(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 4:37 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ RFIs for Kunduz CCAT

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 7:19 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ RFIs for Kunduz CCAT

Sir:

I'll answer the ones I can right now before anyone has to dig them up –

1.
2.
3. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g

I have no information on the 4th question. On the 5th question, there were numerous strikes that day for which the JOC probably has precise times and grids. The most relevant is our reduction of an INS strong point approximately 175-200m west of the SW tower (in the direction of the MSF facility). It took (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to stop the volume of RPG fire from that particular position. Risk estimate distance which establishes "danger close" for this munition is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g so I felt pretty strongly about the level of INS threat to our position throughout the afternoon/evening.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 5:43 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: ~~(S)~~ RFIs for Kunduz CCAT

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Some RFIs for SOTF-A & CJSOAC that came out of a review we did of the CCAT report this afternoon:
Text response is very sufficient, no product required. This is to confirm and clarify areas for the CCAT report, would like to have these tonight or by the morning to inform the report draft that will be reviewed with Afghans and others tomorrow afternoon.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4) Reference the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in the email sent to (but not received) by (b)(1)1.4a

Who added the Kunduz Hospital entry (at MSF Trauma center location)?

When was it added, and was it sent out with that entry prior to the email sent to the CJSOAC and (b)(1)1.4a? (or was this its first issuance)?

Who provided the data (NSL derived or derived from MSF commo to the (b)(3), (b)(6)?

5) We addressed that there were a number of strikes (4 I believe) in the hours (7-9 hours) leading up to the ATG engagement at the Kunduz Trauma Center. I will reference the slides already produced but were there any storyboards or reports for those? I believe at least 1 of them was a bomb on a structure proximate to the PGOV compound. Reports on those/ storyboards would be helpful for deepening the understanding of the context the (b)(1)1.4a were operating in leading up to the (b)(1)1.4a ATG engagement.

For CJSOAC:

1) Did other (b)(1)1.4a fly ISO Kunduz on previous days?

2) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) Kunduz previously (b)(1)1.4a. What dates/ times were those flights.

3) If any other crews/ AC flew, or for the previous (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) were any pre-mission products provided? If so what were they.

You do not have to wait for all to be answered, if there are existing products just send them, text typed responses are fine for most of these.

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 3:11 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ (b)(1)1.4a Leadership Diagram

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NONE~~

Approved for Release

Handling: The message content is ~~SECRET//NONE~~ when separated from attachment.

Sir, the RFI response from (b)(1)1.4d attached.

Please let us know if does not fit the bill.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(6) @soc.smil.mil [mailto: (b)(6) @soc.smil.mil]
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 3:09 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: (b)(1)1.4d Leadership Diagram

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Sir,

Do the attached slides answer the mail?

V/R,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 13, 2015 3:08 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(1)1.4d Leadership Diagram

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please see attached (b)(1)1.4d Leadership Diagram for the (b)(1)1.4d

Please let me know if you have any additional questions or concerns.

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

DERIVED FROM: NS FPP SCG
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF ORIGINATION
DATE OF SOURCE: 20121011

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: NS FPP SCG
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF ORIGINATION
DATE OF SOURCE: 20121011

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release

CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NONE~~

Handling: The message content is ~~SECRET//NONE~~ when separated from attachment.

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, October 14, 2015 7:06 PM
To:
Cc:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ CCAT draft report RFIs

Sir:

(b)(1)1.4d while it is nominally stationed on the edge of Kunduz city, was hastily deployed last (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d into static checkpoints outside the city in places such as Khanabad District to deal with the initial indications of insurgent encroachment, and likely as pawns supporting the ethnic/political maneuvers of some senior stakeholders as well. There were no (b)(1)1.4d personnel present on the initial task organization when we pushed into the city, since they had no adequately-manned organic units other than their (b)(1)1.4a when the city fell (most of its personnel were performing the aforementioned checkpoint duty). There was not a true (b)(1)1.4d -) with organic leadership employed in the city or surrounding area prior to 04 OCT.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 2:56 AM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: ~~(S)~~ CCAT draft report RFIs

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Gentlemen,

Approved for Release

On behalf of the CCAT team I am passing on thanks for all the cooperation and support. The report went through a review this evening and there are a few RFIs that came out, in some cases for confirmation and others for recommended terms to use based on unit/ expert knowledge.

The CCAT will have a (b)(1)1.4d the follow on (b)(1)1.4a and therefore the most inclusive of products submitted to date. As I review all products submitted thus far, if I note any discrepancies I will send them back for refinement before they become final entries. Some clarification and edits have been provided already.

Responses by 1200 on 15 October would be most helpful for inclusion into the next draft version of the CCAT report. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g request can be send later, by 1700 on 15 October as it is for the (b)(1)1.4d report.

Final RFIs

CJSOAC:

1) How would CJSOAC characterize the AC-130 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) mission flown the morning of 2 October in Kunduz City? If the report includes a statement describing the mission being flown, what term would most accurately describe it? The report currently states Close Air Support but I wanted to ensure it is correct.
2) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
3) It is understood what the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was and that it was broken, and what functions were not available. Request that a slide be built for an exhibit in the (b)(1)1.4a report? The questions that were asked tonight specifically were:
   a. Is (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g an acronym and if so what does it stand for?
   b. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
   c.
   d. The final round fired in the event under investigation was a (b)(1)1.4a round that was referenced as a "hot gun". The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ends prior to this round being fired, but the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g continues to include this being addressed. The Air Crew gets clearance from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) to fire the (b)(1)1.4a round into the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ends just as it is about to be fired. Request confirmation of where that round was fired?

SOTF-A:

- The report captures that the US/Aghan partnered SOF force was unfamiliar with Kunduz City specifically, up until the initial infil. That is pretty straight forward for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d is stationed at (b)(1)1.4a does it have experience within Kunduz City itself? It was identified that just because the (b)(1)1.4a is stationed proximate to Kunduz City, it may not have operational experience in the city itself.

Thank you again,

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 2:01 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ (b)(6) Picture

Sir:

That very well might be the guy who was the (b)(6) that night. It was dark, but it looks like him, at least more than anyone I saw in the slide deck. If it is, he's the guy who was on the phone with the (b)(1)1.4a outside the perimeter, and was the one who passed everything I received during their movement.

v/r
(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 10:09 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ (b)(6) Picture

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NONE~~

Handling: The message content is ~~SECRET//NONE~~ when separated from attachment.

(b)(3), (b)(6),
Attached is a photo of (b)(6). He is the one Officer we did not have a photo of, Is he someone you recognize from the PGOV compound that night? If so did he serve to pass any information to you?

Thanks,

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(6)@Soc.smil.mil [mailto: (b)(6)@Soc.smil.mil]
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 10:01 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: (b)(3), (b)(6) Picture

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release

CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Sorry, messed up the first time sir.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 5:29 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: (b)(6) Picture

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Sir,
Let me know if this is the guy. Seemed to be the closet to the description per our conversation.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 15, 2015 5:15 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: (b)(6) Picture

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Sir,

As requested.

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: UNCLASSIFIED

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

DERIVED FROM: NS FPP SCG
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF ORIGINATION
DATE OF SOURCE: 20121011

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

DERIVED FROM: NS FPP SCG
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF ORIGINATION
DATE OF SOURCE: 20121011

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NONE~~

Approved for Release

Handling: The message content is ~~SECRET//NONE~~ when separated from attachment.

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) , are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 OCT 2015

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23RD day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Vance, Bagram, Afghanistan	20151025	1700	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3) - Afghanistan

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. What were the facts and circumstances surrounding the 3 OCT airstrike? (b)(1)1.4a had been in the Provincial Governor's Compound for 3 days at the time the operation was planned by Afghan leadership at Camp Pamir. During their time in Kunduz they had been in a constant fight with enemy forces who continued to come after them. Once our operation in (b)(1)1.4a (the (b)(1)1.4a was cancelled the night of 28 SEP, they were immediately thrust into the fight in Kunduz which, at this point, was already out of control. Friendly security forces had (b)(1)1.4d to the airfield and Camp Pamir. Additionally, up to 300x displaced persons were on the airfield as well. An NDS position, located either directly outside the airfield, or in a building on the airfield, was overrun (apparently they had to destroy their equipment and an (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g phone). (b)(1)1.4a was launched forward to assist as the situation on Pamir looked like it may soon degrade as well. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d forces remained outside of Camp Pamir and the airfield. On 29 SEP, (b)(3), (b)(6) arrived at Pamir to help C2 the (b)(1)1.4a efforts in the District. On 29 SEP (b)(1)1.4a submitted a CONOP to seize a foothold in the city with the main objective being the Kunduz Hospital (south of the MSF Trauma Center). The night of the 29th, the (b)(1)1.4a was unable to make it off the airfield due to enemy attacks directly outside the walls. That night, the SOTF-A conducted kinetic strikes in support of the (b)(1)1.4a resulting in a confirmed 26x EKIA. The following day, 30 SEP, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) partnered with (b)(1)1.4d to develop a plan to make the push in to seize a foothold in the city. It is important to note that (b)(1)1.4d (as well as (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)) did not have a lot, if any, experience operating in Kunduz City. (b)(1)1.4a had positioned themselves forward at Pamir, but had yet to conduct an operation. They are partnered with the (b)(1)1.4d Though their altered plan to clear the NDS, PSU, and PGOV Compounds was hasty, and they were partnered with multiple units (some of which not traditional partners) the operation was expertly executed. The push into the city was met with stiff resistance from the start. Shortly after departing Camp Pamir and the airfield, they were engaged by enemy forces. Despite the contact, they continued to press on as planned. Each OBJ was cleared and the combined element continued to move to the next until they reached the Provincial Governor's Compound. Once there, they remained in constant contact, as waves of insurgents continued to attack. During the course of the days and nights leading up to POD 02/03OCT, the level of contact required emergency resupplies and constant support from armed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a. Additionally, there were (b)(1)1.4a conducted by the (b)(1)1.4a in support of the partnered force. To this point, the unofficial estimate of EKIA is around 500. It is important to note, that the men in the Provincial Governor's Compound were in a near fight, with enemy coming within grenade range of their position. Additionally, on the afternoon of 02 OCT (b)(3), (b)(6) was forced to engage on two buildings across the street, from where insurgents engaged US and partner forces with heavy machine guns and RPGs directly on their position.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE APD LC v1.01ES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The afternoon the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) requested another resupply of food, water, batteries, and ammunition. The (b)(1)1.4a that were at the compound travelled back to Pamir to retrieve supplies for the combined element. The (b)(1)1.4a at Camp Pamir, began planning for the operation that night to seize control of the NDS Compound and asked for the support of the (b)(1)1.4a with CAS. This plan was relayed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) the Provincial Governor's Compound through the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) He then relayed it to us at the SOTF-A HQ. (b)(3), (b)(6) and I discussed the plan and (b)(3), (b)(6) called the SOJTF CG and DCG-O, while I called (b)(3), (b)(6). When the operation commenced, we did not have a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) or could not communicate via (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Throughout the course of the conversations relaying the plan to the SOTF-A the MGRS location for the NDS Compound was never passed. We assumed that the NDS Compound was the same NDS Compound that was cleared the first night during the initial push. It was on the east side of the city, not the west where the other NDS Building is (as well as the Trauma Center). Hence, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was focused on the east side of the city. (b)(3), (b)(6) and his men were also unable to communicate with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) resulting in a lack of SA in the (b)(3), (b)(6) It was not until around 03 0225-0230D*, when (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the JOC and asked if a strike on the Trauma Center was taking place, that I knew anything was going on. We asked (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) out and look for anything of this nature. Shortly after, we located a plume of smoke, correlated the grid with the Trauma Center from the JOC's Common Operating Picture, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was asked him to call us on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Once on the phone, we asked for the situation and told him we thought the Trauma Center was struck. A 'cease fire' was given at this point.

2. Who requested and approved the AC-130? The SOTF-A requested the AC-130 through SOJTF. I cannot recall if I called and spoke to anyone about getting it, or if it was coordinated through the fires desk. I know that I spoke with someone in the J3, likely (b)(3), (b)(6), informing him of the mission and it is within reason for me to have requested it. This practice was not uncommon. It is important to understand that we had continuous CAS and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g throughout this entire operation; THe AC-130 was part of the stack every night that (b)(1)1.4a was in the city.

3. What processes were used to request the AC-130 and other combat enablers? We were receiving (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g every night through a standing request at SOJTF. The operation in Kunduz was the #1 priority in the country and the near-constant TIC

4. What munitions were fired? (b)(1)1.4a

5. What units were involved in the 2 OCT mission to secure the NDS Compound? Although the operation on the night of 2OCT was independently planned and conducted by Afghans, it was enabled by (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

6. What specific concept of the operation (CONOP) was used for the 2/3 OCT mission? They were operating off of the initial RS-approved 2C CONOP from 29SEP. The plan that night was more reactive in nature; It was a 5W. (*This is not an uncommon practice) Due to the 'reactive' nature of this CONOP, this was not pre-planned. There were no pre-planned fires built into the scheme of maneuver.

7. Who was involved in writing and approving the CONOP to include legal review? At the SOTF-A level, there was no written CONOP. However, (b)(3), (b)(6) and myself discussed the plan with each other to ensure there was a common understanding of the operation and the target that (b)(1)1.4a was going to clear, the NDS Compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) then called (b)(1)1.4a and I called (presumably) (b)(3), (b)(6). There was no need for a legal review, because the legal review was conducted in the previously RS approved 2C CONOP dated 29SEP.

8. What was the task/purpose of the 2 OCT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) mission when launched? You would have to discuss this with them. I am not sure what they were told. From our perspective, they were tasked to provide Close Air Support under the control of (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to support the US and Afghan forces on the ground.

9. Did the mission change once on station? No knowledge of what was discussed between the aircrew and the GFC.

10. Was the MSF Trauma Center on the 2 OCT NSL and if so, was it considered in the CONOP process? We did not have a NSL at the time of the strike. That being said, we had plotted the MSF Trauma Center and any other government or protected sites we knew of, on the JOC's Common Operating Picture that is maintained and updated in the JOC as the situation is constantly changing. It should be noted, that the initial CONOP approved at the RS level on 29SEP had the Kunduz Hospital (several kilometers south of the MSF Trauma Center) as the clear OBJ.

11. Is the NSL cross checked during CONOP development or during mission execution? Again, we did not have the NSL at the time of the strike in question. However, we all understand what protected sites are and we definitely cross reference the available information prior to any strike.

12. Who all was involved in the CONOP development and approval for the 2 OCT mission? No one at SOTF-A or above was involved in the development of the 5W that was executed that night. The original CONOP taking them into the city was approved at RS.

13. Was the appropriate legal review done for the CONOP(s)? Yes. Once the initial CONOP was approved at RS HQ, PDSS was

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

granted. After that, it was decided that the follow-on operations would be under OFS authorities.

14. What circumstances surround the decision to authorize pre-planned CAS for the operation? There was no pre-planned CAS strikes during the course of the operation in question, or any operation in Kunduz. While we had pre-planned CAS support on the initial push into the city, there were no pre-planned targets

15. Were there any special instruction issued by chain of command in connection with the approval for CAS support? No. There were no special instructions issued by the chain of command. At the time of the strike on the Trauma Center the team had been in place for 3 days at the Provincial Center with the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g overhead in defense of US and Afghan forces on the ground.

16. Do any graphics at any HQ in the chain of command identify the MSF Trauma Center? Was the MSF Trauma Center on the 2 OCT No Strike List (NSL)? If so, what HQs or unit had it? Yes. The Common Operating Picture, maintained and updated in the SOTF-A JOC identified the MSF Trauma Center. A COP was also provided to SOJTF. We all (SOTF-A) understood the protected status of the Trauma Center and where it was located.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

18. Were you aware of the presence of the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz? Yes.

19. Were you aware of any other targets in Kunduz are on the NSL? At the time, SOTF-A did not have the NSL, however, I understand the protected status of government compounds, schools, mosques, hospitals, etc. I also understand the point at which these structures become valid military targets.

20. What graphical products did you produce or understand to be used during the operation? At the SOTF-A, we utilized the Common Operating Picture in the JOC. It is always posted and constantly updated as information is received.

21. Was the MSF Trauma Center marked as a "no strike" target on an CONOP, AOB-N or AC-130 graphic, guidance systems or documents? Not on any CONOP that passed through the SOTF-A. It was never the target of any operation. The location was on a product that was sent to the aircrew that night prior to their departure. However, it is my understanding that their system was down and they never received it. The Trauma Center wasn't on the original CONOP because we did not know its location until after the CONOP was submitted.

22. What communication or reports from (b)(1)1.4d led to the target decision? Not sure. There was word of previously cleared positions being taken back by insurgents as well as plenty of reporting that they had taken positions as strongpoints throughout the city.

23. Did any intelligence exist indicating the presence of insurgents or persons considered hostile under CENCOM OPORD (b)(1)1.4a Unsure of what is being asked.

24. Was any higher headquarters or operations center able to monitor the strike real time? No. We did not have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) came on station shortly before the strike, but was scanning in the area we believed the objective was, east of the MSF Trauma Center.

25. What was the basis for the use of force against the MSF Trauma Center? I was not there, I do not think I could provide the answer needed for this particular question.

26. What specific operational authorities and rules of engagement were used for the strike? Again, not my place to answer.

27. At what point did US forces realize the strike location was a hospital? At approximately 03 0230D* OCT 2015, the SOTF-A (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the JOC and asked the Night (b)(3), (b)(6) if we were conducting a strike. He stated that he received a call from the MSF stating that the Trauma Center was under attack. To this point, I had no knowledge that a strike was being conducted (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was scanning out to see more of the city and this is when we saw the plume of smoke coming from the Trauma Center. We were able to get the MGRS from the feed and plotted it on the COP. At this point we identified it was the Trauma Center that was struck.

28. What actions were taken once US Forces realized the strike location was a hospital? (b)(3), (b)(6) that we believe the Trauma Center was struck and a 'cease fire' was issued.

29. Was a check fire or cease fire call ever made? Yes. As addressed above.

30. What munitions were employed by the AC-130? (b)(1)1.4a

31. How was the target positively identified? Again, not my question to answer.

32. What was the official or unofficial collateral damage estimate? N/A

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

33. What ROE and Tactical Guidance were used for the strike? Not for me to answer.

34. What tactics, techniques, and procedures were used to deconflict the battlespace? I am not sure what (b)(3), (b)(6) did to deconflict the battlespace at the time of the strike. You will have to ask him. However, in any kinetic strike that is processed

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

35. What TTPs were used to obtain approvals for the enablers used in the strike? The traditional Joint Asset Allocation Meeting is chaired by SOJTF daily. This is how the approval to support an operation with enablers is granted. During the course of the operation in Kunduz, we were receiving regular enabler support.

36. What TTPs were used to obtain approval for the airstrike? Unsure, you would have to ask (b)(3), (b)(6) and the aircrew. The SOTF-A was not contacted by the AOB prior to the strike.

37. What procedures were used to identify friendly forces and non-combatants in the area? In general, we would observe through

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

38. What was the process for receiving and disseminating information on non-combatants and protected sites in the battlespace? We would pass the MGRS and description of protected sites through (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g depending on the tactical situation on the ground and what was available at the time.

39. Identify and describe all approvals received for the airstrike? Again, there was no request (b)(1)1.4a so I am unsure.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

40. What changes should be made to guidance, SOPs, unit procedures or training which could have mitigated the 3 OCT incident? I have actually thought about this one a lot since the incident. The reality is that when a unit is forced into a QRF type role, which I

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

----------END OF STATEMENT----------END OF STATEMENT----------END OF STATEMENT----------

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25th day of October, 2015 at Camp Vance, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Questions for (b)(3), (b)(6) 03 Nov '15

1. What specific concept of the operation (CONOP) was used for the 2/3 OCT? (b)(1)1.4a 09-002 // KUNDUZ CLEARING PATROL (dated 302200D*SEP15) You stated in your previous statement that "The original CONOP taking them into the city was approved at RS? That would be the 2C CONOP (b)(1)1.4a 09-001 on the 29th of Sept that they never executed due to Kunduz AF fight. The 30 September CONOP, 1C (b)(1)1.4a 09-002 was what they executed the POD of 30 Sept / 01 Oct '15. Was this a FRAGO to the 29 Sept CONOP. Did we send it forward as a FRAGO or a CONOP? It was a FRAGO to the overall CONOP (-001// a 2C CONOP approved at RS HQ) Who do you understand was the final approval authority prior to execution? SOJTF-A DCG-O, with concurrence from (b)(3), (b)(6). When did you push / send it to SOJTF and post in the 'Battle Room'? Throughout the course of the afternoon/evening, (b)(3), (b)(6) provided updates to the plan as it was developed with the Afghan leadership on the ground at (b)(1)1.4a Prior to the execution of this operation, the concept and general scheme of maneuver were relayed to the SOJTF-A CG, DCG-O (b)(3), (b)(6) via phone calls from (b)(3), (b)(6) and me. An email from (b)(3), (b)(6) was sent to the CG, DCG-O (b)(3), (b)(6) as well, but after the element had departed Camp Pamir. I am not sure when the graphic was posted in the battle room. Just to be clear, this FRAGO was communicated and approved through the proper channel. There should have been no confusion as to who was doing the operation and what they were doing.

   (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

   operational need and clear direction from higher (SOJTF-A and RS) was that they execute the operation when they did.
2. Was appropriate legal review done for the CONOP, 1C (b)(3), (b)(6) 09-002? Yes. If so, at what level? The (b)(3), (b)(6) reviewed the concept, scheme of maneuver, and identified objectives for the FRAGO and approved. While I cannot speak for SOJTF-A, it was our understanding that their JAGs were involved in this as well.
3. Who did you, your (b)(3), (b)(6) and other staff speak to at SOJTF reference the 1C (b)(3), (b)(6) 09-002 CONOP? Did they understand execution on the POD 30 Sept '15? This was referenced in my response to question #1, but to emphasize, yes, they understood the execution on POD 30 SEP 15.
4. What TTPs were used to obtain approvals for the enablers used in the strike? The SOTF-A, and therefore AOB-N and the ODAs participating in operation in Kunduz, received an allocation of CAS and ISR platforms to support this theater priority mission. There was constant coverage throughout the course of operations. Following the initial push into the city on POD 30 SEP 15, the Coalition element remained in the PGOV Compound. There were no additional FRAGOs submitted until they finally returned to (b)(1)1.4a on the evening of 04 OCT 15. In addition to what was provided, the nightly JAAM served as a venue for us to request assets for what we understood the Afghan plan to be for that evening (traditionally this is where we deconflict assets with (b)(1)1.4a and CJSOAC). I do not think that the JAAM had anything to do with enabler

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support for this operation – or any in Kunduz for that matter – as we were allocated a standard (b)(1)1.4a of assets from SOJTF-A and RS daily/nightly.

5. What tactics, techniques and procedures were used to de-conflict the battlespace? The same

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

6. What TTPs were used to obtain approval for the airstrike? If you are referring to the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, there was no approval requested through the (b)(3), (b)(6)
7. What procedures were used to identify friendly forces and non-combatants in the area? Again, if you are referring to the strike on the MSF Trauma Center, I cannot speak to that; (b)(6) (b)(6) would have to provide clarity.
8. What was the process for receiving and disseminating information on non-combatants and protected sites in the battlespace? We would immediately plot on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) and typically drop the information in the battle room (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. We would then have to call (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) to relay the locations (depending on what was available at the time due to radio traff (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g d batteries on radios or phones).
9. Does the OPCEN mirror the check of all targets as the ODAs/AOB are conducting their missions? I am not exactly sure on what you are asking with this question, but I will answer to what I understand is being asked. If the tactical situation on the ground permits and th (b)(3), (b)(6) this case (b)(3), (b)(6) is able to communicate what he is going to strike in self-defense situations prior to the engagement, then we will cross-reference with our COP, intelligence picture and what SA we are provided throug (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g d intervene if we identify something contrary to what he is seeing on the battlefield at the time. For example, if we could see an ASSF/ANDSF unit maneuvering on the flank of an enemy formation attacking the (b)(1)1.4a at the PGOV Compound, we would ensure that – at a minimum – he knew where they were prior to the strike to avoid fratricide.
10. Did you know the Trauma Center was there before the night of 2/3 October '15? Yes. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) provided me the list of grids to their 4x locations throughout Kunduz City. I instructed the (b)(3), (b)(6) to make sure he communicated it to (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and the men on the ground. He reported back that he talked with (b)(3), (b)(6) and he had the grids. It was not until after the strike under investigation, that we figured out that he asked (b)(3), (b)(6) "if he received the grids" and he answered "yes." The issue, as we know it now, is that he was not specific in his question and (b)(3), (b)(6) understood the "grids" as a separate set of grids received throughout the day for something else. Additionally, when the night (b)(3), (b)(6) came on shift around midnight, I asked him to make sure that they had the grids. He referenced the print out of the grids provided by MSF and called out to (b)(1)1.4a at the PGOV Compound and spoke to someone (he does not recall who), got a read-back on the grids, and relayed that they had received them. In addition to the phone call, he posted a

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message (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g again called out to confirm receipt. He was told (again by who, he cannot recall) that they did.

11. What was your role as (b)(3), (b)(6) during the engagement POD 2/3 October '15? My role that night was the same as any other night. I, along with my (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) While most of this is actually done by the personnel in the JOC, I have to track it all and ensure the Commander and SOJTF-A (b)(3), (b)(6) are tracking.
12. When did you know that the target / objective was a hospital? Just to clarify, the MSF Trauma Center was never a target / objective of any operation. The only hospital that was ever the objective of an operation in Kunduz was the original 2C approved by RS HQ from 29 SEP 2015. I will attempt to answer the question I think you are asking ('when did you know that the MSF Trauma Center was struck that night?'). (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the JOC and asked the JOC (b)(3), (b)(6) if we were striking something because he received a call from the MSF Director that the Trauma Center was being attacked. At that point, (b)(3), (b)(6) (who sit directly behind the Battle Captain in the JOC) stood up and asked what he was talking about. (b)(3), (b)(6) explained that he just received the call from the MSF Country Director, so we inquired if there was a strike going on immediately. That is when (b)(3), (b)(6) told us that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was engaging. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g At this point, we identified that there was a strike on the Trauma Center. What we were unable to immediately understand is why was it being engaged? For this reason we did not immediately call for the cease fire; immediately calling for a cease fire for a situation we have no SA on, could put the ground force at risk. At this point, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) and reported "good effects on target." He was then instructed to come up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and was informed that the MSF Trauma Center was struck and on fire. At this point, the cease fire was given.
13. Do you change the OPCEN procedures when Teams or the AOB have inoperable SA equipment (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g? Yes, procedures are modified but only to the extent that we need to know more information to mitigate any potential issues that may arise. For example, if no one is able to clearly communicate or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g we will need a very clear description of what is happening to approve strikes or facilitate any kind of support to the unit on the ground. If the strike under investigation was not conducted in self-defense, and was requested through normal channels, it would have been identified as the MSF Hospital and the procedures for approval would be processed through SOJTF-A and RS.
14. What other operations were ongoing during the POD of 2/3 October '15? AOB-C was executing (b)(1)1.4a

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UZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1. Y _____ . are ordered not to discuss your statements mad ation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 OCT 15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23rd day of Oct, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Camp Vance, Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan	20151025	1800	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

The answers to the questions below are the best of my knowledge based on my perspective as the (b)(3), (b)(6) and recollection of the events.

1. What are the facts and circumstances surrounding the 03 OCT airstrike? I think it is important to understand the context in which the Special Forces Soldiers were sent to Kunduz to conduct operations. On 28 OCT at approximately 1800D*, SOTF-A conducted a conditions check VTC with SOJTF for a multi-pillared partnered operation in (b)(1)1.4a to be executed that period of darkness (POD). During the VTC at approximately 1830D*, the SOJTF DCG-O (BG Bauernfeind) received a phone call, and subsequently informed SOTF that the operation in (b)(1)1.4a was cancelled. The DCG-O also informed the SOTF that the (b)(6), asked for all U.S. assets be diverted to Kunduz City because it was being overrun by insurgents. When the decision was made to cancel the (b)(1)1.4a operation and divert all assets to Kunduz, the entire ground force was already on helicopters flying to the forward staging base en route to (b)(1)1.4a and had to be turned around. SOTF then began planning to send reinforcements to (b)(1)1.4a, located at the Kunduz Airfield to the SE of the city. Through coordinations with CJSOAC, ODA (b)(1)1.4a and elements of ODA (b)(1)1.4a arrived at 290550D*SEP15 at (b)(1)1.4a to provide additional support to ODA (b)(1)1.4a stationed at (b)(1)1.4a. Reporting from Kunduz City indicated all GIRoA infrastructure and MOD/MOI check points had been either abandoned or overrun, and there was an impending attack on the Kunduz Airfield, which is the life line for ODA (b)(1)1.4a stationed at (b)(1)1.4a. The situation in Kunduz had deteriorated to the point that ODA (b)(1)1.4a was preparing to secure a portion of the airfield to facilitate the potential extraction of designated personnel if needed. By the time the additional USSF personnel arrived, hundreds of Afghans from Kunduz City had taken refuge on the airfield. At the time there was no screening involved with allowing personnel onto the airfield thus creating a significant security concern for the USSF located at (b)(1)1.4a, adjacent to the airfield.

USSF elements immediately began planning with the (b)(1)1.4d located at the Kunduz Airfield. The USSF and (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d developed a plan to secure the Kunduz Hospital (not the MSF Truama Center) on the west side of the city with USSF and Afghan Special Security Forces (ASSF) securing a foothold and passing the Afghan National Defense Security Forces (ANDSF) through to the city center. On the evening of 29OCT, the combined USSF and ASSF force intiated movement from (b)(1)1.4a yet never made it off the airfield. While the patrol was moving across the airfield to exit the outer perimeter to begin the operation, the airfield came under direct and indirect fire. The USSF and ASSF elements immediately moved to defensive positions to repel the attack. These elements continued to exchange fire with the enemy throughout POD 29/30. During this fight on POD 29/30 at the airfield, SOTF conducted four air to ground (ATG) engagements in defense of the ground force under ROE (b)(1)1.4a approved by SOJTF resulting in 26x EKIA. SOTF also conducted an ATG engagement earlier on the 29th destroying a tank that had been captured by the INS. Eventually on the 30th, the USSF and ASSF elements were relieved from their blocking positions by ANDSF elements, and began planning again to seize a foothold in the city. During the planning process, (b)(3), (b)(6) participated in a VTC with GEN

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____"

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Campbell regarding the plan to retake the city of Kunduz. During this VTC (b)(3), (b)(6) was told to get into the city soon and begin conducting operations. The USSF and ASSF elements quickly created a plan to clear the PSU, NDS, and PGOV compounds as they cleared the main eastern route into the city.

The combined element initiated this operation on the evening of the 30th, and from the time they left the airfield, they were constantly engaged with the enemy. As they cleared north along the route, they cleared the PSU HQ and NDS compounds as they reached them. This element conducted at least 5 ATG engagements resulting in at least 31x EKIA as they pushed into the city and into the PGOV compound. Once this element arrived at the PGOV compound, they cleared the structure and used it to create a foothold in the city. For the next 48 hours, the elements at the PGOV compound were engaged with the enemy so close that USSF element were using grenades to defend themselves. I can personally say that every time I spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) on the phone (approximately 6-7 times) during this period I heard constant gun fire and on a few occasions heard incoming mortars. We also conducted emergency resupplies to the elements as the PGOV compound because they assessed that if they left, the city would fall into the hands of the enemy again. While USSF elements were at the PGOV compound, the estimated EKIA from both ATG engagements and engagements from the ground forces is estimated at approximately (b)(1)1.4 To highlight the close proximity of the fight, at 021546D*OCT, the ground forces conducted an ATG engagement on two compounds approximately 240m from the PGOV compound. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a INS from an elevated position in these compounds shot RPGs and machine guns down into the PGOV compound. Had (b)(3), (b)(6) not made the quick decision to conduct an ATG engagement on these buildings, I believe with relative certainty that US Soldiers would have died that day in the PGOV compound from these INS. At the time of the airstrike on 03 OCT, the USSF elements were waiting on a much needed resupply of ammunition (as a result of the constant fighting over three days), food, and batteries in order to continue to fight and hold their position in the city to meet the intent of the senior military leaders in Afghanistan.

2. Who requested and approved the AC-130? The AC-130 was requested from the SOTF to support the ground forces at the Kunduz PGOV compound who had been fighting in close proximity almost continuously since they arrived at the compound. Every night there was the JAAM to determine what assets will support the USSF elements defending the PGOV compound.

3. What processes were used to request the AC-130 and other combat enablers? REF question #2.

4. What munitions were fired? During the airstrike on 03 OCT, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) munitions.

5. What units were involved in the 02 OCT mission to secure the NDS compound? The (b)(1)1.4d conducted the operation as a partner force of AOB (b)(1)1.4a

6. What specific concept of the operations was used for the 2/3 OCT mission? There was not a specific CONOP used for the mission on 2/3 OCT because AOB (b)(1)1.4a was still operating under the CONOP submitted on 29 OCT that allowed the AOB (-) to seize a foothold in the city. Everyday after the AOB (-) seized the foothold in the PGOV compound, they continued to engage and fight the enemy in close proximity and conduct operations under the authority of the original CONOP.

7. Who was involved in writing and approving the CONOP, to include legal review? The only CONOP that existed was the CONOP that was submitted on 29 OCT for the AOB (-) to seize a foothold in the city. This CONOP was written by the AOB (-), approved by SOTF-A and SOJTF/RS, and the requisite legal reviews occurred at both levels.

8. What was the task/purpose of the 02 OCT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) mission when launched? From the SOTF JOC perspective, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was tasked to support the AOB (-) who had been in a constant fight with the enemy since their initial push into the city on POD 30/01.

9. Did the mission change once on station? The mission for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) did not change once (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was on station. The task remained to support the AOB (-) with fire support as directed by the JTAC. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) began conducting engagements in the city on the morning of 30 SEP, and conducted at least nine engagements in the city in support of the AOB (-) prior to the strike on 03 OCT.

10. Was the MSF Trauma Center on the 02 OCT NSL, and if so, was it considered in the CONOP process? I am unaware of a 02 OCT NSL. The MSF Trauma Center location was known in the SOTF-A JOC, and was passed twice to the (b)(3), (b)(6) once at 011857D*OCT15 and again at 021846D*OCT15) in the form of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a by the (b)(3), (b)(6) SOTF-A did not have the locations of the MSF facilities at the time of the CONOP writing or approval.

INITIALS OF (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 28 APD LC v1.01ES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

11. Is the NSL cross checked during CONOP development or during mission execution? SOTF-A received the NSL from SOJTF on 03 OCT, so prior to receiving the NSL, CONOPs were not cross checked. SOTF-A has now distributed the NSL to the lowest levels and incorporated the NSL into all CONOPs. During mission execution, the SOTF will monitor the situation on the ground, yet will only intervene if absolutely necessary and the SOTF has information and situational awareness that the ground forces do not have. During POD 02/03, the SOTF's communications systems (b)(1)1.4g the SOTF's situational awareness of the actions by the ground force (REF. Air to Ground Communication in Kunduz on POD 02/02 OCT 15 slide).

12. Who all was involved in the CONOP development and approval for the 02 OCT mission? The only CONOP that existed was the CONOP that was submitted on 29 OCT for the AOB (-) to seize a foothold in the city. This CONOP was written by the AOB (-), approved by (b)(3), (b)(6) and the requisite legal reviews occurred at both levels.

13. Was the appropriate legal review done for the CONOP? Yes

14. What circumstances surround the decision to authorize pre-planned CAS for the operation? There were no pre-planned CAS engagements in the city. All strikes were either conducted in self-defense by the ground forces or conducted by SOTF-A in defense of USSF under ROE (b)(1)1.4 and approved by SOJTF/RS.

15. Were there any special instructions issued by the chain of command in connection with the approval for CAS support? There was no need for special instructions to be issued by the chain of command because this operation was within the scope of capabilities for an AOB, and the AOB had been in a defensive posture in the PGOV compound for 3 days.

16. Do any graphics at any HQ in the chain of command identify the MSF Trauma Center? REF question #10.

(b)(1)1.4c

18. Were you aware of the presence of the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz? Yes. I received a memorandum from the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) that stated the location of four MSF facilities in Kunduz City.

19. Were you aware of any other targets in the Kunduz area on the NSL? I did not have the NSL at that time. I did know of the four MSF facilities and do understand that certain buildings have protected status from strikes even if I did not have the NSL.

20. What graphical products did you produce or understand to be used during the operation? I can not speak to what was used by the ground forces during this strike. In the JOC we maintain a common operating picture using (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g regarding any given operation.

21. Was the MSF Trauma Center mark as a "no-strike" target on any CONOP, AOB-N or AC-130 graphic, guidance system or documents? Again, the CONOP was submitted before the MSF facilities had been identified, and SOTF-A sent (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to the (b)(3), (b)(6) (REF question #10).

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4d

INITIALS OF PERS (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

25. What was the basis for the use of force against the MSF Trauma Center? I can not comment on the actions of the ground force commander.

26. What specific operational authorities and rules of engagement were used for the strike? I can not comment on the actions of the ground force commander.

27. At what point did US Forces realize the strike location was a hospital? I can only speak as to when I knew the strike location was the MSF Trauma Center. Due to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

28. What actions were taken once US Forces realized the strike location was a hospital? My initial reaction was to do nothing about the strike because I did not know the situation on the ground that warranted the strike to be conducted, and as the (b)(3), (b)(6) I will always give the (b)(3), (b)(6) the benefit of the doubt when conducting engagements in self-defense. It is essential to the safety of the Soldiers within the SOTF that I trust their abilities to make tactical decisions, and do not interfere while they are conducting air-to-ground (ATG) engagements in self-defense. Once (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) checked in on the radio, he was asked to call the SOTF JOC on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Once (b)(3), (b)(6) called the JOC, I informed him that the location of the airstrike was the MSF Trauma Center, and I believed at that time he put (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) in a "check fire".

29. Was a check fire or cease fire call ever made? This will have to be confirmed with the AC-130 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

30. What munitions were employed by the AC-130? REF question #4

31. How was the target positively identified? I do not have knowledge of the answer to this question.

32. What was the official or unofficial collateral damage estimate? I do not have knowledge of the answer to this question.

33. What ROE and Tactical Guidance were used for the strike? Without being on the ground with the (b)(3), (b)(6) or being privy to the communications to the aircraft, I can not answer this question.

34. What tactics, techniques and procedures (TTP) were used to deconflict the battlespace? Without being on the ground with the (b)(3), (b)(6) or being privy to the communications to the aircraft, I can not answer this question.

INITIALS OF PERSON (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 4 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2 APD LC v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Camp Vance, AFG DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

35. What TTPs were used to obtain approvals for the enablers used in the strike? The enablers were requested through SOJTF.

36. What TTPs were used to obtain approval for the airstrike? There was no approval process for these strikes because when ATG engagements are conducted by the (b)(3), (b)(6) in self-defense, the (b)(3), (b)(6)

37. What procedures were used to identify friendly forces and non-combatants in the area? This question can only be answered by the (b)(3), (b)(6)

38. What was the process for receiving and disseminating information on non-combatants and protected sites in the battlespace? Information is passed from the (b)(3), (b)(6) to the ground force using the radio (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

39. Identify and describe all approvals received for the airstrike? The AOB (-) was directed and approved by SOJTF and COMRS to conduct operations in the city of Kunduz to repel the INS attacks and seizing of the city. During the initial push into the city and for days leading up to the strike on 03 OCT, the AOB (-) conducted numerous strikes in self-defense without the requirement to seek approval in order to save American and partner force lives. Again, when strikes are conducted in self-defense by the ground force, the (b)(3), (b)(6) During this same period, SOTF conducted numerous strikes as well in defense of the ground forces under ROE (b)(1)1.4a and with the approval of (b)(3), (b)(6) Throughout the constant fighting in the city leading up to this airstrike, when strike were not in self-defense, all airstrikes were reported to and approved by (b)(3), (b)(6)

40. What changes should be made to guidance, SOPs, unit procedures or training which could have mitigated the 03 OCT incident? This is not a simple question to answer because the implication is that there was a breakdown or an issue with the guidance, SOPs, unit procedures or training. There is a reason that Special Forces elements were asked to conduct this mission. The experience, maturity, professionalism, and ability to operate in the most extreme and austere environments is why they were chosen. There is risk that commanders have to accept when placing American Soldiers in extremis situations, and when GEN Campbell told (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to take his forces and seize a foothold in a city that had been seized by an estimated (b)(1)1.4a INS, there was risk associated with this extremely dangerous mission asked of these SF Soldiers. To highlight the risk, from the moment the USSF convoy departed the airfield, they were in a constant firefight for over 2 days. Every time I spoke with (b)(3), (b)(6) (approximately 6 times from 01 OCT – 03 OCT), I heard constant gun fire and explosions in the background. I believe that any changes/restriction to guidance, SOPs, or unit procedures as a result of the airstrike would hinder the ground forces' ability to act in their own self-defense.

AFFIDAVIT

I (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 5. I FULLY UN IRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECT OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FRE WARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL IN

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25 day of Oct, 2015 at Camp Vance, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Comm

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSO (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NO

APD LC v1.01ES

Approved Release

1. You, _____ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 OCT 15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of OCT 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

Signatu (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VANCE	20151024	2000	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 28 September 2015, the TB launched a coordinated attack on Kunduz City. During the siege, the (b)(3), (b)(6) section began

(b)(1)1.4c

corroborated the insurgent's seizure of key infrastructure. From an analytical standpoint, the insurgency clearly controlled the immediate area within a 600m radius of the NDS Compound and Hospital.

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF _____ PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

---------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

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INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD LC v1.01ES

STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

----------NOTHING FOLLOWS----------

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24 day of OCTOBER, 2015 at CAMP VANCE

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

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STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

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(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Art 136, UCMJ

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE ____ OF ____ PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

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DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 oct 2015

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

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I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of October, 2015.

S (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CJSOAC-A HQ, Bagram, Afghanistan	20151023	1718	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

-Approx (b)(1)1.4a showed up to work at my usual time.
(b)(1)1.4a UB was relatively standard.
-Approx 1320: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) he asked when (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) was supposed to get on station and I replied with "(b)(1)1.4a. This vul window was a contract I made with SOJTF after the first night in KONDUZ in order to get some predictability to the planning cycle.
I asked for updated FF grids and a situation update and got no response (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
-Approx (b)(1)1.4a was told to alert launch (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) to Konduz. I immediately called the planners at (b)(3), (b)(6) and told them to gather the crew and to get in the air as soon as possible.
Shortly after this I again asked my SOTF counterpart if he had any updates on the situation in Konduz. I asked specifically "any grids or information that my guys need to have? or you want me to tell them to come up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g so you can update them directly?" SOTFs response was that "all info we will (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) when able."
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g At this point, the SOTF-ITC emailed me the ITC development (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Konduz. I forwarded this to the (b)(3), (b)(6) and the (b)(3), (b)(6) bistro box, the crew was already headed out to the aircraft.
At this point, I coordinated with CJSOAC-A Airspace to contact tower to give (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g priority for takeoff, as well as coordinated (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) altitude block of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
Shortly after this I got (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g contact with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) and was having a discussion with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
After this, I got word over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) reported their takeoff.
started their rendezvous with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CJSOAC-A HQ DATED 20151023

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) and returned with nothing significant to report.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) reported to me over CJSOAC-A (b)(1)1.4a, (b) that they were going hot, no other amplifying information was provided.

I overheard being passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) grids for the engagement, however I was unable to fully hear what the grids were.

reported to me they were cold.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) reported going hot again.

reported going cold.

Shortly after this, they reported all of the engagement details that was posted in the initial 5Ws report with the exception of the EKIA count being over 50 compared to the 9 initial I reported from overhearing that conversation between (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) I asked (b)(1)1.4a, (b) to confirm they said 50 EKIA several times and asked them to verify how they got that count. They explained the large number of people that flowed into the building after it was set on fire and that they saw no one leave.

Sometime while they were on station after the engagement, we received a phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6) whose name and function I cannot remember saying that there was a CIVCAS allegation. At first we were not certain that it was for (b)(1)1.4a, (b) since there had been multiple engagements in Konduz prior to (b)(1)1.4a, (b) getting on station. He called again about an hour or so later and at that point the information he passed matched the times that (b)(1)1.4a, (b) was on station and we began collecting all of our JOC logs for the night as well as prepped the (b)(3), (b)(6) to be prepared to collect more information than just the standard post shoot information and (b)(1)1.4a, (b) reports.

The rest of the night was pretty quiet until BMNT started to approach at 0030.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) landed back at BAF.

After they landed and debriefed I started working with the (b)(3), (b)(6) to help collect all of the data that was requested of us to include accounting for where every round fired impacted. After this was complete, I went to bed.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature)

WITNESSES:

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25th day of October, 2015 at Bagram Air Field, AFG

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Article 136, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) @soc.smil.mil
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ KONDUZ DEV
Date: Friday, October 23, 2015 7:39:44 PM
Attachments: KONDUZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Sir, This was the first one I received on 1 OCT at 1427z second one to follow

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 2:27 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: ~~(S)~~ KONDUZ DEV

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~
Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

DERIVED FROM: NS FPP SCG
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF ORIGINATION
DATE OF SOURCE: 20121011

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3), (b)(6) @soc.smil.mil
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ KONDUZ DEV
Date: Friday, October 23, 2015 7:54:23 PM
Attachments: KONDUZ (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a-01 KUNDUZ CLEARING PATROL 30SEP.pdf
(b)(1)1.4a

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Sir, here is part 2, these were emailed to the crew when I received them, however due to the outlook issues we discussed earlier the crew did not receive (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g clearing patrol conop.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Friday, October 02, 2015 2:16 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ KONDUZ DEV

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Thursday, October 01, 2015 6:57 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6) @soc.smil.mil'
Subject: ~~(S)~~ KONDUZ DEV

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Approved for Release

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

v/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~
Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~
Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

DERIVED FROM: NS FPP SCG
CLASSIFIED BY: (b)(3), (b)(6)
DECLASSIFY ON: 25 YEARS FROM DATE OF ORIGINATION
DATE OF SOURCE: 20121011

CLASSIFICATION W/O ATCH: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS W/O ATCH: NONE
TERMS W/O ATCH: NONE

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~
CAVEATS: NONE
TERMS: NONE

Approved for Release

AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 OCT 15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of OCTOBER, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

23 October 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Statement from (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding 03 October Konduz airstrike

1. (~~S//NOFORN~~) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) from SOJTF, which (b)(1)1.4a Because it is not unusual to receive such a tasking, I cannot remember who specifically issued the tasking and who received it. Normally, it will be issued via a phone call from the (b)(3), (b)(6), and sometimes the DCG-O will personally give the tasking. They will typically call me or the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), and we will notify the (b)(3), (b)(6) and the AC-130U (b)(3), (b)(6) along with the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a

2. (~~S//NOFORN~~) Shortly after (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) launched, I went to the (b)(1)1.4a building for approximately the next 6 hours to conduct planning with (b)(1)1.4a for the upcoming (b)(1)1.4a operation. I returned to the (b)(3), (b)(6) around the time that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) began its kinetic engagements. From the JOC perspective, the only unusual aspect of this engagement compared to previous engagements in Afghanistan was that it was conducted in an urban environment, which occurs on a relatively rare basis.

10/23/2015

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
BAGRAM, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

ACDC 9 November 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Involvement in the Kunduz 15-6 Investigation

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) assisted the investigation team by providing his expertise and requested products only; therefore, an interview was not necessary from him.

2. The point of contact for this Memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: _____

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

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I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
KUNDUZ CITY, KUNDUZ PROVINCE	20151022	1930	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

I am currently serving as the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). On 28 September 2015 (b)(1)1.4a conducted operations to secure Kunduz Airfield that came under attack from insurgent positions. 29 September through 04 October 2015, (b)(1)1.4a conducted operations to liberate Kunduz City from insurgency control. ODA (b)(1)1.4a was conducted a convoy and a fixed security along with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4d. The convoy and the fixed positions benefited from AC-130, F-16 and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a for the 96 hours contact with the insurgency.

The convoy departed (b)(1)1.4a on the evening of 29 September 2015 without a clear guidance of task, purpose and end state of the mission from Resolute Support or SOJTF. ODA (b)(1)1.4a the led US element received steady contact from the South to the Provincial Police Headquarters (PCOP) compound from the west on route running North to South road leading to Kunduz City. The insurgency set up ambush near the Provincial Security Unit (PSU) compound west of the road leading into the city. The AC-130 engaged the ambush site, resulting in the destruction of the ambush position allowing the convoy continued north into the city. The convoy continued receiving continuousness attacks from the west. The convoy arrived in the Kunduz city center and received two IED attacks and ambushes from the East and West. The convoy halted to terminate the several ambushes with the AC-130 and organic weapons along the way to the Provincial Police Headquarters compound. Several hours into convoy contact was broken from the insurgency, ODA (b)(1)1.4a moved into the PCOP compound and developed a security plan.

Through 30 September 2015 through 3 October 2015 ODA (b)(1)1.4a took up positions on the West, Northwest and Southwest positions. The remainder of time at the PCOP compound, west positions took effective, SAF, PKM, RPG, and indirect fire from the North, South, and West. The largest amount of insurgency assaults came from the west to attempted to penetrate PCOP compound. The insurgency attempted to flank to the North to the East, derived from the West. ODA (b)(1)1.4a immobilized the insurgent movement to the North and East. ODA (b)(1)1.4a received several RPGs that impacted the HESCO barriers providing protection for the members of ODA (b)(1)1.4a

On 02 Oct was the insurgency struggled to regain control with the largest ambition to retake Kunduz City. The insurgency engaged heavy from the West to attempt to maneuver insurgency fighters around the PCOP compound. The fight from the West was so fierce that insurgency for the first time had created enough space to maneuver to the Northeast insurgency element. ODA (b)(1)1.4a successfully engaged insurgent positions to the South-West, West, and North-West. The insurgent force eventually made their way to the Northeast, and effectively engaging friendly positions from West, North, and East in the afternoon of 02 Oct 2015. The insurgency moved closer the PCOP compound from the East and West within 170 meters from the compound with SAF, PKM and highly effective RPG fire into the HESCO barriers and the structures within the compound. ODA (b)(1)1.4a maintained their positions continued engaged the insurgency forces. The enemy fortified position effectively engaged with SAF, PKM and RPG fire. Throughout the conflict, the insurgent staged from the West of the PCOP compound, and prepared all attacks on insurgent position from the West side of the city.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT CAMP VOSE DATED 20151022

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

F-16 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) was cleared to engage a fortified enemy position within 170 m from South-West guard tower. After the second (b)(1)1.4 struck the fortified position ceased all enemy fire allowed ODA (b)(1)1.4 members to hold the South-West guard tower. The East structure roof of the PCOP compound (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) plus other key members received extremely effective fire from the North-East from enemy fortified three adjoining structures. After the fortified position to the east was destroyed, (b)(1)1.4a, (b) engaged onto the enemy fortified structures, eliminating all fire from structure. After the destruction of the two East and West enemy fortified compounds the insurgency attacks decreased with sporadic attacks through the evening.

On the night of 02 October (b)(1)1.4 planned to refit and rotate with another (b)(1)1.4 company located at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 requested air support (AC-130) for their convoy to (b)(1)1.4a and on the return they planned on clearing the National Directorate of Security (NDS) compound. At 0001 03 October I went to bed with continually receiving sporadic fire. I woke up twice, once during explosions, and the second time during resupply. At 0500 I woke up and check on members of ODA (b)(1)1.4 and continued the day, checking on my guys, resupplying, and relaying information. Later in the morning we received reports, that during the night enemy Command and Control (C2) element was killed during the night engagement. USSF members moved to Provincial Governors Headquarters compound to allow ANSF occupy Provincial Police Headquarters compound. Occupying the Governors compound with little insurgent attacks USSF moved back to (b)(1)1.4a to fit for future operations.

(b)(1)1.4a departed early morning on 05 October. Once we landed we noticed what happened on the national news and the interpretation on what happened in Kunduz City.

The USSF elements executed the operation under RS ROE, and all the engagements either with organic weapons or air support were under self-defense. During the 30 September through 4 October, (b)(3), (b)(6) rotated from (b)(3), (b)(6).

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 1. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 22 day of OCTOBER, 2015 at CAMP VOSE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: _____

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

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I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AIRFIELD, AFGHANISTAN	20151025	1500	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was conducting operations in vicinity of the Provincial Police Headquarters compound in downtown Kunduz City, Kunduz Province, Afghanistan. The ODA was conducting fixed-site security along with ODA (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was responsible for securing the compound in the northwestern, western, and southwestern security towers, as well as several other western-oriented elevated sniper positions.

To alleviate personnel fatigue and supply reductions due to continuous fighting, our partner force, (b)(1)1.4d, would run daily resupplies back to (b)(1)1.4a from PHQ. On the night of 02 October, the (b)(1)1.4 came to us with a plan to conduct an enroute mission targeting enemy at the NDS Prison on the way back from (b)(1)1.4 to PHQ, with fresh personnel and a resupply of ammunition. They requested our assistance with respect to supporting them with air support should they need it.

(b)(3), (b)(6) and I would rotate (b)(3), (b)(6) responsibilities at night, generally starting somewhere between (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a There was no set schedule, so when all of us started getting tired, we'd start up the rotation, rotating every couple of hours, but that wasn't set in stone either. If one of us felt good we'd stay on shift a little longer and let everyone else rest up. On the particular night of 03OCT15, I took first shift and was not awake for the strike itself, but awoke when (b)(1)1.4 aircraft came to resupply our position from (b)(1)1.4a. It was at that time that I learned of the AC-130 engagement that had destroyed an enemy C2 position to the southwest of our compound. I was surprised to see that the (b)(1)1.4 aircraft had not taken fire on their way in, simply due to the amount of fire we had been getting--that should have been a very ripe target. I took over for (b)(3), (b)(6) after the resupply came in and, come morning, there was almost no enemy activity. (b)(1)1.4 had told us we had eliminated the enemy C2 position and that Taliban had begun to exfil the city, and by the lack of fire compared to the previous three days, that appeared to be accurate information. It was only when our team arrived back at Bagram on the morning of 05OCT that we saw the news in the chow hall--but that news did not line up at all with what we saw on the ground, so the whole Detachment was in disbelief. All of this said, I will now attempt to weave the narrative utilizing the question list as a guide, with the understanding that I can only provide limited information and atmospherics due to not being awake for the strike itself.

Products: There was one map at (b)(1)1.4a for Kunduz City, and that 1/50k was spread over the hood of the C2 truck for the entirety of the operation once at PHQ. All Detachment leadership utilized and shared that one map. The fidelity on that map was not conducive to urban operations. The Detachment had tried to print imagery prior to infiltration so each member could have imagery, but the printer was malfunctioning, and only printed large magenta blobs. The only actual imagery the Detachment had was in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) had, but by POD 2/3 OCT, the Detachments were (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g maintain radio communication. I can also say without reservation that the MSF facility was not mentioned or

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS	(b)(3), (b)(6)	ENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT O[illegible] DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE APD LC v1.01ES

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAF, AFGHANISTAN DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

or labeled on any map and/or product that was utilized in planning, and that neither myself nor any member of my Detachment were aware of the facility's location in Kunduz. I was not even aware of the existence of a comprehensive Afghan 'no-strike' list until after we returned and started seeing them as CONOP requirements.

Atmosphere leading up to the strike: Absolute chaos amidst a full-on enemy offensive dedicated to overrunning our position at the PHQ. The northwestern, western, and southwestern towers received the majority of enemy attention; it was blatantly obvious to everyone on the ground that the enemy had absolute freedom of maneuver to the west, where they would directly, effectively, and relentlessly engage us with small arms, PKM, DSHK, RPGs, mortars, and various types of IEDs. Some estimates put the total number of enemy fighters at (b)(1)1.4d would say there was definitely no fewer than (b)(1)1.4 and we were forced to kill at least half of those in self-defense over the 96 hour period from 30 September to 04 October. As an (b)(3), (b)(6) I was in a lot of effective firefights, but this was on a completely different level than even any of the experienced Special Operators on any of the Detachments had seen--particularly over such a sustained period of time. It was readily apparent that there was a level of sophistication and coordination that none of us had ever come up against, and there were numerous--now confirmed--reports of significant foreign involvement from several different countries. Tens upon tens upon tens of thousands of rounds were fired against us during our effort to re-take the city. I don't know how to better describe the atmospherics of the situation; how no one was killed, or even wounded, is an absolute miracle.

Partner Force (b)(1)1.4 absolutely requested assistance for their mission-en-route on the NDS compound that evening. We had a great relationship with them on the ground, and they would come to us with grids ten times a day asking us to check them out. These would most always be a dry hole, but we would allocate assets to them and try to confirm. On the evening of 02 October (b)(1)1.4 said with total confidence that the main enemy C2 node was located at the NDS prison to the southwest of PHQ and they would hit that target location while returning to PHQ. What communication from (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6) took place during the operation itself, I was not privy to as I was asleep during that time. But the (b)(1)1.4 would call us frequently, and they had several English speakers so it was not uncommon to talk to them directly without an interpreter.

When I realized the strike was on a trauma center: The morning of 03 October when (b)(3), (b)(6) called me to have (b)(1)1.4 go conduct BDA on the target location due to possible CIVCAS (b)(1)1.4 obliged but reported no damage to any medical facility but a completely destroyed Taliban C2 location. Later that morning (b)(1)1.4 stated that they received information that the (b)(1)1.4b who were co-located with the C2 node. This completed the question of CIVCAS in my mind, and this is why when we returned to BAF what we saw on the news was not at all congruent to what we had seen and heard on the ground.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g The officers were constantly calling partner forces before conducting air to ground engagements throughout the entirety of the operation to ascertain partner force locations. Due to the amount of fire being exchanged, and the amount of movement around the battlefield, it was an absolute necessity to ensure that friendly forces were not in the target area. Though I called several danger-close engagements, up to within 20 meters of our own position, we were extremely careful while clearing areas where our partner forces may have projected into--and pulling them back if required to be safe. But, it was extremely difficult to establish their exact location at any given time.

Question 49: What changes should be made to guidance, SOPs, unit procedures, or training which could have mitigated the 03OCT incident?

I'd like to make this statement in order to provide some color and context to a very dynamic situation, with the sincere hope that it be of value for the purposes of highlighting the chaos of the situation, and the dire need for changes in the way that we choose to conduct business moving forward.

The operation to liberate Kunduz was a unique opportunity whose strategic scale, political implications, and tactical danger was unrivaled in recent past. The decision was rightly made to utilize Green Berets to accomplish the task. The men got it done-- (b)(6) got it done--and they were true professionals every step of the way, unfettered in their loyalty and sense of duty to save their own country from the brink of embarrassment and of political and military failure. I was fortunate and proud to be part of such an operation.

Though not unsolicited, this portion of my statement will not be popular. However, these words may well be the greatest

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMEN (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAF, AFGHANISTAN DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

contribution of my career for one simple reason: the words I speak are the truth. And decision-makers can make good decisions from the truth. Three enemies of the Kunduz operation unfortunately remain wholly intact and are recognizable by their lingering stench. Two enemies must be identified as 'moral cowardice' and 'profound lack of strategy'. There is a third lingering enemy, but it can remain hidden under the rock of professional courtesy.

Moral Cowardice

When an ODA's mission runs headlong into national strategy, and the Detachment asks for guidance on the level of commitment and receives nothing back over a 96 hour period, that's an abject failure of leadership. Inaction or indecision does, however, enable convenient political expedience, where one can reap the rewards of success without facing the responsibility and consequence of failure. Without commitment to a particular course of action or strategy chosen by a subordinate, a leader can smile for the camera while handing out an award, or sidestep the bailiff when the gavel drops on the judge's bench. No fewer than three times did (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) call and ask for the level of commitment from SOTF, who called SOJTF, who called COM-RS. Sadly, the only sounds audible were the sounds of crickets in the PHQ center square, though those were hard to hear over the gunfire. 'How far do you want to go?' is not a proper response to 'How far do you want us to go?'. It's not a strategy, and in fact, it's a recipe for disaster in that kinetic of an environment. I learned a great lesson from the Detachment Commander of ODA (b)(1)1.4a that brought (b)(1)1.4a into country during the initial invasion of 2001, and that was to never let your men leave the wire without a task, purpose, and end-state. How have we as a force, as a group of officers, become so lost from the good lessons that our mentors taught us? I will tell you how. It is a decrepit state that grows out of the expansion of moral cowardice, careerism, and compromise devoid of principle, exchanged for cheap personal gain. We owe the man on the ground more than that, because for him, the decisions that he makes hopefully lands him somewhere between the judge's gavel and the enemy's bullet. However, the decisions that he makes off of the indecision of those above him most certainly leads to no middle ground.

Profound Lack of Strategy

The enemy operates with impunity throughout the country due to our relentless commitment to avoid principled strategy and decision making processes. Do we really think that we can retrograde to super-FOBs and maintain security while the balance sheet of Afghanistan glows red and Pakistan and ISK are coming across the border--flying across the border--with suitcases full of cash, influence, and promises that are backed by action? There is a fine line between not conducting operations to keep people out of harm's way, and not conducting operations in such a fashion that it actually increases overall risk to force and risk to mission. The former, though wonderfully appealing, inevitably invites the latter's cold grasp of failure. Decisive strategy is costly, but would alleviate the recurrence of Kunduz in the future. Unfortunately for the man on the ground and his family back home, decisive strategy must be planned and executed outside of the chains of moral cowardice.

If someone must be held accountable, let it not be the man who was ordered to sky-dive without being given a parachute.

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 25th day of October, 2015 at Camp Vox, BAF, Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD LC v1.01ES

HEADQUARTERS
NATO SPECIAL OPERATIONS COMPONENT COMMAND-AFGHANISTAN
SPECIAL OPERATIONS JOINT TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09354

NSOCC-A/SOJTF-A-DCG-O 26 October 2015

MEMORANDUM FOR Investigating Officer

SUBJECT: Kunduz Investigation

1. In answering these questions, I reviewed my email trails and talked with certain members of the staff to ensure the answers provided were as comprehensive and informative as possible.

2. **Prior to the Taliban attack (27 Sept), what was NSOCC-A's assessment of the security situation in Kunduz?**

   a. We were tracking a deteriorating situation in Kunduz, which included indications of threats against ANSF and ANP in the area. However, there were no major indicators to highlight the scope of the Taliban's planned offensive into the city.

3. **Based on the perceived threat, what actions were taken, orders given?**

   a. We submitted a request for in (b)(1)1.4a for ANDSF and ANP in Kunduz on 27 September 2015 citing the threats we were tracking. The request was denied. We also shifted focus from an operation planned in the south and moved an AOB and ODAs to (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Various ANSDF command elements and units also moved to (b)(1)1.4a

4. **Were there any meetings / VTC's conducted that discussed the way forward with RS HQ or subordinate commands?**

   a. I gave guidance to our team (in the same VTC where we cancelled the operation in the south), but am not aware of any other meetings conducted. I was informed that COMRS held a SVTC with senior Afghan leaders and ANDSF commanders in order to understand what the Afghan's plans were to handle this situation. I understand that (b)(3), (b)(6) was present.

5. **Were there any changes / additions to the COM RS tactical guidance, ROE or other formal/official SOPs?**

   a. To my knowledge, there were no changes or additions to the COMRS tactical guidance, ROE, or other formal/official SOPs. The last tactical guidance change was the 9 Sep 15 change to the RS tactical guidance. No additional changes were made to the RS tactical guidance during the Kunduz operation to my knowledge.

6. **Did NSOCC-A submit a CONOP for the Kunduz mission to RS HQ and was that CONOP briefed to RS Senior leadership / approved?**

   a. The CONOP to begin securing the city and retaking multiple governmental buildings taken by the Taliban was staffed and approved by our CG and forwarded to HQRS. My recollection is we received guidance from RS indicating the operation would be conducted under OFS.

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7. **Was NSOCC-A leadership informed of the planned (b)(1)1.4 operation, with AOB-N support mission, to secure a NDS Facility on the POD 2-3 Oct? If so what level of CONOP was submitted or should have been submitted and what was the approving HQ?**

   a. Yes, we were aware of the potential for this operation. No additional CONOP was submitted as it fell within the scope of the existing CONOP.

8. **Did NSOCC-A receive the 29 SEP MSF message indicating the location of their facilities?**

   a. I did not personally see the message but understand that our J2 section did receive and ensured the grids were input into the appropriate systems for tracking.

   b. **Was the message or information distributed to subordinate units (SOTF-A, CJSOAC)?**

      i. I do not know of any separate distribution, but once the data was entered, it would have been available to our subordinate units.

   c. **What is the process for de-conflicting targets and locations on the No Strike List?**

      i. Deconfliction occurs at multiple levels, through RS, the TAACs, ANDSF and the NMCC. The NSL is linked to our fires processing, and NSL facilities are easily discernable within the area of a deliberate strike target.

   d. **Are NGO locations known?**

      i. NGO locations would be known if entered into the NSL or (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g or were separately transmitted for situational awareness.

9. **Determine whether the (b)(3), (b)(6) were aware or should have been aware that the facility was the MSF hospital prior to the strike on 3 October 2015.**

   a. **Do you track NGO locations?**

      i. The only other way possible to track a NGO location is if it has been entered on the NSL or provided by some other means.

   b. **Were you aware of the MSF location?**

      i. Yes, the MSF Hospital was identified on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

   c. **Did you think AOB and AC knew of the MSF location?**

      i. I do not know whether the AOB or AC knew the location.

   d. **Were there any discussions of dropping buildings?**

      i. I am aware that there was some discussion regarding a deliberate strike on the NDS facility if determined that the HVIs were present and associated tactical guidance could be met. I do not know whether the GFC or AC were aware of that discussion.

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10. Identify whether the hospital was marked as a no-strike facility within the CONOP or other guidance provided to the (b)(3), (b)(6) and if so how, e.g. in what maps, guidance systems, or documents – digital or otherwise. If NSOCC-A knew about the MSF hospital, how was that communicated and was it on ops graphics, etc? SOP? How did you confirm SOTF / CJSOAC received it?

a. The MSF was not identified as a NSF in the CONOP. I did not personally confirm whether subordinate HQs received the MSF grids, but as described above, my understanding is that the information was available to SOTF-A and CJSOAC-A via previously discussed databases and overlays.

11. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

12. Identify / describe the facts and circumstances surrounding the 2/3 Oct (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b) airstrike: Coalition units/ Afghan units.

a. The AOB was located at the PGOV compound with some ANDSF partners. The (b)(1)1.4d conducted a clearing operation focused on the NDS facility. I do not have sufficient details regarding the strike to describe the facts and circumstances adequately.

13. Aircraft and munitions (# / type)

a. CONOP development and approval details

i. The CONOP was developed by SOTF and approved by (b)(3), (b)(6)

b. Strike approval

i. My understanding is the (b)(3), (b)(6) requested and approved the strike.

c. Over watch

i. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) was in the area but tasked against a separate objective.

14. Identify and explain the process (es) and personnel who were involved in requesting and approving the combat enablers that were involved in the airstrike.

a. AC-130 support was included in the original CONOP. The AC-130 would have been allocated during the nightly JAAM on 2 Oct and approved by our (b)(3), (b)(6)

b. Task/ purpose of AC-130

i. The task/purpose for the AC-130 on 2-3 Oct would have been standard for this type of operation - (b)(1)1.4a.

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15. Describe the situation at the hospital as observed by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1) and radion traffic.

a. Did you monitor the situation real-time? Did you have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g of the TAI? What did you see or hear?

i. I did not have access to the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4 and did not monitor the situation real-time.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

16. Was a higher headquarters unit or operations center able to monitor the strike in real time?

a. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

17. Specifically identify the munitions utilized by the AC-130 aircraft during the strike on the MSF facility, and the targeting methodology applied.

a. Based on the limited reporting I have seen – (b)(1)1.4a

b. What specific guidance / restrictions for weapons employment were given in this CONOP?

i. The Concept of Fires, included in the CONOP, provides the tasks and any restrictions.

18. What was the objective of the fires?

a. Who approved strike on the building?

i. The (b)(3), (b) directed and approved the strike.

b. Did ROE/tactical guidance / Command directives / SOP enable sound GFC intent?

i. The application of the ROEs (OFS and RS) and the Tactical Guidance guide our operators but are overly complicated, especially in a long-duration, ongoing firefight. We hold our personnel to a high standard, and train them frequently, but we can develop clearer guidance.

19. What is the system used for the common operating picture for NSOCC-A, SOTF-A, AOB-N and assigned SFODA? How is (b)(1)1.4a, (b) used and which command is responsible for maintaining accuracy in the system?

a. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

20. How does the command battle track ongoing operations to include pre-planned fires on targets?

a. We utilize execution checklists, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and reporting to battle track operations. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g All deliberate fires ensure the five pillars

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((b)(1)1.4a , battlefield deconfliction and no-strike lists are considered and adhered.

21. Describe the conditions surrounding the alert launch of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) on 2 October.

a. The AC-130 was launched approximately 1 hour early due to on-station CAS assets having limited remaining munitions. (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a

22.

23.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

24.

25.

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26. (b)(1)1.4a

27. The point of contact for this memorandum is the undersigned at SVOIP (b)(6) or SIPR (b)(3), (b)(6) @socom.smil.mil.

TONY D. BAUERNFEIND
Brigadier General, USAF
Deputy Commanding General, Operations

Approved for release

AND [redacted] GHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1. You, _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 Oct 2015

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP ALPHA, BAGRAM AB, AFGHANISTAN	20151026	2000	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3) -AFGHANISTAN

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. The following is my involvement to the events occurring on 02 October 2015.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

4. I am the POC for this matter and can be reached at (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(6) @soc.smil.mil./NOTHING FOLLOWS/

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT ____ DATED ____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 2000 DATED 20151026

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

/NOTHING FOLLOWS/

Approved for Release

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE OR UNLAWFUL INTIMIDATION.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26th day of OCTOBER, 2015 at BAGRAM AIR FIELD, AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) , are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 Oct 15

(b)(3), (b)(6)

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23rd day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6) _____ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Bagram AB, Afghanistan	20151023	1347 Z	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3) Bagram

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Ref Q1: What were the facts and circumstances surrounding the 3 OCT airstrike? Please see attachment 1.

Q2: My understanding is SOJTF-A HQ directed/approved the AC-130 launch.

Q3: My understanding is SOJTF-A HQ used a phone call to direct the AC-130 launch.

Q4: (b)(1)1.4a

Q5: As far as I'm aware, there was no CONOP for 2/3 Oct. The only CONOP for Konduz I know of was for 29 Sep.

Q6: SOTF-A wrote the 29 Oct CONOP (I'm assuming), NSOCC-A approved it, don't know who did the legal review.

Q7: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) was launched 2 Oct to provide Close Air Support for U.S./Coalition/Partnered forces in Konduz ISO AIR TIC 001.

Q8: The mission remained Close Air Support through out the night.

Q9: CJSOAC used (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g to display the NSL, and I do know the Trauma Center was not in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g the evening of 2 Oct. I don't know if it was considered in the CONOP, but I know it wasn't displayed in the CONOP graphics on 29 Sep.

Q10: I don't know if other components cross-check CONOPs with the NSL during CONOP development. However, during mission execution, CJSOAC crews depend on products that are pulled from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Prior to 2 Oct, those products were not cross-checked with the raw NSL database, under the assumption that (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was dependable in terms of data being current. Additionally, prior to 2 Oct CJSOAC depended on ground components for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. Those were also not cross-checked against raw information from the NSL database. Post 2 Oct, CJSOAC now builds our own (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and uses the raw NSL database to build our products. That usually happens before the crews launch, but may also happen after they're airborne. In those cases, we pass the products with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and if (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g is unavailable we use voice communications to pass cross-checked information verbally.

Q11: It's my understanding there was no CONOP for 2 Oct mission.

Q12: It's my understanding there was no CONOP for 2 Oct mission.

Q13: First, a decision by the ground force that CAS is required. Second, a formal request for CAS. Third, CJSOAC's Joint Air Allocation process.

Q14: Not to my knowledge.

Q15: Yes, SOTF-A's (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from 1 & 2 Oct; however those files did not upload due to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. My understanding is that SOJTF HQ had access to the NSL with the MSF Trauma Center listed.

Q16: My understanding is that SOTF-A HQ knew the structure hit was the MSF Trauma Center.

Q17: I don't know the answer to this question.

Q18: I have seen (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g showing the Trauma Center, activity around the center, and (b)(1)1.4c at or near the Trauma Center.

Q19: The (b)(3), (b)(6) was not aware of the presence of the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz.

Q20: No - not that I'm aware. It was not on the 29 Sep CONOP or the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g CJSOAC received 1 Oct.

Q21: From the (b)(1)1.4a reviewed, I saw no outward markings indicating the MSF Trauma Center was a hospital.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram AB DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Q22: This is contained in the (b)(1)1.4a and an outline of those radio calls is contained in attachment 1.
Q23: This is contained in the (b)(1)1.4a and an outline of those radio calls is contained in attachment 1.
Q24: I saw (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in/around the trauma center.
Q25: From the (b)(1)1.4a it appeared the crew observed a large compound with multiple buildings and advised ground party of (b)(1)1.4a before being told by the (b)(3), (b)(6) it was a Taliban controlled compound and the 9 pax were hostile.
Q26: Negative, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
Q27: The Trauma center was described as a Taliban controlled compound with 9x hostile pax and (b)(1)1.4a going to that center to conduct clearing operations. The crew was protecting the partner force under ROE (b)(1)1.4a and the USSF advisors on the ground from what they believed was an all-Taliban force.
Q28: Resolute Support Self-Defense ROE (b)(1)1.4a were passed by (b)(3), (b)(6).
Q29: CJSOAC was notified of a potential CIVCAS allegation against the strike by phonecon from (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) The phonecon was followed by email notification from (b)(3), (b)(6) to CJSOAC-(b)(3), (b)(6) while the aircrew was still returning to BAF from the operation in Konduz.
Q30: After (b)(3), (b)(6) called, CJSOAC began to gather information pertinent to the CIVCAS allegation starting (b)(1)1.4a
Q31: There is a cease fire call post-engagement on the (b)(1)1.4a @ 2113:49Z while AC-130 is attempting to clear a hot gun.
Q32:
Q33: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
Q34: (b)(3), (b)(6) intent @ 2103Z: Destroy targets of all opportunity that may impede partner forces success. At 2130Z (b)(3), (b)(6) passes: Prosecute enemy pax @ OBJ BLDG, then (b)(3), (b)(6) wants you to prosecute objective building first, (b)(1)1.4a secondary." AC-130 also receives clearance on all movers (not just (b)(1)1.4a from obj building).
Q35: Target description from JTAC matched MSF Trauma Center -- particularly the north gate which didn't match NDS compound. JTAC confirmed this target as Taliban controlled.
Q36: Unknown to me.
Q37: ROE (b)(1)1.4a tac guidance: self defense exception to section 18 on Air Delivered Munitions.
Q38: Unknown, the crew estimated seeing approx 50 personnel during the engagement.
Q39: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT Bagram AB DATED 20151025

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE _____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHO[redacted]RD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, C[redacted]

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 26th day of OCTOBER, 2015 at BAGRAM AIR FIELD, AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136 (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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Notes for Investigative Team 22 Oct 15

Set Up

1. Konduz falls – 28 Sep
   a. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) is diverted to support
2. 29 Sep through 1 Oct (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) flies in support of Konduz
3. 2 Oct, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) is alerted
   a. CJSOAC-A received direction from SOJTF-A to launch (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) ISQ AIR TIC 001
   b. No brief or products available (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) launched w/frequency, callsign & grid coordinates for friendly forces
   c. T/O time (b)(1)1.4a
   d. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
   e. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) on station at Konduz @ (b)(1)1.4a NSTR
   f. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
   g.
   h. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) on station at Konduz @ (b)(1)1.4a
   i. Compound of Interest grid coordinates passed @ (b)(1)1.4a
   j. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Key Events

(b)(1)1.4a

1. - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
   i. Tasking: Sensor to grid coordinates, (b)(1)1.4a to that center IOT conduct clearing operations
   ii. Result: #1 of 2 large compounds, 300M SW of grid coordinates; referred to as prison compound (b)(3), (b)(6) confirms correct compound.
2. - (b)(1)1.4a passed + 9x (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
   i. (b)(3), (b)(6) declares compound Taliban controlled and 9 pax hostile
   ii. (b)(3), (b)(6) passes (b)(3), (b)(6) intent: Exploit any possible TB in area to lighten load for partner forces infil
3. - (b)(3), (b)(6) re-enters grid IOT re-confirm correct compound
   i. Comparison of compounds, crew requests building description
   ii. (b)(3), (b)(6) passes: outer perimeter wall, multiple bldgs., arched main gate
   iii. 30m vs. 300m clarification
   iv. (b)(3), (b)(6) passes: ***open gate to the north***
      1. Does not match compound #2, matches compound #1
      2. Preliminary conclusion: compound #1 is the intended compound
4. - (b)(3), (b)(6) says "Soften target"
   i. (b)(3), (b)(6) passes (b)(3), (b)(6) intent: Destroy targets of all opportunity that may impede partner forces success
   ii. Launches 5 min discussion on clarification
5. - ***(b)(3), (b)(6) passes: Prosecute enemy pax @ OBJ BLDG + (b)(3), (b)(6)***
   i. ROE requested by crew: (b)(1)1.4a
   ii. (b)(3), (b)(6) requests intent on striking compound & (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) response, "Copy."
   iii. (b)(3), (b)(6) again requests intentions on striking compound & (b)(1)1.4a

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1. (b)(3), (b)(6) responds, (b)(3), (b)(6) wants you to prosecute objective building first, (b)(1)1.4a secondary

iv. (b)(3), (b)(6) ttempts to confirm weaponeering – no response from (b)(3), (b)(6)

v. (b)(3), (b)(6) Clear to engage (b)(1)1.4a

6. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) requests clarification on building to be struck, confirm T-shaped building, (b)(3), (b)(6) response, "Copy"

i. (b)(3), (b)(6) requests (b)(1)1.4a

ii. (b)(3), (b)(6) requests 2nd clarification on large T-shaped building in center of compound

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) responds, "Affirm"

iii. (b)(3), (b)(6) confirms 3rd time "Looking to strike the large t-shaped building in the center of the compound, ensuring we are clear with (b)(1)1.4a on the building."

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) responds, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) "we are clear to engage." (b)(1)1.4a

7. (b)(1)1.4a (b)(3), (b)(6) confirms clearance on all movers, not only (b)(1)1.4a from T-shaped building

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) responds, "Affirm"

8. (b)(1)1.4a - Rounds away

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Notes (b)(3), (b)(6) Konduz/AC-130 incident_3 Oct

RFIs:

1. What time did we (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
2. What time did we (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
3. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
4.
5.
6. Did the crew have all the products we could give them? Why/Why not? Although crews who are launched off alert (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (per AFTTP 3-1.AC-130, 5 Mar 15) we can do more by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
7. Were procedures followed for providing information? If not/why not? Yes, for alert launch. But we need to evaluate & implement (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g procedures.
8. Are there new procedures that could prevent a similar incident? Yes. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
9. Are there new technologies that could prevent a similar incident? Yes. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
10. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
11.
12. Is there a deficiency in target confirmation training for AC-130Us? No. Every training ride, every proficiency ride, every exercise, every tac sortie contains target confirmation training.
13. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(1)1.4g

General Topics to Consider:

1. Pre-flight procedures (NSL availability, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g product development/distro)
2. Tactical guidance (which ROE was given, who had TEA, is tac guidance clear)
3. Target confirmation (what was the target, did it match tgt description, were procedures good)
4. Role of equipment failure (were backup procedures followed, backup eqpmnt used, S.A. level)

<<<signed>>>

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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From: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ RFIs
Date: Saturday, November 07, 2015 12:11:30 PM
Attachments: (b)(1)1.4a

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please include the below email from (b)(3), (b)(6) in our records.

I believe you have the three witness statements (attached), if not, please include them into the witness statement book.

Tnx r/ RA

Gwyn Armfield
Brig Gen USAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2015 7:43 PM
To: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ RFIs

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET~~
Message Body Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

Brig Gen Armfield,

Please see below & attached.

V/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, November 03, 2015 7:03 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ RFIs

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Sir,

Please see answers below to the most recent RFI.

V/r,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

1) Please list the specific actions taken at CJSOAC-A following the phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6) on 3 OCT with the initial potential CIVCAS notification.

   a. Did a post-mission AAR occur with the crew?
   b. When did the crew realize that they had targeted the wrong compound?
   c. Was there any consideration given to de-certifying any aircrew members?

(b)(3), (b)(6) received a phone call from (b)(3), (b)(6) stating that there may have been a

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CIVCAS. The (b)(3), (b)(6) provided this information to (b)(3), (b)(6) who tasked the Staff Judge Advocate, (b)(3), (b)(6), to contact (b)(3), (b)(6) to determine the nature of the allegation and to find out any details surrounding the allegation. Thereafter, (b)(3), (b)(6) sent an email to (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) that a CIVCAS allegation had been raised and that the aircrew was not yet back at (b)(1)1.4a but that the team would begin pulling together data.

Upon the arrival of the aircrew, the (b)(3), (b)(6) and SJA met the crew to pull the (b)(1)1.4a. The aircrew was advised that there was a CIVCAS allegation and they needed to find out where in the (b)(1)1.4a that might be. This process took about one and a half hours. Thereafter, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) with the aircrew, the (b)(3), (b)(6) and the SJA.

Just prior to (b)(3), (b)(6) review, he sent the following email to (b)(3), (b)(6) "Sir, per our conversation, here's some preliminary data from the gunship crew: There was a known enemy (b)(1)1.4a The target was identified as an enemy structure controlled by enemy forces with all personnel in/around structure characterized as enemy. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) cleared the gunship on the enemy structure and associated personnel. There was approx.. 10 minutes of dialogue prior to the engagement regarding target confirmation and exact location of the building/compound. Perhaps the only issue I see with the shoot, was that ROE (b)(1)1.4a was cited. Regardless, our (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) picked up

(b)(1)1.4a

At the end of the (b)(1)1.4a it appeared that the strike was procedurally correct in terms of confirming the applicable ROE, confirming the target, and acquiring the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) intent and authorization.

(b)(3), (b)(6) then began to build a two slide storyboard, (b)(1)1.4a of the strike (showing the declaration that the compound was Taliban controlled with 9 PAX hostile). (b)(3), (b)(6) provided the first impression report to (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) then began to build a timeline of events and (b)(1)1.4a

Neither the aircrew nor (b)(3), (b)(6) was aware they had hit the wrong compound until weeks after the event. CJSOAC-A/SJA spoke w/SOTF-A/SJA and determined through legal channels the wrong target had been struck, on or about mid-October. The crew likely did not know it was the wrong target until the 15-6 investigator's interviews.

The (b)(3), (b)(6) was suspended from flying, and the (b)(3), (b)(6) were subsequently suspended, but no member has been de-certified. Nor was decertification considered as standards were complied with.

2) How many personnel positions (spaces) were assigned to CJSOAC-A in October of 2014 and how many in October 2015? What is the current manning level and where are the vacancies if not 100%?

(b)(1)1.4a

3) (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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4) What Operational Risk Management regulations does CJSOAC use?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR
[mailto (b)(3), (b)(6) @afghan.swa.army.smil.mil]
Sent: Monday, November 02, 2015 9:28 AM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: Bauernfeind, Tony D BG SOJTF-A; Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director
Subject: ~~(S)~~ RFIs

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

A few RFIs for you and your team:

Duplicate , (b)(3), (b)(6)

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Duplicate, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Please provide a written response to the above six questions on a signed MFR to me NLT 1200 3 November 2015. Call or email me if you have any questions.

Thanks, RA

Gwyn Armfield
Brig Gen USAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Approved for Release

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Message Body Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Attachment Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Attachment Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET~~

Message Body Caveats: ~~NOFORN~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

Approved for Release

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: (b)(3), (b)(6)

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

S

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CJSOAC-A	20151023	1700	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Prior to the evening of 2 October 2015, I had flown up to the city of Kunduz, Afghanistan on September 29 in support of the Afghan government's effort to retake control of the city from anti-coaliton forces. That evening my crew and I prosecuted targets and became generally familiar with the layout of the city proper. At mission completion the crew preserved our mission products due to the necessity of maintaining continuity for the area.

On October 2, 2015 my crew and I were tasked to fly back up to Kunduz in support of continued coalition operations, however we were alerted approximately seventy minutes early. This was due to a troops-in-contact situation being declared within the city and and a call for a gunship to respond immediately. My crew and I reported into our operations center and received a quick update on what was occurring. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g My crew and I picked up our products from the previous mission and expedited our departure.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	(b)(3), (b)(6)

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1700 DATED 20151023

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

The (b)(3), (b)(6) raised the crew's Operational Risk Management (ORM) to "high" and stated that at Begin Morning Nautical Twilight (BMNT) the ORM would be elevated to "extreme." The crew then began directing all aircraft overhead the city to immediately begin climbing in an effort to mitigate the emerging threat. Our aircraft commander also began varying our flying orbit over the city in order to avoid the (b)(1)1.4a point of origin. All of this information was relayed by our (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to our Command & Control agencies back at Bagram AB.

After approximately three hours of maintaining sensor coverage over the city and proactively searching areas requested of us by the ground party we were (b)(1)1.4a The coordinates we were given from the (b)(3), (b)(6) initially (b)(1)1.4a to a large complex that was approximately three hundred meters away from the original grids. This was due to the complex being the main distinguishable site near the coordinates. Once we were tracking the area we asked for further clarification as to what we were looking for and if the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a was a large T shaped building that had several other buildings associated with it within the complex and that there was an arched gate on the northern side of the complex. The area that we were looking at matched this description and we were then asked to confirm a (b)(1)1.4a which our sensors verified. The (b)(3), (b)(6) then informed us that a friendly convoy was enroute from (b)(1)1.4a to the site in order to conduct a clearing operation. As we continued to monitor the complex the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) to a set of buildings that was less than a kilometer away and asked to receive further clarification that he was (b)(1)1.4a noticing that this set of structures was the only other complex of buildings nearby the grids passed. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) to the (b)(3), (b)(6) and it was confirmed that it was not the NAI we were requested to track. (b)(1)1.4a continued to monitor the original complex and pass the pattern of life that was found within. A short while later the (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) intended for us to "soften" the complex. Upon asking for clarification as to the meaning of the word "soften" we were told that the (b)(3), (b)(6) wanted us to engage all targets of opportunity that may hinder the ground party's progress of clearing the complex. Shortly there after the (b)(3), (b)(6) relayed to us that the complex that we were monitoring was under "TB" (Taliban) control and that all associated personnel were declared hostile. After a quick crew discussion, our navigator requested to know the Rules of Engagement (ROEs) that we would be working under for the engagement. The (b)(3), (b)(6) then passed that we would be following Resolute Support (b)(1)1.4a and (b)(1)1.4a

After several minutes of continuing to monitor pattern of life at the complex, confirming nearest friendly position (830 meters) and going over weaponeering options we were cleared to engage the complex area. My crew and I began posturing for the engagement and while doing so asked for further guidance as to level of destruction and what it was we were specifically going to engage. The (b)(3), (b)(6) stated that we were to engage the nine personnel outside of the main building as well the main T shaped building itself. He further stated that we were to engage all personnel who (b)(1)1.4a from the T shaped building and the surrounding buildings within the complex. The (b)(3), (b)(6) directed us to cease the engagement once the friendly convoy was within three hundred meters of the complex.

Shortly before the engagement we verified our weapon selection which was (b)(1)1.4a. Once the crew was fully postured to engage I gave the (b)(3), (b)(6) brief followed by the (b)(3), (b)(6) confirming the target and we began to strike the personnel in the compound area as well as the main building. The engagement lasted approximately thirty minutes and then we went cold once the friendly convoy was within seven hundred meters. At this point, the T shaped building was on fire and there was no visible activity within the complex area.

Once we went cold we returned to our (b)(1)1.4a on the known friendly positions and scanning for potential threats to the ground party. The rest of the mission after the engagement was uneventful and we returned to base without incident.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1700 DATED 20151023

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 23rd day of OCTOBER, 2015 at BAGRAM AIR FIELD AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136, (b)(3), (b)(6)
(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 Oct 15

MEMORANDUM FOR AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: Flying Qualification and Training Summary for (b)(3), (b)(6)

1. The following information summarizes the qualification and training for (b)(3), (b)(6) qualified as a (b)(3), (b)(6) in the AC-130U.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

4. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6). He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.af.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE
1ST SPECIAL OPERATIONS WING (AFSOC)
HURLBURT FIELD FLORIDA

21 October 15

MEMORANDUM FOR: AFSOC/A3

FROM: (b)(3), (b)(6)

SUBJECT: (b)(3), (b)(6) Ground and Flight Training

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) had zero discrepancies in required deployment ground and flight training currencies prior to and since deploying to the AOR.

2. My POC for this information is (b)(3), (b)(6) He can be reached at DSN (b)(3), (b)(6) @us.af.mil.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

"For Official Use Only (FOUO) information, which must be protected under the Privacy Act and Air Force Instruction 33-332."

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 23 Oct 15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 23 day of OCTOBER, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

Digital Sender Cover Sheet Agreement/User Agreement

I accept the responsibility to safeguard the information contained in this document to a level commensurate with the classification of the information from unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure or use.

I understand that Communications using, data stored on, or information being transmitted over government networked information systems (IS) are not private. I understand that the use of NSOCC-A networks or any other DoD computer system or network constitutes consent to being monitored at all times for purposes including, but not limited to, penetration testing, COMSEC monitoring, network operations and defense, personal misconduct (PM), law enforcement (LE), and counterintelligence (CI) investigations. At any time, NSOCC-A may inspect and seize data stored or transmitted over government networks.

I will not scan information onto a network if the information has a higher classification than what the network is currently accredited. I will not enter information that is proprietary, contractor-excluded, or otherwise needs special protection or handling, unless approved in writing by Information Assurance (IA). I will have the information to be scanned reviewed and verified by another person for Two Person Integrity (TPI) to prevent unauthorized or inadvertent disclosure or use. I and the TPI person certify to the best of our knowledge that we have taken all appropriate measures to ensure the information contained in this document is authorized for transport over the network on which it will be sent.

I will report incidents pertaining to unauthorized storage or transmission of information of a greater sensitivity than what the system or network is currently accredited for to my servicing Help Desk.

I understand that violations of agreed upon conditions will result in the suspension or termination of my privileges to access classified data. I understand that my access may be suspended, revoked or terminated for non-compliance with DoD security policies. These repercussions also apply to the TPI person.

The undersigned consents to interception/capture and seizure of ALL communications and data for any authorized purpose (including personal misconduct, law enforcement, or counterintelligence investigation). The undersigned understands that violations are punishable by UCMJ action, punitive actions and/or other adverse administrative actions.

Classification of information being scanned: ~~Secret // Noforn~~

Subject: (b)(3), (b)(6) Stmt

YYYY/MMM/DD and Time: 2015 NOV 12 1318 Z

Print Rank/Title Name of User: (b)(3), (b)(6)

User Signature: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Print Rank/Title

TPI Signature: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CJSOAC-A BAGRAM AIR FIELD	20151023	1514	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3)

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Information in this statement is classified up to and including ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

On the night of 02/03 October 2015, my crew and I were launched in response to a TIC (Troops in Contact). After getting ready, I went to our ops room and collected my gear. We immediately stepped out the aircraft with no products for the area, only with the information of the general location (Konduz). We (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g was initially working as we proceeded north. After finishing (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g This does happen sometimes and is impossible to predict. To troubleshoot the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and connection, we (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and it's individual (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g After these steps, I was unable to bring the system and connection back on-line. For the rest of the mission, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, and being (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. We then proceeded to the operation arriving at (b)(1)1.4a We established two-way line-of-sight radio communication with the Joint Terminal Attack Controller (JTAC), who gave us multiple (b)(1)1.4a the loadmaster called " (b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Information in this statement is classified up to and including ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAGRAM AIR FIELD DATED 20151023

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Information in this statement is classified up to and including ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a As we came back on station, we received multiple grids to look at by the (b)(3), (b)(6) As we looked at one of the grids passed, the (b)(3), (b)(6) assed that the compound was under Taliban Control and declared all personnel in that compound to be hostile. Inside the compound, we observed only assessed adult males including two guards at the front gate. Later, the (b)(3), (b)(6) assed that a ground force would be moving through the city to clear that compound and that the (b)(3), (b)(6) intent was to have us "soften the target". After getting clarification of what "soften the target" meant, our crew passed multiple target confirmation radio transmissions to ensure we were on the correct compound. A (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) eared us to engage the building in the center of the compound as well as any (b)(1)1.4a inside the compound, (b)(3), (b)(6) We then got additional target confirmation with the (b)(3), (b)(6) include a large, T-Shaped building in the center of the compound with multiple surrounding buildings with a gate on the north side with an arch. We then went hot (actively shooting) at 2135z targeting the building and associated (b)(1)1.4a I gave advisory calls that we were going hot back to our (b)(1)1.4a I eventually passed grids of the target during the engagement. This is normally done post engagement as part of our Battle Damage Assessment but due to the length of the engagement, I passed them early to start to getting the information to our JOC. About 25 minutes into the engagement when we had almost finished shooting, I was asked to pass if there was any damage to a building to the south of the compound. I asked for clarification and they repeated to pass a collateral damage estimate because there was a trauma center south of that compound. I responded saying that there was no assessed damage to any buildings outside of that compound. Throughout the engagement, we continued to check the location of the ground party as they proceeded inbound to the compound not coming closer than 600m to the target compound. Towards the end, we had a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with a round stuck in the chamber. We stopped firing at the target at 2204z. We then got clearance from the (b)(3), (b)(6) expend the stuck round in an open field that we cleared that had no collateral damage or civilian casualty concerns.

(b)(1)1.4a

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Information in this statement is classified up to and including ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~ (b)(3), (b)(6)

End of Statement

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

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Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAGRAM AIR FIELD DATED 20151023

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)* (b)(3), (b)(6)

End of Statement

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 24th day of OCTOBER, 2015 at BAGRAM AIR FIELD AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

ARTICLE 136, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

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PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

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DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan	20151106	1200	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
Special Operations Task Force-Afghanistan

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

Note: The times referenced in the (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents are in various time zones, I will convert the times to UTC +4:30 (Afghanistan local time) for simplicity. All my statements are to the best of my recollection, with any definitive time and date information being drawn from the email timestamps included in the (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents.

1. Describe in detail your knowledge of learning of the MSF Trauma Center in Kunduz (ref your emails and packet provided).

I first learned of the MSF Trauma Center's location when I saw the document with the coordinates (page 5 of (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents) on the (b)(3), (b)(6) computer. She received the document through the med channels as a possible location to take US/Afghan wounded to in an emergency situation. When I saw the document, I asked her to send it to me as soon as possible (page 6, (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents). I received the document shortly after (010947OCT15), and converted the coordinates to MGRS. Immediately following that. I went to the OPCEN and gave the coordinates to the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), who was managing the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) After the shift change that day, I gave the information to the (b)(3), (b)(6)

2. Provide as specific as possible the timing of emails and phone calls (as mentioned in your emails and packet). Understanding your (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g phone was not set to exact time, please provide windows of when you sent, received emails or spoke to an individual reference the MSF. -

My first contact with anyone regarding the Trauma Center was when I contacted (b)(6) from the United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). I contacted him from his information provided in his email to RS (page (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents) via mobile phone, likely in the afternoon of 01OCT15 IOT begin the process to deconflict any resupply operations that would travel to the hospital. After the conversation, I emailed (b)(6) so that he had my contact information to email me if the need arose (page (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents) and received a response at 011048OCT15.

On 020519OCT15, I received an email (page 11 (b)(3), (b)(6) with the information he obtained (page 16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents) from (b)(6) regarding an upcoming resupply convoy. I believe that (b)(6) called me later that morning, and we discussed MSF's intent to resupply the hospital. The convoy makeup and departure times changed throughout the next several hours, and I received another document with the updated convoy information (pages 15 (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents) provided by MSF at (021321OCT15). I then consolidated that information onto one page (page 16 (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents) and gave it to the (b)(3), (b)(6) so that they could intervene if a strike was called in or vehicles matching that description were heard/observed.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAF DATED 20151106

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Later, that day, but before 021407OCT15, I had an phone conversation with (b)(6), where he asked to put me in touch with (b)(6) (b)(6) to better facilitate the next request from MSF. When I received the call from (b)(6), this request turned out to be a plan for possible extraction from the hospital. In the notes I took (page (b)(3), (b)(6) documents) when I spoke to (b)(6), I wrote that he was asking if we could look into the 'working feasibility' of if/how we could extract them when and if asked. He was clear in indicating that he was not currently asking for an extraction, only that I advise him of the feasibility, which led me to ask about his current disposition. He informed me of the number of beds, number of international aid workers in the hospital, and that the Taliban were 'protecting' the hospital and were treating the government casualties well (I assumed they were from the initial TB push into the city, not from the forces that the USSF accompanied). *that notes page had several different conversations/notes to myself, not all writing is from the phone call*

I believe that it was during the conversation referenced above that I recommended to (b)(6) that MSF take the signs normally affixed to the sides of the trucks and to install them on the top of the vehicle for easy identification by aircraft during this and any future MSF resupply operation(s). I do not know if this was done, but the end result of this exchange (probably around 1530-1630, 02OCT15, near to the convoy's expected arrival time) was confirmed through text message and a subsequent phone conversation (page (b)(3), (b)(6) document) with (b)(6) that confirmed the safe delivery of supplies to the Trauma Center.

3. Discuss the communications reference possible extraction of expats from MSF. How far did the planning of this potential operation go within the staff and higher HQs? Was the AOB aware (Warning Order)?

I do not know if the AOB was notified to begin planning for an extraction, I did inform (b)(3), (b)(6) during this period of my conversation. I do not know if specific plans were made to prepare for an extraction or if any other HQs were made aware.

4. Was the OPCEN tracking the movement of supplies via taxi to the MSF trauma center?

The OPCEN was aware that the convoy was occurring; however, due to ongoing operations, I do not believe they were tracking the movements.

5. Describe your interaction with the OPCEN. When did you first notify them of the grid(s) of the MSF? How many times did you interact with the (b)(3), (b)(6) throughout the days leading up to the 2/3 October A-C130 Strike?

I will refer to question #1 to answer the interaction prior to the strike.

6. When did you receive the phone call informing you of the MSF under attack? Who made the call to you?

During the early morning of 03OCT15, I received a phone call from (b)(6) he began by apologizing for calling so late, and stated that the hospital was being hit by an airstrike, asking that I try to stop it. I replied that I would see what was happening.

At that time, I did not know what was happening in the OPCEN, and I did not know if MSF was really being struck by aircraft or had taken RPG fire from Taliban trying to fire at our forces. For that reason, I recall that I went immediately to the OPCEN and asked the (b)(3), (b)(6) if we were conducting any strikes, because I was just told that we were striking the Trauma Center. (b)(3), (b)(6) overheard and asked me to repeat myself, which I did. By this time, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) had taken action to confirm/deny what I said. I do not recall precisely what time I received the phone call, but it could not have been more than a few minutes between the call and when the OPCEN began to take action to determine what was happening, and ultimately call 'check fire'.

7. When you notified them of the phone call stating the MSF was under attack, how long did it take for a cease fire to be called?

I am not certian how long it took for a cease fire/check fire to be called, but action was taken immediately after I informed the (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) to determine what was happening, and once we knew that a strike had occured on the Trauma Center, a check fire was called.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAF DATED 20151106

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

8. Provide any amplifying information on the actions concerning the MSF strike.

The text message log sequence in the Washington Post article appears accurate (WP Text Log) although there may be slight discrepancies between the Text Log, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Additionally, I was aware that the strike had ended when I replied to (b)(6) texts that the WP Text Log show occured at 0252D*. I did not tell them that the strikes had stopped due to an abundance of caution about OPSEC, and the realization that any information I provided at that point would not affect the situation on the ground. Nothing Follows (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Sig

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

From: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: (U/~~/FOUO~~) Communication record between (b)(3), (b)(6) MSF from 02-03 OCT
Date: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 3:42:54 PM
Attachments: (b)(3), (b)(6) Documents.pdf

CLASSIFICATION: ~~UNCLASSIFIED//FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please file the below info documenting exchange between UN / RS/ SOTF and MSF

Thanks, r/ RA

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From: Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 3:42 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Cc: Jenkins, Sean M. BG Deputy Director; (b)(3), (b)(6)
Team; Hickman, William B. MG US MIL DEPUTY COMMANDER
Subject: FW: (U/~~/FOUO~~) Communication record between (b)(3), (b)(6) MSF from 02-03 OCT

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

I believe you are working the MSF Info LOO.

Attached is some great info but it will require some patient work to piece together for our timeline

I read through all of this and recommend that you to start first w/ email below from (b)(3), (b)(6) then .pdf cover sheet followed by the actual .pdf documents to get the proper feel for the timing.

The info contained is consequential because it highlights the extensive dialogue and relationship between SOTF / RS and MSF to deconflict ops O/A 2 OCT.

r/ RA

Approved for Release

Gwyn Armfield
Brig Gen USAF

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 1:10 AM
To: Jenkins, Sean M BG MIL USA USCENTCOM CCJ3-A; Armfield, Robert G. BG US MIL VICE DIRECTOR
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: (U) Communication record between (b)(3), (b)(6) and MSF from 02-03 OCT

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Message Body Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Gentlemen,

My timeline, to the best of my recollection is as follows due to errors in time stamps on the mobile telephone:

02 OCT approx. 1320 (b)(3), (b)(6) receives email request from (b)(6) to facilitate direct communication between MSF and (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding the need for a possible extraction plan

- Phone conversation regarding this occurs between MSF Representative (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) discussing the need for a plan for extraction in case the situation deteriorates further. MSF emphasizes that the plan is not needed at that time, but may be in the future. Also discussed was the Taliban treatment of hospital workers and patients. Taliban are described as 'protecting' the hospital.
- Around this time, the coordination of a convoy to resupply the hospital is discussed. Information describing the vehicles is transmitted from MSF (b)(3), (b)(6) in the form of a Pashto language letter designed for identification at GIRoA or Taliban CPs with pertinent information. Information is provided to the JOC. Updates to the convoy disposition and are provided by email and text messages (b)(3), (b)(6) advises marking the top of vehicles with MSF logo to be visible to aircraft.

02 OCT approx. 1700 (b)(3), (b)(6) text messages MSF to determine status of convoy. MSF advises of safe delivery of supplies.

03 OCT, between 0200-0220: Phone call received by (b)(3), (b)(6) from MSF stating that the Trauma Center was receiving an airstrike (b)(3), (b)(6) states that he will find out if airstrikes are occurring, asks about casualties, end the call and informs the JOC.

- Text messages are exchanged regarding casualty figures and disposition of the hospital. (as annotated in page four of (b)(3), (b)(6) documents' PDF)

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Unfortunately, I cannot recall the exact time that I received the phone call; however, I do know that as soon as I hung up the phone, I proceeded to the JOC to inform the relevant parties. The times presented for the 2nd of October are based on the email time stamps, and there is no email traffic related to the strike to assist with timeline identification.

If needed, and as previously discussed, I am willing to submit my phone as evidence.

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Attachment Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~
Message Body Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

Classification: UNCLASSIFIED//~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

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More

The sequence appears accurate, although there may be slight discrepancies between this and logs. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3

Summary phone log of contacts MSF made during the US airstrikes[15]

MSF made multiple calls and SMS contacts in an attempt to stop the airstrikes:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

- **At 2.19am**, a call was made from MSF representative in Kabul to Resolute Support in Afghanistan informing them that the hospital had been hit in an airstrike
- **At 2.20am**, a call was made from MSF representative in Kabul to ICRC informing them that the hospital had been hit in an airstrike
- **At 2.32am** a call was made from MSF Kabul to OCHA Civil Military (CivMil) liaison in Afghanistan to inform of the ongoing strikes
- At **2.32am** a call was made by MSF in New York to US Department of Defense contact in Washington informing of the airstrikes
- At **2.45am** an SMS was received from OCHA CivMil in Afghanistan to MSF in Kabul confirming that the information had been passed through "several channels"
- At **2.47am**, an SMS was sent from MSF in Kabul to Resolute Support in Afghanistan informing that one staff was confirmed dead and many were unaccounted for
- At **2.50am** MSF in Kabul informed Afghan Ministry of Interior at Kabul level of the airstrikes. Afghan Ministry of Interior replied that he would contact ground forces
- At **2.52am** a reply was received by MSF in Kabul from Resolute Support stating "I'm sorry to hear that, I still do not know what happened"

for further context, see page 4, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

- At **2.56am** an SMS was sent from MSF in Kabul to Resolute Support insisting that the airstrikes stop and informing that we suspected heavy casualties
- At **2.59am** an SMS reply was received by MSF in Kabul from Resolute Support saying "I'll do my best, praying for you all"
- At **3.04am** an SMS was sent to Resolute Support from MSF in Kabul that the hospital was on fire
- At **3.07am** an SMS was sent from MSF in Kabul to OCHA CivMil that the hospital was on fire
- At **3.09am** an SMS was received by MSF in Kabul from OCHA CivMil asking if the incoming had stopped
- At **3.10am** and again at **3.14am.** follow up calls were made from MSF New York to the US Department of Defense contact in Washington regarding the ongoing airstrikes
- At **3.13am** an SMS was sent from MSF in Kabul to OCHA CivMil saying that incoming had stopped
- At **3.15am** an SMS was received from CivMil OCHA stating that information had been passed to Resolute Support in the North and CJOC in Kabul as well as ANA in Kabul and the North
- At **3.18am** an SMS was sent from MSF in New York to US Department of Defence contact in Washington that one staff was confirmed dead and many were unaccounted for

Approved for release

AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) , are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)
OF EXECUTION: 3NOV15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 3rd day of November, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VANCE, BAGHRAM AFGHANISTAN	20151101	1000	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

There was a memorandum from MSF on my desk at the beginning of my shift with the grids on it. I don't know if this was at 01 0000D*OCT15 or 02 0000D*OCT15. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4a had secured the PGOV compound and the partner force was conducting clearing operations around the PGOV block I asked them if they had cleared the MSF residence located on that block. They were not tracking the MSF building in that area at that time. Shortly after this, I relayed the 4 grids over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (phone) from the paper MSF(Medicines Sans Frontiers, doctors without borders) memorandum. I do not remember the exact time of this conversation. I cannot say with certainty what time I passed the information. At the time I did not think there was any reason to make a record of the conversation. I cannot say with certainty with who I was on the phone. I did not log my conversation in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g or any other log. I don't remember what else was discussed on the call. I know I read the 4 grids and got a read back for accuracy. I think I used the term doctors without borders not MSF. I asked if they were tracking these locations previously and they said no. At the time of the conversation I did not see any need to document the interaction.

At 03(b)(1)1.4a*OCT15 when I came on shift at (b)(1)1.4a I saw I'd received an email with updates on the MSF situation and disposition. I advised (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) that I would be sending them information over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g At about this same time one of the S2 personnel informed me he had a list of potential enemy positions around Kunduz. I instructed him to type the grids into a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g After he sent his (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g I typed the information on the MSF email into a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and sent that. Immediately after I sent that message, (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed me that MSF wanted to do a fixed wing resupply into Kunduz airport the next day (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) to give an update and at that time I asked if they had received my (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and they said they had. It is possible that they received the first and not the second (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g at that time. I then sent a 3rd (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g informing them of the fixed wing MSF resupply mission. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g does not maintain records of sent messages at the sender location. The only way the sender can see their own traffic is if the recipient sends a reply. There were 4 messages sent from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) between midnight and 0400: 0104D*, 0111D*, 0133D*, 0233D*. The fourth message sent at 0233 was replied to and stated (b)(6) for doctors without borders reports trauma center was just hit by an airstrike."

At some point between 0133 and 0233 (b)(3), (b)(6) came into the JOC and informed us that MSF (b)(6) had reported that the clinic had been hit by an airstrike. I sent then sent them the 4th (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g moments later (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) immediately said that we'd received a report that the clinic was hit by an airstrike and for them to come up on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 2 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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(b)(3), (b)(6) 1000 INOVIS

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

All times used in this statement are based on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g sent message log.

TIMELINE for 3OCT15

(b)(1)1.4g*: I began my shift.

UNKNOWN: I informed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) I would be passing information on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

0104D*: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with enemy locations in Kunduz.

0111D*: with MSF location and situation.

UNKNOWN: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g said they had received (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

UNKNOWN: Briefed by (b)(3), (b)(6) about planned fixed wing resupply to Kunduz airport.

0138D*: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with information about MSF planned fixed wing resupply to Kunduz airport.

UNKNOWN: Informed by (b)(3), (b)(6) that MSF Clinic had been hit by airstrike.

0236D*: (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g stating MSF clinic reported being hit by airstrike.

UNKNOWN: I informed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g of report of strike on clinic on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

Nothing Follows

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 2 OF 2 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1.01ES

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP VANCE, BAGHRAM AFGHANISTAN	20151105	0900	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(3)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. What are your duties as the (b)(3), (b)(6) in the OPCEN?

(b)(3), (b)(6)

2. What time did you come on shift on the evening of the 2nd of October 2015?

(b)(1)1.4a *OCT15

3. When do you go off shift (shift change)?

(b)(1)1.4a *

4. Is there a shift change brief? If so, what does it entail? Are CONOPs briefed?

I am briefed by (b)(3), (b)(6). The brief covers events of last 12 hours, current situation, disposition of forces in ongoing operations, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g upcoming operations, operational and personnel related administrative tasks and requirements.

5. Describe your actions in the OPCEN on the night of the 02nd October 2015

At 03(b)(1)1.4a OCT15 when I came on shift at (b)(1)1.4a, I saw I'd received an email with updates on the MSF situation and disposition. I advised (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) that I would be sending them information over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. At about this same time one of the S2 personnel informed me he had a list of potential enemy positions around Kunduz. I instructed him to type the grids into a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. After he sent his (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g I typed the information on the MSF email into a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and sent that. Immediately after I sent that message, (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed me that MSF wanted to do a fixed wing resupply into Kunduz airport the next day. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) to give an update and at that time I asked if they had received my (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and they said they had. It is possible that they received the first and not the second (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g at that time. I then sent a 3rd (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g informing them of the fixed wing MSF resupply mission. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g does not maintain records of sent messages at the sender location. The only way the sender can see their own traffic is if the recipient sends a reply. There were 4 messages sent from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) between midnight and 0400: 0104D*, 0111D*, 0133D*, 0233D*. The fourth message sent at 0233 was replied to and stated "(b)(6) for doctors without borders reports trauma center was just hit by an airstrike." Additionally I was tracking the other ongoing operations.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 4 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 0900 DATED 5NOV15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

6. Was the normal staff on duty during the evening of 2 Oct 15?
To the best of my knowledge and recollection, yes.

7. Is there a battle drill when an air to ground engagement is being conducted? What is your role during the engagement?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

8. Was information was being passed to the OPCEN leadership?
Information is always being passed. I cannot remember specifically who said what to whom.

9. Do you monitor (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g? Is that the OPCEN Log?
I always have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g monitor and review it when time permits. I rely on the ITCs to notify JOC personnel of any important traffic.

10. Describe your actions in the OPCEN on the night of the 02nd October 2015
See question 5.

11. What is or is there a battle drill to monitor operations when systems go down (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g? How do you maintain situational awareness?
I don't know what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g is. When we don't have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in the JOC I rely on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g for situational awareness of what (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g is looking at.

12. What checks do you perform / what are your duties as part of the CONOPS briefs and during execution?
I do not brief any part of formal CONOP briefs. During mission execution I record OPSCHEDs, update the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Room with information passed by the unit, and alert other JOC personnel as required.

13. Do you consult / check a No Strike List as part of your duties?
I was not aware of the existence of the no strike list on 03OCT15. Now the no strike list is attached to the (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a linked (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g.

14. On the night of 2nd morning of the 3rd of October 2015 did you have situational awareness that AOB-N was conducting an engagement on an assessed Taliban controlled compound prior to the first round being fired?
No. I was focused on sending (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and tracking other ongoing operations.

15. While on duty on the night of the 2nd and morning of the 3rd of October 2015, do you recall any information being briefed about an MSF Trauma Center (Hospital)? Any calls or radio (to include (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g transmissions reference the MSF Trauma Center?
I sent (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g about the trauma center at 0111D*. I was briefed by (b)(3), (b)(6) on the situation at the trauma center. It was basically the same information as the email from earlier. I sent a second (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g about the planned fixed wing resupply for the trauma center. (b)(3), (b)(6) informed the JOC that the (b)(6) for MSF reported the trauma center was hit by an airstrike. I sent a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(1)1.4g relying that report. Before I could attempt to contact the team by cell phone or any other means they came up on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and I immediately informed them we received a report the trauma center had been hit by airstrike and told them to come up on (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

16. Why wasn't (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g used to monitor the AC-130 engagement or the PCOP given the integrated defense given the imminent threat?
I do not remember having any awareness of that.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1 01ES

Approved for release

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 0900 DATED 5 NOV 15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

17. Do you recall the (b)(3), (b)(6) coming into the OPCEN? What time?
I remember talking to him at least twice. The first time was to discuss the email that he had sent me earlier that afternoon and MSF resupply operations into Kunduz. The second time was when he had received a report of an airstrike on the clinic. I do not remember the specific time of either conversation.

18. If so, what did he discuss with the (b)(3), (b)(6)?
The first time we spoke we discussed the situation at the clinic and request to make plans for a possible extraction if the situation deteriorated and also ground and fixed wing resupply operations that had been conducted and were planned by MSF.

19. What actions followed?
Following the first conversation I sent a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g with an update about the planned MSF fixed wing resupply into Kunduz airport.

20. Do you monitor (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g? Do you broadcast on a speaker in the OPCEN, or headphones at individual positions in the OPCEN?
(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g is on a speaker box behind me, between me and the (b)(3), (b)(6).

21. When did you receive the grids for the MSF facilities? Who gave them to you (only the memo)?
I know that the grids had been plotted on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g COP prior to my receipt of the memorandum. The memorandum was the first time I remember actually seeing the grids written down anywhere. I was told that the memorandum came from (b)(3), (b)(6)

22. To the best of your memory, tell us about the conversation you had with the AOB when you called to give them the MSF locations?
I told them I had grids to some doctors without borders locations in Kunduz. I told them that 3 were in the city and one was a little to the west. I read them the grids. They read the grids back to me.

23. What was the number of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g phone you used?
They called from the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g or unclassified (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6)

24. What number did you call?
The ground force called me. The (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g until a call needs to be made.

25. Who did you speak with? Officer or NCO?
I don't remember.

26. Did you pass them MGRS or Lat/Long grids?
MGRS

27. What did you use to convert the grids?
The grids were already converted to MGRS on the paper I was using.

28. When you called to verify if the ground forces received the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g did you specifically ask about the grids or just message in general?
I did not specifically ask about grids. I asked if they had received my (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

29. Can you recall when (b)(3), (b)(6) informed the OPCEN about the possible CIVCAS? How much time passed between that moment and you sending the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g regarding MSF at 0233?
I do not know exactly how many minutes and seconds passed between when I received the initial report and I hit send on the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
I sent the message directly after receiving the report.

30. Were you on duty in the OPCEN on the POD of 30 September, 01 October 2015?
(b)(1)1.4a*.

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD PE v1 01ES

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6) 0900 5 NOV 15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

31. If so, do you recall operations that were conducted during the early morning hours of the 01st of October 2015 (specifically (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

No. We almost always have (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g in different parts of the country. I cannot remember what was being looked at on the 1st of October.

32. When was the IC CONOP posted in the battle room?

Full CONOPs are (b)(1)1.4a The CONOP is posted on the portal. There is a single slide (b)(1)1.4a rooms usually. It is usually a slide from the CONOP but not always. I don't remember what slide was (b)(1)1.4a on the date in question.

NOTHING FOLLOWS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLU

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Sgt-A (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 4 OF 4 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

APD PE v1 01ES

Approved for Release

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
To: RSIT 15-6 ALL
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ Call
Date: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 11:45:31 AM
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

ALL, See below email from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)
VR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 27, 2015 9:35 AM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ Call

Sir,

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) After (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) had secured the PGOV compound and was conducting clearing operations around the PGOV block I asked them if they had cleared the MSF residence located on that block. They were not tracking the MSF building in that area at that time. Shortly after this, I relayed the 4 grids over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from the paper MSF memorandum. I do not remember the exact time of this conversation. I believe it was on 1OCT15.

On 3 OCT 15 when I came on shift at (b)(1)1.4a I saw I'd received an email with updates on the MSF situation and disposition. I advised (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) that I would be sending them information over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) also said he had a list of potential enemy positions around Kunduz. I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to type the grids into a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) sent his message at 030133D*OCT15. After (b)(3), (b)(6) sent (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g the information on the MSF email in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g message and sent that at 030223D*OCT15. A short time after that when (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) came up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g asked if they had received my traffic (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g they replied that they had.

Approved for Release

1) Did you log your 01 OCT 15 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) e SOTF-A JOC log? If so, please pass and highlight the entry.
   I did not log my conversation in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g or any other log.
2) Who, if anyone, told you to pass the MSF grids? If no one told you to pass them did you do so of your own initiative?
   I was not told by anyone to pass the MSF grids. There was a memorandum on my desk at the beginning of my shift with the grids on it.
3) Plse describe the exact time and date of the call to the best of your ability.
   I cannot say with certainty what time I passed the information. I know it was (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) secured the PGOV. One of the MSF locations was on the same block as the PGOV. During one of the times the ground force called to update us on the FF disposition they reported the CDOs were clearing in the area where we in the JOC had that MSF location plotted. I asked if they had cleared the MSF building and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) nt I was talking to did not know what I was referring to. The next time they came up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g sed the grids over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g he time I did not think there was any reason to make a record of the conversation.
4) Who, from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) did you speak with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g 01 OCT when you were calling to pass MSF grids?
   I cannot say with certainty whom I was on the phone with.
5) What exactly did you tell (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) er on the other end of (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g call? Did you use the term "MSF"? Did the person you were speaking with recognize what MSF was? What else was discussed in the call?
   I don't remember what else was discussed on the call. I know I read the 4 grids and got a read back for accuracy. I think I used the term doctors without borders. I asked if they were tracking these locations previously and they said no. At the time of the conversation I did not see any need to document the interaction.

Additionally, the phone that we use in the OPCEN to talk to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g VOIP phone. There were several calls between the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g and I do not know from the call log on what call the conversation took place.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Sir,

6) Did you log your 01 OCT 15 (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3) in the SOTF-A JOC log? If so, please pass and highlight the entry.
   I did not log my conversation in the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g or any other log.
7) Who, if anyone, told you to pass the MSF grids? If no one told you to pass them did you do so of your own initiative?
   I was not told by anyone to pass the MSF grids. There was a memorandum on my desk at the beginning of my shift with the grids on it.
8) Plse describe the exact time and date of the call to the best of your ability.
   I cannot say with certainty what time I passed the information. I know it was after (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) had secured the PGOV. One of the MSF locations was on the same block as the PGOV. During one of the times the ground force called to update us on the FF disposition they reported the CDOs were clearing in the area where we in the JOC had that MSF location plotted. I asked if they had cleared the MSF building and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) I was talking to did not know what I was referring to. The next time they came up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g passed the grids over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g At the time I did not think there was any reason to make a record of the conversation.
9) Who (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) did you speak with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g 01 OCT when you were calling to pass MSF grids?
   I cannot say with certainty whom I was on the phone with.
10) What exactly did you tell the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) member on the other end of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g call? Did you use the term "MSF"? Did the person you were speaking with recognize what MSF was? What else was discussed in the call?
    I don't remember what else was discussed on the call. I know I read the 4 grids and got a read back for accuracy. I think I used the term doctors without borders. I asked if they were tracking these locations previously and they said no. At the time of the conversation I did not see any need to document the interaction.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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SIPR (b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 2:02 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ Passing of MSF Grids

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 5:57 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: FW: ~~(S)~~ Passing of MSF Grids

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 5:39 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: ~~(S)~~ Passing of MSF Grids

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Please answer the following questions at your earliest convenience. Each relates to your having passed MSF grids (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) OCT 15 as described in your email pasted below:

1) Did you log your 01 OCT (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) the SOTF-A JOC log? If so, please pass and highlight the entry.
2) Who, if anyone, told you to pass the MSF grids? If no one told you to pass them did you do so of your own initiative?
3) Plse describe the exact time and date of the call to the best of your ability.
4) Who (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) did you speak with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g OCT when you were calling to pass MSF grids?
5) What exactly did you tell (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) on the other end of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g Did you use the term "MSF"? Did the person you were speaking with recognize what MSF was? What else was discussed in the call?

Please let me know the answers to the above questions before 2000 tonight, 20 OCT. Thank you.

V/R,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:47 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
LNO
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: RE: ~~(S)~~ MSF Grids

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Sir,

One very important fact to note, however is that regardless of whether they had these grids, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) the grid they were actually engaging, so they wouldn't have been able to check the grid (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) was engaging against a list of MSF locations, because (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) the grid of the intended OBJ (NDS building), and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) talked them onto the hospital, not knowing it was a hospital themselves.

Respectfully,

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Tuesday, October 20, 2015 1:13 PM
To: (b)(3), (b)(6)
LNO
Subject: ~~(S)~~ MSF Grids

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Sir,

From (b)(3), (b)(6):

Sir,

After (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) had secured the PGOV compound and was conducting clearing operations around the PGOV block I asked them if they had cleared the MSF residence located on that block. They were not tracking the MSF building in that area at that time. Shortly after this, I relayed the 4 grids over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g from the paper MSF memorandum. I do not remember the exact time of this conversation. I believe it was on 1OCT15.

On 3 OCT 15 when I came on shift at (b)(1)1.4a I saw I'd received an email with updates on the MSF situation and disposition. I advised (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) that I would be sending them information over (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) also said he had a list of potential enemy positions around Kunduz. I instructed (b)(3), (b)(6) to type the grids into a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) sent his message at 030133D*OCT15. After (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) I typed the information on the MSF email in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g message and sent that at 030223D*OCT15. A short time after that w (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) came up (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g ed if they had received my traffic (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g hey replied that they had.

(b)(3), (b)(6) (NIGHT)

Approved for Release

(b)(3), (b)(6)

v/r

(b)(3), (b)(6)

SOTF-Afghanistan

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

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Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Message Body Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

Classification: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, FVEY~~

From: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Sent: Monday, October 26, 2015 7:26 PM
To:
Cc: (b)(3), (b)(6)
Subject: ~~(S)~~ Call
Importance: High

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

(b)(3), (b)(6) when I interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) he said that one his BLT NCOs called down (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g sent a (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6) relaing the grids to the MSF hospital. I'm trying to find out who did this and around what time this happened.

Thank you,
(b)(3), (b)(6)
VR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Approved for Release

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECU (b)(3), (b)(6) CT 2015

(b)(3), (b)(6)

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 28 day of OCTOBER, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
CAMP PAMIR, KUNDUZ PROVINCE, AFG	20151031	1030	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3)

9.

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. The situation in Kunduz leading to INS takeover of the city?

The situation in Kunduz Province was that of an environment where the majority of ANDSF forces were committed to static defensive positions through out Kunduz and Badakhshan Province. (b)(1)1.4d were nearly completely committed to (b)(1)1.4a Kunduz Province. The (b)(1)1.4d had been forward staged in (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d ongoing security operation in the area for nearly 3 months leading up to the INS attack in Kunduz. The remaining (b)(1)1.4d leave and scheduled to return following EID in mid September. It was arranged by the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) during his visit to (b)(1)1.4a before EID to have (b)(1)1.4d redeployed from forward staged position in (b)(1)1.4a back to (b)(1)1.4a leave with the remaining COY that was forward staged remaining ISO of (b)(1)1.4d security operation. The intent was to have the (b)(1)1.4a training after EID, with one (b)(1)1.4d. At the time of the attack on Kunduz (b)(1)1.4d had

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d

2. ANDSF response to the INS attack on Kunduz?

ANDSF response to INS attack on Kunduz City was to utilize remaining (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d including those that had returned from (b)(1)1.4d element and attempt to retain the Southeast quadrant of the city near the prison complex; however, they were unsuccessful returning by night fall.

3. The arrival of key US leadership and teams to (b)(1)1.4a /Kunduz?

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

5. All CONOPs (executed or not) developed for the retaking of Kunduz?

Two CONOPs were developed in the retaking of Kunduz. One for 29SEP and one for 30SEP, but I do not remember the time of

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 5 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 PREVIOUS EDITIONS ARE OBSOLETE APD LC v1.01ES

Approved for Release

USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1030 DATED 20151031

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

submittal. Only that they were submitted in the late afternoon and approved by late evening, and approved by COMRS from my understanding.

6. The situation surrounding the securing of Kunduz Airfield?

Some time around 2000, during final PCCs and PCIs for operation to secure foothold in Kunduz on 29SEP the (b)(1)1.4d reported that the Kunduz airfield was under attack, and audible SAF and explosions could be heard in the VIC of the Kunduz airfield. (b)(1)1.4d was re-tasked to secure the Kunduz airfield tower, and departed immediately for the airfield. Additionally, (b)(1)1.4d received FRAGO to secure the Kunduz airfield. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d and select personnel from (b)(1)1.4a en-route to Kunduz airfield to secure location. Upon departure from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d element moved to the NW end of the Kunduz airfield to the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4d simultaneously moved to the SE corner of the airfield and traveled NW along the landing strip to the airfield control tower to link up with (b)(1)1.4d Around 2050, USSF arrived at the Kunduz airfield control tower. The (b)(1)1.4d arrived at and secured the (b)(1)1.4d element arrived at the Kunduz airport tower. The (b)(1)1.4d conducted link up with the (b)(1)1.4d element that had secured the airfield tower. The (b)(1)1.4d identified a secondary (b)(1)1.4d position in a compound to the North of the airfield tower. The (b)(1)1.4d established strongpoint and C2 at the control tower on the airfield with (b)(1)1.4d element while simultaneously maneuvering (b)(1)1.4d GMVs into vehicle fighting position to the NW along the airfield as well as occupying secondary vehicle fighting position to the SE along the airfield. Upon arrival at the airfield tower the (b)(1)1.4d identified multiple civilian personnel who had fled from Kunduz seeking shelter at the airfield with ANP maintaining airfield ECP security. Sometime around 2130, (b)(1)1.4d received effective fires at the airfield tower from mounted ZPU 1.5 km to the NW. Upon INS initiation of fire on the airfield tower all civilian personnel and ANP airfield security force fled from the airfield traveling SE to (b)(1)1.4a both dismounted and mounted. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated for eyes on with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) identifying PID of the mounted ZPU firing on the airfield tower. As the airfield began receiving effective fire all civilians and (b)(1)1.4d fled further South across the airfield towards (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) after confirming PID called air to ground strike on the mounted ZPU with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) employing (b)(1)1.4a munition on the target after approval from (b)(3), (b)(6). Target was destroyed with the following assessed BDA; 1x HMMV and ZPU destroyed with 2 X EKIA. From the engaged target 4 x personnel maneuvered to the NW to a compound, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) maintained custody of 4 x personnel with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g personnel gather at the compound before losing (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g maneuvered GMV from airfield tower in support of (b)(1)1.4d strong pointed in northern compound. Around 2300 (b)(1)1.4d strong point position in North compound and (b)(1)1.4d GMV received effective SAF from unknown number of INS in the green zone 400m NE returning fire with organic weapon systems (b)(1)1.4d advised by (b)(1)1.4d suppressed INS SAF directed at the strong point position through utilization of organic weapon systems and coordinated maneuvering resulting in no further SAF from INS position in the green zone. Around 2330 (b)(1)1.4d maneuvered 3 x GMVs in support of the (b)(1)1.4d strong point position. Sometime around midnight or shortly there after the combined (b)(1)1.4d and (b)(1)1.4d element received no further contact with INS forces with no reported change to friendly disposition. Around 0130, ANP airport security force returned from (b)(1)1.4a and reestablished security positions. Around 0200 (b)(1)1.4d was instructed to return to (b)(1)1.4a, and reconsolidated all elements at the airfield tower followed by movement back to (b)(1)1.4a while the (b)(1)1.4d repositioned GMV in support of (b)(1)1.4d strongpoint position. Around 0430, all elements were conducting stand-to at their positions. Around 0630, GFC received notification to conduct EXFIL from strong point positions at the Kunduz airfield. At 0700, all (b)(1)1.4d GMVs were reconsolidated at the airfield tower postured for movement to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d remained strong pointed in support of ANP airfield security. Around 0715, the (b)(1)1.4d conducted movement SE along the airfield landing strip to (b)(1)1.4a Sometime around 0730, EXFIL was complete.

7. The planning that resulted in the CONOP to retake Kunduz?

I was asleep during the planning to retake Kunduz on 30SEP as we had returned from securing the airfield that morning. I do not know who was there for the planning. I was informed of the plan upon waking up sometime around 1300, and my understanding was that the purpose of the operation was to establishing a foothold through securing key governmental infrastructure from which ANDSF could expand operations.

8. A detailed description of the operation from (b)(1)1.4a to secure the Kunduz PCOP on 30 Sep?

The combined force departed sometime around 2200, with elements moving north in with in order of march of (b)(1)1.4d (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d. Lead element received contact from INS forces and PSU returned fire with organic weapon systems. INS threat was engaged by (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) and element continued forward receiving contact from 12x INS as the PSU approached the PSU HQ building again returning fire with organic weapons and engaging with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6). PSU HQ was secured by the PSU, and at that time and ANA element arrived to assist in securing objective locations as the combined element cleared into the city. PSU remained at the PSU HQ securing the site as the (b)(1)1.4d led into the city toward the prison which was to be secured by (b)(1)1.4d with the ANA in trail to establish CPs and assist in securing OBJ locations. Element received INS SAF returning fire with organic weapon systems and continuing to the prison. As the lead element approached the prison INS contact was made again with SAF, RPG and element

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 2 OF 5 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1030 DATED 20151031

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

returned fire with organic weapons systems and engaged INS with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) as they attempted to maneuver on element. Combined element continued continued to the prison which was cleared by (b)(1)1.4d with no INS contact in the prison. While clearing of prison was being conducted lead element (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d received heavy weapons and RPG fire from a large INS force, and lead element was fixed in place unable to move. INS force was engaged with (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) enabling continued movement the PCOP and PGOV complexes. ANA secured the prison complex reporting that an additional jail/prison 1km North next to the PCOP. The combined element continued North where the lead (b)(1)1.4d element struck a VOIED initiated by a trip wire at the PCOP complex with no friendly casualties (b)(1)1.4d began to secure the area when the lead (b)(1)1.4d vehicle was then struck by a VBIED resulting again in no friendly casualties. Element began to receive SAF from the West and returned fire with organic weapon systems (b)(1)1.4d cleared the Kunduz Hotel South of the PCOP while (b)(1)1.4d cleared the jail West of the PCOP. At this time BMNT was approaching and element began to look for an entrance for vehicles into the PCOP complex. After locating ECP into PCOP element maneuvered to the entrance and received SAF to the South of the ECP and returned fire with organic weapons as the element entered into the cleared PCOP compound and established security in the PCOP. It was now morning of 01OCT and a hasty defense had been established in the PCOP occupying tower positions on the West and roof tops on the East within the compound with (b)(1)1.4d securing ECP on the East. That morning the PCOP and new PGOV arrived to tour the site then departed sometime around 0700. Following their departure the element received IDF, RPG, and SAF in increasing intensity from the North and West of PCOP and element returned fire with organic weapons. Volume of fire continued to increase as INS maneuvered to within 30-50m of the compound perimeter. I directed 2 show of forces from (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) which temporarily dispersed INS force for a short duration. Volume of firing then increased again in intensity within close proximity to the West and North perimeter within 20m. (b)(3), (b)(6) then took control of the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) assets while I ran to the Western perimeter to assess situation and direct fires to repel INS assault. INS fire was effective and continuing to increase as combined element repelled multiple assaults on the PCOP complex. Net call came over the radio to pull back from the Western defensive positions IOT allow for (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) gun runs to repel INS assault. Personnel were pulled from the defensive positions and accounted for then (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) executed gun runs along the Western perimeter having positive effects. Fighting continued through out the day receiving SAF and RPG fire as IDF increased in accuracy impacting along the South wall of the PCOP. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) provided identification of IDF POO site located to the South of the PCOP in an open area. I directed (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) to engage with multiple gun runs having positive effects reducing IDF impacts at the PCOP. That afternoon another concentrated assault was conducted by INS forces to breach the Western perimeter defensive positions, and was repelled utilizing organic weapon systems. Through out the day fighting was nearly non stop as INS forces continually assaulted the PCOP attempting to breach the outer defensive perimeter. That evening, after (b)(3), (b)(6) made repeated request, ANDSF began to show up to assume responsibility of securing the PCOP, but in a small number of about (b)(1)1.4d ANP and ANA combined. Immediately they stated that if the USSF left then they would abandon the defense of the PCOP. (b)(3), (b)(6) assessed, with discussion amongst myself and (b)(3), (b)(6) that we would stay at the PCOP another 24 hrs IOT allow the ANDSF time to martial a larger force to secure the site. At this time class I and VII supplies were becoming and issue and request was submitted for resupply. Sporadic SAF continued through out the night into the morning of 02OCT. The morning of 02OCT began with a lull in contact with INS forces, and we were planning on EXFILL back to (b)(1)1.4a that night; however, early that afternoon a coordinated and heavy assault was conducted by INS forces on the Southwest and Northeast perimeter of the PCOP. It was the heaviest contact we had received up to that point with INS sustaining assaulting effort. ANDSF took 3x casualties (GSWs) who were moved to the center of the compound at the CCP for treatment and stabilized. It was at this time that myself and other (b)(1)1.4a team members ran to the roof on the eastern perimeter and received SAF returning fire with organic weapons. We could see (b)(1)1.4a position to the NE in a large 4-5 story green building in heavy contact with INS force receiving SAF, RPG, and PKM fire. So much so that the buildings were nearly obscured by smoke and dust from the exchange of fire. We continued to receive SAF and PKM from the same direction. I then ran back down to the courtyard and had the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) on the roof with me IOT positively identify (b)(1)1.4a positions utilizing smoke from (b)(1)1.4a to mark INS position and determine friendly positions from marked INS position via communications through (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) simultaneously, as this was occurring the SW defensive position defended by (b)(1)1.4a team members was under heavy SAF, RPG, and PKM fire from INS forces. The volume and intensity of fire of the INS coordinated assault on the PCOP was extremely alarming. Once friendly forces had positively been identified (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted air to ground engagements on both the INS positions to the Northeast and Southwest with positive effects in addition to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducting air to ground on strike on HMMWVs captured by INS maneuvering with 15 PAX to the PCOP with multiple PAX from the North. Fighting continued until POD where INS contact became sporadic SAF. It became clear that we would not be able to EXFIL during that POD as the ANDSF would leave the site since no further ANDSFs had arrived. Also, class V was becoming a supply issue as well as charged batteries IOT sustain communications with air support assets. An aerial resupply request was submitted and (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) to bring back a ground resupply from (b)(1)1.4a after transporting the 3 x casualties back. It was at or around 2130 when the (b)(1)1.4d (b)(6) approached myself and provided two grids which he stated the (b)(1)1.4a would be clearing later that night. He described one grid as the NDS HQ and the second grid as a INS C2 location. He requested that we provide (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3) the locations, and then departed with

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6) PAGE 3 OF 5 PAGES

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1030 DATED 20151031

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

the casualties for the Kunduz Airfield were they were to exchange the casualties with friendly forces and return with (b)(1)1.4d resupply convoy. Then take the resupply convoy back to the airfield after which the (b)(1)1.4d planned to execute clearance of the the two provided OBJ grids. Upon departure the (b)(1)1.4d received SAF contact with INS force approximately 100m South of the PCOP ECP and returned fire with organic weapons pushing through contact and continuing to Kunduz Airfield. I then passed the grids received from (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(3), (b)(6) indicating that one grid was the NDS HQ and the other an INS C2 node, and that both were OBJs for the (b)(1)1.4d later tonight and to (b)(1)1.4a on the locations. I continued to monitor (b)(1)1.4d progress to and from the Kunduz Airfield requesting (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d to verify FLTs while sporadic SAF continued to the West and Southwest. At or around 022345OCT the (b)(1)1.4d were approaching the PCOP and my shift was nearly over manning the C2 position. I awoke (b)(3), (b)(6) and then assisted in downloading of supplies from the (b)(1)1.4d vehicle as the pulled into the PCOP. Once the download of supplies was complete I went to sleep at or around 030015OCT.

a. Operation objectives, which Afghan units participated, which ODA teams?

PSU was to secure the PSU HQ (b)(1)1.4d advised by (b)(1)1.4d were to secure the PCOP/PGOV, and (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4d was to secure the Prison.

b. Did (b)(3), (b)(6) make any statements regarding INS in Kunduz? Did he state that everyone west of route (b)(1)1.4a was an INS?

I do not recall (b)(3), (b)(6) making any such statement that everyone West of (b)(1)1.4a was an INS.

c. Disposition of enemy forces in/around Kunduz?

Reported INS forces were massed in the Southwest, Western, and Northern areas of Kunduz.

b. Situation surrounding discovery/use of PRT map?

The PRT map was discovered in one of the PCOP offices on late evening of 01OCT, and was utilized IOT attempt to mark FLT of friendly units but was not effective as (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g units were not familiar with the area being from Kabul.

10. The (b)(1)1.4d plan to attack the NDS facility (prison) in Kunduz on POD 2-3 Oct?

I do not know what the (b)(1)1.4d plan was clear the OBJs other than they planned on conducting the mission after taking the resupply convoy back to Kunduz Airfield.

a. Who from (b)(1)1.4d relayed plans to US forces, grid references passed, names of Afghan leadership involved (if known)?

I know that (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) at the time provided the grids to myself, and were verified by the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) do not recall their names.

b. Who received the grids (which Leader) and what did they do with them?

I received the (b)(1)1.4d OBJ grids and relayed them to (b)(3), (b)(6)

c. Was the operation intended to be a combined or partnered operation?

I do not know if it was intended to be a partnered operation.

d. Do you know if any US personnel participated in the planning of the (b)(1)1.4d operation?

I do not know if an US personnel participated in planning of the (b)(1)1.4d operation.

e. What did the (b)(1)1.4d request in terms of support? Did they only request (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g

The (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(6) from myself when he passed me the grids.

f. Did (b)(1)1.4d provide a description of the objectives associated with the passed grid references? If so, characterize the description(s).?

I never received a description of the OBJs as the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6) left once he passed me the grids.

g. How many grid references were passed from the (b)(1)1.4d to you?

I received two separate grids.

h. What are those grid(s)?

I do not remember what the grids were. I wrote them down on a luminescent tape writing board the size of a 3x5 card with a dry erase marker and erased them at some point in the future to make room for additional grids passed later on during conduct of the operation.

i. How many grid references were passed to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

I passed the two grids provided to (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) which were passed to myself from the (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(6)

NOTHING ELSE FOLLOWS

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1030 DATED 20151031

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 4. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY AND VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, (b)(3), (b)(6), a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 3 day of OCTOBER, 2015 at 1030

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 5 OF 5 PAGES

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Approved for Release

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 27 Oct 15

(b)(3), (b)(6)

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 27th day of October, 2015.

Sig (b)(3), (b)(6)

S (b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

Derived from AR 15-6, para. 3-8.d. and SF 312

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as [illegible] anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 28 Oct 15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

(b)(3), (b)(6) - USAF

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

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I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 28 day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Approved for Release

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, _____ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 9 Nov 2015

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 28 day of October, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
BAGRAM AF	20151028	1600	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
(b)(3)

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

On 2 October, 2015, I was the (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(3), (b)(6) We were alerted at approximately (b)(1)1.4a to fly in support of a troops-in-contact situation in Konduz, Afghanistan. Due to the short notice of the tasking, we stepped to the aircraft without printed products. Intel briefed us on the general situation in the area and historical surface-to-air threats. We (b)(1)1.4a before proceeding to the Konduz area. While flying in the area, the aircraft was shot at by an (b)(1)1.4g which was initially

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g, (b)(3), (b)(6)

Later in the mission, we were passed coordinates for a building from which coalition forces were receiving fire or had received fire earlier in the night. The grid coordinates passed by the JTAC didn't match what the sensors were seeing at that location, so considerable time was spent by the sensors, FCO, and navigator to confirm with the JTAC that the building they were seeing was the same building that the JTAC intended to strike. Based on descriptions from the sensor operators and discussion internally and with the JTAC, the crew determined we had found the correct compound. The NAV requested the specific ROEs we were operating under to strike the building, and the JTAC passed back Resolute Support (b)(1)1.4a based on the Afghan forces being accompanied by American forces and being granted PDSS. The NAV requested clarification on which buildings should be struck due to the large number of individual buildings inside the compound, and the JTAC specified only the large T-shaped building in the center of the compound. The JTAC requested (b)(1)1.4a rounds on the building and (b)(1)1.4a After multiple engagements on the building and (b)(1)1.4a the crew ceased shooting. There were no further engagements that night.

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF _____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAGRAM AF DATED 28 Oct 15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

N/A

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT (b)(3), (b)(6)

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006 APD LC v1.01ES

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT BAGRAM AF DATED 28 Oct 15

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

N/A

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 3. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, O

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this 28th day of October, 2015 at Bagram Air Field, AFG

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

Article 136, (b)(3), (b)(6)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) _____, are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

The Privacy Act requires that, because information is being solicited from you which will be filed so as to be retrievable by reference to your name or personal identifier, you must be advised of the following information:

A. **AUTHORITY FOR SOLICITING INFORMATION**: 41 U.S.C. § 31; DOD 5200.1-R

B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

C. **ROUTINE USES THAT MAY BE MADE OF THE INFORMATION:** Any information you provide is disclosable to members of the Department of Defense who have an official need to know the information in the performance of their duties.

D. **DISCLOSURE**: If you become a suspect during an investigation, disclosure is voluntary. If you are a witness, you may be ordered to provide in formation.

E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 28 day of OCT 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6) _____ (b)(3), (b)(6) _____

S

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6), are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 04-Nov-15

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 4th day of NOVEMBER, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

(b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Interviewee

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE *(YYYYMMDD)*	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
SOTF-A JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER	2015-11-04	1242	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN

9. I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1. (b)(3), (b)(6)
2. (b)(1)1.4a
3.
4. THERE IS A SHIFT CHANGE BRIEF THAT COVERS EVENTS FROM THE PAST 12 HRS AND PROJECTIONS FOR THE NEXT 24. CONOPS ARE BRIEFED.
5. OPCEN WAS MINOTORING EVENTS IN KUNDUZ WHICH WAS UNDER ATTACK FROM TALIBAN INSURGENTS.
6. YES
7. YES. ENSURE THERE IS ADEQUATE ISR COVERAGE FOR ONGOING OPERATIONS
8. YES
9. YES. YES

(b)(1)1.4c

11. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
12. YES
13. ENSURE THERE IS ADEQUATE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g. ENSURE ASSET AVAILABILITY.
14. NO.
15. YES. DO NOT RECALL
16. NO
17. NO
18. N/A (Q17)
19. N/A (Q17)
20. NO
21. YES
22. NO
23. NO

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

THE BOTTOM OF EACH ADDITIONAL PAGE MUST BEAR THE INITIALS OF THE PERSON MAKING THE STATEMENT, AND PAGE NUMBER MUST BE INDICATED.

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT SOTF-A DATED 04NOV2015

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

Approved for Release

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT SOTF-A DATED 04NOV2015

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE ____. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL INFLUENCE, OR UNLAWFUL INDUCEMENT.

(Signature of Person Making Statement)

WITNESSES:

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this ____ day of ____, ____ at ____

(b)(3), (b)(6)

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

DA FORM 2823, NOV 2006

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Derived from AR 15-6, para. 3-8.d. and SF 312

ORDER PERTAINING TO THE INVESTIGATION INTO EVENTS OCCURRING IN AND AROUND KUNDUZ, AFGHANISTAN ON OR ABOUT 3 OCTOBER 2015

1. You, (b)(3), (b)(6) , are ordered not to discuss your statements made as a part of this investigation with anyone, to include other witnesses or other individuals who may have no official interest in the investigation, except myself, or a designated member of the team investigating events occurring in and around Kunduz, Afghanistan, on or about 3 October 2015, nor disclose any information that you obtained as a result of this interview until the completion of this investigation. For individuals subject to the Uniform Code of Military Justice, failure to comply with this order could result in adverse action, up to and including punitive action.

2. You will comply with all conditions and obligations imposed upon you by this Order until and unless you are released in writing from this agreement.

DATE
OF EXECUTION: 04 Nov 2015

William B. Hickman
MG, USA
DCG-O, USARCENT

Approved for Release

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

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B. **PRINCIPAL PURPOSES FOR WHICH INFORMATION IS INTENDED TO BE USED**: To determine the facts and surrounding circumstances being investigated by the authority of any appropriate CENTCOM regulations regarding Reports of Survey, Line of Duty Investigations, Security Investigations, or any other procedural matters regarding the gathering of evidence in the line of duty.

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E. **THE EFFECT ON YOU IF YOU DO NOT PROVIDE ALL OR PART OF THE INFORMATION REQUESTED**: providing the information is voluntary subject to paragraph D. There will be no adverse effect on your for not providing this information other than certain information might not be available to the appointing or reviewing authority for their decision in this matter.

I acknowledge that I am hereby informed of the above matters regarding the information to be solicited from me this 4th day of November, 2015.

(b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6)

Signature of Witness

Approved for Release

SWORN STATEMENT

For use of this form, see AR 190-45; the proponent agency is PMG.

PRIVACY ACT STATEMENT

AUTHORITY: Title 10, USC Section 301; Title 5, USC Section 2951; E.O. 9397 Social Security Number (SSN).

PRINCIPAL PURPOSE: To document potential criminal activity involving the U.S. Army, and to allow Army officials to maintain discipline, law and order through investigation of complaints and incidents.

ROUTINE USES: Information provided may be further disclosed to federal, state, local, and foreign government law enforcement agencies, prosecutors, courts, child protective services, victims, witnesses, the Department of Veterans Affairs, and the Office of Personnel Management. Information provided may be used for determinations regarding judicial or non-judicial punishment, other administrative disciplinary actions, security clearances, recruitment, retention, placement, and other personnel actions.

DISCLOSURE: Disclosure of your SSN and other information is voluntary.

1. LOCATION	2. DATE (YYYYMMDD)	3. TIME	4. FILE NUMBER
SOTF-A JOINT OPERATIONS CENTER	20151104	1330	

5. LAST NAME, FIRST NAME, MIDDLE NAME	6. SSN	7. GRADE/STATUS
(b)(3), (b)(6)		

8. ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS
SPECIAL OPERATIONS TASK FORCE-AFGHANISTAN

9.
I, (b)(3), (b)(6), WANT TO MAKE THE FOLLOWING STATEMENT UNDER OATH:

1: (b)(3), (b)(6)
2: (b)(1)1.4a
3:
4: THERE IS A SHIFT CHANGE BRIEF THAT COVERS THE LAST 12 HOURS OF SHIFT ANDTHE UPCOMING 24 HOURS.
5: ODA TEAMS WERE IN THE PROCESS MOVING THROUGH KUNDUZ CITY IN ORDER TO RE-TAKE IT FROM INS FORCES.
6: THE NORMAL STAFF WAS PRESENT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.
7: THERE IS A BATTLE DRILL YET IT DOES NOT INVOLVE THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g DESK AFTER ASSET IS ON STATION.
8: TO MY KNOWLEDGE, INFORMATION WAS BEING PASSED THAT INS FORCES WERE CONSOLIDATING IN A SPECIFIC LOCATION.
9: THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g MONITORS EACH INDIVIDUAL ASSET OPERATION (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g AS WELL AS THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g TO ENSURE EACH ASSET IS ON STATION AT THEIR REQUIRED TIME.
10: CUOPS ACTIONS ON THE 2ND OF OCT WERE NORMAL, MONITORING EACH ASSET SCHEDULED FOR KUNDUZ CITY OVERWATCH AS WELL AS ENSURING NO GAPS IN COVERAGE HAPPEND OVER USSF DURING THEIR MOVEMENT.
11: THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g IS IN CHARGE OF (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g SYSTEMS REGULARLY TO ENSURE NO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g EACH SYSTEM, THERE IS NOTHING MORE WE ARE ABLE TO DO.
12: NO
13: MONITOR UPCOMING OPERATIONS TO MAKE SURE EACH HAVE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
14: NO
15: NO, I LEARNED OF THE STRIKE AFTER THE FACT.
16: AFTER THE STRIKE, I LEARNED THAT THE COMPOUND WE JUST HIT MAY BE A MSF HOSPITAL BUT NO FURTHER INFORMATION WAS GIVEN TO THE (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
17: I WAS UNAWARE OF INDIVIDUALS MOVING IN AND OUT OF THE OPCEN AT THAT TIME
18: N/A
19: N/A
20: PASSIVELY LISTEN TO (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g
21: YES
22: TO MY KNOWLEDGE, (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4g WERE BEING CONDUCTED AT THAT TIME

10. EXHIBIT	11. INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING STATEMENT	PAGE 1 OF 3 PAGES
	(b)(3), (b)(6)	

ADDITIONAL PAGES MUST CONTAIN THE HEADING "STATEMENT OF_____ TAKEN AT _____ DATED _____

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USE THIS PAGE IF NEEDED. IF THIS PAGE IS NOT NEEDED, PLEASE PROCEED TO FINAL PAGE OF THIS FORM.

STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1330 DATED 20151104

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

23: NOT TO MY KNOWLEDGE.

Approved for Release

INITIALS O (b)(3), (b)(6) ATEMENT

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STATEMENT OF (b)(3), (b)(6) TAKEN AT 1330 DATED 20151104

9. STATEMENT *(Continued)*

AFFIDAVIT

I, (b)(3), (b)(6), HAVE READ OR HAVE HAD READ TO ME THIS STATEMENT WHICH BEGINS ON PAGE 1, AND ENDS ON PAGE 2. I FULLY UNDERSTAND THE CONTENTS OF THE ENTIRE STATEMENT MADE BY ME. THE STATEMENT IS TRUE. I HAVE INITIALED ALL CORRECTIONS AND HAVE INITIALED THE BOTTOM OF EACH PAGE CONTAINING THE STATEMENT. I HAVE MADE THIS STATEMENT FREELY WITHOUT HOPE OF BENEFIT OR REWARD, WITHOUT THREAT OF PUNISHMENT, AND WITHOUT COERCION, UNLAWFUL

(b)(3), (b)(6)

WITNESSES:

(b)(3), (b)(6)

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

ORGANIZATION OR ADDRESS

Subscribed and sworn to before me, a person authorized by law to administer oaths, this _____ day of _____, _____ at _____

(Signature of Person Administering Oath)

(Typed Name of Person Administering Oath)

(Authority To Administer Oaths)

INITIALS OF PERSON MAKING S (b)(3), (b)(6)

PAGE 3 OF 3 PAGES

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