the security of country "X", and United States' assistance is requested. Obviously, our first reaction will be an attempt to solve the problem through diplomatic means.

Should diplomacy fail we are then faced with two options:

--The first is to fall back and do nothing. In the Middle East and Persian Gulf that could be catastrophic to our future well-being.

--The other is to deploy rapidly and upon invitation a credible force--the RDJTF--as a deterrent. For lack of a better phrase, I refer to this as "circumspect presence." This "circumspect presence" transmits a signal to the Soviet Union that any further movements on their part could result in direct confrontation with the United States. This, needless to say, has two by-products. First, it changes the whole calculus of the crisis for the Soviets, and, second, it demonstrates to our friends and allies that we are willing to use force if necessary. In short, the Rapid Deployment Force puts sharp and lethal teeth in the United States' foreign policy for the Middle East and Persian Gulf.

How rapid is the Rapid Deployment Force? If the United States is invited, how fast can we get forces into the Persian Gulf region?

--We can put the first tactical air there in a matter of hours, some of it land-based and some of it from the carriers offshore.

--We can put the first battalion of the 82d Airborne there inside 48 hours, with the entire division following in less than two weeks.

--And if you give me the same amount of time to deploy my force that you give the Soviet Union to build up their undermanned and under-equipped divisions and then move them into the area, I can give you a very significant force in the area.

With the foregoing as a foundation, let me be a bit more specific about the Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force.

As I implied at the outset, it is unique in our history. It is the first time that a permanent, fully manned Joint Task Force Headquarters has been organized in peacetime with designated forces from all four services.

Our mission is to plan for, jointly train and exercise, and be prepared to deploy and employ combat forces from the Army, Navy, Air Force and Marine Corps.

We have a truly integrated four-service staff headquarters at MacDill Air Force Base in Tampa, and a four-Service RDJTF Liaison Office with the Joint Chiefs of Staff in Washington. This essential office provides us with the Washington level interface so essential for effective crisis management. Our deputy commander is an Air Force Major General, and our chief of staff an Army brigadier general. So, no matter how you look at us you see nothing but "purple," the color we in the military use to identify joint activities.

While we have been officially established for less than six months, you wouldn't know it by what we've accomplished.

Since then we have conducted a major command post employment exercise involving all four major service components, participated in a very extensive JCS worldwide crisis management exercise, operationally tested our complex deployment communications capabilities, and conducted a major, simulated JCS-directed deployment exercise. Additionally, I have visited all of the major commanders involved with the RDJTF, senior and subordinate alike, in Europe, the Pacific, and the United States.

My conclusion is simply this: Even though we have recognized shortcomings in our military establishment, we have hundreds of thousands of superb young Americans in uniform today who have the patriotism, guts, dtermination, and professionalism you had when you were wearing those uniforms. I can't afford the luxury of sitting about hawking over what we need in the future. Even though I support and applaud those who do, I must make do with what I have been given here and now--and the best way to do this is through the harmonization of the many combat capabilities we have extant in all four services. My association with the Rapid Deployment Force--and an intimate association it's been--has convinced me that this is the most innovative and essential military venture I have experienced in over 30 years of active service to my country.

I don't want to paint an overly optimistic picture of the capabilities of the RDJTF. It is not the "do all, be all." Like any military organization, it has its own capabilities and limitations, and as the commander I am acutely aware of "both sides of the coin." But quite frankly, I am fed-up with the "gloom and doom" prophets who have every Soviet soldier leaning forward in his foxhole---and every American fighting man (or woman) sitting on his or her backside not giving a damn. I have nothing but the utmost respect and admiration for the young men and women in the Armed Forces today. Despite the obvious hardships which they endure almost daily, somehow or other their dedication and patriotism shines through. God bless them. They deserve the very best this country can give them!

As you may have gathered by now, I am by my very nature a positive thinker. But so were a few gutsy fellow Americans who stood by a bridge not far from here over 200 years ago--against a superior force which was better equipped and trained. They fired a shot heard "round the world," a shot which resulted in the birth of our nation.

I sometimes wonder where we would be today if the "gloom and doom" experts had been around during the revolutionary war--World War I --or World War II.

If the modern day analysts had looked at places like Tarawa, Iwo and Normandy, they would tell us that the "force asymmetries are such that you can't do it." Well, we did it, you did it, and we were successful.

The only alternative I see to a positive, yet realistic, approach is for me to hunker down and say that the job is impossible. Well, the job isn't impossible--not when you've got well over 200,000 people behind you who are willing, eager, and capable.

In closing, from the viewpoint of an old infantryman who has spent many nights of his life in a foxhole, I would like to ask that this commission undertake an examination of more and better ways to improve the quality of life for our enlisted men and women and junior officers. Of all my concerns for the military establishment of the future, this one stands head and shoulders above all.

I must admit to some very strong emotions, today. Standing before this very prestigious group merely serves as a reminder that it has been a long road since a young 14 year old saw your fellow legionnaires implant the emblem of the American Legion over the newly closed grave of his father. But our country has been kind--thanks, in no small measure, to the superb contributions of this commission. I hope that it is enough to say a humble but very sincere--THANK YOU!

APPENDIX F

WLO PERSONNEL ROSTER

CPAG MEMBERS

Colonel	(b)(6)	USAF
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USAF
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USAF
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
LCDR	(b)(6)	USN

CRG MEMBERS

Colonel	(b)(6)	USAF
Colonel	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USAF
Mr.	(b)(6)	Civilian
Lt Col	(b)(6)	USA

WLO MEMBERS

NAME/RANK/COMPONENT	DOA	DUTY TITLE
(b)(6) CAPT, USN	14 Jul 80	Chief, Contingency Plans Div.
(b)(6) LT COL, USAF	20 Jun 80	Airlift Officer
(b)(6) MAJ, USAF	19 Jun 80	Intelligence Officer
(b)(6) LTC, USA	21 Jul 80	Africa Staff Officer
(b)(6) Jr., SFC, USA	2 May 80	Intelligence NCO
(b)(6) COL, USAF	15 May 80	Chief, POL-MIL Div.
(b)(6) LTC, USA	1 Jul 80	MidEast Staff Officer
(b)(6) LT COL, USMC	23 Jun 80	Marine Corps Plans Officer
(b)(6) LT COL, USMC	14 Jul 80	SW Asia Staff Officer
(b)(6) LTC, USA	25 Jun 80	Army Plans/Spec Ops Officer
(b)(6) SSGT, USAF	13 May 80	Admin Technician
(b)(6) LT COL, USAF	25 Jun 80	Air Force Plans Officer
(b)(6) LTC, USA	24 Jul 80	SW Asia Staff Officer
(b)(6) COL, USA	25 Aug 80	Deputy Director
(b)(6) YNC, USN	18 Aug 80	Admin Supervisor
(b)(6) LCDR, USN	25 Jul 80	Sealift Officer
VESSER, Dale A., BG, USA	25 Mar 80	Director
(b)(6) LT COL, USAF	25 Mar 80	MidEast Staff Officer
(b)(6) CDR, USN	15 Feb 81	Navy Planner

As of 31Dec80

HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

STAFF SECTION	RANK	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
		AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
RDCC	OFF			1	1	1	2			2	3				
	ENL	2	1				2	1		3	3				
	TOT	2	1	1	1	1	4	1		5	6	1	1	6	7
RDDC	OFF							2	2	2	2				
	ENL														
	TOT							2	2	2	2	1	1	3	3
RDCS	OFF	2	1			1	1	1	1	4	3				
	ENL	1		1				1		3	0				
	TOT	3	1	1		1	1	2	1	7	3			7	3
RDSJS	OFF		1								1				
	ENL		2		1				2		5				
	TOT		3		1				2		6				6
RDJ1	OFF	1	1	1	1		1	2	2	4	5				
	ENL	1	1	1	1			2	2	4	4				
	TOT	2	2	2	2		1	4	4	8	9			8	9
RDJ2	OFF	8	8	4	4	2	2	8	10	22	24				
	ENL	9	9	4	6	5	5	13	12	31	32				
	TOT	17	17	8	10	7	7	21	22	53	56			53	56
RDJ3	OFF	20	19	12	10	7	8	14	13	53	50				
	ENL	10	10	2	1	3	3	7	7	22	21				
	TOT	30	29	14	11	10	11	21	20	75	71			75	71
RDJ4	OFF	6	6	3	3	1	1	4	4	14	14				
	ENL	1	1			1	1	2	2	4	4				
	TOT	7	7	3	3	2	2	6	6	18	18			18	18
RDJ5	OFF	3	5	3	4	2	2	4	3	12	14				
	ENL	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	2	5	5				
	TOT	4	6	4	5	3	3	6	5	17	19			17	19

HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

STAFF SECTION	RANK	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
		AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
RDJ6	OFF	3	3	1	1	1	1	2	2	7	7				
	ENL	3	3	1	1	1	1	3	3	8	8				
	TOT	6	6	2	2	2	2	5	5	15	15			15	15
RDHC	OFF	1	2			1	1			2	3				
	ENL	11	12	2	2	4	5	3	3	20	22				
	TOT	12	14	2	2	5	6	3	3	22	25			22	25
RDDA	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL	1	1					1	1	2	2				
	TOT	2	2					1	1	3	3			3	3
RDAG	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL	1		2	2	2	1	4	5	9	8				
	TOT	2	1	2	2	2	1	4	5	10	9			10	9
RDLA	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL							1	1	1	1				
	TOT	1	1					1	1	2	2			2	2
RDCO	OFF	1	2							1	2				
	ENL														
	TOT	1	2							1	2			1	2
RDPA	OFF			1	1					1	1				
	ENL							1	1	1	1				
	TOT			1	1			1	1	2	2			2	2
RDPM	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL														
	TOT	1	1							1	1			1	1
RDMS	OFF	1	1							1	1				
	ENL														
	TOT	1	1							1	1			1	1

HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

STAFF SECTION	RANK	ARMY		NAVY		USMC		USAF		TOTAL MILITARY		US CIVILIAN		TOTAL	
		AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD	AUTH	ASGD
RDWL	OFF	6	6	3	2	2	2	5	5	16	15				
	ENL	1	1	1	1			1	1	3	3				
	TOT	7	7	4	3	2	2	6	6	19	18			19	18
CCAG	OFF		1		1				2		4				
	ENL				1						1				
	TOT		1		2				2		5				5
HQ TOTAL	OFF	56	60	29	28	18	21	42	44	145	153				
	ENL	42	42	15	17	17	19	42	42	116	120				
	TOT	98	102	44	45	35	40	84	86	261	273	1	1	263	275
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														
	OFF														
	ENL														
	TOT														

UNCLASSIFIED

UNCLASSIFIED

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
COMMAND ELEMENT	7	6		13			7	6		13			10	15	3	28	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
(PROTOCOL SHOWN AS SEPERATE SPECIAL STAFF)																	
TOTAL	7	6		13	13		7	6		13	13		10	15	3	28	28
WASHINGTON LIASION OFFICE (WLNO)																	
OFFICE OF CHIEF	2	1		3			2	1		3			2	1		3	
MIL PLAN DIV	7	1		8			7	1		8			7	1		8	
CONTINGENCY PL DIV	7	1		8			7	1		8			7	1		8	
DEPLOYMENT SEC													5	1		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	16	3		19	19		16	3		19	19		21	4		25	25
J-1 PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	1			1			1			1			2	2		4	
CIVILIAN PERSONNEL														4	9	13	
PERSONNEL SERVICES	1	3		4			1	3		4			3	22		25	
PLANS/POLICY	2	1		3			2	1		3			9	8		17	
SERVICES													7	15		22	
MORALE, WELFARE , REC													6	26		32	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	3		4							

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
TOTAL	4	4		8	8		5	7		12	12		27	77	9	113	113
J-2 INTELLIGENCE DIRECTOR	1	3		4			1	3		4			1	4		5	
PLANS/PROGRAMS/SSO	6	9		15			6	9		15			11	20		31	
OPERATIONS	11	14		25			11	14		25			18	12		30	
CRYPTO													3	1		4	
FUSION CENTER													12	24		36	
I&W CENTER													2	14		16	
COLLECTION MGT	2	3		5			2	3		5			2	4		6	
SYSTEMS BRANCH													5	2		7	
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE	2	2		4			2	2		4							
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							7			7			7	6		13	
TOTAL	22	31		53	53		29	31		60	60		61	87		148	148
J-3 OPERATIONS DIRECTOR	1	2		3			1	2		3			4	4		8	
CURRENT OPS DIV	20	14		34			20	14		34			41	24		65	
SPECIAL OPS	9	2		11			9	2		11			9	2		11	
EXERCISE DIV	20	4		24			20	4		24			15	5		20	
COMMAND & CONTROL													16	11		27	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	STAND ALONE OFF	STAND ALONE ENL	STAND ALONE CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES						1			1						
TOTAL	50	22		72	72	52	22		74	74	85	46		131	131
J-4 LOGISTICS DIRECTOR	2	3		5		2	3		5		6	1		7	
MIL ENGINEER/FACIL	6			6		6			6		4	4		8	
JOINT OFFICE	6	1		7		6	1		7		46	55		101	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES															
TOTAL	14	4		18	18	14	4		18	18	56	60		116	116
J-5 PLANS/POLICY DIRECTOR	1	5		6		1	5		6		3	3	1	7	
PLANS	10			10		10			10		14	8		22	
POLICY	1			1		1			1		15	5		20	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES															
TOTAL	12	5		17	17	12	5		17	17	32	16	1	44	49

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
J-6 COMM ELETRONICS DIRECTOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			2	2		4	
OPERATIONS	3	5		8			3	5		8			12	13		25	
ENGINEERING	3	2		5			3	2		5			8	15		23	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							2			2							
TOTAL	7	8		15	15		9	8		17	17		22	30		52	52
ADJ GENERAL																	
AG	1	9		10			1	9		10			1	2		3	
ADMIN SERVICES													2	21		23	
PUBLICATIONS													1	13		14	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES								3		3							
TOTAL	1	9		10	10		1	12		13	13		4	36		40	40
DATA AUTOMATION	1	2		3			1	2		3			2	11		13	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								4		4							
TOTAL	1	2		3	3		1	6		7	7		2	11		13	13
PROTOCOL	1			1	1		1			1	1		3	2		5	5
PROVOST MARSHAL	1			1	1		1			1	1		6	3		9	9

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE			SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
	OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV				OFF	ENL	CIV		
MEDICAL SERVICES	1			1			1			1			12	11		23	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							
TOTAL	1			1	1		2			2	2		12	11		23	23
INSPECTOR GENERAL (ADDITIONAL DUTY TO J-6)													3	2	1	6	6
LEGAL ADVISOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			6	6		12	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							2			2							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								1		1							
TOTAL	1	1		2	2		3	2		5	5		6	6		12	12
COMPTROLLER	1			1			1			1			2	3		5	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	1		2							
TOTAL	1			1	1		2	1		3	3		2	3		5	5
PUBLIC AFFAIRS DIRECTOR	1	1		2			1	1		2			2	1		3	
PLANS/POLICY													2	2		4	
MEDIA OPS & SUPPORT													6	7		13	
PHOTO													1	5		6	
INTERNAL INFO													4	5		9	

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE OFF	STAND ALONE ENL	STAND ALONE CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1	1		2							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1	7		8							
TOTAL	1	1		2	2		3	9		12	12		15	20		35	35
WEATHER (MAC)							6	12		18	18						
HQ CMDT																	
HQ STAFF	2	9		11			2	9		11			5	41		46	
INTERNAL SECURITY		11		11				11		11				26		26	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							3	34		37							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	2	20		22	22		5	54		59	59		5	67		72	72
HQ RDJTF TOTAL	142	116		258	258		169	182			351		372	496	14		882
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								62		62	62		2	113		115	
TOTAL								62		62	62		2	113		115	115

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		STAND ALONE OFF	STAND ALONE ENL	STAND ALONE CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
TEAM AUGMENTEES																	
EXTERNAL SECURITY							4	172		176			4	172		176	
WATER PURIFICATION								3		3				3		3	
WATER TRANSPORT								5		5				5		5	
BATH DETACHMENT								3		3				3		3	
PETRO BULK STORAGE								9		9				9		9	
PETRO BULK DISTRIBUTION								18		18				18		18	
MEDICAL DETACHMENT							1	9		10			1	9		10	
LAUNDRY								7		7				7		7	
TOTAL							5	226		231	231		5	226		231	231
SUPPORT TOTAL	0												7	339			
TOTAL PERSONNEL REQ	142	116	0	258	258		174	470			644		379	835	14	1228	1228

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTED OFF	SUPPORTED ENL	SUPPORTED CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
COMMAND ELEMENT	7	6		13		7	6		13		9	13	3	25	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES (PROTOCOL SHOWN AS SEPARATE SPECIAL STAFF)															
TOTAL	7	6		13	13	7	6		13	13	9	13	3	25	25
WASHINGTON LIAISON OFFICE (WLNO)															
OFFICE OF CHIEF	2	1		3		2	1		3		2	1		3	
MIL PLAN DIV	7	1		8		7	1		8		7	1		8	
CONTINGENCY PL DIV	7	1		8		7	1		8		7	1		8	
DEPLOYMENT SEC											5	1		6	
TOTAL	16	3		19	19	16	3		19	19	21	4		25	25
J-1 PERSONNEL DIRECTORATE	1			1		1			1		2	2		4	
PERSONNEL SERVICES	1	3		4		1	3		4						
PLANS/POLICY	2	1		3		2	1		3		9	6		15	
SERVICES											7	11		18	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						1	3		4						
TOTAL	4	4		8	8	5	7		12	12	18	19		37	37
J-2 INTELLIGENCE															
DIRECTOR	1	3		4		1	3		4		2	0		2	
ADMIN OFFICE											2	4		6	
PLANS/PROGRAMS/SSO	6	9		15		6	9		15		4	2		6	
SECURITY											3	19		22	
OPERATIONS	11	14		25		11	14		25		2	4		6	

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED OFF	SUPPORTED ENL	SUPPORTED CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
FUSION CENTER													17	29		46	
COLLECTION MGT	2	3		5			2	3		5							
COUNTER INTELLIGENCE	2	2		4			2	2		4							
CRYPTO GROUP													3	3		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							7			7			7	0		7	
TOTAL	22	31		53	53		29	31		60	60		40	61		101	101
J-3 OPERATIONS																	
DIRECTOR	1	2		3			1	2		3			4	4		8	
CURRENT OPS DIV	20	14		34			20	14		34			36	19		55	
SPECIAL OPS	9	2		11			9	2		11			9	2		11	
EXERCISE DIV	20	4		24			20	4		24			11	5		16	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							1			1							
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1			1							
TOTAL	50	22		72	72		52	22		74	74		60	30		90	90
J-4 LOGISTICS																	
DIRECTOR	2	3		5			2	3		5			20	5			
MIL ENGINEER/FAC													4	4			
LOG SUPPORT				6			6			6							
TRANS SUPPORT	6	1		7			6	1		7							
REDCOM AUGMENTEES																	
TOTAL	14	4		18	18		14	4		18	18		24	9		33	33
J-5 PLANS/POLICY																	
DIRECTOR	1	5		6			1	5		6			3	4		7	
PLANS	10			10			10			10			14	8		22	
POLICY	1			1			1			1			15	5		20	

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTED OFF	SUPPORTED ENL	SUPPORTED CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
REDCOM AUGMENTEES															
TOTAL	12	5		17	17	12	5		17	17	32	17		49	49
J-6 COMM ELECTRONICS															
DIRECTOR	1	1		2		1	1		2		2	2		4	
OPERATIONS	3	5		8		3	5		8		10	8		18	
ENGINEERING	3	2		5		3	2		5		8	13		21	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						2			2						
TOTAL	7	8		15	15	9	8		17	17	20	23		43	43
ADJ GENERAL															
AG	1	9		10		1	9		10		1	2		3	
ADMIN SERVICES											2	21		23	
PUBLICATIONS											1	13		14	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES							3		3						
TOTAL	1	9		10	10	1	12		13	13	4	36		40	40
DATA AUTOMATION	1	2		3		1	2		3		2	11		13	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							4		4						
TOTAL	1	2		3	3	1	6		7	7	2	11		13	13
PROTOCOL	1			1	1	1			1	1	3	2		5	5
PROVOST MARSHAL	1			1	1	1			1	1	3	2		5	5

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL	SUPPORTED OFF	SUPPORTED ENL	SUPPORTED CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
MEDICAL SERVICES	1			1		1			1		4	2		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						1			1						
TOTAL	1			1	1	2			2	2	4	2		6	6
LEGAL ADVISOR	1	1		2		1	1		2		5	4		9	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						2			2						
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES							1		1						
TOTAL	1	1		2	2	3	2		5	5	5	4		9	9
COMPTROLLER	1			1		1			1		2	3		5	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						1	1		2						
TOTAL	1			1	1	2	1		3	3	2	3		5	5
PUBLIC AFFAIRS															
DIRECTOR	1	1		2		1	1		2		1	1		2	
PLANS/POLICY											2	2		4	
MEDIA OPS & SUPPORT											6	7		13	
PHOTO											1	5		6	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						1	1		2						
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES						1	7		8						
TOTAL	1	1		2	2	3	9		12	12	10	15		25	25
WEATHER (MAC)						6	12		18	18					
HQ CMDT															
HQ STAFF	2	9		11		2	9		11		3	38		41	
INTERNAL SECURITY		11		11			11		11			26		26	
REDCOM AUGMENTEES						3	34		37						
TOTAL	2	20		22	22	5	54		59	59	3	64		67	67

AGENCY/FUNCTION	MACDILL OFF	MACDILL ENL	MACDILL CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTING OFF	SUPPORTING ENL	SUPPORTING CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL		SUPPORTED OFF	SUPPORTED ENL	SUPPORTED CIV	SUB TOTAL	TOTAL
HQ RDJTF TOTAL	142	116		258	258		169	182			351		260	315	3	578	578
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
INDIVIDUAL AUGMENTEES								62		62	62		2	97		99	
TOTAL								62		62	62		2	97		99	99
HQ CMDT SUPPORT																	
TEAM AUGMENTEES																	
EXTERNAL SECURITY							4	172		176			4	172		176	
WATER PURIFICATION								3		3				3		3	
WATER TRANSPORT								5		5				5		5	
BATH DETACHMENT								3		3				3		3	
PETRO BULK STORAGE								9		9				9		9	
PETRO BULK DISTRIBUTION								18		18				18		18	
MEDICAL DETACHMENT							1	9		10			1	9		10	
LAUNDRY								7		7				7		7	
TOTAL							5	226		231	231		5	226		231	231
SUPPORT TOTAL	0						5	288		293	293		7	323		330	330
TOTAL PERSONNEL REQ	142	116	0	258	258		174	470		644	644		267	638	3	908	908

RC AUGMENTEES

DIRECTORATE	PARA	LINE	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
J1	05	06	Personnel Officer	O5	AF	7316
	05	11	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73270
	05	12	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73250
	05	13	Personnel Rcds Spec	E5	A	75D20
J2	06	18	Elec Warfare Off	O4	AF	2275Y
	06	19	Intel Stf Off	O4	A	35B54
	06	33	Collection Officer	O4	A	35B54
	06	34	Intel Stf Off	O4	MC	0202
	06	42	Intel Stf Off	O4	AF	8076
	06	43	Intel Stf Off	O4	N	9640
	06	44	Intel Stf Off	O4	A	35B54
J3	07	35	NUC/EA Stf Off	O4	A	52A13
J6	10	13	C-E Stf Off	O5	A	25A27
HQ CMDT	11	01	HQ CMDT/CDR USAE	O5	A	11A00
	11	02	Dp CMDT/CDR USAFE	O4	AF	7016
	11	05	OPS BS SPT POL Off	O4	A	54A11
	11	07	Admin Supv	E7	AF	70270C
	11	09	Admin Spec	E4	AF	70250B
	11	10	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E7	AF	64570
	11	11	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E6	AF	64570
	11	13	Mat Fac Sp	E5	AF	64551
	11	17	Veh & Bdg Mnt Supv	E6	AF	47273
	11	18	Veh Ops Supv	E6	AF	60370
	11	19	Gen Purpose Veh Rpm	E5	AF	47253
	11	20	Gen Purpose Veh Rpm	E5	AF	47253
	11	21	Site Develop Supt	E8	AF	55390
	11	22	Structural Tech	E6	AF	55271
	11	23	Elec Pwr Prdn Tech	E6	AF	54370
	11	27	Elec Pwr Prod Tech	E5	AF	54350
	11	28	Carpentry Spec	E4	AF	55250
	11	29	Food Service Supv	E7	AF	62270
	11	30	Food Service Supv	E6	AF	62270
	11	31	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	32	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	33	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	36	SP Supv	E7	AF	81170
	11	43	SP Specialist	E5	AF	81150
	11	44	SP Spec	E5	AF	81150
	11	45	SP Spec	E5	AF	81150
	11	47	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	48	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	49	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	50	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	51	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	52	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	53	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	54	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	55	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	56	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	57	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
AG	12	03	Admin Supv	E6	A	71630
	12	06	Admin Spec	E5	AF	70250A
	12	07	Admin Spec	E5	A	71620

RC AUGMENTEES (CONT'D)

DIRECTORATE	PARA	LINE	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
Legal	13	02	Dep Legal Adv	05	AF	8816
	13	03	Asst Legal Adv	05	A	55A00
Public Af	14	03	PAO	04	A	46A00
	14	04	PA Supv	E8	A	84250
Med Svc	15	01	Surgeon	06	A	60A67
Compt	16	02	Finance Stf Off	04	A	45A44
		03	Budget Tech	E7	AF	62770
J6	10	06	Comm STF OFF	05	AF	3016

RC AUGMENTEES (ADDITIONS/DELETIONS)

The following additions/deletions are requested:

ACTION	SECTION	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
Addition	J-1	Pers Plans Off	0-5	A	41A42
Addition	AG	Admin Supv	E-8	A	71L
Addition	AG	Admin Spec	E-4	A	71L10
Addition	J-4	Engr Staff Off (Div Chief)	0-6	A	2100
Addition	J-4	Engr Staff Off	0-5	A	2100
Addition	J-4	Engr Off	0-5	AF	5516
Addition	J-4	Engr Staff Off	0-5	USN	9390
Addition	J-4	Utilities Off	W-4	A	310A
Addition	J-4	Sr Engr Ops Spec	E-8	A	12Z
Addition	J-4	Admin Spec	E-6	A	71L
Addition	J-4	Engr Draftsman/ Topographic Illust Spec	E-6	A	81C

DELETIONS: None

Incl 2

AUGMENTATION TO RDJTF HQ

	MOS/AFSC	GR	SVC	NUMBER
SUPPLY				
Small Arms Rpmn	45B20	E4	A	1
Supply Clk/Driver	76Y10	E3	A	1
FOOD SERVICE				
First Cook	94B20	E5	A	3
Baker	94D20	E5	A	1
Cook	94B20	E4	A	10
TRANS/MAINT				
Wrecker Operator	63F20	E4	A	1
Lt Veh Driver ¼	64C20	E3	A	12
Lt Veh Driver 2½	64C20	E3	A	8
Wheeled Veh Rpmn	63B20	E4	A	1
ENGINEERING				
Duty Foreman	12B40	E7	A	1
Duty Sec Ldr	12B20	E5	A	3
Duty Soldiers	12B10	E3	A	20
LEGAL SERVICES				
Legal Clerk	2516	E7	N	1
OPERATIONS				
Cml/Ea Staff Off	74A00	03	A	1
PUBLIC AFFAIRS				
PAO	4302	03	MC	1
PA Spec	J03200	E6	N	1
Journalist	71Q40	E6	A	1

Inclosure 1

	MOS/AFSC	GR	SVC	NUMBER
PA Tech	79150	E5	AF	1
Press Info Spec	4312	E4	MC	1
Photo Journalist	71Q20J8	E5	A	1
Photo Journalist	231X2	E5	AF	1
Broadcast Spec	79151	E5	AF	1
DATA AUTOMATION				
CRT Operator	2500YN	E5	N	2
CRT Operator	0151	E5	MC	2
CRT Operator	71L20	E5	A	2
CRT Operator	70250B	E5	AF	2

COMPONENT AUGMENTEES (ADDITIONS/DELETIONS)

The following additions/deletions are requested:

ACTION	SECTION	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
Addition	Data Autom	CRT Operator	E-5	A	71L20
Addition	Data Autom	CRT Operator	E-5	A	71L20
Addition	Provost Mar	Opns Officer	0-4	A	31A
Addition	Provost Mar	Asst Opns NCO	E-5	A	95B
Addition	Protocol	Escort Officer	0-2	A	
Addition	Protocol	Escort Officer	0-2	A	
Addition	Protocol	Aviation Liaison	E-5	A	
Addition	Protocol	Admin Clerk	E-4	A	71L
Addition	Protocol	Vehicle Operator	E-3	A	64C
Addition	J-2	Signal Intel Off	0-3	AF	8035
Addition	J-2	Signal Intel Off	0-4	A	375M
Addition	J-2	Signal Intel Tech	W-3	A	981A
Addition	J-2	Elint Tech	W-3	A	982A
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	291XX
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	291XX
Addition	J-2	Targets Off	0-3	AF	8086
Addition	J-2	Targets NCO	E-6	AF	20671
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	29150
Addition	J-2	SSO Comm Optr	E-5	AF	29150
Addition	J-4	Munitions Mat Mgt O	0-4	A	75A00
Addition	J-4	Log Clerk	E-5	USMC	0441
Addition	J-4	Engr Facilities Off	0-5	A	7010
Addition	J-4	Engr Facilities Off	0-4	A	7900

Incl 4

ACTION	SECTION	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
Addition	J-4	Engr Facilities Off	0-4	A	7010
Addition	J-4	Clerk Typist	E-5	A	71L
DELETIONS:		Data Autom CRT Operator	E-5	N	2500
		Data Autom CRT Operator	E-5	N	2500

RDJTF Support Element Augmentation Units

1. Under bare base conditions additional support functions for the RDJTF HQ will be provided to the Headquarters Commandant as augmentation units.

2. Augmentation units required for a specific contingency operation will be specified in the OPLAN. Units outlined below will be manned and equipped by USCINCARRED and attached to the RDJTF HQ Support Element:

a. External Security-Military Police Company.

(1) Mission. Provide external security to the RDJTF, JCSE Headquarters complex.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 19-77H (176 personnel).

b. Water Purification Team.

(1) Mission. Provide purified water for use by RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 5-520H, Team GG (3 personnel).

c. Water Transport Team.

(1) Mission. Transport water in bulk quantities from water supply points to the RDJTF/JCSE Headquarters complex.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 5-520H, Team GJ (5 personnel).

d. Bath Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide a shower facility for use by personnel assigned to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-520H, Team FK (3 personnel).

e. Petroleum Bulk Storage and Issue Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide POL bulk storage and issue for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JD (9 personnel).

INCL 5

RDJTF Support Element Augmentation Units (continued)

f. Petroleum Bulk Distribution Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide local delivery of bulk petroleum products for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JF (18 personnel).

g. Medical Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide primary medical service to personnel assigned to the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 8-620H, Team OA (10 personnel).

H. LAUNDRY SERVICE TEAM (APPROX ~~12~~ 7 PERSONNEL)

I. WEATHER TEAM (10 PERSONNEL)

APPENDIX K
RC AUGMENTEES

DIRECTORATE	PARA	LINE	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
J1	05	05	Personnel Officer	05	AF	7316
	05	10	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73270
	05	11	Personnel Tech	E6	AF	73250
	05	12	Personnel Rcds Spec	E5	A	75D20
	XX	XX	Pers Plans Off	05	A	41A42
J2	06	17	Elec Warfare Off	04	AF	2275Y
	06	18	Intel Stf Off	04	A	35B54
	06	32	Collcetion Officer	04	A	35B54
	06	33	Intel Stf Off	04	MC	0202
	06	41	Intel Stf Off	04	AF	8076
	06	42	Intel Stf Off	04	N	9640
	06	43	Intel Stf Off	04	A	35B54
J3	07	34	NUC/EA NCO	E8	AF	27490
J4			Engr Staff Off(Div Chief)	06	A	2100
			Engr Staff Off	05	A	2100
			Engr Off	05	AF	5516
			Engr Staff Off	05	N	9390
			Utilities Off	W4	A	310A
			Sr Engr Ops Spec	E8	A	12Z
			Admin Spec	E6	A	71L
			Engr Draftsman/Topgraphic Illust Spec	E6	A	81C
J6	10	05	Comm Stf Off	05	AF	3016
	10	12	C-e Stf Off	05	A	25A27
HQ CMDT	11	05	Ops BS Spt POL Off	04	A	54A11
	11	07	Admin Supv	E7	AF	70270C
	11	09	Admin Spec	E4	AF	70250B
	11	10	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E7	AF	64570
	11	11	Inventory Mgmt Supv	E6	AF	64570
	11	13	Mat Fac Sp	E5	AF	64551
	11	17	Veh & Bldg Mnt Supv	E6	AF	47273
	11	18	Veh Ops Supv	E6	AF	60370
	11	19	Gen Purpose Veh Rpmn	E5	AF	47253
	11	20	Gen Purpose Veh Rpmn	E5	AF	47253
	11	21	Site Develop Supt	E8	AF	55390
	11	22	Structural Tech	E6	AF	55271
	11	23	Elec Pwr Prdn Tech	E6	AF	54370
	11	27	Elec Pwr Prod Tech	E5	AF	54350
	11	28	Carpentry Spec	E4	AF	55250
	11	29	Food Service Supv	E7	AF	62270
	11	30	Food Service Supv	E6	AF	62270
	11	31	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	32	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	33	Cook	E5	AF	62250
	11	36	SP Supv	E7	AF	81170
	11	43	SP Specialist	E5	AF	81150
	11	44	SP Spec	E5	AF	81150
	11	45	Sp Spec	E5	AF	81150

DIRECTORATE	PARA	LINE	TITLE	GR	SVC	MOS/ AFSC
HQ CMDT	11	47	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	48	Sp Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	49	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	50	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	51	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	52	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	53	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	54	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	55	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	56	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
	11	57	SP Spec	E4	AF	81150
AG	12	03	Admin Supv	E6	A	71630
	12	06	Admin Spec	E5	AF	70250A
	12	07	Admin Spec	E5	A	71620
	XX	XX	Admin Supv	E8	AF	702X0
	XX	XX	Admin Supv	E4	N	2500
LEGAL	13	02	Dep Legal Adv	05	AF	8816
	13	03	Asst Legal Adv	05	A	55A00
PUBLIC AFF	14	02	PAO	04	A	46A00
	14	03	PA Supv	E8	A	84250
MED SVC	15	01	Surgeon	06	A	60A67
COMPT	16	02	Finance Stf Off	04	A	45A44
	16	03	Budget Tech	E7	AF	62770

COMPONENT/SUPPORTING FORCE AUGMENTEES

SECTION	TITLE	GR	SV	MOS/ AFSC	NUMBER
J2	Signal Intel Off	03	AF	8035	1
J2	Singal Intel Off	04	A	375M	1
J2	Singal Intel Off	W3	A	981A	1
J2	Elint Tech	W3	A	982A	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	291XX	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	291XX	1
J2	Targets Off	03	AF	8086	1
J2	Targets NCO	E6	AF	20671	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	29150	1
J2	SSO Comm Optr	E5	AF	29150	1
J3	Spec Ops NCO	E8	A	11B5S	1
J3	CHEM/EA NCO	E8	A	54E	1
J3	EW Officer	03/4	MC	2600	1
J3	OOB Tech	WO	A	926A	1
J4	Munitions Mat Mgt Off	04	A	75A00	1
J4	Log Clerk	E5	MC	0441	1
J4	Engr Facilities Off	05	A	7010	1
J4	Engr Facilities Off	04	A	7900	1
J4	Engr Facilities Off	04	A	7010	1
J4	Clerk Typist	E5	A	71L	1
MS	Opns SGT/NCO	E7/8	A	91250	1
MS	Admin Soec	E5/6	AF	702X0	1
MS	Med Clerk	E4/5	A	64C20	1
MS	Med Off	04/5	A	60C00	1

SECTION	TITLE	GR	SV	MOS/ AFSC	NUMBER
HC	Supply Clk/Driver	E4	A	76410	1
HC	Supply Clk/Driver	E5	N	76Y10	1
HC	First Cook	E5	A	94B29	3
HC	Baker	E5	A	94D20	1
HC	Cook	E4	A	94B20	8
HC	Cook	E4	N		2
HC	Wrecker Operator	E4	A	63F20	1
HC	Lt Veh Driver ¼T	E3	A	64C20	6
HC	Lt Veh Driver ¼T	E3	AF		4
HC	Lt Veh Driver ¼T	E3	N		2
HC	Lt Veh Driver 2½T	E3	A	63C20	6
HC	Lt Veh Driver 2½T	E3	MC		2
HC	Wheeled Veh Rpmn	E4	A	63C20	1
Prot	Escort Officer	02	N		1
Prot	Escort Officer	02	MC		1
Prot	Aviation Liaison	E5	A		1
Prot	Admin Clerk	E4	AF	702X0	1
Prot	Vehicle Operator	E3	MC		1
LA	Legal Clerk	E7	N	2516	1
PA	PAO	03	MC	4302	1
PA	PA Spec	E6	N	J03200	1
PA	Journalist	E6	A	71Q40	1
PA	PA Tech	E5	AF	79150	1
PA	Press Info Spec	E4	MC	4312	1
PA	Photo Journalist	E5	A	71120J8	1
PA	Photo Journalist	E5	AF	231X2	1
PA	Broadcast Spec	E5	AF	79151	1
DA	CRT Operator	E5	A	2500YN	2

SECTION	TITLE	GR	SV	MOS/ AFSC	NUMBER
DA	CRT Operator	E5	MC	0151	2
DA	CRT Operator	E5	A	71L20	2*
DA	CRT Operator	E5	AF	70250B	2**
PM	Opns Officer	04	A	31A	1
PM	Asst Opns NCO	E5	A	95B	1

* - Additional skill indicator required.

** - Special experience indicator required.

COMPONENT/SUPPORTING FORCE UNIT AUGMENTEES

1. Under bare base conditions additional support functions for the RDJTF HQ will be provided to the Headquarters Commandant as augmentation units.

2. Augmentation units required for a specific contingency operation will be specified in the OPLAN. Units outlined below will be manned and equipped by USCINCARRED and attached to the RDJTF HQ Support Element:

a. External Security-Military Police Company (2 platoons).

(1) Mission. Provide external security to the RDJTF, JCSE Headquarters complex.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 19-77H (120 personnel).

b. Petroleum Bulk Storage and Issue Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide POL bulk storage and issue for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JD (9 personnel).

c. Petroleum Bulk Distribution Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide local delivery of bulk petroleum products for the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be as described in TOE 10-560H, Team JF (18 personnel).

d. Water Purification Team.

(1) Mission. Provide purified water for use by RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (3 personnel).

e. Water Transport Team.

(1) Mission. Transport water in bulk quantities from water supply points to the RDJTF/JCSE Headquarters complex.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (5 personnel).

f. Bath Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide a shower facility for use by personnel assigned to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (3 personnel).

g. Laundry Service Team (approx 7 personnel).

(1) Mission. Provide laundry service to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and Support Elements.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by ARRED (approx 7 personnel).

3. Units outlined below will be manned and equipped by providing service and attached to the RDJTF HQ Support Element.

a. USMC Combat Engineer Platoon.

(1) Mission. Provide engineer support to the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by USMC (37 personnel).

b. Medical Detachment.

(1) Mission. Provide medical service to personnel assigned to the RDJTF HQ, JCSE and the Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by AFRED (10 personnel).

c. Weather Unit.

(1) Mission. Provide current and projected weather information for use by personnel assigned to RDJTF HQ, JCSE and RDJTF Support Element.

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by AFRED (18 personnel).

d. External Security-Military Police Flight.

(1) Same as 2a(1).

(2) Personnel and equipment will be provided by AFRED (60 personnel).

(3) This unit will be part of the MP Co described in para 2a.

JCSE COMMUNICATIONS SUPPORT INCLOSURE

AGENCY	NUMBER	BY SERVICE				BY GRADE		
		AF	AR	N	MC	OFF	ENL	CIV*
HQ RDJTF								
OVERHEAD	27	16	11	0	0	7	18	2
LOGISTICS	39	35	4	0	0	0	27	12
MAINTENANCE	268	160	101	0	7	3	259	6
OPERATIONS	232	79	140	11	2	6	226	0
SUB TOTAL	566	290	256	11	9	16	530	20
ARFOR								
OVERHEAD	2	0	2	0	0	1	1	0
OPERATIONS	28	13	15	0	0	0	28	0
SUB TOTAL	30	13	17	0	0	1	29	0
AFFOR								
OVERHEAD	2	1	1	0	0	1	1	0
OPERATIONS	28	12	16	0	0	0	28	0
SUB TOTAL	30	13	17	0	0	1	29	0
MARFOR								
OVERHEAD	2	0	0	0	2	1	1	0
OPERATIONS	28	12	10	2	4	0	28	0
SUB TOTAL	30	12	10	2	6	1	29	0
JUWTF								
OVERHEAD	4	0	4	0	0	2	2	0
OPERATIONS	78	33	35	10	0	0	78	0
MAINTENANCE	42	21	21	0	0	0	42	0
SUB TOTAL	124	54	60	10	0	2	122	0
TOTAL	780	382	360	23	15	21	739	20

*CIVILIAN PERSONNEL WILL NOT DEPLOY

Incl 3

APPENDIX M

-1-

Terms of Reference for the RDJTF

Combat Capabilities and Analysis Group

1. General

a. These terms of reference (TOR) identify the mission, staff relationships, tasks/responsibilities and support requirements of the Combat Capabilities and Analysis Group (CCAG).

b. The CCAG is a special staff element of the RDJTF reporting directly to the Chief of Staff (RDCS).

c. The CCAG is established to provide the immediate capability to analyze areas of concern and current issues from an operational viewpoint. The total structure of the CCAG will be fluid with a core of six permanently assigned officers and other officers to be assigned on a temporary basis from the other directorates and/or special staff offices for special projects as directed by the RDCS.

d. The permanently assigned CCAG officers required are identified and present source shown.

LINE	DUTY POSITION	RANK	COMPONENT	SOURCE
01	CH CCAG	0-6	AF	Presently 0-6 overage
02	DEP CH CCAG	0-5	A	Presently 0-6 overage
03	CH RED CAPABILITY BR	0-5	N	Presently from J-3
04	ASST CH RED CAPABILITY BR	0-4	AF	Vacant
05	CH BLUE CAPABILITY BR	0-5	MC	Vacant
06	ASST CH BLUE CAPABILITY BR	0-4	A	Vacant

2. Mission

The CCAG will analyze RDJTF areas of concern from an operational perspective to seek improvements in Rapid Deployment Force (RDF) combat capability.

3. Tasks and Responsibilities

a. The CCAG will develop expertise on areas of the world of primary concern to RDJTF. The initial analysis will focus on the Middle East area.

b. The CCAG will provide immediate feedback on all analysis actions to the commander and staff in the most appropriate format.

c. The CCAG will continue to perform sensitivity analysis on assumptions and critical factors involved in the current RDJTF areas of concern.

d. Analysis results will receive RDJTF staff review before presentation to the Command Section and all areas of non-concurrence will be highlighted to the decision-making authority. The most appropriate staff agency will be tasked for implementing actions approved by the Command Section.

e. Methods and display formats will be devised to clearly present the analysis results to the commander and staff.

f. The CCAG will serve as the RDJTF "think tank" and will be unconstrained by present or past solutions. This is an attempt to develope new and innovative approaches to improve operational capability, readiness, mobility, sustainability, and command relationships.

g. The CCAG will function as the point of contact to determine appropriate study efforts that should be conducted for RDJTF by outside agencies and commercial "think tanks".

h. The CCAG will be prepared to present the status of current activities and specific areas of study for high-level visitors, as directed by RDCS.

4. Staff Relationships

a. Direct coordination with all elements of HQ RDJTF authorized.

b. Direct coordination with all Service CHECKMATE/gaming type activities authorized.

c. Direct coordination with RDJTF/WLO authorized.

d. Tasking of AFFOR, ARFOR, MARFOR and NAVFOR will be approved by RDCS.

5. Support Requirements

a. The Chief, CCAG, will identify funding requirements to the RDCO.

b. The Chief of Staff will provide administrative support to the CCAG until such time as internal CCAG administrative requirements are identified and sourced.

APPENDIX N

MEMORANDUM OF AGREEMENT

HEADQUARTERS, STRATEGIC AIR COMMAND

AND

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES READINESS COMMAND

AND

HEADQUARTERS, UNITED STATES RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE

1. PURPOSE: This Memorandum of Agreement (MOA) between the Commanders in Chief, Strategic Air Command (SAC), United States Readiness Command (USREDCOM), and Commander, United States Rapid Deployment Joint Task Force (USRDJTF), affirms the policies and principles relative to SAC participation in the RDJTF and establishment of an Operating Location (OL). This document records those policies and principles agreed to by each agency.

2. OBJECTIVE: The objective of this agreement is to establish liaison and continuity between Headquarters SAC and the RDJTF. This liaison element will provide responsive support to the RDJTF for the inclusion of SAC capabilities into the concept of operations for the Rapid Deployment Force.

3. PRINCIPLES OF OPERATION:

a. The stated objective will be accomplished by placing SAC personnel in full-time residence with the RDJTF support staff or applicable function.

b. The SAC representative(s) will:

(1) Provide timely information and coordination regarding SAC policies, procedures, concepts and philosophies with respect to RDJTF development, employment and accompanying logistical management.

(2) Be responsible for keeping Headquarters SAC agencies apprised of RDJTF activity.

(3) Coordinate SAC activity with USREDCOM and Joint Deployment Agency (JDA). Insure easy access for SAC and USREDCOM for planning and assistance during exercise activities.

(4) Represent SAC during the planning phase for USREDCOM, RDJTF, JDA, command post and field training exercises.

(5) Be responsible to the RDJTF Functional Staff counterparts for taskings other than those directly involving SAC operations, to aid in the accomplishment of the overall RDJTF mission.

(6) Review and expedite coordination of all OPLANS/CONPLANS and other matters involving mutual interest or resources.

c. The Commander, RDJTF will provide collocated SAC personnel with the opportunity to participate in the RDJTF on the same basis and within the same constraints as RDJTF personnel.

d. The liaison office will periodically brief the SAC Consolidated Contingency Steering Group (COSG) and concerned staff offices on the status of SAC participation in RDJTF activity. Similar briefings will be presented to Commander, RJDTF, or his designated representative as required.

4. SPECIFIC COURSES OF ACTION:

a. SACOS/XO is the Headquarters SAC deputate primarily responsible for supporting contingency plans through the administrative direction of the SAC XOO, Director of Combat Operations. The SACOS/XO will provide three Officers (Colonel, AFSC 0036, Major, AFSC 1435C, Major, AFSC 2265Y) and one administration supervisor (TSgt, AFSC 70270B) to serve as the SAC Liaison Element to RDJTF. Headquarters SAC Director of Contingency Logistics will provide one officer (Lt Col, AFSC 6616) to support SAC Logistics Liaison to the RDJTF. These individuals will occupy SAC Special Intelligence (SI) and Special Activity Office (SAO) billets. The official designation for the liaison office is operating location MD (OL-MD), MacDill AFB, FL.

b. The normal duty location of the liaison office, OL-MD, is at the RDJTF, MacDill AFB, FL.

c. All leaves and TDY's requested by the SAC liaison CC must be coordinated with Headquarters SAC/XOO and the RDJTF. The Liaison CC will coordinate and approve leaves and TDY'S of remaining liaison element personnel. SAC personnel assigned at the RDJTF may be placed on TDY to accomplish collateral training, personnel reviews and other personnel actions at times mutually agreeable to the RDJTF and the cognizant SAC agency. TDY directed by RDJTF will be funded from RDJTF resources. TDY directed by SAC will be funded by SAC.

d. SAC will maintain strength accountability of the SAC personnel assigned to the liaison element.

e. Files will be maintained by the liaison office in accordance with applicable directives. RDJTF will furnish appropriate office space, furnishings and safe filing provisions for proper administrative and secure file maintenance.

f. Required Security Clearances will be forwarded to RDJTF by Headquarters SAC and appropriate security badges will be provided by RDJTF.

g. Administrative support will be provided by RDJTF as necessary. It is anticipated that this support will be minimal and will not impose an undue burden and will include:

(1) Telephone communications, including at least one class A telephone line for AUTOVON and outside contact, and at least one class C telephone line for on-base and inter-office calls.

(2) Standard office furniture and equipment to include desks, tables, chairs, filing cabinets, safes, bookcases and typewriters.

(3) Such necessary expendable office supplies which are not within the capability of the liaison office to provide.

(4) Specialized support services, to include microfiche document reproduction, audiovisual equipment loan, photographic and/or graphic arts assistance, classified materials packaging and handling, security indoctrination and debriefing of assigned personnel, and administrative (classified and unclassified distribution).

h. SAC personnel will be provided an opportunity to attend and participate in internal and external conferences/reviews relative to SAC activity and/or related programs. All visits to RDJTF activities by SAC personnel will be coordinated and monitored by the liaison office.

i. The Commander of the RDJTF may expect that all SAC inputs provided by the liaison office represent a fully coordinated and agreed upon SAC position, policy, concept or philosophy. He may also expect that SAC personnel assigned to the liaison office will be of the highest caliber, and their conduct and support will reflect the spirit of cooperation contained in this document.

(1) The Commander of the RDJTF will submit to Headquarters SAC/XOO a Letter of Evaluation (LOE) on the Senior SAC Liaison Officer to support the preparation of his OER.

(2) The Senior Liaison Officer or his designated representative will be authorized to sign all correspondence pertaining to their respective activities.

j. The Commander of the RDJTF will provide Headquarters SAC with reasonable and proper notification of any changes in directives, operating procedures, or philosophy that would substantially alter the present relationship.

k. This Memorandum of Agreement may be terminated by any signatory agency after providing reasonable and proper notification to all participating agencies. It is effective 1 July 1980, and will be reviewed annually by RDJTF/J5 and SACOS/XOO.

R. H. ELLIS
General, USAF
CINCSAC

VOLNEY F. WARNER
General, USA
USCINCRED

P. X. KELLEY
Lieutenant General, USMC
Commander, RDJTF

APPENDIX O

RDJTF INTERVIEWS

1980

June 2	- Phil Budahn, Newport News Daily Press, Maj Gen Taylor
June 18	- Briefing for Pentagon press corps, LtGen Kelley
June 20	- Rick Bernard, Defense Week, Maj Gen Taylor
June 25	- Steve Strasser, Newsweek, LtGen Kelley
July 14	- Walter Guzzardi, Fortune Magazine, LtGen Kelley
July 14	- Richard Halloran, New York Times, LtGen Kelley
July 25	- Bernard Ullman, L'Express, Maj Gen Taylor
July 28	- Ian Mather, London Observer, Maj Gen Taylor
July 31	- Jon Dietz, Sarasota Herald, CDR (b)(6)
August 5	- Richard Halloran, New York Times, LtGen Kellet and others
Sept. 3	- Phil Smith, Newhouse News Service, LtGen Kelley
Sept. 25	- Al Slagle, New York Daily News, Maj Gen Taylor
Sept. 29	- Robert Toth, Los Angeles Times, LtGen Kelley (telephone)
Sept. 30	- Robert Dudney, U.S. News & World Report, LtGen Kelley
Oct. 7	- George Wilson, Washington Post, LtGen Kelley, BG Stiner, and principal staff members
Oct. 8	- Bill Currie, Chicago Tribune, LtGen Kelley
Oct. 24	- Robert Toth, Los Angeles Times, LtGen Kelley
Oct. 29	- Jim West, WTVT Television, LtGen Kelley
Dec. 2	- Editorial Board, New York Times, LtGen Kelley
Dec. 17	- Phillip Clarke, American Legion Magazine, LtGen Kelley

APPENDIX P

DISTINGUISHED VISITORS
TO
HEADQUARTERS, RAPID DEPLOYMENT JOINT TASK FORCE
1980

MARCH

31	MR (b)(6) Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs

APRIL

24-25	BRIGADIER GENERAL WELDON F. HONEYCUTT Assistant Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, FORSCOM
29-30	ADMIRAL WILLIAM J. CROWE, JR CINCSOUTH (Designee)

MAY

1	MAJOR GENERAL ROBERT A. SULLIVAN Chief of Public Affairs, OSA
6	MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. HUDACHEK Commanding General, US Army Computer Systems Command
12	BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD D. BROWN Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, MAC
15	REAR ADMIRAL PETER R. BROWN Commander, Reserve Naval Construction Force, Naval Reserve Center
21	MR (b)(6) Assistant Secretary of the Army for Manpower and Reserve Affairs
21	LIEUTENANT GENERAL ARNOLD W. BRASWELL Commander, 9th Air Force
22	MR (b)(6) Deputy Under Secretary for Policy Planning Office of the Secretary of Defense
22	BRIGADIER GENERAL JAMES I. GRANGER Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, J5, OJCS

27	GENERAL WILLIAM C. WESTMORELAND (Ret)
27	CAPTAIN (b)(6) RAN Commandant, Australian Joint Warfare Establishment
27-28	MAJOR GENERAL HENRY H. HARPER Director, J4/J7, USEUCOM
29	BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT F. MCCARTHY Vice Commander, Air Force Communications Command
28-29	MR (b)(6) Chief, Office of Support to Military Operations, NSA
29-31	BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL P. BURNS Deputy Commander, U.S. Army Finance & Accounting Center

JUNE

2	MAJOR GENERAL BO VAN ENIUS Chief of the Naval Staff, Swedish Coastal Artillery
3-4	BRIGADIER GENERAL HENNING RAMON VON ONDARZA Defense Attache, Embassy of the Federal Republic of Germany
5	BRIGADIER GENERAL VINCENT M. RUSSO Director of Plans, Readiness and Systems, Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Logistics, HQ DA
12	MAJOR GENERAL JOHN N. BRANDENBURG, Director of Operations, USREDCOM (Designee)
19	MR (b)(6) Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
20	MAJOR GENERAL RICHARD E. CAREY Deputy Chief of Staff, Plans, Policy, Joint Exercises, CINCLANT
20	BRIGADIER GENERAL ALBERT J. KAEHN, JR Commander, Air Weather Service, MAC
21	ADMIRAL SIR TERRENCE LEWIN Chief of Defense Staff, United Kingdom

JULY

9	LIEUTENANT GENERAL HAROLD F. HARDIN, JR DCG, Materiel Readiness, DARCOM
10	BRIGADIER GENERAL DOUGLAS B. SMITH Dep Dir for Operations, National Military Command Center (NMCC)

11	BRIGADIER GENERAL DALE A. VESSER Chief, Washington Liaison Office, RDJTF
15-16	GENERAL ROBERT C. MATHIAS Vice Chief of Staff, USAF
16	LIEUTENANT GENERAL EDWARD J. MILLER Commanding General, FMFLANT
21	MAJOR GENERAL WILLIAM E. READ Assistant Chief of Engineers, HQ DA
25	MAJOR GENERAL GERALD E. COOKE Commandant, Air Force Institue of Technology (AFIT)
28	BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD O. ALDRIDGE Deputy Director, Plans and Requirements, Defense Mapping Agency
29	LIEUTENANT GENERAL THOMAS M. RYAN Vice CINCMAC
29-30	BRIGADIER GENERAL JOSEPH C. LUTZ Commander, John F. Kennedy Center for Military Assistance
30	REAR ADMIRAL WILLIAM D. SMITH Director, Naval Communications Division
30	MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES C. IRIONS Deputy Director Logistics, J4, OJCS
31	HONORABLE W. GRAHAM CLAYTOR, JR Deputy Secretary of Defense
	AUGUST
4-5	LIEUTENANT GENERAL PHILIP C. GAST Director of Operations, J3, OJCS
5	BRIGADIER GENERAL THOMAS B. MCHUGH Deputy Director of Operations, NMCC
8	BRIGADIER GENERAL GERALD L. PRATHER Director, J6, USREDCOM (Designee)
18	MR (b)(6) Staff Member, Defense Coordination and Planning Division, Bureau Japanese Defense Agency
20	BRIGADIER GENERAL DAVIS C. ROHR Chief of of Military Cooperation, Egypt
21	EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE TAMPA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE

21-22	AMBASSADOR ROBERT H. PELLETREAU Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs
29	RESERVE NAVAL CONSTRUCTION FORCE MOBILIZATION CONFERENCE

SEPTEMBER

4	MAJOR GENERAL GEORGE A. EDWARDS JR Director, Plans and Policy, USREDCOM (Designee)
7-8	BRIGADIER GENERAL PAUL H. HODGES Deputy Director for Operations, Reconnaissance and Electronic Warfare, J3, OJCS
10-12	REAR ADMIRAL FRED W. JOHNSTON, JR Assistant Deputy Director for Politico-Military Affairs, J5, OJCS
12	GENERAL LEW ALLEN, JR Chief of Staff, USAF
16-17	COLONEL (b)(6) CJCS Staff Group
19	MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES P. GRAHAM Deputy Chief of Staff, Operations, FORSCOM
23	LIEUTENANT GENERAL GERALD J. POST Director, Defense Logistics Agency
23-24	BRIGADIER GENERAL ROBERT D. HAMMOND Chief, Studies, Analysis, and Gaming Agency OJCS
23-24	COLONEL (b)(6) Deputy Director, Washington Liaison Office
24	LIEUTENANT GENERAL JAMES M. GAVIN, (Ret) Arthur D. Little Co.
24-25	MR (b)(6) Director of Procurement, Assistant Secretary of Defense (Comptroller)
25	BRIGADIER GENERAL DONALD A. VOGT Military Assistant to Deputy Undersecretary of Defense for Strategic & Space Systems, OSD
29-30	MR. (b)(6) Special Assistant to the Director of Intelligence, HQMC
29-30	CAPTAIN (b)(6) Commander, Naval Oceanographic Command

OCTOBER

6	MAJOR GENERAL HAROLD A. HATCH Deputy Chief of Staff for Installations and Logistics, HQMC
	BRIGADIER GENERAL MANNON A. JOHNSON, JR Director, Materiel, HQMC
7	LIEUTENANT GENERAL WINFIELD W. SCOTT, JR Commander, Alaskan Air Command
7	MR (b)(6) Professional Staff Member, Senate Armed Services Committee
7-8	MR (b)(6) Deputy Director, DIA
8-9	REAR ADMIRAL ROBERT P. MCKENZIE Commander, Caribbean Contingency JTF
8-9	PROUD SPIRIT EVALUATION TEAM
8-9	BRIGADIER GENERAL JOHN A. SHAUD Commander, 57th Air Division
9-10	(b)(6) Senate Armed Services Committee
9-10	HOUSE ARMED SERVICES COMMITTEE MEMBERS
16	STAFF MEMBERS OF THE SENATE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE
21	GENERAL JOHN R. GUTHRIE Commanding General, DARCOM
21	BRIGADIER GENERAL BENJAMIN L. REGISTER, JR Director, Materiel Management, DARCOM
21	BRIGADIER GENERAL ARTHUR HOLMES, JR Director, Readiness, DARCOM

NOVEMBER

1-3	MAJOR GENERAL PATRICK J. HALLORAN Deputy Director, Strategic Command, Control and Communications Systems, OJCS
2-3	MAJOR GENERAL JAMES M. ROCKWELL Director, Command, Control Communications Systems, CINCPAC (Designee)
2-3	MAJOR GENERAL JOHN W. SEIGLE Assistant DCS, Operations and Plans, Joint Affairs, HQ DA

4-6	MAJOR GENERAL ERIC W. BARTON, MBE Director of Military Survey, Ministry of Defence (UK)
5-6	MR (b)(6) Chief, Operations Support Group
6-8	SENIOR FOREIGN MILITARY ATTACHES
12	VADM WILLIAM J. COWHILL Deputy Chief of Naval Operations, Logistics
12	MAJOR GENERAL ALTON H. HARVEY Judge Advocate General, USA
13	BRIGADIER GENERAL HARRY H. BENDORF Deputy Director for Force Development & Stategic Plans J5, JCS
13-14	BRIGADIER GENERAL LLYLE J. BARKER, JR Deputy Chief of Public Affairs, USA
24	GENERAL BRYCE POE II Commander, Air Force Logistics Command
24	LIEUTENANT GENERAL BILLY M. MINTER DCS/Logistics & Engineering, HQ USAF
24	BRIGADIER GENERAL THEODORE D. BROADWATER Director, Logistics Plans & Programs, HQ USAF
24	BRIGADIER GENERAL CLIFTON D. WRIGHT Deputy Director, Engineering Services, HQ USAF
24	BRIGADIER GENERAL LEO MARQUEZ DCS/Plans & Programs, AFLC
24	MAJOR GENERAL JACK W. WATERS DCS/Logistics Operations, AFLC

DECEMBER

3-5	DR (b)(6) Director of Special Regional Studies, Office of the Secretary of Defense, Programs, Analysis, and Evaluation
4	AIR WAR COLLEGE STUDENTS AND FACULTY
11-12	MR (b)(6) Senior Transportation Officer to Commander, MTMC
14-15	BRIGADIER GENERAL DUANE H. ERICKSON Commander, US Forces Azores/ Commander 1605 ABW, MAC
15	NAVAL COMMAND COLLEGE CLASS OF 1981

16	CONGRESSMAN IKE SKELTON (D-MO) House Armed Services Committee
16	MR (b)(6) Consultant, USDR&E
16-17	MAJOR GENERAL CHARLES L. DONNELLY, JR Chief, US Military Training Mission, Saudi Arabia
17-18	MR (b)(6) Deputy for Mobilization and Analysis, Office of the Assistant Secretary of the Army (Manpower and Reserve Affairs)