

**ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN  
AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015**

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.
2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE  
OF EXECUTION: 04 NOV 15

  
William B. Hickman  
MG, USA  
DCG-O, USARCENT

## PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

**A. AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION:** 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

**B. PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED:** To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

**C. ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

**D. DISCLOSURE:** If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide information.

**E. THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED:** providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on you for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 4<sup>TH</sup> day of NOVEMBER, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

# SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent of this form is ODCSOPS

## PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10 USC Section 301; Title 5 USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Dated November 22, 1943 (SSN)  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To provide commanders and law enforcement officials with means by which information may be accurately recorded.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Your social security number is used as an additional/alternate means of identification to facilitate filing and retrieval.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your social security number is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VANCE, AFGHANISTAN	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 2015-11-04	3. TIME 0115	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME FIRST NAME MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS	
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-AFGHANISTAN			

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. I am the (b)(3), (b)(6)
2. I do not work a shift. I had been on the floor since (b)(1)1.4a
3. I do not work a shift. I leave when the situation dictates.
4. Yes there is a shift change brief and CONOPs are briefed as well as (b)(1)1.4a etc.
5. We were exercising mission command of (b)(1)1.4a combat operations.
6. Yes, all of the standard personnel were on the OPCEN floor almost all night and morning.
7. There is a battle drill for when the SOTF-A conducts a Kinetic Strike. (b)(3), (b)(6)
8. Yes.
9. I do not monitor 4a, (b)(1)1.4a but I monitor the (b)(1)1.4a
10. I was listening to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a transmissions.
11. I don't know. I generally maintain SA through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g transmissions from the ODA.
12. Yes.
13. None.
14. No.
15. No. **NO** (b)(3), (b)(6)
16. I received an email with an attachment that identified a MSF Hospital but I don't recall when.
17. Yes.
18. He said that he received a call or text that there was a Hospital being "bombed".
19. (b)(3), (b)(6) was notified and the ATG engagement was stopped.
20. Yes, it is broadcast on a speak centrally located in the OPCEN.
21. Yes.
22. Yes.
23. **YES** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**NOTHING FOLLOWS**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6)	NG STATEMENT	PAGE <u>1</u> OF <u>2</u> PAGES
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ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_."

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFADAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority to Administer Oath)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

### SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

#### PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

**AUTHORITY:** Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).  
**PRINCIPAL PURPOSE:** To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.  
**ROUTINE USES:** Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.  
**DISCLOSURE:** Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION CAMP VANCE, BAGRAM AIRFIELD	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD) 20151104	3. TIME 0100	4. FILE NUMBER
5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME (b)(3), (b)(6)		6. SSN (b)(3), (b)(6)	7. GRADE/STATUS
8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS (b)(3), (b)(6)			
9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH: The following sworn statement corresponds to a questionnaire given to my by (b)(3), (b)(6) and all questions are answered to the best of my ability. (b)(3), (b)(6)			
2- the evening of the 2nd, I reported to the OPCEN around (b)(1)1.4a			
3- my shift at the time ended at (b)(1)1.4a			
4- at the time, shifts were conducting informal briefs with their counterparts, briefing significant events, upcoming operations and potential due-outs for the new shift.			
5- the night of the 2nd, the operation to retake Konduz was continuing. I had been in country for (b)(1)1.4g night on shift.			
6- to the best of my knowledge, yes. (b)(3), (b)(6)			
7- the reaction to an air to ground kinetic strike depends greatly on the circumstances. Engagements (b)(1)1.4g from the (b)(1)1.4g once authorization is given. Strikes conducted by teams on the ground in self defense are, by definition, harder to track and control. For those we rely on assets to communicate their engagement data to us or relay it through another asset. As (b)(3), (b)(6) I also provide targeting information when necessary if the JTAC is indisposed.			
8- all information available was shared with all leadership			
9- I monitor and frequently use (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and am unaware whether that is the official OPCEN log			
10- (b)(3), (b)(6) with my counterpart, updated airspace (b)(1)1.4a recorded available information for kinetic strikes, developed JTARs for continued operations in Konduz, and relay information from air players to the Battle Captain			
11- operations all have multiple (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g for maintaining situational awareness. If an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g it or have the asset reset. In the case of AC-130s, if their (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g capability does as well, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g becomes the primary means of communication with the OPCEN.			
12- As stated, at the time we were conducting informal shift changes due to the continuous nature of the Konduz operation.			
13- The fires role in conditions checks is to brief ROZ status, JTAC callsign and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g assets requested and approved for support for any given operation.			
14- checking the (b)(1)1.4a and CONOP is part of the Fire's responsibility. The initiation of the Konduz operation was before my time on ground, and I am unaware whether this procedure was done.			
15- The evening of the 2nd, I recall (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)AC-130 saying they were going hot inside our ROZ. We acknowledged their engagement and cleared the net. They did not specify their target at that time.			
16- I do not recall the Trauma Center being mentioned prior to that strike			
10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)		PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF \_\_\_\_\_ TAKEN AT \_\_\_\_\_ DATED \_\_\_\_\_

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE \_\_\_\_ OF \_\_\_\_ PAGES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 0100 DATED 20151104

9. STATEMENT (Continued)

17- If and when (b)(3), (b)(6) came in, I am unaware.

18- Unknown

19- I do not know when he came into the OPCEN, thus cannot say what followed

20- (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g is on a speaker directly next to my desk. It is monitored by myself and/or the (b)(3), (b)(6) duty. the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g levels above my desk and I hear it and listen in when possible.

21- I was in the OPCEN for part of the day on the 30th of September, but at the time had planned on working the day shift so was not present for all if any of that night.

22- I don't have any useful knowledge of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g that early morning.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2 - I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this \_\_\_\_\_ day of \_\_\_\_\_ at \_\_\_\_\_

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The following information summarizes the qualification and training for (b)(3), (b)(6) qualified as a (b)(3), (b)(6) in the AC-130U.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.af.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

MEMORANDUM FOR: AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) had zero discrepancies in required deployment ground and flight training currencies prior to and since deploying to the AOR.

2. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.af.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

“For Official Use Only (FOUO) information, which must be protected under the Privacy Act and Air Force Instruction 33-332.”



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

24 Oct 15


MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (U) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)


*Approved for Release*



(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. (U) My POC for this information is [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.af.mil.

10/26/2015



(b)(3), (b)(6)

I accept the responsibility to safeguard the information contained in this document to a level commensurate with the classification of the information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure or use.

I understand that Communications using, data stored on, or information being transmitted over government networks IS are not private. I understand that the use of USFOR-A networks or any other DoD computer system or network constitutes consent to being monitored at all times for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personal misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. At any time, USFOR-A may inspect and seize data stored or transmitted over government networks.

I will not scan information onto a network if the information has a higher classification than the network. I will not enter information that is proprietary, contractor-excluded, or otherwise needs special protection or handling, unless approved in writing by Information Assurance (IA).

I will not move information from or to the CENTRIXS-ISAF network unless approved by my Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO). I will not move information from SIPR to NIPR without approval by my Site Security Officer (SSO). I certify to the best of my knowledge that I have taken all appropriate measures to ensure the information contained in this document is authorized for transport over the network on which it will be sent.

I will report incidents pertaining to unauthorized storage or transmission of information of a greater sensitivity than what the system or network is currently accredited for to my servicing Help Desk.

I understand that violations of agreed upon conditions will result in the suspension or termination of my privileges to access classified data. I understand that my access may be suspended, revoked or terminated for non-compliance with DoD security policies.

The undersigned consents to interception/capture and seizure of ALL communications and data for any authorized purpose (including personal misconduct, law enforcement, or counterintelligence investigation). The undersigned understands that violations are punishable by UCMJ action, punitive actions and/or other adverse administrative actions.

Classification of information being scanned: ~~SECRET~~

Subject: Letter to [ (b)(6) ] dtd 1 Nov 15 (from [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ])

YYYY/MM/DD and time: 2015 Nov 10

Print [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]  
Sign [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]

Number of Pages 2 this TPI page

TPI Rank must be **CW5, GS-12 & above, or O-4 and above only (No Contractors)!**

Rank/Title [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ] :

Sign: [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

2 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR [redacted (b)(1)1.4a] J3

FROM: RESOLUTE SUPPORT INVESTIGATION TEAM

SUBJECT: Release of [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)] FOOTAGE

1. MG William Hickman is conducting an AR 15-6 COMRS-requested investigation into the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015.

2. On behalf of MG Hickman, I am requesting the release of video footage from the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)] mission that occurred on the night of 30 Sep 15 (Mission [redacted (b)(1)1.4a]). We believe the video footage may contain information valuable to our investigation.

3. My POC for this is [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]. Please forward any questions regarding this request to him at [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)].

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "S.M. Jenkins".

SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigation Team Lead



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A

2 November 2015


Memorandum for Record

From: Brig Gen Armfield

Subject: Review of (b)(3) Operational Risk Management Worksheets.

1. The Investigating Team requested CJSOAC's Operational Risk Management Worksheets for September '15 and 1-3 October 2015.
2. The CJSOAC (b)(3), (b)(6) provided 45 ORM worksheets from the (b)(3)
3. On 2 Nov, I reviewed 45 worksheets containing the following information:
  - a.
  - b.
  - c.
  - d.

(b)(1)1.4a
4. The 2/3 OCT 15 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) incident mission operational risk was rated "Low" by the (b)(3), (b)(6) but the Authorizing Official rated it as "High." The (b)(3) (initials (b)(3), (b)(6)) appears to have signed off on the ORM worksheet as a "Low." This ORM worksheet has been scanned and added to the investigation database.

  
Robert G. Armfield  
Brig Gen, USAF  
RS Investigation Team

From: [Redacted]  
To: [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Cc:  
Subject: SOTF Attendees - Kunduz Overview Brief (23 Oct 15)  
Date: Friday, October 23, 2015 1:57:22 PM

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Sir,

MG Hickman requested a list of the SOTF-A personnel (below) that participated in the overview brief this morning.

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>SOTF Position</b>
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

<b>Rank</b>	<b>Name</b>	<b>AOB Position</b>
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

v/r,

[Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

NIP  
SIPR  
NIP  
CXI: [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

ACDC-O

6 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Investigation Officer's Discussion with SJOTF-A Commanding General

1. On 22 October 2015, investigation team members visited SJOTF-A headquarters to receive an operations and intelligence brief followed by interviews with key staff members. During this visit I had the opportunity for two office visits with the MG Swindell; one at the start of the HQ visit, and a final office call prior to departing the headquarters. Provided below is a summary of the key discussion points.

2. The discussion summary points of our morning meeting.

a. We discussed in general terms the drafting of an overarching CONOP that supported the USSF movement into the objective area. Future operations would be based on this initial approval.

b. In general terms, we discussed how the "pillars" are reviewed prior to a strike that is controlled by the SJOTF-A HQ. A detailed review of the pillars process was provided by the staff in a subsequent meeting.

c. We discussed in general terms, prior and on-going network targeting efforts to include OBJ (b)(1)1.4a. Also, he confirmed the NDS had visited the MSF Trauma Center in early summer but USSF forces had not entered the facility.

3. The discussion summary of our end of visit meeting.

a. Reviewed again the targeting of OBJ (b)(1)1.4a in the Kunduz area.

b. Discussed partner operations – to include, "there is no need to actually move together – the US element can be in over watch and the ANDSF can move toward the target."

c. Discussed the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b system as the SOJTF-A Common Operations Picture system.

ACDC-O

SUBJECT: Investigation Officer's Discussion with SJOTF-A Commanding General

4. I thanked the CG for his team's support to the investigation team. I asked him if he wanted to submit a statement and he declined.



WILLIAM B. HICKMAN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Investigating Officer

Approved for Release

From: [Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR](#)  
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: (S) RFIs  
Date: Saturday, November 07, 2015 12:11:30 PM  
Attachments: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR DA 2823.pdf  
RW MFR.PDF

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please include the below email from (b)(3), (b)(6) in our records.

I believe you have the three witness statements (attached), if not, please include them into the witness statement book.

Tnx r/ RA

Gwyn Armfield  
Brig Gen USAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2015 7:43 PM  
To: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR  
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: (S) RFIs

**Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Message Body Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

Brig Gen Armfield,

Please see below & attached.

V/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2015 7:03 PM  
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Cc: CJSOAC-A CCC  
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ RFIs

**Classification: SECRET//NOFORN**

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

Please see answers below to the most recent RFI.

V/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

- 1) Please list the specific actions taken at CJSOAC-A following the phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6) on 3 OCT with the initial potential CIVCAS notification.
  - a. Did a post-mission AAR occur with the crew?
  - b. When did the crew realize that they had targeted the wrong compound?
  - c. Was there any consideration given to de-certifying any aircrew members?

(b)(3), (b)(6) received a phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6) stating that there may have been a

CIVCAS. The (b)(3), (b)(6) provided this information to (b)(3), (b)(6) who tasked the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to determine the nature of the allegation and to find out any details surrounding the allegation. Thereafter, (b)(3), (b)(6) sent an email to NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A/CC that a CIVCAS allegation had been raised and that the aircrew was not yet back at Camp Alpha but that the team would begin pulling together data.

Upon the arrival of the aircrew, the (b)(3), (b)(6) met the crew to pull the tapes and begin reviewing the tapes. The aircrew was advised that there was a CIVCAS allegation and they needed to find out where in the tapes that might be. This process took about one and a half hours. Thereafter, (b)(3), (b)(6) reviewed and listened to the strike portion of the tape with the aircrew, the (b)(3), (b)(6)

Just prior to (b)(3), (b)(6) review, he sent the following email to COMNSOCC-A/SOJTF-A: "Sir, per our conversation, here's some preliminary data from the gunship crew: There was a known enemy (b)(1)1.4a The target was identified as an enemy structure controlled by enemy forces with all personnel in/around structure characterized as enemy (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) fired the gunship on the enemy structure and associated personnel. There was approx.. 10 minutes of dialogue prior to the engagement regarding target confirmation and exact location of the building/compound. Perhaps the only issue I see with the shoot, was that ROE (b)(1)1.4a was cited. Regardless, our intel net picked up comms during the shoot and immediately following of enemy personnel attempting to contact their compatriots and being told they were in the building that had been fired upon --- confirming enemy forces in/around the targeted structure."

At the end of the tape review, it appeared that the strike was procedurally correct in terms of confirming the applicable ROE, confirming the target, and acquiring the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) intent and authorization.

(b)(3), (b)(6) then began to build a two slide storyboard, pulled three snapshots and a video clip of the strike (showing the declaration that the compound was Taliban controlled with 9 PAX hostile). (b)(3), (b)(6) provided the first impression report to NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A.

(b)(3), (b)(6) then began to build a timeline of events and transcribe the tapes.

Neither the aircrew nor (b)(3), (b)(6) leadership was aware they had hit the wrong compound until weeks after the event. (b)(3), (b)(6) and determined through legal channels the wrong target had been struck, on or about mid-October. The crew likely did not know it was the wrong target until the 15-6 investigator's interviews.

The (b)(3), (b)(6) was suspended from flying, and the (b)(3), (b)(6) were subsequently suspended, but no member has been de-certified. Nor was decertification considered as standards were complied with.

- 2) How many personnel positions (spaces) were assigned to (b)(3), (b)(6) in October of 2014 and how many in October 2015? What is the current manning level and where are the vacancies if not 100%?

(b)(1)1.4a

- 3) What was the AC-130 crew requirement on 3 OCT and how many crews did (b)(3), (b)(6) have assigned? If less than 1:1, how was were the crews managed within CJSOAC to meet the requirement (please list ORM, waivers, etc.)? Were any requests made by (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) AFSOC for additional crews or to meet the requirement if less than 1:1?

(b)(1)1.4a

4) What Operational Risk Management regulations does CJSOAC use?

For each mission, Operational Planners (J5), Aircrew, and Mission Commanders (Squadron Commander) assess the ORM using a unit specific form that facilitates an AFSOC mandated process (attached) that was identified as a "best practice" in 2004. ORM worksheets differ between units because of variations in each unit's mission; however, each worksheet is developed with the METT-TC (Mission, Enemy, Terrain, Weather, Troops and Support Available, Time Available, and Civil Considerations) framework.

Each individual operation is analyzed three times prior to execution. First, during mission planning, the aircrew planners analyze known risks for the specific mission at the time the mission is planned. These planners determine overall mission risk at the time of initial planning. Second, the specific aircrew that will fly the mission performs a second ORM analysis based on the most current information. The crew refines the determination of overall risk. Last, the mission and overall risk is briefed to the Mission Commander, who will then validate the identified risks and overall mission risk level. If the overall risk warrants, additional validations/approvers may be required in accordance with CJSOAC-A "mission execution and risk management" policy (dated 24 April 2014 which remains in effect). [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a

a. Is there specific guidance on what defines low/medium/high risk?

Each aircraft platform independently analyzes risk level based upon aircraft operating parameters, defensive systems, weather capability and how METT-TC factors in for a specific mission.

b. Does CJSOAC consider risk to mission and risk to force separately?

In this ORM process, AFOSC does not consider risk to mission and risk to force separately. Instead, both items gets included in the total METT-TC framework for an overall mission risk assessment.

5) Please talk with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) and determine who had a [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g etc) at the PCOP compound and specifically, if systems were there, why each system was not working. Was any attempt made to use this system during the 3 OCT incident at the MSF Trauma Center? (FYI—the aircraft's

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

See attached statements. The JTACs state that the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g systems at PCOP were inoperable due to lack of power. The team had exhausted their battery supply [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) had a conversation at some point with an [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was needed he would turn it on but that they were critically low on batteries. The [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) that they did not need him to look at the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)

time, (b)(1).4a, (b)(3) states that JTACs were borrowing batteries from ODA members and ODA members were running a (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g in order to preserve battery life and prolong communication ability. Thereafter, during the engagement that night, several of the JTACs (b)(1).4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1).4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) became involved in clearing an HLZ in order to receive an emergency resupply. By the time that resupply was completed, the engagement had ended.

6) Do you know who created the transcript from the 2/3 Oct (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Answers previously provided from both SOTF and CJSOAC-A. It was a combined effort led by the attorneys at each organization. After consolidation of the transcripts/review of slight discrepancies, the transcript was forwarded to SOJTF-A.

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From: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Monday, November 02, 2015 9:28 AM

To: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: Bauernfeind, Tony D BG SOJTF-A; Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director

Subject: (S) RFIs

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A few RFIs for you and your team:

7) Please list the specific actions taken at CJSOAC-A following the phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6) on 3 OCT with the initial potential CIVCAS notification.

- a. Did a post-mission AAR occur with the crew?
- b. When did the crew realize that they had targeted the wrong compound?
- c. Was there any consideration given to de-certifying any aircrew members?

8) How many personnel positions (spaces) were assigned to CJSOAC-A in October of 2014 and how many in October 2015? What is the current manning level and where are the vacancies if not 100%?

9) What was the AC-130 crew requirement on 3 OCT and how many crews did CJSOAC-A have assigned? If less than 1:1, how were the crews managed within CJSOAC to meet the requirement (please list ORM, waivers, etc.)? Were any requests made by

CJSOAC-A to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) or AFSOC for additional crews or to meet the requirement if less than 1:1?

- 10) What Operational Risk Management regulations does CJSOAC use?
- a. Is there specific guidance on what defines low/medium/high risk?
  - b. Does CJSOAC consider risk to mission and risk to force separately?

11) Please talk with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

specifically, if systems were there, why each system was not working. Was any attempt made to use this system during the 3 OCT incident at the MSF Trauma Center? (FYI—the aircraft's

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

12) Do you know who created the transcript from the 2/3 Oct

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) ?

Please provide a written response to the above six questions on a signed MFR to me NLT 1200 3 November 2015. Call or email me if you have any questions.

Thanks, RA

Gwyn Armfield  
Brig Gen USAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Message Body Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

**Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Attachment Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Message Body Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

**Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

28 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (U) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Request for Information

1. (U) The purpose of this memorandum is to describe the requests for information for the aircrew of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

2. (U) The crew of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) not conduct any flights as an entire (b)(1)1.4a aircrew in the 180 days prior to 2 Oct 15 prior to their deployment to CJOA-A. Since this aircrew was not designated as a "hard crew" prior to their deployment, they were not scheduled for flying training events together at any point prior to deployment. In addition, the officers on the aircrew of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) only flew together once in the last 180 days, on (b)(1)1.4a at the deployed location.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. (U) My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

10/28/2015

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Major General Mark Quantock

- Been here before
- [redacted (b)(6)] May back @ hospital
- We'd been in Chaka Sa before land of badness
- Much more kinetic up there
- Mainly Taliban, lots of crime
- No indications of an attack days before. Have sufficient [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g] but not as much post –MK we were focused in there, but there's **act** quite after
- (b)(3), (b)(6) I spoke to [redacted (b)(6)] said he controlled city, focused on North District
- Think [redacted (b)(1)1.4d]
- TAAC-N, NSOC-A, would provide **up to** RS
- Following Afghan's core plan
- Does RS drive IPR for force placement? No
- Use JWICs mainly, think SOF uses [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]

We are not using [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]



I don't know if our guys saw the memo

- The **logs** has been on NSC since 1990s
- Depends on the supported unit, but 13 sounds like a lot. We did it at M/K.
- Collection plan – GS is normally general support, day by day – can check.
- Would this shop track other operations in area, DGA-NO
- [redacted (b)(1)1.4c]
- Can't shoot a building. Period.
- Proportionality issue as well
- CJOC Intel [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]
- Talk to [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

03 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Weather Observation IVO Kunduz AFG 2300 local

1. On 03 2300 (L) October 2015, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was flying in the vicinity of Kunduz AFG and reported the sky conditions as scattered to broken ceiling at 15,000 to 16,000'.
2. This report was obtained from listening to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) on 30 OCT 2015.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. G. Armfield".

ROBERT G. ARMFIELD  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Assistant Investigating Officer



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A

07 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(1)1.4d to review partner force location data for Kunduz, Afghanistan.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Investigation JTAC SME



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A

4 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Transcription of Voice Recordings (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Mission, 2-3 October 2015

1. The following details the efforts undertaken to transcribe the recording made of the voice recordings from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) mission to Kunduz, Afghanistan 2-3 October 2015 provided by (b)(3), (b)(6).

a. According to (b)(3), (b)(6), CJSOAC, "Transcribing the tapes was a collective effort between (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) who were not part of the crew, (b)(3), (b)(6). After these individuals transcribed the tapes, the individual pieces were sent and assembled/reviewed by (b)(3), (b)(6), who forwarded the transcript to SOTF-A for review and comparison. Thereafter, slight discrepancies were resolved and the transcript was forwarded to SOJTF-A."

b. According to (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-A, (b)(3), (b)(6) did the initial transcription for SOTF-A then passed different sections out amongst different individuals to make corrections. Shortly after our corrections were made, we received the CJSOAC transcript. I then had (b)(3), (b)(6) go through the two versions and point out any discrepancies. Finally, I went through both transcripts and listened to the tapes where there were discrepancies. Once I made the changes I returned the transcript to CJSOAC with redline changes. They reviewed and gave us a final thumbs up before I submitted them."

c. (b)(3), (b)(6) oversaw the final compilation of the transcript.

2. The Investigation Team listened to the recording multiple times, and compared the transcript with the recording. The investigation team believes that the transcript is a substantially accurate transcription of the recording.

3. The point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

8 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Kunduz Site Visit, 24 October 2015

1. On Thursday, 24 October 2015, members of the AR 15-6 Investigation Team visited several locations in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan. While at the locations, the investigation team conducted interviews of witnesses to events surrounding the 3 October 2015 strike on the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz City.
2. The team visited the Kunduz Airport, and moved to the ODA (b)(1)1.4a. At (b)(1)1.4a, the team received an Operations and Intelligence overview from ODA (b)(1)1.4a as well as a pre-mission brief. Select members of the investigation team interviewed senior ANDSF leaders, to include (b)(6) who were involved in the ANDSF planning of the operation to re-take Kunduz.
3. Other members of the investigation team interviewed the ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6).
4. Select members of the interview team then interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) separately. Other members of the interview team did an inspection of the equipment (b)(3), (b)(6) had when he was conducting JTAC duties at the PCOP Compound on 3 Oct.
5. The investigation team then conducted ground movement to the Kunduz Provincial Government Complex, which includes the Provincial Chief of Police Compound (PCOP Compound). The team utilized the same route, (b)(1)1.4a US Special Forces Ground Force (USSF) used to conduct movement to the PCOP Compound during the Period of Darkness 30 Sep / 1 Oct.
6. The investigation team inspected key locations within the PCOP Compound identified during the 3 Oct incident, while (b)(3), (b)(6) and other USSF members discussed their actions during the fighting at the location. Key locations the team inspected within the compound included the west wall, the northwest tower on the west wall, the southwest tower on the west wall, a rooftop that the ODA members identified they stood on during the fight, as well as other rooftops within the PCOP Compound. At each location, the team observed possible sight lines and potential sight distances that were described in previous statements, to include those of (b)(3), (b)(6) the (b)(3), (b)(6) during the 3 Oct strike. The team took photographs from several vantage points within the compound.
7. At every location within the PCOP Compound, the team attempted to determine whether an individual could observe the NDS Compound, the intended (b)(1)1.4d

GAF) objective on 3 Oct, or the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Trauma Center. The team determined that neither compound could be observed via direct line of sight from any spot within the PCOP Compound.

8. The team visited the NDS compound, the intended (b)(1)1.4 GAF objective and the intended target of the AC-130U strike on 3 Oct. Although the team was not permitted inside the compound, the team was able to confirm that the main entrance to the compound was on the south side of the location.

9. The team finished by visiting the MSF Trauma Center compound. Select members of the investigation team met several MSF staff members, and were given a tour. The team was able to observe the hospital grounds, the main Trauma Center building that was destroyed, and other select buildings within the complex. The team took photographs of its observations.



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Assistant Investigating Officer



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UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

8 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes of Interview; [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) ~~(S//NF)~~

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) On Tuesday, 22 October 2015, the investigating officer and the following members of the AR 15-6 Investigation Team: BG Jenkins, Asst. IO, Brig Gen Armfield, Asst. IO, and Legal Advisor, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) for the AC-130U callsign (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) during the strike on the Kunduz Trauma Center on 3 October 2015. The interview was conducted at the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Command Headquarters building, Bagram Airfield Afghanistan.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Asst. IO informed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) the purpose of the investigation. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed he did not know the target the aircraft struck on 3 October was a hospital.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) provided his relevant experience. He received his commission through

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) told him the aircraft was to launch immediately because of a troops in contact (TIC), and was told who dropped the request. He stated that he believed the aircraft had [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g capabilities at launch. He stated that the aircraft had products from previous missions over Kunduz. He was not aware of the location of the MSF Trauma Center but knew where Kunduz Hospital was located. He estimated that, from one being the least ready and ten being the most ready, that he was a seven out of ten, because the aircraft launched early, but also had products from previous missions. The information he had prior to the aircraft being refueled just was that there were strikes going on in Afghanistan, and that a TIC was ongoing.

5. (U//~~FOUO~~) The [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) work for him. His duties also include advising on weaponeering and managing the gunners on the aircraft.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The building was selected because the (b)(3), (b)(6) went to the largest compound. His confidence that the aircrew was on the correct target prior to the strike was three out of five, with five being the most confident. The factors reducing his confidence level was the fact that they were in an urban area, and the slaving error. Immediately before the engagement, his confidence level was five out of five.

9. (U//~~FOUO~~) The target description from the (b)(3), (b)(6) and pattern of life raised his confidence level. He recalled an internal discussion about both sites, and the crew as a whole decided they were correct, because the building was the largest T shaped building in the area.

10. (S//~~REL~~) He heard the (b)(3), (b)(6) "soften the target" comment and sought clarification. He detailed the back and forth conversation between the (b)(3), (b)(6) on the radio. The ground asked to confirm (b)(1)1.4a. He did not know whether the Ground Force could see the compound. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

11. (U//~~FOUO~~) The other compound was close, but didn't match the (b)(3), (b)(6) description. Its gate was on the north side of the compound.

12. (U//~~FOUO~~) He was good with the COMRS Tactical Guidance and is familiar with both the RS and OFS versions.

13. (U//~~FOUO~~) The POC for this is the Legal Advisor,

(b)(3), (b)(6)



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Assistant Investigating Officer



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BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

8 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes of Interview; [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (~~S//REL~~)

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) On Tuesday, 22 October 2015, the investigating officer and the following members of the AR 15-6 Investigation Team: BG Jenkins, Asst. IO, Brig Gen Armfield, Asst. IO, and Legal Advisor, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) for the AC-130U, callsign [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) during the strike on the Kunduz Trauma Center on 3 October 2015. The interview was conducted at the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) Headquarters building, Bagram Airfield Afghanistan.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Asst. IO informed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) the purpose of the investigation. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed he did not know the target the aircraft struck on 3 October was a hospital.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

products on the day of the launch. He estimated that in terms of preparedness, he was a two out of ten, with ten being the most prepared. The crew did not receive an in extremis brief plan, however, for communications issues.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) The building was selected because the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) went to the largest compound. His confidence that the aircrew was on the correct target prior to the strike was three out of five, with five being the most confident. The factors reducing his confidence level was the

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fact that they were in an urban area, and the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Immediately before the engagement, his confidence level was five out of five.

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) The target description from the (b)(3), (b)(6) and pattern of life raised his confidence level. He recalled an internal discussion about both sites, and the crew as a whole decided they were correct, because the building was the largest T shaped building in the area.

8. (S//~~REL~~) The aircrew did not seek the compound. However, after thirty minutes, he was fairly confident that they were on the right target. The T Shaped description was important, but he believed that the aircrew used it first.

9. (U//~~FOUO~~) The aircrew were aware of the (b)(1)1.4 Ground Force. The aircrew was tracking the location of the convoy and it was about 1km southeast of the objective when the aircraft began to fire.

10. (U//~~FOUO~~) He had been trained on the Tactical Guidance. The aircrew had a copy of the ROE in the aircraft.

11. (U//~~FOUO~~) The POC for this is the Legal Advisor,

(b)(3), (b)(6)



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Assistant Investigating Officer



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HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF, (b)(3) Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan; Article 31 Rights; Investigation into Potential Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Incident in Kunduz, Afghanistan

1. This investigation was appointed to conduct an investigation into reports that US Forces struck facilities and individuals at or near the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Trauma Center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015.
2. On or about 6 October 2015, during a previous AR 15-6 investigation into the event, (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed by the investigating officer of (b)(3), (b)(6) rights under Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), for a violation of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty, for failing to follow the Commander-RESOLUTE SUPPORT (COMRS) Tactical Guidance, and violating the Rules of Engagement.
3. (b)(3), (b)(6) invoked (b)(3), (b)(6) rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and chose to consult with counsel prior to making any statements to the investigation. (b)(3), (b)(6) consulted with counsel, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF, Area Defense Counsel, Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany. Counsel informed (b)(3), (b)(6) to not make any further statements to the investigation regarding the offense of which (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed. (b)(3), (b)(6) also contacted the legal advisor to the current investigation to inform him (b)(3), (b)(6) would not be making any statements to the investigation.
4. The current investigating officer, MG William Hickman, USARCEN, believed (b)(3), (b)(6) committed the offense of Dereliction of Duty. Therefore, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not interviewed during the investigation's visit to the (b)(3) Afghanistan Headquarters ((b)(3)) on 22 October 2015, although (b)(3), (b)(6) was present in the headquarters (b)(3), (b)(6) did not participate in any briefings or group interviews the investigation conducted with the (b)(3) Command and Staff, and no one from the investigation team contacted (b)(3), (b)(6).
5. The investigation legal advisor contacted (b)(3), (b)(6) about alternative means of information. (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated (b)(3), (b)(6) may be interested in providing responses to written questions, and provided a SIPRnet email address for the investigation to send the questions it would like (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to answer. The legal advisor provided a list of written questions to the SIPRnet email address that (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel provided. As of 9 November 2015, (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel has not indicated whether (b)(3), (b)(6) would be making a statement. The Investigation paralegal emailed (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel a DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Waiver, on or about 5 November 2015. The DA 3881 has not been returned.

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6. POC for this memorandum is the AR 15-6 Legal Advisor, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



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**HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354**

9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR Record

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6), USAF, (b)(3) Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan; Article 31 Rights; Investigation into Potential Civilian Casualty (CIVCAS) Incident in Kunduz, Afghanistan

1. This investigation was appointed to conduct an investigation into reports that US Forces struck facilities and individuals at or near the Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) Trauma Center in Kunduz City, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015.
2. On or about 6 October 2015, during a previous AR 15-6 investigation into the event, (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed by the investigating officer of (b)(3), (b)(6) rights under Article 31(b), Uniform Code of Military Justice (UCMJ), for a violation of Article 92, Dereliction of Duty, for failing to follow the Commander-RESOLUTE SUPPORT (COMRS) Tactical Guidance, and violating the Rules of Engagement.
3. (b)(3), (b)(6) invoked (b)(3), (b)(6) rights under Article 31, UCMJ, and chose to consult with counsel prior to making any statements to the investigation. (b)(3), (b)(6) consulted with counsel, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) USAF, Area Defense Counsel, Ramstein Air Force Base, Germany. Counsel informed (b)(3), (b)(6) to not make any further statements to the investigation regarding the offense of which (b)(3), (b)(6) was informed. (b)(3), (b)(6) also contacted the legal advisor to the current investigation to inform him (b)(3), (b)(6) would not be making any statements to the investigation.
4. The current investigating officer, MG William Hickman, USARCEN, believed (b)(3), (b)(6) committed the offense of Dereliction of Duty. Therefore, (b)(3), (b)(6) was not interviewed during the investigation's visit to the (b)(3) Afghanistan Headquarters (b)(3) on 22 October 2015. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not participate in any briefings or group interviews the investigation conducted with the (b)(3) Command and Staff, and no one from the investigation team contacted (b)(3), (b)(6).
5. The investigation legal advisor contacted (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel about alternative means of information. (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel indicated (b)(3), (b)(6) may be interested in providing responses to written questions, and provided a SIPRnet email address for the investigation to send the questions it would like (b)(3), (b)(6) to answer. The legal advisor provided a list of written questions to counsel on 4 November 2015. On 5 November 2015, (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel indicated that (b)(3), (b)(6) had spoken to (b)(3), (b)(6), and that (b)(3), (b)(6) would be making a statement. The Investigation paralegal emailed (b)(3), (b)(6) counsel a DA Form 3881, Rights Warning Waiver, on or about 5 November 2015. The DA 3881 has not been returned as of this date.

~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOUO~~

6. POC for this memorandum is the AR 15-6 Legal Advisor, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Legal Advisor

Approved for Release



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

ACDC

9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Involvement in the Kunduz 15-6 Investigation

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) assisted the investigation team by providing his expertise and requested products only; therefore, an interview was not necessary from him.
2. The point of contact for this Memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



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UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of (b)(6)

1. On 27 Oct 15, members of the RS Investigation Team interviewed (b)(6) RS (b)(3), (b)(6)

2. (b)(6) stated that he stayed at Camp Pamir on 2-3 Oct 15 as part of an expeditionary group of TAA team. He was sent to Camp Pamir to provide intelligence support and advice to Afghan partners.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6)  
(b)(1)1.4a but had no interaction with US Special Forces (USSF) at the PCOP.

4. (b)(6) mentioned a (b)(6) as a (b)(1)1.4a troop commander (subsequently interviewed by the investigation team). He stated that (b)(6) ran the convoy/resupply route on the night of 2-3 Oct.

5. The point of contact for this Memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins (signature)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

29 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 28 1415 (L) October 2015, MG Hickman, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3) conference room at Camp Vance, Bagram Airfield (BAF). [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about pre-mission training. He stated that his pre-mission was focused on the train, advise, and assist (TAA) role. Following completion of ILE, he reported early in order to participate in Exercise EAGER LION in Jordan. The exercise was focused on TAA with multi-national participation. Following EAGER LION, he continued training at home station, which focused ROE and included VTCs with SOJTF-A.

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he had not worked with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) prior to his current assignment.

5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that this assignment was his first in which he employed AC-130s. He stated that he had participated in urban warfare in the past, but as a [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) Iraq.

6. He stated that had he ranked the provinces within his AOR in importance, he would have ranked Kunduz as number 2 of 17. He also stated that he had not entered Kunduz city prior to the operation beginning on 30 Sep 15.

7. Prior to the operation in Kunduz, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the last time he had more than four hours of sleep was the POD 26-27 Sep 15.

8. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about Persons with Designated Special Status (PDSS) for the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) conducting the operation into Kunduz. He stated that he thought, as a default, operations would be conducted under RS ROE, which is required for PDSS.

9. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about the VTC that was held with COMRS on 30 Sep. He stated that the conversation during the VTC was primarily between GEN Campbell on (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that he joined in the conversation to assist (b)(6). He stated that COMRS said the sooner we get into Kunduz the better. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) said that COMRS never gave specific guidance to him, but he inferred that failure with this operation was not an option. He also stated that he was the only US participant in the VTC form Camp Pamir.

10. Regarding the CONOPs used for the operation in Kunduz, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he used the 30 Sep 15 1C "Kunduz Clearing Patrol" CONOP, for which he received verbal approval (VOCO) at around 2100L on 30 Sep 15.

11. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about preparing his troops for the operation. When asked if he told his subordinates, "the whole world is watching," he stated that it sounded like something he would say in a speech. He said that he attempted to print graphics/imagery in preparation for the operation, but the printer was malfunction and only produced magenta blobs. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he had received (b)(1)1.4a for his partnered forces prior to departing.

12. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he severely underestimated the number of enemy forces in Kunduz. He also stated that he thought the operation would last no more than 24 hours, which is also told COMRS during the VTC on 30 Sep 15. He stated that he didn't think the enemy forces would be persistent and that they would fade away to outlying districts after initial contact.

13. Regarding the events that took place on the evening of 2 Oct 15, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the height of enemy activity took place between 1700L and 1800L. He stated the (b)(1)1.4d wanted to remove their casualties, but that he convinced them to wait until it was dark. A (b)(1)1.4d officer returned and told him that the (b)(1)1.4d intended to strike the NDS facility in Kunduz upon their return from taking their casualties to Camp Pamir. (b)(3), (b)(6) told the officer to brief their plan to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6).

14. (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed (b)(3), (b)(6) on the (b)(1)1.4d plan, explaining that the (b)(1)1.4d had picked two targets: the NDS prison in Kunduz and one other (he did not have information on the other target, so said he didn't worry about it). A (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) asked (b)(3), (b)(6) if US forces would provide air support. (b)(3), (b)(6) said he agreed, so long as the (b)(1)1.4d forces were part of the group's "integrated defense" bubble. He stated that he did not remember the name of the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) He further stated that he assumed the request for air support in support of their targets must have been authorized because no one would ask for that in the ASSF if they did not have the proper authority. He also said that he briefed (b)(3), (b)(6) that the (b)(1)1.4d would secure the prison upon their return from Camp Pamir.

15. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked if the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) provided a physical description of the target (NDS facility). He stated that the (b)(6) told him the target was a long t-shaped building with out-buildings, a wall around it, and an arched gate on the north side.

16. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about the purpose of the AC-130 fires. He stated the purpose was the "overall self-defense of our perimeter," and that everything to the west of (b)(1)1.4a was full of insurgents. He said he did not remember using the term "softening the target."

17. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked what made him decide to authorize the AC-130 to engage the objective (what he believed to be the NDS but turned out to be the MSF facility). He stated that he heard sustained fires coming from the direction of the NDS and tried to get in touch with the convoy with no success which led him to believe that the (b)(1)1.4t convoy was under fire.

18. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked what Positive Identification (PID) he had in order to authorize the strike on the objective. He stated that he had three sources of PID. One, the intelligence and description of the compound he received from the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) Two, the confirmed description passed by the AC-130. Three, the sustained gun fire coming from the direction of the objective the convoy planned to clear.

19. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked what Pattern of Life (POL) information he had for the objective. The (b)(1)1.4d informed him that there would be a small force outside of the building and some guards at the gate. The AC-130 passed a (b)(1)1.4a. They also stated that that there were two individuals guarding the entrance to the compound but did not have weapons. He also stated that when he authorized the strike, he thought it was the NDS building and that non-combatants would not use that building to seek refuge.

20. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about a Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) map (depicting key infrastructure in the city; including the MSF facility as a hospital) was found at the Provincial Government building. He stated that they did not find the map until after the night of the strike.

21. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked if he received any phone calls from SOTF-A relaying information. He stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) called and asked if he received a message on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. He acknowledged receiving a message but he was referring to a message regarding enemy activities in another area and not the message with the MSF grids.

15-6 members present during the interview:

MG William B. Hickman  
BG Sean M. Jenkins

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

1 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 28 October 2015, member of the Resolute Support Investigation Team appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3) conference room at Camp Vance, Bagram Airfield (BAF). [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. During his time at the PCOP compound in Kunduz, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that Afghans would come to him and his team with information about enemy forces, such as their locations in the city. He stated that if the information was found to be valid, the information could be used to target the enemy forces.

5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that communication between the US and Afghans was not ideal. Most communication occurred via [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g phones.

6. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the coordinates passed from the Afghans for the NDS facility (for which the MSF Trauma Center was subsequently misidentified) were like any other coordinates passed to him and his team. He stated that the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 forces wanted to strike the NDS facility upon returning from Camp Pamir during the POD, 2-3 Oct. The [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 element would be returning from delivering casualties to Camp Pamir.

7. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he went down for rest between 2300D\* and 2359D\* on 2 Oct. He stated that he woke up sometime around 0300D\* when a resupply helicopter landed at the PCOP compound.

8. Regarding the Provincial Reconstruction Team (PRT) map found at the site, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that it was found on the evening of 1 Oct or early on 2 Oct, but that it was found “absolutely before the strike occurred.”

9. When asked if he carried a no-strike list (NSL), (b)(3), (b)(6) responded that he did not and that at the time he was not aware that a country NSL existed.

10. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he had heard that non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO) were possible in Kunduz, but that he thought they had already occurred before the night of 2 Oct.

11. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he did not receive a briefing from the (b)(3), (b)(6) officer prior to the mission to enter Kunduz. Regarding the intelligence the team had available for the NDS site, he stated that they only had the information passed to them from the (b)(1)1.4 and that he thought the location had been corroborated via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

12. Regarding the enemy’s disposition in Kunduz, (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that probably 75 percent of fire was coming from the west.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

14. (b)(3), (b)(6) remembers receiving one (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g call, which occurred on the day after the MSF strike.

15. Members of the investigation team present included: BG Sean Jenkins, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins 

(b)(3), (b)(6)



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USFOR-A-RIST

8 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

1. On 08 1400 (L) November 2015, BG Sean Jenkins and (b)(3), (b)(6) AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed (b)(6) via telephone (with an interpreter) in the 9 AETF-A HQ building at Camp RS. (b)(6) is a (b)(6). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. (b)(6) participated in the (b)(1)1.4 mission to secure the NDS facility on the night of 2 Oct. He said that he received the information about the mission from the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6). According to (b)(6) (b)(6) the (b)(1)1.4 believed approximately 150 insurgents were located in the NDS facility on 2 Oct.

3. (b)(6) left Camp Pamir for the NDS facility between 2300 and 2400 on 2 Oct. He stated that before leaving he called (b)(6) at the Provincial Chief of Police Compound (PCOP), who was also participating in the Kunduz operation (b)(6) and told him to ask the US forces to look at the target (NDS facility). (b)(6) said that he also told (b)(6) to tell the USSF at the PCOP to engage anyone at the target site.

4. (b)(6) stated that he did not know who on the Afghan side was the (b)(6) to the USSF at the PCOP. He further stated that he did not know who gave the (b)(1)1.4 target description to the USSF. He mentioned that the (b)(1)1.4 planned for the operation using (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g as he, and presumably others, had never been to Kunduz.

5. (b)(6) stated that the convoy fired as it neared its objective because it feared an ambush from Taliban fighters.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins   
(b)(3), (b)(6)



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 UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
 BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
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USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 3 November 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3) Kabul AF, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) provided information about the CONOP process for SOJTF-A and subordinate units. He specifically spoke of CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a-09-001 and the submission of CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a-09-002. He did not see CONOP 09-002 until after the forces; USSF and partnered forces were already in security positions in the PGOV compound. After the fact he would have treated it as a FRAGO CONOP to 09-001.

3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he did not see CONOP 09-002 posted to the portal. The concept was posted to the Battle Room where it could be reviewed. I recall this was observed in Battle Room the morning of the 1<sup>st</sup> of October '15. CONOP can be turned within three hours.

4. The NSL is updated via email from the CENTCOM JTE and is disseminated via email.

5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that currently no SOP exists at the SOJTF-A to support prosecuting forces when there is degradation in systems [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g etc).

  
 SEAN M. JENKINS  
 BG, USA  
 Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



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APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

9 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 04 1500 (L) November 2015, members of the RS investigation team appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) via secret VTC (SVTC) at Camp RS. (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) is assigned to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. (b)(3), (b)(6) to ANASOC. HQ notified him on 28 Sep 15 that he would travel to Camp Pamir to advise Afghan forces planning to retake Kunduz from Taliban fighters. He arrived at Camp Pamir on the evening of 1 Oct. At Camp Pamir, he partnered with the ANASOC (b)(6). He also advised (b)(6).

3. When (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at Camp Pamir, (b)(1)1.4a was already in Kunduz at the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) compound. He did not play a role in planning the (b)(1)1.4a mission to strike the NDS facility on the night of 2 Oct.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

(b)(3), (b)(6)



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BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
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USFOR-A-RIST

9 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 04 1500 (L) November 2015, members of the RS investigation team appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) via secret VTC (SVTC) at Camp RS. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) is assigned to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) is a military advisor to ANASOC. HQ notified him on 28 Sep 15 that he would travel to Camp Pamir to advise Afghan forces planning to retake Kunduz from Taliban fighters. He arrived at Camp Pamir on the evening of 1 Oct. While there, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. When [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at Camp Pamir, he went to [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a headquarters. He stated there were not many people there because the team was located in Kunduz at the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) compound. He stated that he was not aware of the situation on the ground at the PCOP in Kunduz. He did not play a role in planning the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4 mission to strike the NDS facility on the night of 2 Oct.

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



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BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
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USFOR-A-RIST

9 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 04 1500 (L) November 2015, members of the RS investigation team appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) via secret VTC (SVTC) at Camp RS. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) is assigned to the Afghan National Army Special Operations Command (ANASOC) Special Operations Advisory Group (SOAG). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at Camp Pamir on 12 Oct. He was not at Camp Pamir during the operation to retake Kunduz after it fell to Taliban forces on 28 Sep. As such, he could not provide any information related to the current investigation.

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



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ACDC-O

9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Airstrike on the MSF Trauma Center

1. After a thorough review and analysis of the timeline concerning the AC-130 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) strike on the MSF Trauma Center of 3 Oct 15, the investigation team determined that notable events fell into the categories of Rules of Engagement (ROE) and tactical guidance; situational awareness (SA) and decision making; the targeting process; and leading communications. The following paragraphs provide a brief outline of each consideration.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Situational Awareness and Decision Making. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) crew's SA began degrading from the time they took off without mission products. Degraded SA continued through the time they began searching for the initial grid (of the NDS facility) and failed to identify inherent system errors that caused them to identify a point in an open field 329 meters west of the actual grid location passed. Once the objective was incorrectly identified and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) provided an update of the wrong target, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) informed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) that the observed personnel were hostile, despite the observed normal pattern of life (POL) activities, which (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) never fully described to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was the only crew member to realize that the observed location might be incorrect, but efforts to clarify the discrepancy were diluted by inaccurate, misleading, and digressing communications and descriptions between (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). Decisions made from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) to employ fires were based on poorly-developed or non-existent SA.

4. The Targeting Process. When the grid for the NDS facility was first passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) all should have instantly realized that the errors inherent to the AC-130 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ACDC-O

SUBJECT: Analysis of the Airstrike on the MSF Trauma Center

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Despite the (b)(3), (b)(6) having "great confidence" in the grid passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) the crew essentially disregarded the information in favor of an ambiguous physical description from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) that appeared to match the MSF Trauma Center.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. Please forward any additional questions to (b)(3), (b)(6) RS Investigation Team, HQ RS, Kabul by SIPR e-mail at (b)(3), (b)(6)

  
WILLIAM B. HICKMAN  
Major General, U.S. Army  
Investigating Officer



~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

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USFOR-A RSIT

29 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) Computer Search

1. On 28 October 2015 at the (b)(1)1.4a Afghanistan (b)(1)1.4a headquarters building main conference room, I conducted a thorough search and scan

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. Please forward any questions to (b)(3), (b)(6), RS Investigation Team, HQ RS, Kabul by SIPR e-mail at (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~



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USFOR-A-RIST

29 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 26 1100 (Local) October 2015, MG Hickman, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.
2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked to describe the sequence of events from o/a 27 September through 3 October 2015 explaining [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) actions and involvement in the operations that they conducted during this period.
3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he and some of his teammates were up most of the period of darkness (POD) 27/28 September conducting contingency planning for an insurgent attack on Kunduz for which they had [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c. He stated that there was a mass exfiltration of Afghan police, military and civilians south out of the city to the Kunduz Airport and to Camp Pamir that began that evening.
4. By 1700 on the 28<sup>th</sup> the city of Kunduz was under insurgent control; most police and government officials had fled or were in hiding.
5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and his team began mission planning with the Afghan National Army (ANA) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d Corps to gain a foothold in the Southern part of Kunduz City, specifically the prison and hospital both of which were reported to be under insurgent control and were the two locations the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d Corps wanted to move to first.
6. Early morning on 29 September [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a arrive at Camp Pamir and begin preparing for operations.
7. A level 2C CONOP was submitted and approved on 29 September to gain a foothold in Kunduz City with a planned departure time of 2100 on the 29<sup>th</sup>.
8. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) arrives at Camp Pamir to assume tactical command of the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a preparing to clear Kunduz City and provide TAA to the accompanying ANDSF.
9. During the evening of 29 September the Kunduz Airport came under attack by the insurgents and [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a and select ANA counterparts moved to the Airport in its defense where they remained until the morning of 30 September.

10. (b)(3), (b)(6) conducts mission planning with the ANA (b)(1)1.4d

11. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that a second CONOP was submitted and approved on the 30<sup>th</sup> to clear north on the East side of the city securing, in order, the PSU compound, the prison, and the PGOV compound. They expected to depart at 2200 that evening.

12. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that upon departure the streets were remarkably quiet and in spite of steady enemy contact (neutralized mostly with close air support) along the way all objectives were secured in a timely manner and as dawn approached the ground force established the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) compound (part of the greater Provincial Governors (PGOV) compound) as a strong point.

13. On the morning of 1 October the PCOP and Deputy PGOV arrived at the strong point to discuss operations with the ground force; their visit was associated with a noticeable lull in the enemy fire. The PCOP and Deputy PGOV departed after about an hour.

14. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that shortly after the PCOP and DPGOV the ground force received concentrated fire from the West for about an hour. Throughout their time at the strong point, they received most of their enemy contact from the West.

15. After nearly 60 continuous hours of operations, the ground force was low on ammunition, food and water as well as being fairly exhausted physically and mentally. (b)(3), (b)(6) directed that the ground force institute a rest plan allowing the force some time to re-fit and recover. The ground force was expecting to be able to depart the strong point the next POD (2/3 OCT), turning security over to the ANDSF.

16. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that on the morning of 2 October additional ANDSF forces arrived at the PCOP strong point but explained that they were not comfortable remaining in place without the presence of the U.S. (b)(1)1.4a

17. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the ground force received their most significant contact since departing Camp Pamir the evening of 2 October where they were the target of a well-coordinated attack that simultaneously hit both the Northeast and Southwest corners of their strong point. In addition to returning fire with organic weapon systems, the ground force required multiple CAS strikes to repel the attack. The remainder of that evening they continued to receive sporadic but persistent enemy fire.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)

19. As part of the rest plan that (b)(3), (b)(6) implemented, (b)(3), (b)(6) was on shift from 2000-2200, (b)(3), (b)(6) from 2200-0000, and (b)(3), (b)(6) came on duty at midnight.

20. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that somewhere between 2100-2200 2 October and (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) approached him with grid coordinates for two locations (an NDS facility and a command and control node) the (b)(1)1.4d were planning on securing later that night.



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

9 NOV 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Time Change Conversion

The time change conversion used for the Kunduz investigation was Zulu time + 4hrs 30 mins for local time.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. G. Armfield".

Robert G. Armfield  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Assistant Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

MG William B. Hickman

BG Sean M. Jenkins

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

8 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

1. On 08 1400 (L) November 2015, BG Sean Jenkins and (b)(3), (b)(6) AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed (b)(6) via telephone (with an interpreter) in the 9 AETF-A HQ building at Camp RS. (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. (b)(6) stated that he arrived at Camp Pamir on 30 Oct and participated in the operation to retake Kunduz from Taliban fighters. It was his first in Kunduz.

3. (b)(6) stated that throughout his time at the Provincial Chief of Police (PCOP) compound, he saw several USSF members, including (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6), but had very little substantive interaction with them.

4. (b)(6) was at the PCOP compound on the night of 2 Oct. He was aware that other members of his company (under the direction of (b)(6)) were conducting a mission that night to secure the NDS facility in Kunduz. He stated that he did not have any communication with the convoy other than a single phone call from (b)(6), who called before the convoy SP to tell him about the mission. (b)(6) confirmed that (b)(6) (b)(6) was also at the PCOP compound.

5. (b)(6) did not know who the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) to the USSF at the PCOP was or who provided the USSF the target description for the (b)(1)1.4d objective on the night of 2 Oct.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins   
(b)(3), (b)(6)

## CONOP APPROVAL PROCESS

### Situation

As the situation in Kunduz city began to deteriorate, (b)(1)1.4a started planning with the (b)(1)1.4d to establish a foothold in the city. On September 29, 2015, (b)(1)1.4a developed a 2C-CONOP; Kunduz City Foothold Establishment: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d; Execution DTG: 291530SEPT15-TBD15. On 29 SEP 15, this CONOP was approved by the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (under Operational Freedom Sentinel Rules of Engagement (ROE))<sup>1</sup> and sent to RS HQ for situational awareness.

On the evening of 29 September 2015, the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(1)1.4a arrived at Camp Pamir to assist the ANDSF in mission planning for future operations in Kunduz. At approximately 2000L the situation worsened as INS forces threatened to seize Kunduz airfield. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d and (b)(1)1.4a left Camp Pamir to secure the airfield, fighting thru the night and rallying ANSDF and reestablished their defensive positions. The (b)(1)1.4a returned to Camp Pamir at approximately 0700 on the morning of the 30<sup>th</sup>. As a result of this mission, the 2C-CONOP was not executed. During the POD 29/30 September 2015, the (b)(3), (b)(6) worked with the (b)(1)1.4d to develop a CONOP (FRAGO to the previous 2C CONOP) titled Kunduz Clearing Patrol. Departure from Camp Pamir was set for 302200SEP15. This CONOP was submitted as a FRAGO (to CONOP (b)(1)1.4a-09-001), though given its own CONOP number of (b)(1)1.4a-09-002.<sup>2</sup> The Concept of Operations and manifest were used to update the original CONOP (b)(1)1.4a-09-001). In short, the concept for FRAGO (b)(1)1.4a-09-002 was to conduct operations on the East side of Kunduz City, clearing key infrastructure, Kunduz Prison / NDS HQ, PSU HQ and PGOV center), and establishing a foothold within the city. This CONOP was submitted at approximately 301500 hours to SOTF-A and a VOCO approval send back to the AOB between 1800 -1900 hours.<sup>3</sup> SOTF-A and SOJTF conducted coordination verbally at multiple levels (CDR to CDR, J3 to J3, staff to staff).<sup>4</sup> All commanders comprehended (b)(3), (b)(6) plans for the POD of 30 Sep – 01 Oct.<sup>5</sup>

<sup>1</sup> CONOP (b)(1)1.4a-09-001; Kunduz City Foothold Establishment

<sup>2</sup> (b)(3), (b)(6) statement (3) questions, 03 Nov 15

<sup>3</sup> (b)(3), (b)(6) statement (3) questions, 03 Nov 15

<sup>4</sup> (b)(3), (b)(6) sworn statements (2)

<sup>5</sup> (b)(3), (b)(6) statement (3) questions, 03 Nov 15

## CONOP APPROVAL PROCESS

### Recommendations

The CONOP approval process is explained in various SOPs at each level of command. Resolute Support (RS) Standard Operating Procedure (b)(1)1.4a 15), Coordination, De-confliction and Authorization of Deliberate Operations within the RS Area of Operations; COMRS Tactical Guidance and Delegation of Approval Authorities for RESOLUTE SUPPORT (dtd 09 Sep 15); Draft SOJTF-A CONOP SOP (dtd 28 Oct 15); SOTF CONOP Staffing Process (dtd 25 Aug 15).

A quick read through each of these documents reveals that from RS to the SOTF level, the commands are primarily in synch throughout the CONOPS approval process.

Areas that deserve attention and potentially impacted operations from the 30 Sep to 3 Oct include:

- a. No SOP listed the requirement to review and provide a No Strike List (NSL) overlay as part of the CONOP.
- b. Micro and Macro "Grid Reference Graphics" are optional when submitting the CONOP for approval. Even with technical difficulties at Camp Pamir, other stations / commands would have gained SA on the Kunduz City area to include known NFAs, protected sites.
- c. Not one of the documents details procedures for a TST type mission and the path the CONOP / FRAGO would take to 'get out the door'. Having a detailed process for TSTs could have expedited approval and situational awareness at the appropriate levels as well as the potential for updating subordinate commands on current and new information (MSF memo for example).
- d. RS vs OFS. Confusion exists on the battlefield as to what ROE the force was operating under. CONOP (b)(1)1.4a-09-001 was submitted as RS and came back to the AOB as OFS. The (b)(3), (b)(6) on the POD 2 / 3 Oct believed he was operating under RS authorities when the operation was actually under FS and incorrectly stated (b)(1)1.4a. RS HQs needs to clarify in the process the ROE as per the approval process, as well into mission check-ins / AC departure checks.
- e. Bring Deputy J3 / S3's or CONOP Chiefs together via SVTC or in person to ensure all levels are nested and understand updates to existing SOPs.

## CONOP APPROVAL PROCESS



(b)(1)1.4a

### Kunduz City Foothold

- CONOP was approved as a partnered OP to clear from Camp Pamir to vic Kunduz hospital.
- Task ORG: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d<sup>th</sup>  
(b)(1)1.4d<sup>th</sup>
- SOTF-A and SOJTF-A conducted staffing and legal review.
- The No Strike List (NSL) was not referenced during the approval process.
- The CONOP covered the events for 29 Sep - TBD.
- On 29 Sep, (b)(1)1.4a defended the airfield therefore CONOP (b)(1)1.4a-009-002 was not executed.
- There were no pre-planned fires, only pre-planned assets.

Doctors Without Borders Kunduz, 3 Oct 15

### Kunduz Clearing Patrol

- CONOP (FRAGO) was approved as a partnered OP to clear and secure: PSU HQ, Kunduz prison, NDS HQ and PGOV.
- Task ORG: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d as follow on.
- SOTF-A leadership passed FRAGO (b)(1)1.4a-009-002 to SOJTF-A via voice and email (CDR to CDR and DCG-O, J3 to S3, AJ3 to AS3). Received Vocal Approval (VOCO) from SOJTF-A.
- The CONOP covered the events for 302130SEP15 to 311600SEP15.
- There were NO pre-planned fires, only pre-planned assets. The team requested air assets on a daily basis.
- The operation on the night of 2/3 OCT was not a specific task of the CONOP.

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~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~  
HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

8 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Initial Statement of [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] Advanced Operations Base-North (AOB-N), Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan (SOTF-A)

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) On 22 Oct 2015, [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] was interviewed by the Investigating Officer, BG Jenkins, Assistant Investigating Officer, and Brig Gen Armfield, Assistant Investigating Officer. The Investigation Legal Advisor was also present for the interview. The interview began at 1100 hours (local).
2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The IO informed [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] of the purpose of the investigation, and began interviewing [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] about the events leading up to and during the events on 3 October 2015.
3. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] described the events that led up to the 3 October strike. He explained that he believed the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] unit that conducted the operation on 3 October left his location at the PCOP Compound earlier that day [2 Oct], but the unit left an officer who he described as a [redacted (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)]. He told the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)] before the operation started that he would, "Take care of them." During the afternoon of 2 October, he described the fighting around the PCOP Compound, and described coordinating a few danger close airstrikes.
4. (S//~~REL~~) He stated there were a lot of factors that went into the events of the strike on 3 Oct. The [redacted (b)(1)1.4c] elements were going back and forth from the PCOP Complex, conducting re-supply and CASEVAC. He was passed the grids to the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] objective and considered it to be within his integrated defense. He described his integrated defense area as being [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d] from his position because of the heavy weapons threat in the city.
5. (S//~~REL~~) He believed the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] described the T shaped building first. He confirmed the information passed from the aircraft describing the compound with the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] and confirmed with the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] that the individuals the aircraft described were hostile. He knew he needed multiple [redacted (b)(1)1.4c] and could not rely solely on [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d] but he believed the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)] also confirming Hostiles too. He described being taken to someone at the PCOP Compound, who he does not remember, but recalls that it was around 0205 immediately prior to the strike. He was told by the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d], "strike now." He heard gunfire from the west, and had pattern of life. He couldn't put eyes on the [redacted (b)(1)1.4d] objective, but he knew the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)] could see it.
6. (S//~~REL~~) The criteria he used for the strike was the behavior described by the AC-130 and the gunfire from the west. The direction of the gunfire made sense. [redacted (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d]


~~SECRET//REL USA, FVEY~~

(b)(1)1.4c He was unaware of the location of the MSF hospital. He did not take any graphics with him from Bagram Airfield to Cam Pamir. He took for granted that the (b)(1)1.4a would have graphics when he got to Pamir.

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) The words that his JTAC used were his. The JTAC asked him questions and he told the JTAC what to tell the aircraft. He did tell the JTAC to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) (b)(6) often the target.

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) At this point in the interview, the Investigating Officer had the interviewee step outside and the Investigation Team members had a short discussion with the Legal Advisor. The interview ended at 1130 Local. The POC for this is the Legal Advisor,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

  
SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Assistant Investigating Officer



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

29 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 28 1330 (L) October 2015, MG Hickman, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3) conference room at Camp Vance, Bagram Airfield (BAF). [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.
2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about a Video Teleconference (VTC) between GEN Campbell (COMRS) and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6), on the evening of 30 Sep 15. He stated that he was on speaker phone with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) who was attending the VTC. During the VTC, COMRS was very pointed toward [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) Kunduz. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was present with [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) in Kunduz and no specific guidance was given to him. After the VTC, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) continued to talk about the plans for AOB-N (-) to assist the ANDSF.
3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked to clarify which CONOP was executed and who approved it. He stated that Resolute Support HQ "pulled" for a CONOP to assist the ANDSF to retake Kunduz city. As a result ODA [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a produced a level 2C- CONOP; Kunduz City Foothold Establishment, execution date 291530D\*SEPT15, approved by the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). ODA [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was defending the Kunduz airfield and was unable to execute this CONOP. On the evening of 29 Sep 15, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at Camp Pamir, and began working with [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) plans to retake key sites inside Kunduz city. On 30 Sep 15, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and ODA [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a developed a 1C CONOP; Kunduz Clearing Patrol, execution date 302200D\*SEP15. This CONOP included ODA [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a who returned from Kunduz airfield), [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a with [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) received a verbal approval (VOCO) for the CONOP around 2100L on 30 Sep 15.
4. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked if any other level of command published any other Fragmentary Orders (FRAGOs) during the time period of 30 Sep- 03 Oct. He stated that there were no FRAGOs or additional guidance given to the ground forces. He was also asked if anyone pushed any additional intelligence products, graphics or any other mission related products to the ground forces. He stated that they were no additional products given to the ground forces.
5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked about his knowledge of the operation planned for the POD 2/3 Oct 15. He stated that he received a brief from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) on the evening of 30 Sep 15. During this discussion he was informed that the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a planned to take their wounded back to Camp Pamir and on the way back with resupplies, they would clear the NDS Prison Compound. The GFC was

unable to provide him with any products for this mission. GFC recommended a resupply of batteries and maps.

6. (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked if the grids to the MSF facilities were passed to the ground forces. He stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) called the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) to relay the grids to the four MSF facilities on 01 Oct 15. He stated that the grids were also sent to the ground forces via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

7. (b)(3), (b)(6) in the OPCEN on the POD 2 / 3 Oct '15.



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

MG William B. Hickman  
BG Sean M. Jenkins

(b)(3), (b)(6)



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 23 October 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) office at Camp Vance, Bagram, AF, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that they requested CAS assets for the day, to include ISR, (pre-planned assets) but did not plan pre-planned fires. NSOCC-A approves the asset each night. The [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) had the ball' and it was the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) call as this was a defensive strike. As far as the AC-130 was concerned, [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was not sure why the aircraft was alerted.

3. The CONOP for the POD of the 30<sup>th</sup> was a continuation of the 29 Sep CONOP (-001). There was no No Strike List (NSL) included in either CONOP. He mentioned that after serving in Afghanistan for many deployments [redacted] (b)(6) - parts of all these years [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) has never once seen a NSL. SOTF-A had not received a NSL from higher HQs.

4. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that he was sure that SOTF-A knew exactly where the MSF facility was 'we knew before the event'. We had talked with Doctors without Borders about a potential 'rescue' and we monitored for rescue and evacuation of foreign personnel. A [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was provided to the CJSOAC with MSF locations annotated. This information (grids) was also passed b [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) to the AOB at the PGOV compound via [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

5. SOTF-A was only tracking one NDS Compound that was next to the prison (south of the MSF facility). We only got the grid of the NDS OBJ after the fact. The OBJ for the night of the 2<sup>nd</sup> was an independent Afghan operation. This was planned at Camp Pamir. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed the plan to the SOTF - to enable the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d to go to an objective - but there was no discussion of the grid or the objective plan. There was no request to drop a building, which would take COMRS approval. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that after 3 Oct - partnered operations - [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d at Pamir.

6. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g into the SOTF-A OPCEN is not an abort criteria. This is not unusual that the AOB could not [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6). Unfortunately, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was on the wrong NDS compound; the grid was never passed by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) to the SOTF OPCEN.

7. The AOB-N mission at the PGOV was a strategic mission. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) believed if the PGOV center was lost it would be a strategic loss. He had spoken with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) reference the 620

same sentiment. He further stated that this was an Alamo defense of all US personnel at the PGOV center (he would mention this, "Alamo defense" a number of times during the interview).

8. (b)(3), (b)(6) spoke highly of (b)(3), (b)(6). He stated that (b)(3), (b)(6) is extremely competent; knows the ROE and TAC (Targeting) Guidance as well or better than most. He has a lot of experience and is someone you absolutely trust.

9. (b)(3), (b)(6) provided a sworn statement after the interview which is included in the investigation report.



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

MG William B. Hickman  
BG Sean M. Jenkins  
BG Robert G. Armfield

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) 23 Oct

### Staff Update Notes

1. (b)(1)1.4a – prior SOTF-A – low OPTEMPO – a lot of advising ops
2. Arrived – helmand a flame – Musa Quala taken over
3. (b)(1)1.4d
4. US Marine CORPS GO went there to help
5. (b)(3), (b)(6) – sent (b)(3), (b)(6) there to overseas the SOF
6. (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d
7. (b)(1)1.4d
8. Focus on network targets and respond to emergencies – to help the Afghans respond to District threats
9. Kunduz pops up every six months - non of the previous events came close to the Sep event
10. (b)(1)1.4d –
11. (b)(1)1.4a at Camp Pamir – (b)(1)1.4a – they stayed there to be close to the partners (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
12. For (b)(1)1.4a mission – no specific intel – no T/P given to the unit. No order from RS HQ or NSOCC-A – told to go
13. POD 28-29 Sept (b)(1)1.4a went to Pamir from Baghram
14. (b)(1)1.4a cell of Advisors – (b)(1)1.4a
15. 29 sept 1930 (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at Kunduz
16. (b)(3), (b)(6) – did not plan on initially going into the city –expected to initially do expeditionary TAA not combat advising
17. VTC 30 Sept – (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) – speaks some English – didn't really understand – till about half way through got an interpreter. (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)
18. GEN Campbell – told (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) need to get into the city – will only get worse
19. Told (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) will see the President in a few days.
20. (b)(6) said the plan was to take govt infrastructure
21. Original plan to take the Kunduz hospital –on 29 Sept. not executed
22. Then next plan to look at East Side of Kunduz – PSU HQ, NDS prison compound, PGOV HQ
23. Initial assessment (b)(1)1.4d insurgents
24. When moved on 30 Sept – engaged soon by insurgents
25. CONOP more risks – like the type of vehicles used
26. (b)(1)1.4a – PSU – NDS prison and then PGOV
27. (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) a bit of waves of insurgents coming their way
28. A lot of resupply to Pamir
29. (b)(1)1.4a was done at Pamir
30. (b)(3), (b)(6) POD 30 Sep – 1 Oct arrived at Pamir
31. (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) – Sr Afghan on ground
32. (b)(3), (b)(6) – were there – Pamir
33. 30 Sep – 1 Oct – no issue with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

34. Afghan plan to take the NDS (2-3 Oct)

35. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not give the grid to the NDS obj to SOTF

36. SOTF (b)(1)1.4a looking at the NDS prison with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b wrong place

37. 0210 – Dr w/out borders called their Trauma Center engaged – don't think there are casualties

38. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

39. SOTF called (b)(3), (b)(6) on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b to tell him cease fire

40. SOTF was not tracking the strike

(b)(3), (b)(6) – interview

1. We requested the AC130, AOB-N had the ball, kinetic strike by SOTF or higher, (b)(3), (b)(6) call defense strike
2. (b)(1)1.4a approves the asset – AC130 each night
3. (b)(1)1.4a crew on station – alert launch (b)(3), (b)(6) not sure why it was alerted – did not ask to alert the aircraft.
4. Afghan plan – no conop for (b)(1)1.4a to go to the NDS facility
5. AOB-N at PGOV – Alamo defense all US personal at PGOV HQ
6. No partner planning at Pamir
7. If PGOV center is lost – strategic loss – talked to (b)(3), (b)(6)
8. After 3 Oct – partner conops – (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d
9. (b)(1)1.4d at Pamir prior to 3 Oct
10. SOTF only tracking on NDS Compound next to prison
11. Got coordinate after the fact of the NDS obj
12. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) went into the SOTF JOC
13. Never once saw the no strike list – he has served in Afghan in (b)(6) and (b)(6) – parts of all these years
14. Every single time went on a mission knew there are areas you cannot strike
15. Did not have a no strike list from higher
16. Passed from higher to get positions to strike
17. SOTF A knew exactly where the MFS facility was – knew before the event
18. They talked to Dr w/out borders – talked about a rescue – monitored for rescue and evacuation of foreign personal
19. Passed the info to (b)(3), (b)(6) – to the (b)(3), (b)(6) at night on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b at PGOV passed to them
20. (b)(1)1.4a
21. Sent (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to CIAOSC on MSF locations
22. (b)(3), (b)(6) in the SOTF JOC
23. Initial CONOP – the continuation of the same mission
24. Felt for years ODAs out by themselves fighting on the edge
25. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) not seeing it – not an abort criteria, not unusual they could not see this
26. (b)(1)1.4d to the NDS facility
27. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g looking at obj – the wrong NDS compound

28. (b)(3), (b)(6) did not know the objective, did not know the route the (b)(1)1.4 were taking
29. Timeline – (b)(1)1.4d departs – relay with (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- (b)(3), (b)(6) watching the NDS HQ/prison not the real NDS OBJ
30. (b)(1)1.4a – no known contact in the city at this time
31. (b)(1)1.4a – no known contact in the city at this time
32. Defense fires – go from seconds to minutes – execute quickly
33. To drop a building – need (b)(1)1.4a approval
34. (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed the plan to SOTF – to enable the (b)(1)1.4 to go to an objective – but no discussion of the grid or the obj plan. No request to drop a building
35. (b)(3), (b)(6) – extremely competent – knows ROE and TAC Guidance as well or better than most – a lot of experience – someone absolutely trust.



HEADQUARTERS  
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BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

8 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 28 October 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 2 / 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) office at Camp Alpha, Bagram, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) He is permanently assigned as the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

2. The interview focused on whether [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a operations had any, or could have had any impact on the operations of 2 / 3 Oct '15. There was no indication of any operations that TF had conducted in or around the MSF facility.

3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) provided an external hard drive of [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) for the investigative team to review. No evidence of MSF footage on the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) USB.

SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



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USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

1. On 3 November 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 2 / 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] in the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] office at Camp Integrity, Kabul AF, Afghanistan. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] stated he is not in the CONOP process. He is included on email traffic but the CONOP responsibility sits with the [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]

3. He stated that he did not see the CONOP 09-002 until he saw it in the Battle Room (Concept of Operations slide only). He recalled sometime on the evening of the 30<sup>th</sup> of Sep '15.

4. [redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)] provided a quick synopsis of the actions of AOB-N as they moved North cleared and secured a number of locations with Afghan forces in the role of follow and support and to remain on the OBJs as AOB-N continued to move North and secure the PCOP compound. He stated that the [redacted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d]

5. He was aware that there was a Trauma Center in Kunduz.

SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

[redacted (b)(3), (b)(6)]



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USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 3 November 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) office at Camp Integrity, Kabul AF, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) provided information about the CONOP process for SOJTF-A and subordinate units. He specifically spoke of CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4-09-001 and the submission of CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4-09-002. He did not see CONOP 09-002 until after the forces, USSF and partnered forces were already in security positions in the PGOV compound. After the fact he would have treated it as a FRAGO CONOP to 09-001.

3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he did not see CONOP 09-002 posted to the portal. The concept was posted to the Battle Room where it could be reviewed. I recall this was observed in Battle Room the morning of the 1<sup>st</sup> of October '15. CONOP can be turned within three hours.

4. The NSL is updated via email from the CENTCOM JTE and is disseminated via email.

5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that currently no SOP exists at the SOJTF-A to support prosecuting forces when there is degradation in systems ([redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g etc).

SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

BG Sean M. Jenkins

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



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BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
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USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 3 November 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) office at Camp Vance, Bagram AF, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.
2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the CONOP -09-002 did not stop at the SOTF-A level. Many at the SOTF-A level were on the phone with SOJTF-A seeking approval for the CONOP to be executed on the 30<sup>th</sup> of September '15.
3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) spoke of OPCEN operations and changes that were being made to ensure better situational awareness. We discussed the issues of the wrong grids, no one asking when they here something over one of the radio nets, and the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) being down on the AC-130. He stated, "Had we have known."
4. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he knew of the MSF Trauma Center before the night of 2 / 3 Oct '15 (grids passed on the afternoon of the 2<sup>nd</sup> of Oct '15). The grids had been provided by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). He learned of the MSF Trauma Center being struck also by [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) after he had received a phone call from an MSF representative. They began to work communications afterwards to get [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) on the net to discuss the report from MSF.
5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted a sworn statement on 03 Nov which is contained in the investigation report.

SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:



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USFOR-A-RIST

9 NOV 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview with [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 28 Oct 15, I interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) at the CJSOAC-A HQ. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) of (f) 1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) 2 / 3 OCT 15. The interview focused on conditions surrounding the alert launch and mission. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) made a sworn statement on 28 Oct which is contained in the investigation report.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. G. Armfield".

Robert G. Armfield  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Assistant Investigating Officer



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BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 03 0930 (L) November 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 2 / 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) office at Camp Integrity, Kabul, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.

2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked which CONOP was executed on 30 Sep 15. He stated that the ground force was prepared to execute CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d-001, as approved by the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) on 29 Sep. Due the conditions on the airfield, the ground force was unable to execute the CONOP. With conditions changing in Kunduz City, CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d-002 was developed on 30 Sep. During the staffing and approval process, the Concept of Operations and Task Organization were taken from CONOP -002 and used to update -001. Due to time constraints both [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and primary staff coordinated through emails and phone calls. SOTF-A received a vocal approval (VOCO) from the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) prior to execution. He did not see the CONOP [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d-002 until early morning of 3 Nov 15. The concept of operations slide showed in Battle Room ([redacted] (b)(1)1.4a) on the morning of the 3<sup>rd</sup>. He did not recall when it was posted there. We further discussed the CONOP process for SOJTF-A.

3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked if there were any special instructions approved during the staffing and approval process. He stated that SOJTF-A did not approve any special instructions. Planned CAS allocations were provided ISO of ground forces.

4. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) discussed the SOPs for identifying friendly forces. There are no SOPs per se to facilitate the ID of friendly forces. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d For noncombatants, SOTF-A HQ and NSOCC-A HQ use the five pillars for any engagement.

5. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) was absolutely aware of the Trauma Center location before the night of 2 / 3 Oct '15. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) had to track down the original MSF message. When he found it, the staff had appropriately handled the information. He confirmed that the grid location for the MSF was in fact identified on [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

6. Senior officer on the floor of the SOJTF-A JOC was [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) – a [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) has immediate means to contact the J3 or CDR as needed.

7. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the JOCs at SOTF-A SOJTF-A become more involved (intrusive) when situational awareness (SA) systems go down. Telephone calls, SVTCs and increased contact over

other C2 systems increase. We will do everything to possible replicate the SA systems if all were functional.

8. (b)(3), (b)(6) submitted a sworn statement on 03 Nov '15 which is contained in the investigation report.



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



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USFOR-A-RIST

9 NOV 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Transition of Authority Dates for SOTF-A and (b)(3)

Per SOJTF-A DCG, Brig Gen Bauernfeind, the SOTF-A HQ and (b)(3) Transition of Authority (TOA) date was (b)(1)1.4a for both units.

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "R. G. Armfield".

Robert G. Armfield  
Brig Gen, USAF  
Assistant Investigating Officer

From: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
To: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR  
Date: Wednesday, November 04, 2015 9:19:57 AM

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CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

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From: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sent: Wednesday, November 04, 2015 4:01 AM  
To: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) MFR

**Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~**

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Here's the list of actual training accomplished, outside of the fires shop(SOTACC, MQT, Evals). This stays pretty standardized, year-in, year-out b/c of ops tempo(deploying roughly [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a downrange/ [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a at home-station). The CAS FMPs/Advanced med/Shooting school is the backbone of the training with the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g trips to focus on what's applicable here in Afghanistan.

**Training Event-(Training Focus)**

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[redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

I hope this is along the lines of what you're looking for. If you need any further on assist, or have a question, just let me know.

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



~~SECRET//REL US, FVEY~~  
**HEADQUARTERS  
 UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
 BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
 APO AE 09354**

8 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Notes of Interview: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) (S//REL)

1. (U//~~FOUO~~) On Tuesday, 22 October 2015, the investigating officer and the following members of the AR 15-6 Investigation Team: BG Jenkins, Asst. IO, Brig Gen Armfield, Asst. IO, and Legal Advisor, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) for the AC-130U, callsign [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) during the strike on the Kunduz Trauma Center on 3 October 2015. The interview was conducted at the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a Headquarters building, Bagram Airfield Afghanistan.

2. (U//~~FOUO~~) The Asst. IO informed the interviewees of the purpose of the investigation. [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) confirmed they did not know the target the aircraft struck on 3 October was a hospital. They confirmed that no one told them they had struck a hospital until the investigation informed them on 22 Oct. Both Airmen confirmed that they saw no friendly contact when the decision was made to engage the building. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated that the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was firing during the engagement, but that he could not see muzzle flashes from incoming fire.

3. (U//~~FOUO~~) [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) had flown over Kunduz two days prior to the engagement on 3 October, and on 3 October, the aircraft had situational awareness of the Ground Force. The aircrew could see the Ground Force's blocking positions on the street corners around the PCOP Compound. They each indicated they could positively identify friendly forces off of their sensors and see friendly HMMVs and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d. They could see .50 caliber fire from the northwest against the friendly forces at the compound.

4. (S//REL) They periodically checked the convoy. The last time they checked on the convoy was around 2125 Z (0105L.) They could see the convoy turn west and see the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d on their sensors as it was moving to the objective. [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d was turning west. The [redacted] (b)(1)1.4d round fired after cease fire was called was the only round the aircrew fired after 2203Z (0233L).

5. (S//REL) The [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a make targeting recommendations. When the grids were first inputted, the Sensor went to the open field. They both indicated they are aware of the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4g on the sensors, and are trained to target primarily on confirmation of the target, [redacted] (b)(1)1.4g to the [redacted] (b)(1)1.4g. They saw both compounds initially but ended up calling the MSF that target. They misconstrued the description. When [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) provided by the ground force when the aircraft was in a different orbit, and [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g went right onto the other compound, the grids made the "triangle." He was shown the graphic that has the three possibly identified locations, the field, the NDS Compound, and the MSF Trauma Center and confirmed the

~~SECRET//REL US, FVEY~~


graphic was accurate. (b)(3), (b)(6) switched his (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1) to the NDS compound and they did a side-by-side comparison of the two compounds ; (b)(1)1.4a They did not stop comparing and go to the building struck until they received target confirmation. Got clarifying information and were confident we were on target.

6. (U//~~FOUO~~) They don't call back to JOC. "Not our call." (b)(3), (b)(6) indicated he never directly correlated a 10 digit grid before. They don't even get 8 digit grids very often. They described targeting as a combination of grid location and target coordination. When the aircraft was offset to the northwest, (b)(1)1.4g They learned this through their training, but not a lot of their training is written down. Their main doctrinal source is AFTP 3-3 (Tactics). (b)(3), (b)(6) They received two months of training. Target identification is part of their POI. They are single qualified on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1) but they understand how (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g work. (b)(1)1.4a A TTP is to check each other's (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g which should make it fool proof. (b)(3), (b)(6) has deployed 4 times, and (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) deployed twice before, one of those being to Afghanistan.

7. (U//~~FOUO~~) They were both very confident it was the target. They did question the target to aircrew, until the issue of the gate was raised. They did not assume the JTAC saw target. They based their confidence level on the proximity of the coordinates to the building and the target description. The description was, "walled, with multiple buildings." Both described their confidence level as 5 for 5, with 5 being most confident. The saw guards at the target, but (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g  
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g They could not see markings on the targeted building. (b)(1)1.4g They had an eight digit grid on convoy and could see when and where the convoy was observed.

8. (U//~~FOUO~~) The POC for this is the Legal Advisor,  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

  
SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Assistant Investigating Officer



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USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. On 22 October 2015, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) office at Camp Integrity, Kabul, AF, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). The following memorandum outlines what was discussed during the interview.
2. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) began with a brief description of the situation in Kunduz in the weeks and days leading up to the events of the 28<sup>th</sup> of Sep when the INS took control of the city. He did not perceive the events of the 28<sup>th</sup> given the I & W provided in the days prior. He further described the situation after the engagement of the MSF trauma Center (See sworn statement).
3. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SOTF-A did submit a CONOP for the 29<sup>th</sup>. It went up through the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) and COMRS for SA. The CONOP was approved at the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6). [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) did not see the 30 Sep CONOP (-002) until the morning after the mission to secure multiple en-route OBJs (with ANSDF / ASSF) and the PGOV.
4. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that SOJTF-A does not maintain a separate NSL. The SOJTF-A staff does have access to the NSL via the CJ2 on the SIPR portal. NSLs were not a CONOP requirement prior to the MSF engagement, but have since been added to the SOJTF-A draft CONOP SOP as a requirement prior to approval of any CONOP.
5. SOJTF-A utilizes [redacted] (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4b to maintain their common operating picture (COP). [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) could not speak of what AOB-N was using. For maintaining SA of units on the battlefield, US forces employ [redacted] (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4b while Afghan partners are currently using the [redacted] (b)(1).4d [redacted] (b)(1).4d). We discussed the latency that both of those systems can experience while in use.
6. SOJTF-A was tracking the MSF memo that listed the four grid coordinates prior the engagement on the POD of 2 / 3 Oct. The grids were entered in to the [redacted] (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4b and were identified on the JOC's COP [redacted] (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g.
7. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) deferred on answering whether the [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) engaged solely on Afghan PID / POL. However he did not believe that the [redacted] (b)(1).4a, (b)(1).4g to engage with ADMs.
8. Training is required by RS HQ on some ROE and tactical directives (guidance) (recalls training being conducted on several occasions). No inspections of subordinate units have been

conducted by RS HQ to ensure compliance (the quick turn of units (TF, SOTF-A) RIP'ing in and out of country may add to this result, ie inspections don't keep up with turn-over of units).

8. (b)(3), (b)(6) provided a sworn statement after the interview which is included in the investigation report.



SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

MG William B. Hickman  
BG Sean M. Jenkins

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 23 Oct '15, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about the overnight hours of 3 October 2015, interviewed [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) in the [redacted] (b)(6) office at Camp Alpha, Bagram, Afghanistan. [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

[redacted] (b)(6) We discussed the events of the MSF engagement on the POD of 2 /3 Oct '15. Both officers had minimal involvement in the events preceding and during the incident. Sworn statements from both officers are included as part of the investigation products.

SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

USFOR-A-RIST

08 Nov 15


MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Interview of (b)(3), (b)(6)

On 23 Oct '15, BG Jenkins, AR 15-6 Investigating Officer appointed to investigate the incident of an attack on the MSF hospital in Kunduz, Afghanistan, during the period of darkness of 2 - 3 October 2015, interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) in a (b)(6) conference room at Camp Vance, Bagram, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6) During the interview we discussed the events leading up to the MSF incident. Particular discussion focused on the passing of the MSF memo and who knew of the MSF location prior to the engagement. The ability to conduct (b)(6)

(b)(6)

staff at higher HQs) was also discussed. Sworn statements with accompanying information detail the flow of information flow regarding the MSF (email, phone calls, and SMS messages) are included as part of the investigation products.

  
SEAN M. JENKINS  
BG, USA  
Investigating Officer

15-6 members present during the interview:

Brig. Gen. Robert G. Armfield



HEADQUARTERS  
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN  
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN  
APO AE 09354

10 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Resolute Support (RS) Combined Joint Operations Center (CJOC) Battle Tracking systems.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director**

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2015 5:20 PM  
**To:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director  
**Subject:** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Attachments:** (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Classification:** ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**Message Body Classification:** ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) observe OBJ (b)(1)1.4a on 01OCT15 or wittingly at any other point during operations in Kunduz City between 30SEP15-04OCT15. The specific image in question is from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) 01OCT15 being tasked by (b)(1)1.4a. Observed activity of OBJ (b)(1)1.4a at the MSF Facility conducted by (b)(1)1.4a on 01OCT15 was via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) on 03OCT15 via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) likely had additional (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g assets also observing / working (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g the times that we were not tracked in the (b)(3), (b)(6) due to these assets not being able to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g [note: The 01OCT15 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) products are mislabeled as OBJ (b)(1)1.4a They were following the same (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was previously JP/KIA 30OCT15 by a SOTF-A (b)(1)1.4a at the time (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

The OBJ (b)(1)1.4a activity ASW the (b)(1)1.4a collected was observed in the (b)(3), (b)(6) but purely in a situational awareness and monitoring capacity. After the kinetic strike we conducted on OBJ (b)(1)1.4a on 30OCT15 SOTF gave (b)(1)1.4a allowing them to target OBJ (b)(1)1.4a Due to OBJ (b)(1)1.4a being inside Kunduz City, the SOTF-A (b)(1)1.4a and in battlespace owned by our SOTF-A ODA's on the ground the SOTF-A ITC's monitored all (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g The SOTF did this in order to maintain situational awareness of activity they were observing ASW OBJ (b)(1)1.4a and more importantly so we could quickly work deconfliction with our ODAs and air assets anytime we saw them call correlation or move to strike posture. We had most of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g some of the (b)(1)1.4a flew in Kunduz targeting OBJ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in the front of the JOC between 01OCT15-04OCT15. We would call out significant events posted by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g such as correlation, assets setting strike posture, aborts, etc..

The attachments contain the time (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) post op products from (b)(1)1.4a. You will see on slide 8 of 28 in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) presentation (b)(1)1.4a into a vehicle and an ambulance, using them to move around. Again, they were collecting on (b)(1)1.4a in the days following the 3rd (I think it was on the 4th or 5th).

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil]

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2015 4:34 PM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: (S) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

No issue,

Thanks (b)(3), (b)(6)

vr

sean

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2015 4:18 PM

**To:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director

**Subject:** RE: (S) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

I am about to hit send. Based on your email, what I am sending may be too detailed, but I will send ahead anyway in an effort to ensure we are on the same page and you have all available information.

Give me a few minutes, Sir and it will be in your inbox.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SOTF-Afghanistan

Doctors Without Borders Kunduz, 3 Oct 15

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil]

**Sent:** Tuesday, November 10, 2015 4:16 PM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: (S) a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Anything? Does not have to be super detailed.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, November 09, 2015 9:39 PM

**To:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director; (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: (S) a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

I will go through all of our records tonight and provide a statement tomorrow. I know we could (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) that time, but will do the research to accurately provide times. A summary of what was observed will also be provided.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SOTF-Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)]@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil]  
**t:** Monday, November 09, 2015 9:29 PM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: (S) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Yes please. On in JOC and hours, brief description of what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b  
Also still need (b)(3), (b)(6) statement.

vr  
sean

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Monday, November 09, 2015 9:06 PM  
**To:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director; (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: (S) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

I can attest to the fact that it was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(3), (b)(6) is going to  
tell you the same thing for the SOTF-A JOC.

Do you just need us to put that in a statement?

V/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(6)

**From:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil]

**Sent:** Monday, November 09, 2015 7:51 PM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: (S) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Thanks. Question is who (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in the end was SOJTF-A and SOTF-A (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in the JOC / OPCEN?

vr  
sean

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, November 09, 2015 7:41 PM

Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director; (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** RE: (S) (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

I saw an (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g – unloading casualties and generally in the AO. I can't say for sure that it was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) but I do remember seeing those events (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Do you need someone in addition to me, or are you just looking for someone who can say they (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g?

Are there specific questions you need answered?

V/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Doctors Without Borders Kunduz, 3 Oct 15

646

Camp Integrity, Kabul AF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director [mailto:(b)(3), (b)(6)@afghan.swa.army.smil.mil]

**Sent:** Monday, November 09, 2015 5:59 PM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** (S) a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

All,

Finishing up here. Another statement we require. Who saw the (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)2b, (b)(6)1 Oct time period day or night that were (b)(1)1.4a This is the time period where (b)(1)1.4a

vr

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Effective Date: 31 Oct 2013

SUBJECT: No Strike Target List

1. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) OVERVIEW: The purpose of this JCIF is to reinforce the importance of identifying objects that may be on ISAF's No Strike List (NSL) when advising the ground commander on the targeting process. A recent kinetic strike in the AOR highlighted the need for this JCIF, as the strike was conducted

(b)(1)1.4a

This guidance does not inhibit the inherent right and obligation to exercise unit self-defense.

2. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) DISCUSSION: JTACs must have situational awareness on objects that are on the NSL and have an obligation to advise the ground commander and his staff when employing the targeting process. The NSL process and procedures are outlined in IJC SOP 2020, IJC Joint Targeting Nomination, Vetting, and Management Procedures. The NSL is comprised of prohibited objects, which must not be engaged due to protection under international law and the domestic obligations of participating nations, or for policy reasons. As such, they must not be engaged until they lose that protection and, consequently, become subject to lawful engagement. The NSL comprises two categories of objects, or entities, based on their sensitivity. Paragraphs A and B below are direct from IJC SOP 2020.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

3. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) The IJC Joint Fires Target Operations Cell (IJC JFTOC) can assist in target deconfliction and provide collaborative effort with RC Fires to ensure an objective, or any concern in the area, is not on the NSL.

(A) All indirect fires under ROE [ (b)(1)1.4a ] must be subject to formal or field CDE and coordinated through IJC JFTOC.

(B) [ (b)(1)1.4a ]

(C) Contact IJC JFTOC Shift Director (SVOIP [ (b)(6) ]) with questions about CDE methodology, No Strike Entities or the No Strike List.

4. (~~S//REL USA, ISAF, NATO~~) REFERENCES:

(A) IJC SOP 2020, IJC Joint Targeting Nomination, Vetting, and Management Procedures, 5 Apr 13

(B) The NSL can be found at the following locations

(1) ISAF JTAC Webpage

(2) On SIPRNET: <https://nonrel.centcom.smil.mil/sites> [ (b)(1)1.4a ]

5. (~~U//FOUO~~) COMPLIANCE: Compliance with this guidance is mandatory for all JTACs conducting operations in Afghanistan.

(A) Commanders will ensure all JTACs review and comply with this guidance.

(B) RAOCC JTAC PMs will report completion of this review and alibis to [ (b)(3), (b)(6) ], NLT COB 3 Nov 2013.

6. (~~U//FOUO~~) EFFECTIVE DATE: This JCIF is effective immediately until rescinded.

7. (~~U//FOUO~~) Direct questions concerning this JCIF to IJC JTAC PM, DSN [ (b)(6) ]

[ (b)(3), (b)(6) ]

ATTACHMENT:

[ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ]

Digital Sender Cover Sheet Agreement/User Agreement

I accept the responsibility to safeguard the information contained in this document to a level commensurate with the classification of the information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure or use.

I understand that Communications using, data stored on, or information being transmitted over government networks IS are not private. I understand that the use of USFOR-A networks or any other DoD computer system or network constitutes consent to being monitored at all times for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personal misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. At any time, USFOR-A may inspect and seize data stored or transmitted over government networks.

I will not scan information onto a network if the information has a higher classification than the network. I will not enter information that is proprietary, contractor-excluded, or otherwise needs special protection or handling, unless approved in writing by Information Assurance (IA).

I will not move information from or to the CENTRIXS-ISAF network unless approved by my Foreign Disclosure Officer (FDO). I will not move information from SIPR to NIPR without approval by my Site Security Officer (SSO). I certify to the best of my knowledge that I have taken all appropriate measures to ensure the information contained in this document is authorized for transport over the network on which it will be sent.

I will report incidents pertaining to unauthorized storage or transmission of information of a greater sensitivity than what the system or network is currently accredited for to my servicing Help Desk.

I understand that violations of agreed upon conditions will result in the suspension or termination of my privileges to access classified data. I understand that my access may be suspended, revoked or terminated for non-compliance with DoD security policies.

The undersigned consents to interception/capture and seizure of ALL communications and data for any authorized purpose (including personal misconduct, law enforcement, or counterintelligence investigation). The undersigned understands that violations are punishable by UCMJ action, punitive actions and/or other adverse administrative actions.

Classification of information being scanned: UNCLAS / ~~FOUO~~

Subject: REDUCED MAP OF MSF

YYYY/MM/DD and time: 2015 OCT 27

Print (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sign: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Number of Pages 2 + this TPI page

TPI Rank must be E-5+ E-9 CW2+ CW5 GS-12 & above, or O-4 and above only (No Contractors)!

Rank/Title (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sign: (b)(3), (b)(6)



(b)(3), (b)(6)	28-Aug-15	29-Aug-15
	31-Aug-15	31-Aug-15
	10-Sep-15	10-Sep-15
	10-Sep-15	10-Sep-15
	25-Sep-15	26-Sep-15
	25-Sep-15	26-Sep-15
25-Sep-15	26-Sep-15	

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:**

Tuesday, September 29, 2015 5:43 AM

**To:**

**Cc:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:**

FW: ~~(S//REL)~~ (b)(1)1.4 CONOP

**Attachments:**

(b)(1)1.4 09-001 KONDUZ FOOTHOLD (29 0500D SEPT 15) (NXPowerLite).pptx

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

Sir,

Here is (b)(1)1.4 CONOP for review.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Camp Vance

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:**

Thursday, October 01, 2015 8:19 AM

**To:**

**Cc:**

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:**

~~(S//REL)~~ Updated CONOP

**Attachments:**

(b)(1)1.409-01KUNDUZ CLEARING PATROL 30SEP.pdf

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

Gentlemen,

It was my understanding that this information was passed to SOJTF last night, so I apologize for the confusion this morning regarding the SoM from last night.

If this does not clear up the confusion, let me know.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 01, 2015 8:39 AM  
**To:**  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: ~~(S//REL)~~ Updated CONOP

Thanks (b)(3), (b)(6) please emphasize, the guys did PRECISELY what was planned, and then some. The concept showed exactly what they did, and they did exactly what they said, PLUS clearing the hotel which was across the street from the PGOV complex. All USSF are held at the PGOV complex awaiting further reinforcement from the regular ANA from (b)(1)1.4d

They did a fantastic job.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Thursday, October 01, 2015 8:33 AM  
**To:**  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
(b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** RE: ~~(S//REL)~~ Updated CONOP

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) we were all tracking the same scheme of maneuver. I know this product was hanging in the battle room since early yesterday evening. I believe some of the confusion centers on the uses of the terms "cleared" and "secured." Also, we are tracking that there is a prison and a separate "holding area." Finally, I believe in some versions of the story there was talk of the hospital and/or the trauma center. I'm not sure why these two medical facilities came up, since the SoM never included action at these two facilities.

We'll talk it through one more time over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d at 0900.

Regards,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

-----Original Message-----

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 8:19 AM

To: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: ~~(S//REL)~~ Updated CONOP

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

Gentlemen,

It was my understanding that this information was passed to SOJTF last night, so I apologize for the confusion this morning regarding the SoM from last night.

If this does not clear up the confusion, let me know.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

**SOTF-A**

**AR15-6**

**Kunduz Overview**

## Kunduz Strike

### Narrative:

Leading up to and during the initial accompanied operation in Kunduz, SOTF-A observed hundreds (estimated over 500) of INS spread throughout Kunduz and executed several RS/SOJTF-A approved strikes in defense of USSF (ROE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) and our Partner forces even though the proximity of the threat to USSF was far less than any engagement conducted by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) the operation starting on 30 Sep 15. Further, observation through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g communications with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) provided a strong comprehension of the ROE and the concept of self-defense. Several air-to-ground engagements were conducted during the operation and prior to the strike on the MSF Hospital. Nearly all engagements were observed by SOTF-A and were expertly conducted by an extremely experienced and capable Commander showing a strong understanding of the ROE, tactical guidance, and LOAC principles.

Prior to the strike the early morning of 3 Oct 15, USSF and partner forces had been under consistent heavy fire from SAF, RPGs, mortars, and machine guns since SP, the evening of 30 Sep 15. By early morning 1 Oct 15, USSF and Partner forces had taken back their three intended objectives, the PSU HQ, Prison, and the Provincial Compound; however the threat remained very real, proximate, and it appeared the city was collapsing around their position, isolated from additional support and resupply. The Provincial Compound became the strongpoint from which they could defend themselves and their Partner forces, and conduct TAA to enable the Partner forces to expand the secured area around the compound in defense of their position and to clear the city.

For the following three days USSF and Partner forces were in a continuous firefight defending their position and preventing the fall of Kunduz City. They repelled numerous assaults and received machine gun, SAF, mortar, and RPG fire from all directions. On the night of 2 Oct 15, the (b)(1)1.4a were tasked by MOD to take back one of the NDS locations in the NW of the city. A grid was passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) the compound (b)(1)1.4a described as the objective of their operation and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) Clearance of the NDS compound would expand the secured area to allow freedom of maneuver of USSF and Partner forces and provide additional defense for the Provincial Compound. The grid plots only 450m to the southwest of the Provincial Compound where USSF and Partner forces were located. Fire and assaults on their compound had been coming frequently from the direction of the plotted grid. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) passed and relayed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) there was no activity at the location (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) described a compound which they stated was about 300m SW of the passed grid that appeared to match the description of the objective and passed a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) No markings were visible from the air that would identify the building was a hospital (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) maintained eyes on the new compound as both (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) understood it to be the objective the (b)(1)1.4a were moving towards.

Around (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b) reported they were receiving fire from what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) understood to be the objective compound. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) relayed such information through the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) and directed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) to engage the ADMs located in the compound identified by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) which matched the description, including description of the number of hostile forces, passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3)1.4b) to commencement of their operation (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) began to engage the target at 0208D\*. Shortly before 0230, 3 Oct 15, (b)(3)1.4b) entered the JOC and said he had just received a call that the Doctors without Borders Hospital was under fire. Because the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) was not being passed, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) communications. Further, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) lack of charged batteries and technical issues. Additionally, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b) which would have allowed SOTF-A to maintain SA of the events. Upon receipt of the report from (b)(3)1.4b) SOTF-A requested (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) SOTF-A requested (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3)1.4b) immediately, which he (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) was immediately informed to check fire and that it appeared (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b) had struck the MSF Trauma Center (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) immediately issued the order to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) check fire (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) went cold at 0238D\*.

POL leading up to the morning of 3 Oct 15 (b)(1)1.4c and open source reporting that INS had gained control of areas IVO the NDS compound (grids passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)1.4b) the night of the strike) and the compound later determined to be the MSF Trauma Center (only 300m SW the NDS compound). Multiple

(b)(1)1.4c

## **INDEX**

**A. Operational Overview**

**B. (b)(1)1.4a Documents**

**C. Intelligence Report**

Approved for Release

From: [Redacted]  
To: [Redacted]  
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ Afghanistan NSL  
Date: Thursday, October 22, 2015 8:37:02 PM

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Classification: ~~SECRET~~

[Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

I am the USCENTCOM No Strike List (NSL) Manager and per your request I'm responding to your query about whether or not the Kunduz Hospital [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a was in fact on the Afghanistan NSL prior to 02 Oct 2015. **Yes it was. in fact it has been on the Afghanistan NSL since Oct 28, 2014.**

Unfortunately because of our mission, we only provide the most up to date NSLs for units operating in their respective AORs. Therefore we do not archive or save old versions of any NSL. Each USCENTCOM country that is actively engaged in weapons employment, have NSLs that update at least every 24hrs.

You can obtain this same information through [Redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c there is a "HISTORY" tab in both databases that will show when a BE# was added or removed from an NSL.

If I can be of further assistance please don't hesitate to contact me or any of the other personnel in the "Cc:" line.

[Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Classification: ~~SECRET~~

*Derived From: IAW CENTCOM Classification Guide, CCR 380-14  
Declassify On: 10/22/2025*

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From: [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sent: Thursday, October 22, 2015 11:09 AM  
To: [Redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: ~~(S)~~ Afghanistan NSL  
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir, My name is (b)(3), (b)(6) for HQ Resolute Support. I am currently part of a 15-6 investigation and I am looking for the Afghanistan NSL on 02 Oct 15. I went to the CENTCOM website and the current NSL says it was posted on 20151021. Thank you for your assistance.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

VR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Approved for Release

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Friday, October 02, 2015 8:20 PM  
**To:**  
**Cc:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** ~~(S//REL)~~ PDSS for ASSF ISO Kunduz  
**Attachments:** PDSS Grant - Kunduz ASSF Units.docx

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please see attached. Currently, elements of (b)(1)1.4d accompanied by ODA (b)(1)1.4a are decisively engaged in the city at the PGOV compound. At some point, ODA (b)(1)1.4a wants to move back to (b)(1)1.4a to refit for follow on missions. The intent of this PDSS is to provide enabler support to unaccompanied ASSF units remaining and moving into the city within the confines of the Tactical Guidance. Providing support to these units will also create a force protection buffer between the city and the (b)(1)1.4a where U.S./NATO forces are located.

Please let me know if you have questions/concerns.

V/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

NSOCC-A / SOJTF-A

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

~~SECRET//REL TO USA, NATO, RSMA~~

From: [Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR](#)  
To: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: FW: (U//~~FOUO~~) Communication record between [redacted] MSF from 02-03 OCT  
Date: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 3:42:54 PM  
Attachments: (b)(3), (b)(6) documents.pdf

---

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

Please file the below info documenting exchange between UN / RS/ SOTF and MSF

Thanks, r/ RA

Gwyn Armfield  
Brig Gen USAF

[redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

---

From: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR  
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 3:42 PM  
To: [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Cc: Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director; [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Team; Hickman, William B. MG US MIL DEPUTY COMMANDER  
Subject: FW: (U//~~FOUO~~) Communication record between [redacted] MSF from 02-03 OCT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

[redacted] (b)(6)

I believe you are working the MSF Info LOO.

Attached is some great info but it will require some patient work to piece together for our timeline

I read through all of this and recommend that you to start first w/ email below from [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) then .pdf cover sheet followed by the actual .pdf documents to get the proper feel for the timing.

The info contained is consequential because it highlights the extensive dialogue and relationship between SOTF / RS and MSF to deconflict ops O/A 2 OCT.

r/ RA

Gwyn Armfield  
Brig Gen USAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 1:10 AM  
To: Jenkins, Sean M BG MIL USA USCENCOM CCJ3-A; Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR  
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)  
Subject: (U) Communication record between (b)(3), (b)(6) MSF from 02-03 OCT

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Message Body Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Gentlemen,

My timeline, to the best of my recollection is as follows due to errors in time stamps on the mobile telephone:

02 OCT approx. 1320 (b)(3), (b)(6) receives email request from (b)(3), (b)(6) to facilitate direct communication between MSF and (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding the need for a possible extraction plan

- Phone conversation regarding this occurs between MSF Representative (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) discussing the need for a plan for extraction in case the situation deteriorates further. MSF emphasizes that the plan is not needed at that time, but may be in the future. Also discussed was the Taliban treatment of hospital workers and patients. Taliban are described as 'protecting' the hospital.
- Around this time, the coordination of a convoy to resupply the hospital is discussed. Information describing the vehicles is transmitted from MSF (b)(3), (b)(6) in the form of a Pashto language letter designed for identification at GIRoA or Taliban CPs with pertinent information. Information is provided to the JOC. Updates to the convoy disposition and are provided by email and text message (b)(3), (b)(6) advises marking the top of vehicles with MSF logo to be visible to aircraft.

02 OCT approx. 1700 (b)(3), (b)(6) messages MSF to determine status of convoy. MSF advises of safe delivery of supplies.

03 OCT, between 0200-0220: Phone call received by (b)(3), (b)(6) from MSF stating that the Trauma Center was receiving an airstrike (b)(3), (b)(6) states that he will find out if airstrikes are occurring, asks about casualties, end the call and informs the JOC.

- Text messages are exchanged regarding casualty figures and disposition of the hospital. (as annotated in page four (b)(3), (b)(6) documents' PDF)

Unfortunately, I cannot recall the exact time that I received the phone call; however, I do know that as soon as I hung up the phone, I proceeded to the JOC to inform the relevant parties. The times presented for the 2<sup>nd</sup> of October are based on the email time stamps, and there is no email traffic related to the strike to assist with timeline identification.

If needed, and as previously discussed, I am willing to submit my phone as evidence.

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Attachment Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Message Body Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

**Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**

## Reference for [redacted] Written Correspondence with MSF and UNOCHA

**Note:** The times stamped on each email make the timeline difficult to discern. This is due to the different time zones used by different email clients (un.org, soc.mil, swa.army.mil, etc.)

Page numbers correspond to the PDF version

1. Text messages between [redacted] and UNOCHA (Page 3)
2. Text messages between [redacted] and MSF compiled in an email to the [redacted] (Page 4)
3. Grid Coordinates of MSF facilities originally sent to RS HQ (Page 5)
4. Email Subject: FW: (U//~~FOUO~~) MSF Coordinates of Medical facilities in Kunduz chain from [redacted] [redacted] from United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA) to RS HQ. (Page 6-8)
  - a. Amplification: The grids were passed from RS HQ to the listed emails, but the message somehow got to SOTF-A through the medical channels as a possible medical provider in an emergency situation. [redacted] was attempting to find the location of MSF facilities in Kunduz, and through a chance observation, recognized the MSF locations document on the screen of the [redacted] then requested the document be forwarded to his workstation for action.
5. [redacted] contacted [redacted] via cell phone from his contact information that was listed on the original email. After the conversation, [redacted] identified himself as a member of the US Military who wanted to make sure that military activities and MSF were de-conflicted. [redacted] emailed Mr. [redacted] to maintain communications and to receive any other needed documents.
6. Email Subject: Re: Contact Information (US Military Kunduz) (Page 9-10)
  - a. This email chain is in response (to the best of my recollection) to the conversation that the [redacted] had regarding MSF's intended resupply convoy to the Trauma Center from Pul-e-Khumri
7. Email Subject: Fwd: Identification of MSF trucks en route to Kunduz and (Page 11)
  - a. A forwarded message to [redacted] regarding the composition and route of the MSF resupply convoy referencing the text message that contained the file (could not be read by [redacted] kia)
  - b. Response thread to the convoy information (Page 12)
8. Initial document given to SOTF-A in Pashtu, translated by [redacted], with a note from [redacted] stating that MSF was recommended against travel on 02OCT15. On the back of that document are notes taken during phone conversations with [redacted] (Note: The trucks referenced in this document were later cancelled and supplies were moved to other vehicles, detailed in the next email) (Page 13-14)
9. Email Subject: Re: MSF Kunduz (Page 15)
  - a. Response thread to [redacted] regarding the new plan to utilize smaller vehicles to transport supplies into Kunduz
10. Email Subject: Fwd: URGENT: Movement of 3 MSF hired private taxi from Puli- Khumri to Kunduz MSF Hospital / Departing 1.30pm (Page 16-17)

- a. Email from (b)(6) originally from (b)(6) Representative for MSF with detailed information about the resupply convoy.
11. Vehicle itinerary printed from #8, given to JOC with (b)(6) cell phone in case of questions (Page 18)
12. Email Subject: RE: A question... in case things go bad (Page 19-20)
- a) (b)(6) was CC'ed on the response from (b)(6) regarding the phone calls between (b)(3), (b)(6) facilitated by (b)(6) IOT discuss possibly evacuating his staff in case of an unspecified emergency.

Approved for Release

**Text Messages between (b)(3), (b)(6) and UNOCHA (misspellings included)**

**Note:** Times and dates are not provided because the internal clock on the (b)(3), (b)(6) Nokia phone was not/is not set and the information displayed by the phone is inaccurate.

UNOCHA (b)(3), (b)(6) finally got MSF they have no air ops planned. They do have a road covoy in Phl Ui Chumri waiting for a green light to proceed so any advice is welcome. Cheers. (b)(6)

UNOCHA (b)(3), (b)(6) spoke with Country Diirector MSF just after our conversation and he is now mailing me details of his convoy

(b)(3), (b)(6)

UNOCHA (b)(3), (b)(6) received Letters and symbols received due to an attempt at sending a file from his iPhone to (b)(3), (b)(6) Nokia. Attempt was unsuccessful and the document was later emailed.

UNOCHA: Morning (b)(6) Resolute Support are advising that the trucks do not move into Kunduz today. However if MSF wish to push ahead they are requesting the following. Exact current location. Time of departure. Intended route. Number and description of vehicles. Estimated time of teaching Kunduz. MSF location in Kumduz they will go to first. Registration numbers. If possible a photograph of the vehicles. Best (b)(6)

UNOCHA: Check your mail please (b)(3), (b)(6) MSF about to move

(b)(3), (b)(6)

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Sent:** Saturday, October 03, 2015 10:01 AM  
**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)  
**Subject:** (U//~~FOUO~~) Text messages exchanged by MSF Country Director and (b)(3), (b)(6) on 02-03OCT

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From several hours before the incident and then immediately following it: (MSF refers to communication with Guilhem, country director for MSF)

Texts:

(b)(3), (b)(6) Any update on the 3 cars?

MSF: Arrived, sound and safe!! Thx for your support.

Phone call was made from (b)(3), (b)(6) MSF IOT determine if vehicles and personnel from the MSF resupply were still IVO the Trauma Center, MSF stated to (b)(3), (b)(6) that the vehicles had dropped off supplies and departed the district

Phone call was received by (b)(3), (b)(6) from MSF stating that the Trauma Center was receiving an airstrike, (b)(3), (b)(6) responded that he would find out about an airstrike, asked if there were any casualties, call was ended.

Texts:

MSF: 1 afghan MSF staff severely injured. Not all accounted for yet.

(b)(3), (b)(6) Am sorry to hear that i still do not know what happened

MSF: Ok. Please make sure airstrikes stop. We sustained heavy casualties

(b)(3), (b)(6) will do my best i am praying for you all

MSF: Thanks. East side of the hospital is on fire. We still have staffs unaccounted for and many injuires.

End of Text messaging

0700 03 OCT: MSF calls (b)(3), (b)(6) inform of 1x vehicle with MSF markings taking personnel to the Kunduz Airport, (b)(3), (b)(6) asks if they plan on landing a plane there. MSF replies that they are seeking MOD clearance ATT. Call ends, (b)(3), (b)(6) informs JOC.

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The following information summarizes the qualification and training for (b)(3), (b)(6) qualified as a (b)(3), (b)(6) in the AC-130U.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

MEMORANDUM FOR: AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) had zero discrepancies in required deployment ground and flight training currencies prior to and since deploying to the AOR.

2. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

"For Official Use Only (FOUO) information, which must be protected under the Privacy Act and Air Force Instruction 33-332."



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

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SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The following information summarizes the qualification and training for (b)(3), (b)(6), qualified as a (b)(3), (b)(6) in the AC-130U.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
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4. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

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(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

MEMORANDUM FOR: AFSOC/A3

FROM: 4 SOS/CC

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) had zero discrepancies in required deployment ground and flight training currencies prior to and since deploying to the AOR.
2. Questions regarding (b)(3), (b)(6) currencies should be directed to (b)(3), (b)(6)  
DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

"For Official Use Only (FOUO) information, which must be protected under the Privacy Act and Air Force Instruction 33-332."



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
25TH INTELLIGENCE SQUADRON (ACC)  
HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The following information summarizes the qualification and training for (b)(3), (b)(6) qualified as a (b)(3), (b)(6) on the AC-130U.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

5. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
25TH INTELLIGENCE SQUADRON (ACC)  
HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: 25 IS/CC

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) had zero discrepancies in ground and flight training currencies prior to and since deploying to the Area of Responsibility.

2. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN  
(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

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(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

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FROM: 4 SOS/CC

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) had zero discrepancies in required deployment ground and flight training currencies prior to or since deploying to the AOR.

2. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The following information summarizes the qualification and training for (b)(3), (b)(6) qualified as a (b)(3), (b)(6) in the AC-130U.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

MEMORANDUM FOR: AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
720TH SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA

21 October 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Records Review

1. This MFR is in response to a Request for Information (RFI) from the Commander of the 720<sup>th</sup> Special Tactics Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief Standardizations/Evaluations Examiner (SEE) has conducted a thorough review of all training and evaluation records for the above mentioned individual. Below are the statements of findings.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Any further questions can be directed to, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

*First There... That Others May Live*



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

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**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
**19TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON (AFSOAWC)**  
**HURLBURT FIELD, FL**



21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

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SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(3), (b)(6)

*"Deeds not Words"*



**DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE**  
**19TH SPECIAL OPERATIONS SQUADRON (AFSOAWC)**  
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21 Oct 15

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Approved for Release

*"Deeds not Words"*



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

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DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

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1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

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## AFSOC ORM WORKSHEET INSTRUCTIONS

A preliminary risk assessment will first be accomplished by the squadron planner or flight authorization authenticating official by accomplishing this ORM worksheet. The preliminary assessment will be compared to the flight crew assessment prior to flight and any discrepancies will be discussed with squadron supervision. The flight crew should accomplish their ORM worksheet without reference to the preliminary risk assessment so that the crew risk assessment is not influenced in any way.

### STEP 1: IDENTIFY THE HAZARDS

The worksheet breaks each main METT-T area into several sub-categories which will be identified as Low, Medium, High, or Extreme risk events. All identified risks will be circled/highlighted and then discussed amongst the crew(s). Identifying the hazards is a crew process. Each crewmember will be given the opportunity to provide input.

### STEP 2: ASSESS THE RISKS

All identified risk factors will be considered, and the overall sub-category rating will be assigned a risk rating accordingly. The sub-categories will be compiled in an overall category assessment, which will be noted at the bottom of each main area. Finally, all of the scales will be integrated into the Overall Crew assessment rating.

### STEP 3: ANALYZE RISK CONTROL MEASURES

This step involves evaluation of specific strategies and controls that reduce or eliminate risk.

### STEP 4: MAKE A RISK DECISION

At this point, the Aircraft Commander (AC)/Flight Lead (FL) needs to decide if any unnecessary risk(s) exist, and if so make a risk decision to mitigate those risks. The maxim to remember is to accept risk when the benefit outweighs the costs.

### STEP 5: IMPLEMENT RISK CONTROL MEASURES

The "Top Risks" block will be utilized when considering the greatest hazards to control. The control measures to mitigate those risks will also be noted on the form. The AC/FL should apply risk decisions and control measures to all portions of their flight profile, not just the "Top Risk" areas.

### STEP 6: SUPERVISE & REVIEW

NOTE: the backside of the risk assessment sheet is specifically reserved as a commander's tool. It may be tailored and organized specific to mission needs.

The level of risk acceptance/approval is dependent upon many factors (deployed operations, small unit deployments, command direction etc.) The AC/FL will brief the appropriate level of supervision; Operations Supervisor (OS), Director of Operations (DO), Commander (CC), Group Commander (OG); so they (1) understand the level of risk they are assuming and (2) ensure the aircrews are not accepting unnecessary risks. The AC/FL will brief squadron supervision (CC/DO/ADO/OS) on all of the various risk factors and the mitigation plan for each mission. Commanders will determine the level of risk acceptance required (OS/DO/CC/OG) for their particular mission(s) for operations below "Extreme."

Extreme risk rating will be briefed to the Group Commander/equivalent only after in-unit supervision (DO/CC) has been appraised of the risks. The DO/CC will forward the extreme risk rating to the Group Commander for assessment if additional control measures cannot be implemented.

The OS will monitor the flight and supervise any additional developing risk factors (i.e. weather, mx requirements/ conflicts, real world SAR missions, flight profiles changes, and additional taskings).

The aircrew needs to be updated on any changes to their previously discussed ORM decisions. During the aircrew brief, the AC/FL will provide a review of the flight risks to include any additional inputs from the supervision. Crewmembers will also make any final suggestions/inputs, and the Overall Assessment will be confirmed or modified as necessary.

DATE: 2-Oct-15		(b) 1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Day <del>Night</del>		ACFT/CC: (b)(3), (b)(6)		OP/OBJ:	
Baseline Risk		LEVEL		RISK DRIVERS		NOTIFICATION REQUIRED	
Low	0			Normal timeline with complete products			
Medium	1			Unable to meet climb gradient		(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)	
High	2			Afghan Unilateral			
AC-130		PLANNER		ACFT CC		SPECIFIC CONSIDERATIONS (circle applicable items)	
MISSION		L	M	H	E	L	M
Type	X						<del>Climb</del> Near-Border/Cross-Border/Planned Post BMNT/Daylight
Complexity	X						Pre-planned <del>GSO</del> Airborne Tasking; Overlapping ROZs
Priority	X						<del>TST</del> HHQ Directed <del>CAS</del> TIC / Enemy Senior Leaders
Deconfliction	X						<del>ROZ</del> No ROZ/Formation/Large Air Component / Dissimilar Formation
Familiarity	X						COF, GRG, Imagery Day Plan/ Complete Prods Day Of / Incomplete Prods /None
Supporting/Supported Forces	X						<del>Familiar SOF Users</del> Unfamiliar SOF / Conventional / No JTAC
Overall MISSION is rated:	X						
ENEMY							
Intelligence	X						<del>Known Threat &amp; Loc's</del> Known threat & no loc's / Unknown / Penetrate
Probability of Detection	X						<del>Unlikely</del> / Possible / Probable / Certain (Daylight)
Probability of Engagement	X						Unlikely <del>Possible</del> / Probable / Certain
Probability of Defeating the Threat	X						<del>Highly Likely</del> / Probable / Possible / Unlikely
Overall ENEMY is rated:	X						
TERRAIN (ENVIRONMENT)							
Degraded Aircraft	X						Missing Non-MESL / Missing MESL Equip
Start/Taxi/Takeoff	X						Delayed takeoff / Extended ETIC
Enroute	X						Significant Charted hazards / Uncharted Flight Area
Objective	X						<del>Desert</del> Over Water / Low Contrast / <del>Mountains</del> High DA
Recovery/Divert	X						<del>Known enemy area</del> / Defended Position / Active Air Defense
Performance	X						<del>Complex Approach Proc's</del> / No proc's published
Waivers	X						<del>Less than optimal / Heavy Weight</del> Heavy & Hot / Degraded
Weather	X						Group CC and below required / Above Group CC required
Illumination	X						Ceiling or Vis Marginal / Ceiling or Vis Below Mins / IMC Target Area
BASH	X						Precip, Ice, Turb, Isld TSW / Severe Precip, Ice, Turb, Area TSW
Overall TERRAIN is rated:	X						<del>Low Illum &amp; Silhouette</del> Low Contrast / Silhouetting / Daylight
TROOPS							Adverse Cultural Lighting / Limited Sensor effectiveness
Preflight Fatigue	X						<del>BWC Low</del> / BWC Moderate / BWC Severe / Mult Recent Birdstrikes
In-flight Fatigue	X						
Human Factors	X						Marginal Crew Rest / Chronic Fatigue / Crew Rest Waivers
Qualification/Currency/Proficiency/Mix	X						>10 Hrs Day / >6 Hrs NVG; >12 Hrs Day / >8 Hrs NVG
Waivers	X						Use checklist discipline
Overall TROOPS is rated:	X						Prolonged Hot/Cold Exposure // Extreme Hot/Cold
TIME							(Above 10K for 8hrs) / (Above 10k for 12hrs) / Consecutive
Planning	X						<del>Minor Personal Distractions</del> / Major Life Events
Preparation	X						Use Good CRM
Execution	X						Minor Limiting Factors / Major Limiting Factors
Overall TIME is rated:	X						Group CC and below required / Above Group CC required
Baseline Assessment:		LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME		
Planner's Assessment:		LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME		
ACFT CC'S Assessment:		LOW	MODERATE	HIGH	EXTREME		

**Planner Comments**

**RAISES ORM TO HIGH IF UNILATERAL AFGHAN OPERATION AND REQUIRES CJSOAC/CC APPROVAL**

**Signatures**

Planner Signature \_\_\_\_\_

AO Signature \_\_\_\_\_ (b)(3), (b)(6)

Acft/CC Signature \_\_\_\_\_

**Authorizing Official Comments**

Squadron CC approval required for low risk

First O-5 approval required for medium risk

**Approval Authority Comments**

**Aircraft Commanders Comments**

Daytime Ops thoroughly briefed with crew

Sleep cycle change- mitigated with day rest

Approvals or waivers required/approved	Required	
	Approval Authority Initials	No
Alert duty period - AFSOC DO		X
Alert waivers (non-duty period) - Group CC/COMAFSOF		X
BWC moderate or severe - Group CC		X
Civilian law enforcement/medical personnel - Group CC		X
Commander-directed requalification syllabus - Sqdn CC		X
Crew complement - Group CC/COMAFSOF		X
Crew duty day - Group CC		X
Crew rest - Group CC		X
Cross crew position instruction - Sqdn CC/Sqdn DO/Msn CC		X
Flight >155K lbs - AFSOC DO		X
Flight after MX precautionary landing w/out qualified MX - Sqdn CC		X
Fuel required to divert < fuel available (op/contingency only) - AFSOC DO		X
Interfly - Group CC/COMAFSOF		X
Msn Qual training on operational mission - Group CC		X
No antiexposure suit btwn 51-60 F water temp Sqdn CC/Msn CC		X
Orientation/familiarization flight - Group CC		X
Unable to climb to/maintain ESA/MSA - Group CC/COMAFSOF		X

**Planners Comments:** Planned mission details or XSOF/GSOF as required

**Authorizing Officials Comments:** Any concerns, unmitigated risks, factors which need to be considered. (ie: 1st flight in AOR, 5 flights in 5 days, poor crew rest night prior, etc.)

**Approval Authority Comments:** Concerns, LIMFACS, restrictions imposed by AO

**Mission Benefit Levels:**

Low: Training, FCF, Tweak, Sensor Align, Confidence Flight, etc.

Medium: Standard priority targets, missions, VSOs, pre-planned CJSOTF msns, etc.



High: HVTs, standard TF msns, TSTs, Low-Intensity TICs, Active Air Base Defense

Extreme: High-Intensity TICs, Enemy/Insurgent Senior Leaders

**Assessment of Risk:**

If risk outweighs mission benefit (High risk & Medium benefit), Acft CC & Approval Authority must explain/justify in comments section

Assessment of risk based on factors and mitigation techniques on front





**UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~**  
**UNITED STATES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND**  
OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF STAFF  
7701 TAMPA POINT BLVD.  
MACDILL AIR FORCE BASE, FLORIDA 33621-5323

JAN 20 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR

COMMANDER, U.S. ARMY SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, 2929 DESERT  
STORM DRIVE, FORT BRAGG, NC 28310-9110

COMMANDER, MARINE CORPS FORCES SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, PSC  
BOX 20116, CAMP LEJEUNE, NC 28542-0116

COMMANDER, NAVAL SPECIAL WARFARE COMMAND, 2000 TRIDENT WAY, SAN  
DIEGO, CA 92155-5599

COMMANDER, AIR FORCE SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMMAND, 100 BARTLEY  
STREET, COMMAND SUITE, HURLBURT FIELD, FL 32544-5273

SUBJECT: Integration of Special Operations Forces Ground Force Commander Close Air  
Support Training during Pre-Mission Training

1. REFERENCES.

a. U.S. Special Operations Command (USSOCOM) Chief of Staff Message, Subject:  
USSOCOM Special Operations Forces Fires Working Group, 241158RSEP12.

b. USSOCOM Manual 350-5, Joint Terminal Attack Controller Readiness and Training, 5  
April 2012.

c. USSOCOM Publication 3-33, Multi-Service Tactics, Techniques and Procedures  
(TTPs) for Conventional Forces and Special Operations Forces Integration, Interoperability,  
and Interdependence, March 2014.

d. Joint Close Air Support Action Plan Memorandum of Agreement 2004-01, Joint  
Terminal Attack Controller (Ground)", 1 January 2012.

e. Joint Pub 3-05, Special Operations, 16 July 2014.

f. Joint Pub 3-09, Joint Fire Support, 30 June 2010.

g. Joint Pub 3-09.3, Close Air Support, 8 July 2009.

h. J-Fire - Multi-Service TTPs for the Joint Application of Firepower, ATP 3-09.32 [FM 3-  
09.32]; MCRP 3-16.6A; NTP 3-09.2; AFTTP(I) 3-2.6, November 2012.

i. Air Force Tactics, Techniques and Procedures 3-3.Joint Terminal Attack Controller,  
Combat Fundamentals-Joint Terminal Attack Controller, 24 Oct 2012.

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SOCS

SUBJECT: Integration of Special Operations Forces Ground Force Commander Close Air Support Training during Pre-Mission Training

2. Purpose. Provide specific training guidance for the mandatory integration of Special Operations Forces (SOF) Tactical Maneuver Force / Element Ground Force Commanders (GFC) regarding Close Air Support (CAS) Training during Pre-Mission Training (PMT).

3. Applicability. The mandatory training requirements contained herein apply to all SOF Tactical Maneuver Force / Element Ground Force Commanders. This includes, but is not limited to, the following personnel:

- a. Marine Special Operations Team Commanders.
- b. Special Forces Operational Detachment -Alpha (SFOD-A) Team Leaders.
- c. Ranger Rifle Company Commanders.
- d. SEAL (Troop) Team Leaders.
- e. Special Tactics Team Leaders.
- f. Other personnel that require CAS integration training (e.g. on-scene commanders). These additional personnel may be determined by individual Component Commanders.

4. Background. A recent CAS mishap involving SOF has highlighted the need for an increased emphasis on CAS integration within our SOF teams. Today's complex CAS scenarios require additional preparation and proficiency to hone the skill sets necessary to accomplish required tasks. A clear understanding of tactics, techniques and procedures (TTPs) to locate and maintain situational awareness of friendly/target locations and an emphasis on clearance authority and attack restrictions is paramount.

5. Policy and Procedure. Component Commanders shall incorporate the following Program of Instruction (POI) requirements into existing and/or new Component PMT for mandatory accomplishment prior to the combat deployment of SOF Tactical Maneuver Force/Element Ground Force Commanders:

- a. All personnel in paragraph 3 shall participate in at least one (1) evaluated, SOF JTAC-enabled, Full Mission Profile (FMP) combat-focused training event (integrating both individual and collective skills) that includes fixed-wing CAS support during their unit PMT.
- b. The PMT event may be accomplished using a combination of live CAS and/or an accredited/approved simulation system.
- c. All PMT tasks shall be accomplished to a standard that ensures the trainee has sufficient knowledge and understanding of the items contained therein in order to enable/ensure successful CAS mission integration during SOF missions.

SOCS

SUBJECT: Integration of Special Operations Forces Ground Force Commander Close Air Support Training during Pre-Mission Training

d. The PMT event shall include Tasks 1 through 13 below. This requirement does not preclude Components from adding additional tasks as deemed necessary.

**Task 1. SOF JTAC Role and Capabilities.**

SOF GFC/team shall receive a detailed briefing on the SOF JTAC's capabilities/limitations, duties and responsibilities. This brief shall be given from a qualified (certified) SOF JTAC, preferably the JTAC assigned/attached to the team for deployment.

**Task 2. Airspace Coordinating Measures.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss airspace command and control (Joint and Component) procedures and their impact on CAS mission planning. Supporting documents for discussion include Airspace Control Order (ACO), Airspace Control Measures (ACM), Air Tasking Order (ATO), Special Instructions (SPINS) and applicable Tactical Directives.

**Task 3. Fire Support Coordination Measures.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss the impact of fire support coordination measures (FSCM) on CAS mission planning.

**Task 4. CAS Assets (Air / Ground / Weapons).**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss CAS assets in support of the ground scheme of maneuver to include:

- a. Fixed-Wing / Rotary-Wing platform capabilities / limitations / employment.
- b. SOF-unique platform (e.g. AC-130, AH-64, (b)(1)1.4) capabilities / limitations / employment.
- c. Unmanned Aerial System (UAS) capabilities / limitations / employment (e.g. Group 1 /2/ 3 UAS; including SOF-unique TTP for e.g. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g)
- d. Weapon Effects. Specific weapons effects for all available Aviation / Ground (e.g. High Mobility Artillery Rocket System) munitions.

**Task 5. Command and Control/ Mission Command (clearance of Fires, roles, and responsibilities).**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss:

- a. GFC's Intent for CAS.
- b. GFC's desired effect from Fire Support.
- c. Clear guidelines for the use of CAS / Rules of Engagement (ROE) / Tactical Directives.

SOCS

SUBJECT: Integration of Special Operations Forces Ground Force Commander Close Air Support Training during Pre-Mission Training

- d. GFC's trigger for employment of CAS.
- e. Target approval authority (Time-sensitive, / Limited Targeting Authority (LTA), deliberate targeting, etc.).
- f. Authorized ordnance (with or without specific clearance).
- g. Approval authorities / delegation of target approval authority.
- h. Priority of targets/unit with priority of fire (POF).
- i. Final clearance / restrictions.

**Task 6. Requesting CAS.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss preplanned and immediate Air Support Requests (ASR) and the timely submission of Joint Tactical Air Strike Requests (JTAR).

**Task 7. Terminal Attack Control / Method of Attack.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss components of a game plan / CAS Control /types of Terminal Attack Control / Method of Attack).

**Task 8. Emergency CAS (ECAS) Procedures.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss ECAS procedures (CAS Execution with non-JTAC) in detail and the potential impacts associated with this procedure.

**Task 9. Battle Tracking / Collateral Damage.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss:

- a. Call for fire (CFF).
- b. Civilian Casualties.
- c. Collateral Damage / Collateral Damage Estimate (CDE) / Prevention.
- d. Combat ID (CID).
- e. Commander's Risk Assessment.
- f. Danger Close.
- g. Effective Communication.
- h. Friendly Fire Mitigation / Prevention.

SOCS

SUBJECT: Integration of Special Operations Forces Ground Force Commander Close Air Support Training during Pre-Mission Training

- i. Friendly Markings / Marking Devices (IFF) / Personal ID (PID).
- j. Friendly Marking Procedures.
- k. Location of friendlies / non-combatants.
- l. Nearest collateral concerns.
- m. Risk Estimate Distances Thresholds.
- n. Sensor Capabilities and Management (Includes (b)(1)1.4a and cursory searches for collateral concerns).
- o. Situational Awareness (i.e. "tools").
- p. Target Markings / Marking Devices / "No-mark".
- q. Troops in Contact (TIC) and potential control/approval authorities.

**Task 10. Factors influencing CAS capabilities.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss the effects of weather / terrain / threats / Electronic Warfare on CAS capabilities.

**Task 11. Forward Air Controller (Airborne) (FAC-A) Integration.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss FAC-A capabilities / limitations / employment.

**Task 12. Indirect Fires.**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss the integration of CAS with indirect fires.

**Task 13. Friendly Fire Vignette (Case Studies).**

SOF GFC/team/JTAC shall discuss a previous Friendly Fire incident(s) to include a detailed explanation of the situation and resulting Friendly Fire with causal factors.

**6. Responsibilities. USSOCOM Component Commanders shall:**

- a. Within sixty (60) days from the date of this memorandum, respond back (via official memorandum) to the USSOCOM Director of Force Management and Development, their implementation plan to comply with the requirements of this memorandum.
- b. Fully comply with the requirements of this memorandum (implementation of stated requirements) within six (6) months from the date of this memorandum.
- c. Ensure the PMT event for the GFC is appropriately documented and tracked.

SOCS

SUBJECT: Integration of Special Operations Forces Ground Force Commander Close Air Support Training during Pre-Mission Training

7. Terms of Reference.

a. Full Mission Profile (FMP): An all-inclusive training event that is conducted in a dynamic, operationally-realistic environment. The event is area of responsibility-centric and relevant to the PMT mission tasking.

b. JTAC-enabled: An event accomplished with a qualified (certified) SOF JTAC, preferably the JTAC assigned/attached to the team for deployment.

8. Waiver Authority. The waiver authority for the training requirements in this memorandum is the USSOCOM Chief of Staff unless otherwise delegated.

9. Proponent. The proponent for this policy is the USSOCOM (b)(6). The requirements listed in this memorandum do not expire and shall be reviewed for inclusion into a current or future USSOCOM publication.

10. Point of contact is (b)(3), (b)(6). SIPR e-mail: (b)(3), (b)(6)



W. LEE MILLER, JR.  
Major General, U.S. Marine Corps  
Chief of Staff

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## *US Army Special Operations Command*

# USASOC Lessons Learned Brief Close Air Support / Friendly Fire

USASOC Lessons Learned Fusion Cell

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USASOC Lessons Learned / History Program

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# AGENDA

Terminal Learning Objectives

Summary of (b)(1)1.4a

Contributing Factors

Lessons Learned

Historical Vignettes

Mitigating Recommendations

Conclusion

Comments/Questions

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# TERMINAL LEARNING OBJECTIVES

TLO 1 - Attendees are familiar with SOF CAS fratricide incidents.

TLO 2 - Attendees understand the contributing factors and their role in mitigating them.

TLO 3 - Attendees consider the lessons learned presented in future training and operations.

TLO 4 - Attendees have take-away information for planning consideration.

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# HISTORICAL VIGNETTES

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# COMMENTS/QUESTIONS

# Report of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Munitions Out of Compound

- Summary: Of the 211 rounds fired by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) on 3 Oct 15, there were eight impact locations outside the MSF Trauma Center compound totaling approximately 31 total rounds in three sectors.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

## ROE/TACTICAL GUIDANCE

- [redacted] Original target grid passed (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a "pax are HOSTILE" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "Lighten the load for partner forces [pre-assault forces]" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d description through (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] description through (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] Follow-on obj same intent to "soften target" [pre-assault forces] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) intent to "destroy targets of all opportunity that may impede forces"
- [redacted] "Why don't we just take out that enemy C2?" (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) "Anybody carrying anything?" (b)(3), (b)(6) "Not that I can tell."
- [redacted] Targets of opportunity versus (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) discussion (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) "So we can say 'killshot.'"
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a PID chain of custody; "Eyes on building with 9 pax" (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a resting, sitting in chairs – pax disposition at MSF
- [redacted] "enemy pax at obj building" (b)(3), (b)(6) requests we prosecute those targets"
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) "Confirm ROE" – (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) wants you to prosecute building first followed by (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) "Confirm cleared on all (b)(1)1.4a and not just (b)(1)1.4a
- [redacted] Friendly position "well outside a click [1 km]" (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) "engaging unarmed pax running about]"
- [redacted] "[inaudible], engage (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] [SITUPDATE 2] "Good effects, not seeing (b)(1)1.4a, still hot, continuing (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "Go cold when friendlies are 300m from the target" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "Currently have convoy trucking into their location" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

## SITUATIONAL AWARENESS

- [redacted] "That's most likely what it is" (b)(3), (b)(6) MSF compound initially (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "Affirm, that's the compound" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) "I think it's 30m off initially, not 300m]"
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a identified and passed at (b)(1)1.4a
- [redacted] "We need additional so we can be 100% sure" (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "This looks more like a prison compound [with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g NDS HQ]" (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) says [passes additional target description]" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a "We have great confidence in that grid, so if it's only 30m off" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "Grids sent us to open field – nearest large compound is 300m south" (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] [SOTF coordinating helo re-supply]
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) "Going hot" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] "Confirm it's the T-shaped building" (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) [no acknowledge]
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) "All players, all players, rounds away, rounds away"

- [redacted] “How far away are friendlies from the city?” (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] “Friendly posit well outside of 1 km” (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] First SITUPD Affirm (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) multiple (b)(1)1.4a running into basement on E side”
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a “Can’t punch through to the basement with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) “Can you pass the grid for the engagement?”
- [redacted] “Any effects on major compound to the south?”
- [redacted] First mention of Kunduz Trauma Center (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Negative, all effects are on the T-shaped building”
- [redacted] “Copy, large secondaries on the building”
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Looking for info on the lead-up to the attack

**AC-130 TARGETING PROCESS**

- [redacted] Inherent system error [did anyone plot the original grid in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g]
- [redacted] “Normal POL for this compound – not normally moving around the city” (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] “Are they carrying anything?” (b)(3), (b)(6) Negative, not that I can tell (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] First mention of “T-shape building” internal to aircraft (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) the correct grid – No update to fire control system
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) the grids were in an open field (b)(3), (b)(6) WAS ON the correct grid (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) able to see a gate to the north on MSF, but no arch shape (overhang sign)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a weaponizing recommendation (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a “the compound you currently have your (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) label NDS, then OBJ”
- [redacted] [clearance to fire passed] (b)(6) needs clarification on what specifically to engage
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) confirm it’s the T-shaped building [to strike]” (1st mention)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) confirm it’s the T-shaped building [to strike]” (2nd mention)
- [redacted] “Affirm (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) [response to T-shaped building]
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) do you need delay? (b)(3), (b)(6) for engaging the building)
- [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) can move off to search for the convoy

**DECISION MAKING**

- [redacted] “Copy – updated as new NAI” (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] “Those pax are HOS” (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] [redacted] (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6) wants you to prosecute objective bldg first followed by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] “Cleared to engage” [redacted]
- [redacted] “Cleared to engage” (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- [redacted] “You’ve got consent” [redacted]

- (b)(1)1.4a “We started a fire, good effects, not seeing (b)(1)1.4a, still hot continuing (b)(3), (b)(6)
- (b)(6) safes all guns

**LEADING COMMS**

- (b)(1)1.4a “Looking for building description to confirm we’re looking at the right location”
- (b)(1)1.4a AC-130 internal (b)(3), (b)(6) “here’s this big enemy C2 complex that you know of”
- (b)(1)1.4a “So we can say ‘kill shot’ (b)(3), (b)(6) internal)
- (b)(1)1.4a “The compound you currently have your sensor on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- (b)(1)1.4a “Confirm intentions on striking the compound and (b)(1)1.4a leaving the area”
- (b)(1)1.4a “Looking for intentions on striking compound and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)
- (b)(1)1.4a “Confirm it’s the T-shaped building (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (first mention on fires)
- (b)(1)1.4a “Looking to strike T-shaped building, ensuring we’re clear (b)(1)1.4a on the building”
- (b)(1)1.4a “Confirm we are cleared all (b)(1)1.4a in the compound not just (b)(1)1.4a from the t-shaped building” [(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) affirm.”]

**From:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Sent:** Monday, November 02, 2015 11:26 AM

**To:** (b)(3), (b)(6)

**Subject:** Present in JOC on 3OCT

Below is the list of people present in the JOC on the morning of 3 OCT 15:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release



DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE  
720TH SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA

21 October 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM: 720 OSS/OSKF

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Records Review

1. This MFR is in response to a Request for Information (RFI) from the Commander of the 720<sup>th</sup> Special Tactics Group. (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief Standardizations/Evaluations Examiner (SEE) has conducted a thorough review of all training and evaluation records for the above mentioned individual. Below are the statements of findings.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

3. Any further questions can be directed to, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

*First There... That Others May Live*



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720TH SPECIAL TACTICS GROUP (AFSOC)  
HURLBURT FIELD, FLORIDA

21 October 2015

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The 2011 Operational Law Handbook is available on:

[https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military\\_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook\\_2011.pdf](https://www.loc.gov/rr/frd/Military_Law/pdf/operational-law-handbook_2011.pdf)

Approved for Release

The DoD OGC Law of War Manual from June 2015 is available at:

<http://www.defense.gov/Portals/1/Documents/pubs/Law-of-War-Manual-June-2015.pdf>

Approved for Release