STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURE 2184
FORCE PROTECTION FOR IJC PERSONNEL WORKING IN AFGHAN MINISTRIES

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REFERENCES:

A	Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Instruction (CJCSI) 1630.01, Afghanistan/ Pakistan Hands (AH) Program, dated 03 Sept 10
B	CM-0121-12, CJCS Memorandum to the Chiefs of the Military Services and Combatant Commanders on Afghanistan-Pakistan Hands Program, dated 22 May 2012
C	AD 80-25, Directive for Force Protection, dated 14 May 2009
D	AJP 3.14, Force Protection, dated November 2007
E	DOD O 2000.12-H, DOD Anti-Terrorism Handbook, dated 09 Feb 04
F	DOD D 2000.12, DOD Anti-Terrorism Program, dated 18 Aug 03
G	HQ ISAF SOP 331, Theatre Force Protection Measures, dated 05 Jan 13
H	HQ ISAF SOP 231, Security and Access for ISAF personnel, dated 01 Jul 13
I	HQ ISAF SOP 361, Theatre Driving Principles and Traffic Regulations, 19 Aug 09
J	COMISAF Insider Threat Tactical Directive, dated 3 Mar 12
K	HQ ISAF SOP 332, Mitigation of Insider Threat, dated 25 Apr 13
L	COMISAF's Tactical Driving Directive, Revision 2, dated 05 Nov 11
M	HQ ISAF FRAGO 054-2012, Enduring Force Protection Measures, dated 30 Mar 12
N	HQ ISAF FRAGO 132-2013, Afghan Hands, dated 30 Aug 2013
O	HQ ISAF FRAGO 076-2013, Insider Threat During Ramazan, dated 20 May 13

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Introduction

1. This SOP provides a guide for IJC personnel working in Afghan ministries. The mission of these personnel carries with it certain inherent and unique risks which require specific Force Protection (FP) practices and policies. This SOP details the FP and Risk Management (RM) measures to be applied and considered for all personnel working in these critical positions.

AUTHORITY: This SOP applies to all IJC personnel working in Afghanistan ministries. This SOP is directive in nature. This SOP is consistent with the intent of the Military Technical Agreement concerning ISAF forces,[1] because it is based on military necessity and the request of Afghan ministry officials to reduce the overall appearance of an occupying force during ISAF engagements.

Force Protection & Risk Management

2. The U.S. Department of Defense defines FP as:

"Actions taken to prevent or mitigate hostile action against Department of Defense personnel (to include family members), resources, facilities, and critical infrastructure. These actions conserve the force's fighting potential so it can be applied at the decisive time and place and incorporate the coordinated and synchronized offensive and defensive measures to enable the effective employment of the joint force while degrading opportunities for the enemy."

NATO Defines FP as:

"Measures and means to minimize the vulnerability of personnel, facilities, material, operations and activities from threats and hazards in order to preserve freedom of action and operational effectiveness thereby contributing to mission success."

3. Anti-Terrorism Risk Management (ATRM) is defined as *"The process of systematically identifying, assessing, and controlling risks arising from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits"*. The FP principles of prevention and mitigation of hostile action and conservation of fighting potential are based on application of sound risk management practices. As applicable to the IJC Ministerial Advisors, risk management is based on 3 elements: 1) identifying risk level, 2) reducing the risk level when feasible, and 3) making conscious well thought-out decisions to accept, further mitigate, or avoid the risk.

4. IJC Ministerial Advisors working with Afghanistan Ministries at Afghan locations carries with them certain inherent risks which must be understood and managed. Risk management, not risk avoidance, is required in order to achieve this mission set. Commanders of these personnel should take these increased risks into consideration when making RM decisions. However, increased risk acceptance does not give IJC

[1] Article VI, Section 1 of the Military Technical Agreement, dated 1 April 2002, provides that "ISAF personnel will wear uniforms and may carry arms if authorised by their orders."

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Ministerial Advisors the authority to operate outside of sound FP principles or unilaterally deviate from unit guidance.

Individual Protection

5. All personnel that will work with Afghan ministries will go through their country's pre-deployment Insider Threat and Cultural Awareness Training. There are two courses that are offered by NATO Training Mission –Afghanistan (NTM-A) that should be considered for IJC Ministerial Advisors. The first is the Advanced Insider Threat Detection (AITD) course that is taught to NTM-A/ CSTC-A/AFPAK Hands and anyone who desires the training within the Kabul City Limit Zone. The premise behind this course is to not only define what constitutes the Insider Threat and types of attacks, but to arm the student with tools to detect pre-event indicators that will enable Coalition Force (CF) personnel to deter, prevent, or mitigate an Insider Threat (IT) attack. The class also emphasizes employing the right mindset, a combat mindset IOT react to an attack in an effective manner and to neutralize the threat. The course is based on the U.S. Marine Corps' Combat Hunter program which consists of observation, combat tracking, combat profiling, and intelligence collecting/exploitation techniques and principles. The class is tailored for IJC Ministerial Advisors.

6. The second course is the Quick Reaction Drill (QRD) dry fire and live fire pistol courses, a "Practical Application" to the AITD class designed to define/describe the "Active Shooter", reinforce basic combat marksmanship skills, personal gear use/wearing and to provide enhanced training to combat the "Active Shooter" within the office work space aboard a camp or forward operating base. The live fire portion begins with basic skills reinforcement and progresses to engaging multiple targets while conducting magazine speed reloads. The live fire portion culminates with shooters executing a timed obstacle course, moving and engaging targets from various shooting stances, behind various types of cover and concealment, and conducting speed magazine reloads. This training is offered every month. The course of fire requires 100 rounds per shooter and takes place aboard Kabul Military Training Center (KMTC). Both classes are unclassified; all information for the various caveats comes from open sourcing and unclassified reports.

Individual Risk Assessment.

7. Each IJC Branch Chief will be required to conduct or review an individual risk assessment (see Annex A) for any of their personnel working with an Afghan ministry. The individual risk assessment will be revalidated, reviewed, as appropriate with the arrival of a new personnel, significant change in mission responsibilities, change in organizational leadership, significant change in local threat level, or at any other time it is determined appropriate by their IJC Branch Chief.

8. The risk assessment must be formatted and conducted in accordance with Annex A. The risk assessment must be signed by the first OF-5 (who is not a part of the team covered by the risk assessment) in the IJC chain of command.

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Clothing and Appearance

9. Given the unique missions associated with IJC Ministerial Advisors there may be situations or positions where non-standard uniforms or civilian clothes are necessary. The decision to require IJC personnel to wear civilian clothes must be made deliberately by the first OF-5 (who is not a part of the team covered by the risk assessment) in the IJC chain of command. The fact that IJC Ministerial Advisors are working with non-uniformed government employees or civilians does not automatically justify the wearing of civilian clothes. The decision to allow wearing of civilian clothes must be based on military necessity, and the need to protect non-military members associated with these personnel. In addition to this precondition, national caveats may also limit or even completely interdict the use of civilian clothes by members of the armed forces, since wearing civilian clothes may be viewed as disguising their combatant status. Due to the fact that members of the armed forces affected by these caveats may become subject to national legal and or disciplinary prosecution by violating these rules, these national caveats may supersede military necessities and decisions to wear civilian clothes.

10. If IJC Ministerial Advisors are authorized to wear civilian clothes full-time, the justification for that must be in writing and included in the risk assessment described in this document. Each job and mission is different and requires consideration regarding appropriateness of civilian clothing. In all cases sound risk management principles should be applied to the decision.

11. For the use of civilian clothes on individual missions the first OF-5 (who is not a part of the team covered by the risk assessment) in the IJC chain of command must develop a deliberate approval process, this process may be either blanket or specific to each mission. The approval to use civilian clothes for individual missions must be based on military necessity, the desire to protect non-military members, and the need to comply with the Afghan Government's request to reduce the presence of an occupying force while working in GIRoA government buildings/offices. At no time will any IJC personnel conducting offensive military operations or preparing for offensive military operations wear civilian clothes while performing these functions.

Weapon Status

12. All IJC Ministerial Advisors that carry their weapons should always have their weapon visible to the public. Given the unique missions associated with IJC Ministerial Advisors there may be situations or positions where IJC personnel do not carry a weapon. The decision to not require IJC personnel to carry a weapon must be made deliberately by the first OF-5 (who is not a part of the team covered by the Risk Assessment) in the IJC chain of command. The fact that IJC personnel are working with non-uniformed government employees or civilians does not automatically justify them not carrying a weapon. The decision not to allow IJC Ministerial Advisors carry a weapon must be based on military necessity and the need to protect non-military members associated with these personnel. However, national caveats may require armed forces personnel to carry a weapon at all times, regardless of their task or mission, in order to be able to protect themselves. Due to the fact that members of the armed forces affected by these caveats may become subject to national legal

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and or disciplinary prosecution by violating this rule, these national caveats may supersede decisions of the IJC chain of command not to carry a weapon.

Personal Protective Equipment (PPE)

13. PPE serves a crucial role in individual safety by reducing VULNERABILITY. However, there are occasions when wear and use of PPE (especially distinctive military PPE) may increase the wearer's profile thus allowing for easier targeting of the wearer and individuals and organizations associated with the wearer. Such increased profile may increase the threat to IJC Ministerial Advisors and individuals and organizations working with these personnel. When IJC Ministerial Advisors are operating in civilian clothes/vehicles (especially un-armored vehicles) away from other uniformed ANSF or ISAF personnel, leadership must evaluate the military PPE and make a sound RM decision as to proper level or type of worn PPE. Covert PPE should be considered as an interim step between full military PPE and no PPE. The first OF-5 (who is not a part of the team covered by the risk assessment) in the IJC chain of command should include the required use or authorized non-use of PPE in the risk assessment. However, national caveats may require armed forces personnel to carry PPE outside hardened buildings or installations at all times, regardless of their task or mission, in order to protect themselves. Due to the fact that members of the armed forces affected by these caveats may become subject to national legal and or disciplinary prosecution by violating this rule, these national caveats may supersede decisions of the IJC chain of command not to wear PPE.

Insider Threat Mitigation

14. Insider Threats poses perhaps the gravest overall risk to IJC Ministerial Advisors and must be taken very seriously by everyone. The danger Insider Threats pose to IJC Ministerial Advisors is two-fold. First, the close relationship between Afghans and IJC personnel increases the vulnerability to an insider attack. Second, certain insider threat risk mitigation measures such as highly visible guardian angels may limit the IJC Ministerial Advisors' ability to build close, mutually trusting, and beneficial relationships with Afghan counterparts. For the purposes of this SOP, insider threats are broken down into two general categories: targeted and random. A targeted insider attack, as the name suggests, is directed against a specific individual or group. Such an attack allows the attacker to select the best time and place and attack when the targeted individual or group is the most vulnerable. A random insider attack occurs when a motivated attacker sees an opportunity and acts to cause physical harm to whoever happens to be in the area and vulnerable to the attack. The motivations for conducting an insider attack are extremely varied but are important to understand.

Personal

15. The Afghan culture is based heavily on honor. In fact, to many, especially rural Afghans, honor is potentially more important than life. Additionally, what may be viewed as normal/acceptable behavior in Western culture may present a serious insult in the Afghan culture. However, it is crucial that all IJC Ministerial Advisors continue to use available resources (including Afghan counterparts) to learn and

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develop their understanding of Afghan culture. IJC Ministerial Advisors should take every available opportunity to help others gain knowledge of Afghan culture and should never fail to point out insulting or improper behavior by ISAF personnel when they see it. Moreover, IJC Ministerial Advisors should leverage their close relationship with Afghans to explain Western behavior and help Afghans understand the meaning/rationale behind Western behavior. If IJC Ministerial Advisors are able to serve as a bridge to help both sides better understand the behavior and culture of the other it may help to reduce cases of personally motivated insider attacks. However, cultural understanding is unlikely to eliminate all chance of personally-motivated insider threats. Increases in insider attacks have been noted following events such as the Koran burning, media depictions of the Prophet Mohammad, and other situations viewed as insults to Islam. Additionally, anti-Western sentiment frequently increases following high-profile civilian-casualty incidents or during sensitive times of the year such as Ramazan (sees HQ ISAF FRAGO 076-13 IT Mitigation during Ramadan). All IJC Ministerial Advisors should remain attentive to such situations and during times of increased tension.

Personal Communications

16. Prior to vehicle self-movement the IJC Ministerial Advisors visiting Afghan ministries should be issued a mobile or portable/handheld radio (the ICN – TETRAPOL is preferable) and/or a cell phone (excellent backup have both Roshan and AWCC). Vulnerability may be significantly increased by lack of communications capability. IJC Ministerial Advisors will not depart a secure area without at least two forms of communication device (a blood chit does not count as a communications device).

Command and Signal

17. Command and Control. COMISAF has the overall responsibility for FP. COMISAF as appropriate has delegated FP authority to individual headquarters, organizational, and regional commanders. For FP matters IJC Ministerial Advisors do not operate outside of the TACON unit's operational FP chain of command. IJC personnel must comply with all FP direction and guidance

Releasing Authority:

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Annex A to
SOP-2184
Dated 05 MAR 14

EXAMPLE IJC INDIVIDUAL RISK ASSESSMENT

CLASSIFIED WHEN RISK MITIGATION MEASURES ARE FILLED IN

Name(Last, First, MI)	Rank(NATO)	Assigned Unit
Assigned Section	**Supervisor**	
Date Arrived Theatre	**Date Arrived to Assigned Unit**	
Estimated Redeployment Date	**Nationality**	**Branch of Service**

Military or Civilian Career Specialty (AFSC/MOS)	Years In Specialty

Degrees Awarded	Year Earned

Specialized Skills (self-assessed) (applicable to current mission)	**Skill Level** (self-assessed) (Basic, Intermediate, Expert)

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Experience in Conflict Zones		
Location	Year & Duration	Duty Description

Formal Training (Applicable to Current Mission)	Brief Description of Training

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Duty Position	AH Job Category	Risk Category

Duty Description & Requirements (completed by individual or supervisor)	
Duty Description (Be detailed. Describe requirements to perform duty on/off installation, liaison with locals, travel etc.)	

Risk Analysis CLASSIFIED WHEN FILLED IN	
Consider risks associated w/duty description from block above as related to threats in area of operation. Be as complete as possible.	

Essential Experience &Training(Annex B)					**Method of Training/Explanation of Experience**
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		
	YES		NO		

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Training Discrepancies Review essential training & experience for AH position described in Annex D of this SOP	**CLASSIFIED WHEN MITIGATION MEASURES FILLED IN**
	Mitigation Measures Briefly explain training, experience or TTP that may mitigate training discrepancy

Supervisor (first O-6/OF-5 or civilian equivalent in chain of command) comments regarding level of training, training discrepancies, and risk mitigation measures. **CLASSIFIED WHEN FILLED IN**				
Training Level Acceptable to Perform Mission	YES		NO	
If **NO**, required additional mitigation measures **CLASSIFIED WHEN FILLED IN**				
Supervisor Signature	**Date Signed**			

Off Installation Movement (completed by supervisor)					**Comments**
Authorised *Off Installation Movement*	YES		NO		
Authorised Self-Drive	YES		NO		
Single Vehicle Movement	YES		NO		
Authorised Commercial Vehicle Use	YES		NO		
Authorised to Ride in GIRoA Vehicles	YES		NO		
Authorised to Ride in NGO/Contract Vehicles	YES		NO		
Authorised to Use Afghan Air Transport	YES		NO		

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Annex B to
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Dated 05 MAR 14

JOB RELATED RISK MANAGEMENT MATRIX

Job Category	Description of Duties (Duties given as example only, category should be based on best fit vs. exact description)	Risk Level	Experience (Note: Language indicated Listening/Speaking)	Training
HQ Staff	•Staff Officer/NCO: Primary duties solely involve staff/action officer work within an ISAF/CF installation Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) •Any task that involves movement out of a secured installation or "Green Zone" except routine military movements to nearby CF bases	LOW	Essential Experience • N/A Desirable Experience • Language score 1/1	Essential Training •Medium Risk of Isolation (MRI) Training •Service specific pre-deployment training •Basic M9/M4 Qualification Desirable Training •N/A
HQ Liaison	•Liaison Officer/NCO: Primary duties are to provide liaison between ISAF/CF & military /civilian partner organizations within an ISAF/CF installation or a secured "Green Zone" Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) •Any task that involves routine movement out of a secured installation or "Green Zone" except routine military movements to nearby CF bases	LOW-MEDIUM	Essential Experience • N/A Desirable Experience • Language score 1/1	Essential Training •Medium Risk of Isolation (MRI) Training •Service specific pre-deployment training • Basic M9/M4 Qualification Desirable Training •Cross Cultural Training
HQ Embed	•Embedded Officer/NCO: Primary duties are to embed with military/civilian partner organizations and whose embedded duty location is within an ISAF/CF installation on in a "Green Zone". Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) •Routine work/duties off a secured installation or "Green Zone"	LOW – MEDIUM	Essential Experience • N/A Desirable Experience • Language score 1/1	Essential Training •Medium Risk of Isolation (MRI) Training •Service specific pre-deployment training •Cross Cultural Training •Basic M9/M4 Qualification Desirable Training •C-IED
General Liaison	•Liaison Officer/NCO: Primary duties involve liaison with military/civilian partner organizations outside of ISAF/CF installation or a secured "Green Zone." However, whose day-to-day duty location is within a CF secured area or a "Green Zone." •Off installation single vehicle self drive (when local threat allows) Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) •Establishment of primary duty location outside of a CF secured area. Extended travel/duration away from a CF secured area. Attachment to or operations with ISAF/GIRoA combat elements	MEDIUM	Essential Experience • Language score 1/1 Desirable Experience • Previous tour as Afghan hand or in liaison/embed role	Essential Training •Command driver's course •Tactical/Defensive Driving Course/experience •Medium Risk of Isolation (MRI) Training •C-IED •Service specific pre-deployment training •Cross Cultural Training •Basic M9/M4 Qualification w/M9 concealed carry training Desirable Training •High Risk of Isolation (HRI) Training

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Job Category	Description of Duties (Duties given as example only, category should be based on best fit vs. exact description)	Risk Level	Experience (Note: Language indicated Listening/Speaking)	Training
General Engineer	• Engineering Officer/NCO: Primary duties involve engineering liaison activities with military/civilian partner organizations. However, whose day-to-day duty location is within a CF secured area • Off installation single vehicle self drive (when local threat allows) Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) • Establishment of primary duty location outside of a CF secured area. Extended travel/duration away from a CF secured area. Attachment to or operations with ISAF/GIRoA combat elements	MEDIUM	Essential Experience • Language 1/1 Desirable Experience • Previous tour as Afghan hand or in liaison/embed role	Essential Training •Command driver's course •Tactical/Defensive Driving Course/experience •Medium Risk of Isolation (MRI) Training •C-IED •Service specific pre-deployment training •Cross Cultural Training •Basic M9/M4 Qualification w/M9 concealed carry training Desirable Training •High Risk of Isolation (HRI) Training
General Embed	• Embedded Officer/NCO: Primary duties involve work with military/civilian partner organizations and whose primary duty location is outside of a CF secured area or "Green Zone" • Off installation single vehicle self-drive(when local threat allows) Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) • Any task that involves travel/embed activities with/to outlying provinces/districts.	MEDIUM - HIGH	Essential Experience • Language 1/1 Desirable Experience • Language 1+/1+ • Previous tour as Afghan hand or in liaison/embed role in a combat zone	Essential Training •Command driver's course •Tactical/Defensive Driving Course/experience •High Risk of Isolation (HRI) Training •C-IED Service specific pre-deployment training •Cross Cultural Training •Counter-Surveillance •Basic M9/M4 Qualification w/M9 concealed carry training Desirable Training •Advanced Combat Training •Combat Life Saver
Combat Unit Attachment	• Officer/NCO: Primary duties involve regular attachment to an ISAF or ANSF combat unit (meaning a unit whose duty involves direct combat actions at the level of attachment.) • Off installation single vehicle self-drive (when local threat allows) Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) • Combat operations independent of an attached unit	MEDIUM - HIGH	Essential Experience • Language score 1+/1+ • Previous tour as an Afghan hand or as a liaison w/or attachment to a combat unit in a combat zone • Combat arms Desirable Experience • Language score 2/2 • Special Operations branch/career field (or equivalent)	Essential Training •Command driver's course •High Risk of Isolation (HRI) Training •Advanced C-IED •Advanced Combat Training •Service specific pre-deployment training •Cross Cultural Training •Combat Life Saver •M9/M4/M249/M240 Qualification Desirable Training •Counter-Surveillance •Tactical/Defensive Driving Course/experience •Off-road Advanced Driving

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Job Category	Description of Duties (Duties given as example only, category should be based on best fit vs. exact description)	Risk Level	Experience (Note: Language Indicated Listening/Speaking)	Training
Distributed Engineer	• Embedded Officer/NCO: Primary duties involve embedded & liaison engineering activities with military/civilian partner organizations at the provincial & district level and whose day-to-day primary duty location is outside of ISAF/CF secured area or who regularly performs engineering support activities at the provincial and district levels separated from ISAF secured areas • Single vehicle self-drive (when local threat allows) Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) • N/A	HIGH	Essential Experience • Previous tour as an Afghan Hand • Previous tour in a combat zone with engineering operations • Language 1+/1+ Desirable Experience • Language 2/2	Essential Training • Command driver's course • High Risk of Isolation (HRI) Training • Escape & Conduct After Capture (SERE B, S-V88) • Advanced C-IED • Advanced Combat Training • Advanced Counter-Surveillance • Service specific pre-deployment training • Cross Cultural Training • Combat Life Saver • M9/M4 Qualification w/M9 concealed carry training Desirable Training • M249/M240 familiarization • Tactical/Defensive Driving Course/experience • Off-road Advanced Driving
Distributed Embed	• Embedded Officer/NCO: Primary duties involve embedded activities with military/civilian partner organizations at the provincial & district level and whose day to day primary duty location is outside of an ISAF secured area. • Single vehicle self-drive (when local threat allows) Outside of Scope of Duties (non-standard) • N/A	HIGH	Essential Experience • Previous tour as an Afghan Hand • Combat Arms • Previous experience in a combat zone w/liaison or embed operations • Language 1+/1+ Desirable Experience • Language 2/2	Essential Training • Command driver's course • High Risk of Isolation (HRI) Training • Escape & Conduct After Capture, (SERE B, S-V88) • Advanced C-IED • Advanced Combat Training • Advanced Counter-Surveillance • Service specific pre-deployment training • Cross Cultural Training • Combat Life Saver • M9/M4 Qualification w/M9 concealed carry training Desirable Training • M249/M240 familiarization • Tactical/Defensive Driving Course/experience • Off-road Advanced Driving

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Pages 1 through 79 redacted for the following reasons:
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Tab E, Exhibit B22 - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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Pages 1 through 22 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Tab E, Exhibit C23 - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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HEADQUARTERS
UNITED STATES FORCES-AFGHANISTAN
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO AE 09356

USFOR-A CDR

5 August 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR Brigadier General Donald E. Jackson, Combined Joint Engineer International Joint Command, Kabul, Afghanistan, APO AE 09320

SUBJECT: Appointment as Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer – Insider Attack – Marshall Fahim National Defence University

1. You are hereby appointed as an Army Regulation 15-6 Investigating Officer to investigate the facts and circumstances regarding an insider attack at Marshall Fahim National Defence University (MFNDU) on 5 August 2014.

2. Your duties as an Investigating Officer will take priority over all other duties until your investigation is complete. You will submit your completed findings and recommendations NLT 5 September 2014. If you feel you cannot complete the inquiry by this suspense or if you feel that a change of scope of this investigation is warranted you will send a request for an extension or modification of scope to me through the U.S. Forces – Afghanistan Staff Judge Advocate.

3. At a minimum, your investigation will address the following matters:

a. The facts and circumstances surrounding the attack that occurred at Marshall Fahim National Defence University (MFNDU) on 5 August 2014.

b. The identity of U.S. and coalition forces that were present at the time of the incident and a description of their duties.

c. The identity of Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) that were present at the time of the incident, as well as a description of duties.

d. Describe all static security positions in the vicinity of the attack, including how they were manned and by whom. Include photographs and diagrams where possible.

e. Describe in detail the actions of the person or persons who committed the attack. Include descriptions of their uniforms, their equipment, their weapons, their movements, tactics, and the location from which they conducted their attack, and whether/how they were killed. In your description, include the background of the attacker(s) whether the attacker(s) was a member of the ANSF, their training, duty status, movements the day prior to and day of the attack, and the means by which they gained access to their weapons and the location from which they conducted the attack. Include photographs and diagrams where possible.

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f. Describe in detail the actions of each member of U.S. and coalition forces present on the scene, and include detailed statements from each as to what they observed and what actions they took immediately prior to, during, and after the attack. Include photos and diagrams.

g. Describe what if any threat stream reporting was available prior to the attack, which may reasonably have indicated an elevated risk of attack on the day in question. In addition, describe the atmospherics at the MFNDU and the surrounding area on the day of and prior to the attack.

h. Describe the security posture of the U.S. and/or coalition forces present at the scene, including compliance with relevant operational orders or directives and whether any over watch duties were performed by U.S. and/or coalition forces. If relevant operational orders or directives were not followed or an over watch or similar security posture was not utilized at the scene of the attack, determine why this was the case.

i. Provide a detailed timeline for each WIA and KIA personnel in the engagement, including a timeline and description of medical assistance provided immediately at the scene, details of the MEDEVAC process, including the timing of the request, when MEDEVAC assets arrived, when WIA arrived at follow-on medical treatment facilities, the location of such facilities, a description of the wounds suffered by each WIA and KIA, and a prognosis for WIA personnel.

j. Include a description of the current status of WIA personnel as of the time you submit your report. Provide a timeline, current location, description of the injuries, and prognosis for recovery.

k. Include opinions and recommendations for lessons learned and improvements to U.S. and coalition force tactics, techniques, and procedures that will help avoid this type of incident in the future.

l. Include in your report any other matters pertaining to this incident that you deem relevant and appropriate.

4. Before initiating your investigation, you will receive a legal briefing from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) and U.S. Forces – Afghanistan. He may be contacted by email at (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) or by SVOIP at (b)(6) You should consult with (b)(3), (b)(6) on all aspects of the investigation, including developing an investigation plan, determining whether witnesses need to be advised of their rights under Article 31, Uniform Code of Military Justice, or the Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution, and preparing your findings and recommendations.

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5. Use AR 15-6 as a guide to your investigation. Consider any evidence in the investigation that you determine to be relevant and material. The completed investigation will include the following:

a. This memorandum of appointment.

b. A completed, signed DA Form 1574.

c. A memorandum containing your findings and recommendations, including the information specifically requested above.

d. An executive summary.

e. An index of exhibits.

f. A chronology of your investigation.

g. A list of all persons interviewed, including those from whom no statement was taken.

h. All exhibits labelled in successive order.

i. Proper classification markings for all paragraphs, pages, and exhibits.

j. A PowerPoint slide listing lessons learned from this incident that can be disseminated CJOA-wide.

6. If you suspect that persons you intend to interview may have engaged in criminal conduct, you must advise them of their rights under Article 31, UCMJ, or the Fifth Amendment, prior to conducting any questioning. Witness waivers of the Article 31 or Fifth Amendment rights will be documented on DA Form 3881 (Rights Warning Procedure/Waiver Certificate).

7. All witness statements will be sworn. You are to thoroughly document all witness interviews in writing, preferably on a DA Form 2823, Sworn Statement. Do not include witness social security numbers on the DA Form 2823. If possible, you will interview all witnesses in person. Reduce any oral statements to memorandums for record. If you are unable to obtain a sworn statement from a witness, then a detailed memorandum for record memorializing the substance of the interview and why a sworn statement could not be taken will suffice in place. Prior to questioning coalition members, you will obtain consent of their Senior National Representative through the Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan, (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) who is available at SVOIP (b)(6). You must also coordinate such interviews with the respective commanding officers of such personnel and all such

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interviews must be voluntary. If you suspect criminal misconduct by a coalition force member, stop your investigation and consult your legal advisor.

8. If, during the course of your investigation, you suspect a person of equal or higher rank than yourself has committed misconduct or may be liable, stop your investigation immediately and seek legal advice from your legal advisor.

9. You will consult with your legal advisor while drafting your findings and recommendations. Address your findings and recommendations to me. Your findings will be as thorough as necessary to fully capture the facts and circumstances surrounding the scope of this investigation. Support your findings by substantial evidence and by a greater weight of evidence than supports any different conclusion.

10. You will submit your completed report to the Staff Judge Advocate of U.S. Forces – Afghanistan for a legal review following the completion of your investigation. Your point of contact is (b)(3), (b)(6) who may be contacted by email at (b)(3), (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6) or by SVOIP at (b)(6).

J. F. DUNFORD, JR.
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander
International Assistance Security Force/
United States Forces – Afghanistan

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AR 15-6 Chronology

5-Aug-2014	Appointed to conduct AR 15-6
	Conducted Site Survey at MFNDU
	Established Joint Coalition Assessment Team
6-Aug-2014	Received Brief from Legal Advisor
	Conducted interviews
7-Aug-2014	Reviewed JCAT progress
	Interviewed witnesses at ISAF
8-Aug-2014	Interviewed witnesses at Camp Qargha
9-Aug-2014	Reviewed JCAT progress
10-Aug-2014	Prepared JCAT report
	Pre-Briefed J2/J3
11-Aug-2014	Prepared JCAT report
12-Aug-2014	Briefed A3
13-Aug-2014	Interviewed witnesses at Camp Souter
14-Aug-2014	Prepared notes from interviews
	Gathered additional witness statements
	Collected FRAGOS
	Reviewed investigative material
	Began writing report
15-Aug-2014	Gathered additional witness statements
	Continued drafting report
16-Aug-2014	Conducted interviews at Camp Qargha
17-Aug-2014	Continued drafting report
18-Aug-2014	Continued drafting report
22-Aug-2014	Conducted interviews at ISAF
24-Aug-2014	Drafted Findings and Recommendations
	Reviewed CI assessment
31-Aug-2014	Completed Drafting of Report and Submitted for Legal Review

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Marshal Fahim National Defense University Green on Blue, 5 August 2014
EXSUM

Background and Chronology of Events

~~(S)~~ On 5 August 2014, at approximately 1155 local time, an Afghan National Army (ANA) Military Policeman (MP) opened fire on a large group of Coalition and Afghan Forces who were conducting a series of briefings at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU) in Kabul, Afghanistan. MG Harold Greene, DCG, Combined Security Transition Command – Afghanistan (CSTC-A), was killed and 18 other Coalition and Afghan Forces were injured. The shooter was also killed.

~~(S)~~ CSTC-A is executing a phased construction plan for MFNDU using the US Army Corps of Engineers as the construction agent. The NATO Training Mission – Afghanistan, Unified Training and Advisory Group, had planned a Key Leader Engagement with CSTC-A to visit a number of locations at MFNDU in order to highlight the ongoing construction to senior leaders. The focus of the visit was not so much on the construction itself, but on highlighting the subsequent officer production capability of the MFNDU once complete, and its importance to the ongoing growth and development of the ANA. Of late, problems had arisen with the Afghan Construction Property Management Department (CPMD) coming through with its requirement to increase water supply and distribution, essential to supporting the projected population growth of the MFNDU campus. CSTC-A is working on a project to re-award Phase II of the MFNDU construction, but needed assurances from CPMD they could deliver on past promises to address the water challenges.

~~(S)~~ Initial plans envisioned about 20 participants, but as interest in the event intensified, more interested parties planned to attend. There were ultimately more than 90 US and Coalition Force personnel present for the events of the day, including Personal Security Detachments (PSD) and Close Protection Teams (CPT) from the United States, the UK, and Germany. The Danish Security Platoon, assigned to the UK Force Protection Company at Camp Qargha, provided overall site security. Of note, the party included a total of eight general officers from the ANA and ISAF. The total number of attendees was not confirmed by visit planners until the morning of the event. Even at that time, there was not an accurate head count of all participants, as several additional Afghan leaders joined at the last minute.

~~(S)~~ Despite extensive security planning and a number of site recons by the Danish Force Protection (FP) Platoon, and recons by US, UK, and German PSDs/CPTs, there was no comprehensive plan that incorporated all participating security elements. Individual PSDs/CPTs conducted their own preparation. There was no comprehensive mission brief or rehearsal that incorporated the relevant stakeholders. (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g The Danish Security Platoon Leader was the senior force protection leader, and despite the lack of prior coordination, planned to use his platoon as the lead element with the PSD/CPTs responsible for their individual

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principals. The threat level that day was assessed as low, with no indicators of unusual activity or concern.

~~(S)~~ Several stops were planned to orient the delegation to the ongoing construction and highlight problems with the water supply. Due to the late arrival of several members of the party, the decision was made to bypass a planned stop to observe a rifle firing range and proceed directly to an above ground water storage tank. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) was scheduled to make a presentation at this stop, but it was decided he should delay so the party could continue on to the most important stop, an underground tank along the boundary of the installation, where the main water supply problem could be addressed. It was decided he could make his presentation at that time. Upon arrival at the underground tank, it was determined to be too dark and crowded for his presentation, so the decision was made to move it back to an open area behind the MP Barracks where the group would pass enroute to their next site visit.

~~(S)~~ This stop behind the MP Barracks was unplanned and not coordinated with the Danish Security Platoon. There were no concerns at the time, so the platoon leader simply readjusted his perimeter. A crowd of approximately 58 personnel gathered around (b)(3), (b)(6) for his 15-20 minute discussion (see attached storyboard). An armed ANA MP, recently returning from a security patrol, had arrived to the adjacent MP Company HQ while the party was visiting the underground water tank site. He was instructed to go into the barracks and wait for the delegation to depart, and afterwards he would be given further instructions. This Soldier, now known as Rafiqullah, entered the barracks which was in direct view of the personnel now gathering for the (b)(3), (b)(6) presentation. At some point afterwards, Rafiqullah positioned himself in a bathroom, in direct view of the gathering, stuck the barrel of his M16 rifle out of the bathroom window, and fired approximately 27-30 rounds into the crowd. He hit 18 people, killing MG Greene, and seriously wounded several others before two Coalition Force Soldiers returned fire and killed him. One other participant was injured while trying to escape, but not by direct fire.

What we know about the Shooter

~~(S)~~ The subsequent investigation did not identify any clear links between Rafiqullah and the Taliban or other extremist groups. Intelligence Agencies and ISAF Counter-Intelligence Analysts continue to investigate, (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5) (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5) Although there have been many leads, nothing has yet materialized that conclusively links the shooter to any plots, plans, or person of interest. It may be that the shooter was self-radicalized, or that he suffered from some sort of psychological condition (which is what the ANA claims is the cause). From the evidence we have been able to ascertain from the ANA, and from several detained personnel we were able to interview, it appears the shooting was not premeditated, and the shooter simply took advantage a target of opportunity provided by the close gathering. More detail is provided in Secret-NOFORN and TS Annexes to the 15-6 Report; however, the conclusions remain the same.

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Findings

~~(S)~~ There was no negligence on the part of event planners or leaders present. This incident could not have been reasonably foreseen or prevented, appearing as an isolated act of a determined shooter without indicators or warnings. Visits are a daily occurrence to the MFNDU site. The Afghan National Army Officer Academy (ANAOA) alone has hosted over 100 in nine months. Group sizes often exceed 20 personnel, and multiple VIPs are not uncommon. Planning for this event was conducted as all others have been before and deemed sufficient. Recommendations (below) can help to mitigate future risk.

(b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4d, (b)(5)

~~(S)~~ Actions of Security Team members in neutralizing the shooter, rendering first aid, and evacuating casualties was superb. Despite the lack of coordinated planning, execution was swift and lives were undoubtedly saved as a result.

Recommendations

~~(S)~~ Require an appropriately approved Commander's Risk Assessment. This Risk Assessment must be approved at the appropriate level given the grade and number of participants. Control measures must be put into place to limit the number of participants for any event to that which can be reasonably managed and secured.

~~(S)~~ Require an appropriately approved Security Plan. A Security Plan, informed by the Commander's Risk Assessment, must be implemented. The Security Plan must be approved at the appropriate level given the grade and number of participants. Security Plans for events that include multiple security teams must be fully coordinated, synchronized, and rehearsed with a lead element identified for C2.

~~(S)~~ Review the operational readiness of Personal Security Detachments/Close Protection Teams (PSD/CPT) and Guardian Angels (GA) and institute a standardized training and certification program across ISAF. ISAF Force Protection SOPs, FRAGOs, and GA Publications do not mandate standardized selection, training, and continuation training for GA. All PSD/CPT and GA personnel and teams must be trained and certified in advance of conducting security operations in Afghanistan.

~~(S)~~ Review the ISAF standard uniform and the use of Personal Protective Equipment. The risk of not wearing PPE should be addressed in the Commander's Risk Assessment and adjusted, as required, based upon the threat. As a minimum, personnel should always wear their personal identification tags and carry appropriate personal medical accoutrement (tourniquet, bandage, casualty feeder card, etc) on their

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person. (b)(1)1.4g

(b)(1)1.4g In addition, consideration should also be given to the purchase of concealable body armor to be worn by senior leadership, and possibly by all personnel who work individually or in small groups on a daily basis in Afghan facilities and outside standard ISAF facilities. This would allow a minimally offensive, yet added measure of protection.

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Pages 1 through 7 redacted for the following reasons:
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Tab E, Exhibit G27 - DOD Information Report - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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