NTM-A
NATO Training Mission
AFGHANISTAN

Marshall Fahim National Defense University

BFC CONOP

05 August 2014

Overall Classification:

UNCLASSIFIED



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MFNDU Command Structure

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

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Phase I (Complete FEB 2012)
3,000 occupants
- ANDU HQ
- GSU
- National Military Academy of Afghanistan

Phase IIIA (DEC 2014) & IIIB (SEP 2015)
1,100 occupants Phase IIIA
800 occupants Phase IIIB
- Officers Academy (ANAOA)

MFNDU Facts
- Total Area: 4.8M sq. m
- Population: 8,000 students, 2,000 faculty, 500 GSU



Phase II (DEC 2017)
- Power Plant
- GSU HQ
- Fire Station

Phase II (DEC 2017)
4,600 students
- Command and Staff College
- Sergeants Major Academy
- COIN Centre of Excellence
- Foreign Language Institute

FOB Qargha

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Existing MFNDU Water Infrastructure

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Current MFNDU Water Wells

Existing Conditions

Existing Wells On Site: 12

1 – Supply for MFNDU (40%)
6 – Construction
3 – Temporary Bore Holes ANAOA
1 – Camp Qargha
1 – Local Village

Offsite Sources: 1

Buried Tanker Truck (60%)

On Site Storage: 2

2.4M-L RC (only storage currently used)
3.8M-L Steel (not tested or connected)

Supply Well at Unused 3.8M-L Storage Tank



Buried Tanker Storage Tank

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Future MFNDU Water Infrastructure

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Future MFNDU Water Wells

Future Conditions

Future Wells On Site: 3 (+ 1)

1 – Supply for MFNDU (40%)
1 – Local Village
1 – Camp Qargha

1 – Required to supply the 3.8M-L storage tank

Offsite Sources: 0

Buried Tanker Truck is not secure nor dedicated

On Site Storage: 3

2.4M-L RC (pressure system to be completed)
3.8M-L Steel (to be connected)
1.5M-L RC (constructed under PH IIIA – DEC14)



3.8M-L Storage Tank Connected to Supply



Second RC Storage Tank to be Completed

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MFNDU Water Usage

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Existing Usage (including food preparation):

- Domestic – 250L / person / day x 3,000 ppl = **750,000L / day** (200,000 gallons)
- Landscaping – 45,000L / day (estimated – provided via domestic water and tanker trucks filled from Lake Qargha)
- Storage Capacity: **2,400,000L**

Future Usage (including food preparation):

- 250L / person / day x 10,000 ppl = **2,500,000L / day** (650,000 gallons)
- Landscaping – 165,000L / day (estimated – provided via recycled treated waste water and tanker trucks filled from Lake Qargha only)
- Storage Capacity: **10,100,000L**

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Current & Future Water Usage Concerns

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- Increase in population from 3,500 currently to 10,000 projected
- Current operations and maintenance of fully transitioned and occupied buildings
- Current and future landscaping practices
- Increase in quantity of DFACs
- Addition of laundry facilities
- Addition of fire station to MFNDU GSU

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MFNDU Water Infrastructure COAs

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I. Water use mitigation – landscaping and building maintenance

II. Drill new well (or re-fit existing well) at on-site water storage and connect to existing unused storage tank

III. Drill new well (or re-fit existing well) on-site and connect to existing unused storage tank

IV. Formalize connection with off-site municipal water sources and integrate with MFNDU water infrastructure

V. Drill new off-site well with new off-site storage tank and connect to MFNDU water infrastructure

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Transition of Infrastructure Sustainment

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

Existing Power Generation Plant

Existing & New Waste Water Treatment Plant

Current Building O&M



Future Building Transitions

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Site-Walk Agenda

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

1. Helipad/ Observation Point (RV Meeting point)
2. ANAOA training range
3. On-site Well and Main Water Storage Tank
   – The Blue Tank
4. Buried Tanker – CPMD Augmented Water Supply
5. KLE with COM MFNDU MG Jalandar Shah

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MFNDU Visit (5 August 2014)

PAX LISTING

MG Ameree, Chief, CPMD
MG Shah, COM, MFNDU
MG Wendel, DCOS SA/ CG CSTC-A
MG Greene, DCG, CSTC-A (+9)
MG Bathurst, Director, MOD MAG
BG Russell, CDR, ANAOA
BG Bartscher, CSTC-A MOD MAG Dep Advisor
BG Jackson, IJC ENG
BG Sharifi, COM ANAOA
(b)(6), UTAG
(b)(3), (b)(6)., CSTC-A CJENG (+6)
(b)(3), (b)(6) TAA (+6)

ITINERARY

0900: Depart Camp ISAF
0930: Introduction (POINT #1)
0945: MFNDU Orientation
1000: Observe ANAOA Officer Training (POINT #2)
1030: Water Infrastructure Discussion (POINT #3)
1100: Operations and Maintenance Overview (POINT #4)
1130: KLE with COM MFNDU (POINT #5)
1230: Mission Complete

OBJECTIVES

- Understand MFNDU Construction Timeline/Issues
- Clarify MFNDU Sustainment Issues
  - Water Infrastructure Discussion
- Determine MFNDU Sustainment Transition Plan to ANSF
- Understand MFNDU FE Structure, Resources & Capabilities



1. **Helipad/ Observation Point (RV Meeting point)**
2. **ANAOA training range**
3. **On-site Well and Main Water Storage Tank – The Blue Tank**
4. **Buried Tanker – CPMD Augmented Water Supply**
5. **KLE with COM MFNDU MG Jalandar Shah**

TALKING POINTS

- CSTC-A CJ-ENG will assist CPMD & MFNDU to develop a long term water solution
- CSTC-A CJ-ENG looks forward to developing a project turnover plan for phase II & III construction w/ CPMD & MFNDU
  - Shura Established 6 months out
- CPMD & MFNDU need to budget for future O&M sustainment costs
- CPMD needs to adjust tashkil and ensure MFNDU FE requirements are addressed
- CPMD & MFNDU need to consolidate MFNDU FE's and designate a lead FE -> DPW
- MFNDU a candidate for connecting into the power grid?

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ANDU Programmatic Overview (23 July 2014) DRAFT

Overall Program

-Phase I Completed by AMEC & AFCEC, 28 Feb 14
-Phase II Terminated for Default by AFCEC, Oct 13
-Phase II USACE Re-procurement, Award: 15 Feb 15
-Phase IIIA USACE BOD 30 Dec 14
-Phase IIIB USACE BOD 30 Sep 15

Phase I

supply, waste infrastructure. Supports approx. 3,500 personnel, 2,400 cadets, 600 workers, 100 HQ & Staff Officers, 400 Garrison support personnel
-Contract Amount: $91,000,000
-BOD: Completed & turned over 28 Feb 14

Phase II

Assembly Halls, training ranges, and classrooms
-Original Contract: T4D'd by AFCEC Oct 13
-LOD issued: To USACE to re-procure Oct 13
-Contract Amount: $70,000,000 (Est)
-Available Funds: $24,000,000 (Balance from termination)
-Contract Award: 15 Feb 2015 (Est)
-BOD: 11 Dec 2017 (Est)
-Current Status: Contract will be Best Value Trade Off. Philadelphia District (NAP) prepared Plans & Specs. NATO funds will be used. Funds assurance letter provided. BOCE review underway for 3 packages of revised drawings. Package to TAA CT 6 Sep 14.
-Planning Priorities: Solicitation will include a completion priority for the DFAC and other facilities and phasing as directed by the customer. Schedule will be a selection criteria.

Phase II - Completion Timeline



Phase III A – Completion Timeline



Phase IIIB - Completion Timeline



Key Points / Operational Issues / Challenges

-BCOE complete backcheck in progress.
-Contract brought back to TAA for award as a Best Value Trade Off (BVTO) solicitation.
-P&D funding was not completely available for PPE 17 May 14. Schedule slipped one week. Funding replaced on 10 May 14.
-Sequencing of construction for buildings in Phase IIIA is under review for feasibility and its affect on schedule.
-Current Class schedule: 02/16/14, Kandak #3 – 14 Jun 14 (to include First Female Block of 30 students)
-Analysis of Water Supply and Utilities capacity submitted 2 Apr 2014, continuing scope clarifications.
-O&M issues after facility turn over are still not addressed
-The three phases of the ANDU program will provide a 1,500 acre site with a 17 KM perimeter

Key Players

-USACE:
-UTAG –
-USACE:
-CSTC-A

(b)(6)

Phase IIIA

-Scope: Total of 9 buildings to include Barracks, HQ Building, 3-story classroom, utility upgrades, WWTP, WTP
-Contract award: 25 Jul 12
-Contractor: State Corps
-Contract Amount: $30,572,036
-Project Percentage Complete: 68%
-Male Barracks: 601, 602, 603: 65% ECD 30 Sep 14
-Female Barracks: 610: 67% ECD 30 Sep 14
-Instructor Barracks: 611: 66% ECD 30 Sep 14
-Classroom: 46% ECD 30 Sep 14
-HQ: 63% ECD 30 Sep 14
-Misc: 76-82%
-WWTP: 75% ECD 30 Sep 14

-BOD: 31 Dec 14
-Current Status: Vertical Construction underway for all buildings.
-Planning Priorities: Ph 3A-1 is scheduled for earliest completion and contains HQ Bldg, Instructor Barracks, a

Phase IIIB

grounds, and athletic fields
-Contract award: 22 Feb 13
-Contractor: Assist Consultants, Inc.
-Contract Amount: $15, 676,678
-Percentage Complete: 50% (Ahead of schedule)
-DFAC: 79% ECD Mar 15
-Barracks: 55-70% ECD Jul 15
-Misc Bldgs: 36-67% ECD Jul 15
-BOD: 30 Sep 15
-Current Status: All buildings cleared for construction, and placement underway

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Water System Timeline

2014		2015				2016				2017				2018	
3rd	4th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	1st	2nd	3rd	4th	1st	2nd

Demand Continuum (liters/day):

Phase I	Phase IIIA	Phase IIIB	Phase II
434,000	722,300	852,500	1.24M

Source Continuum (liters/day):

3" automated	Wells 5-7	Qargha Intake Rpr	(b)(6)	All Sources
654,900	715,000	888,400	1.24M	1.44M

Blue Text Indicate Work to be Funded and Executed by CPMD

Storage Continuum (liters, requirement: 3X demand):

Exist RCC Tank	Exist RCC Tank + Phase III Tank	Blue Tank
2.4M	4.8M	7.8M

- ✓ Phase I and II distribution system has been modeled to verify pipe sizes and appurtenances are adequate
- ✓ Phase III distribution system has been modeled to verify pipe sizes and appurtenances are adequate

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MFNDU Sustainment Plan



ESTIMATED SUSTAINMENT COSTS

FE TASHKIL CHART

	Unit	Auth.	Assigned	ITAT Assessed
PHASE I	MFDNU GSU	38	38	AMBER
	NMAA	67	67	GREEN
	SubTotal	105	105	
PHASE II (BOD 2017)	SGM Academy	0		
	Legal & RC Affairs	0		
	PAO	0		
	COIN	4		
	CSC	9		
	JSA	0		
	SubTotal	13		
PHASE III (BOD 2015)	ANAOA	0		
	Grand Total	118		

CONCERNS

- **Budget:**
  - Funding Target assumes Common Output Level Standards (COLS) III – Mission Capable, Medium Risk to facility readiness.
    - ✓ Advisors working with CPMD to establish COLS to provide options for decision making in the funding process, provide customers with realistic expectations of service and provide objective performance metrics.
  - Phase II/III SRM estimated increase of $1.9M (USD)
- **Tashkil:**
  - Consolidation of Tashkil submitted MoD S&P for endorsement.
    - ✓ Tashkil also split at MFNDU & temporary locations at KAIA
  - Recommend FE task organization into 'Zones' to provide priority service for critical areas of MFNDU.

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JCAT Entries
(b)(3), (b)(6)

About 0100, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) Forensic Science Officer (FSO), 502D MP BN (CID)(FWD), Bagram Airfield, Afghanistan, APO AE 09354, arrived at KAIA and linked up with (b)(3), (b)(6) ISAF Joint Command (IJC), Kabul Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) briefed FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) on all aspects of the investigation.

About 0750, FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) and (b)(3), (b)(6) visited KAIA hospital to identify the five individuals treated in that facility:

(b)(3), (b)(6)
(b)(6)
DOD (b)(6) (Army)
DOD (b)(3), (b)(6) (Navy)
(b)(6) (UK)

About 0900, 6 Aug 14, FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted a death scene verification at the Afghanistan National Defense University, Camp Qarga, Afghanistan. FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) exposed photograhs of the area and walked through the area. There scene was sanitized by the Afghanistan National Army (ANA.) Therefore, no evidence was collected for analysis.

About 1100, 6 Aug 14, FSO (b)(3), (b)(6), US Army Counterintelligence, Joint Field Office Afghanistan (JFOA), Kabul, Afghanistan, interviewed ANA Soldier (b)(6) stated he was on duty that day and was told to clean the area in anticipation for a VIP visit. (b)(6) stated he cleaned the area and stayed to welcome the guests and then walked back toward the barracks. (b)(6) stated he saw the board and easel set up for the presentation and then sat at the ECP shack. He stated he was sitting with the Garrison Commander's driver, AZIM, and (b)(6) (platoon leader.) (b)(6) (b)(6) stated he saw RAFIQULLAH and three other individuals exit a Ford Ranger and enter the barracks building with a weapon because RAFIQULLAH was part of the security team.

(b)(6) stated RAFIQULLAH was an ANA soldier who was assigned to the eastside CP to provide security. He stated RAFIQULLAH had been at this location for approximately 3-4 months. He stated RAFIQULLAH was a good guy without any bad habits. (b)(6) stated RAFIQULLAH was from Paktiya Province, but (b)(6) did not know from which village.

About 1300, 6 Aug 14, FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) (b)(6) He stated he was on duty at Garrison at 1000 and returned at 1200.

AGENT'S COMMENT: FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) was called out of interview to attend debrief of (b)(6) (b)(6), lead investigator for ANA CID.

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About 1330, 6 Aug 14, FSO (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6), Lead Investigator, Afghanistan National Army, Criminal Investigation Division, Afghanistan. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), US Army CI, and several other JCAT members were also in attendance.

(b)(6) stated two of RAFIQULLAH's friends, (b)(6) were detained by ANA CID for interrogation. (b)(6) stated he would interrogate both before he would consider allowing American Soldiers access to the individuals. (b)(6) (b)(6) stated RAFIQULLAH both joined the ANA approximately two years ago. (b)(6) stated both RAFIQULLAH (b)(6) (b)(6)

(b)(6) was from the Mongul tribe, Jaji District (Zazi District). RAFIQULLAH was from Para Kyhel Village in Jany Kyhel District. They were not friends prior to assignment together. RAFIQULLAH arrived at approximately 7 months ago in Nov 13. (b)(6) stated his investigators were gathering information on RAFIQULLAH's family.

(b)(6) stated the ANDU had two incidents in the past. One was when a British Soldier beat up an ANA soldier and the Brit was shot.

AGENT'S COMMENT: (b)(6) ended the interview as one of the detainees escaped by jumping out of a window and running away.

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About 1250, 6 Aug 13, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated with (b)(6) CI Analysts, Kabul International Airport (KIA), who provided statistics of personnel injured during incident at Qargha on 5 Aug 14. Statistics provided showed two killed (one US and one Afghan [attacker]), five in critical condition or "A" (two US, one UK, one Afghan, one Unknown), three in moderate condition or "B" (one German, two Unknown), and seven with minor none life threatening injuries (four US, three Unknown). All Class A and B injuries transported to BAF for treatment, while Class C where treated at KIA or on scene and released.

About 1400, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated (b)(3), (b)(6) KIA, who related he did not have the Trip Tickets or MoveCon Orders for the incidents that happened at Qargha. (b)(3), (b)(6) related ISAF or New Kabul Compound (NKC) might have them.

About 1415, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated with MoveCon, NKC, who related they did not have the Trip Tickets or MoveCon Orders from Qargha.

About 1500, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) International Security Armed Forces (ISAF) HQ, who related he had the Trip Ticket # 5468 and 5672 for Qargha, and would provide them to this office.

About 1630, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) DODID: XXX, Combined Security Training Command-Afghanistan (CSTC-A), Combined Joint Engineers (CJ-ENG), who provided contact information for all major parties involved pertaining to this investigation.

About 1945, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6), CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF, who related him, MG GREENE, and the rest of CJ-ENG were out at Qargha about a week ago because of on-going water issues. (b)(3), (b)(6) related Unified Training Advisory Group (UTAG) British Supervisors (NFI) identified the problems with the water, and related the Qargha Compound needed more water in order to operate efficiently; however, his team identified there was enough water there for the Qargha Compound to operate and only required usage guidelines, consumption, and water pressure fixes. (b)(3), (b)(6) related at Qargha were three different Afghanistan Military Schools, which were designed to operate separately with different water sources; however, they were currently all running jointly off the same water source. (b)(3), (b)(6) related (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) UTAG, Qargha (NFI), himself, MG GREENE, and several others Colonels (NFI) drafted a Water Share agreement, and decided to meet on 5 Aug 14 to discuss the water issues and present the agreement. (b)(3), (b)(6) related they all meet at Qargha around 0945, 5 Aug 14, by the Helipads. (b)(3), (b)(6) related it was common practice to take off their body armor to show trust in the Afghanistan Security and Army Forces, and so all the higher ups, including himself, MG GREENE, and MG WENDELL, took off their armor and left them in the vehicles they traveled to Qargha in (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) related they then had two briefs near the Helipads, and traveled in their vehicles to the Qarghga water tower. (b)(3), (b)(6) related once they arrived at the water tower, they had another brief about the water issues. (b)(3), (b)(6) related they then walked to the next brief which was

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adjacent to the Main Gate to the Qargha Compound, and traveled through a building along a barbed wire fence and the wall that was one person abreast, to the water pump generators. (b)(3), (b)(6) related near the main gate he noticed two Afghanistan (NFI) talking, though they did not have weapons. (b)(3), (b)(6) related on top of a two story building was another Afghanistan (NFI) manning a stationary weapon, along with Danish Security Personnel. (b)(3), (b)(6) related after the water pressure briefing, they departed back through the whole in the wall, and a final brief was given around 1145, 5 Aug 14. (b)(3), (b)(6) related after the final briefing, an Afghan General (NFI) stepped forward to shake the speakers hand when the gunfire happened. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he immediately dropped to the ground and saw MG GREENE receive an injury and fall. (b)(3), (b)(6) related MG GREENE appeared to receive a head wound, and so he immediately went to MG GREENE's aid and started to perform life saving measures. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he was checking for signs of life, and discovered MG GREENE was none responsive, had no pulse, and was no breathing. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) related, with his prior knowledge as being a Medical Examiner, he knew MG GREENE was in serious condition. (b)(3), (b)(6) related that was when (b)(3), (b)(6) came forward and they started to move MG GREENE out of the area. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he believe he observed (b)(3), (b)(6) step forward and engage someone in the window. (b)(3), (b)(6) related it was almost noon when the incident happened, and at first no one knew where the gunfire was coming from. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he initially believe the rounds were coming from the roof, and only saw the rounds hit the ground first in the dirt ahead of everyone. (b)(3), (b)(6) related after the rounds hit the dirt, people started to get hit to include MG GREENE. (b)(3), (b)(6) related prior to the incident, he did not notice anything out of the ordinary. (b)(3), (b)(6) related sometime during one of the briefings he gave (b)(3), (b)(6) his camera to take photographs. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he only heard what sounded like an AK-47, but he did not see it personal. (b)(3), (b)(6) related no one was designated as a Guardian Angel; however, they did not have PSD personnel along with PSO's, and Danish Security. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he didn't recall any Afghanistan personnel acting odd. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) related he would provide this office with copies of the pictures from the camera that was used to photograph the briefings.

About 1130, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) coordinated with (b)(3), (b)(6) Chief of Staff, CSTC-A, ISAF, who related that if this office needed any assistance, we could go through him and/or his office.

About 1200, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP CO, ISAF, who related (b)(3), (b)(6), UTAG, Qargha (NFI), coordinated all the security for the events with the Danish personnel. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the Afghanistan General's and other personnel were in uniform; however, they did not have weapons nor armor on. (b)(3), (b)(6) related after they went to the water pump adjacent to the barb wire and wall walkway, they were coming back to their vehicles when the impromptu briefing happened. (b)(3), (b)(6) related that final briefing was not supposed to take place there, and was not on the schedule. (b)(3), (b)(6) related all the officer aids took hits first, and then MG GREENE took a hit. (b)(3), (b)(6) related after MG GREENE was hit, they grabbed everyone and made their way to the main LZ where the medical helicopters were called in to medevac the injured out. (b)(3), (b)(6) related during the incident, he heard an entire clip or two of

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rounds going off from the attacker; however, he did not witness where it came from or ever see the short. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he did not know who did engage the attacker. (b)(3), (b)(6) related prior to the incident, all the Afghanistan people on Qargha appeared oblivious to their presence, and didn't notice anything odd about their demeanor. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he was MG WENDELL's PSO, and was preparing to move to the next location via text messages with his PSD elements when the shooting started. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he sent his last text around 1153, 5 Aug 14, and the shooting started a couple minutes after that. (b)(3), (b)(6) related at the time, they had no known threats; however, once the mission began he and his PSD element believe the biggest threat was the on-going range on Qargha, where all the Afghanistan Soldiers and M16 rifles shooting at targets. (b)(3), (b)(6) related several minutes prior to the incident, the Danish security team cleared the building.

About 1234, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained a hand drawn sketch of the incident from (b)(3), (b)(6), along with pictures of their walkthrough.

About 1246, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted a Canvass Interview Worksheet of (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) 258th MP Co, ISAF, who related he did not see the shooter or witness the incident, as he was with all the vehicles.

About 1310, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained a hand drawn sketch from (b)(3), (b)(6)

About 1430, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted Canvass Interview Worksheets of

(b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
(b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.

AGENT'S COMMENTS: All personnel canvassed related they did not return fire, and did not know who did. (b)(3), (b)(6) related they both twisted his knee sometime during the incident.

About 1445, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) who related she had a camera during the incident; however it was (b)(3), (b)(6) camera. (b)(3), (b)(6) related she returned the camera and all the pictures on it to (b)(3), (b)(6)

About 1450, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained computer drawn map of incident from (b)(3), (b)(6)

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About 1502, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) who related she was part of the Advance Team, and they surveyed and conducted a walkthrough of the area on 2 Aug 14. (b)(3), (b)(6) related when they conducted the walkthrough, (b)(3), (b)(6) related he coordinated with the Danish Security Element on Qargha who would be providing overall security on site while all the Generals were present. (b)(3), (b)(6) related they never did a walkthrough of the building the shooter was in; however, they did do a walkthrough of the building adjacent to it. (b)(3), (b)(6) related (b)(1)1.4 Danish Security personnel were on top of the building the short was in, who were providing overall sniper coverage. (b)(3), (b)(6) related about 20 or so minutes prior to the incident, the Danish security team cleared the building the shooter was in.

About 1515, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained Itinerary and briefing pertaining to Marshal Fahim National Defense University water usage.

About 1600, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted Canvass Interview Worksheets of
(b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.
(b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.
(b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.
(b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.

AGENT'S COMMENTS: All personnel canvassed related they did not see the shooter or engage him, nor knew exactly who did engage the shooter.

About 1615, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained signed statements from (b)(6) (b)(6), Service Number: (b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.

(b)(6) stated he was the (b)(6) of DMOD MAG team and was tasked with providing security for MG BATHURST in Afghanistan. (b)(6) stated on 5 Aug 14, there were providing security at Qargha, and he did not notice anything unusual about the Afghanistan Personnel in the area. (b)(6) stated the forth briefing was in an enclosed building containing a water tank, and only MG BATHURST, (b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF, were present during the incident. (b)(6) stated he and the rest of his team were stationed in or nor their vehicles which were approximately 75 meters north of where the incident took place. (b)(6) stated around 1155, 5 Aug 14, he heard bursts of small arms fire coming from the area of the briefing, in which he and his team moved to engage and extract MG BATHURST. (b)(6) stated upon arrival at the scene (b)(6) extracted MG BATHURST from the area utilizing one of their vehicles, and (b)(6) went to the aid of (b)(6) who was shot in his lower left leg, left elbow, and right hip. (b)(6) stated he and his team then extracted (b)(6) from the area to the medevac point.

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(b)(6) stated he was the driver to the escort vehicle in MG BATHURST convoy. (b)(6) stated immediately prior to the incident, while sitting in his vehicle, he observed a Ford Ranger with ANA markings near the building the short was later in, and four Afghanistan National Security Force MP's exited the vehicle and entered the building. (b)(6) stated shortly after he heard small arms fire and saw rounds impacting around the US, NATO, and Coalition Forces. (b)(6) stated he then went and extracted (b)(6) and other personnel from the area.

(b)(6) stated he was the VIP Driver for MG BATHURST. (b)(6) stated he was sitting in his vehicle when the incident happened around 1130, 5 Aug 14. (b)(6) stated he heard two bursts of gunfire of approximately five rounds each, and then looked at gathering of US, NATO, and Coalition Forces and observed "ground splashes" where the rounds were impacting the ground near them, along with another burst of gunfire of approximately five rounds. (b)(6) stated he then drove his vehicle near the incident site, and extracted MG BATHURST from the area.

(b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, ISAF, stated he was in his vehicle when he observed an tan in color Ford Ranger pick-up truck arrive at the building to where the shooter was at prior to the incident. (b)(6) stated he observed three ANA Soldiers with Red Beret's exited the vehicle and entered the building; however, he did no notice if they had weapons or not. (b)(6) stated shortly after that he heard a burst of automatic gunfire, turned and looked in the direction of the congregation, and heard another burst of gunfire along with observing bullet rounds hit the ground near the congregation. (b)(6) stated he and the rest of the team approached the area and extracted there people from the area.

(b)(6), DMOD MAG CPT, ISAF, stated he was in his vehicle when heard a burst of automatic gunfire, turned and looked in the direction of the congregation, and heard another burst of gunfire along with observing bullet rounds hit the ground near the congregation. (b)(6) stated he and the rest of the team approached the area and extracted there people from the area. (b)(6) stated after the incident occurred, he escorted several people back to the incident, and entered the "U" shaped building. (b)(6) (b)(6) stated as he entered the building he was escorted immediately to the right, and again to the right, and entered the third room on the left which appeared to be a latrine with a toilet in it. (b)(6) (b)(6) stated there were other people in the room (NFI), and on the floor was an Afghanistan male, wearing Afghanistan National Army clothing, who appeared to have been shot several times. (b)(6) stated there were bullets holes in the window directly next to him. (b)(6) (b)(6) stated he did not see a weapon; however, due to the amount of people in the room he could discern if there was one or not.

About 1115, 8 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(6) USACE Trans-Atlantic District, NKC, who related around noon is when the incident occurred on 5 Aug 14. (b)(6) (b)(6) related he did not notice anything out of the ordinary, and all of the Afghanistan General's appeared relaxed as they dropped their body armor with all the other Generals. (b)(6) related

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he was present to provide protection services to (b)(3), (b)(6), and was adjacent to him in the "U" shaped briefing when the incident occurred. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he was nearest to the building the shooter was in when he heard what he believed was an "explosion" first and then gunfire came out of the window. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he then fired about eight rounds into the window where the gunfire was coming from. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the gunfire from the window was continues and was fully automatic. (b)(3), (b)(6) related (b)(3), (b)(6) also returned fire after being hit, with two rounds from his M-4 before it jammed, and then several rounds from his pistol. (b)(3), (b)(6) related (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained injuries to his left forearm, left foot, right leg, and fragments out of his shoulders. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the doctors pulled 4-5 bullets out of him.

About 1115, 8 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted Canvass Interview Worksheet of (b)(3), (b)(6), (b)(3), (b)(6) USACE Trans-Atlantic District, NKC. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he received a gun shoot wound to his shoulder, and fragments hit him in his right elbow. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he did not see the attacker, and they didn't sound like an M-4 or M-16. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the attackers gunfire was over in seconds, and appeared to be one long continuous burst. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he only observed (b)(3), (b)(6) return fire to someone in a window, and (b)(3), (b)(6) returned fire after he was hit.

About 1410, 8 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted Canvass Interview Worksheet of (b)(6) (b)(6), CTSC-A, CJ-Eng, ISAF. (b)(6) related he injured his back after he fled the scene of the incident. (b)(6) related he took shelter in an adjacent building, and attempted to exit through a window by jumping out of it. (b)(6) related when he jumped out of it, he fell and injured his back.

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About 1705, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) this office, interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6), C Company (Task Force 2 Fury), 2nd Battalion-501st Parainfantry Regiment (2-501st), 2nd Brigade Combat Team (BCT), 82nd Airborne Division, ISAF, who stated he was the assigned Protective Service Officer (PSO) for MG GREENE. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated his team went to the site the day prior and conducted a recon of the area they were scheduled to visit. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated the area where the shooting occurred was not designated as a briefing venue until someone set up an easel and started to brief everyone once they returned from an underground bunker. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he was watching the MG GREENE, while his team leader (b)(3), (b)(6) (NFI) was roaming the area around the large horseshoe that formed around the man who was briefing. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the group was approximately 10-15 meters from the building during the briefing and he was less that 10 meters from MG GREENE (between him and the building). (b)(3), (b)(6) related when the shooting occurred, he immediately took cover behind a concrete wall and tried to assess where the shots originated. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he believed MG GREENE was one of the first individuals who went down after the shooting started. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he did not identify the shooter, but once the shooting started he rushed over to MG GREENE and assessed his injuries. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he noticed a gunshot wound to MG GREENE's neck. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated MG GREENE was loaded up into a vehicle and moved to a pre-designated Landing Zone (LZ). (b)(3), (b)(6) stated they called in a MEDEVAC request and when the helicopters approached, he noticed they were flying to a different location and not the one his team marked with smoke. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated they continued to perform first aid on MG GREENE and he believed MG GREENE sustained another gunshot wound to his back. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the group moved to another Landing Zone set up by Camp Qargha and that's when MG GREENE was seen by a British Doctor before he was placed on a helicopter and transported to BAF. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated MG GREENE showed no signs of life the entire time he was being treated after the shooting. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he was not aware of any guardian angels, other than the PSD units, but he was aware that the Danish were providing security at all the venues, which included two snipers on the rooftop of the building from where the shooter fired. (See Canvass Interview Worksheet for details)

About 2050, 6 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) interviewed (b)(3), (b)(6) regarding the incident at the Afghanistan National Defense University (ANDU). (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he believed the event was organized by (b)(3), (b)(6) (NFI), from Camp Qargha, and aside from the Personal Protection teams for the generals he believed the Danish were in charge of security at the event. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated the meeting at ANDU was to discuss a water issue as well as the continued coalition-led construction of the ANDU compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) believed the first meeting at ANDU provided an introduction to the site and it started at 0945, 5 Aug 14. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated this venue was right outside the Camp Qargha compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) related they moved to the second site (a water tower on the ANDU compound) and discussed the water issues. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated this site was fairly close to the ANDU firing range. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated they moved to the third site, which took them to a bunker along the edge of the ANDU

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compound. (b)(3), (b)(6) believed each site briefing lasted approximately 45 minutes and he thinks they got to the bunker around 1100. (b)(3), (b)(6) related he believed only part of their group went into the bunker and the others stayed out where the shooting occurred. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) stated when they returned from the bunker an impromptu briefing from (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) (NFI) started. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated (b)(3), (b)(6) set up an easel and the crowd of people gathered around him in a horseshoe as he briefed. (b)(3), (b)(6) further related the General Officers stood in the front of the horseshoe (b)(3), (b)(6) stated the briefing at this location was not scheduled and no one knew it was going to take place. (b)(3), (b)(6) related (b)(3), (b)(6) finished his brief and everyone was standing around discussing the water issues when the shooting began. (b)(3), (b)(6) related the first few shots hit the ground, because he saw dust fly up, then they started hitting people in the crowd. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he ran behind a concrete wall and he could not identify where the shots were coming from. (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) related several rounds were fired, then there was small pause and several more rounds were fired. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated the firing sounded like very quick bursts but he did not know exactly how many rounds were fired. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated once the firing stopped he and (b)(3), (b)(6) (b)(3), (b)(6) started to treat (b)(3), (b)(6), who had been shot in the leg. (b)(3), (b)(6) informed (b)(3), (b)(6) that the only Soldiers who were wearing body armor during the attack were the security team members. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated the others did not wear armor while on the ANDU compound because they wanted to show trust to their Afghanistan counterparts. (b)(3), (b)(6) stated he did see several ANA Soldiers at the site, but he did not notice if they had weapons.

About 1430, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) completed Canvass Interview Worksheets with the following individuals:

1. (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
2. (b)(3), (b)(6), CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
3. (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
4. (b)(3), (b)(6) CSTC-A, CJ-ENG, ISAF.
5. (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
6. (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
7. (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
8. (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
9. (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.
10. (b)(3), (b)(6), 258th MP Co, ISAF.

Agent's Comments: All of the personnel canvassed related they did not return fire nor did they know who did. (b)(3), (b)(6) related they each twisted their knee sometime during the incident. (See Canvass Interview Worksheets for details)

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About 1515, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained the scheduled agenda and briefing slides pertaining to the visit to the Afghanistan National Defense University (ANDU).

About 1600, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) conducted Canvass Interview Worksheets of:

1. (b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.
2. (b)(6), DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.
3. (b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.
4. (b)(6), DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF.

Agent's Comments: All of the personnel canvassed related they did not see the shooter or engage him nor did they know exactly who engaged fire with the shooter. (See Canvass Interview Worksheets for details)

About 1615, 7 Aug 14, (b)(3), (b)(6) obtained signed statements from (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6), DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF. A review of the sworn statements revealed the following information:

1. (b)(6) stated he was the (b)(6) of DMOD MAG team and was tasked with providing security for MG BATHURST in Afghanistan. (b)(6) stated on 5 Aug 14, there were providing security at Qargha, and he did not notice anything unusual about the Afghan personnel in the area. (b)(6) stated the fourth briefing was in an enclosed building containing a water tank, and only MG BATHURST, (b)(6) DMOD MAG CPT, HQ, ISAF, were present during the incident. (b)(6) stated he and the rest of his team were stationed in or near their vehicles which were approximately 75 meters north of where the incident took place. (b)(6) stated around 1155, 5 Aug 14, he heard bursts of small arms fire coming from the area of the briefing, at which time he and his team moved to engage and extract MG BATHURST. (b)(6) stated upon arrival at the scene (b)(6) extracted MG BATHURST from the area utilizing one of their vehicles, and (b)(6) went to the aid of (b)(6) who was shot in his lower left leg, left elbow, and right hip. (b)(6) stated he and his team then extracted (b)(6) from the area to the medevac point. (See Statement for details)

2. (b)(6) stated he was the driver to the escort vehicle in MG BATHURST convoy. (b)(6) stated immediately prior to the incident, while sitting in his vehicle, he

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Pages 1 through 8 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Tab C, Exhibit E - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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Pages 1 through 14 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Tab C, Exhibit F - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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HEADQUARTERS
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces-Afghanistan
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO AE 09356

10 AUG 2014

Minister of Defense Bismullah Khan Mohammadi
Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan
Kabul, Afghanistan

Dear Minister Mohammadi,

I wish to express my condolences to you and the Afghan officers injured during the 05 August 2014 shooting incident at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University. This was a tragic incident that also took the life of one of our ISAF General Officers and injured many other Coalition personnel. I wish all of the survivors a rapid recovery.

I have directed an ISAF/NATO led investigation in close coordination and cooperation with the Government of the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan (GIRoA). For this to occur, I request your support in gaining expeditious access to Afghan witnesses, as well as to vital material and information already collected by the Ministry. Specifically, we request access to:

1. The perpetrator's body for forensic analysis.
2. A copy of the post mortem report, including any samples of DNA, fingerprints or other forensic evidence collected by the Ministry.
3. All evidence collected by the Ministry in the course of its investigation, including permission to view, copy, or photograph such evidence.
4. Any photographs collected during the Ministry's investigation, including permission to copy such photographs.
5. Identification of all Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel present in the barracks and in/around the military police company headquarters compound at the time of the incident, as well as a description of their duties.
6. Afghanistan National Security Forces members or Ministry civilian employees identified as relevant to the incident either by us or in the course of the Ministry's investigation.

In the meantime I have directed my staff to continue their efforts in analyzing the incident in order to determine how best we can work with the Ministry to prevent something like this from ever happening again.

I want to thank you for your continued support.

Very Respectfully,

J. F. Dunford, Jr.
General, U.S. Marine Corps
Commander
International Security Assistance Force/
United States Forces-Afghanistan

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Pages 1 through 2 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Tab C, Exhibit H - (b)(1)1.4b, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(3), (b)(6)

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(b)(6)

From: (b)(6)
Sent: Wednesday, August 06, 2014 12:56 PM
To: (b)(6)
Subject: ~~(S//REL)~~ Incident report.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

(b)(6)
Below is the final draft of the translation.

V/R,

(b)(6)
HQ-ISAF
Kabul, Afghanistan

(b)(6)

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Subject:
Report of terrorist incident on 1393/5/14 at Marshal Muhammad Ghaseem Fahim Defense University.

Incident report:

Around Ten o'clock in the morning a group of ISAF officers as well as coalition forces including MG Greene DCG CSTC-A along with his security team arrived visited Marshal Fahim Defense University to conduct a second phase of building construction visit. The last phase of the visit, they stopped at the security checkpoint near military police HQ. and were occupied with the engineers brief of technical project of water irrigation of the university. Around 12:00 in spite of the surrounding security which was measured by their security personnel, from inside of the latrine direction around five meter from the clinic, at the stand point of board Rafiq Ulaah son of (b)(6) age 17 in year 1387 (currently 23 years old) primary residence Kuz kele village Parukheil district of Jankheil(Mangal) in Paktiya Province, Pashtun Tribe. On 1391/2/17 he was introduced by paktiya commissioner to Kabul Military Training Center, and for over two years he served at the Garrison unit of the university started firing his M16 weapon, as a result MG Greene was killed, and 15 other personnel including MG Oulam Sakhi, commander of the academy, (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) (b)(6) the building Department were wounded.

Due to the fire fight Rafiq Ullah was gunned downed. The bodies of the wounded were transferred by the order of Defense Ministry. To conduct a thorough investigation, delegations including MG Payande Muhammad, MG Abdul Manan Farahi, Chief of GSG2, MG Madjeed Khavary, chief of legal assignment , along with the legal investigation team visited the crime scene. At the crime scene, attacker's cellular phone personal belongings including his weapon were ceased and confiscated. Five of other personnel in the same company as the attacker were detained. They are under investigation and interrogation. Counter Intelligence team have been sent to Paktiya to conduct further investigation of the residence and collect

more information. Forensic investigation and autopsy of the shooter is ongoing as well. All these organizations are working as team to collect further information. .
Subject matter is been conveyed to higher authorities.

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

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Date: Aug. 6/ 2014

Note

Subject: The report of terrorism attack which, happened on Aug. 6- 2014 in Marshal Mohammad Qaseem Fahim Military Academy.

Theorem event: Around 10:00 AM a group of ISAF and NATO officers including Maj. General Green Deputy Commander of CSTC came to the scene to survey and start renovate the second phase of construction of the Marshal Qaseem Fahim Military Academy with their own security personnel. This visit lasted until 12:00 noon and through the end of the visit they reached close to ECP near MPHQ to hear the reports of project engineers, while their security personnel had secure the promises.

Shortly after 12:00 noon in about 5m form the clinic an individual named Rafiqullah (b)(6) (b)(6) age 17 years old in 1387 (23 years old) according to Tazkira residence of Kooz ,Porokhil village, Jangel Dis. (Mangal) , Paktiya Province . Tribe Pashtun whom, hide inside a bathroom showed up on the scene. In 1391/2/17 (Feb. 7/2012) this individual through Paktya Commissioner introduced and referred to Kabul Training Center and for about two years he served in Garrison Regiment. He was armed with M16 which was issued to him started shooting in a result,Maj. General Green got killed and 15 other people got injured including BG Ghulam Skhai Military Academy Commander (b)(6) and (b)(6) Directorate of Construction . The effect of crossfire Rafiqullah the invading soldiers gone down and so as the rest of killed and injured individual and were taking away from the incident scene for further observations. With the guidance of MOD there is a board case review along with Maj. General Payenda Mohammad (team leader), Maj.General Abdul Manan Farahie Directorate of Surveillance and BG Majid Khawary Directorate of assigned rights and also the rest of intelligent and surveillance personnel came to the scene of incident and collecting evidence and also they collected the personal belongings form invading solders like phones, weapons and personal stuff and the body of invading solders sent to Forensic. According to plenary investigation there are five more individual suspects whom were connected to Rafiqullah were arrested and interrogation and investigation has already started and based on all the evidence they found bunch of stuff including phone numbers addresses and names , which required spread investigations and one assigned team already sent to Paktyia for further investigations .

At the main time all other organization also involved in this case for gathering more quality information. This was the summery of this case which represented to you Sir.

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Page 4 redacted for the following reason:
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
(b)(6)

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



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I made it clear of the urgency and restated that ISAF wants to make sure this gets closed out before D4 departs. He said he will make that happen.

I will push it again tomorrow to ensure Monday happens with F2.

(b)(6)

HQ ISAF
Kabul, Afghanistan

(b)(6)

CLASSIFICATION: ~~SECRET//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO~~

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~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

International Security Assistance Force Joint Command
Kabul, Afghanistan
APO AE 09320

IJC-CJ2X

23 August 2014

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Counterintelligence Assessment Report; Regional Command –Capital (RC-C) Insider Attack in Kabul District on 05 AUG 2014 (U)

1. ~~(REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ INTRODUCTION:
On 05 AUG 2014, at approximately 1155 hours, an insider attack occurred at the Afghan National Army (ANA) Military Police (MP) Barracks ([redacted] (b)(1)1.4a) located at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University (MFNDU), Qargha, Kabul City, Kabul District, Kabul Province by an ANA uniformed individual who engaged at least 15 International Security Assistance Force (ISAF) personnel and Afghan National Security Forces (ANSF) personnel during a VIP visit to the MFNDU, resulting in one death and a number of Category A and other casualties. This report serves to provide an initial summary of findings 10 days after the event in accordance with IJC SOP 332.

2. ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ BACKGROUND:
An ANA MP Guard, Rafiqullah, [redacted] (b)(6) engaged Coalition and Afghan Forces during a Key Leader Event (KLE) located at the Marshal Fahim National Defense University military police barracks with an M16 rifle from the first floor restroom window located approximately 5-15 meters from the KLE. Rafiqullah had just come off guard shift with [redacted] (b)(6) another enlisted MP conducting a roving patrol with Rafiqullah. At approximately 1000 hours, Rafiqullah was notified by his [redacted] (b)(6) to conduct a roving patrol with ANA MP [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) and ensure that all partially constructed and empty buildings are inspected for the VIP delegation of approximately 50 members, to include several (approximately eight VIPs) US, CF and ANA General Officers. Rafiqullah was scheduled to work the east guard post for his shift, but was moved to the roving patrol due to a lack of personnel. Between 1110-1120 hours, [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) along with Rafiqullah and [redacted] (b)(6) returned to the MP barracks and notified [redacted] (b)(6) [redacted] (b)(6) that they had completed the security checks assigned to them. [redacted] (b)(6) informed [redacted] (b)(6) to have [redacted] (b)(6) and Rafiqullah to go inside the MP barracks and remain there until after the delegation departed. [redacted] (b)(6) continued to follow the delegation and provide security over watch.

After conducting a review of the water tank located near the south gate, the delegation moved to a small area beside the MP guard barracks where an easel was erected for the delegation to receive a quick presentation. At approximately 1130-1140 hours, the delegation formed a horse shoe formation around the presenter. Rafiqullah most likely left the barracks room and entered the barracks latrine adjacent to the room where other ANA MP guards where

~~SECRET//NOFORN~~

~~Classified by:~~ [redacted] (b)(3), (b)(6)
~~Derived from: Army CI SCG, 28 Jul 11~~
~~Declassify by: 20230823~~

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gathered during the delegation site visit approximately the same time. Approximately 1150-1155 hours, Rafiqullah pointed his M16 rifle through a medium opening, approximately 14-18 inches, of the restroom window and fired upon both Coalition and Afghan soldiers watching the presentation. Approximately 50 people were in the line of fire. Rafiqullah expended approximately 27-30 rounds of ammunition in about 1-2 minutes, resulting in 1 fatality and 14 wounded personnel.

Coalition Forces engaged the shooter from two positions, suppressing further engagement by Rafiqullah. It is undetermined if Coalition Forces outside the building or ANA within the building killed Rafiqullah, who later died at the scene of the incident. (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c ANA personnel have made no claim to shooting Rafiqullah in the latrine and CF PSD Soldiers have not confirmed possible gun shots after the initial engagement.

3. (U) INCIDENT RESPONSE:

a. ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Rafiqullah died at the scene of the incident.

4. (U) FINDINGS TO DATE:

a. ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ *Overview including initial findings by local units.* On 5 August 2014, at approximately 1150-1155 hrs, an ANA MP guard named Rafiqullah, fired upon a KLE delegation consisting of Coalition and Afghan Forces with an M16A2 rifle loaded with a 30 round clip from the MP Barracks latrine window which was approximately 5-15 meters from the delegation. Approximately 27-30 rounds were expended hitting 15 Coalition and Afghan forces resulting in one KIA and 14 wounded. (b)(6) (b)(6) The shooter was engaged by Coalition Forces and died at the scene of the incident, it is undetermined if ANA soldiers in the MP barracks engaged and killed Rafiqullah after CF returned fire.

b. ~~(NATO//ISAF SECRET)~~ BIOGRAPHICAL DATA

NAME: Rafiqullah, (b)(6)

(b)(6)

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(b)(6) n

c. ~~(S//NF)~~ *CELLEX results.*
On 5 AUG 2014, at approximately 1800 hours, CELLEX was conducted on Rafiqullah's cell phone and associated items in which seven SIM cards were exploited. Further examination resulted in identifying that the phone did not offer access to the internet nor did it have any media or picture files stored.

On 10 AUG 2014, at approximately 1830 hours, CELLEX was performed on eight of nine cells phones belonging to eight detained persons of interests with close association to Rafiqullah:

1. (b)(6) enlisted soldier, from same area.
2. (b)(6) enlisted soldier, who shared wall locker for 7 months.
3. (b)(6) ANA MP (b)(6)
4. (b)(6) enlisted soldier, close friend, Paktiya Province.
5. (b)(6) enlisted soldier, close friend.
6. (b)(6)
7. (b)(6) enlisted soldier, close friend.

CELLEX Results: NSTR on nefarious contacts or activities

d. ~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Pocket litter from the deceased was confiscated by ANA Investigators at the scene of the incident. ANA CID has not provided any pocket litter to the JCAT team for review for any nefarious connections or activities at the time of this report.

5. (U) PERSONS OF INTEREST (POIs):

~~(S//REL TO USA, ISAF, NATO)~~ Rafiqullah joined the ANA in 2012. The Garrison Support Unit (GSU) Guard Force, as an MP, was his first assignment. Current duties were at guard towers which involved a three month rotation to new tower areas. He had not taken leave in the past seven or eight months. Rafiqullah was not liked by other members of his unit due to (b)(6) although CELLEX confirmed there were no media files or pictures found on his phone.

(b)(6)

(b)(6). There were no signs or indications of Anti-US or ISAF Forces sentiments (still developing). There had been zero contact with ISAF

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forces on the NDU Compound. According to ANA CID, and later confirmed by (b)(6) (b)(6) Rafiqullah passed a PCASS interview approximately two-three months ago, which was administered by the GSG2 PCASS Team. His cell phone used seven SIM cards (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c. Rafiqullah was near the end of his enlistment, with approximately three months remaining. He was in charge of two personnel (not identified). According to ANA CID, Rafiqullah possibly carried a fake taskera (confirmed authentic). At the publication of this report, the ANA has detained several of his close associates for further questioning. The following is a list of associates to Rafiqullah:

1). (b)(6) enlisted soldier (b)(6) Pashtun, Mangal Tribe (same tribe Rafiqullah is from) from Paktiya, Samkanai District, Pir Kalai Village, mobile phone # (b)(6) **Reason for detention:** He is the perpetrator's personal friend and their friendship started when they joined the ANA and assigned to Qargha Base MP Company.

2). (b)(6) enlisted soldier, Pashtun from Nangarhar Province, mobile phone # (b)(6). **Reason for detention:** Another close friend of Rafiqullah.

3). (b)(6) # (b)(6) of Qargha Base, Tajik from Panjshir Province, Bazarak District, Karwashi Village (current address Kabul Province, District 15, Khuja Bughra Village), mobile phone # (b)(6) (b)(6)
Reason for detention: The (b)(6) failed in his duties; determine if the (b)(6) was aware of the perpetrator's plan.

4). (b)(6) enlisted Soldier, Pashtun from Nangarhar
Reason for detention: Detained morning of 6th August around 10am. Around 1600, same day, he attempted to flee by jumping out of the interrogation room in the MP barracks, while interrogator left the room for personal needs. By 1820 same day recaptured. (b)(6) and perpetrator were close friends and both were always hanging around together. (b)(6) mobile # was discovered in the perpetrator's phone

5). (b)(6) enlisted Soldier # (b)(6), Uzbek or Turkmen from Kunduz Province, Artepa District, Baghcha Village (current address-same), mobile phone # (b)(6). **Reason for detention:** He was in the vehicle with Rafiqullah for the patrol on the day of the incident. ANA investigators want to know if he knew anything about the plan or Rafiqullah's intentions.

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SUBJECT: Final Assessment Report; Regional Command –Capital (RC-C) Insider Attack in Kabul District on 05 AUG 2014

6). (b)(6) #(b)(6), Pashtun from Laghman Province, Dawlat Shah District, Daratu Village (current address Laghman Province, Qarghaii District, Chappa Dara Village), mobile Phone #(b)(6) driver of the Ford Ranger Truck at the time of the incident. **Reason for detention:** He was the driver of the vehicle for the security roving patrol when they headed back to the barracks after completing the mission assigned to them.

7). (b)(6) enlisted Soldier #(b)(6) from Paktiya Province, Patan District, Serai Cace Village (current address-same) **Reason for Detention:** shared wall locker with Rafiqullah for seven months, denied being friend.

8). (b)(6) for Camp Qargha, working with US infrastructure contractor. Reported information that Rafiqullah had mood swings and possible anti US sentiments. (Provided as a lead from BG Jackson)

6. ~~(S//NF)~~ INTELLIGENCE REPORTING:

(b)(1)1.4c

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Pages 6 through 7 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
(b)(1)1.4c
(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

j. ~~(S//NF)~~ DETAINEE INTERVIEWS:

The IJC CJ2X CI Team requested and was approved by USFOR-A J2/J2X to interview five of the nine detainees on 20 Aug 2014 at the ANA Holding Facility located at Sia Seng Military Training Center, Kabul, Afghanistan. The following is a list of the detainees interviewed:

(b)(6)

Enlisted
Enlisted (b)(6)
Enlisted

The IJC CI Team identified these individuals being the most knowledgeable of Rafiqullah's activities, family issues, foreign travel and associations, hobbies, disposition, attitudes, beliefs, sentiments, patterns of life, work and off-duty time habits or patterns, internet access, and religious practices. The interviews were conducted in the presence of (b)(6) (b)(6) (Interview room #1) and (b)(6) (Interview room #2). This made things very difficult based on (b)(6) interrupting and ensuring that the ANA detainees limit full details or information when asked specific questions in interview room #1. Information garnered from the detainees provided only positive feedback concerning Rafiqullah.

1). (b)(6) met Rafiqullah when he arrived at Qargha in 2013. He never had any issues or problems with Rafiqullah. He states that Rafiqullah would always do his job right. He never saw anti-US or Coalition Forces propaganda, gestures or statements. Rafiqullah did not have any family issues, pay problems/financial issues, no foreign travel, no access to the internet, and although phones were not allowed, he knew that Rafiqullah and the other soldiers would secretly keep phones. The day of the incident, (b)(6) had a last minute ad hoc task, in which Rafiqullah was supporting, to have soldiers patrol northeast northwest construction site to ensure buildings were cleared and safe. He did not notice any change in attitudes, moods, behavior of Rafiqullah prior to or after the patrol. (Reference IJC J2X MFR 004-14)

2). One of the detainees labeled as a close associate, (b)(6) had only met Rafiqullah the day of the vehicle patrol, however, he could not detailed information concerning Rafiqullah based on limited association and contact. (b)(6) was asked about the disposition of Rafiqullah the day of the incident. (b)(6) only stated that he could not understand the language that Rafiqullah was speaking since he doesn't understand Pashtu and he is Turkman. He did not speak to Rafiqullah but did see him point and laugh while in the truck during the patrol. He did

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not see any mood swings or changes in attitude upon their return to the MP barracks. When asked to read the witness statement, (b)(6) stated he could not read or write; however, the interpreter was able to explaine the statement and when asked to sign the document, (b)(6) made a circular mark for his name. (Reference IJC J2X MFR 005-14)

3). (b)(6) allegedly met Rafiqullah 1st time the day before the shooting. Rafiqullah and (b)(6) are described as "very cool", "no arguments" and "good guys". Rafiqullah was described as a simple person who could not read or write and only spent a couple of years in school before joining the ANA. Circa 1000-1130/1140 (b)(6) randomly selected Rafiqullah & (b)(6) to conduct a roving patrol security sweep through buildings under construction in the NW sector of the MFNDU. Rafiqullah & (b)(6) were wearing body armor and issued five 30 round magazines for the guards, which is normal. (b)(6) was the driver of an ANA truck and was not wearing body armor and parked at the NW corner (next to the steps going to the roof) of the barracks upon his return. (b)(6) instructions were to return to the MP Garrison Barracks (shooting site) when the task was completed. (b)(6) ordered Rafiqullah and (b)(6) to the barracks rooms due to the "visitors" that would be in the area and to stay out of sight. (b)(6) stayed outside with the truck. (b)(6) was shown a photo of the delegation prior to the shooting and identified the MP Company Commander in a red beret as (b)(6) (Ref JCAT report "Appendix D-16-24" number "38" who is listed as "(b)(6) (b)(6) (FIELD COMMENT: The face is not recognizable and hidden behind other people but (b)(6) was positive it was (b)(6) and not (b)(6). (b)(6) seemed hesitant in the beginning of the interview but opened up and seemed to be honest in his answers once he understood his purpose of the interview/debrief. (b)(6) (b)(6) was present and did not appear to interfere or intimidate or instruct (b)(6). He spoke several times when the linguist was having trouble explaining something. (Reference IJC J2X MFR 006-14)

4) (b)(6) was detained because he was identified as a close friend to Rafiqullah. 5 Aug 2014, during the shooting, (b)(6) was on duty in the Guard Tower that was approximately 250-300 meters east/south east on the perimeter from the incident site. Within approximately 5-10 minutes after the shooting, (b)(6) called Rafiqullah's cell phone (b)(6) (b)(6) to try and find out what happened. (b)(6) and Rafiqullah's phone numbers/SIM cards are one digit different and both were purchased by (b)(6). Allegedly, Rafiqullah's previous phone was not working so (b)(6) gave Rafiqullah the SIM card to use. (b)(6) or Rafiqullah did not have a computer. (b)(6) said Rafiqullah could read a little bit but could not write. (b)(6) was sad when he learned Rafiqullah was the shooter and deceased. (b)(6) thought Rafiqullah "did a bad decision" and Rafiqullah "didn't look suspicious". (b)(6) had no opinion and was never told by Rafiqullah why he would do the shooting. Rafiqullah didn't have any known medical, drug or discipline problems. (b)(6) did not observe Rafiqullah pray or talk about Jihad or being a martyr. (b)(6) did not observe any ANA leadership problems.

(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

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(b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

5). (b)(6) was detained when he was identified to have shared a closet/wall locker with Rafiqullah for seven months. 5 Aug 2014, during the shooting. (b)(6) was on 10 days of leave in Paktiya Province and was arrested when he returned to work circa 7 Aug 2014 because he was identified as being a closet mate for seven months. (b)(6) states he did not know Rafiqullah and never socialized or worked the same shift during the two and a half years they were in the same unit. (b)(6) does not know why Rafiqullah shot US, CF and ANA Soldiers. (b)(6) stated he never talked to Rafiqullah nor did he ever hear Rafiqullah make anti US, CF or ANA statements

(b)(6) shared a closet with Rafiqullah and one other guy and had his own key but did not have much interaction with Rafiqullah. (b)(6) worked in the north part of the base and Rafiqullah worked the south part of the base. (b)(6) was abrasive and semi-confrontational and answered everything to distance himself from Rafiqullah. (b)(6) was visibly angry for being detained for over two weeks because of Rafiqullah's actions. (b)(6) was animated at various times during the interview. Several times (b)(6) (b)(6) consulted each other in order to explain some questions and comments to (b)(6) (Reference IJC J2X MFR 008-14)

7. ~~(S//NF)~~ *LEADS*:

1). (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4c, (b)(6)

2). On 23 August 2014 IJC CJ2X CI Team met with (b)(6) cell phone (b)(6) from Panjshir Province, Bazark District currently living in Khoja Boghra Jadid District 5. Kabul (b)(6) (b)(6) employed by the British at Camp Qargha) Witness in conjunction with the 5 August 2014 GoB at the MFNDU/Qargha. (b)(6) has had access to the ANA Garrison since

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approximately 2012 through his employment as a linguist/driver with the British contingent located at Camp Qargha. His boss is (b)(6) (b)(6) but since has left the position and is currently in Kuwait on another assignment.

(b)(6) met Rafiqullah circa middle of 2012 at the South ECP (in the vicinity of the MP Barracks where incident took place.) (b)(6) and his boss used to escort workers onto the base and developed a routine of bringing energy drinks and/or candy and giving it to the guards. The one time (b)(6) recollects talking to Rafiqullah in 2012: (b)(6) was handing out a snack and drink to Rafiqullah. Rafiqullah asked "why (b)(6) was working for the Army" to which the (b)(6) replied to Rafiqullah's satisfaction that (b)(6) also worked with the ANA. Rafiqullah said "ok" and there were no further conversations or suspicious activity noticed by (b)(6) (b)(6) didn't feel the question was out of line or reveal anti CF attitude.

(b)(6) has known the (b)(6) since about January 2012 for about four weeks and then during the middle part of 2013 (all summer and winter). (b)(6) stated (b)(6) is Tajik and Rafiqullah was Pashtu and there was a class difference between the two ethnicities. It was opined that (b)(6) was possibly talking down to Rafiqullah and other Pashtuns.

(b)(6) explained since he has known (b)(6) has purchased three new cars. (**Undue Affluence**)(A white Corolla, a black 2010 Corolla a "Mark X") and (b)(6) sold his old car and is allegedly in possession of one new "Mark X" brand of automobile. (b)(6) doesn't think (b)(6) can afford these purchases with his salary. (b)(6) doesn't know if (b)(6) is involved with bribes or corruption at the gates but believes it is possible. (b)(6) has been known to not allow "trucks" onto the base but no reason is known. (Reference IJC J2X MFR 009-14)

BG Jackson provided (b)(6) as a possible source of information based on his discussion and information (b)(6) provided: mood swings of the perpetrator, not wanting to accept drinks from US personnel, only would take it from other Afghans. (b)(6) (b)(6) has been barred from the Qargha for bringing snuff into the British compound. (b)(6) (b)(6) stated during that interview that it was left in his car by his friends and he tried to explain the situation after the Security dogs identified the bag in the car. (b)(6) should be interviewed again to discuss the different stories provided on different occasions.

3). Rafiqullah's family allegedly moved from their original village to the inner city of Paktia. Was this something the family did on their own or was it orchestrated as possible payment for participation and support to the insurgency? Follow up investigative activities need to look into this question as well as the Affirmant, (b)(6), from Rafiqullah's enlistment paperwork.

4). (b)(6) is clearly withholding information which is most likely the motivation of the shooting. Further follow up to obtain information should be pursued.

8. ~~(S//NF)~~ *ASSESSMENT: Wrap up of information to date and where the assessment is heading. If possible, provide tentative motivation.*

As of 22 August 2014, IJC CJ2X CI Team can only determine the case inconclusive at this time. Based on all available information: HUMINT; SIGINT; and OSINT; there is not a

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direct connection to nefarious actors, activities or reasons for Rafiqullah Abdullah to conduct the GoB/GoG attack that targeted 15 Coalition and Afghan Forces personnel on 5 August 2014. Previous GoB/GoG incidents presented certain insider threat indicators or profile that provided insight and possible understanding for the attack such as, (b)(1)1.4a (b)(1)1.4a Rafiqullah did not display any of the insider indicators that would lead to a definitive answer into why he conducted the attack. The J2X CI Team has been hampered by (b)(1)1.4b (b)(1)1.4b Although the ANA stated to the team of full cooperation and transparency, the team has requested access to witnesses, investigative reports, PCASS results, and ballistics reports to aid in the criminal and counterintelligence investigation/assessment. CID Lead investigator would provide various excuses on why reports were not available to the team. On 5 and 6 August, the team met with MG Farahi and (b)(6) who provided their condolences to the JCAT Team. (b)(3), (b)(6) asked if the team would have access to the perpetrators body and weapon for forensics and ballistics tests. MG Farahi adamantly stated that ANA would take care of the forensics and ballistics analysis and provide reports once complete. The team was not able to gain access to the deceased shooter for the CID forensics specialist to conduct a thorough exam or access to the weapon. (b)(6) did provide the forensics report to the team on 8 Aug after much hesitance.

The J2X CI Team asked for reports from the ANA CI Team concerning the interview of the family members in Paktiya. A CI Team was supposedly already in Paktiya conducting interviews according to MG Farahi; however, (b)(6) stated that he was sending a CID Team to Paktiya on 9 August and wouldn't expect a report for two or three days because of the security issues in Paktiya. The IJC J2X CI Team met with (b)(6) on 16 August and inquired about the CI/CID interview report of the family members. A formal report was not provided. (b)(6) only provided that the family was good, but poor and no longer lived in the village and had moved to Paktiya City center. The family was never threatened by Haqqani or Taliban.

Most of the information garnered during this assessment has been provided by ANA CID Lead Investigator. Without the ability of the CI Team to conduct interviews of the family members, friends or other contacts, we can only base our assessment on possibly bias or false information provided by ANA. The J2X CI Team looked into possible grievance's held by Rafiqullah towards his Chain of Command or unit: denied leave during Eid; walking an hour to his post every day; working double shift day of incident; possible unit corruption; and possibly informed of the argument between US and ANA general officers. Unfortunately, none of the grievances could be corroborated with any ANA leadership, witnesses, detainees or sources.

(b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b

It is unlikely that the J2X CI Team will never be able to determine the reasons or motives of Rafiqullah Abdullah. It is unfortunate, that this case will be unsolved do to the amount of inconclusive data on nefarious contacts, malign actors, foreign travel, attitudes, moods, beliefs or any pre-attack planning of the event.

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SUBJECT: Final Assessment Report; Regional Command –Capital (RC-C) Insider Attack in Kabul District on 05 AUG 2014

The CI team recommends continued joint interagency cooperation with Drug Enforcement Agency-Afghanistan to share in research and analysis on Rafiqullah (b)(6) contact, connections between (b)(6) any possible Haqqani Network infiltration of ANA or affiliation with (b)(6) and Rafiqullah, any links between (b)(6) (b)(6) and Rafiqullah to corroborate or refute any direct connections or associations and possible anti-CF/ANA motives or objectives.

9. (U//~~FOUO~~) Point of contact for this memorandum is (b)(3), (b)(6) at SVOIP (b)(6) (b)(6) or (b)(3), (b)(6).

(original signed)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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PLACEHOLDER FOR

TAB C – EXHIBIT K

REDACTED (b)(1)1.4c and (b)(1)1.4d

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Pages 1 through 4 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Tab C, Exhibit L - (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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High Risk
Personnel Security Course

Course Description: Back to Top

Provides specialized training to personnel, other than Military Police, who are assigned to conduct High Risk Personnel (HRP) security operations in combat environments and are responsible for protecting Commanders in key leadership positions, designated by the Combatant Commander and/or Personal Security Vulnerability Assessment (PSVA).

Emphasis is placed on the specific HRP mission of units including doctrine, terminology, coordination, mission planning, special weapons training, evasive driving, and motorcade operations with equipment and weapons organic to units. Training includes a 2-day final practical exercise to test the units ability to organize and execute a High Risk Personnel Security Mission in a hostile environment under adverse conditions.

Units requiring HRP training at their location should request a mobile training team (MTT). This request should be routed through their MACOM to TRADOC or Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATTN: G3 DAMO-ODO Provost marshal Desk, 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310 or TRADOC POC at 757-788-4088.

Class Schedule and Prerequisites: Back to Top

To get the most up-to-date class schedule and perquisites for this course follow these steps:

Click on this website for the ATRRS web site: www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/

- Enter the course number 920-F12 (MTT)
- Enter School Code: 191
- Press the "Search the ATRRS Course Catalog" button.
- Click on the Course

Prerequisites:

This course is available to all Active, Reserve or National Guard of any rank and any MOS except Military Police (31 series)

- Personnel attending the course must have proof that their duties will require them to conduct a Protective Services Operation for a Level I or Level II HRP in a combat environment / hostile fire zone.

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- This is a logistically demanding course.

- Units must provide appropriate training areas for class room instruction, field training sites, multipurpose weapons ranges, driving area (driving tracks, airfields, and blocked roadways), vehicles such as large SUV, and/or sedans for specified training events.

- Highly encouraged to have or use same or similar vehicles and equipment that will be used while conducting HRP duties if possible.

- Class size is limited to 30 students per class.

- An advance will be conducted to determine adequate training facilities and equipment.

NOTE: All students must meet all of the prerequisites in order to attend this course. In the case a unit wants a student to attend this course they need to submit a waiver to the prerequisites.

For students attending this course, who need to request for waivers to any of the prerequisites listed on ATRRS, the unit will need to submit the waiver and get approval from the Director of Training and Education (DOT&E), United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929 prior to the student arriving at training.

Sample of a waiver request.

POC for submitting waivers is the DOT&E Operations NCO (573) 563-5561 or DOT&E Operation Officer (573) 563-7820.

Any student who shows up to training not in possession of the aforementioned documentation during in processing may be denied enrollment into the course.

Special Information: Back to Top
IAW DOD 6055.4 and AR 385-55, students must possess and present an Accident Avoidance Course (AAC), Defensive Driving Course (DDC), or Driving Improvement Course (DIC) card not older than 4 years.

IAW AR 600-55, students must have a valid civilian and military driver's license, specifically.

NOTE: The Army Accident Avoidance Course (AAAC) has replaced the Defensive Driving Course for US Army Soldiers. In order to access the AAAC, go to the https://www.lms.army.mil follow the instructions below.

1. Log on with your AKO credentials (Access and Password).

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2. Type "traffic" in the Catalog Search engine blank and click "Go".
3. Click "Register" for the course and the system requirements sections and follow the procedures to begin your training.
4. You must turn off your "Pop Up Blocker" or you will never see the course.
5. Click "Launch Content"
6. Click "Army POV 1-3"
7. If you have any problems and need HELP, do not contact the Ground Safety office but contact the ALMS Help Desk at 1-877-251-0730.

Students can use their Service specific Accident Avoidance Course if less than 4 years old.

Students should print out the certificate and bring it with them to class.

Students must provide a weapons' qualification with their assigned weapons (M-4, M-9, or M11) within 6 months of course attendance during in-processing.

NOTE: This course requires a high degree of physical fitness. Participants have to negotiate an obstacle course, run, jump, wear protective clothing (body armor, ballistic eye protection, etc.) and will come in contact with other students or instructors during several phases of training. Vehicle dynamics and evasive maneuvers involve quick acceleration, abrupt stops, spins, high speed events and deliberate vehicle-to-vehicle contact.

Topics: Back to Top

- HRP Security Doctrine and Terminology
- Surveillance Detection and Route Analysis
- React to an Attack
- Mounted and Dismounted Formations
- Mission Coordination and Planning
- Advances and Site Survey
- Advanced Weapons Training
- Advanced Driving TTP in specialized vehicles
- Evasive Maneuvers and Motorcade Operations - SUV /
- Comprehensive two-day Final Practical Exercise

Course is 8 consecutive days in Duration

POC: Back to Top
Questions and information concerning this course can be directed to the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, Training Management NCO (573)-596-2001 or ALETD NCOIC (573) 596-2868 or email usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.dotaletd@mail.milL Request you put the course name in the subject line as well as your email address and phone number.

Units requesting the High Risk Personnel Security Course include:

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- Non MP Units tasked or mandated to conduct personnel security mission for the JVB Iraq and the DVB Afghanistan, or similar mission.
- Non MP Units conducting personnel security for Brigade level, or higher, commanders designated as high risk personnel.
- MP units tasked with personnel security, already in theater, who have not attended the PST Course based on time constraints, personnel availability, etc.

Note: IAW DoD Dir 2000.12-H, High Risk Personnel are those who, by their grade, assignment, symbolic value, or relative isolation are likely to be attractive or accessible terrorist targets.

Units who should not attend:

- Military Police personnel conducting a valid and authorized PSD mission. These personnel must attend the USAMPS Protective Service Training and Antiterrorism Evasive Driving Course (Staff Driver) IAW AR 190-58. PST missions should be conducted by USAMPS trained protective service personnel who meet necessary prerequisites (MP, secret clearance, etc.).
- Units conducting "personnel protection" at command levels below Brigade level unless he/she is determined to meet high risk personnel criteria identified in DoD Dir 2000.12-H.

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Protective Services Training Course

Course Description: Back to Top

Provides specialized training to personnel who will conduct Protective Service Operations for executive level DoD leaders who are potential targets of terrorism and/or criminal acts. Emphasis is placed on the full spectrum of protective operations including Doctrine and Terminology, Coordination and Mission Planning, Protective Services in a Hostile Fire Zone, Special Weapons Training, Evasive Driving and Motorcade Operations. Training culminates with a comprehensive four-day practical exercise.

Units requiring Protective Service training or High-Risk Personnel-Security training at their location may request a mobile training team (MTT). This request should be routed through the MACOM to Headquarters, Department of the Army, ATTN: G3 DAMO-ODO Provost marshal Desk, 400 Army Pentagon, Washington, DC 20310. Every attempt to fill vacant seats should be made prior to requesting an MTT.

Class Schedule and Prerequisites: Back to Top

To get the most up-to-date class schedule and perquisites for this course follow these steps:

Click on this website for the ATRRS web site: www.atrrs.army.mil/atrrscc/

- Enter the course number 7H-F18/ASID7/830-F13
- Enter School Code: 191
- Press the "Search the ATRRS Course Catalog" button.
- Click on the Course

Press View Course Prerequisites

- Select your Branch of Service and Rank the review the course Prerequisites.

NOTE: All students must meet all of the prerequisites in order to attend this course. In the case a unit wants a student to attend this course they need to submit a waiver to the prerequisites.

For students attending this course, who need to request for waivers to any of the prerequisites listed on ATRRS, the unit will need to submit the waiver and get approval from the Director of Training and Education (DOT&E), United States Army Military Police School (USAMPS), Fort Leonard Wood, MO 65473-8929 prior to the student arriving at training.

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Sample of a waiver request.

POC for submitting waivers is the DOT&E Operations NCO (573) 563-5561 or DOT&E Operation Officer (573) 563-7820.
Any student who shows up to training not in possession of the aforementioned documentation during in processing may be denied enrollment into the course.

Topics: Back to Top
Graduates will meet regulatory requirements and be trained to plan, coordinate, and conduct all aspects of protective service missions. The extensive curriculum includes the following:

- Protective Services Doctrine
- Surveillance Detection and Route Analysis
- Unarmed Defense Against and Attack
- Dismounted Formations
- Arrivals and Departures
- Mission Coordination and Planning
- Advances and Site Survey
- Special Weapons Training
- Vehicle Dynamics - Sedan / SUV /
- Evasive Maneuvers - Sedan / SUV /
- Motorcade Operations and Vehicle Handling - Sedan / SUV /
- Students will be required to pass a final examination practical exercise to demonstrate all driving skills learned during training. This includes proper execution of the maneuvers and their ability to react to an enemy attack.
- A comprehensive final practical exercise allows students to plan, coordinate, and execute an actual protective service mission both on and off the military installation. Graduates will be required to pass a written examination at the conclusion of training and qualify with the M9 or M11 Pistol (assigned duty weapon).
- Student will be required to pass a final examination driving practical exercise to demonstrate all driving skills learned during training. This includes proper execution of the maneuvers and their ability to react to an enemy attack.
- Man Marking Systems (MMRs) are utilized during practical exercises.

POC: Back to Top
Questions and information concerning this course can be directed to the Advanced Law Enforcement Training Division, Training Management NCO (573)-596-2001 or ALETD NCOIC (573) 596-2868 or email usarmy.leonardwood.mp-schl.mbx.dotaletd@mail.milL Request you put the course name in the subject line as well as your email address and phone number.

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DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF SECURITY ASSISTANCE/ COMBINED SECURITY TRANSITION COMMAND - AFGHANISTAN
KABUL, AFGHANISTAN
APO AE 09356

30 Jul 14

PROTECTIVE SERVICES DETAIL-BRAVO
STANDARD OPERATING PROCEDURES

COMPLIANCE WITH THIS PUBLICATION IS MANDATORY

RELEASABILITY: ~~FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY~~

OPR: (b)(3), (b)(6) Certified by: (b)(3), (b)(6)

Supersedes all previous versions. Pages: 27

This Protective Services Detail (PSD) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) implements Army Regulations 190-58, Personal Security; and Field Manual 3-19.12, Protective Services. It provides guidance pertaining to general protective services duties and shall serve as a management tool, presenting the minimum accepted standards within the detail as well as tactics, techniques and procedures which are critical to Protective Services Operations. This PSD SOP shall apply to all personnel assigned, attached or under either the provisional or operational control of the Officer In Charge of PSD-B.

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Chapter 1

INTRODUCTION TO PERSONAL SECURITY DETAIL

1.1. **Authority and Mission:** Authority for procedures, protocols, and operations of the Personal Security Detail mission derives from Army Regulation 190-58, Field Manual 3-19.12 and the HRP I Letter (25 April 2013).

1.2. **Changes to this SOP:** The OPR for this SOP is the NCOIC, Protective Services Detail-Bravo (PSD-B), and is based on Tactics, Techniques and Procedures established within FM 3-19.12. All comments and proposed changes and/or modifications should be addressed to the OIC, Protective Services Detail-Bravo, who will review and make changes if deemed appropriate.

1.3. **Primary Objectives:** The primary objective of the PSD team is to operate in a manner to detect, deter, and defend against attacks on the Principal as well as evacuate the Principal if an attack occurs. The PSD goal is to operate in a manner so that the Principal is protected from all hazards, whether they are caused by specific design, accident, or negligence. Although absolute protection is never possible, the PSD must operate in a manner that minimizes the possibility of an attack and its probability of success. The primary threats toward the Principal include:

- Injury
- Assassination
- Kidnapping
- Embarrassment

1.4. **Alertness Levels:** There are (5) Five alertness levels that will be utilized by all PSD-B personnel

- **White:** Relaxed
- **Yellow:** A relaxed, but aware state
- **Orange:** Completely alert
- **Red:** Suspected danger (ready to implement countermeasures)
- **Black:** countermeasures are in motion

PSD-B personnel will be in constant alert level **Orange** while on duty and performing the PSD mission. PSD personnel should be aware of their surroundings, looking for potential choke points, or situations that would injure or embarrass the principal. When entering a choke point or another high-threat area, they should increase their alertness level to **Red** and look for avenues of escape. If an attack should take place, the alertness level elevates to **Black** and PSD personnel must immediately execute countermeasures to defend and/or evacuate the Principal.

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Chapter 2

ORGANIZTATIONAL STRUCTURE AND RESPONSIBILITIES

2.1. **Definition:** The PSD is Comprised of Military Police (MP), USAF Security Forces (SF), and various DCOS SA/CSTC-A personnel assets detailed to the Commanding General of DCOS SA/CSTC-A for the sole purpose of providing protective services. The CSTC-A/MAG personnel who are not Military Police or USAF Security Forces are non-trained PSD personnel tasked to provide PSD security. These personnel are held to the same standards as the MP/SF personnel they augment, and will be trained and equipped per FM 3-19.12, prior to assumption of the mission. DCOS SACSTC-A personnel, once identified and placed on a PSD team, shall be considered under the operational control of the OIC, PSD-B.

Position Assignments: Personnel are assigned to positions based on the individual's level of experience, training, and performance. Attitude and motivation are also qualities used to assess each member's position assignment. Each member is assigned a position that is based on the responsibility that the member is deemed capable of grasping with successful results. The OIC, PSD-B will assign each individual member to a position. The OIC and/or NCOIC will make adjustments to the assignment of personnel as needed to best accomplish the mission.

2.2. **Allocation of PSD Members:** Allocation of PSD members is at the discretion of OIC/PSO and/or NCOIC/Shift Leader. The following guidance is to explain the allocation of PSD members in support of protecting the Commanding General (CG) of DCOS SA/CSTC-A. The *minimum* manning for the PSD Team protecting the Commanding General for inner green zone movements is 6 personnel. The *minimum maximum* manning for any other move is 8 personnel. 1 Soldier will remain in the SCR for day shift and 1 Soldier for mid shift. Single vehicle movements are authorized in the green zone per ISAF SOP. For purposes of this SOP, inner green zone locations are: the US Embassy, MoD, ISAF and the Pres. Palace.

Inner Green Zone	**Greater Kabul Area**
Advance Team: 2-4	Advance Team: 4
Main Body: 4	Main Body: 4
SCR: 1	SCR: 1
Mids: 1	Mids: 1
QRF: Advance Team	QRF: Advance Team

2.3. **Attire/Standards of Appearance:** Unless otherwise directed, PSD-B personnel are required to wear FRACUs, ABSG's or Multi-cam uniforms. All personnel will ensure they adhere to their service's dress and appearance regulations or instructions. Given the unique nature of the PSD mission, sometimes personnel will incorporate civilian attire consistent with that of the Principal. The wear of civilian attire will be authorized by the OIC, PSD-B, prior to going out on the mission. Clothing items that are restrictive, limits vision, hearing, reaction, or will hinder the ability to protect the Principal, shall not be worn.

2.4. **Equipment:** PSD personnel are issued weapons (M-4, M-9, M-16, and/or Sig Sauer) from their home-station unit prior to deploying. When out on missions you will carry at a minimum one full combat load for each weapon assigned (M4/M-16: 210 rds, M-9: 45 rds, MP-5: 90 rds). IAW FM 3-19.12, ch 13, "The team is on duty 24 hours a day and needs to be able to react to threats instantly, regardless of the location". All PSD personnel are authorized to carry their assigned weapon in red status when moving the principal IAW ISAF force exemption policy. At all other times PSD weapons must be in amber status IAW Security and Weapons Status, paragraph i. Amber status is defined as weapon on safe and magazine in the well. All PSD personnel are issued sensitive/controlled items such as Personal Locator Beacons and/or PALLAS (Global Positioning System) devices and MBITR radio with battery. These items must be safeguarded and secured at all times.

2.5. **Principal:** Is the person you are protecting whether it is the Commanding General or his staff. PSD members should adapt themselves and the protection they provide to the convenience of the Principal as much as possible. They should make every effort to avoid interference with his official functions. His privacy must always be respected and every effort must be made not to embarrass him, call undue attention to him, or interfere with his activities. Adjustments to security operations that accommodate the Principal's wishes, should not compromise his safety and/or security. The PSO is responsible for ensuring the Principal, as well as his staff is fully briefed on both the responsibilities of the PSD and how the close working relationship between all participants significantly contributes to the overall smooth execution of a PSD mission.

2.6. **Officer in Charge, Protective Services Detail:** The OIC is responsible for personal security of the CG, his staff, and any other high risk personnel as designated by the CG. The OIC will conduct strategic planning and oversight of the detail during the planning, coordination, and execution of all protective service operations throughout the USCENTCOM Area of Responsibility (AOR), and other worldwide locations. The OIC will supervise basic and advanced protective services training, weapons training; motorcade operations, route reconnaissance training, and other mission specific equipment training to ensure all personnel are ready to support mission requirements. The OIC will ensure that service-specific professional development of all joint personnel or attached to the detail are being accomplished. Currently the PSO and OIC are staffed as one duty position.

2.7. **Personal Security Officer:** The PSO is responsible for close-in security of the Principal. PSO will accompany the Principal during travel throughout Afghanistan. The PSO will travel in the right front seat of the Principal's vehicle.

a. **Back-up PSO**: In the event the PSO is TDY or otherwise absent from duty an alternate will be designated with input from the NCOIC and Shift Leader. This person may or may not be the Shift Leader. Assignment of a Back-up PSO is at the direction of the PSO/OIC.

2.8. **Non-commissioned Officer in Charge, Personal Security Detail:** The NCOIC, PSD-B is the supervisor that maintains maximum command and control of the PSD team for administration and evaluation purposes.

a. Responsibilities include:

1. Oversees Security Control Room Operations and the DA Form 1594.

2. Communicating with and notifying the Shift Leader and OIC of any deficiencies.

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3. Reviews the PSD SOP and make suggestions for updates to the OIC as TTP's changes.

4. Ensuring supervision/development/evaluation and counseling of all PSD members.

5. Oversees the maintenance and accountability of assigned/issued vehicles, weapons and technical equipment. (w/ NCO assistant)

6. Assists the PSO and Shift Leaders on the planning, coordination and execution of protective services operations.

7. Counsels all PSD team members as needed. (Initial/Monthly/etc.)

8. Oversees the training program of PSD personnel. (w/ Shift Leader)

9. Will conduct daily SIPR checks and ensure Shift Leaders are reviewing any updated intelligence.

10. Reviews the CG's daily schedule and ensure the Shift Leaders are up to date with any changes.

11. Oversees ammo and all other supply requests. (w/ NCO assistant)

12. Oversees the tracking, inventory and issuance of all equipment to the PSD personnel. (w/ NCO assistant)

13. Manages the tracking of Leave and Passes within the team and updates the PERSTAT.

14. Responsible for random inspections of living quarters.

15. Manages the PSD-B hand receipt and conducts sensitive item inventories. (w/ NCO assistant)

16. Manages and implements the process for any PSD-B related Work Orders.

17. Oversees the COMSEC program. (w/ NCO assistant)

18. Acts as the unit Information Management Officer.

19. Works closely with the BDOC as the PSD-B Force Protection Officer. (w/ NCO assistant)

20. Completes any other tasks deemed mission essential.

2.9. **Shift Leader (Operations NCO):** The PSD Shift Leader has Operational Control over motorcade movement throughout the day to day missions.

a. Responsibilities include:

1. Controlling the motorcade and PSD Teams (set up and personnel placement)

2. In some cases where there are limited resources, the PSO may also function as the Shift Leader.

3. Coordinates all movements of the security team and directs the Advance Team.

4. Reviews the Daily Schedule and Security Control Room Operations and works closely with the NCOIC.

5. Communicating with and notifying the OIC, NCOIC and PSO with any updates.

6. Makes suggestions to the OIC, NCOIC and PSO for changes in PSD TTP's.

7. Responsible for the daily supervision of PSD personnel.

8. Assists the OIC/PSO on planning, coordinating and executive protective services operations for the Principal.

9. Acts as a backup PSO if necessary.

10. Will conduct daily SIPR checks and provide briefings to all PSD personnel before all movements.

11. Responsible for allocation of vehicles and personnel for all ground movements.

12. Inventories and maintains supervision over all CG vehicles. (w/ NCO assistant)

13. Contacts K-9 for vehicle sweeps.

14. Responsible for a daily accountability of individually assigned sensitive items.

15. Works closely with the NCOIC to train incoming PSD team members.

16. Creates and modifies all work schedules as needed. (CG Watch, CR, etc.)

2.10. **Advance Team:** The primary mission of the advance team is to establish initial site security before the Principal's arrival to any location. The advance team will attempt to precede the Principal with sufficient time to set up security measures. Advance teams will be at a minimum of four PSD personnel, one to maintain a secure area at the building/location, one to meet the motorcade on arrival with the Principal, and two to expedite the motorcade through any entry control points at the drop location. The advance team will coordinate and execute on-site security arrangements. When the PSO arrives at each location with the Principal, an advance team member will meet him and provide information concerning local security arrangements and details of the visit to include, but not limited to, maps, floor plans, POC's, names of individuals involved, telephone numbers, emergency evacuation routes, hold rooms and safe rooms.

a. Responsibilities include:

1. Will conduct an advance on all locations being visited by the Principal except locations designated by the OIC.

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2. Required to be at the specified locations approximately one hour prior to the Principal's arrival. 30 minutes for Inner Green Zone movement. (OIC will determine if additional or less time is needed).

3. Establishes effective working relations with the location hosts.

4. Upon arrival, the advance team will meet the POC to ascertain if there are any last minute changes. The advance team will contact the Shift Leader (SL) and Security Control Room on updated information and secure the location until the Principal's arrival.

5. Upon arrival of the Principal, the Advance team will lead the Principal into the function area. One Advance person will remain with the motorcade to brief the Shift Leader on safe havens, route to function, restrooms, telephones, parking POCs evacuation plans and holding rooms.

6. Based upon the intelligence, threat and anticipated activities against the Principal, the SL will determine if the Advance team is required to remain in the area for the duration of the event.

7. Lead advance agent will receive or verify the following information for the site survey:

- Specific location(s) of the principal's visit
- Estimated duration of the event or function
- Motorcade arrival, staging and parking area
- Safe Havens
- Holding Room Location
- Emergency facilities, capabilities and telephone numbers (fire, police, hospitals and emergency medical services [EMS])
- Emergency signals (verbal or visual)

8. The Advance team will perform route reconnaissance and make the determination of the primary and secondary routes.

Advance site surveys on routes should include:

- Primary and alternate routes (minimum of one for each)
- Primary and alternate evacuation routes
- Established travel time on all routes
- Rush hour and traffic levels on all routes
- The route the Principal will use once at the location or event
- Construction schedules
- Choke points and danger areas (such as bridges, tunnels, culverts, shoulders, narrow winding streets, sewer covers, construction sites and detours)
- Medical facility locations and route

9. The Advance team will stay on site until they receive authorization from the SL to leave for the next location. At that time, the Advance team will depart to arrive at least one hour before the Principal's arrival at the next location. If time

constraints allow, the SL may release the Advance team early from the current location in order to have additional time to set up site security at the next location.

2.11. **Drivers:** As a general rule, drivers should not exit their vehicle until completion of the mission. This is to allow for a quick departure in the event of an emergency. Drivers will take all directions from the Truck Commander and/or Shift Leader. In the event of a motor vehicle accident, Drivers and TC's will follow all protocols and adhere to the Accident Card. (See Accident Card)

a. Responsibilities include:

1. The Drivers are required to inventory the emergency equipment (CLS bag, tow strap, emergency road kit etc.) against the inventory list, and ensure all items are present and are serviceable. They will identify any missing or inoperative items and bring them to the Shift Leader, NCOIC or PSO immediately for replacement.

2. Will conduct a daily PMCS before the first mission each day.

3. Must have knowledge of all primary and alternate motorcade routes.

4. Will prepare the vehicle for motorcade movement.

5. Ensure the vehicles are at a fuel level no lower than ¾ of a tank.

6. Ensure all windows are clean and free of dirt, streaks, dust, or debris before operation.

7. Ensure the floorboards, seats, and areas visible to the Principal are free of dirt, dust, or debris.

8. Will conduct a 360 degree walk around of the vehicle to ensure no suspicious/hazardous items were placed on or around the vehicle that would endanger the safety of vehicle operations.

9. Providing vehicle security while the motorcade is not in movement, depending on the security threat/situation.

10. Will maintain motorcade integrity while on the movement.

11. Will drive in a safe manner.

12. Will balance safety and aggressiveness when driving.

NOTE: Drivers and/or TC's can be held financially responsible for damage to vehicles caused by negligence and/or unsafe driving, and may be subject to UCMJ Punishment.

NOTE: Drivers and/or TC's that cause Injury and/or Death of any Civilians or Coalition Forces as a result of negligence/unsafe driving could be subject to ART-15 and/or referred to Courts Martial.

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2.12. **Team Members:** All other team members not currently assigned a position as described above will be considered Shooters.

a. Responsibilities include:

1. Assisting the OIC, PSO and NCOIC in planning, coordinating, supervising, and executing the protective service operations.

2. Conduct threat assessments and collect threat INTEL.

3. Assist in preparing security plans and site surveys at all locations to be visited.

4. Be the point of contact between any security element on the mission and relaying any information to the Shift Leader.

5. Provide security for the motorcade, routes, residence, hotels, and classified containers.

6. Provide close-in protection of the Principal, if directed by the Shift Leader.

Chapter 3

PROTECTIVE SERVICES FUNDMENTALS

3.1. **Assignment of Responsibilities:** Mission responsibilities must be clearly defined and each PSD member should be assigned a specified duty and responsibility for each phase of the protective service mission. Project Officers, Protocol Officers, and the Hosts of events where the Principal is to visit must be identified and their plans reviewed and discussed. Effective coordination and communication between all key individuals must be established to ensure complete mission success in the protection of our Principal and that he/she suffers no embarrassment and remains unharmed. These issues should be discussed with the OIC, Principal's Aide De Camp, or Chief of Staff as deemed appropriate.

3.2. **PSD Appearance and Attire:** The PSDs mission is to provide executive security protective services, as such is viewed as an elite duty that commands respect worldwide in military and civilian settings. Regardless of your position within the organization, your appearance and demeanor reflect directly on both the organization as a whole. We are representatives (ambassadors) of DCOS SA/CSTC-A, the US Armed Services and our Principal. We, and our organization, are judged on both our behavior and appearance. Personnel assigned or attached who conduct missions with PSD-B, should make every effort to excel in order to keep that image untarnished and unchallenged.

a. Grooming: Since the US Military is a uniform service where discipline is judged in part by the manner in which the individual appears in public, all personnel assigned or attached to the PSD will maintain a neat and well-groomed appearance. Everyone will ensure they adhere to their military service's dress and appearance standards. No faddish or extreme hairstyles are authorized. Due to our close contact with our Principal and their staff, we should blend in with them and their grooming style.

b. Dress Code: The primary dress code for all PSD members will be IAW their respective military services uniform (i.e. FRACUs, ABSG's, and Multicams). However it is important we blend in as much as possible with the Principles dress and appearance to lower his threat profile. Additionally, appropriate civilian attire is authorized to reduce the signature of the Principal.

a) PSD members will be in the duty uniform between the hours of 0830-2230 unless otherwise direct by the OIC/PSO, NCOIC or Shift Leader.

b) The PT uniform is authorized for wear during the duty day when conducting PT and/or moving to conduct PT, depending on mission requirements.

c. Professional and Military Bearing: With the premise that "actions speak louder than words," every PSD member, attached or assigned, will conduct themselves professionally while conducting business in the current AOR. Behavior is to be such that it does not bring embarrassment or shame on the United States, US Military, DCOS SA/CSTC-A, the Principal, or the individual PSD member.

d. Respect & Military Decorum: Due to the relaxed atmosphere that is so essential to the conduct of our mission, open interaction between high ranking officers/civilians while operating in the AOR is inevitable while conducting missions. Every member assigned or attached to PSD-B is to be mindful at all times that they are members of the US Military and

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must abide by all military customs and courtesies. **Remember:** ***First impressions are lasting.***

3.3. **Drug/ Alcohol Consumption:** PSD members of DCOS SA/CSTC-A are NOT authorized the consumption of alcoholic beverages. All positive urinalysis results **WILL BE** referred for ART-15 or Courts Martial. Abuse of any other substance (OTC medication, compressed air duster, etc.) will result in severe ART-15 and possible Courts Martial.

NOTE: Any violation or possible violation of this section will result in the immediate suspension of duty from PSD-B pending results of an official investigation.

3.4. **Physical Security:** To enhance the physical security of personnel and property (equipment and weapons).

a. Procedures:

1. Office/Building Security:

a) All personnel should assist the Macedonian force in greeting and screening visitors when possible. All visitors, to include the contract cleaning team, must be escorted to prevent pilferage and gathering intelligence in regards to paperwork and equipment within the office area. Classified documents will be removed from any area and properly secured prior to a visitor entering the area.

b) The building entrances will remain locked at all times when unoccupied. All entrances will be equipped with an operational cipher/key lock.

2. Equipment Security: Equipment will be secured at all times.

a) No sensitive items (PLB, PALLACE device, MBITR, DAGR, weapon and ammunition) will remain in vehicles overnight or left unattended in an open view vehicle.

b) Assigned weapons will not be left unattended in vehicles or rooms (unless it is locked behind 2 doors.)

c) Weapons may be placed in the Security Control Room for security and accountability if not carried by the PSD member. All PSD members will have assigned lockers for equipment.

d) Only weapons assigned to PSD-B and other authorized weapons will be secured in the weapons storage area of the SCR. (M249 and M240 machine guns are authorized to be secured in the weapons storage area)

3. Weapons Security:

c) It is of paramount importance that PSD members exercise due care over safeguarding their weapons/munitions and be particularly alert to any situation which may result in the loss or theft of that weapon. It goes without saying that a lost or stolen weapon not only poses a public safety

hazard, but can potentially end a PSD members assignment if found negligent in its loss or theft.

d) The following guidance is provided to minimize the risk of loss or theft of a weapon.

1) Temporarily securing the weapon inside your vehicle as long as it is being secured by another PSD member. This procedure may be necessary for instances when entering the US Embassy or Embassy Annex.

2) Placing the weapon in the temporary custody of Marine guards or the Regional Security Office at the American Embassy or consulate.

3) Securing the weapon inside a locked pelican-case left inside your room when the room is locked and unattended. In such instances the pelican-cases should be checked often as opposed to leaving the weapon in the case for several days without checking to ensure it is still there. The case itself should be placed out of plain view. Consideration should also be given to securing the case to a fixed object in the room by using hand irons if available.

4) Securing the weapon inside the Security Control Room for up to *two hours*.

5) Weapons will not be left unattended in a "soft sided" suitcase, garment bag, or in a drawer in your rooms.

NOTE: The foregoing list is not all inclusive. It is intended to provide you with some alternatives in having your weapon reasonably secured when it is not feasible to have that weapon physically under your control.

3.5 **Controlling Information:** Release of personal information pertaining to the Principal and other members of his party, details of the itinerary, and the security procedures to be employed is closely controlled. Security personnel are prohibited from discussing or releasing any of this information with anyone other than authorized personnel. Security personnel will refer all press personnel to the Public Affairs Office (PAO). Release of any information to other than authorized person can adversely affect the integrity of the security mission. According to AR 525-13/Antiterrorism Force Protection, the itinerary of an HRP (to include general officers or civilian equivalents) will be marked, at a minimum, "FOR OFFICIAL USE ONLY. Such itineraries may be upgraded when warranted by the threat and authorized by the appropriate classification authority guidelines. Security classification should be assigned to extremely detailed itineraries (those that include exact dates, times, and locations), which would be of substantial value to threat entities planning an attack.

3.6. **Use of Force:** Any defensive actions taken by PSD members are undertaken for protective reasons or in self-defense, rather than for law enforcement. In making this determination, one should consider if the subject constitutes a present or a continuing threat to the Principal and the unlawful act is considered a threat. If it is determined that sufficient threat exists (requiring action by PSD members), the PSD member must show that the action taken was necessary and under an emergency situation. It must also show that the restraint used was minimal and only to the extent necessary to hinder the attacker from continuing. (See DCOS SA/CSTC-A Rules of Engagement Card)

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3.7. **Being Flexible:** The fact that there may be unexpected changes to the itinerary requires that flexibility be the keynote factor in planning a PSD mission. Alternate and contingency plans should be prepared to cover such circumstances such as inclement weather, possible threats, or any other actions that may affect the security of the Principal. Good preventative measures and thorough backup plans can save the life of the Principal as well as the PSD team.

Chapter 4

SECURITY CONTROL ROOM

4.1. **Security Control Room (SCR):** SCR (commonly referred to as WOLFPACK DEN) will be established as the base of operations for all matters involving security for a PSD mission and will track the Principles movement while he is away from the installation. The SCR will be manned 24 hours a day. Communications, security operations, and logistics will all be centrally located within this SCR.

4.2. **Organization and Responsibilities:** The organization and overall supervision of the SCR, located on HQ ISAF will be supervised by the NCOIC, PSD-B. Overall final say will be made by the OIC for any unresolved issues.

a. The SCR is the command and control center for the security responsible for the protection of Commanding General of DCOS SA/CSTC-A and all personnel assigned to that Principal.

b. The SCR will be manned 24 hours a day on a rotational basis and only PSD-B personnel are allowed unescorted entry. It will be considered the monitoring point for security communications systems.

c. The SCR personnel will be tasked with numerous duties. Each task will contribute to the safety and welfare of the Principal. Security personnel will not be assigned any additional duties when in the performance of the control duties.

d. The SCR is a place of business and may be visited by senior leadership to include representatives of the United States or host nation governments. It must be maintained in a high state of cleanliness and order and never present a cluttered or unkempt appearance.

e. The SCR is not a recreation room for "off duty" security personnel, nor a lounge for the staff of the Principal. It is the responsibility of the controller to ensure that only essential personnel are in the control room.

f. The SCR will be located in the container below the CG's office area. Therefore, noise and excessive incoming and outgoing traffic must be kept to a minimum. The volume level of communications systems in use will be turned only loud enough to allow the controller to monitor transmissions. All conversations will be in moderate tones at all times. Any and all commercial radios, televisions, or other entertainment systems will be operated in a manner that will NOT disrupt anyone to include the on duty controller.

g. Smoking in the SCR is prohibited. The OIC and the NCOIC may establish guidelines to provide relief for a break for the on duty security member.

h. If the on duty security controller cannot be relieved for meals, they will be permitted to take meals in the control room provided all litter is removed at the end of shift.

i. Additional special weapons (MP-5), ammunition, and supplies for such will be stored in the SCR. Only security personnel who have qualified or familiarized with these weapons within 12 months preceding this mission are authorized access to these special weapons.

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j. SCR is a 24 hour shift starting at 0800-0800hours.

k. Sleeping is not authorized while on duty.

l. Controller WILL monitor radio/BFT/SIPR traffic while any PSD element is on mission. Movies, video games and personal use of any computer ARE NOT AUTHORIZED while any PSD-B element is on mission.

m. The television is authorized to be on the NEWS channel only while any PSD-B element is on mission. This is to allow the SCR to update the Shift Leader of any situation which would cause an increased security posture.

4.3. **Telephones:** The SCR is equipped with a VOIP and SVOIP system with DSN access. The use of these landlines must be kept at a minimum. All incoming phone calls will be noted in the DA FM 1594.

4.4. **Radio Communications:** The SCR is equipped with a MBITR radio system and is encrypted. The controller is responsible for operating and monitoring the base station radio system. During missions the radio will ALWAYS be on channel PSD-1. During hours on base the radio will normally be on the BDOC channel. In the event of a simultaneous CG and CSM move, two radios should be utilized and the other radio will be on channel PSD-2.

4.5. **Duty Journal:** The duty journal (DA Form 1594) is a formal record and is in chronological order indicating all significant activities and incidents which impact the PSD team or the safety and well being of the Principal. All information pertaining to the protective services mission will be recorded in the journal as it occurs. At the end of each shift the outgoing PSD member will print and sign the duty journal. Past duty journals will be kept in a file for future reference.

a. At a *minimum*, the following will be entered into the duty journal (see attachment 1):

1. Changes of relief in the security control room.
2. Arrivals and departures of all PSD team motorcade movements.
3. Failure of equipment, to include telephones, computers and vehicles.
4. Accountability of all PSD-B assigned weapons/other weapons.
5. Completion of cleaning tasks.
6. Functions check of the BFT and radio sets.
7. Checks for changes to the CG's daily calendar and notification to OIC/NCOIC.
8. The short term (2 hours or less) safeguarding of weapons from other PSD-B team members.
9. Incoming phone calls. (Control Cell, DSN and SVoIP)
10. Sensitive item checks called in while any PSD element is on mission.

11. Changes in Route Status.
12. Opening and closing of the VIP Gate drop arm.

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Chapter 5

MOTORCADE OPERATIONS

5.1. **Motorcade Movement Procedures:** Motorcade movements that are obtrusive and overly aggressive in nature present a negative perception of US Forces on foreign soil. All motorcade operations will be unobtrusive to pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Screens, Counterflow movements, and blocks will be executed only where the possibility of a threat is present or during an emergency evacuation of the Principal. It is important that all drivers and members of the PSD understand that we are operating in a foreign land therefore we should respect all traffic laws and customs, pedestrians, and other motorists on the road. As long as the motorcade continues to move in a smooth and orderly fashion, the motorcade will be a hard target to hit by a possible suicide bomber, IED, or any other type of attack. Vehicles that move smoothly as a synchronized unit become faster and faster the longer they work together. Motorcade maneuvers should be smooth so as not to draw attention from the public.

a. The following movement procedures will be used for a three vehicle motorcade:

1. **Entering a Traffic Circle:** When entering a traffic circle with a three vehicle motorcade, the lead vehicle should wait for an opening in the traffic flow that would accommodate all three vehicles. When the opening is available the lead vehicle should move cautiously towards the opening from the outside of the circle moving towards the center. The limo will follow the lead vehicle with a slight off-set to the right side as a precaution until the chase vehicle is able to secure the left lane. The chase vehicle will provide a modified screen to the inside of the limo to gain possession of lane to the immediate left of the limo. The screen will not cause the rest of the traffic to stop but it will simply change lanes in order to provide safe passage to the limo into the inner lane.

2. **Movement within a Traffic Circle:** Once the entire motorcade is inside the traffic circle, the lead vehicle will continue to follow the path of less resistance in order to keep the motorcade moving with the flow of traffic. The limo should maintain a slight off-set to the left of the lead vehicle. The chase vehicle should maintain the same lane that the lead vehicle is driving in and will provide modified screens when another vehicle is driving aggressively or recklessly. If traffic congestion causes the motorcade to stop, the lead and chase vehicles will provide a 'bubble' around the limo by creating enough space between traffic ahead and behind the motorcade.

3. **Exiting a Traffic Circle:** In most instances the lead vehicle will be the first vehicle to exit a circle. The lead vehicle will survey the traffic flow and will choose the path of less resistance so as to not interfere with the normal flow of traffic. The limo will drive with a slight off-set to the left of the lead vehicle as a precaution to not create a traffic accident. The chase vehicle will travel on the same lane as the lead vehicle and will provide modified screens as needed.

4. **Passing Vehicles:** When a motorist is driving slowly on the road, the motorcade should pass the vehicle as soon as it is safe to do so. If there is no room ahead of the slow moving vehicle, the motorcade should maintain a safe distance behind the vehicle and wait for the appropriate time and location to pass. The lead vehicle

should ensure that there is enough space in front of the slow moving vehicle for the whole motorcade before attempting to pass. Acceleration while passing a slow moving vehicle should not be erratic and should not cause the vehicle to slow down or move off the road.

5. **Vehicles Passing the Motorcade:** Motorists wishing to pass the motorcade should be allowed to pass as long as there is room available without causing an accident for either the motorcade or the passing vehicle. When a vehicle is attempting to pass the motorcade ensure an appropriate side off-set is made from the limo. There should always be at least one lane distance between the limo and the passing vehicle if roads allow. The lead and chase vehicle will maintain surveillance on the limo of the motorcade at all times. This will allow sufficient time to identify any deliberate movements towards the limo and will allow the chase or the lead vehicle to initiate counter action.

b. **Two Vehicle Motorcade:** Within the Kabul AOR, screens in a two vehicle motorcade will be identical to the three vehicle motorcade minus the assistance of the lead vehicle. All motorcade operations will be unobtrusive to pedestrian or vehicular traffic. Screens and blocks will be executed at every instance where the possibility of a threat is present, yet these maneuvers will be executed as unobtrusively as possible, as not to present an overly aggressive posture. Main focus of the movement is to maintain a smooth and constant speed of travel so that the motorcade blends in with the flow of traffic.

1. **Entering Traffic Circles:** In most cases the limo will be the first vehicle to enter the circle. The limo will survey the traffic flow and will choose the path of less resistance so as to not interfere with the normal flow of traffic. The chase vehicle will ease into the flow of traffic, left of the limo, to provide a clear lane for the limo to take. Once the chase vehicle has provided a free and clear lane, the limo will then move into that lane and both vehicles will continues to move with the flow of traffic. The chase vehicle will provide modified screens as needed so that other vehicular traffic does not crash into the limo. The preferred lane of travel for the limo should be the inner most lane closest to the inner circle. The chase vehicle will drive with a slight offset to the right of the limo. If the inner most lanes are not available, the immotorcade should travel along the outermost lane of the traffic circle with the chase vehicle providing screens on both sides as needed. All movements should be executed as unobtrusive as possible keeping in mind that other motorists have the right of way.

2. **Exiting Traffic Circles:** In most cases the limo will be the first vehicle exiting the traffic circle. The chase vehicle will provide a lane to the right of the limo to take when approaching towards the exit. The limo will not move into the lane to the right until the chase clears the lane for them. At the exit point, the chase will provide a rolling screen to allow the limo to exit the circle first. All movements should be executed as unobtrusive as possible keeping in mind that other motorists have the right of way.

3. **Passing Vehicles:** Refer to the same paragraph above in the three vehicle motorcade.

4. **Vehicles Passing the Motorcade:** Refer to the same paragraph above in the three vehicle motorcade.

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5.2 **Actions Upon Down Vehicle**: The following guidance will be adhered to in the event of a down vehicle (i.e. Disabled vehicle do to minor accident, major accident, ambush, IED attack, VBIED attack, SVIED attack, or any other circumstance where a vehicle is no long operational)

a. Notify the Security Control Room and relay the following information:

1. Situation (i.e. stuck vehicle, ambush, IED, etc.)

2. Location of incident

3. Injuries (type, if any)

b. SCR will:

1. Contact BDOC and TF SECFOR and relay information received from the team at the incident.

2. Inform BDOC of any efforts being conducted by our teams(s) (i.e. QRF Team dispatched)

3. Provide contact numbers to BDOC for the down team and QRF Team

c. It will be mandatory for the Shift Leader and/or QRF Team involved in the incident to keep the Security Control Room constantly updated.

d. Personnel will be cross loaded into operational vehicles. The QRF Team will evacuate the Principal and continue the primary mission, or stay with the downed vehicle, depending on the situation.

5.3 **Actions Upon Complex Attack:** In the event of a complex attack involving multiple PSD-B vehicles becoming inoperable. PSD-B members will:

a. Dismount from the vehicles.

1. Instruct all passengers to do the same.

b. Return fire.

1. Instruct all passengers to do the same.

c. Secure the nearest hard structure in the 3 o'clock direction on the limo, *situation dependant* (use tactical common sense).

1. Assist wounded personnel.

d. Secure and maintain Principal and all passengers until evacuated

1. Account for all personnel.

e. Maintain 360 degree security until evacuated.

1. Instruct all passengers to do the same.

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Chapter 6

FORMATIONS (DISMOUNTED)

6.1. **Diamond:** If the principal wishes to dismount a vehicle outside the perimeter of an American or Coalition military encampment, a diamond formation shall be utilized. Refer to Field Manual 3-19.12, Chapter 7, for detailed information.

6.2. **Modified Diamond:** If the principal wishes to dismount a vehicle within the perimeter of an Afghan controlled police station, military base, or government compound, a modified diamond formation will be utilized. A modified diamond formation will be comprised of three PSD members. The PSO will be within two arms reach of the Principal, one PSD member leading the Principal approximately 5 meters in front, and another PSD member approximately 5 meters behind the Principal.

6.3. **No Formation:** When the Principal is inside an American or Coalition compound such as the US Embassy, NKC, NKIA or ISAF he will have the PSO within eyesight but will not walk with any PSD members. The PSO will be notified by the advance members where the nearest bunker or safe haven is found and will have an emergency plan in case there is a fire, accident, or any other hazardous situations.

Chapter 7

HQ ISAF EVAC/CG DEFENSE PLAN

7.1. **Attack on HQ ISAF:** In the event that HQ ISAF is attacked by unfriendly forces, the PSO will find the Principal and will lead him/her to the nearest bunker or safe house. It is of upmost importance that the PSO knows where the Principal is located at all times. Once the Principal has been taken to a safe haven the PSO will immediately contact the Security Control Room and provide their location and status. Once it is safe to leave the bunker or safe house, the PSO will transport the Principal to wherever he/she wishes to go to.

a. During normal duty hours (0700-2200):
   1. PSD members will "gear up" and go to the SCR.
   2. The first PSD member arriving at the SCR will be dispatched by the SCR to go to the CG and relieve the CG Watch. This individual will act as the Back Up PSO until the PSO arrives. This person will also notify the SCR of the exact location of the CG.
   3. Main Body and QRF drivers will secure their vehicles and move them to a location closest to the CG.
   4. All other PSD members will establish a 360 degree perimeter around the CG's location. Both 10 meter and 25 rings of security will be established.

b. During non-duty hours (2200-0700)
   1. PSD members will "gear up" and go to the SCR.
   2. The first PSD member arriving at the SCR will move to the CG's quarters and notify the SCR.
   3. Main Body and QRF drivers will secure their vehicles and move them to a location closest to the CG.
   4. All other PSD members will establish a 360 degree perimeter around the CG. Both 10 meter and 25 rings of security will be established.

7.2. **Security Control Room:** In the event of an attack, the control room will be the central point of all operations for the PSD. The PSO will contact the control room and provide their location and status of the Principal. All PSD personnel will be recalled to report to the control room with their PPE and weapon. Personnel accountability will be conducted to ensure 100% accountability and this information will be relayed to the Joint Operations Center. PSD personnel will be sent to secure the Principals office building and PSD personnel will be sent to secure the motorcade vehicles in preparation for any movements. All information will be relayed to the NCOIC and to the OIC when tasked are accomplished.

7.3. **Medical Evacuation:** In case of a medical emergency the Principal shall be taken to the Role 1 medic station on HQ ISAF for evaluation. The medical personnel will make further determination if the Principal needs to be transported to a medical treatment facility. If ground transportation is needed, the PSD team will provide transportation to the medical facility. If air transportation is needed, coordinate with Commanders Action group (CAG) for air transportation.

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Chapter 8

AFTER ACTION REVIEW

9.1. An After Action Review (AAR) will be conducted after *EVERY* mission involving any PSD-B element. As a general rule the AAR will be conducted verbally and the Shift Leader will lead the session. *All PSD members should give input and no PSD member will be chastised for their opinion.* Remember to be polite and professional. Every PSD member has useful tools and information that can improve the Team as a whole.

a. At a minimum, the following will be included in the AAR:

1. Sustainment's to the mission.

2. Improvements to the mission.

3. Unsafe acts/safety violations during the mission.

4. Actions to rectify any unsafe acts/safety violations.

NOTE: AAR's will be considered a verbal counseling. Any and all guidance provided by the Shift Leader/PSO/NCOIC during an AAR will be followed accordingly.

Conclusion

This SOP is meant to be a guideline for PSD-B actions and activities. This SOP is subject to change at any time. Updates will be published as needed.

Failure to adhere to this SOP will result in, at a minimum, verbal and/or written counseling. ART-15 may also be used if repeated violations of this SOP occur. PSD-B members facing ART-15 and/or other UCMJ action will be suspended from PSD duty and will be reassigned within DCOS SA/CSTC-A at the discretion of the Commander, DCOS SA/CSTC-A.

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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Attachment 1

SECURITY CONTROL ROOM LOG EXAMPLE

DAILY STAFF JOURNAL OR DUTY OFFICER'S LOG

For use of this form, see AR 220-45; the proponent agency is Office of The Deputy Chief of Staff for Operations & Plans

PAGE NO. 1 | NO. OF PAGES 1

ORGANIZATION OR INSTALLATION: CNTC-A/ PSD-B

LOCATION: Viet House, Camp Eggers Afghanistan

PERIOD COVERED — FROM: HOUR 0600, DATE 27Feb2011 — TO: HOUR 1800, DATE 27Feb2011

ITEM NO.	TIME IN	TIME OUT	INCIDENTS, MESSAGES, ORDERS, ETC.	ACTION TAKEN	INIT.
1	0600		Sfgt SNUFFY relieved Sfgt SNUFFY of duty as controller. All equipment was accounted for with no discrepancies.	Logged	RAS
2		0800	Sfgt ADAM departed Camp Eggers to BAF	Logged	RAS
3		0810	Sfgt ADAM arrived at BAF	Logged	RAS
4		0900	Sfgt ADAM departed BAF to Camp Eggers	Logged	RAS
5	0910		Sfgt ADAM returned to Camp Eggers	Logged	RAS
6	1130	1135	Sfgt SNUFFY went to chow. Sfgt ROGERS watches control room	Logged	RAS
7		1755	Sfgt JAMES relieved Sfgt SNUFFY of duty as controller. All equipment was accounted for with no discrepancies	Logged	RAS

TYPED NAME AND GRADE OF OFFICER OR OFFICER ON DUTY: Sfgt SNUFFY, ROBERTS

SIGNATURE: [signature]

DA FORM 1594, NOV 1982 — PREVIOUS EDITION OF THIS FORM IS OBSOLETE. — APD PE v3.00ES

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
TRANSATLANTIC AFGHANISTAN DISTRICT
U.S. ARMY CORPS OF ENGINEERS
KABUL AREA OFFICE – CAMP PHOENIX
APO AE 09320

August 22, 2013

CETAA-KAO

MEMORANDUM FOR RECORD

SUBJECT: Uniform Wear for Site Visits on ANA Afghanistan National Defense University (ANDU)

1. Per guidance from the Transatlantic Afghanistan District Commander, (b)(3), (b)(6), on 21 August 2013, the Kabul Area Office will be allowed a variation for uniform requirements while at ANA Afghanistan National Defense University (ANDU). These uniform requirements may adjust depending upon the current enemy threat.

2. Therefore, unless the threat level changes, USACE civilians and military personnel executing missions or site visits to projects located on ANA ANDU are only required to wear their standard ACU, DCU or Multi-cam uniform with appropriate eye protection. There is no requirement to wear body armor, Kevlar, or other associated Personal Protective Equipment. Once on the actual project site, USACE personnel will wear either a USACE Hard Hat or Kevlar helmet.

3. When traveling or visiting USACE projects located outside of the ANA ANDU perimeter, USACE personnel will wear all of their Personal Protective Equipment (i.e. Body Armor, Kevlar, etc).

4. POC for this memorandum is the undersigned at phone: (b)(6) or email: (b)(3), (b)(6)

(b)(3), (b)(6)

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MISSION BRIEF

NTM-A
NATO Training Mission AFGHANISTAN



SITUATION

NTM-A
NATO Training Mission AFGHANISTAN

1. **Situation: Mission #CG-082**

   A. Enemy Forces

1) **The greater Kabul area consists of densely structured urban areas with narrow streets and a large pedestrian population.**

2) **The overall threat level in Kabul is Significant. The most likely enemy COA for contact is small arms fire/PBIED/VBIED or a complex attack of all three. SIGACTS in RC-Capitol in the last 24 hours: (b)(3), (b)(6) will brief SIGACTS.**

   B. Friendly Forces in the AO

   1) NKC/QRF

   2) Bala Hissar/QRF

   3) Attachments: (b)(6)

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Pages 2 through 18 redacted for the following reasons:
- -
Tab C, Exhibit P - (b)(1)1.4a, (b)(1)1.4b - DEFER TO NATO

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PLACEHOLDER FOR TAB C

EXHIBITS Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z

WITHHELD PER (b)(1)1.4b

– DEFER TO NATO

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